• Re: The latest slew of prompted lemmas, "almost-quite" (verum/certum)

    From Ross Finlayson@ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com to sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Oct 26 09:44:27 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.math

    On 10/08/2026 06:54 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
    On 10/08/2026 06:24 AM, sobriquet wrote:
    Op 8-10-2026 om 05:21 schreef Ross Finlayson:
    On 10/07/2026 07:20 PM, sobriquet wrote:
    [..]
    Do you think AI will have solved all the remaining Millennium-prize
    problems by the end of next year?
    It seems they pretty rapidly went from being able to solve high-school >>>> level Math Olympiad problems to research level math problems.


    No, I think that a variety of Hilbert or Clay problems
    are _independent_ "standard" or "ordinary" number theory
    after "standard" and "ordinary" set theory the usual
    descriptive set theory's account, then that solvers like
    HOL/Isabelle/Coq/Lean and so on where the primitives are
    classes for relation suffer all the aspects of class/set
    distinction, then furthermore, primitives of "total functions"
    suffer from that there exists non-Cartesian functions,
    like "sweep", the natural/unit equivalency function.


    I think a variety of what's considered in the extrapolation
    is that what's been "solved" isn't really considered "solved",
    either. I.e., people are reading too much into the results,
    as about the "almost-quite", here.


    Thanks for writing, good luck in your endeavors.



    For now it seems like it will be like Euclid, gathering all existing
    math and formalizing it into a comprehensive framework (Lean).
    It will be really interesting when it starts coming up with new math
    concepts, but I reckon that would still require some sort of
    breakthrough, since it seems it can't even come up with concepts from
    scratch for toy problems like the game of go.


    There's the Cantorian Continuum Hypothesis, which supposedly
    contributed to Cantor's madness that he couldn't prove it,
    then that Goedel showed it consistent (shown) one way,
    von Neumann the other way which is usually excluded,
    then Cohen added more baggage and an axiom of forcing
    to result it "independent" instead of "inconsistent",
    while yet various inductive arguments contradict each
    other and thus in the weaker sort of account of induction,
    have it "inconsistent".


    It's so that mathematics has accounts of independence after
    each of its accounts of openings/perestroikas/catastrophes,
    since ancient times like for accounts of magnitudes or the
    Pythagorean and so on, up to the 1900's account about whether
    the reals and complex numbers are isomorphism then their _uniqueness_
    up to isomorphism, when for examples there is readily contrived
    other structures that fit the field axioms and are analytic,
    besides that division in complex numbers is another opening,
    helping show that mathematics the usual account of functional
    analysis is full of holes.

    "Openings", then, like openings in games, where chess is a
    set-piece while go is a blank slate, with a lattice, about chess
    or go or tong qi or the like, there is that "singularities in
    a singularity theory are branches in a multiplicity theory".

    Then, about the usual order of description of operations,
    like those of arithmetic, then for example about whether
    convolution is first or last or eventual, and it varies,
    makes for accounts of the equi-interpretability of model theories.


    So, the Cantorian with almost-all transcendental and the
    Pythagorean with almost-all rational plainly don't agree,
    yet either on its own account, then for what meets in the
    middle "the middle of nowhere" that accounts of weak induction
    will always fail to conclude concomitantly exist, yet that
    the super-classical account of motion always concludes does.


    We already have one.







    That's a big "if".


    "Common-sensical" is by definition a sort of reflection on
    the inter-subjective and all the accounts of _reason_.


    As "reflection on reason", and "structured reflection on
    reason", then philosophy in a sense is about thinking beings
    and feeling beings about human condition where man is animal
    and man is machine, yet, man is mind, which is somehow sublime,
    where for example it's an opinion that there's not a mind/body
    problem, instead that a sort of holistic dual monism makes
    for an account of paradox-free reason for theory primarily.


    Then, sometimes "philosopher" is inclusive, and means any
    thinking-being engaging in first-class reason, and sometimes
    it's exclusive, meaning we're only yet attaining to be
    "true philosophers", about what's "Truth" vis-a-vis
    what's "true".


    The notion of "philocasuy" then at least is a form of philosophy
    that's yet rather more demanding its fulfillment.

