• =?UTF-8?Q?Re=3A_Within_Proof_Theoretic_Semantics_G=C3=B6del=27s_G_h?= =?UTF-8?Q?as_no_meaning_in_PA?=

    From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,sci.math.symbolic,comp.ai.philosophy on Sat Jun 20 17:50:25 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 23/04/2026 00:06, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-04-22 01:48, olcott wrote:
    On 4/22/2026 2:19 AM, Mikko wrote:

    It is a syntax error to use open variables -a in a definition.Besides
    KnownTrue is a bad name for a symbol that does not refer to knowledge.


    KnownTrue :=
    There exists a sequence of back-chained inference
    steps +o in PA such that -a reaches the axioms of PA

    That doesn't solve the problem of the open variable.

    You could solve this by changing it to KnownTrue(-a) := ...

    But I still think your better off dispensing with the formalism and
    simply expressing your ideas in English since you always mangle the formalism.

    Why not simply say:

    A proposition is known to be true if there is a sequence of back-chained inference steps from that proposition to the axioms of Peano Arithmetic.

    I'm not saying I agree with the above, but at least it is more clear
    than your attempts at formalism.


    "A proposition is known to be true [at least when] ..." isn't the same
    as "KnownTrue := ...". The former has extra semantics.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2026 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,sci.math.symbolic,comp.ai.philosophy on Sat Jun 20 12:32:15 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 6/20/2026 11:50 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 23/04/2026 00:06, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-04-22 01:48, olcott wrote:
    On 4/22/2026 2:19 AM, Mikko wrote:

    It is a syntax error to use open variables -a in a definition.Besides
    KnownTrue is a bad name for a symbol that does not refer to knowledge. >>>>

    KnownTrue :=
    There exists a sequence of back-chained inference
    steps +o in PA such that -a reaches the axioms of PA

    That doesn't solve the problem of the open variable.

    You could solve this by changing it to KnownTrue(-a) := ...

    But I still think your better off dispensing with the formalism and
    simply expressing your ideas in English since you always mangle the
    formalism.

    Why not simply say:

    A proposition is known to be true if there is a sequence of back-chained
    inference steps from that proposition to the axioms of Peano Arithmetic.

    I'm not saying I agree with the above, but at least it is more clear
    than your attempts at formalism.


    "A proposition is known to be true [at least when] ..." isn't the same
    as "KnownTrue := ...". The former has extra semantics.



    A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when
    it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
    PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz
    is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt
    with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x).
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,sci.math.symbolic,comp.ai.philosophy on Sat Jun 27 07:53:33 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:

    A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when
    it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
    PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz
    is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt
    with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x).


    That's surprising, disregard for axioms?
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2026 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Ross Finlayson@ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,sci.math.symbolic,comp.ai.philosophy on Sat Jun 27 07:19:11 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 06/26/2026 11:53 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:

    A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when
    it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
    PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz
    is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt
    with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x).


    That's surprising, disregard for axioms?






    It's sadly common these days with "non-classical logics"
    or "synthetic pluralism", the, "ignoring definition"
    or where that's defensible inside an axiomatics,
    "having contradictory definition".

    Some words have two definitions - a few have it that
    their definitions are opposites, like "entropy",
    Aristotle's and Leibnitz'. Mostly though if they're
    not the same they have different contexts altogether,
    so today's "pluralistic" accounts are almost always
    contradictory each other, and "non-classical logics"
    are quite often having contradictions in them.

    (Here "classical logic" is a modal, temporal, relevance
    logic, with axiomless natural deduction, that most people
    find as most usual the common sense logically about logic.)


    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From polcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math on Sat Jun 27 09:50:09 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:

    A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when
    it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
    PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz
    is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt
    with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x).


    That's surprising, disregard for axioms?



    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from
    ~reax x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~reax x=S(x) is
    ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.

    This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
    it means that ~reax x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math on Sun Jun 28 11:39:04 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:

    A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when
    it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
    PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz
    is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt
    with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x).

    That's surprising, disregard for axioms?

    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from
    ~reax x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~reax x=S(x) is
    ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.

    This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
    it means that ~reax x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q.

    It comes close. If reax x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but in the
    language of Q then ~reax x=S(x) and reax x=S(x) are both undecidable
    and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math on Sun Jun 28 21:52:26 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:

    A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when
    it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
    PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz
    is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt
    with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x).

    That's surprising, disregard for axioms?

    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from
    ~reax x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~reax x=S(x) is
    ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.

    This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
    it means that ~reax x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q.

    It comes close. If reax x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but in the
    language of Q then ~reax x=S(x) and reax x=S(x) are both undecidable
    and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean.


    Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make
    Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
    defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to
    its intended purpose. A car without an engine is
    incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math on Mon Jun 29 09:14:31 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
    On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:

    A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when
    it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
    PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz
    is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt
    with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x).

    That's surprising, disregard for axioms?

    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from
    ~reax x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~reax x=S(x) is
    ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.

    This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
    it means that ~reax x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q.

    It comes close. If reax x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but in the
    language of Q then ~reax x=S(x) and reax x=S(x) are both undecidable
    and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean.

    Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make
    Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
    defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to
    its intended purpose. A car without an engine is
    incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.

    Irrelevant. The definition of completeness inly refers to the
    sentences in the language of the theory. To bake a cake is an
    action, not a sentence, so irrelevant.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math on Mon Jun 29 10:50:16 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 27/06/2026 15:50, polcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:

    A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when
    it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
    PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz
    is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt
    with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x).


    That's surprising, disregard for axioms?



    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from
    ~reax x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~reax x=S(x) is
    ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.

    I understood that grounded means that there are no
    variables/indeterminates in the presentation of an object rather than
    that there is an inference to it from the axioms. As in "ground term" in prolog.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2026 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From polcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math on Mon Jun 29 08:01:55 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 6/29/2026 4:50 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 15:50, polcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:

    A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when
    it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
    PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz
    is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt
    with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x).


    That's surprising, disregard for axioms?



    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from
    ~reax x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~reax x=S(x) is
    ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.

    I understood that grounded means that there are no
    variables/indeterminates in the presentation of an object rather than
    that there is an inference to it from the axioms. As in "ground term" in prolog.


    In Prolog it would mean that the Rules cannot
    reach the Facts.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jun 29 08:29:53 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
    On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:

    A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when
    it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
    PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz
    is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt
    with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x).

    That's surprising, disregard for axioms?

    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from
    ~reax x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~reax x=S(x) is
    ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.

    This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
    it means that ~reax x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q.

    It comes close. If reax x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but in the
    language of Q then ~reax x=S(x) and reax x=S(x) are both undecidable
    and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean.

    Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make
    Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
    defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to
    its intended purpose. A car without an engine is
    incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.

    Irrelevant. The definition of completeness

    It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies)
    that something is missing that could be added to make
    it complete. The way that terms-of-the-art are formed
    is very misleading and as much as intentionally deceptive.

    "undecidable" often means input is semantically
    incoherent. Whenever the input is semantically
    incoherent it is more accurately called incoherent
    rather than undecidable.

    Food is called inedible for many reasons such as
    spoilage. We could also call a railroad tie inedible
    ignoring the type mismatch error. A railroad tie
    is inedible for the same kind of reason that some
    expressions are undecidable.

    inly refers to the
    sentences in the language of the theory. To bake a cake is an
    action, not a sentence, so irrelevant.


    Q intentionally defined to not be able to prove ~reax x=S(x).
    A car that had its engine removed to make it undrivable
    is not incomplete relative to its intended purpose.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jun 29 11:05:09 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 2026-06-29 07:29, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
    On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:

    A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when
    it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
    PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz
    is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt
    with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x).

    That's surprising, disregard for axioms?

    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from
    ~reax x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~reax x=S(x) is
    ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.

    This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
    it means that ~reax x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q.

    It comes close. If reax x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but in the
    language of Q then ~reax x=S(x) and reax x=S(x) are both undecidable
    and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean.

    Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make
    Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
    defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to
    its intended purpose. A car without an engine is
    incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.

    Irrelevant. The definition of completeness

    It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies)
    that something is missing that could be added to make
    it complete. The way that terms-of-the-art are formed
    is very misleading and as much as intentionally deceptive.

    You really need to learn that terms used in a given field have
    definitions within that field that may or may not correspond to what you
    want a term to mean, and that you actually need to learn those definitions.

    In mathematics, a system is incomplete if there are statements in the
    language of that system which can neither be proven nor disproven.

    That's *all* incomplete means. No more, no less. It doesn't mean that something is missing that could be added. It makes no reference
    whatsoever to the purpose for which a system was designed.

    When mathematicians talk about rings, do you object based on the fact
    that you can't put them on your finger?

    When mathematicians talk about fields, do you object based on the fact
    that nothing can graze on them?

    To put things in terms of your system, the term 'incomplete' as used by mathematicians has a different GUID than the term 'incomplete' when used colloquially, just as the term 'pen' has different GUIDs depending on
    whether it is used to store pigs or ink. [note that I do not actually
    endorse the use of GUIDs; that's just plain silly].

    Andr|-
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jun 29 13:16:26 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 6/29/2026 12:05 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 07:29, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
    On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:

    A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when
    it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
    PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz
    is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt
    with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x).

    That's surprising, disregard for axioms?

    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from
    ~reax x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~reax x=S(x) is
    ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.

    This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
    it means that ~reax x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q.

    It comes close. If reax x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but in the
    language of Q then ~reax x=S(x) and reax x=S(x) are both undecidable >>>>> and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean.

    Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make
    Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
    defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to
    its intended purpose. A car without an engine is
    incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.

    Irrelevant. The definition of completeness

    It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies)
    that something is missing that could be added to make
    it complete. The way that terms-of-the-art are formed
    is very misleading and as much as intentionally deceptive.

    You really need to learn that terms used in a given field have
    definitions within that field that may or may not correspond to what you want a term to mean, and that you actually need to learn those definitions.


    That is the way that it usually works. In Proof Theoretic
    Semantics each author has their own terms-of-the-art that
    has a very similar yet not exactly the same semantic meaning
    as entirely different terms-of-the-art used by another author.

    Also these meanings gradually evolve over time so they
    change in subtle ways from their original meanings.

    In mathematics, a system is incomplete if there are statements in the language of that system which can neither be proven nor disproven.


    Q was intentionally defined to handle less than PA
    thus is not at all in any way incomplete relative
    to its defined purpose.

    That's *all* incomplete means. No more, no less. It doesn't mean that something is missing that could be added. It makes no reference
    whatsoever to the purpose for which a system was designed.


    So they could have defined "has a box of clowns" as
    the situation where en expression can neither be
    proven nor refuted in Q.

    So we can say that the halting problem "has a box
    of clowns" instead of saying that computation is
    in any way limited.

    When mathematicians talk about rings, do you object based on the fact
    that you can't put them on your finger?

    When mathematicians talk about fields, do you object based on the fact
    that nothing can graze on them?

    To put things in terms of your system, the term 'incomplete' as used by mathematicians has a different GUID than the term 'incomplete' when used colloquially, just as the term 'pen' has different GUIDs depending on whether it is used to store pigs or ink. [note that I do not actually endorse the use of GUIDs; that's just plain silly].

    Andr|-


    And likewise "undecidable" really means that the
    expression is semantically incoherent. We could
    equally call this "has a square box of clowns".
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jun 29 12:29:54 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 2026-06-29 12:16, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 12:05 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 07:29, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
    On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:

    A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when
    it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
    PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz
    is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt
    with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x).

    That's surprising, disregard for axioms?

    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from
    ~reax x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~reax x=S(x) is
    ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.

    This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
    it means that ~reax x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q.

    It comes close. If reax x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but in the >>>>>> language of Q then ~reax x=S(x) and reax x=S(x) are both undecidable >>>>>> and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean.

    Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make
    Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
    defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to
    its intended purpose. A car without an engine is
    incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.

    Irrelevant. The definition of completeness

    It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies)
    that something is missing that could be added to make
    it complete. The way that terms-of-the-art are formed
    is very misleading and as much as intentionally deceptive.

    You really need to learn that terms used in a given field have
    definitions within that field that may or may not correspond to what
    you want a term to mean, and that you actually need to learn those
    definitions.


    That is the way that it usually works. In Proof Theoretic
    Semantics each author has their own terms-of-the-art that
    has a very similar yet not exactly the same semantic meaning
    as entirely different terms-of-the-art used by another author.

    Also these meanings gradually evolve over time so they
    change in subtle ways from their original meanings.

    In mathematics, a system is incomplete if there are statements in the
    language of that system which can neither be proven nor disproven.


    Q was intentionally defined to handle less than PA
    thus is not at all in any way incomplete relative
    to its defined purpose.

    The definition of 'incomplete' makes no reference whatsoever to 'defined purpose'. If there are sentences in the language of Q which can neither
    be proven nor disproven by Q, then Q is incomplete. And it is.

    That's *all* incomplete means. No more, no less. It doesn't mean that
    something is missing that could be added. It makes no reference
    whatsoever to the purpose for which a system was designed.


    So they could have defined "has a box of clowns" as
    the situation where en expression can neither be
    proven nor refuted in Q.

    Is "has a box of clowns" in the language of Q? No. I didn't think so, so
    your example is completely irrelevant.

    So we can say that the halting problem "has a box
    of clowns" instead of saying that computation is
    in any way limited.

    When mathematicians talk about rings, do you object based on the fact
    that you can't put them on your finger?

    No answer?

    When mathematicians talk about fields, do you object based on the fact
    that nothing can graze on them?

    No answer?

    Andr|-

    To put things in terms of your system, the term 'incomplete' as used
    by mathematicians has a different GUID than the term 'incomplete' when
    used colloquially, just as the term 'pen' has different GUIDs
    depending on whether it is used to store pigs or ink. [note that I do
    not actually endorse the use of GUIDs; that's just plain silly].

    Andr|-


    And likewise "undecidable" really means that the
    expression is semantically incoherent. We could
    equally call this "has a square box of clowns".


    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jun 29 14:08:01 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 6/29/2026 1:29 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 12:16, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 12:05 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 07:29, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
    On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:

    A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when
    it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
    PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz
    is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt
    with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x).

    That's surprising, disregard for axioms?

    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from
    ~reax x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~reax x=S(x) is
    ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.

    This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
    it means that ~reax x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q.

    It comes close. If reax x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but in the >>>>>>> language of Q then ~reax x=S(x) and reax x=S(x) are both undecidable >>>>>>> and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean.

    Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make
    Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
    defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to
    its intended purpose. A car without an engine is
    incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.

    Irrelevant. The definition of completeness

    It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies)
    that something is missing that could be added to make
    it complete. The way that terms-of-the-art are formed
    is very misleading and as much as intentionally deceptive.

    You really need to learn that terms used in a given field have
    definitions within that field that may or may not correspond to what
    you want a term to mean, and that you actually need to learn those
    definitions.


    That is the way that it usually works. In Proof Theoretic
    Semantics each author has their own terms-of-the-art that
    has a very similar yet not exactly the same semantic meaning
    as entirely different terms-of-the-art used by another author.

    Also these meanings gradually evolve over time so they
    change in subtle ways from their original meanings.

    In mathematics, a system is incomplete if there are statements in the
    language of that system which can neither be proven nor disproven.


    Q was intentionally defined to handle less than PA
    thus is not at all in any way incomplete relative
    to its defined purpose.

    The definition of 'incomplete' makes no reference whatsoever to 'defined purpose'. If there are sentences in the language of Q which can neither
    be proven nor disproven by Q, then Q is incomplete. And it is.

    That's *all* incomplete means. No more, no less. It doesn't mean that
    something is missing that could be added. It makes no reference
    whatsoever to the purpose for which a system was designed.


    So they could have defined "has a box of clowns" as
    the situation where en expression can neither be
    proven nor refuted in Q.

    Is "has a box of clowns" in the language of Q? No. I didn't think so, so your example is completely irrelevant.


    It is an idiom stipulated to mean:
    sentences in the language of Q which can neither
    be proven nor disproven by Q

    So we can say that the halting problem "has a box
    of clowns" instead of saying that computation is
    in any way limited.

    When mathematicians talk about rings, do you object based on the fact
    that you can't put them on your finger?

    No answer?


    Off topic, irrelevant.

    When mathematicians talk about fields, do you object based on the
    fact that nothing can graze on them?

    No answer?


    Off topic, irrelevant.

    When Peter Schroeder-Heister talks about
    The Definitional View of Atomic Systems in Proof-Theoretic Semantics
    How close is this to Dag Prawitz Theory of Grounds?

    Same ball park, they never seem to ever talk
    about exact the same thing, yet it is within
    PTS just the same.

    Andr|-

    To put things in terms of your system, the term 'incomplete' as used
    by mathematicians has a different GUID than the term 'incomplete'
    when used colloquially, just as the term 'pen' has different GUIDs
    depending on whether it is used to store pigs or ink. [note that I do
    not actually endorse the use of GUIDs; that's just plain silly].

    Andr|-


    And likewise "undecidable" really means that the
    expression is semantically incoherent. We could
    equally call this "has a square box of clowns".



    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jun 29 13:33:01 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 2026-06-29 13:08, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:29 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:

    Is "has a box of clowns" in the language of Q? No. I didn't think so,
    so your example is completely irrelevant.


    It is an idiom stipulated to mean:
    sentences in the language of Q which can neither
    be proven nor disproven by Q

    Q doesn't have idioms. That's a natural language concept alien to
    theories of arithmetic.

    So we can say that the halting problem "has a box
    of clowns" instead of saying that computation is
    in any way limited.

    When mathematicians talk about rings, do you object based on the
    fact that you can't put them on your finger?

    No answer?


    Off topic, irrelevant.

    When mathematicians talk about fields, do you object based on the
    fact that nothing can graze on them?

    No answer?

    These questions are relevant because they get to whether your objection
    to the term 'incomplete' extends to other terms as well. If G||del had
    used the term 'fnord' instead of incomplete, I suspect you wouldn't have
    the same objection to it. Your objection seems to be entirely based on
    the fact that you are reading things into the term 'incomplete' which
    aren't actually there based on your own interpretation of the colloquial
    term 'incomplete'. But the mathematical term and the colloquial term are different, just as the mathematical term 'ring' differs from the
    colloquial term. Technical terms often diverge significantly from
    colloquial ones. For example, to an astronomer, oxygen is classified as
    a metal despite the fact that this doesn't correspond to everyday usage.
    This doesn't cause problems for astronomers.

    Andr|-
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jun 29 14:47:35 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 6/29/2026 2:33 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 13:08, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:29 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:

    Is "has a box of clowns" in the language of Q? No. I didn't think so,
    so your example is completely irrelevant.


    It is an idiom stipulated to mean:
    sentences in the language of Q which can neither
    be proven nor disproven by Q

    Q doesn't have idioms. That's a natural language concept alien to
    theories of arithmetic.

    So we can say that the halting problem "has a box
    of clowns" instead of saying that computation is
    in any way limited.

    When mathematicians talk about rings, do you object based on the
    fact that you can't put them on your finger?

    No answer?


    Off topic, irrelevant.

    When mathematicians talk about fields, do you object based on the
    fact that nothing can graze on them?

    No answer?

    These questions are Irrelevant because
    In Proof Theoretic Semantics
    statements in the language of that system
    which can neither be proven nor disproven

    have not established that they have semantic
    meaning because semantic meaning is ONLY
    established in PTS by canonical proofs.

    This is simply the same way that actual
    meaning really works. Model theory is merely
    a strange idea that was adopted because keeping
    semantics and syntax together as one was too
    difficult for people to figure out back when
    model theory was first created.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jun 29 14:02:23 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 2026-06-29 13:47, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 2:33 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 13:08, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:29 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:

    Is "has a box of clowns" in the language of Q? No. I didn't think
    so, so your example is completely irrelevant.


    It is an idiom stipulated to mean:
    sentences in the language of Q which can neither
    be proven nor disproven by Q

    Q doesn't have idioms. That's a natural language concept alien to
    theories of arithmetic.

    So we can say that the halting problem "has a box
    of clowns" instead of saying that computation is
    in any way limited.

    When mathematicians talk about rings, do you object based on the
    fact that you can't put them on your finger?

    No answer?


    Off topic, irrelevant.

    When mathematicians talk about fields, do you object based on the >>>>>> fact that nothing can graze on them?

    No answer?

    These questions are Irrelevant because
    In Proof Theoretic Semantics
    statements in the language of that system
    which can neither be proven nor disproven

    have not established that they have semantic
    meaning because semantic meaning is ONLY
    established in PTS by canonical proofs.

    This is a misrepresentation on your part. Whereas truth functional
    semantics takes true and false to be the semantic primatives, PTS uses
    either (depending on which author you follow) proven and not proven or provable and not provable as its primitives without dealing with truth
    or falsity. Thus, they would treat a statement like 'no number is
    greater than its successor' as being unprovable in Robinson Arithmetic,
    not as being meaningless as you seem to think.

    Andr|-
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jun 29 15:06:16 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 6/29/2026 3:02 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 13:47, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 2:33 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 13:08, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:29 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:

    Is "has a box of clowns" in the language of Q? No. I didn't think
    so, so your example is completely irrelevant.


    It is an idiom stipulated to mean:
    sentences in the language of Q which can neither
    be proven nor disproven by Q

    Q doesn't have idioms. That's a natural language concept alien to
    theories of arithmetic.

    So we can say that the halting problem "has a box
    of clowns" instead of saying that computation is
    in any way limited.

    When mathematicians talk about rings, do you object based on the >>>>>>> fact that you can't put them on your finger?

    No answer?


    Off topic, irrelevant.

    When mathematicians talk about fields, do you object based on the >>>>>>> fact that nothing can graze on them?

    No answer?

    These questions are Irrelevant because
    In Proof Theoretic Semantics
    statements in the language of that system
    which can neither be proven nor disproven

    have not established that they have semantic
    meaning because semantic meaning is ONLY
    established in PTS by canonical proofs.

    This is a misrepresentation on your part. Whereas truth functional
    semantics takes true and false to be the semantic primatives, PTS uses either (depending on which author you follow) proven and not proven or provable and not provable as its primitives without dealing with truth
    or falsity.

    Yes that is an accurate paraphrase.

    Thus, they would treat a statement like 'no number is
    greater than its successor' as being unprovable in Robinson Arithmetic,
    not as being meaningless as you seem to think.


    You are not being consistent with you own paraphrase.
    I still don't have all of the exact nuances exactly
    correct because unlike every other field each author
    has their own terms-of-the-art.

    Andr|-


    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jun 29 14:58:07 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 2026-06-29 14:06, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 3:02 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 13:47, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 2:33 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 13:08, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:29 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:

    Is "has a box of clowns" in the language of Q? No. I didn't think >>>>>> so, so your example is completely irrelevant.


    It is an idiom stipulated to mean:
    sentences in the language of Q which can neither
    be proven nor disproven by Q

    Q doesn't have idioms. That's a natural language concept alien to
    theories of arithmetic.

    So we can say that the halting problem "has a box
    of clowns" instead of saying that computation is
    in any way limited.

    When mathematicians talk about rings, do you object based on the >>>>>>>> fact that you can't put them on your finger?

    No answer?


    Off topic, irrelevant.

    When mathematicians talk about fields, do you object based on >>>>>>>> the fact that nothing can graze on them?

    No answer?

    These questions are Irrelevant because
    In Proof Theoretic Semantics
    statements in the language of that system
    which can neither be proven nor disproven

    have not established that they have semantic
    meaning because semantic meaning is ONLY
    established in PTS by canonical proofs.

    This is a misrepresentation on your part. Whereas truth functional
    semantics takes true and false to be the semantic primatives, PTS uses
    either (depending on which author you follow) proven and not proven or
    provable and not provable as its primitives without dealing with truth
    or falsity.

    Yes that is an accurate paraphrase.

    Thus, they would treat a statement like 'no number is greater than its
    successor' as being unprovable in Robinson Arithmetic, not as being
    meaningless as you seem to think.


    You are not being consistent with you own paraphrase.
    I still don't have all of the exact nuances exactly
    correct because unlike every other field each author
    has their own terms-of-the-art.

    Of course I am being consistent. Within PTD, unproven/unprovable *is* a semantic value, i.e. a meaning; so you can't claim that the expression
    'no number is greater than its successor' isn't meaningful in Q.

    Can you provide a single example of someone working within PTS who has
    taken issue with incompleteness? Incompleteness exists in PTS just as
    much as it exists in any other framework.

    Andr|-
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jun 29 16:10:04 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 6/29/2026 3:58 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 14:06, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 3:02 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 13:47, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 2:33 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 13:08, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:29 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:

    Is "has a box of clowns" in the language of Q? No. I didn't think >>>>>>> so, so your example is completely irrelevant.


    It is an idiom stipulated to mean:
    sentences in the language of Q which can neither
    be proven nor disproven by Q

    Q doesn't have idioms. That's a natural language concept alien to
    theories of arithmetic.

    So we can say that the halting problem "has a box
    of clowns" instead of saying that computation is
    in any way limited.

    When mathematicians talk about rings, do you object based on >>>>>>>>> the fact that you can't put them on your finger?

    No answer?


    Off topic, irrelevant.

    When mathematicians talk about fields, do you object based on >>>>>>>>> the fact that nothing can graze on them?

    No answer?

    These questions are Irrelevant because
    In Proof Theoretic Semantics
    statements in the language of that system
    which can neither be proven nor disproven

    have not established that they have semantic
    meaning because semantic meaning is ONLY
    established in PTS by canonical proofs.

    This is a misrepresentation on your part. Whereas truth functional
    semantics takes true and false to be the semantic primatives, PTS
    uses either (depending on which author you follow) proven and not
    proven or provable and not provable as its primitives without dealing
    with truth or falsity.

    Yes that is an accurate paraphrase.

    Thus, they would treat a statement like 'no number is greater than
    its successor' as being unprovable in Robinson Arithmetic, not as
    being meaningless as you seem to think.


    You are not being consistent with you own paraphrase.
    I still don't have all of the exact nuances exactly
    correct because unlike every other field each author
    has their own terms-of-the-art.

    Of course I am being consistent. Within PTD, unproven/unprovable *is* a semantic value,

    Impossibly provable in Q means cannot possibly
    derive a semantic meaning Q.

    i.e. a meaning; so you can't claim that the expression
    'no number is greater than its successor' isn't meaningful in Q.

    Can you provide a single example of someone working within PTS who has
    taken issue with incompleteness? Incompleteness exists in PTS just as
    much as it exists in any other framework.

    Andr|-

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jun 29 15:18:18 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 2026-06-29 15:10, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 3:58 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 14:06, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 3:02 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 13:47, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 2:33 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 13:08, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:29 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:

    Is "has a box of clowns" in the language of Q? No. I didn't
    think so, so your example is completely irrelevant.


    It is an idiom stipulated to mean:
    sentences in the language of Q which can neither
    be proven nor disproven by Q

    Q doesn't have idioms. That's a natural language concept alien to >>>>>> theories of arithmetic.

    So we can say that the halting problem "has a box
    of clowns" instead of saying that computation is
    in any way limited.

    When mathematicians talk about rings, do you object based on >>>>>>>>>> the fact that you can't put them on your finger?

    No answer?


    Off topic, irrelevant.

    When mathematicians talk about fields, do you object based on >>>>>>>>>> the fact that nothing can graze on them?

    No answer?

    These questions are Irrelevant because
    In Proof Theoretic Semantics
    statements in the language of that system
    which can neither be proven nor disproven

    have not established that they have semantic
    meaning because semantic meaning is ONLY
    established in PTS by canonical proofs.

    This is a misrepresentation on your part. Whereas truth functional
    semantics takes true and false to be the semantic primatives, PTS
    uses either (depending on which author you follow) proven and not
    proven or provable and not provable as its primitives without
    dealing with truth or falsity.

    Yes that is an accurate paraphrase.

    Thus, they would treat a statement like 'no number is greater than
    its successor' as being unprovable in Robinson Arithmetic, not as
    being meaningless as you seem to think.


    You are not being consistent with you own paraphrase.
    I still don't have all of the exact nuances exactly
    correct because unlike every other field each author
    has their own terms-of-the-art.

    Of course I am being consistent. Within PTD, unproven/unprovable *is*
    a semantic value,

    Impossibly provable in Q means cannot possibly
    derive a semantic meaning Q.

    'impossibly' in English is an intensifier, i.e. 'he was impossibly
    strong' means 'he was exceedingly strong'. I have no idea what
    'impossibly provable' might mean, but if you intended to say
    'unprovable' then you are misinterpreting PTS. Unprovable is one of the
    two semantic primitives used by PTS (the other being provable).

    i.e. a meaning; so you can't claim that the expression 'no number is
    greater than its successor' isn't meaningful in Q.

    Can you provide a single example of someone working within PTS who has
    taken issue with incompleteness? Incompleteness exists in PTS just as
    much as it exists in any other framework.

    I would really like you to answer the above question. I've never seen
    any author writing within PTS express any misgivings about the fact that
    some formal systems are inconsistent. This is something that you are projecting onto that theory based on the fact that you really do not understand it.

    Andr|-
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jun 29 16:39:09 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 6/29/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 15:10, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 3:58 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 14:06, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 3:02 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 13:47, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 2:33 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 13:08, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:29 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:

    Is "has a box of clowns" in the language of Q? No. I didn't >>>>>>>>> think so, so your example is completely irrelevant.


    It is an idiom stipulated to mean:
    sentences in the language of Q which can neither
    be proven nor disproven by Q

    Q doesn't have idioms. That's a natural language concept alien to >>>>>>> theories of arithmetic.

    So we can say that the halting problem "has a box
    of clowns" instead of saying that computation is
    in any way limited.

    When mathematicians talk about rings, do you object based on >>>>>>>>>>> the fact that you can't put them on your finger?

    No answer?


    Off topic, irrelevant.

    When mathematicians talk about fields, do you object based on >>>>>>>>>>> the fact that nothing can graze on them?

    No answer?

    These questions are Irrelevant because
    In Proof Theoretic Semantics
    statements in the language of that system
    which can neither be proven nor disproven

    have not established that they have semantic
    meaning because semantic meaning is ONLY
    established in PTS by canonical proofs.

    This is a misrepresentation on your part. Whereas truth functional
    semantics takes true and false to be the semantic primatives, PTS
    uses either (depending on which author you follow) proven and not
    proven or provable and not provable as its primitives without
    dealing with truth or falsity.

    Yes that is an accurate paraphrase.

    Thus, they would treat a statement like 'no number is greater than
    its successor' as being unprovable in Robinson Arithmetic, not as
    being meaningless as you seem to think.


    You are not being consistent with you own paraphrase.
    I still don't have all of the exact nuances exactly
    correct because unlike every other field each author
    has their own terms-of-the-art.

    Of course I am being consistent. Within PTD, unproven/unprovable *is*
    a semantic value,

    Impossibly provable in Q means cannot possibly
    derive a semantic meaning Q.

    'impossibly' in English is an intensifier, i.e. 'he was impossibly
    strong' means 'he was exceedingly strong'. I have no idea what
    'impossibly provable' might mean, but if you intended to say
    'unprovable' then you are misinterpreting PTS. Unprovable is one of the
    two semantic primitives used by PTS (the other being provable).


    This exactly and perfectly what it precisely means.

    % This sentence is not true.
    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    i.e. a meaning; so you can't claim that the expression 'no number is
    greater than its successor' isn't meaningful in Q.

    Can you provide a single example of someone working within PTS who
    has taken issue with incompleteness? Incompleteness exists in PTS
    just as much as it exists in any other framework.

    I would really like you to answer the above question.

    If you understand PTS you will understand that their
    reasoning cannot possibly get to incompleteness.

    I have been trying to get you to understand this
    reasoning and you are making some progress.

    I've never seen
    any author writing within PTS express any misgivings about the fact that some formal systems are inconsistent. This is something that you are projecting onto that theory based on the fact that you really do not understand it.

    Andr|-


    That whole thing is totally out-of-sync with the
    way that they think.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jun 29 16:25:55 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 2026-06-29 15:39, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 15:10, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 3:58 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 14:06, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 3:02 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 13:47, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 2:33 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 13:08, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:29 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:

    Is "has a box of clowns" in the language of Q? No. I didn't >>>>>>>>>> think so, so your example is completely irrelevant.


    It is an idiom stipulated to mean:
    sentences in the language of Q which can neither
    be proven nor disproven by Q

    Q doesn't have idioms. That's a natural language concept alien >>>>>>>> to theories of arithmetic.

    So we can say that the halting problem "has a box
    of clowns" instead of saying that computation is
    in any way limited.

    When mathematicians talk about rings, do you object based on >>>>>>>>>>>> the fact that you can't put them on your finger?

    No answer?


    Off topic, irrelevant.

    When mathematicians talk about fields, do you object based >>>>>>>>>>>> on the fact that nothing can graze on them?

    No answer?

    These questions are Irrelevant because
    In Proof Theoretic Semantics
    statements in the language of that system
    which can neither be proven nor disproven

    have not established that they have semantic
    meaning because semantic meaning is ONLY
    established in PTS by canonical proofs.

    This is a misrepresentation on your part. Whereas truth functional >>>>>> semantics takes true and false to be the semantic primatives, PTS >>>>>> uses either (depending on which author you follow) proven and not >>>>>> proven or provable and not provable as its primitives without
    dealing with truth or falsity.

    Yes that is an accurate paraphrase.

    Thus, they would treat a statement like 'no number is greater than >>>>>> its successor' as being unprovable in Robinson Arithmetic, not as >>>>>> being meaningless as you seem to think.


    You are not being consistent with you own paraphrase.
    I still don't have all of the exact nuances exactly
    correct because unlike every other field each author
    has their own terms-of-the-art.

    Of course I am being consistent. Within PTD, unproven/unprovable
    *is* a semantic value,

    Impossibly provable in Q means cannot possibly
    derive a semantic meaning Q.

    'impossibly' in English is an intensifier, i.e. 'he was impossibly
    strong' means 'he was exceedingly strong'. I have no idea what
    'impossibly provable' might mean, but if you intended to say
    'unprovable' then you are misinterpreting PTS. Unprovable is one of
    the two semantic primitives used by PTS (the other being provable).


    This exactly and perfectly what it precisely means.

    If it means 'unprovable' then say 'unprovable' or 'impossible to prove'.
    Don't use a nonsensical expression like 'impossibly provable'.

    % This sentence is not true.
    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    That's an example, not a definition. Examples don't take the place of definitions.

    i.e. a meaning; so you can't claim that the expression 'no number is
    greater than its successor' isn't meaningful in Q.

    Can you provide a single example of someone working within PTS who
    has taken issue with incompleteness? Incompleteness exists in PTS
    just as much as it exists in any other framework.

    I would really like you to answer the above question.

    If you understand PTS you will understand that their
    reasoning cannot possibly get to incompleteness.

    Then you should be able to produce an actual citation to this effect. As
    it stands, this is simply a baseless assertion on your part, and since
    your grasp of PTS doesn't seem particularly strong, it carries very
    little weight.

    You keep offering PTS as an alternative to truth-functional semantics,
    but incompleteness has absolutely nothing to do with truth-functional semantics as the definition of incompleteness doesn't even mention truth
    or falsity (or semantics). If anything, it is more aligned with PTS than
    with TFS since it pertains to theoremhood i.e. provability, the semantic primitive used by PTS.

    A system is incomplete if there is an expression in the language of that system, P such that neither P nor -4P can be derived as a theorem.
    'Theorem' is a notion pertaining to provability, not truth.

    Andr|-
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jun 29 17:38:26 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 6/29/2026 5:25 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 15:39, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 15:10, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 3:58 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 14:06, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 3:02 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 13:47, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 2:33 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 13:08, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:29 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:

    Is "has a box of clowns" in the language of Q? No. I didn't >>>>>>>>>>> think so, so your example is completely irrelevant.


    It is an idiom stipulated to mean:
    sentences in the language of Q which can neither
    be proven nor disproven by Q

    Q doesn't have idioms. That's a natural language concept alien >>>>>>>>> to theories of arithmetic.

    So we can say that the halting problem "has a box
    of clowns" instead of saying that computation is
    in any way limited.

    When mathematicians talk about rings, do you object based >>>>>>>>>>>>> on the fact that you can't put them on your finger?

    No answer?


    Off topic, irrelevant.

    When mathematicians talk about fields, do you object based >>>>>>>>>>>>> on the fact that nothing can graze on them?

    No answer?

    These questions are Irrelevant because
    In Proof Theoretic Semantics
    statements in the language of that system
    which can neither be proven nor disproven

    have not established that they have semantic
    meaning because semantic meaning is ONLY
    established in PTS by canonical proofs.

    This is a misrepresentation on your part. Whereas truth
    functional semantics takes true and false to be the semantic
    primatives, PTS uses either (depending on which author you
    follow) proven and not proven or provable and not provable as its >>>>>>> primitives without dealing with truth or falsity.

    Yes that is an accurate paraphrase.

    Thus, they would treat a statement like 'no number is greater
    than its successor' as being unprovable in Robinson Arithmetic, >>>>>>> not as being meaningless as you seem to think.


    You are not being consistent with you own paraphrase.
    I still don't have all of the exact nuances exactly
    correct because unlike every other field each author
    has their own terms-of-the-art.

    Of course I am being consistent. Within PTD, unproven/unprovable
    *is* a semantic value,

    Impossibly provable in Q means cannot possibly
    derive a semantic meaning Q.

    'impossibly' in English is an intensifier, i.e. 'he was impossibly
    strong' means 'he was exceedingly strong'. I have no idea what
    'impossibly provable' might mean, but if you intended to say
    'unprovable' then you are misinterpreting PTS. Unprovable is one of
    the two semantic primitives used by PTS (the other being provable).


    This exactly and perfectly what it precisely means.

    If it means 'unprovable' then say 'unprovable' or 'impossible to prove'. Don't use a nonsensical expression like 'impossibly provable'.


    Impossibly provable because remains stuck
    in an infinite loop.

    % This sentence is not true.
    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    That's an example, not a definition. Examples don't take the place of definitions.


    It is the only perfect example of an idea from
    Proof Theoretic Semantics that seems to stay a
    little bit nebulous because each author uses their
    own author specific terminology.

    i.e. a meaning; so you can't claim that the expression 'no number
    is greater than its successor' isn't meaningful in Q.

    Can you provide a single example of someone working within PTS who
    has taken issue with incompleteness? Incompleteness exists in PTS
    just as much as it exists in any other framework.

    I would really like you to answer the above question.

    If you understand PTS you will understand that their
    reasoning cannot possibly get to incompleteness.

    Then you should be able to produce an actual citation to this effect.

    Each author uses their own author specific terminology
    and the meanings slightly change across authors.

