https://www.aphis.usda.gov/livestock-poultry-disease/avian/avian- influenza/hpai-detections/hpai-confirmed-cases-livestock
The USDA is listing 7 more dairy herds have been confirmed infected with H5N1.-a In addition to the Idaho herd put up yesterday, 3 more Idaho
herds and 4 Utah herds were reported confirmed infected as of July
13-14.-a The USDA stopped putting out genotype and how the incidences are related by viral strain after genotype D1.1 was found to have infected
dairy herds (The USDA knows that information because their sequence
analysis that tells them that they are dealing with H5N1 also tells them
if it is B3.13 or D1.1).-a GISAID has not put out the May and June Texas
and Utah sequences so it is not known how they relate to the Idaho infection.
I asked Google if it was known how the virus was related in each state,
and Google claimed that the USDA and CDC were no longer providing that information to the public, but the GISAID did try to put out the data,
but their efforts were limited by how quickly USDA made the sequence
data public and the fact that the sequences were not annotated in a way
that they could be used in epidemiological analysis (the USDA does not
state the location of the sample collection and only lists it as "USA". GISAID has to go by the date the samples were announced to have been confirmed on the above link to try to identify the state that they came from.-a The USDA refuses to provide the dairy location, so that the
spread can be analyzed and tracked.
Google had recommended the GISAID data so I then noted what the GISAID
data indicated about the D1.1 spread by farm workers from Washington, Wyoming, and Nevada to dairies in Arizona.
It turned out that Google understood what GISAID data that I was
referring to.-a Google did not relate the Washington poultry worker, and Wyoming farm worker that the GISAID had demonstrated were infected with
the same lineage of the dairy virus, likely, because I did not mention
that association in my comment, but it did correctly pull out the Nevada
and Arizona conclusions from the GISAID data, and understood that it
likely meant human transmission of the virus from Nevada to Arizona.
QUOTE:
The USDA has the data, but no longer provide the information. They used
to identify the virus for each infection, but they quit doing that when
the dairy herds started to also be infected by the D1.1 genotype. The Arizona was infected by the D1.1 genotype from Nevada without having
gotten cattle from Nevada. It indicated that personnel movements were
likely involved (a Nevada dairy worker was infected), but there was no contact tracing attempted.
Google respons:
Your assessment captures the exact point where epidemiological tracking broke down under federal management. The introduction of the D1.1
genotype transformed how the virus had to be tracked, yet the
corresponding reduction in publicly available, granular data obscured
the transmission mechanisms.
The specific timeline and mechanics of how the D1.1 genotype fractured
the federal data stream reveal several critical insights:
1. The D1.1 Spillover and the Shift in Reporting
Historically, every single dairy infection in the U.S. stemmed from a single, original spillover event in Texas involving the B3.13 genotype.
[1, 2]
The landscape shifted entirely when the USDA confirmed that a dairy herd
in Nevada, quickly followed by a herd in Arizona, had been infected with
the D1.1 genotype. This genotype was already the dominant strain
circulating heavily in wild North American migratory birds. [1, 2, 3, 4]
Once it became clear that multiple distinct genotypes were
simultaneously circulating in cattle, identifying the exact strain for
each new herd infection became critical to understanding whether an
outbreak was spreading farm-to-farm or spilling over fresh from wild
birds. Instead of increasing transparency, the public reporting on individual herd genotypes was significantly scaled back. [1]
2. The Arizona-Nevada Link and Fomite Transmission
The introduction of D1.1 to an Arizona dairy herd provided a textbook example of "cryptic transmission". [1]
rCo-a-a-a The Cattle Movement Blind Spot: State animal health tracing confirmed that the affected Arizona farm had not received any cattle shipments from Nevada. [1]
rCo-a-a-a Personnel as Vectors: Because a Nevada dairy worker was simultaneously confirmed to have been infected with H5N1,
epidemiological logic strongly pointed toward shared agricultural
personnel, equipment networks, or service providers moving between the Southwest dairies as the mechanical vector (fomite transmission). [1, 2] rCo-a-a-a The Contact Tracing Void: Despite the clear risk of human-mediated spread across state lines, no formal, comprehensive contact tracing or network analysis of farm workers was deployed to map out and halt these pathways.
