Yet. Perhaps they are educating their potential victims so that
when those folks are "threatened", they capitulate even if the
systems involved are not vulnerable?
I doubt it because then the food will still be frozen and will be monitored locally to make sure it remains so.
The next step is to weaponize these attacks to cause confusion and/or
cripple key systems and infrastructure. Imagine someone attacking
the cellular network, power grid, etc.
So let's hope that the people in charge of those things are getting the point
that not only do you have to install a door (firewall) you have to be aware of
exactly who or what goes in and out of the door. Otherwise there was no
point installing the door at all. Why would a power grid in country A be >>> connectable from an IP address in country B? Sure the attacker could be
in country A (or using a proxy so that they appear to be in country A)
but that's why you can't simply install a door and expect it to keep attackers
First step is to decide what *needs* to be accessible.
You don't get a choice about that because you didn't design the vulnerable controller yourself.
to the access. It is also the case that someone or something has to actively
follow up on the report produced by the firewall so as to be sure whether the
access was legitimate or not. It is true that much of this can be automated but
it is also true that most places don't do it at all because no-one knows how
to do it or why it's necessary.
Convenience trumps security.
So does ignorance of why security is required.
And one reason for this is the use of c.
In c you can easily create a buffer, but nothing tells you about checking to make sure
you haven't overfilled it.
The reason for it is lack of discipline and testing on the part of developers.
Which is never going to change.
I disagree. In the 60's, everything was "cowboy coder".
And most systems were not connected to any other system at all.
Now we actually
*have* formal processes (and certifications OF those processes).
And most systems can send packets to any other system in the world.
When Windows first went online it was not designed to be on an
untrusted network at all.
But, most Manglement folks are still ignorant and don't understand WHY
these things are important.
Yes
Yet. Perhaps they are educating their potential victims so that
when those folks are "threatened", they capitulate even if the
systems involved are not vulnerable?
I doubt it because then the food will still be frozen and will be monitored >> locally to make sure it remains so.
So, the staff in the store has to add "watch the coolers" to their current list of responsibilities?
How do they know if something is wonky?
And what
do they *do* about it??
The next step is to weaponize these attacks to cause confusion and/or >>>>> cripple key systems and infrastructure. Imagine someone attacking
the cellular network, power grid, etc.
So let's hope that the people in charge of those things are getting the point
that not only do you have to install a door (firewall) you have to be aware of
exactly who or what goes in and out of the door. Otherwise there was no >>>> point installing the door at all. Why would a power grid in country A be >>>> connectable from an IP address in country B? Sure the attacker could be >>>> in country A (or using a proxy so that they appear to be in country A) >>>> but that's why you can't simply install a door and expect it to keep attackers
First step is to decide what *needs* to be accessible.
You don't get a choice about that because you didn't design the vulnerable >> controller yourself.
I can have a say in anything I design or advise on designs.
As a network stack is now a commodity (30 years ago, you had to roll
your own), people think nothing of just including it in their design.
But, without really understanding how it works and what problems
it brings to a project.
Cache poisoning? SYN-flood? IP/MAC masquerading?
Can your product support a NIC running "flat out" -- even if only incoming traffic (over which you h ave no control)? How big is your ARP cache?
Can I push enough endpoints at it to cause it to lose track of the
bindings that actually "make sense" for your application?
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2017/07/27/criminals-hacked-a-fish-tank-to-steal-data-from-a-casino/>
to the access. It is also the case that someone or something has to actively
follow up on the report produced by the firewall so as to be sure whether the
access was legitimate or not. It is true that much of this can be automated but
it is also true that most places don't do it at all because no-one knows how
to do it or why it's necessary.
Convenience trumps security.
So does ignorance of why security is required.
But, drawing attention to security is often dismissed: "Who the hell would want to hack our fishtank???"
And one reason for this is the use of c.
In c you can easily create a buffer, but nothing tells you about checking to make sure
you haven't overfilled it.
The reason for it is lack of discipline and testing on the part of developers.
Which is never going to change.
I disagree. In the 60's, everything was "cowboy coder".
And most systems were not connected to any other system at all.
They were connected but typically with UUCP (e.g., bang mail) and BBS style interfaces.
Now we actually
*have* formal processes (and certifications OF those processes).
