On 10/08/2026 06:24 AM, sobriquet wrote:
Op 8-10-2026 om 05:21 schreef Ross Finlayson:
On 10/07/2026 07:20 PM, sobriquet wrote:
[..]
Do you think AI will have solved all the remaining Millennium-prize
problems by the end of next year?
It seems they pretty rapidly went from being able to solve high-school >>>> level Math Olympiad problems to research level math problems.
No, I think that a variety of Hilbert or Clay problems
are _independent_ "standard" or "ordinary" number theory
after "standard" and "ordinary" set theory the usual
descriptive set theory's account, then that solvers like
HOL/Isabelle/Coq/Lean and so on where the primitives are
classes for relation suffer all the aspects of class/set
distinction, then furthermore, primitives of "total functions"
suffer from that there exists non-Cartesian functions,
like "sweep", the natural/unit equivalency function.
I think a variety of what's considered in the extrapolation
is that what's been "solved" isn't really considered "solved",
either. I.e., people are reading too much into the results,
as about the "almost-quite", here.
Thanks for writing, good luck in your endeavors.
For now it seems like it will be like Euclid, gathering all existing
math and formalizing it into a comprehensive framework (Lean).
It will be really interesting when it starts coming up with new math
concepts, but I reckon that would still require some sort of
breakthrough, since it seems it can't even come up with concepts from
scratch for toy problems like the game of go.
There's the Cantorian Continuum Hypothesis, which supposedly
contributed to Cantor's madness that he couldn't prove it,
then that Goedel showed it consistent (shown) one way,
von Neumann the other way which is usually excluded,
then Cohen added more baggage and an axiom of forcing
to result it "independent" instead of "inconsistent",
while yet various inductive arguments contradict each
other and thus in the weaker sort of account of induction,
have it "inconsistent".
It's so that mathematics has accounts of independence after
each of its accounts of openings/perestroikas/catastrophes,
since ancient times like for accounts of magnitudes or the
Pythagorean and so on, up to the 1900's account about whether
the reals and complex numbers are isomorphism then their _uniqueness_
up to isomorphism, when for examples there is readily contrived
other structures that fit the field axioms and are analytic,
besides that division in complex numbers is another opening,
helping show that mathematics the usual account of functional
analysis is full of holes.
"Openings", then, like openings in games, where chess is a
set-piece while go is a blank slate, with a lattice, about chess
or go or tong qi or the like, there is that "singularities in
a singularity theory are branches in a multiplicity theory".
Then, about the usual order of description of operations,
like those of arithmetic, then for example about whether
convolution is first or last or eventual, and it varies,
makes for accounts of the equi-interpretability of model theories.
So, the Cantorian with almost-all transcendental and the
Pythagorean with almost-all rational plainly don't agree,
yet either on its own account, then for what meets in the
middle "the middle of nowhere" that accounts of weak induction
will always fail to conclude concomitantly exist, yet that
the super-classical account of motion always concludes does.
We already have one.
On 10/08/2026 06:54 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 10/08/2026 06:24 AM, sobriquet wrote:
Op 8-10-2026 om 05:21 schreef Ross Finlayson:
On 10/07/2026 07:20 PM, sobriquet wrote:
[..]
Do you think AI will have solved all the remaining Millennium-prize
problems by the end of next year?
It seems they pretty rapidly went from being able to solve high-school >>>>> level Math Olympiad problems to research level math problems.
No, I think that a variety of Hilbert or Clay problems
are _independent_ "standard" or "ordinary" number theory
after "standard" and "ordinary" set theory the usual
descriptive set theory's account, then that solvers like
HOL/Isabelle/Coq/Lean and so on where the primitives are
classes for relation suffer all the aspects of class/set
distinction, then furthermore, primitives of "total functions"
suffer from that there exists non-Cartesian functions,
like "sweep", the natural/unit equivalency function.
I think a variety of what's considered in the extrapolation
is that what's been "solved" isn't really considered "solved",
either. I.e., people are reading too much into the results,
as about the "almost-quite", here.
Thanks for writing, good luck in your endeavors.
For now it seems like it will be like Euclid, gathering all existing
math and formalizing it into a comprehensive framework (Lean).
It will be really interesting when it starts coming up with new math
concepts, but I reckon that would still require some sort of
breakthrough, since it seems it can't even come up with concepts from
scratch for toy problems like the game of go.
There's the Cantorian Continuum Hypothesis, which supposedly
contributed to Cantor's madness that he couldn't prove it,
then that Goedel showed it consistent (shown) one way,
von Neumann the other way which is usually excluded,
then Cohen added more baggage and an axiom of forcing
to result it "independent" instead of "inconsistent",
while yet various inductive arguments contradict each
other and thus in the weaker sort of account of induction,
have it "inconsistent".