    As
    it stands, this is simply a baseless assertion on your part, and since
    your grasp of PTS doesn't seem particularly strong, it carries very
    little weight.

    You keep offering PTS as an alternative to truth-functional semantics,
    but incompleteness has absolutely nothing to do with truth-functional semantics as the definition of incompleteness doesn't even mention truth

    Truth as an Epistemic Notion --- Dag Prawitz
    What is the appropriate notion of truth for
    sentences whose meanings are understood in
    epistemic terms such as proof or ground for
    an assertion? It seems that the truth of such
    sentences has to be identified with the existence
    of proofs or grounds... https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11245-011-9107-6

    or falsity (or semantics). If anything, it is more aligned with PTS than with TFS since it pertains to theoremhood i.e. provability, the semantic primitive used by PTS.

    A system is incomplete if there is an expression in the language of that system, P such that neither P nor -4P can be derived as a theorem.

    That is simply not the way that it works in Proof Theoretic Semantics.

    'Theorem' is a notion pertaining to provability, not truth.

    Andr|-

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jun 29 17:03:06 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 2026-06-29 16:38, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 5:25 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 15:39, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 15:10, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 3:58 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 14:06, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 3:02 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 13:47, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 2:33 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 13:08, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:29 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:

    Is "has a box of clowns" in the language of Q? No. I didn't >>>>>>>>>>>> think so, so your example is completely irrelevant.


    It is an idiom stipulated to mean:
    sentences in the language of Q which can neither
    be proven nor disproven by Q

    Q doesn't have idioms. That's a natural language concept alien >>>>>>>>>> to theories of arithmetic.

    So we can say that the halting problem "has a box
    of clowns" instead of saying that computation is
    in any way limited.

    When mathematicians talk about rings, do you object based >>>>>>>>>>>>>> on the fact that you can't put them on your finger?

    No answer?


    Off topic, irrelevant.

    When mathematicians talk about fields, do you object based >>>>>>>>>>>>>> on the fact that nothing can graze on them?

    No answer?

    These questions are Irrelevant because
    In Proof Theoretic Semantics
    statements in the language of that system
    which can neither be proven nor disproven

    have not established that they have semantic
    meaning because semantic meaning is ONLY
    established in PTS by canonical proofs.

    This is a misrepresentation on your part. Whereas truth
    functional semantics takes true and false to be the semantic
    primatives, PTS uses either (depending on which author you
    follow) proven and not proven or provable and not provable as >>>>>>>> its primitives without dealing with truth or falsity.

    Yes that is an accurate paraphrase.

    Thus, they would treat a statement like 'no number is greater >>>>>>>> than its successor' as being unprovable in Robinson Arithmetic, >>>>>>>> not as being meaningless as you seem to think.


    You are not being consistent with you own paraphrase.
    I still don't have all of the exact nuances exactly
    correct because unlike every other field each author
    has their own terms-of-the-art.

    Of course I am being consistent. Within PTD, unproven/unprovable
    *is* a semantic value,

    Impossibly provable in Q means cannot possibly
    derive a semantic meaning Q.

    'impossibly' in English is an intensifier, i.e. 'he was impossibly
    strong' means 'he was exceedingly strong'. I have no idea what
    'impossibly provable' might mean, but if you intended to say
    'unprovable' then you are misinterpreting PTS. Unprovable is one of
    the two semantic primitives used by PTS (the other being provable).


    This exactly and perfectly what it precisely means.

    If it means 'unprovable' then say 'unprovable' or 'impossible to
    prove'. Don't use a nonsensical expression like 'impossibly provable'.


    Impossibly provable because remains stuck
    in an infinite loop.

    You're abusing English. As I said, 'impossibly' is an intensifier. If I
    say someone is impossibly strong it doesn't mean it is impossible for
    them to be strong, it means they are stronger than I would have thought possible, i.e. that they are extraordinarily strong. Saying something is 'impossibly provable' would mean it is extraordinarily provable which
    isn't coherent since provability isn't a gradient concept. What is wrong
    with simply using the term 'unprovable' which is actually coherent English?

    % This sentence is not true.
    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    That's an example, not a definition. Examples don't take the place of
    definitions.


    It is the only perfect example of an idea from
    Proof Theoretic Semantics that seems to stay a
    little bit nebulous because each author uses their
    own author specific terminology.

    It has absolutely nothing to do with Robinson Arithmetic or
    incompleteness which were the topics under discussion. It's your feeble attempt at trying to formalize the liar paradox in Prolog and it fails
    at that because the Liar Paradox rests on the interpretation of the
    deictic expression 'this', and your formulation does not contain
    anything corresponding to 'this'. It is simply a circular definition.

    i.e. a meaning; so you can't claim that the expression 'no number >>>>>> is greater than its successor' isn't meaningful in Q.

    Can you provide a single example of someone working within PTS who >>>>>> has taken issue with incompleteness? Incompleteness exists in PTS >>>>>> just as much as it exists in any other framework.

    I would really like you to answer the above question.

    If you understand PTS you will understand that their
    reasoning cannot possibly get to incompleteness.

    Then you should be able to produce an actual citation to this effect.

    Each author uses their own author specific terminology
    and the meanings slightly change across authors.

    How does this prevent you from offering a citation?

    -aAs it stands, this is simply a baseless assertion on your part, and
    since your grasp of PTS doesn't seem particularly strong, it carries
    very little weight.

    You keep offering PTS as an alternative to truth-functional semantics,
    but incompleteness has absolutely nothing to do with truth-functional
    semantics as the definition of incompleteness doesn't even mention truth

    Truth as an Epistemic Notion --- Dag Prawitz
    What is the appropriate notion of truth for
    sentences whose meanings are understood in
    epistemic terms such as proof or ground for
    an assertion? It seems that the truth of such
    sentences has to be identified with the existence
    of proofs or grounds... https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11245-011-9107-6

    That quotation has nothing to do with anything I said and it certainly
    makes no claims about incompleteness.

    or falsity (or semantics). If anything, it is more aligned with PTS
    than with TFS since it pertains to theoremhood i.e. provability, the
    semantic primitive used by PTS.

    A system is incomplete if there is an expression in the language of
    that system, P such that neither P nor -4P can be derived as a theorem.

    That is simply not the way that it works in Proof Theoretic Semantics.

    Then provide a citation which explains how incompleteness is treated by PTS.

    Andr|-
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jun 29 18:36:17 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 6/29/2026 6:03 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 16:38, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 5:25 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 15:39, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 15:10, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 3:58 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 14:06, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 3:02 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 13:47, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 2:33 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 13:08, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:29 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:

    Is "has a box of clowns" in the language of Q? No. I didn't >>>>>>>>>>>>> think so, so your example is completely irrelevant.


    It is an idiom stipulated to mean:
    sentences in the language of Q which can neither
    be proven nor disproven by Q

    Q doesn't have idioms. That's a natural language concept >>>>>>>>>>> alien to theories of arithmetic.

    So we can say that the halting problem "has a box
    of clowns" instead of saying that computation is
    in any way limited.

    When mathematicians talk about rings, do you object based >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on the fact that you can't put them on your finger? >>>>>>>>>>>>>
    No answer?


    Off topic, irrelevant.

    When mathematicians talk about fields, do you object >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> based on the fact that nothing can graze on them?

    No answer?

    These questions are Irrelevant because
    In Proof Theoretic Semantics
    statements in the language of that system
    which can neither be proven nor disproven

    have not established that they have semantic
    meaning because semantic meaning is ONLY
    established in PTS by canonical proofs.

    This is a misrepresentation on your part. Whereas truth
    functional semantics takes true and false to be the semantic >>>>>>>>> primatives, PTS uses either (depending on which author you
    follow) proven and not proven or provable and not provable as >>>>>>>>> its primitives without dealing with truth or falsity.

    Yes that is an accurate paraphrase.

    Thus, they would treat a statement like 'no number is greater >>>>>>>>> than its successor' as being unprovable in Robinson Arithmetic, >>>>>>>>> not as being meaningless as you seem to think.


    You are not being consistent with you own paraphrase.
    I still don't have all of the exact nuances exactly
    correct because unlike every other field each author
    has their own terms-of-the-art.

    Of course I am being consistent. Within PTD, unproven/unprovable >>>>>>> *is* a semantic value,

    Impossibly provable in Q means cannot possibly
    derive a semantic meaning Q.

    'impossibly' in English is an intensifier, i.e. 'he was impossibly
    strong' means 'he was exceedingly strong'. I have no idea what
    'impossibly provable' might mean, but if you intended to say
    'unprovable' then you are misinterpreting PTS. Unprovable is one of >>>>> the two semantic primitives used by PTS (the other being provable).


    This exactly and perfectly what it precisely means.

    If it means 'unprovable' then say 'unprovable' or 'impossible to
    prove'. Don't use a nonsensical expression like 'impossibly provable'.


    Impossibly provable because remains stuck
    in an infinite loop.

    You're abusing English. As I said, 'impossibly' is an intensifier. If I
    say someone is impossibly strong it doesn't mean it is impossible for
    them to be strong, it means they are stronger than I would have thought possible, i.e. that they are extraordinarily strong. Saying something is 'impossibly provable' would mean it is extraordinarily provable which
    isn't coherent since provability isn't a gradient concept. What is wrong with simply using the term 'unprovable' which is actually coherent English?


    3 is impossibly numerically greater than 5.

    % This sentence is not true.
    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    That's an example, not a definition. Examples don't take the place of
    definitions.


    It is the only perfect example of an idea from
    Proof Theoretic Semantics that seems to stay a
    little bit nebulous because each author uses their
    own author specific terminology.

    It has absolutely nothing to do with Robinson Arithmetic or
    incompleteness which were the topics under discussion.

    It perfectly establishes that impossibly provable
    means has no proof theoretic semantic meaning.

    There is a key difference between we did not yet
    find a proof of X and a proof of X cannot possibly
    exist.

    It's your feeble
    attempt at trying to formalize the liar paradox in Prolog and it fails
    at that because the Liar Paradox rests on the interpretation of the
    deictic expression 'this', and your formulation does not contain
    anything corresponding to 'this'. It is simply a circular definition.


    "this" literally means := when formalized
    LP := ~True(LP) expands to
    ~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(...)))))))

    i.e. a meaning; so you can't claim that the expression 'no number >>>>>>> is greater than its successor' isn't meaningful in Q.

    Can you provide a single example of someone working within PTS
    who has taken issue with incompleteness? Incompleteness exists in >>>>>>> PTS just as much as it exists in any other framework.

    I would really like you to answer the above question.

    If you understand PTS you will understand that their
    reasoning cannot possibly get to incompleteness.

    Then you should be able to produce an actual citation to this effect.

    Each author uses their own author specific terminology
    and the meanings slightly change across authors.

    How does this prevent you from offering a citation?


    It does seem that they do agree that no proof
    of G can possibly exist in PA does means that
    G has no semantic meaning in PA.

    "Failure of Normalization"
    "Lack of a Canonical Form"
    "Disharmony"
    are some of the ways that they describe this.

    I have to spend a very long time carefully
    analyzing two papers before I can even use
    one author's terms regarding one aspect of PTS
    limited to that author's terms.

    "anti-realism" seems like it means a psychotic
    break for reality yet seems to merely specify
    valid deductive inference in the terms-of-the-art
    of PTS.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jun 29 17:45:24 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 2026-06-29 17:36, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 6:03 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 16:38, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 5:25 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 15:39, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 15:10, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 3:58 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 14:06, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 3:02 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 13:47, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 2:33 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 13:08, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:29 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:

    Is "has a box of clowns" in the language of Q? No. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>> didn't think so, so your example is completely irrelevant. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    It is an idiom stipulated to mean:
    sentences in the language of Q which can neither
    be proven nor disproven by Q

    Q doesn't have idioms. That's a natural language concept >>>>>>>>>>>> alien to theories of arithmetic.

    So we can say that the halting problem "has a box >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of clowns" instead of saying that computation is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in any way limited.

    When mathematicians talk about rings, do you object >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> based on the fact that you can't put them on your finger? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    No answer?


    Off topic, irrelevant.

    When mathematicians talk about fields, do you object >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> based on the fact that nothing can graze on them? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    No answer?

    These questions are Irrelevant because
    In Proof Theoretic Semantics
    statements in the language of that system
    which can neither be proven nor disproven

    have not established that they have semantic
    meaning because semantic meaning is ONLY
    established in PTS by canonical proofs.

    This is a misrepresentation on your part. Whereas truth
    functional semantics takes true and false to be the semantic >>>>>>>>>> primatives, PTS uses either (depending on which author you >>>>>>>>>> follow) proven and not proven or provable and not provable as >>>>>>>>>> its primitives without dealing with truth or falsity.

    Yes that is an accurate paraphrase.

    Thus, they would treat a statement like 'no number is greater >>>>>>>>>> than its successor' as being unprovable in Robinson
    Arithmetic, not as being meaningless as you seem to think. >>>>>>>>>>

    You are not being consistent with you own paraphrase.
    I still don't have all of the exact nuances exactly
    correct because unlike every other field each author
    has their own terms-of-the-art.

    Of course I am being consistent. Within PTD, unproven/unprovable >>>>>>>> *is* a semantic value,

    Impossibly provable in Q means cannot possibly
    derive a semantic meaning Q.

    'impossibly' in English is an intensifier, i.e. 'he was impossibly >>>>>> strong' means 'he was exceedingly strong'. I have no idea what
    'impossibly provable' might mean, but if you intended to say
    'unprovable' then you are misinterpreting PTS. Unprovable is one
    of the two semantic primitives used by PTS (the other being
    provable).


    This exactly and perfectly what it precisely means.

    If it means 'unprovable' then say 'unprovable' or 'impossible to
    prove'. Don't use a nonsensical expression like 'impossibly provable'. >>>>

    Impossibly provable because remains stuck
    in an infinite loop.

    You're abusing English. As I said, 'impossibly' is an intensifier. If
    I say someone is impossibly strong it doesn't mean it is impossible
    for them to be strong, it means they are stronger than I would have
    thought possible, i.e. that they are extraordinarily strong. Saying
    something is 'impossibly provable' would mean it is extraordinarily
    provable which isn't coherent since provability isn't a gradient
    concept. What is wrong with simply using the term 'unprovable' which
    is actually coherent English?


    3 is impossibly numerically greater than 5.

    Not if you're speaking English.

    % This sentence is not true.
    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    That's an example, not a definition. Examples don't take the place
    of definitions.


    It is the only perfect example of an idea from
    Proof Theoretic Semantics that seems to stay a
    little bit nebulous because each author uses their
    own author specific terminology.

    It has absolutely nothing to do with Robinson Arithmetic or
    incompleteness which were the topics under discussion.

    It perfectly establishes that impossibly provable
    means has no proof theoretic semantic meaning.

    It shows no such thing.

    There is a key difference between we did not yet
    find a proof of X and a proof of X cannot possibly
    exist.

    Yes. And the two English terms in use for these are 'unproven' and 'unprovable'. Not 'impossibly provable'.

    It's your feeble attempt at trying to formalize the liar paradox in
    Prolog and it fails at that because the Liar Paradox rests on the
    interpretation of the deictic expression 'this', and your formulation
    does not contain anything corresponding to 'this'. It is simply a
    circular definition.


    "this" literally means := when formalized
    LP := ~True(LP) expands to ~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(...)))))))

    No. := means defined as, not 'this'.

    If you think otherwise, explain how you would formalize a sentence
    involving what you would call non-pathological self reference using :=.
    For example, 'this sentence contains five words'.

    i.e. a meaning; so you can't claim that the expression 'no
    number is greater than its successor' isn't meaningful in Q.

    Can you provide a single example of someone working within PTS >>>>>>>> who has taken issue with incompleteness? Incompleteness exists >>>>>>>> in PTS just as much as it exists in any other framework.

    I would really like you to answer the above question.

    If you understand PTS you will understand that their
    reasoning cannot possibly get to incompleteness.

    Then you should be able to produce an actual citation to this effect.

    Each author uses their own author specific terminology
    and the meanings slightly change across authors.

    How does this prevent you from offering a citation?


    It does seem that they do agree that no proof
    of G can possibly exist in PA does means that
    G has no semantic meaning in PA.

    I've not seen anyone operating in PTS who says anything remotely like
    that. They do not agree with this; rather, you are projecting your own peculiar views onto their theory.

    Andr|-

    "Failure of Normalization"
    "Lack of a Canonical Form"
    "Disharmony"
    are some of the ways that they describe this.

    I have to spend a very long time carefully
    analyzing two papers before I can even use
    one author's terms regarding one aspect of PTS
    limited to that author's terms.

    "anti-realism" seems like it means a psychotic
    break for reality yet seems to merely specify
    valid deductive inference in the terms-of-the-art
    of PTS.


    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jun 29 19:37:58 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 6/29/2026 6:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 17:36, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 6:03 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 16:38, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 5:25 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 15:39, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 15:10, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 3:58 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 14:06, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 3:02 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 13:47, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 2:33 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 13:08, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:29 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:

    Is "has a box of clowns" in the language of Q? No. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> didn't think so, so your example is completely irrelevant. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    It is an idiom stipulated to mean:
    sentences in the language of Q which can neither
    be proven nor disproven by Q

    Q doesn't have idioms. That's a natural language concept >>>>>>>>>>>>> alien to theories of arithmetic.

    So we can say that the halting problem "has a box >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of clowns" instead of saying that computation is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in any way limited.

    When mathematicians talk about rings, do you object >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> based on the fact that you can't put them on your finger? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    No answer?


    Off topic, irrelevant.

    When mathematicians talk about fields, do you object >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> based on the fact that nothing can graze on them? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    No answer?

    These questions are Irrelevant because
    In Proof Theoretic Semantics
    statements in the language of that system
    which can neither be proven nor disproven

    have not established that they have semantic
    meaning because semantic meaning is ONLY
    established in PTS by canonical proofs.

    This is a misrepresentation on your part. Whereas truth >>>>>>>>>>> functional semantics takes true and false to be the semantic >>>>>>>>>>> primatives, PTS uses either (depending on which author you >>>>>>>>>>> follow) proven and not proven or provable and not provable as >>>>>>>>>>> its primitives without dealing with truth or falsity.

    Yes that is an accurate paraphrase.

    Thus, they would treat a statement like 'no number is greater >>>>>>>>>>> than its successor' as being unprovable in Robinson
    Arithmetic, not as being meaningless as you seem to think. >>>>>>>>>>>

    You are not being consistent with you own paraphrase.
    I still don't have all of the exact nuances exactly
    correct because unlike every other field each author
    has their own terms-of-the-art.

    Of course I am being consistent. Within PTD, unproven/
    unprovable *is* a semantic value,

    Impossibly provable in Q means cannot possibly
    derive a semantic meaning Q.

    'impossibly' in English is an intensifier, i.e. 'he was
    impossibly strong' means 'he was exceedingly strong'. I have no >>>>>>> idea what 'impossibly provable' might mean, but if you intended >>>>>>> to say 'unprovable' then you are misinterpreting PTS. Unprovable >>>>>>> is one of the two semantic primitives used by PTS (the other
    being provable).


    This exactly and perfectly what it precisely means.

    If it means 'unprovable' then say 'unprovable' or 'impossible to
    prove'. Don't use a nonsensical expression like 'impossibly provable'. >>>>>

    Impossibly provable because remains stuck
    in an infinite loop.

    You're abusing English. As I said, 'impossibly' is an intensifier. If
    I say someone is impossibly strong it doesn't mean it is impossible
    for them to be strong, it means they are stronger than I would have
    thought possible, i.e. that they are extraordinarily strong. Saying
    something is 'impossibly provable' would mean it is extraordinarily
    provable which isn't coherent since provability isn't a gradient
    concept. What is wrong with simply using the term 'unprovable' which
    is actually coherent English?


    3 is impossibly numerically greater than 5.

    Not if you're speaking English.

    % This sentence is not true.
    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    That's an example, not a definition. Examples don't take the place
    of definitions.


    It is the only perfect example of an idea from
    Proof Theoretic Semantics that seems to stay a
    little bit nebulous because each author uses their
    own author specific terminology.

    It has absolutely nothing to do with Robinson Arithmetic or
    incompleteness which were the topics under discussion.

    It perfectly establishes that impossibly provable
    means has no proof theoretic semantic meaning.

    It shows no such thing.

    There is a key difference between we did not yet
    find a proof of X and a proof of X cannot possibly
    exist.

    Yes. And the two English terms in use for these are 'unproven' and 'unprovable'. Not 'impossibly provable'.

    It's your feeble attempt at trying to formalize the liar paradox in
    Prolog and it fails at that because the Liar Paradox rests on the
    interpretation of the deictic expression 'this', and your formulation
    does not contain anything corresponding to 'this'. It is simply a
    circular definition.


    "this" literally means := when formalized
    LP := ~True(LP) expands to
    ~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(...)))))))

    No. := means defined as, not 'this'.


    It only means that: when formalized.

    If you think otherwise, explain how you would formalize a sentence
    involving what you would call non-pathological self reference using :=.
    For example, 'this sentence contains five words'.

    i.e. a meaning; so you can't claim that the expression 'no
    number is greater than its successor' isn't meaningful in Q. >>>>>>>>>
    Can you provide a single example of someone working within PTS >>>>>>>>> who has taken issue with incompleteness? Incompleteness exists >>>>>>>>> in PTS just as much as it exists in any other framework.

    I would really like you to answer the above question.

    If you understand PTS you will understand that their
    reasoning cannot possibly get to incompleteness.

    Then you should be able to produce an actual citation to this effect. >>>>
    Each author uses their own author specific terminology
    and the meanings slightly change across authors.

    How does this prevent you from offering a citation?


    It does seem that they do agree that no proof
    of G can possibly exist in PA does means that
    G has no semantic meaning in PA.

    I've not seen anyone operating in PTS who says anything remotely like
    that. They do not agree with this; rather, you are projecting your own peculiar views onto their theory.

    Andr|-


    Because they beat around the bush about that using
    terminology that varies across every author.

    "Failure of Normalization"
    "Lack of a Canonical Form"
    "Disharmony"
    are some of the ways that they describe this.

    I have to spend a very long time carefully
    analyzing two papers before I can even use
    one author's terms regarding one aspect of PTS
    limited to that author's terms.

    "anti-realism" seems like it means a psychotic
    break for reality yet seems to merely specify
    valid deductive inference in the terms-of-the-art
    of PTS.



    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jun 29 19:01:37 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 2026-06-29 18:37, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 6:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 17:36, olcott wrote:

    It does seem that they do agree that no proof
    of G can possibly exist in PA does means that
    G has no semantic meaning in PA.

    I've not seen anyone operating in PTS who says anything remotely like
    that. They do not agree with this; rather, you are projecting your own
    peculiar views onto their theory.

    Andr|-


    Because they beat around the bush about that using
    terminology that varies across every author.

    It's not that they are beating around the bush; it's that they aren't
    actually saying what you want them to say. Face it, you really don't understand the PTS literature as it is above your head.

    Andr|-
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jun 29 20:19:12 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 6/29/2026 8:01 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 18:37, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 6:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 17:36, olcott wrote:

    It does seem that they do agree that no proof
    of G can possibly exist in PA does means that
    G has no semantic meaning in PA.

    I've not seen anyone operating in PTS who says anything remotely like
    that. They do not agree with this; rather, you are projecting your
    own peculiar views onto their theory.

    Andr|-


    Because they beat around the bush about that using
    terminology that varies across every author.

    It's not that they are beating around the bush; it's that they aren't actually saying what you want them to say. Face it, you really don't understand the PTS literature as it is above your head.

    Andr|-


    PTS is the way that meaning actually works.
    We can make a simpler analogy in that English
    words are meaningless until they are defined.

    The PTS connection of an expression in Q to
    its axioms Q is analogous to the connection
    of an English word to its definition.

    A proof merely looks to see if a definition
    exists and if it does not then the English
    Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jun 29 19:54:38 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 2026-06-29 19:19, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 8:01 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 18:37, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 6:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 17:36, olcott wrote:

    It does seem that they do agree that no proof
    of G can possibly exist in PA does means that
    G has no semantic meaning in PA.

    I've not seen anyone operating in PTS who says anything remotely
    like that. They do not agree with this; rather, you are projecting
    your own peculiar views onto their theory.

    Andr|-


    Because they beat around the bush about that using
    terminology that varies across every author.

    It's not that they are beating around the bush; it's that they aren't
    actually saying what you want them to say. Face it, you really don't
    understand the PTS literature as it is above your head.

    Andr|-


    PTS is the way that meaning actually works.
    We can make a simpler analogy in that English
    words are meaningless until they are defined.

    The PTS connection of an expression in Q to
    its axioms Q is analogous to the connection
    of an English word to its definition.

    A proof merely looks to see if a definition
    exists and if it does not then the English
    Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.

    That's not what PTS says; that's simply you.

    There is a difference between meaningless and wrong.

    ''Twas brillig, and the slithey toves did did gyre and gimble in the
    wabe.' is meaningless. 'five plus six equals seven' is wrong but
    meaningful. Neither are provable.

    If an expression P is provable in PTS, then its negation -4P is
    unprovable, but to say that it is meaningless is simply wrong. We often discuss statements which are false and need to do so. If they were truly meaningless we would have no reason to do so.

    Andr|-
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jun 29 21:17:18 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 6/29/2026 8:54 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 19:19, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 8:01 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 18:37, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 6:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 17:36, olcott wrote:

    It does seem that they do agree that no proof
    of G can possibly exist in PA does means that
    G has no semantic meaning in PA.

    I've not seen anyone operating in PTS who says anything remotely
    like that. They do not agree with this; rather, you are projecting
    your own peculiar views onto their theory.

    Andr|-


    Because they beat around the bush about that using
    terminology that varies across every author.

    It's not that they are beating around the bush; it's that they aren't
    actually saying what you want them to say. Face it, you really don't
    understand the PTS literature as it is above your head.

    Andr|-


    PTS is the way that meaning actually works.
    We can make a simpler analogy in that English
    words are meaningless until they are defined.

    The PTS connection of an expression in Q to
    its axioms Q is analogous to the connection
    of an English word to its definition.

    A proof merely looks to see if a definition
    exists and if it does not then the English
    Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.

    That's not what PTS says; that's simply you.

    There is a difference between meaningless and wrong.

    % This sentence is not true.
    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    Olcott's Minimal Type Theory
    G rao -4Prov_PA(riLGriY)
    Directed Graph of evaluation sequence
    00 rao 01 02
    01 G
    02 -4 03
    03 Prov_PA 04
    04 G||del_Number_of 01 // cycle indicates no well-founded justification
    tree exists.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jun 29 21:26:06 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 6/29/2026 8:54 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 19:19, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 8:01 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 18:37, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 6:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 17:36, olcott wrote:

    It does seem that they do agree that no proof
    of G can possibly exist in PA does means that
    G has no semantic meaning in PA.

    I've not seen anyone operating in PTS who says anything remotely
    like that. They do not agree with this; rather, you are projecting
    your own peculiar views onto their theory.

    Andr|-


    Because they beat around the bush about that using
    terminology that varies across every author.

    It's not that they are beating around the bush; it's that they aren't
    actually saying what you want them to say. Face it, you really don't
    understand the PTS literature as it is above your head.

    Andr|-


    PTS is the way that meaning actually works.
    We can make a simpler analogy in that English
    words are meaningless until they are defined.

    The PTS connection of an expression in Q to
    its axioms Q is analogous to the connection
    of an English word to its definition.

    A proof merely looks to see if a definition
    exists and if it does not then the English
    Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.

    That's not what PTS says; that's simply you.


    That <is> the essence of what PTS says.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jun 29 20:31:56 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 2026-06-29 20:17, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 8:54 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 19:19, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 8:01 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 18:37, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 6:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 17:36, olcott wrote:

    It does seem that they do agree that no proof
    of G can possibly exist in PA does means that
    G has no semantic meaning in PA.

    I've not seen anyone operating in PTS who says anything remotely
    like that. They do not agree with this; rather, you are projecting >>>>>> your own peculiar views onto their theory.

    Andr|-


    Because they beat around the bush about that using
    terminology that varies across every author.

    It's not that they are beating around the bush; it's that they
    aren't actually saying what you want them to say. Face it, you
    really don't understand the PTS literature as it is above your head.

    Andr|-


    PTS is the way that meaning actually works.
    We can make a simpler analogy in that English
    words are meaningless until they are defined.

    The PTS connection of an expression in Q to
    its axioms Q is analogous to the connection
    of an English word to its definition.

    A proof merely looks to see if a definition
    exists and if it does not then the English
    Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.

    That's not what PTS says; that's simply you.

    There is a difference between meaningless and wrong.

    % This sentence is not true.
    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    Olcott's Minimal Type Theory
    G rao -4Prov_PA(riLGriY)
    Directed Graph of evaluation sequence
    00 rao-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a 01 02
    01 G
    02 -4-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a 03
    03 Prov_PA-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a 04
    04 G||del_Number_of 01-a // cycle indicates no well-founded justification tree exists.

    That's completely nonresponsive. You're simply copying and pasting text
    from previous posts without any explanation of how you think it relates
    to the point I made (which you disingenuously snipped).

    The Liar's Paradox isn't what I am discussing. I am discussing the fact
    that 'no number is equal to its successor' can't be proven in Q. That statement has absolutely no similarities to the Liar's Paradox.

    Andr|-
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jun 29 21:42:04 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 6/29/2026 9:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 20:17, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 8:54 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 19:19, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 8:01 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 18:37, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 6:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 17:36, olcott wrote:

    It does seem that they do agree that no proof
    of G can possibly exist in PA does means that
    G has no semantic meaning in PA.

    I've not seen anyone operating in PTS who says anything remotely >>>>>>> like that. They do not agree with this; rather, you are
    projecting your own peculiar views onto their theory.

    Andr|-


    Because they beat around the bush about that using
    terminology that varies across every author.

    It's not that they are beating around the bush; it's that they
    aren't actually saying what you want them to say. Face it, you
    really don't understand the PTS literature as it is above your head. >>>>>
    Andr|-


    PTS is the way that meaning actually works.
    We can make a simpler analogy in that English
    words are meaningless until they are defined.

    The PTS connection of an expression in Q to
    its axioms Q is analogous to the connection
    of an English word to its definition.

    A proof merely looks to see if a definition
    exists and if it does not then the English
    Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.

    That's not what PTS says; that's simply you.

    There is a difference between meaningless and wrong.

    % This sentence is not true.
    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    Olcott's Minimal Type Theory
    G rao -4Prov_PA(riLGriY)
    Directed Graph of evaluation sequence
    00 rao-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a 01 02
    01 G
    02 -4-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a 03
    03 Prov_PA-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a 04
    04 G||del_Number_of 01-a // cycle indicates no well-founded
    justification tree exists.

    That's completely nonresponsive. You're simply copying and pasting text
    from previous posts without any explanation of how you think it relates
    to the point I made (which you disingenuously snipped).

    The Liar's Paradox isn't what I am discussing. I am discussing the fact
    that 'no number is equal to its successor' can't be proven in Q. That statement has absolutely no similarities to the Liar's Paradox.

    Andr|-


    Those are specific concrete examples of how
    Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
    as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jun 29 20:49:08 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 9:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 20:17, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 8:54 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 19:19, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 8:01 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 18:37, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 6:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 17:36, olcott wrote:

    It does seem that they do agree that no proof
    of G can possibly exist in PA does means that
    G has no semantic meaning in PA.

    I've not seen anyone operating in PTS who says anything remotely >>>>>>>> like that. They do not agree with this; rather, you are
    projecting your own peculiar views onto their theory.

    Andr|-


    Because they beat around the bush about that using
    terminology that varies across every author.

    It's not that they are beating around the bush; it's that they
    aren't actually saying what you want them to say. Face it, you
    really don't understand the PTS literature as it is above your head. >>>>>>
    Andr|-


    PTS is the way that meaning actually works.
    We can make a simpler analogy in that English
    words are meaningless until they are defined.

    The PTS connection of an expression in Q to
    its axioms Q is analogous to the connection
    of an English word to its definition.

    A proof merely looks to see if a definition
    exists and if it does not then the English
    Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.

    That's not what PTS says; that's simply you.

    There is a difference between meaningless and wrong.

    % This sentence is not true.
    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    Olcott's Minimal Type Theory
    G rao -4Prov_PA(riLGriY)
    Directed Graph of evaluation sequence
    00 rao-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a 01 02
    01 G
    02 -4-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a 03
    03 Prov_PA-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a 04
    04 G||del_Number_of 01-a // cycle indicates no well-founded
    justification tree exists.

    That's completely nonresponsive. You're simply copying and pasting
    text from previous posts without any explanation of how you think it
    relates to the point I made (which you disingenuously snipped).

    The Liar's Paradox isn't what I am discussing. I am discussing the
    fact that 'no number is equal to its successor' can't be proven in Q.
    That statement has absolutely no similarities to the Liar's Paradox.

    Andr|-


    Those are specific concrete examples of how
    Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
    as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.

    No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of proof-theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples or comparable examples or made
    any claims about 'rejecting expressions as proof theoretic semantically incoherent'. And there's nothing incoherent about the statement 'no
    number is equal to its successor' which is the example under discussion.

    Andr|-
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jun 29 22:06:18 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 9:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 20:17, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 8:54 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 19:19, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 8:01 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 18:37, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 6:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 17:36, olcott wrote:

    It does seem that they do agree that no proof
    of G can possibly exist in PA does means that
    G has no semantic meaning in PA.

    I've not seen anyone operating in PTS who says anything
    remotely like that. They do not agree with this; rather, you >>>>>>>>> are projecting your own peculiar views onto their theory.

    Andr|-


    Because they beat around the bush about that using
    terminology that varies across every author.

    It's not that they are beating around the bush; it's that they
    aren't actually saying what you want them to say. Face it, you
    really don't understand the PTS literature as it is above your head. >>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    PTS is the way that meaning actually works.
    We can make a simpler analogy in that English
    words are meaningless until they are defined.

    The PTS connection of an expression in Q to
    its axioms Q is analogous to the connection
    of an English word to its definition.

    A proof merely looks to see if a definition
    exists and if it does not then the English
    Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.

    That's not what PTS says; that's simply you.

    There is a difference between meaningless and wrong.

    % This sentence is not true.
    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    Olcott's Minimal Type Theory
    G rao -4Prov_PA(riLGriY)
    Directed Graph of evaluation sequence
    00 rao-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a 01 02
    01 G
    02 -4-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a 03
    03 Prov_PA-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a 04
    04 G||del_Number_of 01-a // cycle indicates no well-founded
    justification tree exists.

    That's completely nonresponsive. You're simply copying and pasting
    text from previous posts without any explanation of how you think it
    relates to the point I made (which you disingenuously snipped).

    The Liar's Paradox isn't what I am discussing. I am discussing the
    fact that 'no number is equal to its successor' can't be proven in Q.
    That statement has absolutely no similarities to the Liar's Paradox.

    Andr|-


    Those are specific concrete examples of how
    Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
    as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.

    No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of proof-theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples or comparable examples or made
    any claims about 'rejecting expressions as proof theoretic semantically incoherent'. And there's nothing incoherent about the statement 'no
    number is equal to its successor' which is the example under discussion.

    Andr|-


    None-the-less what I have said remains completely true.
    What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first
    principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
    exactly that way before does not mean that it is not
    exactly correct PTS.

    The biggest mistake that humanity makes that is killing
    the whole planet is treating unbelievable as exactly
    one-and-the-same-thing as untrue.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,sci.math.symbolic,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Jun 30 06:54:12 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 26/04/2026 21:01, Scott Hoge wrote:
    ...

    The correct interpretation was, I argued, not "This sentence is
    unprovable," but rather:

    The following is unprovable (1):
    The following is unprovable (2):
    The following is unprovable (3):
    ...

    As regards semantics, I could call statement (1) the "unencoded
    sentence," ...

    1. The /unencoded sentence/ is /true and meaningful/. It's a
    statement about numbers.

    No, it's unbounded in its expression and therefore cannot be assigned
    meaning or it contains the ellipsis which is no better defined than
    "This sentence is unprovable". At best "..." is there (implicitly, hence
    the forever mistake) defined to be identical to "This sentence is
    unprovable".

    much like (pseudo formality):

    Let "..." := "This sentence is unprovable" in
    This following is unprovable (1):
    ...

    And you've made no progress by expanding it, in fact you've regressed.

    See the Y combinator in combinatory logic which applies quite directly
    since you've made no treatment of the (possibly real) distinction
    between sentences and propositonal thought objects.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2026 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Jun 30 11:18:19 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 29/06/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
    On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:

    A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when
    it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
    PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz
    is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt
    with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x).

    That's surprising, disregard for axioms?

    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from
    ~reax x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~reax x=S(x) is
    ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.

    This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
    it means that ~reax x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q.

    It comes close. If reax x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but in the
    language of Q then ~reax x=S(x) and reax x=S(x) are both undecidable
    and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean.

    Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make
    Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
    defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to
    its intended purpose. A car without an engine is
    incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.

    Irrelevant. The definition of completeness

    It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies)
    that something is missing that could be added to make
    it complete.

    It does mean that something is missing that could be added to
    enabe a proof of an unprovable sentence. For example, the theory
    of a group does not tell whether reCxreCy (x * y = y * x). It could
    be true or it could be false. But it is possible to add an
    axiom to make it provagle, e.g, xreCy (x * y = y * x) itself,
    giving the theory of an Abelian group, which is still incomplete
    but can be said to be less incomplete. Therefore the meaning of
    "complete" is not very different from its common sense meaning,
    just not as ambiguous.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Jun 30 13:14:23 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 01/05/2026 21:36, olcott wrote:
    Within completely coherent semantics the notion of
    undecidability cannot exist. Model Theoretic Semantics
    is incoherent. Proof Theoretic Semantics is coherent.

    Then Proof Theoretic Semantics seems unnecessarily restricted. Is there
    a Deduction Theoretic Semantics without that limitation and does it
    subsume (by embedding, for example) the Model Theoretic Semantics and
    the Proof Theoretic Semantics?
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2026 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Jun 30 08:58:58 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 6/30/2026 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
    On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:

    A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when
    it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
    PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz
    is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt
    with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x).

    That's surprising, disregard for axioms?

    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from
    ~reax x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~reax x=S(x) is
    ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.

    This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
    it means that ~reax x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q.

    It comes close. If reax x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but in the
    language of Q then ~reax x=S(x) and reax x=S(x) are both undecidable >>>>> and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean.

    Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make
    Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
    defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to
    its intended purpose. A car without an engine is
    incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.

    Irrelevant. The definition of completeness

    It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies)
    that something is missing that could be added to make
    it complete.