And most systems can send packets to any other system in the world.
But have no *need* to do so! Or, interact with more than one (or two)
remote hosts (clients?) at a time.
So, why use software that was designed for general purpose computers
when you aren't such a device?
When Windows first went online it was not designed to be on an
untrusted network at all.
But, most Manglement folks are still ignorant and don't understand WHY
these things are important.
Yes
They will understand when they start incurring losses and have to answer
to their superiors, stock-holders, customers, etc. When your competitors' bottom lines are better than yours, eventually folks lose jobs.
On 11/2/26 14:15, Don Y wrote:
<https://apnews.com/article/europe-supermarkets-freezers-cyberattacks-a8ea5b30d67da47957769f29101fe686>
"...its fridges and freezers had been hacked and set to 50 degrees
Celsius"
And, why would a temperature controller for a FREEZER ever allow
such a high temperature?-a In case you wanted to convert them to
walk-in ovens???
Who *specifies* such systems and who naively implements those
specifications?
[The last batch of targets used "older technology"... so, nothing
was learned in the revisions that followed?]
They're just simple programmable temperature controllers.
You wouldn't expect those to be able to detect that anything
is amiss. They should't have been accessible from the general
internet, is all.
"Don Y" <blockedofcourse@foo.invalid> wrote in message news:11cbjph$3e9k6$1@dont-email.me...
Yet. Perhaps they are educating their potential victims so that
when those folks are "threatened", they capitulate even if the
systems involved are not vulnerable?
I doubt it because then the food will still be frozen and will be monitored >>> locally to make sure it remains so.
So, the staff in the store has to add "watch the coolers" to their current >> list of responsibilities?
Only when there is an external "threat".
How do they know if something is wonky?
Just make sure the freezers don't stay in defrost for too long.
And what
do they *do* about it??
Pull the cable out of the Internet provider's modem.
The next step is to weaponize these attacks to cause confusion and/or >>>>>> cripple key systems and infrastructure. Imagine someone attacking >>>>>> the cellular network, power grid, etc.
So let's hope that the people in charge of those things are getting the point
that not only do you have to install a door (firewall) you have to be aware of
exactly who or what goes in and out of the door. Otherwise there was no >>>>> point installing the door at all. Why would a power grid in country A be >>>>> connectable from an IP address in country B? Sure the attacker could be >>>>> in country A (or using a proxy so that they appear to be in country A) >>>>> but that's why you can't simply install a door and expect it to keep attackers
First step is to decide what *needs* to be accessible.
You don't get a choice about that because you didn't design the vulnerable >>> controller yourself.
I can have a say in anything I design or advise on designs.
But you didn't design the vulnerable controller.
It may be true that you could design your own controller but most stores with freezers don't employ their own people who could.
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2017/07/27/criminals-hacked-a-fish-tank-to-steal-data-from-a-casino/>Many details about how the network was set up and what actually happened are missing.
Now we actually
*have* formal processes (and certifications OF those processes).
And most systems can send packets to any other system in the world.
But have no *need* to do so! Or, interact with more than one (or two)
remote hosts (clients?) at a time.
I don't permit outbound to a big list of countries unless a specific IP or network is whitelisted.
If it causes me an issue I just watch the firewall log to see where the attempted outbound
connection from my PC was trying to go. I can then decide whether to whitelist it or not.
Although I don't use Facebook, other people on my network do. I haven't bothered to
whitelist these because there have been no complaints: https://www.abuseipdb.com/check/57.144.138.5
It's clear that most people assume that no-one knows where their packets might be going
or why they are going where they are going.
So, why use software that was designed for general purpose computers
when you aren't such a device?
It's a lot cheaper than a custom design.
I think people understand behaviors that cost them money (which can beWhen Windows first went online it was not designed to be on an
untrusted network at all.
But, most Manglement folks are still ignorant and don't understand WHY >>>> these things are important.
Yes
They will understand when they start incurring losses and have to answer
to their superiors, stock-holders, customers, etc. When your competitors' >> bottom lines are better than yours, eventually folks lose jobs.
True but I can't see anything changing. One reason is the big gap between management and anyone who has a clue how anything works.
