[ Followup-To: set ]
In comp.theory olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
On 6/19/2026 2:23 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 18/06/2026 22:35, olcott wrote:
On 6/17/2026 4:14 PM, olcott wrote:
https://www.youtube.com/@rossfinlayson
Making sure to leave out
Proof-theoretic semantics
(an alternative to truth-condition semantics)
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/
Some people only memorize conventional views and
reject alternative views out-of-hand without review.
Whereas you are stuck to your own incoherent views and reject
alternative views out-of-hand without review.
Calling my views (anchored in proof theoretic semantics)
incoherent merely proves that you are too damned lazy to
look into proof theoretic semantics.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/
I've spent a couple of hours reading that web page. It is abstract in
the extreme. One thing is utterly clear: its level of abstraction is
well beyond the comprehension capabilities of Peter Olcott, who can't
even understand proof by contradiction.
That page's level of abstraction is high enough that I can't be bothered
to read it any further. If it actually says anything at all, that
something is heavily disguised. From it's "Conclusion and Outlook"
section at the end:
| Standard proof-theoretic semantics has practically exclusively been
| occupied with logical constants. Logical constants play a central role
| in reasoning and inference, but are definitely not the exclusive, and
| perhaps not even the most typical sort of entities that can be defined
| inferentially. A framework is needed that deals with inferential
| definitions in a wider sense and covers both logical and extra-logical
| inferential definitions alike.
Does this have any meaning?
I put it to everybody here that Peter Olcott has been bluffing. He has purported to understand Proof-theoretic semantics and repeatedly cited a
web page far outside his own understanding, believing nobody else would
ever challenge this deception.
I'm challenging it now. Peter, you have repeatedly stated that G||del's Incompleteness Theorem is unproven when one takes PTS as a basis. I put
it to you this is a lie, and that you are as clueless about PTS as you
are about G||del's Theorem. Feel free to refute my assertion.
Or, at the very least, explain in readily accessible English precisely
what is meant above by "logical constants" and how and why "they play a central role in reasoning and inference". I put it to you you cannot do this.
On 6/19/2026 3:28 PM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:That's non-responsive to my point, which I'll repeat: you are as clueless
In comp.theory olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:My basis in PTS is what is referred to in the Literature
On 6/19/2026 2:23 AM, Mikko wrote:I've spent a couple of hours reading that web page. It is abstract in
On 18/06/2026 22:35, olcott wrote:Calling my views (anchored in proof theoretic semantics)
On 6/17/2026 4:14 PM, olcott wrote:Whereas you are stuck to your own incoherent views and reject
https://www.youtube.com/@rossfinlaysonSome people only memorize conventional views and
Making sure to leave out
Proof-theoretic semantics
(an alternative to truth-condition semantics)
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/
reject alternative views out-of-hand without review.
alternative views out-of-hand without review.
incoherent merely proves that you are too damned lazy to
look into proof theoretic semantics.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/
the extreme. One thing is utterly clear: its level of abstraction is
well beyond the comprehension capabilities of Peter Olcott, who can't
even understand proof by contradiction.
That page's level of abstraction is high enough that I can't be bothered
to read it any further. If it actually says anything at all, that something is heavily disguised. From it's "Conclusion and Outlook"
section at the end:
| Standard proof-theoretic semantics has practically exclusively been
| occupied with logical constants. Logical constants play a central role
| in reasoning and inference, but are definitely not the exclusive, and
| perhaps not even the most typical sort of entities that can be defined
| inferentially. A framework is needed that deals with inferential
| definitions in a wider sense and covers both logical and extra-logical
| inferential definitions alike.
Does this have any meaning?
I put it to everybody here that Peter Olcott has been bluffing. He has purported to understand Proof-theoretic semantics and repeatedly cited a web page far outside his own understanding, believing nobody else would ever challenge this deception.
I'm challenging it now. Peter, you have repeatedly stated that G||del's Incompleteness Theorem is unproven when one takes PTS as a basis. I put
it to you this is a lie, and that you are as clueless about PTS as you
are about G||del's Theorem. Feel free to refute my assertion.
Or, at the very least, explain in readily accessible English precisely
what is meant above by "logical constants" and how and why "they play a central role in reasoning and inference". I put it to you you cannot do this.
as Dag Prawitz Theory of Grounds and its extensions and
elaborations. https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0,42&q=Prawitz+theory+of+grounds
I came up with all this stuff on my own entirely onAll things beyond your understanding, if they are coherent things at all.
the basis of reverse-engineering from first principles.
I only very recently found out that it has an existing
basis in the work of others.
These are the usual things that PTS refers to:
Natural Deduction, Sequent Calculus, Martin-L||f Type Theory,
Intuitionistic Logic. I extend the essence of PTS all the way
to natural language formalized as CycL.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CycL
----
Copyright 2026 Olcott
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