    It does mean that something is missing that could be added to
    enabe a proof of an unprovable sentence.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) allows that.
    It never was incomplete. It always did what it was defined to do.
    When Q is extended to become PA it stops being Q and becomes PA.

    For example, the theory
    of a group does not tell whether reCxreCy (x * y = y * x). It could
    be true or it could be false. But it is possible to add an
    axiom to make it provagle, e.g, xreCy (x * y = y * x) itself,
    giving the theory of an Abelian group, which is still incomplete
    but can be said to be less incomplete. Therefore the meaning of
    "complete" is not very different from its common sense meaning,
    just not as ambiguous.

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to sci.logic,sci.math,sci.math.symbolic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Jun 30 16:10:55 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 06/05/2026 20:48, phoenix wrote:

    I guess my question is this: If the diagonal sequence is inadequate,
    just what exactly is Cantor attempting to represent with the diagonal sequence at all?

    The outline is that the argument involves showing that /each/ and
    /every/ sequence of /all/ the reals in [0,1) (should there be any) can
    be mapped by a function to a real in [0,1) - perhaps a different one for
    each sequence - that could not have been in the sequence it was
    generated from. Thereby one shows that there is no sequence of /all/ the
    reals in [0,1) - a solution and the only solution.

    It is usually taught as "write a list of all the reals and then..."
    which is useless. It is usually also taught with steps missing since the formalisation of reals and limits that we trust today wasn't available
    to Cantor so his proof doesn't involve them.

    If someone were to bother making what would be a valid proof today
    instead of what would have been called a proof back /then/ they would
    use theorems about limits and either a constructive definition of the
    reals or a constructive definition of a constraint on constructions to
    those that define the reals (as they are conceived rather than later constructively explicated).
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2026 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Jun 30 15:18:29 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:

    Those are specific concrete examples of how
    Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
    as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.

    No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of
    proof-theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples or
    comparable examples or made any claims about 'rejecting expressions as
    proof theoretic semantically incoherent'. And there's nothing
    incoherent about the statement 'no number is equal to its successor'
    which is the example under discussion.

    Andr|-


    None-the-less what I have said remains completely true.
    What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first
    principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
    exactly that way before does not mean that it is not
    exactly correct PTS.

    Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight.

    Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement being
    false and a statement being meaningless?

    The biggest mistake that humanity makes that is killing
    the whole planet is treating unbelievable as exactly
    one-and-the-same-thing as untrue.

    I have no idea what you're getting at here.

    Andr|-
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Jun 30 16:45:22 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:

    Those are specific concrete examples of how
    Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
    as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.

    No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of proof-
    theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples or comparable
    examples or made any claims about 'rejecting expressions as proof
    theoretic semantically incoherent'. And there's nothing incoherent
    about the statement 'no number is equal to its successor' which is
    the example under discussion.

    Andr|-


    None-the-less what I have said remains completely true.
    What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first
    principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
    exactly that way before does not mean that it is not
    exactly correct PTS.

    Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight.


    Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact
    text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own
    private author by author language it must be a
    work written for a general audience like this work. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/


    Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement being
    false and a statement being meaningless?


    PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can make a
    simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless until
    they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in
    Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an
    English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to
    see if a definition exists and if it does not then the
    English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.

    PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between
    an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of
    this expression. These are the two papers that establish
    this Definitional View.

    The Definitional View of Atomic Systems in Proof-Theoretic Semantics
    Thomas Piecha and Peter Schroeder-Heister

    Atomic Systems in Proof-Theoretic Semantics: Two Approaches
    Thomas Piecha & Peter Schroeder-Heister

    The biggest mistake that humanity makes that is killing
    the whole planet is treating unbelievable as exactly
    one-and-the-same-thing as untrue.

    I have no idea what you're getting at here.


    Climate change is killing the planet and too many people
    do not believe this because of the well funded hired liars.

    Andr|-

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Jun 30 15:56:17 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:

    Those are specific concrete examples of how
    Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
    as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.

    No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of proof-
    theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples or comparable
    examples or made any claims about 'rejecting expressions as proof
    theoretic semantically incoherent'. And there's nothing incoherent
    about the statement 'no number is equal to its successor' which is
    the example under discussion.

    Andr|-


    None-the-less what I have said remains completely true.
    What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first
    principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
    exactly that way before does not mean that it is not
    exactly correct PTS.

    Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight.


    Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact
    text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own
    private author by author language it must be a
    work written for a general audience like this work. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/


    Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement being
    false and a statement being meaningless?


    PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can make a
    simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless until
    they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in
    Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an
    English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to
    see if a definition exists and if it does not then the
    English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.

    PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between
    an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of
    this expression. These are the two papers that establish
    this Definitional View.

    None of the above answers my question:

    Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement being
    false and a statement being meaningless?

    That's a simple yes/no question. If you want to append an explanation
    that's fine, but please start your answer with either yes or no.

    Andr|-
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Jun 30 16:56:43 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:

    Those are specific concrete examples of how
    Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
    as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.

    No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of proof-
    theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples or comparable
    examples or made any claims about 'rejecting expressions as proof
    theoretic semantically incoherent'. And there's nothing incoherent
    about the statement 'no number is equal to its successor' which is
    the example under discussion.

    Andr|-


    None-the-less what I have said remains completely true.
    What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first
    principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
    exactly that way before does not mean that it is not
    exactly correct PTS.

    Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight.

    Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement being
    false and a statement being meaningless?


    Of course and that is such a dumb question that I
    ignored it.

    The biggest mistake that humanity makes that is killing
    the whole planet is treating unbelievable as exactly
    one-and-the-same-thing as untrue.

    I have no idea what you're getting at here.

    Andr|-

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Jun 30 17:04:42 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:

    Those are specific concrete examples of how
    Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
    as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.

    No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of proof-
    theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples or comparable
    examples or made any claims about 'rejecting expressions as proof
    theoretic semantically incoherent'. And there's nothing incoherent
    about the statement 'no number is equal to its successor' which is
    the example under discussion.

    Andr|-


    None-the-less what I have said remains completely true.
    What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first
    principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
    exactly that way before does not mean that it is not
    exactly correct PTS.

    Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight.


    Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact
    text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own
    private author by author language it must be a
    work written for a general audience like this work.
    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/


    Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement being
    false and a statement being meaningless?


    PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can make a
    simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless until
    they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in
    Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an
    English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to
    see if a definition exists and if it does not then the
    English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.

    PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between
    an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of
    this expression. These are the two papers that establish
    this Definitional View.

    None of the above answers my question:

    Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement being
    false and a statement being meaningless?


    I don't answer dumb questions.
    That is why I am not responding to any posts
    besides yours. dbush has become a troll again.

    Here is meaningless:
    Iz droopingstin pathorm mopygird

    Here is false:
    bovine cows are a kind of race car.

    Please go back and carefully study my careful response.
    I very carefully composed exactly what constitutes
    meaning. Failing to meet that spec entails meaningless.

    That's a simple yes/no question. If you want to append an explanation
    that's fine, but please start your answer with either yes or no.

    Andr|-

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Jun 30 16:06:55 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 2026-06-30 15:56, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:

    Those are specific concrete examples of how
    Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
    as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.

    No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of proof-
    theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples or comparable
    examples or made any claims about 'rejecting expressions as proof
    theoretic semantically incoherent'. And there's nothing incoherent
    about the statement 'no number is equal to its successor' which is
    the example under discussion.

    Andr|-


    None-the-less what I have said remains completely true.
    What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first
    principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
    exactly that way before does not mean that it is not
    exactly correct PTS.

    Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight.

    Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement being
    false and a statement being meaningless?


    Of course and that is such a dumb question that I
    ignored it.

    But your interpretation of PTS claims that there is no difference. You
    claim that unprovable statements are meaningless; but any false
    statement will be unprovable in a consistent logic.

    PA can prove that 2 + 3 = 5
    PA can't prove that 2 + 3 rea 5

    But the latter isn't meaningless, it's simply false.

    You're simply wrong when you assert that PTS claims that unprovable
    claims are meaningless; that's simply not a coherent view.

    Andr|-
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Jun 30 17:08:41 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 6/30/2026 5:06 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-30 15:56, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:

    Those are specific concrete examples of how
    Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
    as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.

    No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of proof-
    theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples or comparable
    examples or made any claims about 'rejecting expressions as proof
    theoretic semantically incoherent'. And there's nothing incoherent
    about the statement 'no number is equal to its successor' which is
    the example under discussion.

    Andr|-


    None-the-less what I have said remains completely true.
    What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first
    principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
    exactly that way before does not mean that it is not
    exactly correct PTS.

    Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight.

    Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement being
    false and a statement being meaningless?


    Of course and that is such a dumb question that I
    ignored it.

    But your interpretation of PTS claims that there is no difference.

    Spent at least ten minutes carefully studying
    my first response.

    You
    claim that unprovable statements are meaningless; but any false
    statement will be unprovable in a consistent logic.

    PA can prove that 2 + 3 = 5
    PA can't prove that 2 + 3 rea 5

    But the latter isn't meaningless, it's simply false.

    You're simply wrong when you assert that PTS claims that unprovable
    claims are meaningless; that's simply not a coherent view.

    Andr|-

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Jun 30 17:42:16 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 6/30/2026 5:06 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-30 15:56, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:

    Those are specific concrete examples of how
    Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
    as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.

    No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of proof-
    theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples or comparable
    examples or made any claims about 'rejecting expressions as proof
    theoretic semantically incoherent'. And there's nothing incoherent
    about the statement 'no number is equal to its successor' which is
    the example under discussion.

    Andr|-


    None-the-less what I have said remains completely true.
    What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first
    principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
    exactly that way before does not mean that it is not
    exactly correct PTS.

    Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight.

    Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement being
    false and a statement being meaningless?


    Of course and that is such a dumb question that I
    ignored it.

    But your interpretation of PTS claims that there is no difference. You
    claim that unprovable statements are meaningless; but any false
    statement will be unprovable in a consistent logic.

    PA can prove that 2 + 3 = 5
    PA can't prove that 2 + 3 rea 5

    But the latter isn't meaningless, it's simply false.


    If no connection exists between an expression E
    (or its negation ~E) and the axioms of formal
    system F then E is undefined in F.

    You're simply wrong when you assert that PTS claims that unprovable
    claims are meaningless; that's simply not a coherent view.

    Andr|-

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Jun 30 16:51:20 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 2026-06-30 16:42, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 5:06 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-30 15:56, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:

    Those are specific concrete examples of how
    Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
    as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.

    No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of proof-
    theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples or comparable >>>>>> examples or made any claims about 'rejecting expressions as proof >>>>>> theoretic semantically incoherent'. And there's nothing incoherent >>>>>> about the statement 'no number is equal to its successor' which is >>>>>> the example under discussion.

    Andr|-


    None-the-less what I have said remains completely true.
    What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first
    principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
    exactly that way before does not mean that it is not
    exactly correct PTS.

    Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight.

    Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement being
    false and a statement being meaningless?


    Of course and that is such a dumb question that I
    ignored it.

    But your interpretation of PTS claims that there is no difference. You
    claim that unprovable statements are meaningless; but any false
    statement will be unprovable in a consistent logic.

    PA can prove that 2 + 3 = 5
    PA can't prove that 2 + 3 rea 5

    But the latter isn't meaningless, it's simply false.


    If no connection exists between an expression E
    (or its negation ~E) and the axioms of formal
    system F then E is undefined in F.

    So now you are adding 'or its negation' to your position (something not present in your earlier presentations). Can you provide a reference to a single author writing in PTS who makes such a claim?

    And does 'undefined' differ from your earlier term 'meaningless'?

    Andr|-
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Jun 30 21:07:11 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 6/30/2026 5:51 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-30 16:42, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 5:06 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-30 15:56, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:

    Those are specific concrete examples of how
    Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
    as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.

    No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of proof-
    theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples or comparable >>>>>>> examples or made any claims about 'rejecting expressions as proof >>>>>>> theoretic semantically incoherent'. And there's nothing
    incoherent about the statement 'no number is equal to its
    successor' which is the example under discussion.

    Andr|-


    None-the-less what I have said remains completely true.
    What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first
    principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
    exactly that way before does not mean that it is not
    exactly correct PTS.

    Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight.

    Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement
    being false and a statement being meaningless?


    Of course and that is such a dumb question that I
    ignored it.

    But your interpretation of PTS claims that there is no difference.
    You claim that unprovable statements are meaningless; but any false
    statement will be unprovable in a consistent logic.

    PA can prove that 2 + 3 = 5
    PA can't prove that 2 + 3 rea 5

    But the latter isn't meaningless, it's simply false.


    If no connection exists between an expression E
    (or its negation ~E) and the axioms of formal
    system F then E is undefined in F.

    So now you are adding 'or its negation' to your position (something not present in your earlier presentations). Can you provide a reference to a single author writing in PTS who makes such a claim?


    I did not put negation in there because I thought that
    my words obviously included it. Clearly I was wrong
    about this. The PTS people themselves mostly talk about
    canonical proof, normalization and harmony.

    And does 'undefined' differ from your earlier term 'meaningless'?

    Andr|-

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Jun 30 22:34:10 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:

    Those are specific concrete examples of how
    Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
    as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.

    No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of proof-
    theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples or comparable >>>>>> examples or made any claims about 'rejecting expressions as proof >>>>>> theoretic semantically incoherent'. And there's nothing incoherent >>>>>> about the statement 'no number is equal to its successor' which is >>>>>> the example under discussion.

    Andr|-


    None-the-less what I have said remains completely true.
    What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first
    principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
    exactly that way before does not mean that it is not
    exactly correct PTS.

    Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight.


    Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact
    text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own
    private author by author language it must be a
    work written for a general audience like this work.
    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/


    Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement being
    false and a statement being meaningless?


    PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can make a
    simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless until
    they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in
    Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an
    English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to
    see if a definition exists and if it does not then the
    English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.

    PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between
    an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of
    this expression. These are the two papers that establish
    this Definitional View.

    None of the above answers my question:

    Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement being
    false and a statement being meaningless?


    I don't answer dumb questions.

    Translation:

    "I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong"

    That is why I am not responding to any posts
    besides yours. dbush has become a troll again.


    Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction intruduction is truth-preserving by your repeated dishonest dodging of how P can be true
    and P re? Q can be false is not trolling.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Jun 30 21:57:28 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:

    Those are specific concrete examples of how
    Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
    as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.

    No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of proof-
    theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples or comparable >>>>>>> examples or made any claims about 'rejecting expressions as proof >>>>>>> theoretic semantically incoherent'. And there's nothing
    incoherent about the statement 'no number is equal to its
    successor' which is the example under discussion.

    Andr|-


    None-the-less what I have said remains completely true.
    What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first
    principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
    exactly that way before does not mean that it is not
    exactly correct PTS.

    Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight.


    Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact
    text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own
    private author by author language it must be a
    work written for a general audience like this work.
    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/


    Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement
    being false and a statement being meaningless?


    PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can make a
    simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless until
    they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in
    Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an
    English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to
    see if a definition exists and if it does not then the
    English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.

    PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between
    an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of
    this expression. These are the two papers that establish
    this Definitional View.

    None of the above answers my question:

    Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement being
    false and a statement being meaningless?


    I don't answer dumb questions.

    Translation:

    "I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong"

    That is why I am not responding to any posts
    besides yours. dbush has become a troll again.


    Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction intruduction is truth-preserving by your repeated dishonest dodging of how P can be true
    and P re? Q can be false is not trolling.


    In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q),
    the statement "no number is equal to its
    successor" is not provable. While this statement
    is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson
    Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally
    (reC x, S(x) rea x).

    That you brought this up was a brilliant simplification
    of the point that I was making proving that you can
    understand the key ideas.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Jun 30 23:02:09 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:

    Those are specific concrete examples of how
    Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
    as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.

    No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of proof- >>>>>>>> theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples or
    comparable examples or made any claims about 'rejecting
    expressions as proof theoretic semantically incoherent'. And
    there's nothing incoherent about the statement 'no number is
    equal to its successor' which is the example under discussion. >>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    None-the-less what I have said remains completely true.
    What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first
    principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
    exactly that way before does not mean that it is not
    exactly correct PTS.

    Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight.


    Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact
    text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own
    private author by author language it must be a
    work written for a general audience like this work.
    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/


    Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement
    being false and a statement being meaningless?


    PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can make a
    simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless until
    they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in
    Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an
    English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to
    see if a definition exists and if it does not then the
    English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.

    PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between
    an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of
    this expression. These are the two papers that establish
    this Definitional View.

    None of the above answers my question:

    Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement being
    false and a statement being meaningless?


    I don't answer dumb questions.

    Translation:

    "I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong"

    That is why I am not responding to any posts
    besides yours. dbush has become a troll again.


    Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction intruduction is
    truth-preserving by your repeated dishonest dodging of how P can be
    true and P re? Q can be false is not trolling.


    In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q),
    the statement "no number is equal to its
    successor" is not provable. While this statement
    is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson
    Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally
    (reC x, S(x) rea x).

    That you brought this up was a brilliant simplification
    of the point that I was making proving that you can
    understand the key ideas.

    What is was is a way to show more easily how you're wrong. That you
    claim that "no number is equal to its successor" is semantically invalid
    shows everyone that your ideas are worthless.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Jun 30 23:04:32 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:

    Those are specific concrete examples of how
    Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
    as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.

    No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of proof- >>>>>>>> theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples or
    comparable examples or made any claims about 'rejecting
    expressions as proof theoretic semantically incoherent'. And
    there's nothing incoherent about the statement 'no number is
    equal to its successor' which is the example under discussion. >>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    None-the-less what I have said remains completely true.
    What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first
    principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
    exactly that way before does not mean that it is not
    exactly correct PTS.

    Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight.


    Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact
    text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own
    private author by author language it must be a
    work written for a general audience like this work.
    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/


    Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement
    being false and a statement being meaningless?


    PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can make a
    simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless until
    they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in
    Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an
    English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to
    see if a definition exists and if it does not then the
    English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.

    PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between
    an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of
    this expression. These are the two papers that establish
    this Definitional View.

    None of the above answers my question:

    Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement being
    false and a statement being meaningless?


    I don't answer dumb questions.

    Translation:

    "I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong"

    Your lack of response to this constitutes that you agree it is correct,
    and show everyone reading this what a liar you are.


    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Jun 30 22:10:02 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:

    Those are specific concrete examples of how
    Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
    as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.

    No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of proof- >>>>>>>>> theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples or
    comparable examples or made any claims about 'rejecting
    expressions as proof theoretic semantically incoherent'. And >>>>>>>>> there's nothing incoherent about the statement 'no number is >>>>>>>>> equal to its successor' which is the example under discussion. >>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    None-the-less what I have said remains completely true.
    What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first
    principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
    exactly that way before does not mean that it is not
    exactly correct PTS.

    Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight.


    Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact
    text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own
    private author by author language it must be a
    work written for a general audience like this work.
    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/


    Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement
    being false and a statement being meaningless?


    PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can make a
    simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless until
    they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in
    Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an
    English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to
    see if a definition exists and if it does not then the
    English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.

    PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between
    an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of
    this expression. These are the two papers that establish
    this Definitional View.

    None of the above answers my question:

    Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement
    being false and a statement being meaningless?


    I don't answer dumb questions.

    Translation:

    "I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong"

    That is why I am not responding to any posts
    besides yours. dbush has become a troll again.


    Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction intruduction is
    truth-preserving by your repeated dishonest dodging of how P can be
    true and P re? Q can be false is not trolling.


    In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q),
    the statement "no number is equal to its
    successor" is not provable. While this statement
    is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson
    Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally
    (reC x, S(x) rea x).

    That you brought this up was a brilliant simplification
    of the point that I was making proving that you can
    understand the key ideas.

    What is was is a way to show more easily how you're wrong.-a That you
    claim that "no number is equal to its successor" is semantically invalid shows everyone that your ideas are worthless.


    This is more accurate:
    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Jun 30 22:11:46 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 6/30/2026 10:04 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:

    Those are specific concrete examples of how
    Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
    as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.

    No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of proof- >>>>>>>>> theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples or
    comparable examples or made any claims about 'rejecting
    expressions as proof theoretic semantically incoherent'. And >>>>>>>>> there's nothing incoherent about the statement 'no number is >>>>>>>>> equal to its successor' which is the example under discussion. >>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    None-the-less what I have said remains completely true.
    What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first
    principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
    exactly that way before does not mean that it is not
    exactly correct PTS.

    Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight.


    Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact
    text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own
    private author by author language it must be a
    work written for a general audience like this work.
    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/


    Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement
    being false and a statement being meaningless?


    PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can make a
    simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless until
    they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in
    Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an
    English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to
    see if a definition exists and if it does not then the
    English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.

    PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between
    an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of
    this expression. These are the two papers that establish
    this Definitional View.

    None of the above answers my question:

    Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement
    being false and a statement being meaningless?


    I don't answer dumb questions.

    Translation:

    "I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong"

    Your lack of response to this constitutes that you agree it is correct,
    and show everyone reading this what a liar you are.



    Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement
    being false and a statement being meaningless?

    Well duh.
    Would you agree that bovine cows are not a type of race car?
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Jun 30 23:17:18 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 6/30/2026 11:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:

    Those are specific concrete examples of how
    Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
    as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.

    No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of proof- >>>>>>>>>> theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples or
    comparable examples or made any claims about 'rejecting
    expressions as proof theoretic semantically incoherent'. And >>>>>>>>>> there's nothing incoherent about the statement 'no number is >>>>>>>>>> equal to its successor' which is the example under discussion. >>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    None-the-less what I have said remains completely true.
    What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first
    principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
    exactly that way before does not mean that it is not
    exactly correct PTS.

    Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight.


    Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact
    text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own
    private author by author language it must be a
    work written for a general audience like this work.
    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/


    Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement >>>>>>>> being false and a statement being meaningless?


    PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can make a
    simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless until
    they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in
    Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an
    English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to
    see if a definition exists and if it does not then the
    English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.

    PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between
    an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of
    this expression. These are the two papers that establish
    this Definitional View.

    None of the above answers my question:

    Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement
    being false and a statement being meaningless?


    I don't answer dumb questions.

    Translation:

    "I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong"

    That is why I am not responding to any posts
    besides yours. dbush has become a troll again.


    Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction intruduction is
    truth-preserving by your repeated dishonest dodging of how P can be
    true and P re? Q can be false is not trolling.


    In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q),
    the statement "no number is equal to its
    successor" is not provable. While this statement
    is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson
    Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally
    (reC x, S(x) rea x).

    That you brought this up was a brilliant simplification
    of the point that I was making proving that you can
    understand the key ideas.

    What is was is a way to show more easily how you're wrong.-a That you
    claim that "no number is equal to its successor" is semantically
    invalid shows everyone that your ideas are worthless.


    This is more accurate:
    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x)

    So you admit that the above statement which exists in Q must be either
    true or false.

    does not exist in Q.


    You just contradicted yourself.


    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Jun 30 21:31:06 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 2026-06-30 21:10, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:

    What is was is a way to show more easily how you're wrong.-a That you
    claim that "no number is equal to its successor" is semantically
    invalid shows everyone that your ideas are worthless.


    This is more accurate:
    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q.

    But as soon as you bring up truth values you're no longer talking about
    PTS which semantically divides expressions into 'provable' and 'not
    provable'.

    In truth-functional semantics, the law of the excluded middle dictates
    that reCx, S(x) rea x must be either true or false. It's truth value might
    be unknown to us but there is a big difference between unknown and nonexistent.

    Within PTS there is absolutely no contradiction about claiming that reCx,
    S(x) rea x is unprovable while at the same time claiming that its negation
    is unprovable, but that both are perfectly legitimate and meaningful expressions of Q. If you think otherwise, provide a reference to some
    author working in PTS who actually asserts something of this sort. I
    suspect you can't because this simply isn't what PTS claims. It's you
    imposing your own views on a system developed by others which you do not
    fully understand.

    Andr|-
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Jun 30 22:49:04 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 6/30/2026 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:

    Those are specific concrete examples of how
    Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
    as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.

    No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of >>>>>>>>>>> proof- theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples or >>>>>>>>>>> comparable examples or made any claims about 'rejecting >>>>>>>>>>> expressions as proof theoretic semantically incoherent'. And >>>>>>>>>>> there's nothing incoherent about the statement 'no number is >>>>>>>>>>> equal to its successor' which is the example under discussion. >>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    None-the-less what I have said remains completely true.
    What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first
    principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
    exactly that way before does not mean that it is not
    exactly correct PTS.

    Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight.


    Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact
    text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own
    private author by author language it must be a
    work written for a general audience like this work.
    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/


    Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement >>>>>>>>> being false and a statement being meaningless?


    PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can make a
    simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless until
    they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in
    Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an
    English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to
    see if a definition exists and if it does not then the
    English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.

    PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between
    an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of
    this expression. These are the two papers that establish
    this Definitional View.

    None of the above answers my question:

    Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement
    being false and a statement being meaningless?


    I don't answer dumb questions.

    Translation:

    "I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong"

    That is why I am not responding to any posts
    besides yours. dbush has become a troll again.


    Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction intruduction is >>>>> truth-preserving by your repeated dishonest dodging of how P can be >>>>> true and P re? Q can be false is not trolling.


    In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q),
    the statement "no number is equal to its
    successor" is not provable. While this statement
    is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson
    Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally
    (reC x, S(x) rea x).

    That you brought this up was a brilliant simplification
    of the point that I was making proving that you can
    understand the key ideas.

    What is was is a way to show more easily how you're wrong.-a That you
    claim that "no number is equal to its successor" is semantically
    invalid shows everyone that your ideas are worthless.


    This is more accurate:
    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x)

    So you admit that the above statement which exists in Q must be either
    true or false.

    does not exist in Q.



    Unlike PA it cannot possibly have any finite sequence
    of inference steps in Q that resolve to a truth value in Q.

    You just contradicted yourself.


    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 00:01:16 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 6/30/2026 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:

    Those are specific concrete examples of how
    Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
    as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.

    No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of >>>>>>>>>>>> proof- theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples >>>>>>>>>>>> or comparable examples or made any claims about 'rejecting >>>>>>>>>>>> expressions as proof theoretic semantically incoherent'. And >>>>>>>>>>>> there's nothing incoherent about the statement 'no number is >>>>>>>>>>>> equal to its successor' which is the example under discussion. >>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    None-the-less what I have said remains completely true.
    What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first >>>>>>>>>>> principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
    exactly that way before does not mean that it is not
    exactly correct PTS.

    Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight.


    Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact
    text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own
    private author by author language it must be a
    work written for a general audience like this work.
    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/ >>>>>>>>>

    Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement >>>>>>>>>> being false and a statement being meaningless?


    PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can make a
    simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless until
    they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in
    Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an
    English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to
    see if a definition exists and if it does not then the
    English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.

    PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between
    an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of
    this expression. These are the two papers that establish
    this Definitional View.

    None of the above answers my question:

    Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement >>>>>>>> being false and a statement being meaningless?


    I don't answer dumb questions.

    Translation:

    "I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong"

    That is why I am not responding to any posts
    besides yours. dbush has become a troll again.


    Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction intruduction
    is truth-preserving by your repeated dishonest dodging of how P
    can be true and P re? Q can be false is not trolling.


    In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q),
    the statement "no number is equal to its
    successor" is not provable. While this statement
    is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson
    Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally
    (reC x, S(x) rea x).

    That you brought this up was a brilliant simplification
    of the point that I was making proving that you can
    understand the key ideas.

    What is was is a way to show more easily how you're wrong.-a That you >>>> claim that "no number is equal to its successor" is semantically
    invalid shows everyone that your ideas are worthless.


    This is more accurate:
    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x)

    So you admit that the above statement which exists in Q must be either
    true or false.


    Your lack of reply confirms your above admission.

    does not exist in Q.



    Unlike PA it cannot possibly have any finite sequence
    of inference steps in Q that resolve to a truth value in Q.

    Which means, by definition, you agree that Q is incomplete.


    You just contradicted yourself.





    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Jun 30 23:17:29 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 6/30/2026 10:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-30 21:10, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:

    What is was is a way to show more easily how you're wrong.-a That you
    claim that "no number is equal to its successor" is semantically
    invalid shows everyone that your ideas are worthless.


    This is more accurate:
    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q.

    But as soon as you bring up truth values you're no longer talking about
    PTS which semantically divides expressions into 'provable' and 'not provable'.

    In truth-functional semantics, the law of the excluded middle dictates
    that reCx, S(x) rea x must be either true or false. It's truth value might be unknown to us but there is a big difference between unknown and nonexistent.

    Within PTS there is absolutely no contradiction about claiming that reCx, S(x) rea x is unprovable while at the same time claiming that its negation is unprovable, but that both are perfectly legitimate and meaningful expressions of Q. If you think otherwise, provide a reference to some
    author working in PTS who actually asserts something of this sort. I
    suspect you can't because this simply isn't what PTS claims. It's you imposing your own views on a system developed by others which you do not fully understand.


    I am working to get more support for my understandings.
    It is difficult when each author has their own terminology
    for the same ideas.

    Andr|-


    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Jun 30 23:20:37 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 6/30/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:

    Those are specific concrete examples of how
    Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
    as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.

    No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of >>>>>>>>>>>>> proof- theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples >>>>>>>>>>>>> or comparable examples or made any claims about 'rejecting >>>>>>>>>>>>> expressions as proof theoretic semantically incoherent'. >>>>>>>>>>>>> And there's nothing incoherent about the statement 'no >>>>>>>>>>>>> number is equal to its successor' which is the example >>>>>>>>>>>>> under discussion.

    Andr|-


    None-the-less what I have said remains completely true. >>>>>>>>>>>> What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first >>>>>>>>>>>> principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
    exactly that way before does not mean that it is not
    exactly correct PTS.

    Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight.


    Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact
    text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own
    private author by author language it must be a
    work written for a general audience like this work.
    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/ >>>>>>>>>>

    Would you agree that there is a difference between a
    statement being false and a statement being meaningless? >>>>>>>>>>>

    PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can make a
    simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless until >>>>>>>>>> they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in
    Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an
    English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to
    see if a definition exists and if it does not then the
    English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.

    PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between
    an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of
    this expression. These are the two papers that establish
    this Definitional View.

    None of the above answers my question:

    Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement >>>>>>>>> being false and a statement being meaningless?


    I don't answer dumb questions.

    Translation:

    "I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong"

    That is why I am not responding to any posts
    besides yours. dbush has become a troll again.


    Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction intruduction >>>>>>> is truth-preserving by your repeated dishonest dodging of how P >>>>>>> can be true and P re? Q can be false is not trolling.


    In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q),
    the statement "no number is equal to its
    successor" is not provable. While this statement
    is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson
    Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally
    (reC x, S(x) rea x).

    That you brought this up was a brilliant simplification
    of the point that I was making proving that you can
    understand the key ideas.

    What is was is a way to show more easily how you're wrong.-a That
    you claim that "no number is equal to its successor" is
    semantically invalid shows everyone that your ideas are worthless.


    This is more accurate:
    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x)

    So you admit that the above statement which exists in Q must be
    either true or false.


    Your lack of reply confirms your above admission.


    I make a very specific statement.
    You mangle it and ask if I agree.

    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q.
    If you change that in any way you can assume that I do not agree.

    does not exist in Q.



    Unlike PA it cannot possibly have any finite sequence
    of inference steps in Q that resolve to a truth value in Q.

    Which means, by definition, you agree that Q is incomplete.


    You just contradicted yourself.





    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 10:24:17 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 30/06/2026 16:58, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
    On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:

    A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when
    it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
    PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz
    is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt
    with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x).

    That's surprising, disregard for axioms?

    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from
    ~reax x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~reax x=S(x) is
    ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.

    This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
    it means that ~reax x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q.

    It comes close. If reax x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but in the >>>>>> language of Q then ~reax x=S(x) and reax x=S(x) are both undecidable >>>>>> and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean.

    Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make
    Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
    defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to
    its intended purpose. A car without an engine is
    incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.

    Irrelevant. The definition of completeness

    It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies)
    that something is missing that could be added to make
    it complete.

    It does mean that something is missing that could be added to
    enabe a proof of an unprovable sentence.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) allows that.
    It never was incomplete. It always did what it was defined to do.
    When Q is extended to become PA it stops being Q and becomes PA.

    However, there are theories that reamain incomplete even when
    more postolates are added, as long as there is a way to know
    which sentences are included in the added postulates. Important
    examples include Peano arithmetic and ZFC set theory.
    --
    Mikko

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 07:55:38 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 12:20 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:

    Those are specific concrete examples of how
    Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
    as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.

    No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> proof- theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples >>>>>>>>>>>>>> or comparable examples or made any claims about 'rejecting >>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressions as proof theoretic semantically incoherent'. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> And there's nothing incoherent about the statement 'no >>>>>>>>>>>>>> number is equal to its successor' which is the example >>>>>>>>>>>>>> under discussion.

    Andr|-


    None-the-less what I have said remains completely true. >>>>>>>>>>>>> What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first >>>>>>>>>>>>> principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
    exactly that way before does not mean that it is not >>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly correct PTS.

    Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight. >>>>>>>>>>>>

    Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact
    text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own
    private author by author language it must be a
    work written for a general audience like this work.
    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/ >>>>>>>>>>>

    Would you agree that there is a difference between a
    statement being false and a statement being meaningless? >>>>>>>>>>>>

    PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can make a >>>>>>>>>>> simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless until >>>>>>>>>>> they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in >>>>>>>>>>> Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an
    English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to
    see if a definition exists and if it does not then the
    English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.

    PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between
    an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of
    this expression. These are the two papers that establish >>>>>>>>>>> this Definitional View.

    None of the above answers my question:

    Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement >>>>>>>>>> being false and a statement being meaningless?


    I don't answer dumb questions.

    Translation:

    "I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong"

    That is why I am not responding to any posts
    besides yours. dbush has become a troll again.


    Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction intruduction >>>>>>>> is truth-preserving by your repeated dishonest dodging of how P >>>>>>>> can be true and P re? Q can be false is not trolling.


    In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q),
    the statement "no number is equal to its
    successor" is not provable. While this statement
    is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson
    Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally
    (reC x, S(x) rea x).

    That you brought this up was a brilliant simplification
    of the point that I was making proving that you can
    understand the key ideas.

    What is was is a way to show more easily how you're wrong.-a That >>>>>> you claim that "no number is equal to its successor" is
    semantically invalid shows everyone that your ideas are worthless. >>>>>>

    This is more accurate:
    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x)

    So you admit that the above statement which exists in Q must be
    either true or false.


    Your lack of reply confirms your above admission.


    I make a very specific statement.
    You mangle it and ask if I agree.

    There was no mangling. That is the meaning of the words you used.


    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x)

    In order for it to have a truth value, it must be either true or false.
    That you say it has a truth value is your admission that it is in fact
    either true or false.

    Only a statement that is semantically valid / correct can be true or
    false, as it is it semantics (in this case the semantics of Q and the
    English language sentence it translates to) that determines truth values.

    This therefore constitutes your admission that the above statement is semantically valid / correct, and that by extension PTS is incorrect
    about this and therefore useless.


    does not exist in Q.
    If you change that in any way you can assume that I do not agree.




    does not exist in Q.



    Unlike PA it cannot possibly have any finite sequence
    of inference steps in Q that resolve to a truth value in Q.

    Which means, by definition, you agree that Q is incomplete.


    You just contradicted yourself.








    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 09:40:09 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 6:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 12:20 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:

    Those are specific concrete examples of how
    Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
    as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.

    No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proof- theoretic semantics has ever offered those >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> examples or comparable examples or made any claims about >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'rejecting expressions as proof theoretic semantically >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incoherent'. And there's nothing incoherent about the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement 'no number is equal to its successor' which is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the example under discussion.

    Andr|-


    None-the-less what I have said remains completely true. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first >>>>>>>>>>>>>> principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS >>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly that way before does not mean that it is not >>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly correct PTS.

    Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight. >>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact
    text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own
    private author by author language it must be a
    work written for a general audience like this work.
    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/ >>>>>>>>>>>>

    Would you agree that there is a difference between a >>>>>>>>>>>>> statement being false and a statement being meaningless? >>>>>>>>>>>>>

    PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can make a >>>>>>>>>>>> simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless until >>>>>>>>>>>> they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in >>>>>>>>>>>> Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an >>>>>>>>>>>> English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to >>>>>>>>>>>> see if a definition exists and if it does not then the >>>>>>>>>>>> English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.

    PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between >>>>>>>>>>>> an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of >>>>>>>>>>>> this expression. These are the two papers that establish >>>>>>>>>>>> this Definitional View.

    None of the above answers my question:

    Would you agree that there is a difference between a
    statement being false and a statement being meaningless? >>>>>>>>>>>

    I don't answer dumb questions.

    Translation:

    "I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong"

    That is why I am not responding to any posts
    besides yours. dbush has become a troll again.


    Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction
    intruduction is truth-preserving by your repeated dishonest >>>>>>>>> dodging of how P can be true and P re? Q can be false is not >>>>>>>>> trolling.


    In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q),
    the statement "no number is equal to its
    successor" is not provable. While this statement
    is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson
    Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally
    (reC x, S(x) rea x).

    That you brought this up was a brilliant simplification
    of the point that I was making proving that you can
    understand the key ideas.

    What is was is a way to show more easily how you're wrong.-a That >>>>>>> you claim that "no number is equal to its successor" is
    semantically invalid shows everyone that your ideas are worthless. >>>>>>>

    This is more accurate:
    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x)

    So you admit that the above statement which exists in Q must be
    either true or false.


    Your lack of reply confirms your above admission.


    I make a very specific statement.
    You mangle it and ask if I agree.

    There was no mangling.-a That is the meaning of the words you used.


    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x)


    You already mangled it.
    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q.

    In order for it to have a truth value, it must be either true or false.
    That you say it has a truth value is your admission that it is in fact either true or false.

    Only a statement that is semantically valid / correct can be true or
    false, as it is it semantics (in this case the semantics of Q and the English language sentence it translates to) that determines truth values.

    This therefore constitutes your admission that the above statement is semantically valid / correct, and that by extension PTS is incorrect
    about this and therefore useless.


    does not exist in Q.
    If you change that in any way you can assume that I do not agree.




    does not exist in Q.



    Unlike PA it cannot possibly have any finite sequence
    of inference steps in Q that resolve to a truth value in Q.

    Which means, by definition, you agree that Q is incomplete.


    You just contradicted yourself.








    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 10:16:10 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 2:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 30/06/2026 16:58, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
    On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:

    A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when
    it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
    PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz
    is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt
    with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x).

    That's surprising, disregard for axioms?

    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from
    ~reax x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~reax x=S(x) is
    ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.