    Then, we might separate the "technical philosophy" from the
    "analytical philosophy", or the "technical" from the "techno-analytic",
    that any usual common-sensical abstraction is well enough "analytic"
    or "techno-analytic", yet, in terms of a theory overall and an
    overall theory to be "technical", to be subjectable to technique,
    that "most philosophers" these days would consider themselves in
    their "paleo-classical, post-modern" approach to be analytical,
    that logic and mathematics makes quite strong requirements what's
    to be properly "technical".


    Then, "moral philosophy" is its own sort of account about the
    human condition, basically reflecting on free-will I haven't
    much spoken to it, while I maintain notions of "absolute"
    ethics and morals as for and above one-self.

    Nobody's perfect, ..., "Truth" is, though.



    How about "extreme rationalism" since "structural realism",
    and then for "Foundations" and something like a "theatheory"
    as a putative candidate for a Foundations a theory-of-everything,
    in the technical sense for a constant, consistent, complete,
    and concrete account of a paleo-classical post-modern treatment
    of reason on Truth?


    Reflections on reason?

    That for a "technical philosophy", then,
    can we ever take the "mean" out of the "meaning"?




    Like I said, I don't believe in Wittgenstein,
    and whether or not he basically stole the Tractatus
    from Frege under his tutelage then absconded to
    Cambridge to fester under Russell, of course that's
    not a usually considered fact.


    Like other strong mathematical platonists since antiquity,
    the idea that truth exists and is discovered, and that
    right angles, straight lines, and perfect circles exist
    regardless our mere mortal meanderings, makes for itself
    that the later account of the apriori for the axiomatics
    is simple since Proclus, then that accounts of language
    and the inter-subjective are well-known since Lucretius
    and Aristotle and sense.




    That "space exists" is usually given in the negative since Aristotle
    with "nature abhors a vacuum", yet one must acknowledge that it's
    simply the result of an inductive argument and sticking with "substance exists", that yet "substrate exists" is certainly part of modern
    theories like physics' with Einstein's.


    Half-Aristotleans and other adherents to "the invincible ignorance
    of inductive inference" plainly _fail_ in the super-classical, which is.



    Zero, one, and infinity are the regular singular points of the
    hypergeometric.


    "Numbers exist" is not only a usual account of platonism the
    mathematical platonism, also they say you don't exist.



    There's "differential geometry", often the main of which should
    be called "partial differential geometry", since similarly to
    how "classical functions" won't admit vertical tangents, that
    "partial differential geometry" won't admit horizontal tangents.

    When learning of this, I think most people would be apalled,
    since it seems they intend to re-define "function" to be of
    less generality than it is, then to claim more generality for
    various numerical methods, when really it should be "pdg-functions",
    that "partial differential geometry" is just a little sub-field.


    Basically making accounts about the total and absolute about
    "holonomy" then resulting an opposite meaning and calling it same,
    makes for that "partial differential geometry" is considered
    what it should be, since "differential geometry" would include
    the "total" and "absolute" of the "differential geometry",
    not "banning zero" since "banning infinity".


    So, it's f'in wrong and a lie, much like "classical quasi-modal logic".


    Zero is more than just a singularity, along with infinity, since
    singularities in what would be singularity theories are branches
    in a multiplicity theory, then for example that the "identity
    dimension", including zero, is an extended singularity, and the
    envelope of the linear fractional equation, Clairaut's equation,
    d'Alembert's equation, and so on, the integral equations.


    Quantum mechanics since Born that basically intend to include
    "rest" have the failing that much like Planck being smallest
    yet finite, have that thusly they have no straight lines,
    right angles, perfect circles, and so on.



    Zero, one, and infinity are the regular singular points of
    the hypergeometric.



    So, zero meters-per-second, is, infinity seconds-per-meter.
    Yet, what that ignores is that rest is transient, that
    zero meters-per-second, is in seconds (secondae, after minutae,
    units of time), and infinity seconds-per-meter, is also in seconds,
    everything all parameterized by time.

    So, the dimensional analysis, is a bit too weakly the dimensionless
    analysis, that a wider dimensioned analysis, brings in the non-local,
    and the overall potentialistic account of theory, about which the
    usual account of "the classical" is a bit "the partial".


    It's similar the difference between "length" and "distance", or
    about "metric" and "norm": no longer do meters suffice, since,
    distance is meters in time/time, about the infinitely-many higher orders
    of acceleration all in time.