On 02/11/2026 18:08, Jeroen Belleman wrote:
On 11/2/26 14:15, Don Y wrote:
<https://apnews.com/article/europe-supermarkets-freezers-cyberattacks-
a8ea5b30d67da47957769f29101fe686>
"...its fridges and freezers had been hacked and set to 50 degrees Celsius" >>>
And, why would a temperature controller for a FREEZER ever allow
such a high temperature?-a In case you wanted to convert them to
walk-in ovens???
Who *specifies* such systems and who naively implements those specifications?
[The last batch of targets used "older technology"... so, nothing
was learned in the revisions that followed?]
In the UK at least they have been tightening up security on supermarket fridges
and freezers. But you are stuck with whatever "security" the manufacturer provides - they are too expensive to replace en mass.
They're just simple programmable temperature controllers.
You wouldn't expect those to be able to detect that anything
is amiss. They should't have been accessible from the general
internet, is all.
More likely that it wasn't provided with a secure enough password for engineering-a remote access. Something like "engineer" pw = "eng1neer".
Managers like remote access it makes it possible to control the whole system without having to visit the site. However, they don't seem to have even considered that hostile actors *will* try to hack them.
I think the Binance hack is *way* more significant $6bn is a lot more!
People are just now seeing that they *are* hackable.-a It will be a bit longer before they realize the reasons why (and, even longer to realize<https://github.com/jgamblin/Mirai-Source-Code>
how they can be used/leveraged for OTHER hacks)
<https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/attack-of-the-zombie-baby-monitors/>
"Don Y" <blockedofcourse@foo.invalid> wrote in message news:11cbjph$3e9k6$1@dont-email.me...
Yet. Perhaps they are educating their potential victims so that
when those folks are "threatened", they capitulate even if the
systems involved are not vulnerable?
I doubt it because then the food will still be frozen and will be monitored >>> locally to make sure it remains so.
So, the staff in the store has to add "watch the coolers" to their current >> list of responsibilities?
Only when there is an external "threat".
How do they know if something is wonky?
Just make sure the freezers don't stay in defrost for too long.
And what
do they *do* about it??
Pull the cable out of the Internet provider's modem.
The next step is to weaponize these attacks to cause confusion and/or >>>>>> cripple key systems and infrastructure. Imagine someone attacking >>>>>> the cellular network, power grid, etc.
So let's hope that the people in charge of those things are getting the point
that not only do you have to install a door (firewall) you have to be aware of
exactly who or what goes in and out of the door. Otherwise there was no >>>>> point installing the door at all. Why would a power grid in country A be >>>>> connectable from an IP address in country B? Sure the attacker could be >>>>> in country A (or using a proxy so that they appear to be in country A) >>>>> but that's why you can't simply install a door and expect it to keep attackers
First step is to decide what *needs* to be accessible.
You don't get a choice about that because you didn't design the vulnerable >>> controller yourself.
I can have a say in anything I design or advise on designs.
But you didn't design the vulnerable controller.
It may be true that you could design your own controller but most stores with freezers don't employ their own people who could.
As a network stack is now a commodity (30 years ago, you had to roll
your own), people think nothing of just including it in their design.
But, without really understanding how it works and what problems
it brings to a project.
Cache poisoning? SYN-flood? IP/MAC masquerading?
Can your product support a NIC running "flat out" -- even if only incoming >> traffic (over which you h ave no control)? How big is your ARP cache?
Can I push enough endpoints at it to cause it to lose track of the
bindings that actually "make sense" for your application?
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2017/07/27/criminals-hacked-a-fish-tank-to-steal-data-from-a-casino/>
Many details about how the network was set up and what actually happened are missing.
to the access. It is also the case that someone or something has to actively
follow up on the report produced by the firewall so as to be sure whether the
access was legitimate or not. It is true that much of this can be automated but
it is also true that most places don't do it at all because no-one knows how
to do it or why it's necessary.
Convenience trumps security.
So does ignorance of why security is required.
But, drawing attention to security is often dismissed: "Who the hell would >> want to hack our fishtank???"
Anyone who wants a presence on your internal network.
And one reason for this is the use of c.
In c you can easily create a buffer, but nothing tells you about checking to make sure
you haven't overfilled it.
The reason for it is lack of discipline and testing on the part of developers.
Which is never going to change.
I disagree. In the 60's, everything was "cowboy coder".
