On 10/9/2026 3:50 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 04/10/2026 16:22, olcott wrote:
On 10/4/2026 6:30 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/10/2026 14:55, olcott wrote:
On 10/2/2026 4:37 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 01/10/2026 17:47, olcott wrote:
On 10/1/2026 5:03 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 29/09/2026 19:31, olcott wrote:
On 9/29/2026 11:01 AM, Python wrote:
No, Pete. Calling an undecidable sentence "out-of-scope" does >>>>>>>>>> not make undecidability disappear.
For a formal theory T, "G is undecidable in T" simply means >>>>>>>>>>
-a-a-a T |-/- G-a-a-a and-a-a-a T |-/- ~G
That is a statement entirely about proofs. No model theory is >>>>>>>>>> involved.
And G is not "out-of-scope": it is a perfectly well-formed >>>>>>>>>> sentence of the language of T. What is out-of-scope,
apparently, is merely anything for which your proposed
semantics fails to supply an answer.
Within PTS any expression that is neither provable nor refutable >>>>>>>>> never acquires any semantic meaning.
There is one more thing one needs to consider: there is no complete >>>>>>>> method to find out whether a sentence or its negation can be
proven.
Consequently, it is not possible to construct a system that rejects >>>>>>>> all undecidable sentences.
If back-chained inference from expression X to axioms
has a loop it is rejected.
Irrelevant. A direct proof is either a forward chain from premises >>>>>> to conclusion and an indirect proof is a similar chain from tne
negation of the axioms and conclusion to a contradiction.
It turns out that automated proof systems expose
the correct details the most clearly. They used
back-chained inference. In any case when a finite
canonical proof is impossible then the expression
never gets semantically grounded.
Existence of a proof and existence of a meaning are irrelevant to
The Goldbach conjecture is meaningful yet its truth value will be
unknown unless and until it proof can be algorithmically compressed.
It might be the case that its truth value is unknowable. I restricted
my system to "the body of general knowledge that can be expressed in
language" to handle these edge cases.
each other. For example, the sentence reCx reCy (x * y = y * x) is
The Commutative Law For Multiplication
https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Basic_Laws_of_Algebra
meaningful in many theories and provable in some of them and
unporvable others.
That is merely a limitation of the individual formal systems.
My focus has always been on "the body of general knowledge
that can be expressed in language". I never really cared that
system X is too weak to fully express Y.
Does that include cases where X is Peano arithmetic and Y is a
proof that G is true about natural number?
Now I have (with the help of Gemini) finally totally
anchored my claim that in PTS the meaning of an
expression is only derived by the existence of a
canonical proof of it.
On 10/9/2026 3:45 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/10/2026 14:55, olcott wrote:
On 10/2/2026 4:37 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 01/10/2026 17:47, olcott wrote:
On 10/1/2026 5:03 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 29/09/2026 19:31, olcott wrote:
On 9/29/2026 11:01 AM, Python wrote:
No, Pete. Calling an undecidable sentence "out-of-scope" does >>>>>>>> not make undecidability disappear.
For a formal theory T, "G is undecidable in T" simply means
-a-a-a T |-/- G-a-a-a and-a-a-a T |-/- ~G
That is a statement entirely about proofs. No model theory is >>>>>>>> involved.
And G is not "out-of-scope": it is a perfectly well-formed
sentence of the language of T. What is out-of-scope, apparently, >>>>>>>> is merely anything for which your proposed semantics fails to >>>>>>>> supply an answer.
Within PTS any expression that is neither provable nor refutable >>>>>>> never acquires any semantic meaning.
There is one more thing one needs to consider: there is no complete >>>>>> method to find out whether a sentence or its negation can be proven. >>>>>> Consequently, it is not possible to construct a system that rejects >>>>>> all undecidable sentences.
If back-chained inference from expression X to axioms
has a loop it is rejected.
Irrelevant. A direct proof is either a forward chain from premises
to conclusion and an indirect proof is a similar chain from tne
negation of the axioms and conclusion to a contradiction.
It turns out that automated proof systems expose
the correct details the most clearly. They used
back-chained inference. In any case when a finite
canonical proof is impossible then the expression
never gets semantically grounded.