    Further reductionist accounts result zero (by zero).






    There's Hume with necessity of relevance logic and Frege with language
    quite structured, about kicking Hobbes, Wittgenstein, etc.


    Did Wittgenstein simply _steal_ the Tractatus from Frege, many
    of whose works shortly thereafter were burned up? There are
    yet posthumous Frege writings to be dug up, while it's so that
    Frege already had a great account of language and that after logic.


    When Frank Ramsey went to Austria to translate Wittgenstein's
    copy of the Tractatus, and spent it mostly with Wittgenstein
    not helping, then later back at Cambridge mostly was against
    Wittgenstein, does it suggest that Wittgenstein was a fraud
    and later a fraudster? Here it's a hunch, yet the stylistic
    account that there's no way young hot-head Wittgenstein wrote
    the Tractatus, that Ramsey was a pretty great mind.


    Then there's Hume, the "problem of induction" usually enough mis-read,
    that Hume demands a modal temporal relevance logic, then also makes
    for accounts of the strength of the wider, fuller dialectic.


    So, putting down Wittgenstein as a plagiarist in language games after
    Frege, the Heidegger as a plagiarist in language games after
    Parmenidies, then Nietzsche as a plagiarist in language games after
    Emerson, and Russell as a plagiarist after Philo, they're weak anti-Platos.


    Which make examples of object lessons, ....




    Usual proof systems' reliance on "total functions" and "class
    primitives" is more a failure than mere "incompleteness".

    There are others, ....

    The damnation as it were to "the invincible ignorance of inductive
    inference" among "completing claims" and "conflicting conclusions"
    of "contrasting or irresolute regularities/rulialities" makes for why
    that a real modal, temporal relevance logic is necessary for sound
    reasoning, in a wide account.


    I'm a canonical dogmatic doctrinal researcher in
    a paleo-classical post-modern account with a thorough
    account of reason and super-classical reasoning,
    not an ingrate.


    It's hard to say what would be "original" thought, though,
    for example, I introduce something like an "original" as
    an "originary" analysis for mathematics like "the identity dimension".

    Attaining to "Truth" is a usual account of seeking wisdom,
    then that accounts of "Foundations" have very, very strong
    requirements for their satisfaction of being thorough.


    So, the "paleo-classical post-modern" as "super-classical
    super-modern" makes for that historicity, metaphysics,
    and monism are present.



    Anybody has their own philosophy and psychology.





    An account of a holistic dual monism, for example in the West from
    Heraclitus and in the East from Zen or the Dao, is completely trivial
    from accounts of "Being" and "Universe", and inverse.

    Free-will is given as an account of individual freedom, including
    freedom of religion, where what people bind themselves to as the lig-ous
    or their ligatures their ontological commitment, may include
    for example "atheism", or even "nihilism", then that free-will is
    nominally un-falsifiable with regards to otherwise stimulus and
    response, and randomness or stochasticity, thusly that it's
    "super-scientific": not necessarily un-scientific, simply super.


    So, "holistic dual monism" is for an account of
    "dually-self-infraconsistency", for paradox-free reason, so that
    reason is not wrong and you're right.



    Tarski's account of model-relative non-self-contradiction
    is simple, closed, and inductively-biased empirical non-affirmation.



    https://www.youtube.com/@rossfinlayson

    How about 200+ hours of unscripted lectures?

    "Axiomless Principled Thea-theory"


    I summed it up in "Axiomless Principled Thea-theory".


    It's a "theory of everything" where "truth" is the quantity,
    and it's conserved, always-everywhere and always-becoming.

    It's a theory where as a heno-theory then various accounts
    of heno-theory make for theories like logic, and mathematics
    with geometry and arithmetic, and language with language
    and words (and probability and physics).

    There's a modal, temporal relevance logic, that's classical.
















    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Ross Finlayson@ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com to sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Oct 27 09:47:55 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.math

    On 10/26/2026 09:44 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
    On 10/08/2026 06:54 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
    On 10/08/2026 06:24 AM, sobriquet wrote:
    Op 8-10-2026 om 05:21 schreef Ross Finlayson:
    On 10/07/2026 07:20 PM, sobriquet wrote:
    [..]
    Do you think AI will have solved all the remaining Millennium-prize
    problems by the end of next year?
    It seems they pretty rapidly went from being able to solve high-school >>>>> level Math Olympiad problems to research level math problems.


