• Re: Tarski Undefinability Theorem is refuted

    From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Sat Nov 7 12:20:50 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 05/10/2026 14:28, olcott wrote:
    On 10/5/2026 3:19 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 01/10/2026 17:47, olcott wrote:
    On 10/1/2026 5:03 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/09/2026 19:31, olcott wrote:
    On 9/29/2026 11:01 AM, Python wrote:
    No, Pete. Calling an undecidable sentence "out-of-scope" does not
    make undecidability disappear.

    For a formal theory T, "G is undecidable in T" simply means

    -a-a-a T |-/- G-a-a-a and-a-a-a T |-/- ~G

    That is a statement entirely about proofs. No model theory is
    involved.

    And G is not "out-of-scope": it is a perfectly well-formed
    sentence of the language of T. What is out-of-scope, apparently,
    is merely anything for which your proposed semantics fails to
    supply an answer.

    Within PTS any expression that is neither provable nor refutable
    never acquires any semantic meaning.

    There is one more thing one needs to consider: there is no complete
    method to find out whether a sentence or its negation can be proven.
    Consequently, it is not possible to construct a system that rejects
    all undecidable sentences.

    If back-chained inference from expression X to axioms
    has a loop it is rejected.

    Irrelevant. Proofs are finite strings and strings don't contain
    loops.


    Unprovable and irrefutable in PA entails that
    G never acquires semantic meaning in PA.

    Semantic meaning is only acquired by two types
    of relations between finite strings.
    (a) Stipulated relations provide the axiomatic basis.

    (b) Semantic relations specified syntactically are
    -a-a-a the only inference step that is allowed.

    The above is the way that
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    has always worked in actual reality.

    This applies to

    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability. rCa (G||del 1931:40/43)

    No, it does not. The quote is about a sentence and its interpretation,
    not about any inference.

    -a-a-a It would then be possible to reconstruct the
    -a-a-a antinomy of the liar in the metalanguage, by
    -a-a-a forming in the language itself a sentence x
    -a-a-a such that the sentence of the metalanguage
    -a-a-a which is correlated with x asserts that x is
    -a-a-a not a true sentence.
    -a-a-a https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf

    Maybe, maybe mot. But whther it would be possible does not matter
    as it was not done.

    -a-a ... the diagonal lemma, with B(x) instantiated
    -a-a to -4True(x), yields a counterexample to this
    -a-a equivalence, by giving a "liar" formula S such
    -a-a that S rf| -4True(g(S)) holds in N.
    -a-a https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tarski%27s_undefinability_theorem

    He implements this as the basis of his whole proof.

    Formalized as:
    x ree True if and only if p
    where the symbol 'p' represents the whole sentence x https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf

    adapted to become this
    x ree Pr if and only if p-a // line 1 of the proof

    Here is the Tarski Undefinability Theorem proof
    (1) x ree Provable if and only if p-a-a-a-a-a-a // assumption (see above)
    (2) x ree True if and only if p-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a // Tarski's convention T
    (3) x ree Provable if and only if x ree True. // (1) and (2) combined
    (4) either x ree True or x|a ree True;-a-a-a-a-a // axiom: ~True(x) re? ~True(~x)
    (5) if x ree Provable, then x ree True;-a // axiom: Provable(x) raA True(x) (6) if x|a ree Provable, then x|a ree True;-a // axiom: Provable(~x) raA True(~x)
    (7) x ree True
    (8) x ree Provable
    (9) x|a ree Provable

    This is the final resolution to the Liar Paradox that
    conclusively proves that it never had a truth value.

    No, it has a truth value: true.

    His system is (perhaps covertly) inconsistent, explodes, and
    consequently every sentence is true and every unary predicate is
    trivially a truth predicate.

    The error is in believing that the contensive ontology that "-4" is a
    negating connective rather than a holding connective. That is a
    NONtology. While truth might be monotonic wrt system extension, clearly ontology is not; parts of an ontology may be inverted rather than merely weakened, strengthened or sustained by system extension.

    The clue is in the fact that Tarski's theorem includes the condition
    that the system has negation. By Modus Tollens we find that if it has a
    truth predicate then it does not have negation. Since we have no
    negation in the face of explosion we may have a truth predicate, and for
    any useful system we must and we already know we have no negation upon explosion.

    Clearly he has a covert rule of the sort "If 'forall P. P' Then 'P'"
    (common in the pre-war European era it seems but not assumed by Russell)
    which gives him explosion.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

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  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to sci.logic,comp.theory on Sat Nov 7 12:47:55 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 06/10/2026 13:45, olcott wrote:

    No final resolution of the Lair Paradox has ever been accepted.
    It remains an open problem because the people that understand
    the Liar Paradox and Prolog are a mutually exclusive set.

    Lol. Perhaps you understand the Liar Paradox then; your Prolog
    exposition of the same is still rubbish.

    The Liar Paradox is very deep and resolution clearly involves
    unification of contensive ontological propositions with time-varying non-monotonic logics and perhaps some sort of differential calculus of
    such logics to cover all possible /perceptions/ of sequences of thoughts
    about the meaning of the paradox' presentation.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

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  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to sci.logic,comp.theory on Sat Nov 7 13:39:50 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 06/10/2026 17:50, olcott wrote:
    On 10/6/2026 11:35 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

    Tarski is also a sort of retro-finitist reductionist.

    Do you ever have any substantial original thought that
    does not conform to some conventional textbook view?

    Would that be useful for many readers? I find that a real human stating
    true relations can be useful (well... not an arbitrary choice of
    relation from the full suite, obvs.).
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2026 Tristan Wibberley except
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  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to sci.logic,comp.theory on Sat Nov 7 13:45:28 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 06/10/2026 19:51, olcott wrote:
    On 10/6/2026 1:14 PM, Blaine wrote:
    Ross Finlayson wrote:
    [...]
    Anybody has their own philosophy and psychology.


    This is the first post I've seen by you that I have understood. Well,
    at least until I got to the word, 'monism'.

    Speaking with clarity is not his strongest skill.


    I think he's clear if you've read /exactly/ the same books in /exactly/
    the same order. Lots of philosophers have redefined words over the years
    with autoexplications as well as verbing nouns and nouning verbs until
    all combinations of words are valid sentences and the language has
    maximum entropy.

    He exposes the breadth and depth of the field(s) we're talking about and showcases doors to study that we may choose. Don't knock it too much.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2026 Tristan Wibberley except
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    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
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  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to sci.logic,comp.theory on Sat Nov 7 13:59:04 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 07/10/2026 20:06, Ross Finlayson wrote:
    A heno-theory is any account of a theory that intends to
    interpret any other theory, in terms of their "primary elements".

    A theory has no intention, its author might have an intention; does each heno-theory have one author with one intention or possibly many, each
    with different intentions at different times?

    I note that there are two meta levels (1 and 2 below) in your abstract
    of heno-theory:

    1. The heno-theory is an account,
    2. it's an account of a theory,
    3. it's an account of a theory that may be contensively related to a quantification of other theories.

    Did I pick up on that quirk correctly?

    Is there a henothea-theory?
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2026 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.
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