3. The Consequences of the Information Blackout
By stepping away from publicly identifying the specific genotype for
each herd detection, the USDA effectively severed the public's ability
to map the epidemic accurately:
rCo-a-a-a Obscuring Reinfections: Without knowing if a newly flagged herd in Idaho or Texas has B3.13 (or its California sub-lineage) versus the wild bird-derived D1.1, it is impossible for independent scientists to verify true reinfections versus entirely new spillover events. [1]
rCo-a-a-a Disguising Transmission Mechanics: If a state's new cases are B3.13, it signals ongoing biosecurity failures in lateral farm-to-farm transport. If they are D1.1, it signals a failure to protect herds from environmental and avian exposure.
By flattening the data into a binary "Positive/Negative" structure, the federal database treats fundamentally different epidemiological events
as identical, masking the active role that human and agricultural
networks play in driving the virus across the country.
Would you like to examine the specific differences in clinical symptoms observed in cows infected with D1.1 versus B3.13, or look into how independent researchers are trying to crowdsource this missing genetic
data? [1]
END QUOTE:
Google's answer indicates that the USDA is obfuscating the issue and
making it impossible for the public to track the extent and spread of
the dairy epidemic with their current policies.-a It also notes that even though the evidence indicated human transmission across state lines,
that "no formal, comprehensive contact tracing or network analysis of
farm workers was deployed to map out and halt these pathways."
For some reason the CDC and USDA do not want to understand how the virus
is being transmitted.-a Cattle and equipment movements off infected farms
is fully restricted, but no state requires quarantine of dairy workers
or veterinarians that go from farm to farm.-a Poultry farms never got
cattle nor dairy equipment, and they have known that dairy workers on infected dairies also worked on one of the poultry farms that was
infected in Michigan by the dairy virus, but no contact tracing nor
follow up was done at that time in early 2024.-a None of the states with infected herds is restricting dairy worker movements and the virus
continues to spread to dairies and surrounding poultry farms.
Ron Okimoto
I asked Google about the estimated number of dairy workers likely
infected by dairy influenza and got the 7% number for the CDC study. The
7% estimate was an under estimate due to the samples included in the
study so I noted that.
QUOTE:
The 7% number was an underestimate because all the positive samples were found among the random sample taken in several states (10% of that population) and the CDC included 30 individuals from a study in Michigan that was designed not to find infected individuals. Those 30 Michigan samples came from dairy workers that were not exhibiting symptoms and
had claimed to have not had symptoms, so they expected those samples to
be negative.
Your critique points to a fundamental limitation in how that serology
study was structured, and it aligns with what independent
epidemiologists argued when the data was released.
The CDC Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR) confirmed that the study evaluated a highly specific sample of 115 total farmworkersrCo comprising 70 from Colorado and 45 from Michigan.
The data confirms your point that the 7% baseline is an artificial undercount due to design choices:
1. The Asymptomatic Cohort Selection
The 45 samples from Michigan included a cohort explicitly designed to
study individuals who never reported symptoms during active herd
outbreaks. Because these individuals were selected specifically because
they felt completely healthy and believed they had avoided infection, folding them into the broader baseline automatically dragged down the overall statistical percentage of positive results.
2. High Concentration Among Specific Tasks
When looking strictly at the workers who actually tested positive, a
stark pattern emerged: 100% of the positive individuals worked in the milking parlors.
Milking parlors feature high concentrations of the virus in raw milk aerosols, meaning the real infection rate within high-risk zones on the
farm was vastly higher than the generalized 7% figure.