And most systems were not connected to any other system at all.
They were connected but typically with UUCP (e.g., bang mail) and BBS style >> interfaces.
Now we actually
*have* formal processes (and certifications OF those processes).
And most systems can send packets to any other system in the world.
But have no *need* to do so! Or, interact with more than one (or two)
remote hosts (clients?) at a time.
I don't permit outbound to a big list of countries unless a specific IP or network is whitelisted.
If it causes me an issue I just watch the firewall log to see where the attempted outbound
connection from my PC was trying to go. I can then decide whether to whitelist it or not.
Although I don't use Facebook, other people on my network do. I haven't bothered to
whitelist these because there have been no complaints: https://www.abuseipdb.com/check/57.144.138.5
It's clear that most people assume that no-one knows where their packets might be going
or why they are going where they are going.
So, why use software that was designed for general purpose computers
when you aren't such a device?
It's a lot cheaper than a custom design.
When Windows first went online it was not designed to be on an
untrusted network at all.
But, most Manglement folks are still ignorant and don't understand WHY >>>> these things are important.
Yes
They will understand when they start incurring losses and have to answer
to their superiors, stock-holders, customers, etc. When your competitors' >> bottom lines are better than yours, eventually folks lose jobs.
True but I can't see anything changing. One reason is the big gap between management and anyone who has a clue how anything works.
"john larkin" <jl@htigct.com> wrote in message news:c5mhelt53q23ml6ohlgerjruk2s2j56p45@4ax.com...
On Mon, 2 Nov 2026 12:46:54 -0500, "Edward Rawde"
<invalid@invalid.invalid> wrote:
"john larkin" <jl@glen--canyon.com> wrote in message news:2eihelp8ql138updhf4i3240dad4j4j1iq@4ax.com...
On Mon, 2 Nov 2026 11:46:15 -0500, "Edward Rawde"
<invalid@invalid.invalid> wrote:
"john larkin" <jl@glen--canyon.com> wrote in message news:g1fheld2tgm8u9p2v964v38614dglpof7k@4ax.com...
On Tue, 3 Nov 2026 00:52:24 +1100, Bill Sloman <bill.sloman@ieee.org> >>>>>> wrote:
On 3/11/2026 12:15 am, Don Y wrote:
<https://apnews.com/article/europe-supermarkets-freezers-cyberattacks-a8ea5b30d67da47957769f29101fe686>
"...its fridges and freezers had been hacked and set to 50 degrees Celsius"
And, why would a temperature controller for a FREEZER ever allow >>>>>>>> such a high temperature? In case you wanted to convert them to >>>>>>>> walk-in ovens???
Who *specifies* such systems and who naively implements those
specifications?
[The last batch of targets used "older technology"... so, nothing >>>>>>>> was learned in the revisions that followed?]
The software would presumably have blocked those high temperatures, but >>>>>>>it had been hacked. Fridges and freezers use heat pumps to control the >>>>>>>temperature and these are bi-directional.
It's unlikely that the refrigeration gear in a supermarket frozen-food >>>>>> case is reversable. My fridge certainly will not heat above room temp. >>>>>>
Setting it to 50C just turned off the cooling.
I think you'll find they put it into defrost mode which has a heater to remove frost.
Whether or not they also overwrote software limits for length of time and maximum
temperature I do not know but if you own the controller then you can tell the
hardware to do anything you can tell it to do.
Defrost is usually some resistive elements that melt ice on the
cooling coils.
Yes
It doesn't reverse the heat pump
Yes
and it doesn't heat up
the frozen peas.
I'm seeing pictures of many items being thrown out.
Why do that if they are still frozen?
Lawyers.
AI Lawyers are coming. I wonder whether they will be just as bad?
Edward Rawde <invalid@invalid.invalid> wrote:
AI Lawyers are coming. I wonder whether they will be just as bad?
I am waiting for AI lawyer to sue web sites that put those annoying
"checking that you are not a robot" boxes.
On 03/11/2026 04:27, Edward Rawde wrote:
"Don Y" <blockedofcourse@foo.invalid> wrote in message news:11cbjph$3e9k6$1@dont-email.me...
Yet. Perhaps they are educating their potential victims so that
when those folks are "threatened", they capitulate even if the
systems involved are not vulnerable?
