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from https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2025/mar/23/antisemitism-redefinition-jewish-safety-christian-nationalism-democracy

The new definition of antisemitism is transforming America rCo and serving
a Christian nationalist plan
Itamar Mann and Lihi Yona
two flags interwoven
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Illustration: Guardian Design
Redefining antisemitism in the law was never about Jewish safety. It is
about consolidating authoritarian power under the veneer of minority protection

Sun 23 Mar 2025 08.38 EDT
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In 1919, Jacob Isra|2l de Haan, an Orthodox Jewish queer poet and lawyer, arrived in British Mandate Palestine from the Netherlands. Despite his
initial sympathies with Zionism, within a few years de Haan would become
an outspoken critic of the movement. Driven by what he called a rCLnatural feeling for justicerCY, he advocated for rCLanother Jewish community in PalestinerCY rCo one that sought cooperation with the Arab-Palestinian community. His steadfast opposition to mainstream Zionism made de Haan a controversial figure, drawing the ire of Zionist leadership. On 30 June
1924, de Haan was assassinated by a member of the Zionist organization Haganah.

This political assassination represented not merely the elimination of
one man, but a portentous statement about which perspectives would be tolerated in the emerging political landscape. A century later, we are witnessing a similar troubling pattern. As attacks against universities
and intimidation of Palestinian activists become ever more rife, those
who challenge Zionist orthodoxy rCo whether out of political conviction, religious belief or ethical principle rCo face exclusion, vilification and worse. This time, the main tool is a sweeping legal redefinition of antisemitism in American law and policy.

Something unprecedented rCo and deeply unsettling rCo is unfolding: under
the guise of a legal redefinition of antisemitism, the basic
architecture of American public life is being radically transformed.
What appears, at first glance, to be a technical change in terminology
has become a powerful instrument for political control, solidifying
executive power to enforce a narrow, state-sanctioned definition of
Judaism. In the name of combating antisemitism, this effort threatens to reshape American public life rCo and with it, the pillars of American liberalism. But despite what some will have you believe, two things are
clear: first, this campaign does not protect Jews rCo it endangers them;
and second, this redefinition plays into a larger Christian nationalist project.

The clash over the definition of antisemitism
Following the horrendous Hamas attack of 7 October 2023, and the
subsequent war and utter destruction of Gaza, two sharply contrasting positions have emerged. On the one hand, many Jewish organizations and advocates have seen the emerging pro-Palestinian protest movement as a manifestation of antisemitism, a classic example of the
over-scrutinization of Israel, and the denial of IsraelrCOs right to
defend itself.

On the other hand, many critics of Israel and of Zionism argue against
this conflation and in favor of their right to support the Palestinian struggle. For them, labeling anti-Israel positions as antisemitic is a
way to silence dissenting opinions and to prevent an honest discussion
of IsraelrCOs actions in Gaza.

Even before this clash entered the mainstream in the last year and a
half, American decision-makers and institutions had already taken a
clear side, framing anti-Israel positions as antisemitic. A landmark
moment in the emergence of this new understanding of antisemitism is no
doubt the 2016 International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA)
definition of antisemitism, which has rapidly become a legal benchmark
for defining antisemitism in the US and has a growing presence in both
state and federal law.

The redefinition of antisemitism isnrCOt simply a policy shift rCo itrCOs part of a deeper transformation of American democracy

While the core definition makes no explicit mention of Israel, the
examples of purported antisemitism that IHRA provides tell a different
story. Among the illustrative cases, it notes that antisemitism rCLmight include the targeting of the state of Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectivityrCY. Other examples include rCLclaiming that the existence of a state of Israel is a racist endeavorrCY, and rCL[d]rawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the NazisrCY.

Back in his first term, Donald Trump issued a 2019 executive order
directing federal agencies to consider the IHRA definition when
enforcing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits
discrimination in federally funded programs, cementing this problematic standard. It has been formally adopted in multiple federal and state
statutes, in which it is used to equate criticism of Israel or Zionism
with antisemitism. These laws have been applied in a range of legal and
policy contexts rCo restricting free speech, shaping civil rights
protections and even influencing the classification of hate crimes in
state criminal codes.

TrumprCOs January 2025 executive order on rCLAdditional Measures to Combat AntisemitismrCY marks a dangerous escalation in this trend. The order
directs multiple federal agencies to rCLprosecute, remove, or otherwise
hold to account the perpetrators of unlawful anti-Semitic harassment and violencerCY.