    This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
    it means that ~reax x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q.

    It comes close. If reax x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but in the >>>>>>> language of Q then ~reax x=S(x) and reax x=S(x) are both undecidable >>>>>>> and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean.

    Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make
    Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
    defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to
    its intended purpose. A car without an engine is
    incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.

    Irrelevant. The definition of completeness

    It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies)
    that something is missing that could be added to make
    it complete.

    It does mean that something is missing that could be added to
    enabe a proof of an unprovable sentence.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) allows that.
    It never was incomplete. It always did what it was defined to do.
    When Q is extended to become PA it stops being Q and becomes PA.

    However, there are theories that reamain incomplete even when
    more postolates are added, as long as there is a way to know
    which sentences are included in the added postulates. Important
    examples include Peano arithmetic and ZFC set theory.


    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) seems to be essentially a cheat.
    When we ask what is grounded in an atomic base of Q and we
    add axioms to Q to become PA we cheated in that we changed
    the original question rather than answered it.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 13:33:51 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 6:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 12:20 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:

    Those are specific concrete examples of how
    Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.

    No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proof- theoretic semantics has ever offered those >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> examples or comparable examples or made any claims about >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'rejecting expressions as proof theoretic semantically >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incoherent'. And there's nothing incoherent about the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement 'no number is equal to its successor' which is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the example under discussion.

    Andr|-


    None-the-less what I have said remains completely true. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly that way before does not mean that it is not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly correct PTS.

    Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact
    text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own
    private author by author language it must be a
    work written for a general audience like this work.
    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Would you agree that there is a difference between a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement being false and a statement being meaningless? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can make a >>>>>>>>>>>>> simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless until >>>>>>>>>>>>> they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in >>>>>>>>>>>>> Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an >>>>>>>>>>>>> English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to >>>>>>>>>>>>> see if a definition exists and if it does not then the >>>>>>>>>>>>> English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.

    PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between >>>>>>>>>>>>> an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of >>>>>>>>>>>>> this expression. These are the two papers that establish >>>>>>>>>>>>> this Definitional View.

    None of the above answers my question:

    Would you agree that there is a difference between a
    statement being false and a statement being meaningless? >>>>>>>>>>>>

    I don't answer dumb questions.

    Translation:

    "I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong"

    That is why I am not responding to any posts
    besides yours. dbush has become a troll again.


    Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction
    intruduction is truth-preserving by your repeated dishonest >>>>>>>>>> dodging of how P can be true and P re? Q can be false is not >>>>>>>>>> trolling.


    In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q),
    the statement "no number is equal to its
    successor" is not provable. While this statement
    is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson
    Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally
    (reC x, S(x) rea x).

    That you brought this up was a brilliant simplification
    of the point that I was making proving that you can
    understand the key ideas.

    What is was is a way to show more easily how you're wrong.-a That >>>>>>>> you claim that "no number is equal to its successor" is
    semantically invalid shows everyone that your ideas are worthless. >>>>>>>>

    This is more accurate:
    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x)

    So you admit that the above statement which exists in Q must be
    either true or false.


    Your lack of reply confirms your above admission.


    I make a very specific statement.
    You mangle it and ask if I agree.

    There was no mangling.-a That is the meaning of the words you used.


    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x)


    You already mangled it.
    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q.

    In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of statement to
    not exist in a formal system?


    In order for it to have a truth value, it must be either true or
    false. That you say it has a truth value is your admission that it is
    in fact either true or false.

    Only a statement that is semantically valid / correct can be true or
    false, as it is it semantics (in this case the semantics of Q and the
    English language sentence it translates to) that determines truth values.

    This therefore constitutes your admission that the above statement is
    semantically valid / correct, and that by extension PTS is incorrect
    about this and therefore useless.


    does not exist in Q.
    If you change that in any way you can assume that I do not agree.




    does not exist in Q.



    Unlike PA it cannot possibly have any finite sequence
    of inference steps in Q that resolve to a truth value in Q.

    Which means, by definition, you agree that Q is incomplete.


    You just contradicted yourself.











    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 13:01:20 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 6:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 12:20 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:

    Those are specific concrete examples of how >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proof- theoretic semantics has ever offered those >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> examples or comparable examples or made any claims >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about 'rejecting expressions as proof theoretic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantically incoherent'. And there's nothing >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incoherent about the statement 'no number is equal to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> its successor' which is the example under discussion. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    None-the-less what I have said remains completely true. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly that way before does not mean that it is not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly correct PTS.

    Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact >>>>>>>>>>>>>> text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own
    private author by author language it must be a
    work written for a general audience like this work. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Would you agree that there is a difference between a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement being false and a statement being meaningless? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can make a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless until >>>>>>>>>>>>>> they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an >>>>>>>>>>>>>> English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> see if a definition exists and if it does not then the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between >>>>>>>>>>>>>> an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> this expression. These are the two papers that establish >>>>>>>>>>>>>> this Definitional View.

    None of the above answers my question:

    Would you agree that there is a difference between a >>>>>>>>>>>>> statement being false and a statement being meaningless? >>>>>>>>>>>>>

    I don't answer dumb questions.

    Translation:

    "I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong"

    That is why I am not responding to any posts
    besides yours. dbush has become a troll again.


    Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction
    intruduction is truth-preserving by your repeated dishonest >>>>>>>>>>> dodging of how P can be true and P re? Q can be false is not >>>>>>>>>>> trolling.


    In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q),
    the statement "no number is equal to its
    successor" is not provable. While this statement
    is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson
    Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally
    (reC x, S(x) rea x).

    That you brought this up was a brilliant simplification
    of the point that I was making proving that you can
    understand the key ideas.

    What is was is a way to show more easily how you're wrong. >>>>>>>>> That you claim that "no number is equal to its successor" is >>>>>>>>> semantically invalid shows everyone that your ideas are worthless. >>>>>>>>>

    This is more accurate:
    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x)

    So you admit that the above statement which exists in Q must be >>>>>>> either true or false.


    Your lack of reply confirms your above admission.


    I make a very specific statement.
    You mangle it and ask if I agree.

    There was no mangling.-a That is the meaning of the words you used.


    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x)


    You already mangled it.
    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q.

    In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of statement to
    not exist in a formal system?


    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    Until "cats are animals" is translated into Chinese
    it is just random gibberish that has no meaning or
    truth value in Chinese.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 12:10:35 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 2026-07-01 12:01, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:

    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q.

    In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of statement
    to not exist in a formal system?


    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    Until "cats are animals" is translated into Chinese
    it is just random gibberish that has no meaning or
    truth value in Chinese.

    But reC x, S(x) rea x *isn't* random gibberish in Q. It is a well-formed expression of Q that has a well-defined meaning. It just happens to be unprovable. If it were random gibberish no one would have entertained
    the question of whether it could or could not be proven in Q.

    Andr|-
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 14:15:59 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 6:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 12:20 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:

    Those are specific concrete examples of how >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    No, they are not. No author writing in the framework >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of proof- theoretic semantics has ever offered those >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> examples or comparable examples or made any claims >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about 'rejecting expressions as proof theoretic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantically incoherent'. And there's nothing >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incoherent about the statement 'no number is equal to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> its successor' which is the example under discussion. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    None-the-less what I have said remains completely true. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly that way before does not mean that it is not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly correct PTS.

    Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> private author by author language it must be a
    work written for a general audience like this work. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantics/


    Would you agree that there is a difference between a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement being false and a statement being meaningless? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can make a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless until >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> see if a definition exists and if it does not then the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this expression. These are the two papers that establish >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this Definitional View.

    None of the above answers my question:

    Would you agree that there is a difference between a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement being false and a statement being meaningless? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    I don't answer dumb questions.

    Translation:

    "I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong"

    That is why I am not responding to any posts
    besides yours. dbush has become a troll again.


    Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction
    intruduction is truth-preserving by your repeated dishonest >>>>>>>>>>>> dodging of how P can be true and P re? Q can be false is not >>>>>>>>>>>> trolling.


    In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q),
    the statement "no number is equal to its
    successor" is not provable. While this statement
    is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson
    Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally
    (reC x, S(x) rea x).

    That you brought this up was a brilliant simplification
    of the point that I was making proving that you can
    understand the key ideas.

    What is was is a way to show more easily how you're wrong. >>>>>>>>>> That you claim that "no number is equal to its successor" is >>>>>>>>>> semantically invalid shows everyone that your ideas are
    worthless.


    This is more accurate:
    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x)

    So you admit that the above statement which exists in Q must be >>>>>>>> either true or false.


    Your lack of reply confirms your above admission.


    I make a very specific statement.
    You mangle it and ask if I agree.

    There was no mangling.-a That is the meaning of the words you used.


    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x)


    You already mangled it.
    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q.

    In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of statement
    to not exist in a formal system?


    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    I didn't ask for an example. I asked for a definition of what it mean
    for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 13:20:52 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 1:10 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:01, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:

    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q.

    In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of statement
    to not exist in a formal system?


    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    Until "cats are animals" is translated into Chinese
    it is just random gibberish that has no meaning or
    truth value in Chinese.

    But reC x, S(x) rea x *isn't* random gibberish in Q. It is a well-formed expression of Q that has a well-defined meaning. It just happens to be unprovable. If it were random gibberish no one would have entertained
    the question of whether it could or could not be proven in Q.

    Andr|-


    It has no finite sequence of inference steps between
    the expression and the axioms of Q. This seems to
    mean that (reCx, S(x) rea x) is ungrounded in the atomic
    base of Q in many of the different ways that this
    can be expressed by different PTS authors.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 13:21:49 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 1:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 6:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 12:20 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:

    Those are specific concrete examples of how >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    No, they are not. No author writing in the framework >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of proof- theoretic semantics has ever offered those >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> examples or comparable examples or made any claims >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about 'rejecting expressions as proof theoretic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantically incoherent'. And there's nothing >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incoherent about the statement 'no number is equal to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> its successor' which is the example under discussion. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    None-the-less what I have said remains completely true. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly that way before does not mean that it is not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly correct PTS.

    Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> private author by author language it must be a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work written for a general audience like this work. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantics/


    Would you agree that there is a difference between a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement being false and a statement being meaningless? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can make a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless until >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> see if a definition exists and if it does not then the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this expression. These are the two papers that establish >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this Definitional View.

    None of the above answers my question:

    Would you agree that there is a difference between a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement being false and a statement being meaningless? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    I don't answer dumb questions.

    Translation:

    "I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong"

    That is why I am not responding to any posts
    besides yours. dbush has become a troll again.


    Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction >>>>>>>>>>>>> intruduction is truth-preserving by your repeated dishonest >>>>>>>>>>>>> dodging of how P can be true and P re? Q can be false is not >>>>>>>>>>>>> trolling.


    In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q),
    the statement "no number is equal to its
    successor" is not provable. While this statement
    is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson
    Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally
    (reC x, S(x) rea x).

    That you brought this up was a brilliant simplification >>>>>>>>>>>> of the point that I was making proving that you can
    understand the key ideas.

    What is was is a way to show more easily how you're wrong. >>>>>>>>>>> That you claim that "no number is equal to its successor" is >>>>>>>>>>> semantically invalid shows everyone that your ideas are >>>>>>>>>>> worthless.


    This is more accurate:
    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x)

    So you admit that the above statement which exists in Q must be >>>>>>>>> either true or false.


    Your lack of reply confirms your above admission.


    I make a very specific statement.
    You mangle it and ask if I agree.

    There was no mangling.-a That is the meaning of the words you used.


    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x)


    You already mangled it.
    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q.

    In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of statement
    to not exist in a formal system?


    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a definition of what it mean
    for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.


    Wittgenstein (1937)
    'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
    proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
    system' means: the opposite has been proved
    in Russell's system
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 14:34:08 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 2:20 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:10 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:01, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:

    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q.

    In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of
    statement to not exist in a formal system?


    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    Until "cats are animals" is translated into Chinese
    it is just random gibberish that has no meaning or
    truth value in Chinese.

    But reC x, S(x) rea x *isn't* random gibberish in Q. It is a well-formed
    expression of Q that has a well-defined meaning. It just happens to be
    unprovable. If it were random gibberish no one would have entertained
    the question of whether it could or could not be proven in Q.

    Andr|-


    It has no finite sequence of inference steps between
    the expression and the axioms of Q. This seems to
    mean that (reCx, S(x) rea x) is ungrounded in the atomic
    base of Q in many of the different ways that this
    can be expressed by different PTS authors.


    In other words, (reCx, S(x) rea x) is not provable in Q.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else but using different words.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 14:35:43 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 2:21 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 6:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 12:20 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:

    Those are specific concrete examples of how >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    No, they are not. No author writing in the framework >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of proof- theoretic semantics has ever offered those >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> examples or comparable examples or made any claims >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about 'rejecting expressions as proof theoretic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantically incoherent'. And there's nothing >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incoherent about the statement 'no number is equal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to its successor' which is the example under >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> discussion.

    Andr|-


    None-the-less what I have said remains completely true. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first
    principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly that way before does not mean that it is not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly correct PTS.

    Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> private author by author language it must be a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work written for a general audience like this work. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantics/


    Would you agree that there is a difference between a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement being false and a statement being meaningless? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can make a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> until
    they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> see if a definition exists and if it does not then the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this expression. These are the two papers that establish >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this Definitional View.

    None of the above answers my question:

    Would you agree that there is a difference between a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement being false and a statement being meaningless? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    I don't answer dumb questions.

    Translation:

    "I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That is why I am not responding to any posts
    besides yours. dbush has become a troll again.


    Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction >>>>>>>>>>>>>> intruduction is truth-preserving by your repeated >>>>>>>>>>>>>> dishonest dodging of how P can be true and P re? Q can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>> false is not trolling.


    In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q),
    the statement "no number is equal to its
    successor" is not provable. While this statement
    is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson
    Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally
    (reC x, S(x) rea x).

    That you brought this up was a brilliant simplification >>>>>>>>>>>>> of the point that I was making proving that you can
    understand the key ideas.

    What is was is a way to show more easily how you're wrong. >>>>>>>>>>>> That you claim that "no number is equal to its successor" is >>>>>>>>>>>> semantically invalid shows everyone that your ideas are >>>>>>>>>>>> worthless.


    This is more accurate:
    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x)

    So you admit that the above statement which exists in Q must >>>>>>>>>> be either true or false.


    Your lack of reply confirms your above admission.


    I make a very specific statement.
    You mangle it and ask if I agree.

    There was no mangling.-a That is the meaning of the words you used. >>>>>>

    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x)


    You already mangled it.
    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q.

    In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of
    statement to not exist in a formal system?


    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a definition of what it mean
    for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.


    Wittgenstein (1937)
    'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
    proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
    system' means: the opposite has been proved
    in Russell's system

    I specifically didn't ask for an external quote, as you have
    demonstrated on countless occasions that you can't understand what
    others have written.

    Tell me, *in your own words*, what you think it means for the truth
    value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 12:40:31 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 2026-07-01 12:20, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:10 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:01, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:

    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q.

    In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of
    statement to not exist in a formal system?


    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    Until "cats are animals" is translated into Chinese
    it is just random gibberish that has no meaning or
    truth value in Chinese.

    But reC x, S(x) rea x *isn't* random gibberish in Q. It is a well-formed
    expression of Q that has a well-defined meaning. It just happens to be
    unprovable. If it were random gibberish no one would have entertained
    the question of whether it could or could not be proven in Q.

    Andr|-


    It has no finite sequence of inference steps between
    the expression and the axioms of Q. This seems to
    mean that (reCx, S(x) rea x) is ungrounded in the atomic
    base of Q in many of the different ways that this
    can be expressed by different PTS authors.

    Having no finite sequence of inference steps between the expression and
    the axioms of Q is *not* the same thing as random gibberish. It simply
    means it is unprovable in Q. And being ungrounded in the atomic base of
    Q means that it cannot achieve the PTS meaning of provable but rather
    remains unprovable. There's no way you can get from any of those things
    to 'random gibberish'.

    Andr|-
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 12:45:28 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:

    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a definition of what it mean
    for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.

    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what a definition is.
    I've frequently asked him for definitions and he invariably responds
    with an example or an analogy (assuming he responds at all). He doesn't
    get that examples don't take the place of definitions. Examples can be
    useful for clarifying definitions, but they aren't particularly useful
    on their own.

    Andr|-
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 13:50:08 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 1:40 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:20, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:10 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:01, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:

    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q.

    In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of
    statement to not exist in a formal system?


    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    Until "cats are animals" is translated into Chinese
    it is just random gibberish that has no meaning or
    truth value in Chinese.

    But reC x, S(x) rea x *isn't* random gibberish in Q. It is a well-formed >>> expression of Q that has a well-defined meaning. It just happens to
    be unprovable. If it were random gibberish no one would have
    entertained the question of whether it could or could not be proven
    in Q.

    Andr|-


    It has no finite sequence of inference steps between
    the expression and the axioms of Q. This seems to
    mean that (reCx, S(x) rea x) is ungrounded in the atomic
    base of Q in many of the different ways that this
    can be expressed by different PTS authors.

    Having no finite sequence of inference steps between the expression and
    the axioms of Q is *not* the same thing as random gibberish.

    It is closer to an English word such as "cat" that is
    defined in English us undefined in Chinese.

    It simply
    means it is unprovable in Q.

    Which means something entirely different in PTS than
    it means in TCS.

    And being ungrounded in the atomic base of
    Q means that it cannot achieve the PTS meaning of provable but rather remains unprovable.

    What does Boxcar meaning in Chinese?
    It has no meaning in Chinese.

    When Boxcar is translated into Chinese: uuU*+a
    then is has a Chinese meaning in Chinese.

    There's no way you can get from any of those things
    to 'random gibberish'.


    The main unprovable that I have been working on
    for 27 years is cases of pathological self-reference
    that have incoherent meaning like this famous sentence:

    Colorless green ideas sleep furiously was composed by
    Noam Chomsky in his 1957 book Syntactic Structures as
    an example of a sentence that is grammatically well-formed,
    but semantically nonsensical.

    It has no coherent compositional meaning even though
    each word has meaning.

    Andr|-

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 13:51:16 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:

    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a definition of what it mean
    for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.

    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what a definition is. I've frequently asked him for definitions and he invariably responds
    with an example or an analogy (assuming he responds at all). He doesn't
    get that examples don't take the place of definitions. Examples can be useful for clarifying definitions, but they aren't particularly useful
    on their own.

    Andr|-


    You want a definition look-it-up.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 13:53:05 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 1:34 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:20 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:10 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:01, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:

    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q.

    In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of
    statement to not exist in a formal system?


    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    Until "cats are animals" is translated into Chinese
    it is just random gibberish that has no meaning or
    truth value in Chinese.

    But reC x, S(x) rea x *isn't* random gibberish in Q. It is a well-formed >>> expression of Q that has a well-defined meaning. It just happens to
    be unprovable. If it were random gibberish no one would have
    entertained the question of whether it could or could not be proven
    in Q.

    Andr|-


    It has no finite sequence of inference steps between
    the expression and the axioms of Q. This seems to
    mean that (reCx, S(x) rea x) is ungrounded in the atomic
    base of Q in many of the different ways that this
    can be expressed by different PTS authors.


    In other words, (reCx, S(x) rea x) is not provable in Q.


    In PTS that means the expression is undefined.
    It does not mean that Q has undecidable sentences in PTS.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else but using different words.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 13:54:59 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:21 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 6:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 12:20 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:

    Those are specific concrete examples of how >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    No, they are not. No author writing in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> framework of proof- theoretic semantics has ever >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> offered those examples or comparable examples or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> made any claims about 'rejecting expressions as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proof theoretic semantically incoherent'. And >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there's nothing incoherent about the statement 'no >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> number is equal to its successor' which is the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example under discussion.

    Andr|-


    None-the-less what I have said remains completely true. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first
    principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly that way before does not mean that it is not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly correct PTS.

    Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> private author by author language it must be a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work written for a general audience like this work. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantics/


    Would you agree that there is a difference between a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement being false and a statement being meaningless? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can make a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> until
    they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> see if a definition exists and if it does not then the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this expression. These are the two papers that establish >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this Definitional View.

    None of the above answers my question:

    Would you agree that there is a difference between a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement being false and a statement being meaningless? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    I don't answer dumb questions.

    Translation:

    "I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That is why I am not responding to any posts
    besides yours. dbush has become a troll again.


    Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> intruduction is truth-preserving by your repeated >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dishonest dodging of how P can be true and P re? Q can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false is not trolling.


    In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q),
    the statement "no number is equal to its
    successor" is not provable. While this statement
    is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally
    (reC x, S(x) rea x).

    That you brought this up was a brilliant simplification >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the point that I was making proving that you can >>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand the key ideas.

    What is was is a way to show more easily how you're wrong. >>>>>>>>>>>>> That you claim that "no number is equal to its successor" >>>>>>>>>>>>> is semantically invalid shows everyone that your ideas are >>>>>>>>>>>>> worthless.


    This is more accurate:
    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x)

    So you admit that the above statement which exists in Q must >>>>>>>>>>> be either true or false.


    Your lack of reply confirms your above admission.


    I make a very specific statement.
    You mangle it and ask if I agree.

    There was no mangling.-a That is the meaning of the words you used. >>>>>>>

    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x)


    You already mangled it.
    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q.

    In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of
    statement to not exist in a formal system?


    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a definition of what it
    mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>

    Wittgenstein (1937)
    'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
    proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
    system' means: the opposite has been proved
    in Russell's system

    I specifically didn't ask for an external quote, as you have
    demonstrated on countless occasions that you can't understand what
    others have written.

    Everything that I have said in the last five years
    sums up to the above quote.


    Tell me, *in your own words*, what you think it means for the truth
    value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.

    I have mean exactly what Wittgenstein (1937) means
    several years before I ever heard of him.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 14:56:41 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 2:51 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:

    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a definition of what it
    mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.

    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what a definition
    is. I've frequently asked him for definitions and he invariably
    responds with an example or an analogy (assuming he responds at all).
    He doesn't get that examples don't take the place of definitions.
    Examples can be useful for clarifying definitions, but they aren't
    particularly useful on their own.

    Andr|-


    You want a definition look-it-up.


    I don't ask for the book definition of the term. I want to know what
    *you* think it means for the truth value of a statement to not exist in
    a formal system *in your own words*.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 14:57:46 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 2:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:34 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:20 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:10 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:01, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:

    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q.

    In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of
    statement to not exist in a formal system?


    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    Until "cats are animals" is translated into Chinese
    it is just random gibberish that has no meaning or
    truth value in Chinese.

    But reC x, S(x) rea x *isn't* random gibberish in Q. It is a well-formed >>>> expression of Q that has a well-defined meaning. It just happens to
    be unprovable. If it were random gibberish no one would have
    entertained the question of whether it could or could not be proven
    in Q.

    Andr|-


    It has no finite sequence of inference steps between
    the expression and the axioms of Q. This seems to
    mean that (reCx, S(x) rea x) is ungrounded in the atomic
    base of Q in many of the different ways that this
    can be expressed by different PTS authors.


    In other words, (reCx, S(x) rea x) is not provable in Q.


    In PTS that means the expression is undefined.
    It does not mean that Q has undecidable sentences in PTS.

    In your own words, what do you think it means for an expression to be undefined, and what do you think it means for a formal system to have undecidable sentences?


    So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else but using
    different words.



    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 14:59:38 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 2:54 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:21 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 6:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 12:20 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:

    Those are specific concrete examples of how >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    No, they are not. No author writing in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> framework of proof- theoretic semantics has ever >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> offered those examples or comparable examples or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> made any claims about 'rejecting expressions as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proof theoretic semantically incoherent'. And >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there's nothing incoherent about the statement 'no >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> number is equal to its successor' which is the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example under discussion.

    Andr|-


    None-the-less what I have said remains completely >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true.
    What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first
    principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly that way before does not mean that it is not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly correct PTS.

    Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> private author by author language it must be a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work written for a general audience like this work. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantics/


    Would you agree that there is a difference between a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement being false and a statement being >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless?


    PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> make a
    simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> until
    they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> see if a definition exists and if it does not then the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this expression. These are the two papers that establish >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this Definitional View.

    None of the above answers my question:

    Would you agree that there is a difference between a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement being false and a statement being meaningless? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    I don't answer dumb questions.

    Translation:

    "I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That is why I am not responding to any posts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> besides yours. dbush has become a troll again. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> intruduction is truth-preserving by your repeated >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dishonest dodging of how P can be true and P re? Q can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false is not trolling.


    In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q),
    the statement "no number is equal to its
    successor" is not provable. While this statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally
    (reC x, S(x) rea x).

    That you brought this up was a brilliant simplification >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the point that I was making proving that you can >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand the key ideas.

    What is was is a way to show more easily how you're wrong. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> That you claim that "no number is equal to its successor" >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is semantically invalid shows everyone that your ideas are >>>>>>>>>>>>>> worthless.


    This is more accurate:
    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x)

    So you admit that the above statement which exists in Q must >>>>>>>>>>>> be either true or false.


    Your lack of reply confirms your above admission.


    I make a very specific statement.
    You mangle it and ask if I agree.

    There was no mangling.-a That is the meaning of the words you used. >>>>>>>>

    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x)


    You already mangled it.
    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q.

    In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of
    statement to not exist in a formal system?


    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a definition of what it
    mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal
    system.


    Wittgenstein (1937)
    'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
    proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
    system' means: the opposite has been proved
    in Russell's system

    I specifically didn't ask for an external quote, as you have
    demonstrated on countless occasions that you can't understand what
    others have written.

    Everything that I have said in the last five years
    sums up to the above quote.

    Don't sum it up in someone else's words. Sum it up *in your own words*.



    Tell me, *in your own words*, what you think it means for the truth
    value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.

    I have mean exactly what Wittgenstein (1937) means
    several years before I ever heard of him.

    What you think he means and what others think he means may not be the same.

    That's why I asked you what you think it means in your own words.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 14:02:51 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 1:56 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:51 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:

    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a definition of what it
    mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal
    system.

    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what a definition
    is. I've frequently asked him for definitions and he invariably
    responds with an example or an analogy (assuming he responds at all).
    He doesn't get that examples don't take the place of definitions.
    Examples can be useful for clarifying definitions, but they aren't
    particularly useful on their own.

    Andr|-


    You want a definition look-it-up.


    I don't ask for the book definition of the term.-a I want to know what
    *you* think it means for the truth value of a statement to not exist in
    a formal system *in your own words*.

    I have already said this thousands of times in the
    last ten years.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 15:05:59 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 3:02 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:56 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:51 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:

    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a definition of what it
    mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal
    system.

    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what a definition
    is. I've frequently asked him for definitions and he invariably
    responds with an example or an analogy (assuming he responds at
    all). He doesn't get that examples don't take the place of
    definitions. Examples can be useful for clarifying definitions, but
    they aren't particularly useful on their own.

    Andr|-


    You want a definition look-it-up.


    I don't ask for the book definition of the term.-a I want to know what
    *you* think it means for the truth value of a statement to not exist
    in a formal system *in your own words*.

    I have already said this thousands of times in the
    last ten years.


    Only liars refuse to define their terms.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 14:06:24 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 1:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:34 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:20 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:10 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:01, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:

    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q.

    In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of
    statement to not exist in a formal system?


    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    Until "cats are animals" is translated into Chinese
    it is just random gibberish that has no meaning or
    truth value in Chinese.

    But reC x, S(x) rea x *isn't* random gibberish in Q. It is a well-
    formed expression of Q that has a well-defined meaning. It just
    happens to be unprovable. If it were random gibberish no one would
    have entertained the question of whether it could or could not be
    proven in Q.

    Andr|-


    It has no finite sequence of inference steps between
    the expression and the axioms of Q. This seems to
    mean that (reCx, S(x) rea x) is ungrounded in the atomic
    base of Q in many of the different ways that this
    can be expressed by different PTS authors.


    In other words, (reCx, S(x) rea x) is not provable in Q.


    In PTS that means the expression is undefined.
    It does not mean that Q has undecidable sentences in PTS.

    In your own words, what do you think it means for an expression to be undefined, and what do you think it means for a formal system to have undecidable sentences?


    I am trying to bridge my work to the work of proof
    theoretic semantics. I have exactly agreed with
    Wittgenstein's view about five years before I ever
    heard of him.

    What I (and Wittgenstein) call ~True(L,x)
    PTS mostly calls ~Defined(L,x).


    So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else but
    using different words.



    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 14:09:32 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 1:59 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:54 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:21 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 6:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 12:20 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Those are specific concrete examples of how >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    No, they are not. No author writing in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> framework of proof- theoretic semantics has ever >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> offered those examples or comparable examples or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> made any claims about 'rejecting expressions as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proof theoretic semantically incoherent'. And >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there's nothing incoherent about the statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'no number is equal to its successor' which is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the example under discussion.

    Andr|-


    None-the-less what I have said remains completely >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true.
    What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> from first
    principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly that way before does not mean that it is not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly correct PTS.

    Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> private author by author language it must be a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work written for a general audience like this work. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantics/


    Would you agree that there is a difference between >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a statement being false and a statement being >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless?


    PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> make a
    simpler analogy in that English words are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless until
    they are defined. The PTS connection of an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression in
    Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> see if a definition exists and if it does not then the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this expression. These are the two papers that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> establish
    this Definitional View.

    None of the above answers my question:

    Would you agree that there is a difference between a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement being false and a statement being meaningless? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    I don't answer dumb questions.

    Translation:

    "I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That is why I am not responding to any posts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> besides yours. dbush has become a troll again. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> intruduction is truth-preserving by your repeated >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dishonest dodging of how P can be true and P re? Q can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false is not trolling.


    In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q),
    the statement "no number is equal to its
    successor" is not provable. While this statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (reC x, S(x) rea x).

    That you brought this up was a brilliant simplification >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the point that I was making proving that you can >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand the key ideas.

    What is was is a way to show more easily how you're >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrong. That you claim that "no number is equal to its >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> successor" is semantically invalid shows everyone that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your ideas are worthless.


    This is more accurate:
    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x)

    So you admit that the above statement which exists in Q >>>>>>>>>>>>> must be either true or false.


    Your lack of reply confirms your above admission.


    I make a very specific statement.
    You mangle it and ask if I agree.

    There was no mangling.-a That is the meaning of the words you used. >>>>>>>>>

    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x)


    You already mangled it.
    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q.

    In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of
    statement to not exist in a formal system?


    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a definition of what it
    mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal
    system.


    Wittgenstein (1937)
    'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
    proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
    system' means: the opposite has been proved
    in Russell's system

    I specifically didn't ask for an external quote, as you have
    demonstrated on countless occasions that you can't understand what
    others have written.

    Everything that I have said in the last five years
    sums up to the above quote.

    Don't sum it up in someone else's words.-a Sum it up *in your own words*.


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo X) // copyright Olcott 2018

    or as I say it now
    True(L, X) := rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o reo X)

    True(L,x) is merely a short-hand macro defined as
    provable on the basis of a set of Atomic Facts.



    Tell me, *in your own words*, what you think it means for the truth
    value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.

    I have mean exactly what Wittgenstein (1937) means
    several years before I ever heard of him.

    What you think he means and what others think he means may not be the same.

    That's why I asked you what you think it means in your own words.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Alan Mackenzie@acm@muc.de to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 19:18:26 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    [ Followup-To: set ]

    In comp.theory dbush <dbush.mobile@gmail.com> wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:54 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:

    [ .... ]

    Tell me, *in your own words*, what you think it means for the truth
    value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.

    I have mean exactly what Wittgenstein (1937) means
    several years before I ever heard of him.

    What you think he means and what others think he means may not be the same.

    That's why I asked you what you think it means in your own words.

    You're asking Olcott an abstract question, a very abstract question, and
    it is simply beyond his intellect even to understand it, never mind
    answer it.

    There used to be another crank in sci.math who would repeatedly assert
    that "negative numbers don't exist" and similar. When I asked him what
    exactly he meant by "don't exist", there came no coherent answer.

    I think you're being somewhat unfair expecting a coherent answer from
    somebody of Peter Olcott's intellectual prowess. It seems clear to me
    that he spuriously equates "provable" with "true". He's incapable of understanding that propositions can be both true and unprovable, despite mentally grappling with the notion for many years.
    --
    Alan Mackenzie (Nuremberg, Germany).

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 15:19:16 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 3:09 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:59 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:54 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:21 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 6:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 12:20 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Those are specific concrete examples of how >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    No, they are not. No author writing in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> framework of proof- theoretic semantics has ever >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> offered those examples or comparable examples or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> made any claims about 'rejecting expressions as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proof theoretic semantically incoherent'. And >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there's nothing incoherent about the statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'no number is equal to its successor' which is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the example under discussion.

    Andr|-


    None-the-less what I have said remains completely >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true.
    What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> from first
    principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly that way before does not mean that it is not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly correct PTS.

    Unfortunately, your say so carries very little >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> weight.


    Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> private author by author language it must be a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work written for a general audience like this work. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantics/


    Would you agree that there is a difference between >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a statement being false and a statement being >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless?


    PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> make a
    simpler analogy in that English words are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless until
    they are defined. The PTS connection of an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression in
    Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English word to its definition. A proof merely >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> looks to
    see if a definition exists and if it does not then the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between
    an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this expression. These are the two papers that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> establish
    this Definitional View.

    None of the above answers my question: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Would you agree that there is a difference between a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement being false and a statement being >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless?


    I don't answer dumb questions.

    Translation:

    "I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That is why I am not responding to any posts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> besides yours. dbush has become a troll again. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> intruduction is truth-preserving by your repeated >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dishonest dodging of how P can be true and P re? Q can >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be false is not trolling.


    In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q), >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the statement "no number is equal to its
    successor" is not provable. While this statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (reC x, S(x) rea x).

    That you brought this up was a brilliant simplification >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the point that I was making proving that you can >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand the key ideas.

    What is was is a way to show more easily how you're >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrong. That you claim that "no number is equal to its >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> successor" is semantically invalid shows everyone that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your ideas are worthless.


    This is more accurate:
    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x)

    So you admit that the above statement which exists in Q >>>>>>>>>>>>>> must be either true or false.


    Your lack of reply confirms your above admission.


    I make a very specific statement.
    You mangle it and ask if I agree.

    There was no mangling.-a That is the meaning of the words you >>>>>>>>>> used.


    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x)


    You already mangled it.
    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q.

    In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of
    statement to not exist in a formal system?


    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a definition of what it >>>>>> mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal
    system.


    Wittgenstein (1937)
    'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
    proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
    system' means: the opposite has been proved
    in Russell's system

    I specifically didn't ask for an external quote, as you have
    demonstrated on countless occasions that you can't understand what
    others have written.

    Everything that I have said in the last five years
    sums up to the above quote.

    Don't sum it up in someone else's words.-a Sum it up *in your own words*.


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo X) // copyright Olcott 2018

    So in other words, the truth value of a statement not existing in a
    formal system simply means that the statement is not provable in that
    system.

    And again you're saying the same thing as everyone else but using
    different words.

    Just to summarize for everyone, you've given definitions for the
    following terms when applied to a statement which indicate they mean the
    same as "unproven":

    - truth value doesn't exist
    - out-of-scope
    - not semantically grounded
    - not grounded in the atomic base
    - not a confirmed statement
    - untrue

    I invite others to add this list as they come across other synonyms.




    or as I say it now
    True(L, X) := rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o reo X)

    True(L,x) is merely a short-hand macro defined as
    provable on the basis of a set of Atomic Facts.






    Tell me, *in your own words*, what you think it means for the truth
    value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.

    I have mean exactly what Wittgenstein (1937) means
    several years before I ever heard of him.

    What you think he means and what others think he means may not be the
    same.

    That's why I asked you what you think it means in your own words.



    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 13:23:16 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 2026-07-01 12:50, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:40 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:20, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:10 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:01, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:

    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q.

    In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of
    statement to not exist in a formal system?


    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    Until "cats are animals" is translated into Chinese
    it is just random gibberish that has no meaning or
    truth value in Chinese.

    But reC x, S(x) rea x *isn't* random gibberish in Q. It is a well-formed >>>> expression of Q that has a well-defined meaning. It just happens to
    be unprovable. If it were random gibberish no one would have
    entertained the question of whether it could or could not be proven
    in Q.

    Andr|-


    It has no finite sequence of inference steps between
    the expression and the axioms of Q. This seems to
    mean that (reCx, S(x) rea x) is ungrounded in the atomic
    base of Q in many of the different ways that this
    can be expressed by different PTS authors.

    Having no finite sequence of inference steps between the expression
    and the axioms of Q is *not* the same thing as random gibberish.

    It is closer to an English word such as "cat" that is
    defined in English us undefined in Chinese.

    That's a completely spurious analogy. 'cat' isn't an expression of the
    Chinese language. reC x, S(x) rea x *is* an expression of the language of Q.

    It simply means it is unprovable in Q.

    Then you're either using a completely idiosyncratic definition of
    'gibberish' or a completely idiosyncratic definition of 'provable'
    (or both). That's why people keep asking you to provide *your*
    definitions, but you only respond with examples or analogies which fail
    to clarify what you might mean.

    Which means something entirely different in PTS than
    it means in TCS.

    unprovable means the same thing in both.

    And being ungrounded in the atomic base of Q means that it cannot
    achieve the PTS meaning of provable but rather remains unprovable.

    What does Boxcar meaning in Chinese?
    It has no meaning in Chinese.

    When Boxcar is translated into Chinese: uuU*+a
    then is has a Chinese meaning in Chinese.

    There's no way you can get from any of those things to 'random
    gibberish'.


    The main unprovable that I have been working on
    for 27 years is cases of pathological self-reference
    that have incoherent meaning like this famous sentence:

    Colorless green ideas sleep furiously was composed by
    Noam Chomsky in his 1957 book Syntactic Structures as
    an example of a sentence that is grammatically well-formed,
    but semantically nonsensical.

    Chomsky was making a point about *natural* languages, not Q. And I don't
    think you understand what the purpose of this example was. And, I should
    note that the example isn't nonsensical as it can have a poetic meaning (something which doesn't exist in formal languages).

    Chomsky's sole point with this example was to stress that you couldn't
    appeal to semantic ill-formedness to explain ungrammaticality in natural languages. Rather, syntactic rules had to stand on their own.
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 13:31:58 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:

    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a definition of what it
    mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.

    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what a definition
    is. I've frequently asked him for definitions and he invariably
    responds with an example or an analogy (assuming he responds at all).
    He doesn't get that examples don't take the place of definitions.
    Examples can be useful for clarifying definitions, but they aren't
    particularly useful on their own.

    Andr|-


    You want a definition look-it-up.