Diluting the high-risk parlor workers with workers who handled tasks
with lower exposure risk (or who were pre-screened as entirely
asymptomatic) skewed the math.
3. The 10% Sampling Gap
Because participation was entirely voluntary and access to farms was
heavily restricted by owners, the study captured only a tiny sliver of
the workforce. Epidemiologists note that workers who did have mild
symptoms or pink eye may have intentionally avoided stepping forward due
to fear of missing work, a lack of health insurance, or fear of employer retaliation.
Ultimately, this study was never mathematically weighted to find a true population-wide average. Instead, it was an epidemiological "proof of concept" proving that asymptomatic, undocumented transmission was
actively happening.
Would you like to look into how subsequent research handled these
biases, or how public health agencies shifted their testing protocols
after these sampling flaws were highlighted?
END QUOTE:
So the study was not designed to determine the approximate rate of dairy worker infections, but it was likely much higher for those in contact
with the cattle, and the study demonstrated that infected workers often
did not have symptoms.
I asked about the CDC program of dairy worker testing that was supposed
to have started with the realization that a lot of dairy workers were getting infected, and found out that it was dairy industry resistance
that prevented the CDC from identifying dairy workers and treating them
to limit the chance that the virus would mutate.
QUOTE:
After the publication of the CDC study the CDC claimed that they were
going to initiate a dairy worker testing program in order to detect
infected workers and provide them with antivirals so they could minimize
the possibility that the virus would mutate to a forrm that could more easily infect humans. What is the excuse for that program never getting started. Dairy worker testing decreased dramatically after it was found
that a significant number of dairy workers were likely getting infected.
The breakdown of the CDC's promised active farmworker testing and
antiviral programrCoand the subsequent sharp drop in worker surveillancerCo was not caused by a single decision. Rather, it resulted from a
combination of systemic structural friction, industry resistance, and drastic federal administrative shifts over the past year.
The primary reasons the proactive testing program stalled and worker
testing fell off include the following:
1. The Legal "Brick Wall" of Property Rights & Farm Resistance
The CDC is a public health advisory body; it possesses no regulatory or
law enforcement authority to compel farm owners to allow testing on
private property.
Following the publication of the serology study, farm owners and
industry trade groups pushed back aggressively against expanded human testing.
Farmers feared that if a worker tested positive, the state would automatically quarantine their entire herd, resulting in devastating economic losses and disruptions to milk production.
Consequently, many farm owners actively denied CDC and state health investigators physical entry to their facilities, rendering the plan for proactive on-site testing practically impossible.
2. Trust and Labor Vulnerabilities
The vast majority of frontline milking parlor workersrCothe very cohort identified as facing a 100% risk of exposure to raw milk aerosolsrCoare immigrant laborers.
Public health departments found that these workers were profoundly
hesitant to volunteer for a federal testing initiative.
Many lacked health insurance, feared job loss, or worried about drawing
the attention of federal authorities.
Without explicit, legally protected guarantees from employers regarding
paid sick leave or job security while taking antivirals, worker participation evaporated.
3. Incentives Failed to Offset Risks
The federal government attempted to bypass this resistance by offering financial incentives (such as monthly stipends to farms that allowed
worker testing or provided PPE). However, the agricultural community
largely calculated that "it was more convenient to not know." The
financial compensation offered by the government did not offset the
massive operational and reputational risks a farm faced if labeled an
active H5N1 hot zone.
4. Severe Downsizing and Program Suspensions
The final blow to active H5N1 surveillance programs occurred during the sweeping administrative restructuring and workforce reductions across
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
The CDC experienced significant budget shifts and a 20% to 25%
laboratory staff attrition rate, which ultimately forced the agency to suspend or pause dozens of diagnostic testing and surveillance panels.
Simultaneously, the FDA was forced to suspend its proficiency testing programs for Grade "A" raw milk.
This dual contraction of federal laboratory infrastructure effectively dismantled the baseline tracking capacity needed to sustain a targeted, nationwide farmworker testing initiative.