Just days after the order, the administration slashed $400m in federal research funding from Columbia University over what it claimed was a
systemic tolerance of antisemitic activity and demanded changes to the schoolrCOs policies rCo a move widely seen as retaliation for
pro-Palestinian campus activism, to which Columbia has consented in an extraordinary surrender of its academic freedom. Similar threats have
followed against numerous additional universities. In a recent chilling development, the Department of Homeland Security arrested Mahmoud
Khalil, a Palestinian permanent resident and student organizer whom the government is now seeking to deport, with more arrests promised.
(Indeed, they have begun.) The redefinition of antisemitism isnrCOt simply
a policy shift rCo itrCOs part of a deeper transformation of American democracy.

We have never been secular
No doubt, proponents of the IHRA definition raise an important point. To understand why, we need to recognize something distinctive about Jewish identity: it has always been deeply political. Unlike modern
Christianity, which developed alongside a strong liberal separation of
church and state, Judaism has never drawn such a sharp line. Jewish
identity has long resisted the tidy categories that liberal theory
prefers rCo religious or secular, ethnic or political, private or public.
From biblical times through the diaspora and into modernity, Jewish communities understood religious life not just as a set of spiritual
beliefs but as the foundation of a political community. Jewish religious leadership traditionally held legal and political authority rCo issuing binding rulings on property, taxation, even criminal law. This isnrCOt a historical anomaly rCo itrCOs a defining feature of Jewish tradition.
Zionism, despite the secular aspirations of many of its founders, built
on this legacy by channeling the political dimension of Jewish identity
into the framework of a modern nation-state.

torah
Accordingly, for many Jews, Israel is a crucial element of their Jewish identity. As Noah Feldman writes in To Be a Jew Today, for many American
Jews, rCLIsrael can function as the chosen focal point of their Jewish identity and connection. Caring about and supporting Israel can be constitutive of what makes them actively Jewish.rCY An attack on that
element, a denial of its legitimacy, feels to many like an attack on who
they are as Jews.

But this does not necessarily cast anti-Israel opinions as antisemitic.
When we criticize something important to someonerCOs identity, it doesnrCOt automatically mean werCOre attacking their identity itself. When political positions become enshrined as essential components of personhood,
substantive disagreements risk being recast as attacks on identity. The result, as the scholar Richard Ford once put it, is the potential to rCLcamouflagerCY ideological conflict as discrimination.

Take male circumcision rCo a ritual at the heart of Jewish tradition
practiced by most Jewish families worldwide. When medical experts or
rights advocates question circumcision based on concerns about bodily
autonomy or health risks, most people understand they arenrCOt being antisemitic. No matter where they stand on circumcision, they recognize critics may be raising ethical questions that exist independently of
Jewish identity. This same logic must apply to Israel. Criticizing
Israeli policies may, for instance, reflect genuine concerns about human rights rather than prejudice against Jews, even as the criticism is
directed at a defining feature of their Jewishness.

The labeling of criticism against Israel as antisemitism has already
worked to quash serious discussions on Israel-Palestine in the United
States. Even Kenneth Stern, who drafted the original working definition, argued in an opinion piece for the Guardian that the IHRA definition has
been weaponized against legitimate political expression.

Silencing dissent
Federal measures such as TrumprCOs 2019 executive order have fueled a wave
of investigations by the Department of Education into universities over pro-Palestinian activism, pressuring administrators to police student
speech. At NYU, political statements such as rCLFuck IsraelrCY have led to antisemitism charges against students. At Columbia, students faced disciplinary charges for acts as simple as hanging Palestinian flags
from dorm windows or displaying them on campus statues, underscoring the growing constraints on Palestine-related activism in academic spaces. Relatedly, recently New YorkrCOs governor ordered Hunter College to remove
a job posting for a Palestinian studies position, claiming the need to rCLensure that antisemitic theories are not promoted in the classroomrCY.
This interference with academic hiring marks a dangerous precedent.

The pressure from federal and state authorities has led universities to internalize this surveillance logic. Last week, Columbia University
unveiled an expansive compliance plan in response to the
administrationrCOs $400m funding cut, pledging stricter enforcement of
student discipline, new security forces empowered to arrest
demonstrators, mandatory identification checks at protests and a
top-down review of academic programs, including scrutiny of hiring
decisions and curricula. These measures reflect not only institutional capitulation, but the chilling normalization of ideological policing on campus.