    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English dictionary, this
    isn't really an option.

    Andr|-
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 14:44:29 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 2:19 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:09 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:59 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:54 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:21 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 6:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 12:20 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Those are specific concrete examples of how >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    No, they are not. No author writing in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> framework of proof- theoretic semantics has >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ever offered those examples or comparable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> examples or made any claims about 'rejecting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressions as proof theoretic semantically >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incoherent'. And there's nothing incoherent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about the statement 'no number is equal to its >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> successor' which is the example under discussion. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    None-the-less what I have said remains >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> completely true.
    What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> from first
    principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly that way before does not mean that it is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not
    exactly correct PTS.

    Unfortunately, your say so carries very little >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> weight.


    Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> private author by author language it must be a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work written for a general audience like this work. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theoretic- semantics/


    Would you agree that there is a difference >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between a statement being false and a statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> being meaningless?


    PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> make a
    simpler analogy in that English words are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless until
    they are defined. The PTS connection of an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression in
    Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of an
    English word to its definition. A proof merely >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> looks to
    see if a definition exists and if it does not then >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
    English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between
    an expression and a set of axioms as the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of
    this expression. These are the two papers that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> establish
    this Definitional View.

    None of the above answers my question: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Would you agree that there is a difference between >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a statement being false and a statement being >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless?


    I don't answer dumb questions.

    Translation:

    "I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That is why I am not responding to any posts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> besides yours. dbush has become a troll again. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> intruduction is truth-preserving by your repeated >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dishonest dodging of how P can be true and P re? Q can >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be false is not trolling.


    In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q), >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the statement "no number is equal to its
    successor" is not provable. While this statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (reC x, S(x) rea x).

    That you brought this up was a brilliant simplification >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the point that I was making proving that you can >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand the key ideas.

    What is was is a way to show more easily how you're >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrong. That you claim that "no number is equal to its >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> successor" is semantically invalid shows everyone that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your ideas are worthless.


    This is more accurate:
    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x)

    So you admit that the above statement which exists in Q >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must be either true or false.


    Your lack of reply confirms your above admission.


    I make a very specific statement.
    You mangle it and ask if I agree.

    There was no mangling.-a That is the meaning of the words you >>>>>>>>>>> used.


    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x)


    You already mangled it.
    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q. >>>>>>>>>
    In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of >>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal system?


    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a definition of what it >>>>>>> mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>> system.


    Wittgenstein (1937)
    'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
    proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
    system' means: the opposite has been proved
    in Russell's system

    I specifically didn't ask for an external quote, as you have
    demonstrated on countless occasions that you can't understand what
    others have written.

    Everything that I have said in the last five years
    sums up to the above quote.

    Don't sum it up in someone else's words.-a Sum it up *in your own words*. >>>

    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo X) // copyright Olcott 2018

    So in other words, the truth value of a statement not existing in a
    formal system simply means that the statement is not provable in that system.

    That is not what I said.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 14:47:58 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 2:23 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:50, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:40 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:20, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:10 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:01, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:

    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q.

    In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of
    statement to not exist in a formal system?


    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    Until "cats are animals" is translated into Chinese
    it is just random gibberish that has no meaning or
    truth value in Chinese.

    But reC x, S(x) rea x *isn't* random gibberish in Q. It is a well-
    formed expression of Q that has a well-defined meaning. It just
    happens to be unprovable. If it were random gibberish no one would
    have entertained the question of whether it could or could not be
    proven in Q.

    Andr|-


    It has no finite sequence of inference steps between
    the expression and the axioms of Q. This seems to
    mean that (reCx, S(x) rea x) is ungrounded in the atomic
    base of Q in many of the different ways that this
    can be expressed by different PTS authors.

    Having no finite sequence of inference steps between the expression
    and the axioms of Q is *not* the same thing as random gibberish.

    It is closer to an English word such as "cat" that is
    defined in English us undefined in Chinese.

    That's a completely spurious analogy. 'cat' isn't an expression of the Chinese language. reC x, S(x) rea x *is* an expression of the language of Q.

    It simply means it is unprovable in Q.

    Then you're either using a completely idiosyncratic definition of 'gibberish' or a completely idiosyncratic definition of 'provable'
    (or both). That's why people keep asking you to provide *your*
    definitions, but you only respond with examples or analogies which fail
    to clarify what you might mean.

    Which means something entirely different in PTS than
    it means in TCS.

    unprovable means the same thing in both.


    Wittgenstein (1937)
    'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
    proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
    system' means: the opposite has been proved
    in Russell's system

    Does not mean that G is undecidable in PA.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 15:52:05 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 3:44 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:19 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:09 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:59 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:54 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:21 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 6:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 12:20 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Those are specific concrete examples of how >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    No, they are not. No author writing in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> framework of proof- theoretic semantics has >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ever offered those examples or comparable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> examples or made any claims about 'rejecting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressions as proof theoretic semantically >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incoherent'. And there's nothing incoherent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about the statement 'no number is equal to its >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> successor' which is the example under discussion. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    None-the-less what I have said remains >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> completely true.
    What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> from first
    principles is exactly that. That no one applied >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> PTS
    exactly that way before does not mean that it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not
    exactly correct PTS.

    Unfortunately, your say so carries very little >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> weight.


    Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> private author by author language it must be a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work written for a general audience like this work. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theoretic- semantics/


    Would you agree that there is a difference >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between a statement being false and a statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> being meaningless?


    PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can make a
    simpler analogy in that English words are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless until
    they are defined. The PTS connection of an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression in
    Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of an
    English word to its definition. A proof merely >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> looks to
    see if a definition exists and if it does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then the
    English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between
    an expression and a set of axioms as the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of
    this expression. These are the two papers that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> establish
    this Definitional View.

    None of the above answers my question: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Would you agree that there is a difference between >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a statement being false and a statement being >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless?


    I don't answer dumb questions.

    Translation:

    "I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That is why I am not responding to any posts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> besides yours. dbush has become a troll again. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> intruduction is truth-preserving by your repeated >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dishonest dodging of how P can be true and P re? Q can >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be false is not trolling.


    In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q), >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the statement "no number is equal to its >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> successor" is not provable. While this statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (reC x, S(x) rea x).

    That you brought this up was a brilliant simplification >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the point that I was making proving that you can >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand the key ideas.

    What is was is a way to show more easily how you're >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrong. That you claim that "no number is equal to its >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> successor" is semantically invalid shows everyone that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your ideas are worthless.


    This is more accurate:
    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x)

    So you admit that the above statement which exists in Q >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must be either true or false.


    Your lack of reply confirms your above admission.


    I make a very specific statement.
    You mangle it and ask if I agree.

    There was no mangling.-a That is the meaning of the words you >>>>>>>>>>>> used.


    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x)


    You already mangled it.
    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q. >>>>>>>>>>
    In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of >>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal system?


    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a definition of what >>>>>>>> it mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a
    formal system.


    Wittgenstein (1937)
    'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
    proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
    system' means: the opposite has been proved
    in Russell's system

    I specifically didn't ask for an external quote, as you have
    demonstrated on countless occasions that you can't understand what >>>>>> others have written.

    Everything that I have said in the last five years
    sums up to the above quote.

    Don't sum it up in someone else's words.-a Sum it up *in your own
    words*.


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo X) // copyright Olcott 2018 >>
    So in other words, the truth value of a statement not existing in a
    formal system simply means that the statement is not provable in that
    system.

    That is not what I said.


    Then translate the above symbols to English so we can examine that more carefully.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 14:53:35 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:

    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a definition of what it
    mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal
    system.

    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what a definition
    is. I've frequently asked him for definitions and he invariably
    responds with an example or an analogy (assuming he responds at all).
    He doesn't get that examples don't take the place of definitions.
    Examples can be useful for clarifying definitions, but they aren't
    particularly useful on their own.

    Andr|-


    You want a definition look-it-up.

    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English dictionary, this
    isn't really an option.

    Andr|-


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo X) // copyright Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o reo X)
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 14:11:15 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 2026-07-01 13:47, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:23 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:50, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:40 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:20, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:10 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:01, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:

    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q.

    In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of
    statement to not exist in a formal system?


    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    Until "cats are animals" is translated into Chinese
    it is just random gibberish that has no meaning or
    truth value in Chinese.

    But reC x, S(x) rea x *isn't* random gibberish in Q. It is a well- >>>>>> formed expression of Q that has a well-defined meaning. It just
    happens to be unprovable. If it were random gibberish no one would >>>>>> have entertained the question of whether it could or could not be >>>>>> proven in Q.

    Andr|-


    It has no finite sequence of inference steps between
    the expression and the axioms of Q. This seems to
    mean that (reCx, S(x) rea x) is ungrounded in the atomic
    base of Q in many of the different ways that this
    can be expressed by different PTS authors.

    Having no finite sequence of inference steps between the expression
    and the axioms of Q is *not* the same thing as random gibberish.

    It is closer to an English word such as "cat" that is
    defined in English us undefined in Chinese.

    That's a completely spurious analogy. 'cat' isn't an expression of the
    Chinese language. reC x, S(x) rea x *is* an expression of the language of Q. >>
    It simply means it is unprovable in Q.

    Then you're either using a completely idiosyncratic definition of
    'gibberish' or a completely idiosyncratic definition of 'provable'
    (or both). That's why people keep asking you to provide *your*
    definitions, but you only respond with examples or analogies which
    fail to clarify what you might mean.

    Which means something entirely different in PTS than
    it means in TCS.

    unprovable means the same thing in both.


    Wittgenstein (1937)
    'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
    proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
    system' means: the opposite has been proved
    in Russell's system

    You keep quoting this particular bit despite the fact that its been
    pointed out on numerous occasions that Wittgenstein wrote the above in
    his private notes *before* he had actually read G||del's paper, and he
    never went on to publish anything to this effect suggesting he didn't subscribe to this position after he'd actually read G||del.

    Does not mean that G is undecidable in PA.

    It doesn't say anything at all about whether G is decidable in PA.

    Andr|-
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 14:13:39 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:

    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a definition of what it
    mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal
    system.

    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what a definition
    is. I've frequently asked him for definitions and he invariably
    responds with an example or an analogy (assuming he responds at
    all). He doesn't get that examples don't take the place of
    definitions. Examples can be useful for clarifying definitions, but
    they aren't particularly useful on their own.

    Andr|-


    You want a definition look-it-up.

    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English dictionary, this
    isn't really an option.

    Andr|-


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo X) // copyright Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o reo X)

    That claims what it means to have the truth value 'true' (or at least it
    would if you defined AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It doesn't in any
    way clarify what you think it means for something to not have a truth value.

    Andr|-
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 15:23:47 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:44 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:19 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:09 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:59 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:54 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:21 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 6:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 12:20 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Those are specific concrete examples of how >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    No, they are not. No author writing in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> framework of proof- theoretic semantics has >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ever offered those examples or comparable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> examples or made any claims about 'rejecting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressions as proof theoretic semantically >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incoherent'. And there's nothing incoherent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about the statement 'no number is equal to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> its successor' which is the example under >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> discussion.

    Andr|-


    None-the-less what I have said remains >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> completely true.
    What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> from first
    principles is exactly that. That no one >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> applied PTS
    exactly that way before does not mean that it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not
    exactly correct PTS.

    Unfortunately, your say so carries very little >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> weight.


    Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> private author by author language it must be a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work written for a general audience like this work. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theoretic- semantics/


    Would you agree that there is a difference >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between a statement being false and a statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> being meaningless?


    PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can make a
    simpler analogy in that English words are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless until
    they are defined. The PTS connection of an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression in
    Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of an
    English word to its definition. A proof merely >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> looks to
    see if a definition exists and if it does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then the
    English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between
    an expression and a set of axioms as the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of
    this expression. These are the two papers that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> establish
    this Definitional View.

    None of the above answers my question: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Would you agree that there is a difference >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between a statement being false and a statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> being meaningless?


    I don't answer dumb questions.

    Translation:

    "I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That is why I am not responding to any posts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> besides yours. dbush has become a troll again. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> intruduction is truth-preserving by your repeated >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dishonest dodging of how P can be true and P re? Q >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can be false is not trolling.


    In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q), >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the statement "no number is equal to its >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> successor" is not provable. While this statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (reC x, S(x) rea x).

    That you brought this up was a brilliant simplification >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the point that I was making proving that you can >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand the key ideas.

    What is was is a way to show more easily how you're >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrong. That you claim that "no number is equal to its >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> successor" is semantically invalid shows everyone >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that your ideas are worthless.


    This is more accurate:
    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x)

    So you admit that the above statement which exists in Q >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must be either true or false.


    Your lack of reply confirms your above admission. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    I make a very specific statement.
    You mangle it and ask if I agree.

    There was no mangling.-a That is the meaning of the words >>>>>>>>>>>>> you used.


    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x)


    You already mangled it.
    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q. >>>>>>>>>>>
    In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of >>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal system?


    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a definition of what >>>>>>>>> it mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a >>>>>>>>> formal system.


    Wittgenstein (1937)
    'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
    proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
    system' means: the opposite has been proved
    in Russell's system

    I specifically didn't ask for an external quote, as you have
    demonstrated on countless occasions that you can't understand
    what others have written.

    Everything that I have said in the last five years
    sums up to the above quote.

    Don't sum it up in someone else's words.-a Sum it up *in your own
    words*.


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo X) // copyright Olcott 2018 >>>
    So in other words, the truth value of a statement not existing in a
    formal system simply means that the statement is not provable in that
    system.

    That is not what I said.


    Then translate the above symbols to English so we can examine that more carefully.

    True in the formal language of formal system L for expression X means
    that there exists a subset of the axioms of L such that a finite
    sequence of inference steps in L reach this subset of axioms of L.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 15:28:09 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 3:11 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 13:47, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:23 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:50, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:40 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:20, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:10 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:01, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:

    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q. >>>>>>>>>
    In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of >>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal system?


    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    Until "cats are animals" is translated into Chinese
    it is just random gibberish that has no meaning or
    truth value in Chinese.

    But reC x, S(x) rea x *isn't* random gibberish in Q. It is a well- >>>>>>> formed expression of Q that has a well-defined meaning. It just >>>>>>> happens to be unprovable. If it were random gibberish no one
    would have entertained the question of whether it could or could >>>>>>> not be proven in Q.

    Andr|-


    It has no finite sequence of inference steps between
    the expression and the axioms of Q. This seems to
    mean that (reCx, S(x) rea x) is ungrounded in the atomic
    base of Q in many of the different ways that this
    can be expressed by different PTS authors.

    Having no finite sequence of inference steps between the expression >>>>> and the axioms of Q is *not* the same thing as random gibberish.

    It is closer to an English word such as "cat" that is
    defined in English us undefined in Chinese.

    That's a completely spurious analogy. 'cat' isn't an expression of
    the Chinese language. reC x, S(x) rea x *is* an expression of the
    language of Q.

    It simply means it is unprovable in Q.

    Then you're either using a completely idiosyncratic definition of
    'gibberish' or a completely idiosyncratic definition of 'provable'
    (or both). That's why people keep asking you to provide *your*
    definitions, but you only respond with examples or analogies which
    fail to clarify what you might mean.

    Which means something entirely different in PTS than
    it means in TCS.

    unprovable means the same thing in both.


    Wittgenstein (1937)
    'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
    proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
    system' means: the opposite has been proved
    in Russell's system

    You keep quoting this particular bit despite the fact that its been
    pointed out on numerous occasions that Wittgenstein wrote the above in
    his private notes *before* he had actually read G||del's paper, and he

    What matters is the it is the way that true on the
    basis of meaning expressed in language has always
    worked. Also what matters is that I came up with
    this exact same thing years before I ever heard
    of him.

    never went on to publish anything to this effect suggesting he didn't subscribe to this position after he'd actually read G||del.

    Does not mean that G is undecidable in PA.

    It doesn't say anything at all about whether G is decidable in PA.

    Andr|-


    Any expression X that is unprovable in any formal
    system F is untrue in that formal system F

    Any expression X that is irrefutable in any formal
    system F is unfalse in that formal system F.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 15:29:25 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:

    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a definition of what it >>>>>> mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal
    system.

    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what a
    definition is. I've frequently asked him for definitions and he
    invariably responds with an example or an analogy (assuming he
    responds at all). He doesn't get that examples don't take the place >>>>> of definitions. Examples can be useful for clarifying definitions,
    but they aren't particularly useful on their own.

    Andr|-


    You want a definition look-it-up.

    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English dictionary,
    this isn't really an option.

    Andr|-


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo X) // copyright Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o reo X)

    That claims what it means to have the truth value 'true' (or at least it would if you defined AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It doesn't in any
    way clarify what you think it means for something to not have a truth
    value.

    Andr|-


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did
    not bother to pay attention that is your mistake
    and your fault.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 16:31:09 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 4:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:44 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:19 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:09 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:59 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:54 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:21 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 6:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 12:20 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Those are specific concrete examples of how >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    No, they are not. No author writing in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> framework of proof- theoretic semantics has >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ever offered those examples or comparable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> examples or made any claims about 'rejecting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressions as proof theoretic semantically >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incoherent'. And there's nothing incoherent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about the statement 'no number is equal to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> its successor' which is the example under >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> discussion.

    Andr|-


    None-the-less what I have said remains >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> completely true.
    What I have spent 28 years reverse- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> engineering from first
    principles is exactly that. That no one >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> applied PTS
    exactly that way before does not mean that it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not
    exactly correct PTS.

    Unfortunately, your say so carries very little >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> weight.


    Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exact
    text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> private author by author language it must be a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work written for a general audience like this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work.
    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theoretic- semantics/


    Would you agree that there is a difference >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between a statement being false and a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement being meaningless? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can make a
    simpler analogy in that English words are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless until
    they are defined. The PTS connection of an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression in
    Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connection of an
    English word to its definition. A proof merely >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> looks to
    see if a definition exists and if it does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then the
    English Word / Expression of Q remains >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless.

    PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between
    an expression and a set of axioms as the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of
    this expression. These are the two papers that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> establish
    this Definitional View.

    None of the above answers my question: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Would you agree that there is a difference >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between a statement being false and a statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> being meaningless?


    I don't answer dumb questions.

    Translation:

    "I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That is why I am not responding to any posts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> besides yours. dbush has become a troll again. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Reminding people that you admitted that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> disjunction intruduction is truth-preserving by >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your repeated dishonest dodging of how P can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true and P re? Q can be false is not trolling. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q), >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the statement "no number is equal to its >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> successor" is not provable. While this statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (reC x, S(x) rea x).

    That you brought this up was a brilliant >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> simplification
    of the point that I was making proving that you can >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand the key ideas.

    What is was is a way to show more easily how you're >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrong. That you claim that "no number is equal to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> its successor" is semantically invalid shows >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> everyone that your ideas are worthless. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    This is more accurate:
    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x)

    So you admit that the above statement which exists in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Q must be either true or false.


    Your lack of reply confirms your above admission. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    I make a very specific statement.
    You mangle it and ask if I agree.

    There was no mangling.-a That is the meaning of the words >>>>>>>>>>>>>> you used.


    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x)


    You already mangled it.
    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q. >>>>>>>>>>>>
    In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of >>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal system?


    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a definition of what >>>>>>>>>> it mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a >>>>>>>>>> formal system.


    Wittgenstein (1937)
    'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
    proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
    system' means: the opposite has been proved
    in Russell's system

    I specifically didn't ask for an external quote, as you have
    demonstrated on countless occasions that you can't understand >>>>>>>> what others have written.

    Everything that I have said in the last five years
    sums up to the above quote.

    Don't sum it up in someone else's words.-a Sum it up *in your own >>>>>> words*.


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo X) // copyright Olcott 2018 >>>>
    So in other words, the truth value of a statement not existing in a
    formal system simply means that the statement is not provable in
    that system.

    That is not what I said.


    Then translate the above symbols to English so we can examine that
    more carefully.

    True in the formal language of formal system L for expression X means
    that there exists a subset of the axioms of L such that a finite
    sequence of inference steps in L reach this subset of axioms of L.


    I didn't ask what you think true in a formal system means. I asked what
    you think it means for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a
    formal system.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 16:37:28 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:

    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a definition of what it >>>>>>> mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>> system.

    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what a
    definition is. I've frequently asked him for definitions and he
    invariably responds with an example or an analogy (assuming he
    responds at all). He doesn't get that examples don't take the
    place of definitions. Examples can be useful for clarifying
    definitions, but they aren't particularly useful on their own.

    Andr|-


    You want a definition look-it-up.

    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English dictionary,
    this isn't really an option.

    Andr|-


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo X) // copyright Olcott 2018 >>> has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o reo X)

    That claims what it means to have the truth value 'true' (or at least
    it would if you defined AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It doesn't in
    any way clarify what you think it means for something to not have a
    truth value.

    Andr|-


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did
    not bother to pay attention that is your mistake
    and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.

    A valid answer would look something like this:

    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal system when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 15:42:47 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 3:31 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:44 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:19 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:09 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:59 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:54 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:21 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 6:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 12:20 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 11:10 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Those are specific concrete examples of how >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    No, they are not. No author writing in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> framework of proof- theoretic semantics has >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ever offered those examples or comparable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> examples or made any claims about >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'rejecting expressions as proof theoretic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantically incoherent'. And there's >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> nothing incoherent about the statement 'no >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> number is equal to its successor' which is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the example under discussion. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    None-the-less what I have said remains >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> completely true.
    What I have spent 28 years reverse- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> engineering from first >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> principles is exactly that. That no one >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> applied PTS
    exactly that way before does not mean that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it is not
    exactly correct PTS.

    Unfortunately, your say so carries very >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> little weight.


    Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exact
    text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> private author by author language it must be a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work written for a general audience like this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work.
    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theoretic- semantics/


    Would you agree that there is a difference >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between a statement being false and a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement being meaningless? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can make a
    simpler analogy in that English words are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless until
    they are defined. The PTS connection of an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression in
    Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connection of an
    English word to its definition. A proof merely >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> looks to
    see if a definition exists and if it does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then the
    English Word / Expression of Q remains >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless.

    PTS counts a finite sequence of inference >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> steps between
    an expression and a set of axioms as the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of
    this expression. These are the two papers that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> establish
    this Definitional View.

    None of the above answers my question: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Would you agree that there is a difference >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between a statement being false and a statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> being meaningless?


    I don't answer dumb questions.

    Translation:

    "I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That is why I am not responding to any posts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> besides yours. dbush has become a troll again. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Reminding people that you admitted that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> disjunction intruduction is truth-preserving by >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your repeated dishonest dodging of how P can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true and P re? Q can be false is not trolling. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q), >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the statement "no number is equal to its >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> successor" is not provable. While this statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (reC x, S(x) rea x).

    That you brought this up was a brilliant >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> simplification
    of the point that I was making proving that you can >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand the key ideas.

    What is was is a way to show more easily how you're >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrong. That you claim that "no number is equal to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> its successor" is semantically invalid shows >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> everyone that your ideas are worthless. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    This is more accurate:
    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    So you admit that the above statement which exists in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Q must be either true or false.


    Your lack of reply confirms your above admission. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    I make a very specific statement.
    You mangle it and ask if I agree.

    There was no mangling.-a That is the meaning of the words >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you used.


    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x)


    You already mangled it.
    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
    In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of >>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal system?


    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a definition of >>>>>>>>>>> what it mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist >>>>>>>>>>> in a formal system.


    Wittgenstein (1937)
    'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
    proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
    system' means: the opposite has been proved
    in Russell's system

    I specifically didn't ask for an external quote, as you have >>>>>>>>> demonstrated on countless occasions that you can't understand >>>>>>>>> what others have written.

    Everything that I have said in the last five years
    sums up to the above quote.

    Don't sum it up in someone else's words.-a Sum it up *in your own >>>>>>> words*.


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo X) // copyright Olcott 2018

    So in other words, the truth value of a statement not existing in a >>>>> formal system simply means that the statement is not provable in
    that system.

    That is not what I said.


    Then translate the above symbols to English so we can examine that
    more carefully.

    True in the formal language of formal system L for expression X means
    that there exists a subset of the axioms of L such that a finite
    sequence of inference steps in L reach this subset of axioms of L.


    I didn't ask what you think true in a formal system means.-a I asked what you think it means for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.


    And I told you.
    You are you are playing head games about it.
    Unprovable MEANS Untrue
    Irrefutable MEANS Unfalse.
    Untrue and Unfalse means has no truth value.
    "What time is it?" has no truth value.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 15:50:05 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:

    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a definition of what >>>>>>>> it mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a
    formal system.

    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what a
    definition is. I've frequently asked him for definitions and he >>>>>>> invariably responds with an example or an analogy (assuming he
    responds at all). He doesn't get that examples don't take the
    place of definitions. Examples can be useful for clarifying
    definitions, but they aren't particularly useful on their own.

    Andr|-


    You want a definition look-it-up.

    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English dictionary,
    this isn't really an option.

    Andr|-


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo X) // copyright Olcott 2018 >>>> has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o reo X)

    That claims what it means to have the truth value 'true' (or at least
    it would if you defined AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It doesn't in
    any way clarify what you think it means for something to not have a
    truth value.

    Andr|-


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did
    not bother to pay attention that is your mistake
    and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.

    A valid answer would look something like this:

    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal system when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F.
    I have said this so many thousands of times over
    the years that it did not occur to me that I did
    not fully spell this out this time.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 14:50:35 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 2026-07-01 14:28, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:11 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 13:47, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:23 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:50, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:40 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:20, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:10 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:01, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:

    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q. >>>>>>>>>>
    In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of >>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal system?


    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    Until "cats are animals" is translated into Chinese
    it is just random gibberish that has no meaning or
    truth value in Chinese.

    But reC x, S(x) rea x *isn't* random gibberish in Q. It is a well- >>>>>>>> formed expression of Q that has a well-defined meaning. It just >>>>>>>> happens to be unprovable. If it were random gibberish no one
    would have entertained the question of whether it could or could >>>>>>>> not be proven in Q.

    Andr|-


    It has no finite sequence of inference steps between
    the expression and the axioms of Q. This seems to
    mean that (reCx, S(x) rea x) is ungrounded in the atomic
    base of Q in many of the different ways that this
    can be expressed by different PTS authors.

    Having no finite sequence of inference steps between the
    expression and the axioms of Q is *not* the same thing as random
    gibberish.

    It is closer to an English word such as "cat" that is
    defined in English us undefined in Chinese.

    That's a completely spurious analogy. 'cat' isn't an expression of
    the Chinese language. reC x, S(x) rea x *is* an expression of the
    language of Q.

    It simply means it is unprovable in Q.

    Then you're either using a completely idiosyncratic definition of
    'gibberish' or a completely idiosyncratic definition of 'provable'
    (or both). That's why people keep asking you to provide *your*
    definitions, but you only respond with examples or analogies which
    fail to clarify what you might mean.

    Which means something entirely different in PTS than
    it means in TCS.

    unprovable means the same thing in both.


    Wittgenstein (1937)
    'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
    proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
    system' means: the opposite has been proved
    in Russell's system

    You keep quoting this particular bit despite the fact that its been
    pointed out on numerous occasions that Wittgenstein wrote the above in
    his private notes *before* he had actually read G||del's paper, and he

    What matters is the it is the way that true on the
    basis of meaning expressed in language has always
    worked. Also what matters is that I came up with
    this exact same thing years before I ever heard
    of him.

    If that's what you believe then make your case. But don't cite
    Wittgenstein as supporting your position when it's unlikely he actually
    stood by those remarks

    never went on to publish anything to this effect suggesting he didn't
    subscribe to this position after he'd actually read G||del.

    Does not mean that G is undecidable in PA.

    It doesn't say anything at all about whether G is decidable in PA.

    Andr|-


    Any expression X that is unprovable in any formal
    system F is untrue in that formal system F

    Any expression X that is irrefutable in any formal
    system F is unfalse in that formal system F.

    So now you have a four-valued logic? (true, false, untrue, unfalse).

    If so, you'll need to define what all of these values actually mean, and you'll need to completely redefine all of the basic logical operators so
    that they account for these four values.

    5 = 5 is irrefutable in Q. According to what you say above that makes it 'unfalse'. How is that different from being 'true'?

    Andr|-
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 15:52:24 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 3:50 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 14:28, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:11 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 13:47, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:23 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:50, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:40 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:20, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:10 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:01, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:

    The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q. >>>>>>>>>>>
    In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of >>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal system?


    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    Until "cats are animals" is translated into Chinese
    it is just random gibberish that has no meaning or
    truth value in Chinese.

    But reC x, S(x) rea x *isn't* random gibberish in Q. It is a well- >>>>>>>>> formed expression of Q that has a well-defined meaning. It just >>>>>>>>> happens to be unprovable. If it were random gibberish no one >>>>>>>>> would have entertained the question of whether it could or
    could not be proven in Q.

    Andr|-


    It has no finite sequence of inference steps between
    the expression and the axioms of Q. This seems to
    mean that (reCx, S(x) rea x) is ungrounded in the atomic
    base of Q in many of the different ways that this
    can be expressed by different PTS authors.

    Having no finite sequence of inference steps between the
    expression and the axioms of Q is *not* the same thing as random >>>>>>> gibberish.

    It is closer to an English word such as "cat" that is
    defined in English us undefined in Chinese.

    That's a completely spurious analogy. 'cat' isn't an expression of
    the Chinese language. reC x, S(x) rea x *is* an expression of the
    language of Q.

    It simply means it is unprovable in Q.

    Then you're either using a completely idiosyncratic definition of
    'gibberish' or a completely idiosyncratic definition of 'provable'
    (or both). That's why people keep asking you to provide *your*
    definitions, but you only respond with examples or analogies which
    fail to clarify what you might mean.

    Which means something entirely different in PTS than
    it means in TCS.

    unprovable means the same thing in both.


    Wittgenstein (1937)
    'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
    proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
    system' means: the opposite has been proved
    in Russell's system

    You keep quoting this particular bit despite the fact that its been
    pointed out on numerous occasions that Wittgenstein wrote the above
    in his private notes *before* he had actually read G||del's paper, and he >>
    What matters is the it is the way that true on the
    basis of meaning expressed in language has always
    worked. Also what matters is that I came up with
    this exact same thing years before I ever heard
    of him.

    If that's what you believe then make your case. But don't cite
    Wittgenstein as supporting your position when it's unlikely he actually stood by those remarks

    never went on to publish anything to this effect suggesting he didn't
    subscribe to this position after he'd actually read G||del.

    Does not mean that G is undecidable in PA.

    It doesn't say anything at all about whether G is decidable in PA.

    Andr|-


    Any expression X that is unprovable in any formal
    system F is untrue in that formal system F

    Any expression X that is irrefutable in any formal
    system F is unfalse in that formal system F.

    So now you have a four-valued logic? (true, false, untrue, unfalse).


    Like the expression: "What time is it?"
    we have true, false, not truth apt.

    If so, you'll need to define what all of these values actually mean, and you'll need to completely redefine all of the basic logical operators so that they account for these four values.

    5 = 5 is irrefutable in Q. According to what you say above that makes it 'unfalse'. How is that different from being 'true'?

    Andr|-

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 16:57:09 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:

    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a definition of what >>>>>>>>> it mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a >>>>>>>>> formal system.

    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what a
    definition is. I've frequently asked him for definitions and he >>>>>>>> invariably responds with an example or an analogy (assuming he >>>>>>>> responds at all). He doesn't get that examples don't take the >>>>>>>> place of definitions. Examples can be useful for clarifying
    definitions, but they aren't particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    You want a definition look-it-up.

    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English dictionary, >>>>>> this isn't really an option.

    Andr|-


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo X) // copyright Olcott 2018 >>>>> has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o reo X)

    That claims what it means to have the truth value 'true' (or at
    least it would if you defined AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It
    doesn't in any way clarify what you think it means for something to
    not have a truth value.

    Andr|-


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did
    not bother to pay attention that is your mistake
    and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth value of a
    statement to not exist in a formal system.

    A valid answer would look something like this:

    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal system
    when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F.

    Good. So when you say "The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not
    exist in Q", you mean "(reC x, S(x) rea x) is unprovable in Q", which is commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else but using different words.

    And just to remind everyone, the following terms mean the same as
    "unprovable" as per the definitions given by olcott:

    - truth value doesn't exist
    - out-of-scope
    - not semantically grounded
    - not grounded in the atomic base
    - not a confirmed statement




    I have said this so many thousands of times over
    the years that it did not occur to me that I did
    not fully spell this out this time.



    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 16:04:45 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:

    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a definition of what >>>>>>>>>> it mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a >>>>>>>>>> formal system.

    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what a
    definition is. I've frequently asked him for definitions and he >>>>>>>>> invariably responds with an example or an analogy (assuming he >>>>>>>>> responds at all). He doesn't get that examples don't take the >>>>>>>>> place of definitions. Examples can be useful for clarifying >>>>>>>>> definitions, but they aren't particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    You want a definition look-it-up.

    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English dictionary, >>>>>>> this isn't really an option.

    Andr|-


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo X) // copyright Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o reo X)

    That claims what it means to have the truth value 'true' (or at
    least it would if you defined AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It
    doesn't in any way clarify what you think it means for something to >>>>> not have a truth value.

    Andr|-


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did
    not bother to pay attention that is your mistake
    and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth value of a
    statement to not exist in a formal system.

    A valid answer would look something like this:

    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal system
    when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F.

    Good.-a So when you say "The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q", you mean "(reC x, S(x) rea x) is unprovable in Q", which is commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else but using different words.


    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient.

    The Halting Problem counter-example input is more like
    the Liar Paradox. For HHH(DD) DD is bad input not at all
    the same thing as saying that computation is fundamentally
    limited.

    And just to remind everyone, the following terms mean the same as "unprovable" as per the definitions given by olcott:

    - truth value doesn't exist
    - out-of-scope
    - not semantically grounded
    - not grounded in the atomic base
    - not a confirmed statement




    I have said this so many thousands of times over
    the years that it did not occur to me that I did
    not fully spell this out this time.



    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 15:10:31 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 2026-07-01 14:52, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:50 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:

    Any expression X that is unprovable in any formal
    system F is untrue in that formal system F

    Any expression X that is irrefutable in any formal
    system F is unfalse in that formal system F.

    So now you have a four-valued logic? (true, false, untrue, unfalse).


    Like the expression: "What time is it?"
    we have true, false, not truth apt.

    So a three-valued system. Then the same remarks apply. You need to
    actually define your three-valued system and show how the basic logical operators actually work in that system.

    And your natural language example is entirely unrevealing. Natural
    language distinguishes between interrogative and declarative sentences.
    Q has only declarative sentences and declarative sentences, by
    definition, are sentences which evaluate to a truth value.

    And in standard logic there is this thing called the law of the excluded middle which states that every declarative sentence is either true or
    false. You can't just introduce some concept like "not truth apt"
    without completely redefining logic from the ground up. You haven't made
    even the feeblest attempt at doing this. You simply introduce concepts
    as if they will magically fit into an existing system rather than
    exploring what the consequences of introducing such concepts would
    actually have

    If so, you'll need to define what all of these values actually mean,
    and you'll need to completely redefine all of the basic logical
    operators so that they account for these four values.

    5 = 5 is irrefutable in Q. According to what you say above that makes
    it 'unfalse'. How is that different from being 'true'?

    No answer?

    Andr|-
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 17:15:10 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:

    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a definition of >>>>>>>>>>> what it mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist >>>>>>>>>>> in a formal system.

    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what a >>>>>>>>>> definition is. I've frequently asked him for definitions and >>>>>>>>>> he invariably responds with an example or an analogy (assuming >>>>>>>>>> he responds at all). He doesn't get that examples don't take >>>>>>>>>> the place of definitions. Examples can be useful for
    clarifying definitions, but they aren't particularly useful on >>>>>>>>>> their own.

    Andr|-


    You want a definition look-it-up.

    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English
    dictionary, this isn't really an option.

    Andr|-


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo X) // copyright Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o reo X)

    That claims what it means to have the truth value 'true' (or at
    least it would if you defined AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It
    doesn't in any way clarify what you think it means for something
    to not have a truth value.

    Andr|-


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did
    not bother to pay attention that is your mistake
    and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth value of
    a statement to not exist in a formal system.

    A valid answer would look something like this:

    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal system
    when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F.

    Good.-a So when you say "The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not
    exist in Q", you mean "(reC x, S(x) rea x) is unprovable in Q", which is
    commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else but using
    different words.


    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient.

    False. It means that there are statements in the language of Q that
    have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of the system.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input

    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists that meets
    the following requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that computes the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when executed directly


    is more like
    the Liar Paradox. For HHH(DD)

    Which must return 1 to meet the above requirements, since finite string
    DD is stipulated to be the description of algorithm DD which halts when executed directly.

    DD is bad input

    which is just another way of saying it gets the wrong answer.

    not at all
    the same thing as saying that computation is fundamentally
    limited.

    Sure it does, as no algorithm exists that can compute the above mapping



    And just to remind everyone, the following terms mean the same as
    "unprovable" as per the definitions given by olcott:

    - truth value doesn't exist
    - out-of-scope
    - not semantically grounded
    - not grounded in the atomic base
    - not a confirmed statement




    I have said this so many thousands of times over
    the years that it did not occur to me that I did
    not fully spell this out this time.






    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 17:43:20 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 4:10 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 14:52, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:50 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:

    Any expression X that is unprovable in any formal
    system F is untrue in that formal system F

    Any expression X that is irrefutable in any formal
    system F is unfalse in that formal system F.

    So now you have a four-valued logic? (true, false, untrue, unfalse).


    Like the expression: "What time is it?"
    we have true, false, not truth apt.

    So a three-valued system. Then the same remarks apply. You need to
    actually define your three-valued system and show how the basic logical operators actually work in that system.


    It is not a three-valued system as these are commonly
    understood. When we go with the expressiveness of
    natural language then construing all sentences as
    true or false is directly seen to be as stupid as it
    has always been.

    And your natural language example is entirely unrevealing. Natural
    language distinguishes between interrogative and declarative sentences.
    Q has only declarative sentences and declarative sentences, by
    definition, are sentences which evaluate to a truth value.

    Because logic only has propositions that it incorrectly assumed
    must be true or false it stupidly ignores the third possibility
    of semantically ill-formed.

    And in standard logic there is this thing called the law of the excluded middle which states that every declarative sentence is either true or
    false. You can't just introduce some concept like "not truth apt"
    without completely redefining logic from the ground up.

    Not truth apt and not a truth bearer already has established
    well-defined meanings that logic stupidly ignores.

    The law of the excluded middle forces logicians to stupidly
    classify semantic nonsense as true or false.

