From Newsgroup: sci.lang
On 6/19/2026 3:28 PM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
[ Followup-To: set ]
In comp.theory olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
On 6/19/2026 2:23 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 18/06/2026 22:35, olcott wrote:
On 6/17/2026 4:14 PM, olcott wrote:
https://www.youtube.com/@rossfinlayson
Making sure to leave out
Proof-theoretic semantics
(an alternative to truth-condition semantics)
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/
Some people only memorize conventional views and
reject alternative views out-of-hand without review.
Whereas you are stuck to your own incoherent views and reject
alternative views out-of-hand without review.
Calling my views (anchored in proof theoretic semantics)
incoherent merely proves that you are too damned lazy to
look into proof theoretic semantics.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/
I've spent a couple of hours reading that web page. It is abstract in
the extreme. One thing is utterly clear: its level of abstraction is
well beyond the comprehension capabilities of Peter Olcott, who can't
even understand proof by contradiction.
That page's level of abstraction is high enough that I can't be bothered
to read it any further. If it actually says anything at all, that
something is heavily disguised. From it's "Conclusion and Outlook"
section at the end:
| Standard proof-theoretic semantics has practically exclusively been
| occupied with logical constants. Logical constants play a central role
| in reasoning and inference, but are definitely not the exclusive, and
| perhaps not even the most typical sort of entities that can be defined
| inferentially. A framework is needed that deals with inferential
| definitions in a wider sense and covers both logical and extra-logical
| inferential definitions alike.
Does this have any meaning?
I put it to everybody here that Peter Olcott has been bluffing. He has purported to understand Proof-theoretic semantics and repeatedly cited a
web page far outside his own understanding, believing nobody else would
ever challenge this deception.
I'm challenging it now. Peter, you have repeatedly stated that G||del's Incompleteness Theorem is unproven when one takes PTS as a basis. I put
it to you this is a lie, and that you are as clueless about PTS as you
are about G||del's Theorem. Feel free to refute my assertion.
Or, at the very least, explain in readily accessible English precisely
what is meant above by "logical constants" and how and why "they play a central role in reasoning and inference". I put it to you you cannot do this.
My basis in PTS is what is referred to in the Literature
as Dag Prawitz Theory of Grounds and its extensions and
elaborations.
https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0,42&q=Prawitz+theory+of+grounds
I came up with all this stuff on my own entirely on
the basis of reverse-engineering from first principles.
I only very recently found out that it has an existing
basis in the work of others.
These are the usual things that PTS refers to:
Natural Deduction, Sequent Calculus, Martin-L||f Type Theory,
Intuitionistic Logic. I extend the essence of PTS all the way
to natural language formalized as CycL.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CycL
--
Copyright 2026 Olcott
My 28 year goal has been to make
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
The complete structure of this system is now defined.
The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
(a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.
My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
language such as CycL of the Cyc project.
(b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
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