The new definition of antisemitism imposes a straitjacket of Zionist
identity on American Jews

A similar pattern extends to Congress, where lawmakers such as Rashida
Tlaib have been formally censured with another censure effort against
Ilhan Omar introduced over statements critical of Israel, in effect
framing Palestinian advocacy as beyond the bounds of legitimate
discourse. Meanwhile, many individuals have lost jobs, been denied opportunities, or faced disciplinary measures for expressing
pro-Palestinian views or criticizing Israeli policy. This dynamic
narrows the space for legitimate discussion on US foreign policy and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The charge of antisemitism shifts the
focus from IsraelrCOs actions to the credibility of its critics. While combating antisemitism is imperative, the sweeping application of this
label to pro-Palestinian voices endangers dissenting voices and erodes
free expression, making open debate on one of the worldrCOs most enduring conflicts increasingly difficult.

the star of david separating from the flag of israel
But thatrCOs not the only problem with the new definition of antisemitism.
By legally enshrining support for Israel as a defining characteristic of Jewish identity, the new definition of antisemitism imposes a
straitjacket of Zionist identity on American Jews, in effect telling
them that certain political positions are incompatible with being authentically Jewish. But, precisely because Jewish identity has always
also been political, we should not be delegitimizing those whose Jewish identity entails a criticism or even outright rejection of
ethno-national Judaism.

The historical diversity of Jewish identity
Jewish communities have always been diverse and plural in their
orientations toward Jewish nationality. From the ultra-Orthodox Satmar community that opposes Zionism on religious grounds to the socialist
Jewish Bund that promoted cultural autonomy without a state, to
current-day Jewish American organizations that oppose IsraelrCOs
occupation and military control over Palestinians, anti-Zionist and non-Zionist movements have always been central to Jewish identity.

Many anti-Zionist Jews arenrCOt rejecting Jewish political life or denying Jews the right to self-determination. Rather, theyrCOre expressing
different visions of Jewish political existence and self-determination.
Some of them view opposition to the state of Israel as emerging from
Jewish values and traditions rCo whether stemming from religious beliefs
about exile and redemption, or interpretations of Jewish ethical
traditions that emphasize universal justice and opposition to oppression.

In his recent book The No State Solution: A Jewish Manifesto, the
religion scholar Daniel Boyarin reflects on how he moved from Zionism
into anti-Zionism, with rCLmy commitment to Jewish identity and identification, Torah study, scholarship, practice, literature and
liturgy, and modes of speech and thinking undiminished, even growing
stronger and strongerrCY. Criticism of Israel can stem from deep Jewish religious commitment.

The real question, then, isnrCOt what the proper connection between Israel
and Jewish identity is, but rather how to allow for multiple, sometimes competing interpretations of this relationship. By bootstrapping the definition of antisemitism to Israel, IHRA narrows the boundaries of legitimate Jewish identity. While Palestinians have been, without a
doubt, the primary targets of this effort, it also takes aim at a rich
Jewish tradition. It restricts the freedom of Jews to define their own identity, limiting the ways in which Jewish beliefs, thought and
activism can be expressed.

And indeed, on college campuses and in workplaces, Jews who express
solidarity with Palestinians report being called rCLself-hating JewsrCY, rCLun-JewsrCY or rCLtraitorsrCY by fellow students or colleagues. In fact, just
this month, Trump rCo our self-appointed arbiter of religious authenticity
rCo announced that the Senate minority leader, Chuck Schumer, is rCLnot
Jewish anymorerCY.

Defining antisemitism in the service of conservative Christians
Smearing progressive Jews as rCLnot real JewsrCY has ramifications that
extend far beyond the Jewish community, serving a conservative Christian strategy to exploit religious liberties for the sake of suppressing progressive values.

In recent years the US supreme court has taken a sharp turn towards conservative Christianity, altering the basic liberal structure of
American constitutionalism. The court has upheld religious claims
challenging pandemic restrictions on gatherings and vaccination
requirements, LGBTQ+ non-discrimination laws, and the separation of
church and state in public education.

This strengthens conservative Christian influence by transforming
political views into constitutional protections rCo for example, when the supreme court ruled the constitution allowed a Catholic foster care
agency to exclude same-sex couples on religious grounds. However, as
David Schraub, a professor at Lewis & Clark Law School, has pointed out,
this strategy faces a significant obstacle: progressive Jews.
Progressive Jews, and any other group whose religious commitments might
be threatened by conservative policies, could leverage the expansion of precisely these religious protections to opt out of conservative policy initiatives.