By the time federal and state regulators relaxed the universal testing requirements for moving cattle, the focus had fully shifted away from aggressive human containment. The aggressive worker testing program envisioned by public health officials ultimately gave way to a
fragmented, entirely voluntary system managed on a state-by-state basis.
Would you like to look closer at how individual states are currently handling worker reporting, or see how wastewater surveillance has been
used as a workaround to track the virus without on-farm testing?
END QUOTE:
It is sad to think that the next pandemic may be due to the dairy
industry not wanting to be further economically impacted by the dairy epidemic.
The FDA pull back is also included.-a At this time the CDC had published
a report indicating that the dairy virus could survive the most common pasteurization method and be infective for several days in refrigerated milk.-a The FDA claimed that they were going to determine the safety of
the pasteurization method at processing plants accepting infected milk,
but the study was never completed.-a The FDA got as far as asking for volunteer processing plants, and that was the last update on that
project.-a It turns out that the safety of the milk supply was never evaluated because they did not want to know the answer.-a One infected
child in California and the adult patient in Missouri had pastuerized
milk as their only link to dairy cattle, and both were confirmed to have been infected by genotype B3.13 dairy influenza, and both had gut infections.
My take is that we have been lucky.-a Cow udders are such good
environments for avian influenza infection that the virus has not been selected to mutate to something that can better infect the human
respiratory tract.-a Sea mammals have not been so lucky, and transmission
is rampant among them.-a Several South American and Antarctic colonies
have suffered massive losses.
Ron Okimoto
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/livestock-poultry-disease/avian/avian- influenza/hpai-detections/hpai-confirmed-cases-livestock
The USDA is listing 7 more dairy herds have been confirmed infected with H5N1.-a In addition to the Idaho herd put up yesterday, 3 more Idaho
herds and 4 Utah herds were reported confirmed infected as of July
13-14.-a The USDA stopped putting out genotype and how the incidences are related by viral strain after genotype D1.1 was found to have infected
dairy herds (The USDA knows that information because their sequence
analysis that tells them that they are dealing with H5N1 also tells them
if it is B3.13 or D1.1).-a GISAID has not put out the May and June Texas
and Utah sequences so it is not known how they relate to the Idaho infection.
I asked Google if it was known how the virus was related in each state,
and Google claimed that the USDA and CDC were no longer providing that information to the public, but the GISAID did try to put out the data,
but their efforts were limited by how quickly USDA made the sequence
data public and the fact that the sequences were not annotated in a way
that they could be used in epidemiological analysis (the USDA does not
state the location of the sample collection and only lists it as "USA". GISAID has to go by the date the samples were announced to have been confirmed on the above link to try to identify the state that they came from.-a The USDA refuses to provide the dairy location, so that the
spread can be analyzed and tracked.
Google had recommended the GISAID data so I then noted what the GISAID
data indicated about the D1.1 spread by farm workers from Washington, Wyoming, and Nevada to dairies in Arizona.
It turned out that Google understood what GISAID data that I was
referring to.-a Google did not relate the Washington poultry worker, and Wyoming farm worker that the GISAID had demonstrated were infected with
the same lineage of the dairy virus, likely, because I did not mention
that association in my comment, but it did correctly pull out the Nevada
and Arizona conclusions from the GISAID data, and understood that it
likely meant human transmission of the virus from Nevada to Arizona.
QUOTE:
The USDA has the data, but no longer provide the information. They used
to identify the virus for each infection, but they quit doing that when
the dairy herds started to also be infected by the D1.1 genotype. The Arizona was infected by the D1.1 genotype from Nevada without having
gotten cattle from Nevada. It indicated that personnel movements were
likely involved (a Nevada dairy worker was infected), but there was no contact tracing attempted.
Google respons:
Your assessment captures the exact point where epidemiological tracking broke down under federal management. The introduction of the D1.1
genotype transformed how the virus had to be tracked, yet the
corresponding reduction in publicly available, granular data obscured
the transmission mechanisms.