    No, I think that a variety of Hilbert or Clay problems
    are _independent_ "standard" or "ordinary" number theory
    after "standard" and "ordinary" set theory the usual
    descriptive set theory's account, then that solvers like
    HOL/Isabelle/Coq/Lean and so on where the primitives are
    classes for relation suffer all the aspects of class/set
    distinction, then furthermore, primitives of "total functions"
    suffer from that there exists non-Cartesian functions,
    like "sweep", the natural/unit equivalency function.


    I think a variety of what's considered in the extrapolation
    is that what's been "solved" isn't really considered "solved",
    either. I.e., people are reading too much into the results,
    as about the "almost-quite", here.


    Thanks for writing, good luck in your endeavors.



    For now it seems like it will be like Euclid, gathering all existing
    math and formalizing it into a comprehensive framework (Lean).
    It will be really interesting when it starts coming up with new math
    concepts, but I reckon that would still require some sort of
    breakthrough, since it seems it can't even come up with concepts from
    scratch for toy problems like the game of go.


    There's the Cantorian Continuum Hypothesis, which supposedly
    contributed to Cantor's madness that he couldn't prove it,
    then that Goedel showed it consistent (shown) one way,
    von Neumann the other way which is usually excluded,
    then Cohen added more baggage and an axiom of forcing
    to result it "independent" instead of "inconsistent",
    while yet various inductive arguments contradict each
    other and thus in the weaker sort of account of induction,
    have it "inconsistent".


    It's so that mathematics has accounts of independence after
    each of its accounts of openings/perestroikas/catastrophes,
    since ancient times like for accounts of magnitudes or the
    Pythagorean and so on, up to the 1900's account about whether
    the reals and complex numbers are isomorphism then their _uniqueness_
    up to isomorphism, when for examples there is readily contrived
    other structures that fit the field axioms and are analytic,
    besides that division in complex numbers is another opening,
    helping show that mathematics the usual account of functional
    analysis is full of holes.

    "Openings", then, like openings in games, where chess is a
    set-piece while go is a blank slate, with a lattice, about chess
    or go or tong qi or the like, there is that "singularities in
    a singularity theory are branches in a multiplicity theory".

    Then, about the usual order of description of operations,
    like those of arithmetic, then for example about whether
    convolution is first or last or eventual, and it varies,
    makes for accounts of the equi-interpretability of model theories.


    So, the Cantorian with almost-all transcendental and the
    Pythagorean with almost-all rational plainly don't agree,
    yet either on its own account, then for what meets in the
    middle "the middle of nowhere" that accounts of weak induction
    will always fail to conclude concomitantly exist, yet that
    the super-classical account of motion always concludes does.


    We already have one.







    That's a big "if".


    "Common-sensical" is by definition a sort of reflection on
    the inter-subjective and all the accounts of _reason_.


    As "reflection on reason", and "structured reflection on
    reason", then philosophy in a sense is about thinking beings
    and feeling beings about human condition where man is animal
    and man is machine, yet, man is mind, which is somehow sublime,
    where for example it's an opinion that there's not a mind/body
    problem, instead that a sort of holistic dual monism makes
    for an account of paradox-free reason for theory primarily.


    Then, sometimes "philosopher" is inclusive, and means any
    thinking-being engaging in first-class reason, and sometimes
    it's exclusive, meaning we're only yet attaining to be
    "true philosophers", about what's "Truth" vis-a-vis
    what's "true".


    The notion of "philocasuy" then at least is a form of philosophy
    that's yet rather more demanding its fulfillment.

    Then, we might separate the "technical philosophy" from the
    "analytical philosophy", or the "technical" from the "techno-analytic",
    that any usual common-sensical abstraction is well enough "analytic"
    or "techno-analytic", yet, in terms of a theory overall and an
    overall theory to be "technical", to be subjectable to technique,
    that "most philosophers" these days would consider themselves in
    their "paleo-classical, post-modern" approach to be analytical,
    that logic and mathematics makes quite strong requirements what's
    to be properly "technical".


    Then, "moral philosophy" is its own sort of account about the
    human condition, basically reflecting on free-will I haven't
    much spoken to it, while I maintain notions of "absolute"
    ethics and morals as for and above one-self.