It's so that mathematics has accounts of independence after
each of its accounts of openings/perestroikas/catastrophes,
since ancient times like for accounts of magnitudes or the
Pythagorean and so on, up to the 1900's account about whether
the reals and complex numbers are isomorphism then their _uniqueness_
up to isomorphism, when for examples there is readily contrived
other structures that fit the field axioms and are analytic,
besides that division in complex numbers is another opening,
helping show that mathematics the usual account of functional
analysis is full of holes.
"Openings", then, like openings in games, where chess is a
set-piece while go is a blank slate, with a lattice, about chess
or go or tong qi or the like, there is that "singularities in
a singularity theory are branches in a multiplicity theory".
Then, about the usual order of description of operations,
like those of arithmetic, then for example about whether
convolution is first or last or eventual, and it varies,
makes for accounts of the equi-interpretability of model theories.
So, the Cantorian with almost-all transcendental and the
Pythagorean with almost-all rational plainly don't agree,
yet either on its own account, then for what meets in the
middle "the middle of nowhere" that accounts of weak induction
will always fail to conclude concomitantly exist, yet that
the super-classical account of motion always concludes does.
We already have one.
That's a big "if".
"Common-sensical" is by definition a sort of reflection on
the inter-subjective and all the accounts of _reason_.
As "reflection on reason", and "structured reflection on
reason", then philosophy in a sense is about thinking beings
and feeling beings about human condition where man is animal
and man is machine, yet, man is mind, which is somehow sublime,
where for example it's an opinion that there's not a mind/body
problem, instead that a sort of holistic dual monism makes
for an account of paradox-free reason for theory primarily.
Then, sometimes "philosopher" is inclusive, and means any
thinking-being engaging in first-class reason, and sometimes
it's exclusive, meaning we're only yet attaining to be
"true philosophers", about what's "Truth" vis-a-vis
what's "true".
The notion of "philocasuy" then at least is a form of philosophy
that's yet rather more demanding its fulfillment.
Then, we might separate the "technical philosophy" from the
"analytical philosophy", or the "technical" from the "techno-analytic",
that any usual common-sensical abstraction is well enough "analytic"
or "techno-analytic", yet, in terms of a theory overall and an
overall theory to be "technical", to be subjectable to technique,
that "most philosophers" these days would consider themselves in
their "paleo-classical, post-modern" approach to be analytical,
that logic and mathematics makes quite strong requirements what's
to be properly "technical".
Then, "moral philosophy" is its own sort of account about the
human condition, basically reflecting on free-will I haven't
much spoken to it, while I maintain notions of "absolute"
ethics and morals as for and above one-self.
Nobody's perfect, ..., "Truth" is, though.
How about "extreme rationalism" since "structural realism",
and then for "Foundations" and something like a "theatheory"
as a putative candidate for a Foundations a theory-of-everything,
in the technical sense for a constant, consistent, complete,
and concrete account of a paleo-classical post-modern treatment
of reason on Truth?
Reflections on reason?
That for a "technical philosophy", then,
can we ever take the "mean" out of the "meaning"?
Like I said, I don't believe in Wittgenstein,
and whether or not he basically stole the Tractatus
from Frege under his tutelage then absconded to
Cambridge to fester under Russell, of course that's
not a usually considered fact.
Like other strong mathematical platonists since antiquity,
the idea that truth exists and is discovered, and that
right angles, straight lines, and perfect circles exist
regardless our mere mortal meanderings, makes for itself
that the later account of the apriori for the axiomatics
is simple since Proclus, then that accounts of language
and the inter-subjective are well-known since Lucretius
and Aristotle and sense.
That "space exists" is usually given in the negative since Aristotle
with "nature abhors a vacuum", yet one must acknowledge that it's
simply the result of an inductive argument and sticking with "substance exists", that yet "substrate exists" is certainly part of modern
theories like physics' with Einstein's.
Half-Aristotleans and other adherents to "the invincible ignorance
of inductive inference" plainly _fail_ in the super-classical, which is.
Zero, one, and infinity are the regular singular points of the hypergeometric.
"Numbers exist" is not only a usual account of platonism the
mathematical platonism, also they say you don't exist.
There's "differential geometry", often the main of which should
be called "partial differential geometry", since similarly to
how "classical functions" won't admit vertical tangents, that
"partial differential geometry" won't admit horizontal tangents.
When learning of this, I think most people would be apalled,
since it seems they intend to re-define "function" to be of
less generality than it is, then to claim more generality for
various numerical methods, when really it should be "pdg-functions",
that "partial differential geometry" is just a little sub-field.
Basically making accounts about the total and absolute about
"holonomy" then resulting an opposite meaning and calling it same,
makes for that "partial differential geometry" is considered
what it should be, since "differential geometry" would include
the "total" and "absolute" of the "differential geometry",
not "banning zero" since "banning infinity".
So, it's f'in wrong and a lie, much like "classical quasi-modal logic".