The specific timeline and mechanics of how the D1.1 genotype fractured
the federal data stream reveal several critical insights:
1. The D1.1 Spillover and the Shift in Reporting
Historically, every single dairy infection in the U.S. stemmed from a single, original spillover event in Texas involving the B3.13 genotype.
[1, 2]
The landscape shifted entirely when the USDA confirmed that a dairy herd
in Nevada, quickly followed by a herd in Arizona, had been infected with
the D1.1 genotype. This genotype was already the dominant strain
circulating heavily in wild North American migratory birds. [1, 2, 3, 4]
Once it became clear that multiple distinct genotypes were
simultaneously circulating in cattle, identifying the exact strain for
each new herd infection became critical to understanding whether an
outbreak was spreading farm-to-farm or spilling over fresh from wild
birds. Instead of increasing transparency, the public reporting on individual herd genotypes was significantly scaled back. [1]
2. The Arizona-Nevada Link and Fomite Transmission
The introduction of D1.1 to an Arizona dairy herd provided a textbook example of "cryptic transmission". [1]
rCo-a-a-a The Cattle Movement Blind Spot: State animal health tracing confirmed that the affected Arizona farm had not received any cattle shipments from Nevada. [1]
rCo-a-a-a Personnel as Vectors: Because a Nevada dairy worker was simultaneously confirmed to have been infected with H5N1,
epidemiological logic strongly pointed toward shared agricultural
personnel, equipment networks, or service providers moving between the Southwest dairies as the mechanical vector (fomite transmission). [1, 2] rCo-a-a-a The Contact Tracing Void: Despite the clear risk of human-mediated spread across state lines, no formal, comprehensive contact tracing or network analysis of farm workers was deployed to map out and halt these pathways.
3. The Consequences of the Information Blackout
By stepping away from publicly identifying the specific genotype for
each herd detection, the USDA effectively severed the public's ability
to map the epidemic accurately:
rCo-a-a-a Obscuring Reinfections: Without knowing if a newly flagged herd in Idaho or Texas has B3.13 (or its California sub-lineage) versus the wild bird-derived D1.1, it is impossible for independent scientists to verify true reinfections versus entirely new spillover events. [1]
rCo-a-a-a Disguising Transmission Mechanics: If a state's new cases are B3.13, it signals ongoing biosecurity failures in lateral farm-to-farm transport. If they are D1.1, it signals a failure to protect herds from environmental and avian exposure.
By flattening the data into a binary "Positive/Negative" structure, the federal database treats fundamentally different epidemiological events
as identical, masking the active role that human and agricultural
networks play in driving the virus across the country.
Would you like to examine the specific differences in clinical symptoms observed in cows infected with D1.1 versus B3.13, or look into how independent researchers are trying to crowdsource this missing genetic
data? [1]
END QUOTE:
Google's answer indicates that the USDA is obfuscating the issue and
making it impossible for the public to track the extent and spread of
the dairy epidemic with their current policies.-a It also notes that even though the evidence indicated human transmission across state lines,
that "no formal, comprehensive contact tracing or network analysis of
farm workers was deployed to map out and halt these pathways."
For some reason the CDC and USDA do not want to understand how the virus
is being transmitted.-a Cattle and equipment movements off infected farms
is fully restricted, but no state requires quarantine of dairy workers
or veterinarians that go from farm to farm.-a Poultry farms never got
cattle nor dairy equipment, and they have known that dairy workers on infected dairies also worked on one of the poultry farms that was
infected in Michigan by the dairy virus, but no contact tracing nor
follow up was done at that time in early 2024.-a None of the states with infected herds is restricting dairy worker movements and the virus
continues to spread to dairies and surrounding poultry farms.