    You haven't made
    even the feeblest attempt at doing this. You simply introduce concepts
    as if they will magically fit into an existing system rather than
    exploring what the consequences of introducing such concepts would
    actually have

    If so, you'll need to define what all of these values actually mean,
    and you'll need to completely redefine all of the basic logical
    operators so that they account for these four values.

    5 = 5 is irrefutable in Q. According to what you say above that makes
    it 'unfalse'. How is that different from being 'true'?

    No answer?

    Andr|-


    Wittgenstein (1937)
    'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
    proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
    system' means: the opposite has been proved
    in Russell's system

    Has been inherently the way that true on the basis
    of meaning expressed in language HAS ALWAYS WORKED.

    Expressions of language are ONLY true, or false on
    the basis of their connections to other Expressions
    of language.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 17:09:39 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 2026-07-01 16:43, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:10 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 14:52, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:50 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:

    Any expression X that is unprovable in any formal
    system F is untrue in that formal system F

    Any expression X that is irrefutable in any formal
    system F is unfalse in that formal system F.

    So now you have a four-valued logic? (true, false, untrue, unfalse).


    Like the expression: "What time is it?"
    we have true, false, not truth apt.

    So a three-valued system. Then the same remarks apply. You need to
    actually define your three-valued system and show how the basic
    logical operators actually work in that system.


    It is not a three-valued system as these are commonly
    understood.

    If it divides sentences into anything other than true and false then it
    is a three-valued system.

    When we go with the expressiveness of
    natural language then construing all sentences as
    true or false is directly seen to be as stupid as it
    has always been.

    Natural language tells us nothing about Q.

    And your natural language example is entirely unrevealing. Natural
    language distinguishes between interrogative and declarative
    sentences. Q has only declarative sentences and declarative sentences,
    by definition, are sentences which evaluate to a truth value.

    Because logic only has propositions that it incorrectly assumed
    must be true or false it stupidly ignores the third possibility
    of semantically ill-formed.

    And in standard logic there is this thing called the law of the
    excluded middle which states that every declarative sentence is either
    true or false. You can't just introduce some concept like "not truth
    apt" without completely redefining logic from the ground up.

    Not truth apt and not a truth bearer already has established
    well-defined meanings that logic stupidly ignores.

    AFAICT, 'truth bearer' is simply a synonym for 'declarative sentence'.
    And declarative sentences are the only kind of sentence found in Q.
    Whatever meaning you intended is not an 'established well-defined
    meaning'. It is your own private meaning.

    And reC x, S(x) rea x is most definitely a truth bearer.

    The law of the excluded middle forces logicians to stupidly
    classify semantic nonsense as true or false.

    Which is exactly what we want in Boolean logic.

    You haven't made even the feeblest attempt at doing this. You simply
    introduce concepts as if they will magically fit into an existing
    system rather than exploring what the consequences of introducing such
    concepts would actually have

    If so, you'll need to define what all of these values actually mean,
    and you'll need to completely redefine all of the basic logical
    operators so that they account for these four values.

    5 = 5 is irrefutable in Q. According to what you say above that
    makes it 'unfalse'. How is that different from being 'true'?

    No answer?

    Andr|-


    Wittgenstein (1937)
    'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
    proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
    system' means: the opposite has been proved
    in Russell's system

    I explained to you not two hours ago why this particular quote carries absolutely no weight with me, so there's really no point in bringing it
    up again.

    If true and provable were equivalent, we wouldn't have two different
    words for them. 'true' is an ontological category; 'provable' is an
    epistemic category. They don't map onto one another.

    Andr|-

    Has been inherently the way that true on the basis
    of meaning expressed in language HAS ALWAYS WORKED.

    Expressions of language are ONLY true, or false on
    the basis of their connections to other Expressions
    of language.

    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 18:37:11 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:

    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a definition of >>>>>>>>>>>> what it mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist >>>>>>>>>>>> in a formal system.

    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what a >>>>>>>>>>> definition is. I've frequently asked him for definitions and >>>>>>>>>>> he invariably responds with an example or an analogy
    (assuming he responds at all). He doesn't get that examples >>>>>>>>>>> don't take the place of definitions. Examples can be useful >>>>>>>>>>> for clarifying definitions, but they aren't particularly >>>>>>>>>>> useful on their own.

    Andr|-


    You want a definition look-it-up.

    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English
    dictionary, this isn't really an option.

    Andr|-


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo X) // copyright Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o reo X)

    That claims what it means to have the truth value 'true' (or at >>>>>>> least it would if you defined AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It >>>>>>> doesn't in any way clarify what you think it means for something >>>>>>> to not have a truth value.

    Andr|-


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did
    not bother to pay attention that is your mistake
    and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth value of >>>>> a statement to not exist in a formal system.

    A valid answer would look something like this:

    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal system
    when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F.

    Good.-a So when you say "The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not >>> exist in Q", you mean "(reC x, S(x) rea x) is unprovable in Q", which is >>> commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else but
    using different words.


    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient.

    False.-a It means that there are statements in the language of Q that
    have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of the system.


    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input

    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists that meets
    the following requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that computes the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when executed directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the
    first five minutes that this requirement was made.


    is more like
    the Liar Paradox. For HHH(DD)

    If it is true that makes it false.
    If it is false that make is true.
    Therefore is has always been fucking nonsense.

    That it took humans more than five minutes to
    see this conclusively proves how stupid they are.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 19:05:09 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 6:09 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 16:43, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:10 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 14:52, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:50 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:

    Any expression X that is unprovable in any formal
    system F is untrue in that formal system F

    Any expression X that is irrefutable in any formal
    system F is unfalse in that formal system F.

    So now you have a four-valued logic? (true, false, untrue, unfalse). >>>>>

    Like the expression: "What time is it?"
    we have true, false, not truth apt.

    So a three-valued system. Then the same remarks apply. You need to
    actually define your three-valued system and show how the basic
    logical operators actually work in that system.


    It is not a three-valued system as these are commonly
    understood.

    If it divides sentences into anything other than true and false then it
    is a three-valued system.

    When we go with the expressiveness of
    natural language then construing all sentences as
    true or false is directly seen to be as stupid as it
    has always been.

    Natural language tells us nothing about Q.

    And your natural language example is entirely unrevealing. Natural
    language distinguishes between interrogative and declarative
    sentences. Q has only declarative sentences and declarative
    sentences, by definition, are sentences which evaluate to a truth value. >>>
    Because logic only has propositions that it incorrectly assumed
    must be true or false it stupidly ignores the third possibility
    of semantically ill-formed.

    And in standard logic there is this thing called the law of the
    excluded middle which states that every declarative sentence is
    either true or false. You can't just introduce some concept like "not
    truth apt" without completely redefining logic from the ground up.

    Not truth apt and not a truth bearer already has established
    well-defined meanings that logic stupidly ignores.

    AFAICT, 'truth bearer' is simply a synonym for 'declarative sentence'.
    And declarative sentences are the only kind of sentence found in Q.
    Whatever meaning you intended is not an 'established well-defined
    meaning'. It is your own private meaning.


    Not exactly because most every human has been too stupid
    to understand that "This sentence is not true" is a semantically
    incoherent declarative sentence. Even the great Saul Kripke
    (did better than everyone else) yet did not quite get there.

    And reC x, S(x) rea x is most definitely a truth bearer.


    If is it not provable in Q then it is not a truth
    bearer in Q. Because we can see that it is provable
    in PA this causes us to screw up and think that this
    means that it is true in Q.

    The law of the excluded middle forces logicians to stupidly
    classify semantic nonsense as true or false.

    Which is exactly what we want in Boolean logic.

    You haven't made even the feeblest attempt at doing this. You simply
    introduce concepts as if they will magically fit into an existing
    system rather than exploring what the consequences of introducing
    such concepts would actually have

    If so, you'll need to define what all of these values actually
    mean, and you'll need to completely redefine all of the basic
    logical operators so that they account for these four values.

    5 = 5 is irrefutable in Q. According to what you say above that
    makes it 'unfalse'. How is that different from being 'true'?

    No answer?

    Andr|-


    Wittgenstein (1937)
    'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
    proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
    system' means: the opposite has been proved
    in Russell's system

    I explained to you not two hours ago why this particular quote carries absolutely no weight with me, so there's really no point in bringing it
    up again.


    Of course woefully fallible humans never give a rat's ass for infallible
    truth. They only care if they believe something. You don't believe
    Wittgenstein thus can't be bothered to see that he is inherently
    correct.

    If true and provable were equivalent, we wouldn't have two different
    words for them. 'true' is an ontological category; 'provable' is an epistemic category. They don't map onto one another.


    Truth as an Epistemic Notion
    Truth as an Epistemic Notion
    Truth as an Epistemic Notion https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11245-011-9107-6

    For all expressions that are true on the basis of their
    meaning expressed in language IT IS ONLY THIS MEANING
    EXPRESSED IN LANGUAGE THAT MAKES THEM TRUE.

    Andr|-

    Has been inherently the way that true on the basis
    of meaning expressed in language HAS ALWAYS WORKED.

    Expressions of language are ONLY true, or false on
    the basis of their connections to other Expressions
    of language.


    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 18:39:03 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 2026-07-01 18:05, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 6:09 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:

    Not exactly because most every human has been too stupid
    to understand that "This sentence is not true" is a semantically
    incoherent declarative sentence. Even the great Saul Kripke
    (did better than everyone else) yet did not quite get there.

    Claiming that it is semantically incoherent is *your* view. It is hardly universally accepted and therefore you are required to actually defend
    this view rather than simply assert it.

    Also, that isn't the sentence we are considering. We are considering reC
    x, S(x) rea x in Q. There is no reason to think that any claim you might
    make about the LP is also applicable to this sentence.

    And reC x, S(x) rea x is most definitely a truth bearer.


    If is it not provable in Q then it is not a truth
    bearer in Q. Because we can see that it is provable
    in PA this causes us to screw up and think that this
    means that it is true in Q.

    I never claimed that it was true, nor did I claim that it was false. I
    simply claimed that it was a truth-bearer without committing to its
    actual truth value.

    Do you actually understand *why* reC x, S(x) rea x is not provable in Q?
    Until you understand this you really don't have a good grasp of what it
    means for Q to be incomplete.

    The reason why we cannot prove that reC x, S(x) rea x in Q is because it is possible in Q to construct a model in which that statement is *false*.
    Such a model would not correspond to the natural numbers as commonly understood, but it would be a consistent model. In a model corresponding
    to the natural numbers as commonly understood, this statement would be
    *true*.

    For any given model of Q, reC x, S(x) rea x is either true or it is false.
    It is never some indeterminate value. But the truth value of this
    statement cannot be proven solely by considering the axioms of Q. We
    need to look at the actual model. Thus, Q is incomplete because its
    axioms don't lead to a single, unique model. And that will hold true for
    all but the simplest systems.


    The law of the excluded middle forces logicians to stupidly
    classify semantic nonsense as true or false.

    Which is exactly what we want in Boolean logic.

    You haven't made even the feeblest attempt at doing this. You simply
    introduce concepts as if they will magically fit into an existing
    system rather than exploring what the consequences of introducing
    such concepts would actually have

    If so, you'll need to define what all of these values actually
    mean, and you'll need to completely redefine all of the basic
    logical operators so that they account for these four values.

    5 = 5 is irrefutable in Q. According to what you say above that
    makes it 'unfalse'. How is that different from being 'true'?

    No answer?

    Andr|-


    Wittgenstein (1937)
    'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
    proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
    system' means: the opposite has been proved
    in Russell's system

    I explained to you not two hours ago why this particular quote carries
    absolutely no weight with me, so there's really no point in bringing
    it up again >
    Of course woefully fallible humans never give a rat's ass for infallible truth.

    You don't have any special ability to identify 'infallible truth'.

    They only care if they believe something. You don't believe
    Wittgenstein thus can't be bothered to see that he is inherently
    correct.

    That wasn't my point. I claimed that it wasn't clear that *Wittgenstein* actually believed this once he had actually reflected on the problem,
    and that therefore this quote really cannot be legitimately used to
    support any particular position.

    If true and provable were equivalent, we wouldn't have two different
    words for them. 'true' is an ontological category; 'provable' is an
    epistemic category. They don't map onto one another.


    Truth as an Epistemic Notion
    Truth as an Epistemic Notion
    Truth as an Epistemic Notion

    Saying it three times doesn't achieve anything. And I would argue that
    Prawitz is confused here. Citing a single article that makes a claim
    doesn't validate that claim.

    Andr|-
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 20:01:26 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 7:39 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 18:05, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 6:09 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:

    Not exactly because most every human has been too stupid
    to understand that "This sentence is not true" is a semantically
    incoherent declarative sentence. Even the great Saul Kripke
    (did better than everyone else) yet did not quite get there.

    Claiming that it is semantically incoherent is *your* view.

    It <is> semantically incoherent in such a way that
    anyone disagreeing is ABSOLUTELY INCORRECT.

    It is hardly
    universally accepted and therefore you are required to actually defend
    this view rather than simply assert it.


    It used to be universally agree that the Earth is flat.

    Also, that isn't the sentence we are considering. We are considering reC
    x, S(x) rea x in Q. There is no reason to think that any claim you might make about the LP is also applicable to this sentence.


    We are also considering that sentence.

    And reC x, S(x) rea x is most definitely a truth bearer.


    If is it not provable in Q then it is not a truth
    bearer in Q. Because we can see that it is provable
    in PA this causes us to screw up and think that this
    means that it is true in Q.

    I never claimed that it was true, nor did I claim that it was false. I simply claimed that it was a truth-bearer without committing to its
    actual truth value.


    Yes that that is the vagueness that prevents much
    of what is semantically incoherent to be undecidable.
    Q was intentionally defined to be weaker than PA.

    Do you actually understand *why* reC x, S(x) rea x is not provable in Q? Until you understand this you really don't have a good grasp of what it means for Q to be incomplete.


    it lacks the mathematical induction axiom schema
    required to generalize this rule to all elements in a domain

    The reason why we cannot prove that reC x, S(x) rea x in Q is because it is possible in Q to construct a model in which that statement is *false*.

    Not when you make sure to completely and totally toss
    model theory out on its ass and replace it with proof
    theoretic semantics instead.

    Such a model would not correspond to the natural numbers as commonly understood, but it would be a consistent model. In a model corresponding
    to the natural numbers as commonly understood, this statement would be *true*.

    For any given model of Q, reC x, S(x) rea x is either true or it is false. It is never some indeterminate value. But the truth value of this
    statement cannot be proven solely by considering the axioms of Q. We
    need to look at the actual model. Thus, Q is incomplete because its
    axioms don't lead to a single, unique model. And that will hold true for
    all but the simplest systems.


    The law of the excluded middle forces logicians to stupidly
    classify semantic nonsense as true or false.

    Which is exactly what we want in Boolean logic.

    You haven't made even the feeblest attempt at doing this. You
    simply introduce concepts as if they will magically fit into an
    existing system rather than exploring what the consequences of
    introducing such concepts would actually have

    If so, you'll need to define what all of these values actually
    mean, and you'll need to completely redefine all of the basic
    logical operators so that they account for these four values.

    5 = 5 is irrefutable in Q. According to what you say above that >>>>>>> makes it 'unfalse'. How is that different from being 'true'?

    No answer?

    Andr|-


    Wittgenstein (1937)
    'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
    proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
    system' means: the opposite has been proved
    in Russell's system

    I explained to you not two hours ago why this particular quote
    carries absolutely no weight with me, so there's really no point in
    bringing it up again >
    Of course woefully fallible humans never give a rat's ass for infallible
    truth.

    You don't have any special ability to identify 'infallible truth'.

    They only care if they believe something. You don't believe
    Wittgenstein thus can't be bothered to see that he is inherently
    correct.

    That wasn't my point. I claimed that it wasn't clear that *Wittgenstein* actually believed this once he had actually reflected on the problem,
    and that therefore this quote really cannot be legitimately used to
    support any particular position.

    If true and provable were equivalent, we wouldn't have two different
    words for them. 'true' is an ontological category; 'provable' is an
    epistemic category. They don't map onto one another.


    Truth as an Epistemic Notion
    Truth as an Epistemic Notion
    Truth as an Epistemic Notion

    Saying it three times doesn't achieve anything. And I would argue that Prawitz is confused here. Citing a single article that makes a claim
    doesn't validate that claim.


    You were sure that provable is epistemic and thus
    truth is not. Truth as an Epistemic Notion is the
    core of Wittgenstein.

    Andr|-


    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 19:23:17 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 2026-07-01 19:01, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:39 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 18:05, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 6:09 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:

    Not exactly because most every human has been too stupid
    to understand that "This sentence is not true" is a semantically
    incoherent declarative sentence. Even the great Saul Kripke
    (did better than everyone else) yet did not quite get there.

    Claiming that it is semantically incoherent is *your* view.

    It <is> semantically incoherent in such a way that
    anyone disagreeing is ABSOLUTELY INCORRECT.

    It is hardly universally accepted and therefore you are required to
    actually defend this view rather than simply assert it.


    It used to be universally agree that the Earth is flat.

    Actually, there's no evidence to support this claim. Can you name a
    single work on the topic of geography or astronomy which actually
    asserted that the world was flat? There are religious texts which *can*
    be interpreted as consistent with a flat earth, but those texts weren't dealing with geography; they were dealing with allegory.

    Also, that isn't the sentence we are considering. We are considering reC
    x, S(x) rea x in Q. There is no reason to think that any claim you might
    make about the LP is also applicable to this sentence.


    We are also considering that sentence.

    You may be. I am not. I'm discussing Q and the Liar Paradox isn't
    stateable in Q.

    And reC x, S(x) rea x is most definitely a truth bearer.


    If is it not provable in Q then it is not a truth
    bearer in Q. Because we can see that it is provable
    in PA this causes us to screw up and think that this
    means that it is true in Q.

    I never claimed that it was true, nor did I claim that it was false. I
    simply claimed that it was a truth-bearer without committing to its
    actual truth value.


    Yes that that is the vagueness that prevents much
    of what is semantically incoherent to be undecidable.
    Q was intentionally defined to be weaker than PA.

    Do you actually understand *why* reC x, S(x) rea x is not provable in Q?
    Until you understand this you really don't have a good grasp of what
    it means for Q to be incomplete.


    it lacks the mathematical induction axiom schema
    required to generalize this rule to all elements in a domain

    That's something that distinguishes Q from PA. By itself, it's not an explanation of why reC x, S(x) rea x isn't provable in Q. I'm trying to see whether you really even understand this.

    The reason why we cannot prove that reC x, S(x) rea x in Q is because it
    is possible in Q to construct a model in which that statement is *false*.

    Not when you make sure to completely and totally toss
    model theory out on its ass and replace it with proof
    theoretic semantics instead.

    PTS doesn't rely on model theoretic semantics because it is interested
    in epistemic rather than ontological questions. That's not the same
    thing as discarding models altogether or throwing model theory 'out on
    its ass'. Q isn't particularly useful in absence of a model.

    I don't think you really understand what models actually are.


    Truth as an Epistemic Notion

    Saying it three times doesn't achieve anything. And I would argue that
    Prawitz is confused here. Citing a single article that makes a claim
    doesn't validate that claim.


    You were sure that provable is epistemic and thus
    truth is not. Truth as an Epistemic Notion is the
    core of Wittgenstein.

    And I am still sure of this. Prawitz is simply misguided.

    Andr|-
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 21:03:04 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 8:23 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 19:01, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:39 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 18:05, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 6:09 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:

    Not exactly because most every human has been too stupid
    to understand that "This sentence is not true" is a semantically
    incoherent declarative sentence. Even the great Saul Kripke
    (did better than everyone else) yet did not quite get there.

    Claiming that it is semantically incoherent is *your* view.

    It <is> semantically incoherent in such a way that
    anyone disagreeing is ABSOLUTELY INCORRECT.

    It is hardly universally accepted and therefore you are required to
    actually defend this view rather than simply assert it.


    It used to be universally agree that the Earth is flat.

    Actually, there's no evidence to support this claim. Can you name a
    single work on the topic of geography or astronomy which actually
    asserted that the world was flat? There are religious texts which *can*
    be interpreted as consistent with a flat earth, but those texts weren't dealing with geography; they were dealing with allegory.

    Also, that isn't the sentence we are considering. We are considering
    reC x, S(x) rea x in Q. There is no reason to think that any claim you
    might make about the LP is also applicable to this sentence.


    We are also considering that sentence.

    You may be. I am not. I'm discussing Q and the Liar Paradox isn't
    stateable in Q.

    And reC x, S(x) rea x is most definitely a truth bearer.


    If is it not provable in Q then it is not a truth
    bearer in Q. Because we can see that it is provable
    in PA this causes us to screw up and think that this
    means that it is true in Q.

    I never claimed that it was true, nor did I claim that it was false.
    I simply claimed that it was a truth-bearer without committing to its
    actual truth value.


    Yes that that is the vagueness that prevents much
    of what is semantically incoherent to be undecidable.
    Q was intentionally defined to be weaker than PA.

    Do you actually understand *why* reC x, S(x) rea x is not provable in Q? >>> Until you understand this you really don't have a good grasp of what
    it means for Q to be incomplete.


    it lacks the mathematical induction axiom schema
    required to generalize this rule to all elements in a domain

    That's something that distinguishes Q from PA. By itself, it's not an explanation of why reC x, S(x) rea x isn't provable in Q. I'm trying to see whether you really even understand this.


    It seems to me that I do understand that by itself is the
    one and only reason why (reCx, S(x) rea x) is unprovable in Q.
    That would entail that you would be flat out lying.
    Q cannot do the reCx without an infinite sequence of steps.
    Since you know that why do you lie about that?
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 22:36:25 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:

    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a definition of >>>>>>>>>>>>> what it mean for the truth value of a statement to not >>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system.

    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what a >>>>>>>>>>>> definition is. I've frequently asked him for definitions and >>>>>>>>>>>> he invariably responds with an example or an analogy
    (assuming he responds at all). He doesn't get that examples >>>>>>>>>>>> don't take the place of definitions. Examples can be useful >>>>>>>>>>>> for clarifying definitions, but they aren't particularly >>>>>>>>>>>> useful on their own.

    Andr|-


    You want a definition look-it-up.

    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English
    dictionary, this isn't really an option.

    Andr|-


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo X) // copyright Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o reo X)

    That claims what it means to have the truth value 'true' (or at >>>>>>>> least it would if you defined AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It >>>>>>>> doesn't in any way clarify what you think it means for something >>>>>>>> to not have a truth value.

    Andr|-


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did
    not bother to pay attention that is your mistake
    and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth value
    of a statement to not exist in a formal system.

    A valid answer would look something like this:

    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal system >>>>>> when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F.

    Good.-a So when you say "The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not >>>> exist in Q", you mean "(reC x, S(x) rea x) is unprovable in Q", which is >>>> commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else but
    using different words.


    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient.

    False.-a It means that there are statements in the language of Q that
    have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of the system.


    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input

    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists that meets
    the following requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of instructions)
    X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that computes the
    following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when executed
    directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the
    first five minutes that this requirement was made.

    In other words, you don't understand that if this was algorithm H:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
    int result;
    {
    result = 0;
    }
    return result;
    }

    The counter-example algorithm D is this:

    void D(ptr *I)
    {
    ptr *X = D;
    ptr *Y = I;
    int result;
    {
    result = 0;
    }
    if (result == 1) {
    while (1);
    }
    }



    is more like
    the Liar Paradox. For HHH(DD)

    If it is true that makes it false.
    If it is false that make is true.
    Therefore is has always been fucking nonsense.

    That it took humans more than five minutes to
    see this conclusively proves how stupid they are.


    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 21:53:35 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:

    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a definition of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> what it mean for the truth value of a statement to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system.

    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what a >>>>>>>>>>>>> definition is. I've frequently asked him for definitions >>>>>>>>>>>>> and he invariably responds with an example or an analogy >>>>>>>>>>>>> (assuming he responds at all). He doesn't get that examples >>>>>>>>>>>>> don't take the place of definitions. Examples can be useful >>>>>>>>>>>>> for clarifying definitions, but they aren't particularly >>>>>>>>>>>>> useful on their own.

    Andr|-


    You want a definition look-it-up.

    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English
    dictionary, this isn't really an option.

    Andr|-


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo X) // copyright Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o reo X)

    That claims what it means to have the truth value 'true' (or at >>>>>>>>> least it would if you defined AtomicFacts in a coherent way). >>>>>>>>> It doesn't in any way clarify what you think it means for
    something to not have a truth value.

    Andr|-


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did
    not bother to pay attention that is your mistake
    and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth value >>>>>>> of a statement to not exist in a formal system.

    A valid answer would look something like this:

    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal system >>>>>>> when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F.

    Good.-a So when you say "The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not >>>>> exist in Q", you mean "(reC x, S(x) rea x) is unprovable in Q", which >>>>> is commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else but
    using different words.


    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient.

    False.-a It means that there are statements in the language of Q that
    have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of the system.


    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input

    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists that
    meets the following requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of instructions)
    X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that computes the
    following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when executed
    directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the
    first five minutes that this requirement was made.

    In other words, you don't understand that if this was algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.
    It has always been fucking nuts to require a machine
    to report on the behavior of another machine that
    does the opposite of whatever it reports.

    Are you too fucking stupid to see this?
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 23:00:58 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:

    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a definition of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what it mean for the truth value of a statement to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system.

    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition is. I've frequently asked him for definitions >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and he invariably responds with an example or an analogy >>>>>>>>>>>>>> (assuming he responds at all). He doesn't get that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> examples don't take the place of definitions. Examples can >>>>>>>>>>>>>> be useful for clarifying definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own.

    Andr|-


    You want a definition look-it-up.

    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English >>>>>>>>>>>> dictionary, this isn't really an option.

    Andr|-


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo X) // copyright Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o reo X)

    That claims what it means to have the truth value 'true' (or >>>>>>>>>> at least it would if you defined AtomicFacts in a coherent >>>>>>>>>> way). It doesn't in any way clarify what you think it means >>>>>>>>>> for something to not have a truth value.

    Andr|-


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did
    not bother to pay attention that is your mistake
    and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth value >>>>>>>> of a statement to not exist in a formal system.

    A valid answer would look something like this:

    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal
    system when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F.

    Good.-a So when you say "The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does >>>>>> not exist in Q", you mean "(reC x, S(x) rea x) is unprovable in Q", >>>>>> which is commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else but
    using different words.


    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient.

    False.-a It means that there are statements in the language of Q that >>>> have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of the system.


    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input

    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists that
    meets the following requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of
    instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that computes
    the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when executed
    directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the
    first five minutes that this requirement was made.

    In other words, you don't understand that if this was algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.

    And still don't understand that this algorithm:


    void D(ptr *I)
    {
    ptr *X = D;
    ptr *Y = I;
    int result;
    {
    result = 0;
    }
    if (result == 1) {
    while (1);
    }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
    int result;
    {
    result = 0;
    }
    return result;
    }

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 22:17:01 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:

    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a definition >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of what it mean for the truth value of a statement to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not exist in a formal system.

    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition is. I've frequently asked him for definitions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and he invariably responds with an example or an analogy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (assuming he responds at all). He doesn't get that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> examples don't take the place of definitions. Examples >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can be useful for clarifying definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own.

    Andr|-


    You want a definition look-it-up.

    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English >>>>>>>>>>>>> dictionary, this isn't really an option.

    Andr|-


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo X) // copyright Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o reo X)

    That claims what it means to have the truth value 'true' (or >>>>>>>>>>> at least it would if you defined AtomicFacts in a coherent >>>>>>>>>>> way). It doesn't in any way clarify what you think it means >>>>>>>>>>> for something to not have a truth value.

    Andr|-


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did
    not bother to pay attention that is your mistake
    and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth
    value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.

    A valid answer would look something like this:

    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal
    system when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F.

    Good.-a So when you say "The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does >>>>>>> not exist in Q", you mean "(reC x, S(x) rea x) is unprovable in Q", >>>>>>> which is commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else but >>>>>>> using different words.


    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient.

    False.-a It means that there are statements in the language of Q
    that have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of the system. >>>>>

    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input

    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists that
    meets the following requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of
    instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that computes
    the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when executed
    directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the
    first five minutes that this requirement was made.

    In other words, you don't understand that if this was algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.

    And still don't understand that this algorithm:


    void D(ptr *I)
    {
    -a-a-a ptr *X = D;
    -a-a-a ptr *Y = I;
    -a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a }
    -a-a-a if (result == 1) {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a while (1);
    -a-a-a }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
    -a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a }
    -a-a-a return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 23:18:10 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:

    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese.

    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a definition >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of what it mean for the truth value of a statement to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not exist in a formal system.

    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a definition is. I've frequently asked him for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions and he invariably responds with an example >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or an analogy (assuming he responds at all). He doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> get that examples don't take the place of definitions. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Examples can be useful for clarifying definitions, but >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they aren't particularly useful on their own.

    Andr|-


    You want a definition look-it-up.

    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English >>>>>>>>>>>>>> dictionary, this isn't really an option.

    Andr|-


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo X) // copyright Olcott
    2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o reo X)

    That claims what it means to have the truth value 'true' (or >>>>>>>>>>>> at least it would if you defined AtomicFacts in a coherent >>>>>>>>>>>> way). It doesn't in any way clarify what you think it means >>>>>>>>>>>> for something to not have a truth value.

    Andr|-


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did
    not bother to pay attention that is your mistake
    and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth >>>>>>>>>> value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.

    A valid answer would look something like this:

    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>> system when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F.

    Good.-a So when you say "The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does >>>>>>>> not exist in Q", you mean "(reC x, S(x) rea x) is unprovable in Q", >>>>>>>> which is commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else but >>>>>>>> using different words.


    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient.

    False.-a It means that there are statements in the language of Q
    that have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of the system. >>>>>>

    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input

    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists that
    meets the following requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of
    instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that computes >>>>>> the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly >>>>>> (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when executed >>>>>> directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the
    first five minutes that this requirement was made.

    In other words, you don't understand that if this was algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.

    And still don't understand that this algorithm:


    void D(ptr *I)
    {
    -a-a-a-a ptr *X = D;
    -a-a-a-a ptr *Y = I;
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a if (result == 1) {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a while (1);
    -a-a-a-a }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting problem for the
    last 22 years.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 22:29:22 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:

    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a definition >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of what it mean for the truth value of a statement to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not exist in a formal system.

    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a definition is. I've frequently asked him for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions and he invariably responds with an example >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or an analogy (assuming he responds at all). He doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> get that examples don't take the place of definitions. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Examples can be useful for clarifying definitions, but >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they aren't particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    You want a definition look-it-up.

    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dictionary, this isn't really an option.

    Andr|-


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo X) // copyright Olcott
    2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o reo X)

    That claims what it means to have the truth value 'true' >>>>>>>>>>>>> (or at least it would if you defined AtomicFacts in a >>>>>>>>>>>>> coherent way). It doesn't in any way clarify what you think >>>>>>>>>>>>> it means for something to not have a truth value.

    Andr|-


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did
    not bother to pay attention that is your mistake
    and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth >>>>>>>>>>> value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.

    A valid answer would look something like this:

    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>> system when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F.

    Good.-a So when you say "The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does >>>>>>>>> not exist in Q", you mean "(reC x, S(x) rea x) is unprovable in Q", >>>>>>>>> which is commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else >>>>>>>>> but using different words.


    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient.

    False.-a It means that there are statements in the language of Q >>>>>>> that have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of the system. >>>>>>>

    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input

    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists that >>>>>>> meets the following requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of
    instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that computes >>>>>>> the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly >>>>>>> (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when executed >>>>>>> directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the
    first five minutes that this requirement was made.

    In other words, you don't understand that if this was algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.

    And still don't understand that this algorithm:


    void D(ptr *I)
    {
    -a-a-a-a ptr *X = D;
    -a-a-a-a ptr *Y = I;
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a if (result == 1) {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a while (1);
    -a-a-a-a }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting problem for the
    last 22 years.

    D(D); // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)
    Are you a complete jackass?
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 23:34:45 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 11:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:

    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of what it mean for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what a definition is. I've frequently asked him for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions and he invariably responds with an example >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or an analogy (assuming he responds at all). He >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't get that examples don't take the place of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions. Examples can be useful for clarifying >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions, but they aren't particularly useful on >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their own.

    Andr|-


    You want a definition look-it-up.

    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dictionary, this isn't really an option.

    Andr|-


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo X) // copyright >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o reo X)

    That claims what it means to have the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'true' (or at least it would if you defined AtomicFacts in >>>>>>>>>>>>>> a coherent way). It doesn't in any way clarify what you >>>>>>>>>>>>>> think it means for something to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did
    not bother to pay attention that is your mistake
    and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth >>>>>>>>>>>> value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.

    A valid answer would look something like this:

    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>> system when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F.

    Good.-a So when you say "The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) >>>>>>>>>> does not exist in Q", you mean "(reC x, S(x) rea x) is unprovable >>>>>>>>>> in Q", which is commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else >>>>>>>>>> but using different words.


    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient.

    False.-a It means that there are statements in the language of Q >>>>>>>> that have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of the
    system.


    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input

    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists that >>>>>>>> meets the following requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of
    instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that
    computes the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly >>>>>>>> (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when
    executed directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the
    first five minutes that this requirement was made.

    In other words, you don't understand that if this was algorithm H: >>>>>>

    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.

    And still don't understand that this algorithm:


    void D(ptr *I)
    {
    -a-a-a-a ptr *X = D;
    -a-a-a-a ptr *Y = I;
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a if (result == 1) {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a while (1);
    -a-a-a-a }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting problem for the
    last 22 years.

    D(D);-a-a // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)

    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm D contains
    a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 22:37:18 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:

    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a definition >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of what it mean for the truth value of a statement to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not exist in a formal system.

    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a definition is. I've frequently asked him for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions and he invariably responds with an example >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or an analogy (assuming he responds at all). He doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> get that examples don't take the place of definitions. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Examples can be useful for clarifying definitions, but >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they aren't particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    You want a definition look-it-up.

    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dictionary, this isn't really an option.

    Andr|-


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo X) // copyright Olcott
    2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o reo X)

    That claims what it means to have the truth value 'true' >>>>>>>>>>>>> (or at least it would if you defined AtomicFacts in a >>>>>>>>>>>>> coherent way). It doesn't in any way clarify what you think >>>>>>>>>>>>> it means for something to not have a truth value.

    Andr|-


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did
    not bother to pay attention that is your mistake
    and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth >>>>>>>>>>> value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.

    A valid answer would look something like this:

    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>> system when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F.

    Good.-a So when you say "The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does >>>>>>>>> not exist in Q", you mean "(reC x, S(x) rea x) is unprovable in Q", >>>>>>>>> which is commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else >>>>>>>>> but using different words.


    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient.

    False.-a It means that there are statements in the language of Q >>>>>>> that have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of the system. >>>>>>>

    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input

    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists that >>>>>>> meets the following requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of
    instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that computes >>>>>>> the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly >>>>>>> (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when executed >>>>>>> directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the
    first five minutes that this requirement was made.

    In other words, you don't understand that if this was algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.

    And still don't understand that this algorithm:


    void D(ptr *I)
    {
    -a-a-a-a ptr *X = D;
    -a-a-a-a ptr *Y = I;
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a if (result == 1) {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a while (1);
    -a-a-a-a }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting problem for the
    last 22 years.

    D(D); // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)
    Are you a complete jackass?
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 23:43:28 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:

    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of what it mean for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what a definition is. I've frequently asked him for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions and he invariably responds with an example >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or an analogy (assuming he responds at all). He >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't get that examples don't take the place of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions. Examples can be useful for clarifying >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions, but they aren't particularly useful on >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their own.

    Andr|-


    You want a definition look-it-up.

    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dictionary, this isn't really an option.

    Andr|-


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo X) // copyright >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o reo X)

    That claims what it means to have the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'true' (or at least it would if you defined AtomicFacts in >>>>>>>>>>>>>> a coherent way). It doesn't in any way clarify what you >>>>>>>>>>>>>> think it means for something to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did
    not bother to pay attention that is your mistake
    and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth >>>>>>>>>>>> value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.

    A valid answer would look something like this:

    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>> system when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F.

    Good.-a So when you say "The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) >>>>>>>>>> does not exist in Q", you mean "(reC x, S(x) rea x) is unprovable >>>>>>>>>> in Q", which is commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else >>>>>>>>>> but using different words.


    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient.

    False.-a It means that there are statements in the language of Q >>>>>>>> that have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of the
    system.


    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input

    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists that >>>>>>>> meets the following requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of
    instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that
    computes the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly >>>>>>>> (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when
    executed directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the
    first five minutes that this requirement was made.

    In other words, you don't understand that if this was algorithm H: >>>>>>

    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.

    And still don't understand that this algorithm:


    void D(ptr *I)
    {
    -a-a-a-a ptr *X = D;
    -a-a-a-a ptr *Y = I;
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a if (result == 1) {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a while (1);
    -a-a-a-a }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting problem for the
    last 22 years.

    D(D);-a-a // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)

    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm D contains
    a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 22:59:30 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:

    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of what it mean for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what a definition is. I've frequently asked him for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions and he invariably responds with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example or an analogy (assuming he responds at all). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> He doesn't get that examples don't take the place of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions. Examples can be useful for clarifying >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions, but they aren't particularly useful on >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their own.

    Andr|-


    You want a definition look-it-up.

    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dictionary, this isn't really an option.

    Andr|-


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo X) // copyright >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o reo X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That claims what it means to have the truth value 'true' >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (or at least it would if you defined AtomicFacts in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coherent way). It doesn't in any way clarify what you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think it means for something to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is your mistake
    and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>> value of a statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A valid answer would look something like this:

    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>> system when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F.

    Good.-a So when you say "The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) >>>>>>>>>>> does not exist in Q", you mean "(reC x, S(x) rea x) is unprovable >>>>>>>>>>> in Q", which is commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else >>>>>>>>>>> but using different words.


    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient.

    False.-a It means that there are statements in the language of Q >>>>>>>>> that have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of the >>>>>>>>> system.


    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input

    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists >>>>>>>>> that meets the following requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of
    instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that
    computes the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly >>>>>>>>> (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when
    executed directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the
    first five minutes that this requirement was made.

    In other words, you don't understand that if this was algorithm H: >>>>>>>

    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.

    And still don't understand that this algorithm:


    void D(ptr *I)
    {
    -a-a-a-a ptr *X = D;
    -a-a-a-a ptr *Y = I;
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a if (result == 1) {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a while (1);
    -a-a-a-a }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting problem for the
    last 22 years.