This farcical performance of concern would merely be amusing were it not
for the very real possibility that it serves as a prelude for persecution

Progressive Jewish communities have already begun to challenge
conservative policy agendas on religious freedom grounds rCo most notably around reproductive rights. In the wake of the Dobbs decision
overturning Roe v Wade and the wave of state-level abortion bans that followed, Jewish women, congregations and community leaders have filed lawsuits asserting that such bans violate their religious freedom. In
some cases, plaintiffs have argued that Jewish law not only permits but
may even require abortion under certain circumstances. While many of
these cases are still pending, in a landmark ruling in April 2024, the
Indiana court of appeals recognized, for the first time, the legitimacy
of such claims.

One way conservatives can eliminate this risk to their project is by questioning liberal JewsrCO Jewishness. rCLIf liberal Jews can be erased rCo either pushed out of the public eye or denied as genuine or authentic specimens of Judaism rCo then the challenge of liberal Jews disappears
with it,rCY Schraub explains.

This isnrCOt just a theoretical concern rCo itrCOs already happening. Project Esther, a new initiative launched by the Christian nationalist Heritage Foundation known for Project 2025, offers a blueprint for combating antisemitism that targets not only pro-Palestinian groups but what it
calls a broader rCLcoalition of leftist, progressive organizationsrCY rCo including Jewish groups rCo through tools such as anti-terrorism
prosecutions, deportations, public firings, and efforts to rCLdisrupt and degraderCY dissenting movements. Despite its use of Jewish religious
language, the plan has virtually no Jewish authors and is riddled with
basic errors, including misrepresentations of Jewish texts. It chastises American Jews who donrCOt align with its worldview, calling them rCLcomplacentrCY and their positions rCLinexplicablerCY.

This farcical performance of concern would merely be amusing were it not
for the very real possibility that it serves as a prelude for persecution.

Reclaiming Jewish religious freedom from the state
The increasingly aggressive use of rCLantisemitismrCY as a political instrument was never about Jewish safety. It has always been about
power: consolidating a political order that merges religion, nationalism
and authoritarianism under the veneer of minority protection.

The ease with which progressive Jews have been thrown under the bus
makes this painfully clear. Their erasure is not a side effect rCo it is
the mechanism through which this agenda advances. Because once Jewish
identity is defined from above rCo even with the active participation of
some Jews rCo any Jew who resists can be disqualified and delegitimized.
This was true for de Haan, and it is true today.

The threat is immediate and ongoing. Already, whole sectors of society rCo educators, students, artists, political activists and immigrants rCo are paying the price. And if this continues, we can expect the same logic to
be applied across a wider range of policies: tightening ideological
control, redefining constitutional norms and re-engineering public institutions in the image of an authoritarian state.

But there is another path. The unique position of progressive Jews
offers a way to push back against the rise of the far right in the US,
both with regard to Israel-Palestine, but also more broadly. Recognizing
the unique harm caused to Jews by the new definition of antisemitism
allows us to develop new ways to combat it.

The establishment clause of the US constitution, for instance, prohibits
the state from intervening in religious disputes. By adopting the IHRA definition into law, the US government has in effect taken sides in an intra-Jewish debate, recruiting Zionist Jews to side in a war against
its ideological opponents. The redefinition of antisemitism is therefore
not only an attack on political dissent rCo it is an intrusion into Jewish religious life. By codifying support for Israel as a requirement for
being Jewish, these laws function as a state intervention in an ongoing
Jewish theological and ethical debate.

By pushing against the legal redefinition of antisemitism, Jews can
refuse to surrender their identity to the state. By continuing to anchor
it firmly in their communities, they can resist the instrumentalization
of Judaism against others.

Reclaiming religious freedom from the state, as part of this act of resistance, would not just protect Jewish dissenters rCo it would offer a broader framework for resisting state attempts to control religious
identity. No government rCo not the Israeli government, and surely not the American government rCo should have the power to define what it means to
be a Jew.

This article was amended on 23 March 2025 to clarify that Ilhan Omar was
not formally censured by Congress

Itamar Mann is an associate professor of law at the University of Haifa,
and currently a Humboldt fellow at Humboldt University. He holds a
doctorate from Yale Law School

Lihi Yona is an associate professor of law and criminology at the
University of Haifa. She holds a doctorate from Columbia Law School. Her research focuses on antidiscrimination law in the United States and Israel


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