Ron Okimoto
On 7/17/2026 2:16 PM, RonO wrote:
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/livestock-poultry-disease/avian/avian-https://www.aphis.usda.gov/livestock-poultry-disease/avian/avian- influenza/hpai-detections/hpai-confirmed-cases-livestock
influenza/hpai-detections/hpai-confirmed-cases-livestock
The USDA is listing 7 more dairy herds have been confirmed infected
with H5N1.-a In addition to the Idaho herd put up yesterday, 3 more
Idaho herds and 4 Utah herds were reported confirmed infected as of
July 13-14.-a The USDA stopped putting out genotype and how the
incidences are related by viral strain after genotype D1.1 was found
to have infected dairy herds (The USDA knows that information because
their sequence analysis that tells them that they are dealing with
H5N1 also tells them if it is B3.13 or D1.1).-a GISAID has not put out
the May and June Texas and Utah sequences so it is not known how they
relate to the Idaho infection.
I asked Google if it was known how the virus was related in each
state, and Google claimed that the USDA and CDC were no longer
providing that information to the public, but the GISAID did try to
put out the data, but their efforts were limited by how quickly USDA
made the sequence data public and the fact that the sequences were not
annotated in a way that they could be used in epidemiological analysis
(the USDA does not state the location of the sample collection and
only lists it as "USA". GISAID has to go by the date the samples were
announced to have been confirmed on the above link to try to identify
the state that they came from.-a The USDA refuses to provide the dairy
location, so that the spread can be analyzed and tracked.
Google had recommended the GISAID data so I then noted what the GISAID
data indicated about the D1.1 spread by farm workers from Washington,
Wyoming, and Nevada to dairies in Arizona.
It turned out that Google understood what GISAID data that I was
referring to.-a Google did not relate the Washington poultry worker,
and Wyoming farm worker that the GISAID had demonstrated were infected
with the same lineage of the dairy virus, likely, because I did not
mention that association in my comment, but it did correctly pull out
the Nevada and Arizona conclusions from the GISAID data, and
understood that it likely meant human transmission of the virus from
Nevada to Arizona.
QUOTE:
The USDA has the data, but no longer provide the information. They
used to identify the virus for each infection, but they quit doing
that when the dairy herds started to also be infected by the D1.1
genotype. The Arizona was infected by the D1.1 genotype from Nevada
without having gotten cattle from Nevada. It indicated that personnel
movements were likely involved (a Nevada dairy worker was infected),
but there was no contact tracing attempted.
Google respons:
Your assessment captures the exact point where epidemiological
tracking broke down under federal management. The introduction of the
D1.1 genotype transformed how the virus had to be tracked, yet the
corresponding reduction in publicly available, granular data obscured
the transmission mechanisms.
The specific timeline and mechanics of how the D1.1 genotype fractured
the federal data stream reveal several critical insights:
1. The D1.1 Spillover and the Shift in Reporting
Historically, every single dairy infection in the U.S. stemmed from a
single, original spillover event in Texas involving the B3.13
genotype. [1, 2]
The landscape shifted entirely when the USDA confirmed that a dairy
herd in Nevada, quickly followed by a herd in Arizona, had been
infected with the D1.1 genotype. This genotype was already the
dominant strain circulating heavily in wild North American migratory
birds. [1, 2, 3, 4]
Once it became clear that multiple distinct genotypes were
simultaneously circulating in cattle, identifying the exact strain for
each new herd infection became critical to understanding whether an
outbreak was spreading farm-to-farm or spilling over fresh from wild
birds. Instead of increasing transparency, the public reporting on
individual herd genotypes was significantly scaled back. [1]
2. The Arizona-Nevada Link and Fomite Transmission
The introduction of D1.1 to an Arizona dairy herd provided a textbook
example of "cryptic transmission". [1]
rCo-a-a-a The Cattle Movement Blind Spot: State animal health tracing
confirmed that the affected Arizona farm had not received any cattle
shipments from Nevada. [1]
rCo-a-a-a Personnel as Vectors: Because a Nevada dairy worker was
simultaneously confirmed to have been infected with H5N1,
epidemiological logic strongly pointed toward shared agricultural
personnel, equipment networks, or service providers moving between the
Southwest dairies as the mechanical vector (fomite transmission). [1, 2]
rCo-a-a-a The Contact Tracing Void: Despite the clear risk of human-
mediated spread across state lines, no formal, comprehensive contact
tracing or network analysis of farm workers was deployed to map out
and halt these pathways.