    D(D);-a-a // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)

    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm D contains
    a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 00:01:00 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:

    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of what it mean for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what a definition is. I've frequently asked him for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions and he invariably responds with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example or an analogy (assuming he responds at all). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> He doesn't get that examples don't take the place of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions. Examples can be useful for clarifying >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions, but they aren't particularly useful on >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their own.

    Andr|-


    You want a definition look-it-up.

    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dictionary, this isn't really an option.

    Andr|-


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo X) // copyright
    Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o reo X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That claims what it means to have the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'true' (or at least it would if you defined AtomicFacts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a coherent way). It doesn't in any way clarify what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you think it means for something to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>> value of a statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A valid answer would look something like this:

    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>> system when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F.

    Good.-a So when you say "The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) >>>>>>>>>>>> does not exist in Q", you mean "(reC x, S(x) rea x) is >>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable in Q", which is commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else >>>>>>>>>>>> but using different words.


    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient. >>>>>>>>>>
    False.-a It means that there are statements in the language of >>>>>>>>>> Q that have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of the >>>>>>>>>> system.


    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input

    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists >>>>>>>>>> that meets the following requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of
    instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that
    computes the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed >>>>>>>>>> directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when
    executed directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the
    first five minutes that this requirement was made.

    In other words, you don't understand that if this was algorithm H: >>>>>>>>

    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.

    And still don't understand that this algorithm:


    void D(ptr *I)
    {
    -a-a-a-a ptr *X = D;
    -a-a-a-a ptr *Y = I;
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a if (result == 1) {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a while (1);
    -a-a-a-a }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting problem for
    the last 22 years.

    D(D);-a-a // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)

    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm D
    contains a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.


    Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know the
    difference between an algorithm and a C function.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jul 1 23:03:57 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:

    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of what it mean for the truth value of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what a definition is. I've frequently asked him for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions and he invariably responds with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example or an analogy (assuming he responds at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> all). He doesn't get that examples don't take the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> place of definitions. Examples can be useful for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarifying definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own.

    Andr|-


    You want a definition look-it-up.

    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dictionary, this isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo X) // copyright
    Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o reo X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That claims what it means to have the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'true' (or at least it would if you defined AtomicFacts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a coherent way). It doesn't in any way clarify what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you think it means for something to not have a truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value.

    Andr|-


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A valid answer would look something like this:

    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F.

    Good.-a So when you say "The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) >>>>>>>>>>>>> does not exist in Q", you mean "(reC x, S(x) rea x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable in Q", which is commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone >>>>>>>>>>>>> else but using different words.


    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient. >>>>>>>>>>>
    False.-a It means that there are statements in the language of >>>>>>>>>>> Q that have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of >>>>>>>>>>> the system.


    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input

    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists >>>>>>>>>>> that meets the following requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of >>>>>>>>>>> instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that >>>>>>>>>>> computes the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed >>>>>>>>>>> directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when >>>>>>>>>>> executed directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the
    first five minutes that this requirement was made.

    In other words, you don't understand that if this was algorithm H: >>>>>>>>>

    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.

    And still don't understand that this algorithm:


    void D(ptr *I)
    {
    -a-a-a-a ptr *X = D;
    -a-a-a-a ptr *Y = I;
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a if (result == 1) {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a while (1);
    -a-a-a-a }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting problem for
    the last 22 years.

    D(D);-a-a // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)

    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm D
    contains a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.


    Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know the
    difference between an algorithm and a C function.


    Back to being ignored for trolling again.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 09:55:46 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 01/07/2026 18:16, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 30/06/2026 16:58, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
    On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:

    A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when
    it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
    PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz
    is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt
    with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x).

    That's surprising, disregard for axioms?

    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from
    ~reax x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~reax x=S(x) is
    ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.

    This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
    it means that ~reax x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q.

    It comes close. If reax x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but in the >>>>>>>> language of Q then ~reax x=S(x) and reax x=S(x) are both undecidable >>>>>>>> and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean.

    Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make
    Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
    defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to
    its intended purpose. A car without an engine is
    incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.

    Irrelevant. The definition of completeness

    It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies)
    that something is missing that could be added to make
    it complete.

    It does mean that something is missing that could be added to
    enabe a proof of an unprovable sentence.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) allows that.
    It never was incomplete. It always did what it was defined to do.
    When Q is extended to become PA it stops being Q and becomes PA.

    However, there are theories that reamain incomplete even when
    more postolates are added, as long as there is a way to know
    which sentences are included in the added postulates. Important
    examples include Peano arithmetic and ZFC set theory.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) seems to be essentially a cheat.
    When we ask what is grounded in an atomic base of Q and we
    add axioms to Q to become PA we cheated in that we changed
    the original question rather than answered it.

    Yes, in a sense. But sometimes it is better to have a partial answer
    rather than no answer at all. Of course Q with any additional
    postulate is not Q but if the additional postulates are true about
    natural numbers then the strengthened theory is still a theory of
    natural numbers. PA is one such strengthened Q but still incomplete
    and can be strengthened further.
    --
    Mikko

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 09:57:04 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of what it mean for the truth value of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what a definition is. I've frequently asked him >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for definitions and he invariably responds with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example or an analogy (assuming he responds at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> all). He doesn't get that examples don't take the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> place of definitions. Examples can be useful for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarifying definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own.

    Andr|-


    You want a definition look-it-up.

    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English dictionary, this isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo X) // copyright
    Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o reo X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That claims what it means to have the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'true' (or at least it would if you defined >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It doesn't in any way >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarify what you think it means for something to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have a truth value.

    Andr|-


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F.

    Good.-a So when you say "The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) >>>>>>>>>>>>>> does not exist in Q", you mean "(reC x, S(x) rea x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable in Q", which is commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone >>>>>>>>>>>>>> else but using different words.


    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable >>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient. >>>>>>>>>>>>
    False.-a It means that there are statements in the language >>>>>>>>>>>> of Q that have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms >>>>>>>>>>>> of the system.


    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input

    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists >>>>>>>>>>>> that meets the following requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of >>>>>>>>>>>> instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that >>>>>>>>>>>> computes the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed >>>>>>>>>>>> directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when >>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2. >>>>>>>>>>>
    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the
    first five minutes that this requirement was made.

    In other words, you don't understand that if this was
    algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.

    And still don't understand that this algorithm:


    void D(ptr *I)
    {
    -a-a-a-a ptr *X = D;
    -a-a-a-a ptr *Y = I;
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a if (result == 1) {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a while (1);
    -a-a-a-a }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting problem for >>>>>> the last 22 years.

    D(D);-a-a // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)

    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm D
    contains a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.


    Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know the
    difference between an algorithm and a C function.


    Back to being ignored for trolling again.

    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored by everone.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,sci.math,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 09:49:14 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/2/2026 1:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 01/07/2026 18:16, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 30/06/2026 16:58, olcott wrote:
    On 6/30/2026 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
    On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
    On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:

    A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when
    it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
    PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz
    is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt
    with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x). >>>>>>>>>>>
    That's surprising, disregard for axioms?

    If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from
    ~reax x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~reax x=S(x) is
    ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.

    This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
    it means that ~reax x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q.

    It comes close. If reax x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but in the >>>>>>>>> language of Q then ~reax x=S(x) and reax x=S(x) are both undecidable >>>>>>>>> and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean.

    Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make
    Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
    defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to
    its intended purpose. A car without an engine is
    incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.

    Irrelevant. The definition of completeness

    It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies)
    that something is missing that could be added to make
    it complete.

    It does mean that something is missing that could be added to
    enabe a proof of an unprovable sentence.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) allows that.
    It never was incomplete. It always did what it was defined to do.
    When Q is extended to become PA it stops being Q and becomes PA.

    However, there are theories that reamain incomplete even when
    more postolates are added, as long as there is a way to know
    which sentences are included in the added postulates. Important
    examples include Peano arithmetic and ZFC set theory.

    Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) seems to be essentially a cheat.
    When we ask what is grounded in an atomic base of Q and we
    add axioms to Q to become PA we cheated in that we changed
    the original question rather than answered it.

    Yes, in a sense. But sometimes it is better to have a partial answer
    rather than no answer at all. Of course Q with any additional
    postulate is not Q but if the additional postulates are true about
    natural numbers then the strengthened theory is still a theory of
    natural numbers. PA is one such strengthened Q but still incomplete
    and can be strengthened further.


    Is (reC x, S(x) rea x) provable or refutable in Q?
    Yes if you cheat, no if you don't cheat.

    One cannot properly study math and logic without
    looking at them through computation because
    computation requires things that math and logic
    incorrectly assume away.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 09:51:24 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of what it mean for the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of a statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understands what a definition is. I've frequently >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asked him for definitions and he invariably >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> responds with an example or an analogy (assuming >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he responds at all). He doesn't get that examples >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't take the place of definitions. Examples can >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be useful for clarifying definitions, but they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> aren't particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    You want a definition look-it-up.

    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English dictionary, this isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo X) // copyright
    Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o reo X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That claims what it means to have the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'true' (or at least it would if you defined >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It doesn't in any way >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarify what you think it means for something to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have a truth value.

    Andr|-


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system.

    A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F.

    Good.-a So when you say "The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> x) does not exist in Q", you mean "(reC x, S(x) rea x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable in Q", which is commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> else but using different words.


    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable >>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
    False.-a It means that there are statements in the language >>>>>>>>>>>>> of Q that have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms >>>>>>>>>>>>> of the system.


    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input

    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists >>>>>>>>>>>>> that meets the following requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of >>>>>>>>>>>>> instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that >>>>>>>>>>>>> computes the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed >>>>>>>>>>>>> directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when >>>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2. >>>>>>>>>>>>
    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see >>>>>>>>>>>> that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt >>>>>>>>>>>> status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H >>>>>>>>>>>> reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the >>>>>>>>>>>> first five minutes that this requirement was made.

    In other words, you don't understand that if this was
    algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.

    And still don't understand that this algorithm:


    void D(ptr *I)
    {
    -a-a-a-a ptr *X = D;
    -a-a-a-a ptr *Y = I;
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a if (result == 1) {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a while (1);
    -a-a-a-a }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting problem for >>>>>>> the last 22 years.

    D(D);-a-a // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)

    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm D
    contains a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.


    Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know the
    difference between an algorithm and a C function.


    Back to being ignored for trolling again.

    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored by everone.


    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 12:04:44 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    The same thing as: "cats are animals" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of what it mean for the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of a statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understands what a definition is. I've >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently asked him for definitions and he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> invariably responds with an example or an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy (assuming he responds at all). He >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't get that examples don't take the place >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of definitions. Examples can be useful for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarifying definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English dictionary, this isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo X) // copyright
    Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o reo X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That claims what it means to have the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'true' (or at least it would if you defined >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It doesn't in any >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> way clarify what you think it means for something to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not have a truth value.

    Andr|-


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system.

    A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F.

    Good.-a So when you say "The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> x) does not exist in Q", you mean "(reC x, S(x) rea x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable in Q", which is commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> else but using different words.


    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    False.-a It means that there are statements in the language >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of Q that have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the system.


    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input

    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H >>>>>>>>>>>>>> exists that meets the following requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> computes the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed >>>>>>>>>>>>>> directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when >>>>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>> to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see >>>>>>>>>>>>> that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt >>>>>>>>>>>>> status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H >>>>>>>>>>>>> reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the >>>>>>>>>>>>> first five minutes that this requirement was made.

    In other words, you don't understand that if this was >>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.

    And still don't understand that this algorithm:


    void D(ptr *I)
    {
    -a-a-a-a ptr *X = D;
    -a-a-a-a ptr *Y = I;
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a if (result == 1) {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a while (1);
    -a-a-a-a }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting problem >>>>>>>> for the last 22 years.

    D(D);-a-a // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)

    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm D
    contains a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.


    Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know the
    difference between an algorithm and a C function.


    Back to being ignored for trolling again.

    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored by everone.


    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?


    It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be a halt
    decider, and another algorithm built by the template that the first one answers wrong.

    If you disagree, explain in detail why.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 11:52:12 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    The same thing as: "cats are animals" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of what it mean for the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of a statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understands what a definition is. I've >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently asked him for definitions and he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> invariably responds with an example or an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy (assuming he responds at all). He >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't get that examples don't take the place >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of definitions. Examples can be useful for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarifying definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English dictionary, this isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo X) // >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> copyright Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o reo X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That claims what it means to have the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'true' (or at least it would if you defined >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It doesn't in any >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> way clarify what you think it means for something >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to not have a truth value.

    Andr|-


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system.

    A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F.

    Good.-a So when you say "The truth value of (reC x, S(x) rea >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> x) does not exist in Q", you mean "(reC x, S(x) rea x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable in Q", which is commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> else but using different words.


    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    False.-a It means that there are statements in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language of Q that have *only* an infinite connection to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the axioms of the system.


    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input

    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exists that meets the following requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> computes the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt >>>>>>>>>>>>>> status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H >>>>>>>>>>>>>> reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> first five minutes that this requirement was made.

    In other words, you don't understand that if this was >>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.

    And still don't understand that this algorithm:


    void D(ptr *I)
    {
    -a-a-a-a ptr *X = D;
    -a-a-a-a ptr *Y = I;
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a if (result == 1) {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a while (1);
    -a-a-a-a }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting problem >>>>>>>>> for the last 22 years.

    D(D);-a-a // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)

    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm D
    contains a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.


    Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know the
    difference between an algorithm and a C function.


    Back to being ignored for trolling again.

    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored by everone.


    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?


    It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be a halt
    decider,

    Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input.

    Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify.

    I will not respond to any of your future posts that
    are very stupid. Say something smart or you will be
    ignored from now on.

    and another algorithm built by the template that the first one
    answers wrong.

    If you disagree, explain in detail why.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 12:55:14 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    The same thing as: "cats are animals" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of what it mean for the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value of a statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system.

    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understands what a definition is. I've >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently asked him for definitions and he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> invariably responds with an example or an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy (assuming he responds at all). He >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't get that examples don't take the place >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of definitions. Examples can be useful for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarifying definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English dictionary, this isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo X) // >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> copyright Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o reo X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That claims what it means to have the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'true' (or at least it would if you defined >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It doesn't in any >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> way clarify what you think it means for something >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to not have a truth value.

    Andr|-


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system.

    A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Good.-a So when you say "The truth value of (reC x, S(x) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rea x) does not exist in Q", you mean "(reC x, S(x) rea x) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is unprovable in Q", which is commonly known. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    So once again, you're saying the same thing as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> everyone else but using different words.


    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    False.-a It means that there are statements in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language of Q that have *only* an infinite connection to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the axioms of the system.


    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input

    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exists that meets the following requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> instructions) X described as <X> with input Y: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> computes the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first five minutes that this requirement was made. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    In other words, you don't understand that if this was >>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.

    And still don't understand that this algorithm:


    void D(ptr *I)
    {
    -a-a-a-a ptr *X = D;
    -a-a-a-a ptr *Y = I;
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a if (result == 1) {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a while (1);
    -a-a-a-a }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting problem >>>>>>>>>> for the last 22 years.

    D(D);-a-a // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)

    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm D >>>>>>>> contains a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.


    Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know the
    difference between an algorithm and a C function.


    Back to being ignored for trolling again.

    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored by everone.


    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?


    It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be a halt decider,

    Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input.

    Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to map all inputs
    to non-halting.


    Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify.

    Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what algorithm D
    does, as per the design of algorithm D.


    I will not respond to any of your future posts that
    are very stupid. Say something smart or you will be
    ignored from now on.

    and another algorithm built by the template that the first one answers
    wrong.

    If you disagree, explain in detail why.



    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 13:13:43 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    The same thing as: "cats are animals" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of what it mean for the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value of a statement to not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system.

    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understands what a definition is. I've >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently asked him for definitions and he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> invariably responds with an example or an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy (assuming he responds at all). He >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't get that examples don't take the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> place of definitions. Examples can be useful >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for clarifying definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English dictionary, this isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo X) // >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> copyright Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o reo X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That claims what it means to have the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'true' (or at least it would if you defined >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It doesn't in any >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> way clarify what you think it means for something >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to not have a truth value.

    Andr|-


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth value of a statement to not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system.

    A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Good.-a So when you say "The truth value of (reC x, S(x) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rea x) does not exist in Q", you mean "(reC x, S(x) rea x) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is unprovable in Q", which is commonly known. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    So once again, you're saying the same thing as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> everyone else but using different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    False.-a It means that there are statements in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language of Q that have *only* an infinite connection >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to the axioms of the system.


    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input

    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exists that meets the following requirements: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> instructions) X described as <X> with input Y: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that computes the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when executed directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first five minutes that this requirement was made. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    In other words, you don't understand that if this was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.

    And still don't understand that this algorithm:


    void D(ptr *I)
    {
    -a-a-a-a ptr *X = D;
    -a-a-a-a ptr *Y = I;
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a if (result == 1) {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a while (1);
    -a-a-a-a }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting problem >>>>>>>>>>> for the last 22 years.

    D(D);-a-a // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)

    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm D >>>>>>>>> contains a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.


    Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know the >>>>>>> difference between an algorithm and a C function.


    Back to being ignored for trolling again.

    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored by everone. >>>>>

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?


    It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be a halt
    decider,

    Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input.

    Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to map all inputs
    to non-halting.


    Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify.

    Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what algorithm D
    does, as per the design of algorithm D.


    I am trying to keep liars from killing the
    whole fucking planet by making truth computable
    and you act like this is a fucking joke to be
    trolled.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 14:22:46 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    The same thing as: "cats are animals" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of what it mean for the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value of a statement to not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system.

    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understands what a definition is. I've >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently asked him for definitions and he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> invariably responds with an example or an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy (assuming he responds at all). He >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't get that examples don't take the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> place of definitions. Examples can be useful >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for clarifying definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English dictionary, this isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo X) // >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> copyright Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o reo X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That claims what it means to have the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value 'true' (or at least it would if you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't in any way clarify what you think it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means for something to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth value of a statement to not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system.

    A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a formal system when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Good.-a So when you say "The truth value of (reC x, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q", you mean "(reC x, S(x) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rea x) is unprovable in Q", which is commonly known. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    So once again, you're saying the same thing as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> everyone else but using different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deficient.

    False.-a It means that there are statements in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language of Q that have *only* an infinite connection >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to the axioms of the system.


    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exists that meets the following requirements: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of instructions) X described as <X> with input Y: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that computes the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when executed directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first five minutes that this requirement was made. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    In other words, you don't understand that if this was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.

    And still don't understand that this algorithm:


    void D(ptr *I)
    {
    -a-a-a-a ptr *X = D;
    -a-a-a-a ptr *Y = I;
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a if (result == 1) {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a while (1);
    -a-a-a-a }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting >>>>>>>>>>>> problem for the last 22 years.

    D(D);-a-a // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)

    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm D >>>>>>>>>> contains a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.


    Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know the >>>>>>>> difference between an algorithm and a C function.


    Back to being ignored for trolling again.

    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored by everone. >>>>>>

    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?


    It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be a halt
    decider,

    Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input.

    Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to map all inputs
    to non-halting.


    Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify.

    Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what algorithm D
    does, as per the design of algorithm D.


    I am trying to keep liars from killing the
    whole fucking planet by making truth computable

    Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi and others.

    and you act like this is a fucking joke to be
    trolled.

    That you don't understand my explanations for why you're wrong doesn't
    mean I'm trolling.

    It is amusing however how you claim to be working so hard against liars
    when you've demonstrated yourself to be as much of a liar if not more
    that the people you say you're fighting against.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 14:33:57 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    The same thing as: "cats are animals" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a definition of what it mean for the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value of a statement to not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system.

    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understands what a definition is. I've >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently asked him for definitions and he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> invariably responds with an example or an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy (assuming he responds at all). He >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't get that examples don't take the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> place of definitions. Examples can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for clarifying definitions, but they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> aren't particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English dictionary, this isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo X) // >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> copyright Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this

    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o reo X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That claims what it means to have the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value 'true' (or at least it would if you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't in any way clarify what you think it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means for something to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth value of a statement to not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system.

    A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "The truth value of a statement does not exist in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a formal system when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Good.-a So when you say "The truth value of (reC x, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q", you mean "(reC x, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> S(x) rea x) is unprovable in Q", which is commonly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> everyone else but using different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deficient.

    False.-a It means that there are statements in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language of Q that have *only* an infinite connection >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to the axioms of the system.


    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exists that meets the following requirements: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of instructions) X described as <X> with input Y: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that computes the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when executed directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first five minutes that this requirement was made. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    In other words, you don't understand that if this was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.

    And still don't understand that this algorithm:


    void D(ptr *I)
    {
    -a-a-a-a ptr *X = D;
    -a-a-a-a ptr *Y = I;
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a if (result == 1) {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a while (1);
    -a-a-a-a }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting >>>>>>>>>>>>> problem for the last 22 years.

    D(D);-a-a // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)

    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm >>>>>>>>>>> D contains a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.


    Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know the >>>>>>>>> difference between an algorithm and a C function.


    Back to being ignored for trolling again.

    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored by
    everone.


    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?


    It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be a halt
    decider,

    Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input.

    Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to map all
    inputs to non-halting.


    Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify.

    Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what algorithm D
    does, as per the design of algorithm D.


    I am trying to keep liars from killing the
    whole fucking planet by making truth computable

    Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi and others.


    By proving the errors in logic I can make
    logic into correct reasoning. That most
    logic people are a herd of sheep that would
    gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
    what their herd accepts makes correcting this
    error too fucking difficult.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 15:52:46 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/2/2026 3:33 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    The same thing as: "cats are animals" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed in
    English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a definition of what it mean for the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value of a statement to not exist >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understands what a definition is. I've >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently asked him for definitions and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he invariably responds with an example or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an analogy (assuming he responds at all). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> He doesn't get that examples don't take >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the place of definitions. Examples can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for clarifying definitions, but >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they aren't particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Until someone publishes an Olcott to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Standard English dictionary, this isn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> really an option.

    Andr|-


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo X) //
    copyright Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o reo X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That claims what it means to have the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value 'true' (or at least it would if you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't in any way clarify what you think it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means for something to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth value of a statement to not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system.

    A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "The truth value of a statement does not exist >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a formal system when ..."

    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Good.-a So when you say "The truth value of (reC x, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q", you mean "(reC x, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> S(x) rea x) is unprovable in Q", which is commonly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> everyone else but using different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deficient.

    False.-a It means that there are statements in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language of Q that have *only* an infinite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connection to the axioms of the system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exists that meets the following requirements: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of instructions) X described as <X> with input Y: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that computes the following mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when executed directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first five minutes that this requirement was made. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    In other words, you don't understand that if this was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.

    And still don't understand that this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    void D(ptr *I)
    {
    -a-a-a-a ptr *X = D;
    -a-a-a-a ptr *Y = I;
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a if (result == 1) {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a while (1);
    -a-a-a-a }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting >>>>>>>>>>>>>> problem for the last 22 years.

    D(D);-a-a // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)

    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm >>>>>>>>>>>> D contains a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite. >>>>>>>>>>>
    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.


    Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know >>>>>>>>>> the difference between an algorithm and a C function.


    Back to being ignored for trolling again.

    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored by
    everone.


    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?


    It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be a halt
    decider,

    Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input.

    Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to map all
    inputs to non-halting.


    Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify.

    Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what algorithm D
    does, as per the design of algorithm D.


    Still no reply to this, so I have to assume you agree it's correct.


    I am trying to keep liars from killing the
    whole fucking planet by making truth computable

    Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi and others.


    By proving the errors in logic I can make
    logic into correct reasoning. That most
    logic people are a herd of sheep that would
    gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
    what their herd accepts makes correcting this
    error too fucking difficult.

    There is no error. The POE follows from a series of truth preserving operations starting with the precondition that a contradiction has been
    proven true in the system in question.

    You agreed with this when you dishonestly dodged the question (on
    multiple occasions) of how P can be true and P re? Q can be false.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 15:53:02 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/2/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:33 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    The same thing as: "cats are animals" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for a definition of what it mean for the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value of a statement to not exist >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understands what a definition is. I've >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently asked him for definitions and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he invariably responds with an example or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an analogy (assuming he responds at all). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> He doesn't get that examples don't take >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the place of definitions. Examples can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for clarifying definitions, but >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they aren't particularly useful on their >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> own.

    Andr|-


    You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Until someone publishes an Olcott to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Standard English dictionary, this isn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> really an option.

    Andr|-


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo X) //
    copyright Olcott 2018
    has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o reo X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That claims what it means to have the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value 'true' (or at least it would if you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't in any way clarify what you think it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means for something to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    When I define a term hundreds of times and you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> did
    not bother to pay attention that is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the truth value of a statement to not exist >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a formal system.

    A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "The truth value of a statement does not exist >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a formal system when ..." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Good.-a So when you say "The truth value of (reC x, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q", you mean "(reC x, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> S(x) rea x) is unprovable in Q", which is commonly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> everyone else but using different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deficient.

    False.-a It means that there are statements in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language of Q that have *only* an infinite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connection to the axioms of the system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> H exists that meets the following requirements: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence of instructions) X described as <X> with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that computes the following mapping: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when executed directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first five minutes that this requirement was made. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    In other words, you don't understand that if this was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.

    And still don't understand that this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    void D(ptr *I)
    {
    -a-a-a-a ptr *X = D;
    -a-a-a-a ptr *Y = I;
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a if (result == 1) {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a while (1);
    -a-a-a-a }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> problem for the last 22 years.

    D(D);-a-a // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D) >>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because
    algorithm D contains a copy of algorithm H and does the >>>>>>>>>>>>> opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.


    Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know >>>>>>>>>>> the difference between an algorithm and a C function.


    Back to being ignored for trolling again.

    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored by >>>>>>>>> everone.


    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?


    It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be a halt >>>>>>> decider,

    Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input.

    Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to map all
    inputs to non-halting.


    Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify.

    Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what algorithm
    D does, as per the design of algorithm D.


    Still no reply to this, so I have to assume you agree it's correct.


    I am trying to keep liars from killing the
    whole fucking planet by making truth computable

    Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi and others.


    By proving the errors in logic I can make
    logic into correct reasoning. That most
    logic people are a herd of sheep that would
    gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
    what their herd accepts makes correcting this
    error too fucking difficult.

    There is no error.-a The POE follows from a series of truth preserving operations

    To say this objectively classical logic is objectively incorrect
    when it diverges from what correct reasoning would be while
    retaining the full English semantics of the terms.

    (P reo -4P) reo Q is ridiculously stupid when we plug English
    sentences in for P and Q and use semantic entailment in English
    as the measure of correct reasoning.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 16:54:47 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/2/2026 4:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:33 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    The same thing as: "cats are animals" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Chinese.

    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for a definition of what it mean for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth value of a statement to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understands what a definition is. I've >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently asked him for definitions and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he invariably responds with an example >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or an analogy (assuming he responds at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> all). He doesn't get that examples don't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> take the place of definitions. Examples >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can be useful for clarifying >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Until someone publishes an Olcott to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Standard English dictionary, this isn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> really an option.

    Andr|-


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo X) //
    copyright Olcott 2018 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o reo X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That claims what it means to have the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value 'true' (or at least it would if you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't in any way clarify what you think it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means for something to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    When I define a term hundreds of times and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you did
    not bother to pay attention that is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the truth value of a statement to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system.

    A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "The truth value of a statement does not exist >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a formal system when ..." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Now complete the sentence.

    It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Good.-a So when you say "The truth value of (reC x, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q", you mean "(reC x, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> S(x) rea x) is unprovable in Q", which is commonly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> everyone else but using different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deficient.

    False.-a It means that there are statements in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language of Q that have *only* an infinite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connection to the axioms of the system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> H exists that meets the following requirements: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence of instructions) X described as <X> with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> H that computes the following mapping: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halt when executed directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not immediately >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> see
    that the requirement for H to correctly report the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first five minutes that this requirement was made. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    In other words, you don't understand that if this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> was algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And still don't understand that this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    void D(ptr *I)
    {
    -a-a-a-a ptr *X = D;
    -a-a-a-a ptr *Y = I;
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a if (result == 1) {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a while (1);
    -a-a-a-a }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> problem for the last 22 years.

    D(D);-a-a // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because >>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D contains a copy of algorithm H and does the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.


    Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know >>>>>>>>>>>> the difference between an algorithm and a C function.


    Back to being ignored for trolling again.

    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored by >>>>>>>>>> everone.


    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?


    It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be a halt >>>>>>>> decider,

    Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input.

    Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to map all
    inputs to non-halting.


    Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify.

    Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what algorithm >>>>>> D does, as per the design of algorithm D.


    Still no reply to this, so I have to assume you agree it's correct.


    I am trying to keep liars from killing the
    whole fucking planet by making truth computable

    Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi and others.


    By proving the errors in logic I can make
    logic into correct reasoning. That most
    logic people are a herd of sheep that would
    gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
    what their herd accepts makes correcting this
    error too fucking difficult.

    There is no error.-a The POE follows from a series of truth preserving
    operations

    To say this objectively classical logic is objectively incorrect
    when it diverges from what correct reasoning would be while
    retaining the full English semantics of the terms.

    (P reo -4P) reo Q-a is ridiculously stupid when we plug English
    sentences in for P and Q and use semantic entailment in English
    as the measure of correct reasoning.




    We already did that and you got confused, calling it a mind game (see
    below):

    On 6/28/2026 11:56 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 11:34 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 11:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 9:02 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 9:53 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 9:49 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 8:42 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 9:40 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/27/2026 8:29 PM, dbush wrote:
    Given that the following natural language statement is true:

    --------------------------------------
    Earth is the third planet from the sun.
    --------------------------------------

    In the following natural language statement:

    --------------------------------------
    At least one of the following statements is true:
    - Earth is the third planet from the sun.
    - <X>
    --------------------------------------

    Given that <X> is any *truth bearing* natural language statement,
    does there exist a statement X such that the condition "At least one
    of the following statements is true" is false?


    Head games will be ignored.


    Explain in detail how this is a head game.

    Failure to either answer the above question or explain how it is a
    head game in your next reply or within one hour of you next post in
    this newsgroup will be taken as your official, on-the-record admission
    that Disjunction introduction is in fact truth preserving and valid,
    and therefore so is the Principle of Explosion.


    Let the record show that Peter Olcott made the following post in this newsgroup:

    On 6/28/2026 10:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make
    Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
    defined to do.
    ...

    And more that one hour has passed with no attempt to answer the above question or explain why it is a head game. Therefore, as per the above criteria:

    Let The Record Show

    That Peter Olcott

    Has *Officially* Admitted:

    That Disjunction introduction is in fact truth preserving and valid, and therefore so is the Principle of Explosion.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 16:12:05 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/2/2026 3:54 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:33 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    The same thing as: "cats are animals" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Chinese.

    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for a definition of what it mean for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth value of a statement to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understands what a definition is. I've >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently asked him for definitions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and he invariably responds with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example or an analogy (assuming he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> responds at all). He doesn't get that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> examples don't take the place of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions. Examples can be useful for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarifying definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Until someone publishes an Olcott to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Standard English dictionary, this isn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo X) //
    copyright Olcott 2018 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o reo X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That claims what it means to have the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value 'true' (or at least it would if you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't in any way clarify what you think >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it means for something to not have a truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value.

    Andr|-


    When I define a term hundreds of times and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you did
    not bother to pay attention that is your >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mistake
    and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the truth value of a statement to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "The truth value of a statement does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system when ..." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Now complete the sentence. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Good.-a So when you say "The truth value of (reC >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q", you mean "(reC >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> x, S(x) rea x) is unprovable in Q", which is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> everyone else but using different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Not really. It is normally thought of as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deficient.

    False.-a It means that there are statements in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language of Q that have *only* an infinite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connection to the axioms of the system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which starts with the assumption that an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H exists that meets the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence of instructions) X described as <X> with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> H that computes the following mapping: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halt when executed directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly report the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement within >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
    first five minutes that this requirement was made. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    In other words, you don't understand that if this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> was algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And still don't understand that this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    void D(ptr *I)
    {
    -a-a-a-a ptr *X = D;
    -a-a-a-a ptr *Y = I;
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a if (result == 1) {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a while (1);
    -a-a-a-a }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> problem for the last 22 years.

    D(D);-a-a // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D contains a copy of algorithm H and does the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know >>>>>>>>>>>>> the difference between an algorithm and a C function. >>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Back to being ignored for trolling again.

    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored by >>>>>>>>>>> everone.


    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?


    It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be a >>>>>>>>> halt decider,

    Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input.

    Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to map all >>>>>>> inputs to non-halting.


    Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify.

    Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what
    algorithm D does, as per the design of algorithm D.


    Still no reply to this, so I have to assume you agree it's correct.


    I am trying to keep liars from killing the
    whole fucking planet by making truth computable

    Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi and others. >>>>>

    By proving the errors in logic I can make
    logic into correct reasoning. That most
    logic people are a herd of sheep that would
    gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
    what their herd accepts makes correcting this
    error too fucking difficult.

    There is no error.-a The POE follows from a series of truth preserving
    operations

    To say this objectively classical logic is objectively incorrect
    when it diverges from what correct reasoning would be while
    retaining the full English semantics of the terms.

    (P reo -4P) reo Q-a is ridiculously stupid when we plug English
    sentences in for P and Q and use semantic entailment in English
    as the measure of correct reasoning.




    We already did that and you got confused, calling it a mind game (see below):

    The confusing part is how an intelligent person can
    accept POE as correct for more than sixty seconds.

    Every average third grader knows that a contradiction
    proves that at least one of the two sentences is false.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 17:23:22 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/2/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:54 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:33 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    The same thing as: "cats are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.-a I asked >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for a definition of what it mean for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth value of a statement to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I'm actually not convinced that Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understands what a definition is. I've >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently asked him for definitions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and he invariably responds with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example or an analogy (assuming he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> responds at all). He doesn't get that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> examples don't take the place of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions. Examples can be useful >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for clarifying definitions, but they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> aren't particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Until someone publishes an Olcott to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Standard English dictionary, this isn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo X) //
    copyright Olcott 2018 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o reo X)

    That claims what it means to have the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value 'true' (or at least it would >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if you defined AtomicFacts in a coherent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> way). It doesn't in any way clarify what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you think it means for something to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    When I define a term hundreds of times and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you did
    not bother to pay attention that is your >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mistake
    and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it means >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the truth value of a statement to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "The truth value of a statement does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system when ..." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Now complete the sentence. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Good.-a So when you say "The truth value of (reC >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q", you mean >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "(reC x, S(x) rea x) is unprovable in Q", which is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> everyone else but using different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Not really. It is normally thought of as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deficient.

    False.-a It means that there are statements in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the language of Q that have *only* an infinite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connection to the axioms of the system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which starts with the assumption that an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H exists that meets the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence of instructions) X described as <X> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H that computes the following mapping: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halt when executed directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly report >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> within the
    first five minutes that this requirement was made. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    In other words, you don't understand that if this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> was algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And still don't understand that this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    void D(ptr *I)
    {
    -a-a-a-a ptr *X = D;
    -a-a-a-a ptr *Y = I;
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a if (result == 1) {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a while (1);
    -a-a-a-a }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> problem for the last 22 years.

    D(D);-a-a // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D contains a copy of algorithm H and does the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't >>>>>>>>>>>>>> know the difference between an algorithm and a C function. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Back to being ignored for trolling again.

    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored by >>>>>>>>>>>> everone.


    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?


    It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be a >>>>>>>>>> halt decider,

    Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input.

    Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to map all >>>>>>>> inputs to non-halting.


    Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify.

    Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what
    algorithm D does, as per the design of algorithm D.


    Still no reply to this, so I have to assume you agree it's correct.


    I am trying to keep liars from killing the
    whole fucking planet by making truth computable

    Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi and others. >>>>>>

    By proving the errors in logic I can make
    logic into correct reasoning. That most
    logic people are a herd of sheep that would
    gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
    what their herd accepts makes correcting this
    error too fucking difficult.

    There is no error.-a The POE follows from a series of truth
    preserving operations

    To say this objectively classical logic is objectively incorrect
    when it diverges from what correct reasoning would be while
    retaining the full English semantics of the terms.

    (P reo -4P) reo Q-a is ridiculously stupid when we plug English
    sentences in for P and Q and use semantic entailment in English
    as the measure of correct reasoning.




    We already did that and you got confused, calling it a mind game (see
    below):

    The confusing part is how an intelligent person can
    accept POE as correct for more than sixty seconds.

    Every average third grader knows that a contradiction
    States that both a statement and its negation are true. And if a formal system can reach a contradiction through a series of truth preserving operations from its axioms, that means both statements are proven true.

    From *there*, the principle of explosion is applied, demonstrating that
    the system that proved the contradiction is useless.


    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 16:40:36 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/2/2026 4:23 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:54 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:33 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    The same thing as: "cats are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.-a I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asked for a definition of what it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I'm actually not convinced that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott understands what a definition >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is. I've frequently asked him for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions and he invariably >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> responds with an example or an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy (assuming he responds at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> all). He doesn't get that examples >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't take the place of definitions. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Examples can be useful for clarifying >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Until someone publishes an Olcott to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Standard English dictionary, this isn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> X) // copyright Olcott 2018 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o reo X)

    That claims what it means to have the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value 'true' (or at least it would >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if you defined AtomicFacts in a coherent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> way). It doesn't in any way clarify what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you think it means for something to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    When I define a term hundreds of times and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you did
    not bother to pay attention that is your >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mistake
    and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means for the truth value of a statement to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "The truth value of a statement does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system when ..." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Now complete the sentence. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Good.-a So when you say "The truth value of (reC >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q", you mean >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "(reC x, S(x) rea x) is unprovable in Q", which >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is commonly known.

    So once again, you're saying the same thing >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as everyone else but using different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Not really. It is normally thought of as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deficient.

    False.-a It means that there are statements in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the language of Q that have *only* an infinite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connection to the axioms of the system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which starts with the assumption that an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H exists that meets the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence of instructions) X described as <X> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H that computes the following mapping: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halt when executed directly


    Sure and we could equally start with the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly report >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> within the
    first five minutes that this requirement was made. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    In other words, you don't understand that if this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> was algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And still don't understand that this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    void D(ptr *I)
    {
    -a-a-a-a ptr *X = D;
    -a-a-a-a ptr *Y = I;
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a if (result == 1) {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a while (1);
    -a-a-a-a }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> problem for the last 22 years.

    D(D);-a-a // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D contains a copy of algorithm H and does the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know the difference between an algorithm and a C function. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Back to being ignored for trolling again.