    Nobody's perfect, ..., "Truth" is, though.



    How about "extreme rationalism" since "structural realism",
    and then for "Foundations" and something like a "theatheory"
    as a putative candidate for a Foundations a theory-of-everything,
    in the technical sense for a constant, consistent, complete,
    and concrete account of a paleo-classical post-modern treatment
    of reason on Truth?


    Reflections on reason?

    That for a "technical philosophy", then,
    can we ever take the "mean" out of the "meaning"?




    Like I said, I don't believe in Wittgenstein,
    and whether or not he basically stole the Tractatus
    from Frege under his tutelage then absconded to
    Cambridge to fester under Russell, of course that's
    not a usually considered fact.


    Like other strong mathematical platonists since antiquity,
    the idea that truth exists and is discovered, and that
    right angles, straight lines, and perfect circles exist
    regardless our mere mortal meanderings, makes for itself
    that the later account of the apriori for the axiomatics
    is simple since Proclus, then that accounts of language
    and the inter-subjective are well-known since Lucretius
    and Aristotle and sense.




    That "space exists" is usually given in the negative since Aristotle
    with "nature abhors a vacuum", yet one must acknowledge that it's
    simply the result of an inductive argument and sticking with "substance exists", that yet "substrate exists" is certainly part of modern
    theories like physics' with Einstein's.


    Half-Aristotleans and other adherents to "the invincible ignorance
    of inductive inference" plainly _fail_ in the super-classical, which is.



    Zero, one, and infinity are the regular singular points of the hypergeometric.


    "Numbers exist" is not only a usual account of platonism the
    mathematical platonism, also they say you don't exist.



    There's "differential geometry", often the main of which should
    be called "partial differential geometry", since similarly to
    how "classical functions" won't admit vertical tangents, that
    "partial differential geometry" won't admit horizontal tangents.

    When learning of this, I think most people would be apalled,
    since it seems they intend to re-define "function" to be of
    less generality than it is, then to claim more generality for
    various numerical methods, when really it should be "pdg-functions",
    that "partial differential geometry" is just a little sub-field.


    Basically making accounts about the total and absolute about
    "holonomy" then resulting an opposite meaning and calling it same,
    makes for that "partial differential geometry" is considered
    what it should be, since "differential geometry" would include
    the "total" and "absolute" of the "differential geometry",
    not "banning zero" since "banning infinity".


    So, it's f'in wrong and a lie, much like "classical quasi-modal logic".


    Zero is more than just a singularity, along with infinity, since singularities in what would be singularity theories are branches
    in a multiplicity theory, then for example that the "identity
    dimension", including zero, is an extended singularity, and the
    envelope of the linear fractional equation, Clairaut's equation,
    d'Alembert's equation, and so on, the integral equations.


    Quantum mechanics since Born that basically intend to include
    "rest" have the failing that much like Planck being smallest
    yet finite, have that thusly they have no straight lines,
    right angles, perfect circles, and so on.



    Zero, one, and infinity are the regular singular points of
    the hypergeometric.



    So, zero meters-per-second, is, infinity seconds-per-meter.
    Yet, what that ignores is that rest is transient, that
    zero meters-per-second, is in seconds (secondae, after minutae,
    units of time), and infinity seconds-per-meter, is also in seconds, everything all parameterized by time.

    So, the dimensional analysis, is a bit too weakly the dimensionless
    analysis, that a wider dimensioned analysis, brings in the non-local,
    and the overall potentialistic account of theory, about which the
    usual account of "the classical" is a bit "the partial".


    It's similar the difference between "length" and "distance", or
    about "metric" and "norm": no longer do meters suffice, since,
    distance is meters in time/time, about the infinitely-many higher orders
    of acceleration all in time.

    Further reductionist accounts result zero (by zero).






    There's Hume with necessity of relevance logic and Frege with language
    quite structured, about kicking Hobbes, Wittgenstein, etc.


    Did Wittgenstein simply _steal_ the Tractatus from Frege, many
    of whose works shortly thereafter were burned up? There are
    yet posthumous Frege writings to be dug up, while it's so that
    Frege already had a great account of language and that after logic.