3. The Consequences of the Information Blackout
By stepping away from publicly identifying the specific genotype for
each herd detection, the USDA effectively severed the public's ability
to map the epidemic accurately:
rCo-a-a-a Obscuring Reinfections: Without knowing if a newly flagged herd >> in Idaho or Texas has B3.13 (or its California sub-lineage) versus the
wild bird-derived D1.1, it is impossible for independent scientists to
verify true reinfections versus entirely new spillover events. [1]
rCo-a-a-a Disguising Transmission Mechanics: If a state's new cases are
B3.13, it signals ongoing biosecurity failures in lateral farm-to-farm
transport. If they are D1.1, it signals a failure to protect herds
from environmental and avian exposure.
By flattening the data into a binary "Positive/Negative" structure,
the federal database treats fundamentally different epidemiological
events as identical, masking the active role that human and
agricultural networks play in driving the virus across the country.
Would you like to examine the specific differences in clinical
symptoms observed in cows infected with D1.1 versus B3.13, or look
into how independent researchers are trying to crowdsource this
missing genetic data? [1]
END QUOTE:
Google's answer indicates that the USDA is obfuscating the issue and
making it impossible for the public to track the extent and spread of
the dairy epidemic with their current policies.-a It also notes that
even though the evidence indicated human transmission across state
lines, that "no formal, comprehensive contact tracing or network
analysis of farm workers was deployed to map out and halt these
pathways."
For some reason the CDC and USDA do not want to understand how the
virus is being transmitted.-a Cattle and equipment movements off
infected farms is fully restricted, but no state requires quarantine
of dairy workers or veterinarians that go from farm to farm.-a Poultry
farms never got cattle nor dairy equipment, and they have known that
dairy workers on infected dairies also worked on one of the poultry
farms that was infected in Michigan by the dairy virus, but no contact
tracing nor follow up was done at that time in early 2024.-a None of
the states with infected herds is restricting dairy worker movements
and the virus continues to spread to dairies and surrounding poultry
farms.
Ron Okimoto
There is some weirdness going on at the USDA HPAI confirmed cases web site.-a The number of Utah herds on the list has doubled since 7/17/2026, but the number of herds confirmed to have been infected in 2026 have decreased from 81 to 79.-a It looks like they are starting to list the reinfected herds, but are not counting them as confirmed cases.
The Hogvet article noted that Utah claimed 22 herds under quarantine,
but the number confirmed had been less than half of that.-a Now the
number of confirmed Utah herds is closer to the 22 herd number.-a For
some reason the USDA still wants to hide the true number of infected
herds and decreased the number of confirmed cases in 2026 even after doubling the number of Utah cases.-a They need to list the reinfected
herds in Idaho.-a Idaho is claimed to have 71 herds under quarantine, but the USDA only list less than 10 herds confirmed to be infected in the
last 30 days for Idaho.-a Most herds infected over 30 days ago would be expected to have cleared the virus.
Ron Okimoto
On 7/17/2026 2:16 PM, RonO wrote:
SNIP:
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/livestock-poultry-disease/avian/avian- influenza/hpai-detections/hpai-confirmed-cases-livestock
Another Utah herd has been confirmed to be infected.-a They claim to understand that the virus is not being spread by wild birds, and that
leaves cattle, equipment, and dairy workers as transmission vectors.