    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored >>>>>>>>>>>>> by everone.


    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?


    It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be a >>>>>>>>>>> halt decider,

    Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input. >>>>>>>>>
    Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to map all >>>>>>>>> inputs to non-halting.


    Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify.

    Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what
    algorithm D does, as per the design of algorithm D.


    Still no reply to this, so I have to assume you agree it's correct.


    I am trying to keep liars from killing the
    whole fucking planet by making truth computable

    Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi and others. >>>>>>>

    By proving the errors in logic I can make
    logic into correct reasoning. That most
    logic people are a herd of sheep that would
    gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
    what their herd accepts makes correcting this
    error too fucking difficult.

    There is no error.-a The POE follows from a series of truth
    preserving operations

    To say this objectively classical logic is objectively incorrect
    when it diverges from what correct reasoning would be while
    retaining the full English semantics of the terms.

    (P reo -4P) reo Q-a is ridiculously stupid when we plug English
    sentences in for P and Q and use semantic entailment in English
    as the measure of correct reasoning.




    We already did that and you got confused, calling it a mind game (see
    below):

    The confusing part is how an intelligent person can
    accept POE as correct for more than sixty seconds.

    Every average third grader knows that a contradiction
    States that both a statement and its negation are true.-a And if a formal system can reach a contradiction through a series of truth preserving operations from its axioms, that means both statements are proven true.


    Every third grader knows that it must have fucked up somewhere.

    The conclusion that most all logicians are despicable liars
    seems implausible so what is left? INDOCTRINATION !!!

    From *there*, the principle of explosion is applied, demonstrating that
    the system that proved the contradiction is useless.


    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 17:59:45 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/2/2026 5:40 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:23 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:54 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:33 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    The same thing as: "cats are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.-a I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asked for a definition of what it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I'm actually not convinced that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott understands what a definition >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is. I've frequently asked him for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions and he invariably >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> responds with an example or an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy (assuming he responds at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> all). He doesn't get that examples >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't take the place of definitions. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Examples can be useful for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarifying definitions, but they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> aren't particularly useful on their >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> own.

    Andr|- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Until someone publishes an Olcott to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Standard English dictionary, this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo
    X) // copyright Olcott 2018 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o reo X)

    That claims what it means to have the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value 'true' (or at least it would >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if you defined AtomicFacts in a coherent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> way). It doesn't in any way clarify what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you think it means for something to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    When I define a term hundreds of times >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and you did
    not bother to pay attention that is your >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mistake
    and your fault.


    You gave no such definition of what it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means for the truth value of a statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A valid answer would look something like >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this:

    "The truth value of a statement does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system when ..." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Now complete the sentence. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Good.-a So when you say "The truth value of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q", you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean "(reC x, S(x) rea x) is unprovable in Q", >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which is commonly known. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    So once again, you're saying the same thing >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as everyone else but using different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Not really. It is normally thought of as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is deficient.

    False.-a It means that there are statements in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the language of Q that have *only* an infinite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connection to the axioms of the system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which starts with the assumption that an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H exists that meets the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence of instructions) X described as <X> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H that computes the following mapping: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halt when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Sure and we could equally start with the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly report >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> within the
    first five minutes that this requirement was made. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    In other words, you don't understand that if >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this was algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And still don't understand that this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    void D(ptr *I)
    {
    -a-a-a-a ptr *X = D;
    -a-a-a-a ptr *Y = I;
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a if (result == 1) {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a while (1);
    -a-a-a-a }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halting problem for the last 22 years.

    D(D);-a-a // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D contains a copy of algorithm H and does >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know the difference between an algorithm and a C function. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Back to being ignored for trolling again.

    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored >>>>>>>>>>>>>> by everone.


    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?


    It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be a >>>>>>>>>>>> halt decider,

    Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input. >>>>>>>>>>
    Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to map >>>>>>>>>> all inputs to non-halting.


    Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify.

    Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what
    algorithm D does, as per the design of algorithm D.


    Still no reply to this, so I have to assume you agree it's correct. >>>>>>

    I am trying to keep liars from killing the
    whole fucking planet by making truth computable

    Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi and
    others.


    By proving the errors in logic I can make
    logic into correct reasoning. That most
    logic people are a herd of sheep that would
    gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
    what their herd accepts makes correcting this
    error too fucking difficult.

    There is no error.-a The POE follows from a series of truth
    preserving operations

    To say this objectively classical logic is objectively incorrect
    when it diverges from what correct reasoning would be while
    retaining the full English semantics of the terms.

    (P reo -4P) reo Q-a is ridiculously stupid when we plug English
    sentences in for P and Q and use semantic entailment in English
    as the measure of correct reasoning.




    We already did that and you got confused, calling it a mind game
    (see below):

    The confusing part is how an intelligent person can
    accept POE as correct for more than sixty seconds.

    Every average third grader knows that a contradiction
    States that both a statement and its negation are true.-a And if a
    formal system can reach a contradiction through a series of truth
    preserving operations from its axioms, that means both statements are
    proven true.


    Every third grader knows that it must have fucked up somewhere.

    Your intuition fails you. It just means that the axioms of the system
    in question are inconsistent. And the principle of explosion can be
    used to show that an inconsistent system is useless.



    The conclusion that most all logicians are despicable liars
    seems implausible so what is left?

    Simple. You're not smart enough to understand high school level logic,
    which you've demonstrated on countless occasions.



    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 17:13:44 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/2/2026 4:59 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:40 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:23 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:54 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:33 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    The same thing as: "cats are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.-a I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asked for a definition of what it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I'm actually not convinced that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott understands what a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition is. I've frequently >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asked him for definitions and he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> invariably responds with an example >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or an analogy (assuming he responds >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> at all). He doesn't get that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> examples don't take the place of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions. Examples can be useful >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for clarifying definitions, but >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they aren't particularly useful on >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Until someone publishes an Olcott to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Standard English dictionary, this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo
    X) // copyright Olcott 2018 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o reo X)

    That claims what it means to have the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value 'true' (or at least it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would if you defined AtomicFacts in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coherent way). It doesn't in any way >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarify what you think it means for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> something to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    When I define a term hundreds of times >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and you did
    not bother to pay attention that is your >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mistake
    and your fault. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    You gave no such definition of what it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means for the truth value of a statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A valid answer would look something like >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this:

    "The truth value of a statement does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system when ..." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Now complete the sentence. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Good.-a So when you say "The truth value of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q", you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean "(reC x, S(x) rea x) is unprovable in Q", >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which is commonly known. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    So once again, you're saying the same thing >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as everyone else but using different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Not really. It is normally thought of as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is deficient.

    False.-a It means that there are statements in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the language of Q that have *only* an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> infinite connection to the axioms of the system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which starts with the assumption that an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H exists that meets the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence of instructions) X described as <X> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H that computes the following mapping: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when executed directly
    (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not halt when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Sure and we could equally start with the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural number > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 3 and < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly report >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> within the
    first five minutes that this requirement was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> made.

    In other words, you don't understand that if >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this was algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And still don't understand that this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    void D(ptr *I)
    {
    -a-a-a-a ptr *X = D;
    -a-a-a-a ptr *Y = I;
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a if (result == 1) {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a while (1);
    -a-a-a-a }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halting problem for the last 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    D(D);-a-a // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D contains a copy of algorithm H and does >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know the difference between an algorithm and a C function. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Back to being ignored for trolling again.

    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by everone.


    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
    to show the halting problem counter-example?


    It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be a >>>>>>>>>>>>> halt decider,

    Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input. >>>>>>>>>>>
    Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to map >>>>>>>>>>> all inputs to non-halting.


    Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify.

    Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what >>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D does, as per the design of algorithm D.


    Still no reply to this, so I have to assume you agree it's correct. >>>>>>>

    I am trying to keep liars from killing the
    whole fucking planet by making truth computable

    Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi and >>>>>>>>> others.


    By proving the errors in logic I can make
    logic into correct reasoning. That most
    logic people are a herd of sheep that would
    gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
    what their herd accepts makes correcting this
    error too fucking difficult.

    There is no error.-a The POE follows from a series of truth
    preserving operations

    To say this objectively classical logic is objectively incorrect
    when it diverges from what correct reasoning would be while
    retaining the full English semantics of the terms.

    (P reo -4P) reo Q-a is ridiculously stupid when we plug English
    sentences in for P and Q and use semantic entailment in English
    as the measure of correct reasoning.




    We already did that and you got confused, calling it a mind game
    (see below):

    The confusing part is how an intelligent person can
    accept POE as correct for more than sixty seconds.

    Every average third grader knows that a contradiction
    States that both a statement and its negation are true.-a And if a
    formal system can reach a contradiction through a series of truth
    preserving operations from its axioms, that means both statements are
    proven true.


    Every third grader knows that it must have fucked up somewhere.

    Your intuition fails you.-a It just means that the axioms of the system
    in question are inconsistent.-a And the principle of explosion can be
    used to show that an inconsistent system is useless.


    It makes more sense to use the ordinary meaning
    of contradiction:

    When-so-ever two sentences contradict each other
    at least one of them is false.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 18:32:07 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/2/2026 6:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:59 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:40 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:23 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:54 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:33 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    The same thing as: "cats are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I didn't ask for an example.-a I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asked for a definition of what it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I'm actually not convinced that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott understands what a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition is. I've frequently >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asked him for definitions and he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> invariably responds with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example or an analogy (assuming he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> responds at all). He doesn't get >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that examples don't take the place >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of definitions. Examples can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for clarifying definitions, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but they aren't particularly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Until someone publishes an Olcott to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Standard English dictionary, this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo
    X) // copyright Olcott 2018 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o reo X)

    That claims what it means to have the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value 'true' (or at least it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would if you defined AtomicFacts in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coherent way). It doesn't in any way >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarify what you think it means for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> something to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    When I define a term hundreds of times >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and you did
    not bother to pay attention that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    You gave no such definition of what it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means for the truth value of a statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A valid answer would look something like >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this:

    "The truth value of a statement does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system when ..." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Now complete the sentence. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Good.-a So when you say "The truth value of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q", you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean "(reC x, S(x) rea x) is unprovable in Q", >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which is commonly known. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    So once again, you're saying the same >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thing as everyone else but using different >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> words.


    Not really. It is normally thought of as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is deficient.

    False.-a It means that there are statements >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the language of Q that have *only* an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> infinite connection to the axioms of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system.


    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which starts with the assumption that an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H exists that meets the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence of instructions) X described as <X> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H that computes the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not halt when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Sure and we could equally start with the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural number > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 3 and < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> report the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> within the
    first five minutes that this requirement was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> made.

    In other words, you don't understand that if >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this was algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And still don't understand that this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    void D(ptr *I)
    {
    -a-a-a-a ptr *X = D;
    -a-a-a-a ptr *Y = I;
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a if (result == 1) {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a while (1);
    -a-a-a-a }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0;
    -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halting problem for the last 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    D(D);-a-a // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D contains a copy of algorithm H and does >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know the difference between an algorithm and a C >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> function.


    Back to being ignored for trolling again.

    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignored by everone.


    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to show the halting problem counter-example?


    It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be >>>>>>>>>>>>>> a halt decider,

    Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input. >>>>>>>>>>>>
    Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to map >>>>>>>>>>>> all inputs to non-halting.


    Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify.

    Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what >>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D does, as per the design of algorithm D.


    Still no reply to this, so I have to assume you agree it's correct. >>>>>>>>

    I am trying to keep liars from killing the
    whole fucking planet by making truth computable

    Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi and >>>>>>>>>> others.


    By proving the errors in logic I can make
    logic into correct reasoning. That most
    logic people are a herd of sheep that would
    gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
    what their herd accepts makes correcting this
    error too fucking difficult.

    There is no error.-a The POE follows from a series of truth
    preserving operations

    To say this objectively classical logic is objectively incorrect >>>>>>> when it diverges from what correct reasoning would be while
    retaining the full English semantics of the terms.

    (P reo -4P) reo Q-a is ridiculously stupid when we plug English
    sentences in for P and Q and use semantic entailment in English
    as the measure of correct reasoning.




    We already did that and you got confused, calling it a mind game
    (see below):

    The confusing part is how an intelligent person can
    accept POE as correct for more than sixty seconds.

    Every average third grader knows that a contradiction
    States that both a statement and its negation are true.-a And if a
    formal system can reach a contradiction through a series of truth
    preserving operations from its axioms, that means both statements
    are proven true.


    Every third grader knows that it must have fucked up somewhere.

    Your intuition fails you.-a It just means that the axioms of the system
    in question are inconsistent.-a And the principle of explosion can be
    used to show that an inconsistent system is useless.


    It makes more sense to use the ordinary meaning
    of contradiction:

    When-so-ever two sentences contradict each other
    at least one of them is false.

    Whatever you call it, if the axioms of a formal system can prove both X
    and ~X, then the principle of explosion can be used to show that system
    is useless.



    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 17:35:06 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/2/2026 5:32 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 6:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:59 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:40 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:23 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:54 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:33 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The same thing as: "cats are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't ask for an example.-a I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asked for a definition of what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it mean for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I'm actually not convinced that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott understands what a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition is. I've frequently >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asked him for definitions and he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> invariably responds with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example or an analogy (assuming >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he responds at all). He doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> get that examples don't take the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> place of definitions. Examples >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can be useful for clarifying >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Until someone publishes an Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to Standard English dictionary, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo
    X) // copyright Olcott 2018 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reo X)

    That claims what it means to have the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value 'true' (or at least it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would if you defined AtomicFacts in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coherent way). It doesn't in any way >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarify what you think it means for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> something to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|-


    When I define a term hundreds of times >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    You gave no such definition of what it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A valid answer would look something >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> like this:

    "The truth value of a statement does >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not exist in a formal system when ..." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Now complete the sentence. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Good.-a So when you say "The truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q", >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you mean "(reC x, S(x) rea x) is unprovable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Q", which is commonly known. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    So once again, you're saying the same >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thing as everyone else but using >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Not really. It is normally thought of as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Q is deficient.

    False.-a It means that there are statements >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the language of Q that have *only* an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> infinite connection to the axioms of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system.


    OK, I verified that.


    The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which starts with the assumption that an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H exists that meets the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirements:

    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence of instructions) X described as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <X> with input Y:

    A solution to the halting problem is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H that computes the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not halt when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Sure and we could equally start with the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural number >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > 3 and < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> report the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> within the
    first five minutes that this requirement was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> made.

    In other words, you don't understand that if >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this was algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And still don't understand that this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    void D(ptr *I)
    {
    -a-a-a-a ptr *X = D;
    -a-a-a-a ptr *Y = I;
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a if (result == 1) {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a while (1);
    -a-a-a-a }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halting problem for the last 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    D(D);-a-a // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D contains a copy of algorithm H and does >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus.
    I have been a professional C programmer since 1986. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Says the person that just demonstrated that they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't know the difference between an algorithm and a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> C function.


    Back to being ignored for trolling again.

    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignored by everone.


    Do you know enough about C to understand that
    dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to show the halting problem counter-example?


    It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a halt decider,

    Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to map >>>>>>>>>>>>> all inputs to non-halting.


    Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what >>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D does, as per the design of algorithm D.


    Still no reply to this, so I have to assume you agree it's
    correct.


    I am trying to keep liars from killing the
    whole fucking planet by making truth computable

    Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi and >>>>>>>>>>> others.


    By proving the errors in logic I can make
    logic into correct reasoning. That most
    logic people are a herd of sheep that would
    gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
    what their herd accepts makes correcting this
    error too fucking difficult.

    There is no error.-a The POE follows from a series of truth >>>>>>>>> preserving operations

    To say this objectively classical logic is objectively incorrect >>>>>>>> when it diverges from what correct reasoning would be while
    retaining the full English semantics of the terms.

    (P reo -4P) reo Q-a is ridiculously stupid when we plug English >>>>>>>> sentences in for P and Q and use semantic entailment in English >>>>>>>> as the measure of correct reasoning.




    We already did that and you got confused, calling it a mind game >>>>>>> (see below):

    The confusing part is how an intelligent person can
    accept POE as correct for more than sixty seconds.

    Every average third grader knows that a contradiction
    States that both a statement and its negation are true.-a And if a
    formal system can reach a contradiction through a series of truth
    preserving operations from its axioms, that means both statements
    are proven true.


    Every third grader knows that it must have fucked up somewhere.

    Your intuition fails you.-a It just means that the axioms of the
    system in question are inconsistent.-a And the principle of explosion
    can be used to show that an inconsistent system is useless.


    It makes more sense to use the ordinary meaning
    of contradiction:

    When-so-ever two sentences contradict each other
    at least one of them is false.

    Whatever you call it, if the axioms of a formal system can prove both X
    and ~X, then the principle of explosion can be used to show that system
    is useless.


    X & ~X proves FALSE.
    How can anyone that is not nuts possibly think otherwise?
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 18:47:02 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/2/2026 6:35 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:32 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 6:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:59 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:40 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:23 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:54 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:33 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
    On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The same thing as: "cats are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't ask for an example.-a I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asked for a definition of what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it mean for the truth value of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a statement to not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm actually not convinced that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott understands what a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition is. I've frequently >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asked him for definitions and he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> invariably responds with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example or an analogy (assuming >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he responds at all). He doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> get that examples don't take the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> place of definitions. Examples >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can be useful for clarifying >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andr|- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Until someone publishes an Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to Standard English dictionary, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o reo
    X) // copyright Olcott 2018 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) (+o
    reo X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That claims what it means to have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth value 'true' (or at least >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it would if you defined AtomicFacts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a coherent way). It doesn't in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> any way clarify what you think it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means for something to not have a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    When I define a term hundreds of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    You gave no such definition of what it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system.

    A valid answer would look something >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "The truth value of a statement does >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not exist in a formal system when ..." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Now complete the sentence. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Good.-a So when you say "The truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in Q", >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you mean "(reC x, S(x) rea x) is unprovable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Q", which is commonly known. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    So once again, you're saying the same >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thing as everyone else but using >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Not really. It is normally thought of as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Q is deficient.

    False.-a It means that there are statements >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the language of Q that have *only* an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> infinite connection to the axioms of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system.


    OK, I verified that. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which starts with the assumption that an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H exists that meets the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> following requirements: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immutable sequence of instructions) X >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> described as <X> with input Y: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A solution to the halting problem is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H that computes the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halts when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not halt when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Sure and we could equally start with the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural number >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > 3 and < 2.

    I really don't see how everyone did not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> report the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> within the
    first five minutes that this requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> was made.

    In other words, you don't understand that if >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this was algorithm H:


    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And still don't understand that this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    void D(ptr *I)
    {
    -a-a-a-a ptr *X = D;
    -a-a-a-a ptr *Y = I;
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a if (result == 1) { >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a while (1); >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -a-a-a-a }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halting problem for the last 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    D(D);-a-a // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D contains a copy of algorithm H and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> does the opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I have been a professional C programmer since 1986. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Says the person that just demonstrated that they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't know the difference between an algorithm and a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> C function.


    Back to being ignored for trolling again. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignored by everone.


    Do you know enough about C to understand that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to show the halting problem counter-example? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a halt decider,

    Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> map all inputs to non-halting.


    Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what >>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D does, as per the design of algorithm D. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Still no reply to this, so I have to assume you agree it's >>>>>>>>>> correct.


    I am trying to keep liars from killing the
    whole fucking planet by making truth computable

    Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi and >>>>>>>>>>>> others.


    By proving the errors in logic I can make
    logic into correct reasoning. That most
    logic people are a herd of sheep that would
    gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
    what their herd accepts makes correcting this
    error too fucking difficult.

    There is no error.-a The POE follows from a series of truth >>>>>>>>>> preserving operations

    To say this objectively classical logic is objectively incorrect >>>>>>>>> when it diverges from what correct reasoning would be while
    retaining the full English semantics of the terms.

    (P reo -4P) reo Q-a is ridiculously stupid when we plug English >>>>>>>>> sentences in for P and Q and use semantic entailment in English >>>>>>>>> as the measure of correct reasoning.




    We already did that and you got confused, calling it a mind game >>>>>>>> (see below):

    The confusing part is how an intelligent person can
    accept POE as correct for more than sixty seconds.

    Every average third grader knows that a contradiction
    States that both a statement and its negation are true.-a And if a >>>>>> formal system can reach a contradiction through a series of truth >>>>>> preserving operations from its axioms, that means both statements >>>>>> are proven true.


    Every third grader knows that it must have fucked up somewhere.

    Your intuition fails you.-a It just means that the axioms of the
    system in question are inconsistent.-a And the principle of explosion >>>> can be used to show that an inconsistent system is useless.


    It makes more sense to use the ordinary meaning
    of contradiction:

    When-so-ever two sentences contradict each other
    at least one of them is false.

    Whatever you call it, if the axioms of a formal system can prove both
    X and ~X, then the principle of explosion can be used to show that
    system is useless.


    X & ~X proves FALSE.
    How can anyone that is not nuts possibly think otherwise?

    Assuming that X & ~X has been proven from the axioms of a formal system, further truth preserving operations leads to the principle of explosion.

    That it appears counterintuitive does not mean it is incorrect. You
    were challenged to find a step that was not truth preserving and you
    were unable to do so.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 17:53:25 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/2/2026 5:47 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 6:35 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:32 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 6:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:59 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:40 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:23 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:54 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:33 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The same thing as: "cats are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't ask for an example. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I asked for a definition of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what it mean for the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value of a statement to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm actually not convinced that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott understands what a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition is. I've frequently >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asked him for definitions and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he invariably responds with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example or an analogy (assuming >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he responds at all). He doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> get that examples don't take >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the place of definitions. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Examples can be useful for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarifying definitions, but >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they aren't particularly useful >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andr|- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Until someone publishes an Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to Standard English dictionary, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o
    reo X) // copyright Olcott 2018 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (+o reo X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That claims what it means to have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth value 'true' (or at least >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it would if you defined AtomicFacts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a coherent way). It doesn't in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> any way clarify what you think it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means for something to not have a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    When I define a term hundreds of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    You gave no such definition of what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it means for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system.

    A valid answer would look something >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "The truth value of a statement does >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not exist in a formal system when ..." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Now complete the sentence. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It is neither provable nor refutable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in F.

    Good.-a So when you say "The truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not exist in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Q", you mean "(reC x, S(x) rea x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable in Q", which is commonly known. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    So once again, you're saying the same >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thing as everyone else but using >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Not really. It is normally thought of as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
    meaning that Q is incomplete meaning >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that Q is deficient. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    False.-a It means that there are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statements in the language of Q that have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *only* an infinite connection to the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> axioms of the system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    OK, I verified that. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which starts with the assumption that an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H exists that meets the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> following requirements: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immutable sequence of instructions) X >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> described as <X> with input Y: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A solution to the halting problem is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H that computes the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halts when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> does not halt when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Sure and we could equally start with the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> number > 3 and < 2. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I really don't see how everyone did not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> report the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement within the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first five minutes that this requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> was made.

    In other words, you don't understand that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if this was algorithm H: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And still don't understand that this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    void D(ptr *I)
    {
    -a-a-a-a ptr *X = D;
    -a-a-a-a ptr *Y = I;
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a if (result == 1) { >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a while (1); >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -a-a-a-a }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a return result;
    }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halting problem for the last 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    D(D);-a-a // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because algorithm D contains a copy of algorithm >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> H and does the opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I have been a professional C programmer since 1986. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Says the person that just demonstrated that they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't know the difference between an algorithm and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a C function.


    Back to being ignored for trolling again. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignored by everone.


    Do you know enough about C to understand that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to show the halting problem counter-example? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a halt decider,

    Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> input.

    Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> map all inputs to non-halting.


    Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D does, as per the design of algorithm D. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Still no reply to this, so I have to assume you agree it's >>>>>>>>>>> correct.


    I am trying to keep liars from killing the
    whole fucking planet by making truth computable

    Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi >>>>>>>>>>>>> and others.


    By proving the errors in logic I can make
    logic into correct reasoning. That most
    logic people are a herd of sheep that would
    gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
    what their herd accepts makes correcting this
    error too fucking difficult.

    There is no error.-a The POE follows from a series of truth >>>>>>>>>>> preserving operations

    To say this objectively classical logic is objectively incorrect >>>>>>>>>> when it diverges from what correct reasoning would be while >>>>>>>>>> retaining the full English semantics of the terms.

    (P reo -4P) reo Q-a is ridiculously stupid when we plug English >>>>>>>>>> sentences in for P and Q and use semantic entailment in English >>>>>>>>>> as the measure of correct reasoning.




    We already did that and you got confused, calling it a mind >>>>>>>>> game (see below):

    The confusing part is how an intelligent person can
    accept POE as correct for more than sixty seconds.

    Every average third grader knows that a contradiction
    States that both a statement and its negation are true.-a And if a >>>>>>> formal system can reach a contradiction through a series of truth >>>>>>> preserving operations from its axioms, that means both statements >>>>>>> are proven true.


    Every third grader knows that it must have fucked up somewhere.

    Your intuition fails you.-a It just means that the axioms of the
    system in question are inconsistent.-a And the principle of
    explosion can be used to show that an inconsistent system is useless. >>>>>

    It makes more sense to use the ordinary meaning
    of contradiction:

    When-so-ever two sentences contradict each other
    at least one of them is false.

    Whatever you call it, if the axioms of a formal system can prove both
    X and ~X, then the principle of explosion can be used to show that
    system is useless.


    X & ~X proves FALSE.
    How can anyone that is not nuts possibly think otherwise?

    Assuming that X & ~X has been proven from the axioms of a formal system,

    Stipulating the ordinary English meaning of contradiction
    such that a pair of sentences X and Y cannot possibly both
    be true...
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 18:59:54 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/2/2026 6:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:47 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 6:35 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:32 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 6:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:59 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:40 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:23 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:54 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:33 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The same thing as: "cats are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't ask for an example. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I asked for a definition of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what it mean for the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value of a statement to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm actually not convinced >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that Olcott understands what a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition is. I've frequently >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asked him for definitions and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he invariably responds with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example or an analogy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (assuming he responds at all). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> He doesn't get that examples >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't take the place of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions. Examples can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for clarifying >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andr|- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Until someone publishes an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott to Standard English >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dictionary, this isn't really an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andr|- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) (+o
    reo X) // copyright Olcott 2018 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (+o reo X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That claims what it means to have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth value 'true' (or at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> least it would if you defined >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't in any way clarify what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you think it means for something >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    When I define a term hundreds of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    You gave no such definition of what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it means for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A valid answer would look something >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "The truth value of a statement does >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not exist in a formal system when ..." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Now complete the sentence. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It is neither provable nor refutable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in F.

    Good.-a So when you say "The truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in Q", you mean "(reC x, S(x) rea x) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is unprovable in Q", which is commonly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known.

    So once again, you're saying the same >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thing as everyone else but using >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Not really. It is normally thought of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as undecidable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that Q is incomplete meaning >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that Q is deficient. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    False.-a It means that there are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statements in the language of Q that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have *only* an infinite connection to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the axioms of the system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    OK, I verified that. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which starts with the assumption that an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H exists that meets the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> following requirements: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immutable sequence of instructions) X >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> described as <X> with input Y: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A solution to the halting problem is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H that computes the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halts when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> does not halt when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Sure and we could equally start with the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> number > 3 and < 2. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I really don't see how everyone did not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immediately see
    that the requirement for H to correctly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> report the halt
    status of input D that does the opposite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement within the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first five minutes that this requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> was made.

    In other words, you don't understand that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if this was algorithm H: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And still don't understand that this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    void D(ptr *I)
    {
    -a-a-a-a ptr *X = D;
    -a-a-a-a ptr *Y = I;
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a if (result == 1) { >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a while (1); >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -a-a-a-a }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
    -a-a-a-a int result;
    -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a return result; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> }


    That is just nonsense.


    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halting problem for the last 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    D(D);-a-a // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> D(D)

    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because algorithm D contains a copy of algorithm >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> H and does the opposite.

    You just don't know jack shit dufus. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I have been a professional C programmer since 1986. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Says the person that just demonstrated that they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't know the difference between an algorithm and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a C function.


    Back to being ignored for trolling again. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignored by everone.


    Do you know enough about C to understand that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to show the halting problem counter-example? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a halt decider,

    Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> input.

    Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> map all inputs to non-halting.


    Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D does, as per the design of algorithm D. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Still no reply to this, so I have to assume you agree it's >>>>>>>>>>>> correct.


    I am trying to keep liars from killing the
    whole fucking planet by making truth computable

    Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and others.


    By proving the errors in logic I can make
    logic into correct reasoning. That most
    logic people are a herd of sheep that would
    gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
    what their herd accepts makes correcting this
    error too fucking difficult.

    There is no error.-a The POE follows from a series of truth >>>>>>>>>>>> preserving operations

    To say this objectively classical logic is objectively incorrect >>>>>>>>>>> when it diverges from what correct reasoning would be while >>>>>>>>>>> retaining the full English semantics of the terms.

    (P reo -4P) reo Q-a is ridiculously stupid when we plug English >>>>>>>>>>> sentences in for P and Q and use semantic entailment in English >>>>>>>>>>> as the measure of correct reasoning.




    We already did that and you got confused, calling it a mind >>>>>>>>>> game (see below):

    The confusing part is how an intelligent person can
    accept POE as correct for more than sixty seconds.

    Every average third grader knows that a contradiction
    States that both a statement and its negation are true.-a And if >>>>>>>> a formal system can reach a contradiction through a series of >>>>>>>> truth preserving operations from its axioms, that means both
    statements are proven true.


    Every third grader knows that it must have fucked up somewhere.

    Your intuition fails you.-a It just means that the axioms of the
    system in question are inconsistent.-a And the principle of
    explosion can be used to show that an inconsistent system is useless. >>>>>>

    It makes more sense to use the ordinary meaning
    of contradiction:

    When-so-ever two sentences contradict each other
    at least one of them is false.

    Whatever you call it, if the axioms of a formal system can prove
    both X and ~X, then the principle of explosion can be used to show
    that system is useless.


    X & ~X proves FALSE.
    How can anyone that is not nuts possibly think otherwise?

    Assuming that X & ~X has been proven from the axioms of a formal system,

    Stipulating the ordinary English meaning of contradiction

    Is not the stipulated meaning used in logic and is therefore irrelevant.

    If you want an example, naive set theory is an inconsistent system. It
    is able to prove both X = "set R contains itself" and ~X = "set R does
    not contain itself". So X & ~X is proven TRUE in naive set theory. The principle of explosion can then be used to show that naive set theory is useless.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 18:49:26 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/2/2026 5:59 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 6:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:47 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 6:35 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:32 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 6:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:59 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:40 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:23 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:54 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 3:33 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
    On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, Andr|- G. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, Andr|- G. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, Andr|- G. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The same thing as: "cats >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't ask for an example. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I asked for a definition of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what it mean for the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value of a statement to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm actually not convinced >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that Olcott understands what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a definition is. I've >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently asked him for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions and he invariably >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> responds with an example or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an analogy (assuming he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> responds at all). He doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> get that examples don't take >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the place of definitions. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Examples can be useful for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarifying definitions, but >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they aren't particularly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andr|- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Until someone publishes an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott to Standard English >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dictionary, this isn't really >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andr|- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> True(L, X) rei rea+o rea BaseFacts(L) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (+o reo X) // copyright Olcott 2018 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> True(L, X):= rea+o rea AtomicFacts(L) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (+o reo X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    That claims what it means to have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth value 'true' (or at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> least it would if you defined >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> AtomicFacts in a coherent way). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It doesn't in any way clarify >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what you think it means for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> something to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Andr|- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    When I define a term hundreds of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    You gave no such definition of what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it means for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A valid answer would look something >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    "The truth value of a statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> does not exist in a formal system >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when ..." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Now complete the sentence. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    It is neither provable nor refutable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in F.

    Good.-a So when you say "The truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value of (reC x, S(x) rea x) does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in Q", you mean "(reC x, S(x) rea >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> x) is unprovable in Q", which is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> commonly known. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    So once again, you're saying the same >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thing as everyone else but using >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Not really. It is normally thought of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as undecidable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that Q is incomplete meaning >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that Q is deficient. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    False.-a It means that there are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statements in the language of Q that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have *only* an infinite connection to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the axioms of the system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    OK, I verified that. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which starts with the assumption that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an algorithm H exists that meets the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> following requirements: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immutable sequence of instructions) X >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> described as <X> with input Y: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    A solution to the halting problem is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H that computes the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mapping:

    (<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halts when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> does not halt when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Sure and we could equally start with the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement
    to prove that there exists a natural >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> number > 3 and < 2. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    I really don't see how everyone did not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immediately see >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the requirement for H to correctly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> report the halt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> status of input D that does the opposite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of whatever H
    reports is a moronically stupid >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement within the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first five minutes that this requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> was made.

    In other words, you don't understand that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if this was algorithm H: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    And still don't understand that this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm:


    void D(ptr *I)
    {
    -a-a-a-a ptr *X = D; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -a-a-a-a ptr *Y = I; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -a-a-a-a int result; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a if (result == 1) { >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a while (1); >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -a-a-a-a }
    }

    Is the counter example input to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> {
    -a-a-a-a int result; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -a-a-a-a {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a result = 0; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -a-a-a-a }
    -a-a-a-a return result; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> }


    That is just nonsense. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halting problem for the last 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    D(D);-a-a // merely halts
    H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> D(D)

    And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because algorithm D contains a copy of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H and does the opposite. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    You just don't know jack shit dufus. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I have been a professional C programmer since 1986. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Says the person that just demonstrated that they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't know the difference between an algorithm >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and a C function.


    Back to being ignored for trolling again. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Maybe by someone but you are still far from being >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignored by everone.


    Do you know enough about C to understand that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to show the halting problem counter-example? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be a halt decider,

    Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> input.

    Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> map all inputs to non-halting.


    Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what algorithm D does, as per the design of algorithm D. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    Still no reply to this, so I have to assume you agree it's >>>>>>>>>>>>> correct.


    I am trying to keep liars from killing the
    whole fucking planet by making truth computable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and others.


    By proving the errors in logic I can make
    logic into correct reasoning. That most
    logic people are a herd of sheep that would
    gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
    what their herd accepts makes correcting this
    error too fucking difficult.

    There is no error.-a The POE follows from a series of truth >>>>>>>>>>>>> preserving operations

    To say this objectively classical logic is objectively >>>>>>>>>>>> incorrect
    when it diverges from what correct reasoning would be while >>>>>>>>>>>> retaining the full English semantics of the terms.

    (P reo -4P) reo Q-a is ridiculously stupid when we plug English >>>>>>>>>>>> sentences in for P and Q and use semantic entailment in English >>>>>>>>>>>> as the measure of correct reasoning.




    We already did that and you got confused, calling it a mind >>>>>>>>>>> game (see below):

    The confusing part is how an intelligent person can
    accept POE as correct for more than sixty seconds.

    Every average third grader knows that a contradiction
    States that both a statement and its negation are true.-a And if >>>>>>>>> a formal system can reach a contradiction through a series of >>>>>>>>> truth preserving operations from its axioms, that means both >>>>>>>>> statements are proven true.


    Every third grader knows that it must have fucked up somewhere. >>>>>>>
    Your intuition fails you.-a It just means that the axioms of the >>>>>>> system in question are inconsistent.-a And the principle of
    explosion can be used to show that an inconsistent system is
    useless.


    It makes more sense to use the ordinary meaning
    of contradiction:

    When-so-ever two sentences contradict each other
    at least one of them is false.

    Whatever you call it, if the axioms of a formal system can prove
    both X and ~X, then the principle of explosion can be used to show
    that system is useless.


    X & ~X proves FALSE.
    How can anyone that is not nuts possibly think otherwise?

    Assuming that X & ~X has been proven from the axioms of a formal system, >>
    Stipulating the ordinary English meaning of contradiction

    Is not the stipulated meaning used in logic and is therefore irrelevant.

    If you want an example, naive set theory is an inconsistent system.-a It
    is able to prove both X = "set R contains itself" and ~X = "set R does
    not contain itself".-a So X & ~X is proven TRUE in naive set theory.-a The principle of explosion can then be used to show that naive set theory is useless.

    Russell's Paradox is the exact same issue as the
    pathological self reference (PSR) of the Halting
    Problem. I have studied PSR as a primary focus
    for 28 years.

    Why is it so hard for people to see that PSR is
    the same issue that ZFC eliminated?
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jul 2 20:03:19 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.logic

    On 7/2/2026 7:49 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:59 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 6:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:47 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 6:35 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:32 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 6:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:59 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:40 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 4:23 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 7/2/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    The confusing part is how an intelligent person can
    accept POE as correct for more than sixty seconds.

    Every average third grader knows that a contradiction
    States that both a statement and its negation are true.-a And >>>>>>>>>> if a formal system can reach a contradiction through a series >>>>>>>>>> of truth preserving operations from its axioms, that means >>>>>>>>>> both statements are proven true.


    Every third grader knows that it must have fucked up somewhere. >>>>>>>>
    Your intuition fails you.-a It just means that the axioms of the >>>>>>>> system in question are inconsistent.-a And the principle of
    explosion can be used to show that an inconsistent system is
    useless.


    It makes more sense to use the ordinary meaning
    of contradiction:

    When-so-ever two sentences contradict each other
    at least one of them is false.

    Whatever you call it, if the axioms of a formal system can prove
    both X and ~X, then the principle of explosion can be used to show >>>>>> that system is useless.


    X & ~X proves FALSE.
    How can anyone that is not nuts possibly think otherwise?

    Assuming that X & ~X has been proven from the axioms of a formal
    system,

    Stipulating the ordinary English meaning of contradiction

    Is not the stipulated meaning used in logic and is therefore irrelevant.

    If you want an example, naive set theory is an inconsistent system.
    It is able to prove both X = "set R contains itself" and ~X = "set R
    does not contain itself".-a So X & ~X is proven TRUE in naive set
    theory.-a The principle of explosion can then be used to show that
    naive set theory is useless.

    Russell's Paradox is the exact same issue as the
    pathological self reference (PSR) of the Halting
    Problem. I have studied PSR as a primary focus
    for 28 years.

    The halting problem doesn't actually have self reference, as algorithms
    can be copied as in the below example of algorithm D:

    void D(ptr *I)
    {
    // algorithm D; input: I
    ptr *X = D;
    ptr *Y = I;
    int result;
    {
    // algorithm H; inputs: X,Y
    result = 0;
    }
    if (result == 1) {
    while (1);
    }
    }

    Which is the counter example input to algorithm H:

    int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
    {
    int result;
    {
    // algorithm H; inputs: X,Y
    result = 0;
    }
    return result;
    }

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2