    When Frank Ramsey went to Austria to translate Wittgenstein's
    copy of the Tractatus, and spent it mostly with Wittgenstein
    not helping, then later back at Cambridge mostly was against
    Wittgenstein, does it suggest that Wittgenstein was a fraud
    and later a fraudster? Here it's a hunch, yet the stylistic
    account that there's no way young hot-head Wittgenstein wrote
    the Tractatus, that Ramsey was a pretty great mind.


    Then there's Hume, the "problem of induction" usually enough mis-read,
    that Hume demands a modal temporal relevance logic, then also makes
    for accounts of the strength of the wider, fuller dialectic.


    So, putting down Wittgenstein as a plagiarist in language games after
    Frege, the Heidegger as a plagiarist in language games after
    Parmenidies, then Nietzsche as a plagiarist in language games after
    Emerson, and Russell as a plagiarist after Philo, they're weak anti-Platos.


    Which make examples of object lessons, ....




    Usual proof systems' reliance on "total functions" and "class
    primitives" is more a failure than mere "incompleteness".

    There are others, ....

    The damnation as it were to "the invincible ignorance of inductive
    inference" among "completing claims" and "conflicting conclusions"
    of "contrasting or irresolute regularities/rulialities" makes for why
    that a real modal, temporal relevance logic is necessary for sound
    reasoning, in a wide account.


    I'm a canonical dogmatic doctrinal researcher in
    a paleo-classical post-modern account with a thorough
    account of reason and super-classical reasoning,
    not an ingrate.


    It's hard to say what would be "original" thought, though,
    for example, I introduce something like an "original" as
    an "originary" analysis for mathematics like "the identity dimension".

    Attaining to "Truth" is a usual account of seeking wisdom,
    then that accounts of "Foundations" have very, very strong
    requirements for their satisfaction of being thorough.


    So, the "paleo-classical post-modern" as "super-classical
    super-modern" makes for that historicity, metaphysics,
    and monism are present.



    Anybody has their own philosophy and psychology.





    An account of a holistic dual monism, for example in the West from
    Heraclitus and in the East from Zen or the Dao, is completely trivial
    from accounts of "Being" and "Universe", and inverse.

    Free-will is given as an account of individual freedom, including
    freedom of religion, where what people bind themselves to as the lig-ous
    or their ligatures their ontological commitment, may include
    for example "atheism", or even "nihilism", then that free-will is
    nominally un-falsifiable with regards to otherwise stimulus and
    response, and randomness or stochasticity, thusly that it's "super-scientific": not necessarily un-scientific, simply super.


    So, "holistic dual monism" is for an account of "dually-self-infraconsistency", for paradox-free reason, so that
    reason is not wrong and you're right.



    Tarski's account of model-relative non-self-contradiction
    is simple, closed, and inductively-biased empirical non-affirmation.



    https://www.youtube.com/@rossfinlayson

    How about 200+ hours of unscripted lectures?

    "Axiomless Principled Thea-theory"


    I summed it up in "Axiomless Principled Thea-theory".


    It's a "theory of everything" where "truth" is the quantity,
    and it's conserved, always-everywhere and always-becoming.

    It's a theory where as a heno-theory then various accounts
    of heno-theory make for theories like logic, and mathematics
    with geometry and arithmetic, and language with language
    and words (and probability and physics).

    There's a modal, temporal relevance logic, that's classical.


















    By now the other day a new result was "Exponential Time Hypothesis
    negated", yet that doesn't necessarily mean "P = NP", when it's
    just "sub-linear" instead of "linear", just like "factorial"
    isn't according to Big O less than "exponential", though it is
    sort of "half-exponential" in practice, about Big O, little o,
    and theta (or Theta), in asymptotics.

    Also there is a great reading called "Polynomial Approximations
    to NP-hard problems" since the 1990's which is also as for
    accounts of numerical methods making for cases and that
    basically it's also another example of "almost-quite".


    That's the sort of sensationalist claim that more sedate
    and responsible types see as overblown.

    Factorial is faster than exponential though,
    also people who say hash-map lookup is O(1)
    instead of O(log(n)), or O(log(n)) for colliding
    keys, are wrong.



    About the actual exponential and that at least one point
    its derivative is linear and a constant and equals one,
    and about larger numbers and having a giant super-scalar solving what
    are "exponential" in the "linear" then the "constant", those are very
    large lines and even larger constants.


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