Zero is more than just a singularity, along with infinity, since singularities in what would be singularity theories are branches
in a multiplicity theory, then for example that the "identity
dimension", including zero, is an extended singularity, and the
envelope of the linear fractional equation, Clairaut's equation,
d'Alembert's equation, and so on, the integral equations.
Quantum mechanics since Born that basically intend to include
"rest" have the failing that much like Planck being smallest
yet finite, have that thusly they have no straight lines,
right angles, perfect circles, and so on.
Zero, one, and infinity are the regular singular points of
the hypergeometric.
So, zero meters-per-second, is, infinity seconds-per-meter.
Yet, what that ignores is that rest is transient, that
zero meters-per-second, is in seconds (secondae, after minutae,
units of time), and infinity seconds-per-meter, is also in seconds, everything all parameterized by time.
So, the dimensional analysis, is a bit too weakly the dimensionless
analysis, that a wider dimensioned analysis, brings in the non-local,
and the overall potentialistic account of theory, about which the
usual account of "the classical" is a bit "the partial".
It's similar the difference between "length" and "distance", or
about "metric" and "norm": no longer do meters suffice, since,
distance is meters in time/time, about the infinitely-many higher orders
of acceleration all in time.
Further reductionist accounts result zero (by zero).
There's Hume with necessity of relevance logic and Frege with language
quite structured, about kicking Hobbes, Wittgenstein, etc.
Did Wittgenstein simply _steal_ the Tractatus from Frege, many
of whose works shortly thereafter were burned up? There are
yet posthumous Frege writings to be dug up, while it's so that
Frege already had a great account of language and that after logic.
When Frank Ramsey went to Austria to translate Wittgenstein's
copy of the Tractatus, and spent it mostly with Wittgenstein
not helping, then later back at Cambridge mostly was against
Wittgenstein, does it suggest that Wittgenstein was a fraud
and later a fraudster? Here it's a hunch, yet the stylistic
account that there's no way young hot-head Wittgenstein wrote
the Tractatus, that Ramsey was a pretty great mind.
Then there's Hume, the "problem of induction" usually enough mis-read,
that Hume demands a modal temporal relevance logic, then also makes
for accounts of the strength of the wider, fuller dialectic.
So, putting down Wittgenstein as a plagiarist in language games after
Frege, the Heidegger as a plagiarist in language games after
Parmenidies, then Nietzsche as a plagiarist in language games after
Emerson, and Russell as a plagiarist after Philo, they're weak anti-Platos.
Which make examples of object lessons, ....
Usual proof systems' reliance on "total functions" and "class
primitives" is more a failure than mere "incompleteness".
There are others, ....
The damnation as it were to "the invincible ignorance of inductive
inference" among "completing claims" and "conflicting conclusions"
of "contrasting or irresolute regularities/rulialities" makes for why
that a real modal, temporal relevance logic is necessary for sound
reasoning, in a wide account.
I'm a canonical dogmatic doctrinal researcher in
a paleo-classical post-modern account with a thorough
account of reason and super-classical reasoning,
not an ingrate.
It's hard to say what would be "original" thought, though,
for example, I introduce something like an "original" as
an "originary" analysis for mathematics like "the identity dimension".
Attaining to "Truth" is a usual account of seeking wisdom,
then that accounts of "Foundations" have very, very strong
requirements for their satisfaction of being thorough.
So, the "paleo-classical post-modern" as "super-classical
super-modern" makes for that historicity, metaphysics,
and monism are present.
Anybody has their own philosophy and psychology.
An account of a holistic dual monism, for example in the West from
Heraclitus and in the East from Zen or the Dao, is completely trivial
from accounts of "Being" and "Universe", and inverse.
Free-will is given as an account of individual freedom, including
freedom of religion, where what people bind themselves to as the lig-ous
or their ligatures their ontological commitment, may include
for example "atheism", or even "nihilism", then that free-will is
nominally un-falsifiable with regards to otherwise stimulus and
response, and randomness or stochasticity, thusly that it's "super-scientific": not necessarily un-scientific, simply super.
So, "holistic dual monism" is for an account of "dually-self-infraconsistency", for paradox-free reason, so that
reason is not wrong and you're right.
Tarski's account of model-relative non-self-contradiction
is simple, closed, and inductively-biased empirical non-affirmation.
https://www.youtube.com/@rossfinlayson
How about 200+ hours of unscripted lectures?
"Axiomless Principled Thea-theory"
I summed it up in "Axiomless Principled Thea-theory".
It's a "theory of everything" where "truth" is the quantity,
and it's conserved, always-everywhere and always-becoming.
It's a theory where as a heno-theory then various accounts
of heno-theory make for theories like logic, and mathematics
with geometry and arithmetic, and language with language
and words (and probability and physics).
There's a modal, temporal relevance logic, that's classical.
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