On 10/1/2026 4:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 29/09/2026 18:48, olcott wrote:
On 9/29/2026 4:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 28/09/2026 15:10, olcott wrote:
On 9/28/2026 4:31 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 27/09/2026 05:59, olcott wrote:
On 9/24/2026 6:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 23/09/2026 16:39, olcott wrote:
On 9/23/2026 4:45 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 22/09/2026 18:01, olcott wrote:
Provability in PA requires a sequence of syntactic
inference steps that remain totally in PA and do not
leap outside of PA into any model of arithmetic.
That is not specific to PA. That is what formal provability means >>>>>>>>>> for every formal theory.
If that was true then everyone would understand that
Wittgenstein is correct and G||del is wrong.
That is clearly false. The meaning of the word "provability" (or >>>>>>>> amy
word) has no consequences beyond meanings of words.
The rest of the quoted message and my response to it are irrelevant >>>>>>>> to my comment above.
-a-a-a 'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
-a-a-a proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
-a-a-a system' means: the opposite has been proved in
-a-a-a Russell's system.
https://www.liarparadox.org/Wittgenstein.pdf
With that defimition the words "true" and "false" lose a part of >>>>>>>> their
useful meanings. In order to say "proved in Russell's system" >>>>>>>> one can
say "proved in Russell's system". A statement proved in Russell's >>>>>>>> system can also be called a "theorem of Russell's system".
G||del's result is only achieved by going outside of Peano
Arithmetic into the standard model of Arithmetic.
No, it is only necessary to go to some system where the results >>>>>>>> make
sense. G||del's most important results are not about numbers but >>>>>>>> about
formal theories. A map of Italy does not help if you have problems >>>>>>>> with finding your way in Tokyo.
Proof Theoretic Semantics does this differently:
-a-a-a What is the appropriate notion of truth for sentences >>>>>>>>> -a-a-a whose meanings are understood in epistemic terms
-a-a-a such as proof or ground for an assertion? It seems
-a-a-a that the truth of such sentences has to be identified >>>>>>>>> -a-a-a with the existence of proofs or grounds.
Truth as an Epistemic Notion --- Dag Prawitz (2011)
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11245-011-9107-6
Truth theoretic semantics is not the kind of semantics we
usually want.
Many useful things can be done with no semantics at all.
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language" is
reliably computable for the entire body of general knowledge.
There is no coherent sense of "incompleteness" or undecidability >>>>>>> within such a system.
Forst of all, that is a change of topic, apparently in order to make >>>>>> people to forget what you said earlier. WHich is in fact a good idea, >>>>>> there is no need to remember your errors. But it is useful to
remember
that most of what you say is erroneous.
Whether "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language" is
computable depends on a language. For an uninterpreted formal
language nothing in the language is true, so the computation is
trivial.
The body of general knowledge expressed in formalized English
can be formalized in CycL. That "cats are animals" is one
example of "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
An ordinary dictionary like https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/cat can
tell that cats are animals. If you want to get anybody interested
you need more impressive examples.
Just that one example refutes Quine's
Two Dogmas of Empiricism
https://www.ditext.com/quine/quine.html
Quine's "Two Dogams of Empiricism" is an example of what most
people consider uninteresting.
Math and logic people don't care about this because they
take alternative foundations as inherently incorrect.
Most philosophers take Quine ideas to be an established
verified fact, thus shutting off making
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
reliably computable before it has a chance to begin.
Anyway, "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language" does
not cover the truths we usually need to know. An example is the
whether tomorrow: it is not computable. A prediction can be computed >>>>>> but sometimes the truth is different.
The scope of the body of general knowledge that is
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
Tomorrow's weather is outside of this scope.
And so are most of the things that people might want to find out.
The best that any system of knowledge can possibly
provide is elements of the body of knowledge. Requiring
psychic ability is a bad requirement.
Most people care about real world knowledge, which tends to be
uncertain but is often useful anyway.
I am not sure what you mean when we limit the
scope to the body of general knowledge. Unknowns
are definitely excluded.
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