A sentence of natural number arithmetic has a well defined arithemtic
meaning, whether grounded or not. Existence of a proof from some set
of axioms is irrelevant to the arithmetic meaning.
**On the Relation Between HeytingrCOs**
**and GentzenrCOs Approaches to Meaning**
"GentzenrCOs idea could be summarized by saying that
-athe meaning of a sentence is determined by what
-acounts as a canonical proof of it..."
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-22686-6_2
On 10/9/2026 2:59 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 07/10/2026 16:10, polcott wrote:
On 10/7/2026 3:49 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 06/10/2026 15:32, olcott wrote:
On 10/6/2026 2:59 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 04/10/2026 16:22, olcott wrote:
On 10/4/2026 6:30 AM, Mikko wrote:It truth value will be known as soon as its proof has been
On 02/10/2026 14:55, olcott wrote:The Goldbach conjecture is meaningful yet its truth value will be >>>>>>> unknown unless and until it proof can be algorithmically compressed. >>>>>>
On 10/2/2026 4:37 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 01/10/2026 17:47, olcott wrote:
On 10/1/2026 5:03 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 29/09/2026 19:31, olcott wrote:
On 9/29/2026 11:01 AM, Python wrote:
No, Pete. Calling an undecidable sentence "out-of-scope" >>>>>>>>>>>>>> does not make undecidability disappear.
For a formal theory T, "G is undecidable in T" simply means >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
-a-a-a T |-/- G-a-a-a and-a-a-a T |-/- ~G
That is a statement entirely about proofs. No model theory >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is involved.
And G is not "out-of-scope": it is a perfectly well-formed >>>>>>>>>>>>>> sentence of the language of T. What is out-of-scope, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> apparently, is merely anything for which your proposed >>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantics fails to supply an answer.
Within PTS any expression that is neither provable nor >>>>>>>>>>>>> refutable
never acquires any semantic meaning.
There is one more thing one needs to consider: there is no >>>>>>>>>>>> complete
method to find out whether a sentence or its negation can be >>>>>>>>>>>> proven.
Consequently, it is not possible to construct a system that >>>>>>>>>>>> rejects
all undecidable sentences.
If back-chained inference from expression X to axioms
has a loop it is rejected.
Irrelevant. A direct proof is either a forward chain from >>>>>>>>>> premises
to conclusion and an indirect proof is a similar chain from tne >>>>>>>>>> negation of the axioms and conclusion to a contradiction.
It turns out that automated proof systems expose
the correct details the most clearly. They used
back-chained inference. In any case when a finite
canonical proof is impossible then the expression
never gets semantically grounded.
Existence of a proof and existence of a meaning are irrelevant to >>>>>>>
chekcked and
found good. The proof can be algorithmically compressed as soon as >>>>>> it is
found, even before the verification, though that is irrelevant to the >>>>>> knowledge of its truth. Thought it is possible that it will be
found to
be unprovable. But none of that affects its meaning and
meaningfulness.
What PTS says about its meaning is irrelevant.
A finite proof might not exist.
It may forever remain unknowable
thus outside of the domain of knowledge.
Maybe, maybe not. If it ever will be found it is in the domain
of knowledge and has always been.
Unless at least one mind contains a truth such as
the ratio of the diameter to the circumference of
a circle back in caveman days I construe this as
outside of the domain of knowledge at the time.
An obvious attempt to decive (this time a change of subject) does not
work. In order to decive one needs to behave as a honest person would.
It seems incorrect to call anything "knowledge" that
no one has ever known. We can call it unknown truth.
On 10/5/2026 3:19 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 01/10/2026 17:47, olcott wrote:
On 10/1/2026 5:03 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 29/09/2026 19:31, olcott wrote:
On 9/29/2026 11:01 AM, Python wrote:
No, Pete. Calling an undecidable sentence "out-of-scope" does not >>>>>> make undecidability disappear.
For a formal theory T, "G is undecidable in T" simply means
-a-a-a T |-/- G-a-a-a and-a-a-a T |-/- ~G
That is a statement entirely about proofs. No model theory is
involved.
And G is not "out-of-scope": it is a perfectly well-formed
sentence of the language of T. What is out-of-scope, apparently,
is merely anything for which your proposed semantics fails to
supply an answer.