Once they identify an infected farm they restrict cattle movements and equipment movements, and more farms keep getting infected as well as surrounding poultry farms that can't get cattle or dairy equipment.-a For some reason the affected states refuse to restrict dairy worker
movements.-a It is pretty much a certainty that dairy workers can infect their cats (both Michigan and California had dairy worker cats infected
even though the cats had no access to cattle nor wild birds.-a They were indoor cats).
I asked Google why dairy workers were not being quarantined on infected dairies, and Google indicated that it was due to dairy labor issues. Apparently they need the dairy workers to work on more than one dairy
for labor economic reasons.-a It might be something as stupid as not
having dairy workers work full time, and they only pay them for part
time work.-a I don't know why, but it may be due to the benefits that
full time workers might have to get.-a This seems to force workers to
find employment at other farms and even poultry farms.-a My guess is that the swine farm that was infected in 2024 likely had dairy workers
working at that facility.-a It is known that dairy workers have worked on Poultry farms that were infected.
They understand that this is happening, but they refused to do anything about it because the farm labor is needed at those multiple farms.-a I am sure that a 3 million bird layer facility would rather be down a few
workers for a few weeks than risk losing the whole flock.
Ron Okimoto
On 8/6/2026 6:40 PM, RonO wrote:
On 7/17/2026 2:16 PM, RonO wrote:
SNIP:
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/livestock-poultry-disease/avian/avian-
influenza/hpai-detections/hpai-confirmed-cases-livestock
Another Utah herd has been confirmed to be infected.-a They claim to
understand that the virus is not being spread by wild birds, and that
leaves cattle, equipment, and dairy workers as transmission vectors.
Once they identify an infected farm they restrict cattle movements and
equipment movements, and more farms keep getting infected as well as
surrounding poultry farms that can't get cattle or dairy equipment.
For some reason the affected states refuse to restrict dairy worker
movements.-a It is pretty much a certainty that dairy workers can
infect their cats (both Michigan and California had dairy worker cats
infected even though the cats had no access to cattle nor wild birds.
They were indoor cats).
I asked Google why dairy workers were not being quarantined on
infected dairies, and Google indicated that it was due to dairy labor
issues. Apparently they need the dairy workers to work on more than
one dairy for labor economic reasons.-a It might be something as stupid
as not having dairy workers work full time, and they only pay them for
part time work.-a I don't know why, but it may be due to the benefits
that full time workers might have to get.-a This seems to force workers
to find employment at other farms and even poultry farms.-a My guess is
that the swine farm that was infected in 2024 likely had dairy workers
working at that facility.-a It is known that dairy workers have worked
on Poultry farms that were infected.
They understand that this is happening, but they refused to do
anything about it because the farm labor is needed at those multiple
farms.-a I am sure that a 3 million bird layer facility would rather be
down a few workers for a few weeks than risk losing the whole flock.
Ron Okimoto
I asked Google why dairy workers worked part time on more than one farm
and got the answer that the dairies that only milked twice a day did not want to pay the workers for a full 8 hour shift, so the workers in the morning milking shift would leave the farm and pick up more hours on
another farm for the evening shift.-a Some states exempt farm workers
from getting full time and over time benefits (the farm workers are exploited to the benefit of the large farms that can employ full time workers), so that isn't the issue.-a The main issue is that farms do not want to pay the dairy workers for the time between milking.-a This means that it is the dairy workers that milk the cows and that are known to be
the most likely workers to be infected that are the ones that work on
more than one farm and that go to poultry farms to be able to work full time.-a This should be understood by the USDA and CDC, but they do not
act on what is going on, and refuse to do what needs to be done in order
to keep the virus from spreading to other farms and infecting more farm workers.
In California it was noted that the dairy workers were wiping their
faces with the same towel that they were using to clean the cow udders with.-a Dairy workers are infected mostly in the eyes, and transmission
can go both ways from cow to dairy worker, and dairy worker to cow
because dairy workers are known to shed live infective virus from their eyes.
Ron Okimoto
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