Within PTS any expression that is neither provable nor refutable
never acquires any semantic meaning.
There is one more thing one needs to consider: there is no complete
method to find out whether a sentence or its negation can be proven.
Consequently, it is not possible to construct a system that rejects
all undecidable sentences.
If back-chained inference from expression X to axioms
has a loop it is rejected.
Irrelevant. Proofs are finite strings and strings don't contain
loops.
Unprovable and irrefutable in PA entails that
G never acquires semantic meaning in PA.
On 10/5/2026 3:19 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 01/10/2026 17:47, olcott wrote:
On 10/1/2026 5:03 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 29/09/2026 19:31, olcott wrote:
On 9/29/2026 11:01 AM, Python wrote:
No, Pete. Calling an undecidable sentence "out-of-scope" does not
make undecidability disappear.
For a formal theory T, "G is undecidable in T" simply means
-a-a-a T |-/- G-a-a-a and-a-a-a T |-/- ~G
That is a statement entirely about proofs. No model theory is
involved.
And G is not "out-of-scope": it is a perfectly well-formed
sentence of the language of T. What is out-of-scope, apparently,
is merely anything for which your proposed semantics fails to
supply an answer.
Within PTS any expression that is neither provable nor refutable
never acquires any semantic meaning.
There is one more thing one needs to consider: there is no complete
method to find out whether a sentence or its negation can be proven.
Consequently, it is not possible to construct a system that rejects
all undecidable sentences.
If back-chained inference from expression X to axioms
has a loop it is rejected.
Irrelevant. Proofs are finite strings and strings don't contain
loops.
Unprovable and irrefutable in PA entails that
G never acquires semantic meaning in PA.
Semantic meaning is only acquired by two types
of relations between finite strings.
(a) Stipulated relations provide the axiomatic basis.
(b) Semantic relations specified syntactically are
-a-a-a the only inference step that is allowed.
The above is the way that
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
has always worked in actual reality.
-a-a ... the diagonal lemma, with B(x) instantiatedThis applies to
...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
asserts its own unprovability. rCa (G||del 1931:40/43)
No, it does not. The quote is about a sentence and its interpretation,
not about any inference.
-a-a-a It would then be possible to reconstruct the
-a-a-a antinomy of the liar in the metalanguage, by
-a-a-a forming in the language itself a sentence x
-a-a-a such that the sentence of the metalanguage
-a-a-a which is correlated with x asserts that x is
-a-a-a not a true sentence.
-a-a-a https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
Maybe, maybe mot. But whther it would be possible does not matter
as it was not done.
-a-a to -4True(x), yields a counterexample to this
-a-a equivalence, by giving a "liar" formula S such
-a-a that S rf| -4True(g(S)) holds in N.
-a-a https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tarski%27s_undefinability_theorem
He implements this as the basis of his whole proof.
Formalized as:
x ree True if and only if p
where the symbol 'p' represents the whole sentence x https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
adapted to become this
x ree Pr if and only if p-a // line 1 of the proof
Here is the Tarski Undefinability Theorem proof
(1) x ree Provable if and only if p-a-a-a-a-a-a // assumption (see above)
(2) x ree True if and only if p-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a // Tarski's convention T
(3) x ree Provable if and only if x ree True. // (1) and (2) combined
(4) either x ree True or x|a ree True;-a-a-a-a-a // axiom: ~True(x) re? ~True(~x)
(5) if x ree Provable, then x ree True;-a // axiom: Provable(x) raA True(x) (6) if x|a ree Provable, then x|a ree True;-a // axiom: Provable(~x) raA True(~x)
(7) x ree True
(8) x ree Provable
(9) x|a ree Provable
This is the final resolution to the Liar Paradox that
conclusively proves that it never had a truth value.
| Sysop: | Amessyroom |
|---|---|
| Location: | Fayetteville, NC |
| Users: | 76 |
| Nodes: | 6 (0 / 6) |
| Uptime: | 55:41:31 |
| Calls: | 1,265 |
| Calls today: | 1 |
| Files: | 1,362 |
| D/L today: |
3 files (2,684K bytes) |
| Messages: | 285,687 |