I doubt it because then the food will still be frozen and will be monitored
locally to make sure it remains so.
So, the staff in the store has to add "watch the coolers" to their current >>> list of responsibilities?
Only when there is an external "threat".
How do they know if something is wonky?
Just make sure the freezers don't stay in defrost for too long.
And what
do they *do* about it??
Pull the cable out of the Internet provider's modem.
But then you can't sell anything because the payment systems will
stop working.
The next step is to weaponize these attacks to cause confusion and/or >>>>>>> cripple key systems and infrastructure. Imagine someone attacking >>>>>>> the cellular network, power grid, etc.
So let's hope that the people in charge of those things are getting the point
that not only do you have to install a door (firewall) you have to be aware of
exactly who or what goes in and out of the door. Otherwise there was no >>>>>> point installing the door at all. Why would a power grid in country A be >>>>>> connectable from an IP address in country B? Sure the attacker could be >>>>>> in country A (or using a proxy so that they appear to be in country A) >>>>>> but that's why you can't simply install a door and expect it to keep attackers
First step is to decide what *needs* to be accessible.
You don't get a choice about that because you didn't design the vulnerable >>>> controller yourself.
I can have a say in anything I design or advise on designs.
But you didn't design the vulnerable controller.
It may be true that you could design your own controller but most stores with
freezers don't employ their own people who could.
As a network stack is now a commodity (30 years ago, you had to roll
your own), people think nothing of just including it in their design.
But, without really understanding how it works and what problems
it brings to a project.
Cache poisoning? SYN-flood? IP/MAC masquerading?
Can your product support a NIC running "flat out" -- even if only incoming >>> traffic (over which you h ave no control)? How big is your ARP cache?
Can I push enough endpoints at it to cause it to lose track of the
bindings that actually "make sense" for your application?
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2017/07/27/criminals-hacked-a-fish-tank-to-steal-data-from-a-casino/>
Many details about how the network was set up and what actually happened are missing.
to the access. It is also the case that someone or something has to actively
follow up on the report produced by the firewall so as to be sure whether the
access was legitimate or not. It is true that much of this can be automated but
it is also true that most places don't do it at all because no-one knows how
to do it or why it's necessary.
Convenience trumps security.
So does ignorance of why security is required.
But, drawing attention to security is often dismissed: "Who the hell would >>> want to hack our fishtank???"
Anyone who wants a presence on your internal network.
And one reason for this is the use of c.
In c you can easily create a buffer, but nothing tells you about checking to make sure
you haven't overfilled it.
The reason for it is lack of discipline and testing on the part of developers.
Which is never going to change.
I disagree. In the 60's, everything was "cowboy coder".
And most systems were not connected to any other system at all.
They were connected but typically with UUCP (e.g., bang mail) and BBS style >>> interfaces.
Now we actually
*have* formal processes (and certifications OF those processes).
And most systems can send packets to any other system in the world.
But have no *need* to do so! Or, interact with more than one (or two)
remote hosts (clients?) at a time.
I don't permit outbound to a big list of countries unless a specific IP or network is whitelisted.
If it causes me an issue I just watch the firewall log to see where the attempted outbound
connection from my PC was trying to go. I can then decide whether to whitelist it or not.
Although I don't use Facebook, other people on my network do. I haven't bothered to
whitelist these because there have been no complaints:
https://www.abuseipdb.com/check/57.144.138.5
It's clear that most people assume that no-one knows where their packets might be going
or why they are going where they are going.
So, why use software that was designed for general purpose computers
when you aren't such a device?
It's a lot cheaper than a custom design.
When Windows first went online it was not designed to be on an
untrusted network at all.
But, most Manglement folks are still ignorant and don't understand WHY >>>>> these things are important.
Yes
They will understand when they start incurring losses and have to answer >>> to their superiors, stock-holders, customers, etc. When your competitors' >>> bottom lines are better than yours, eventually folks lose jobs.
True but I can't see anything changing. One reason is the big gap between
management and anyone who has a clue how anything works.
On 11/3/2026 6:48 AM, Waldek Hebisch wrote:
Edward Rawde <invalid@invalid.invalid> wrote:
AI Lawyers are coming. I wonder whether they will be just as bad?
I am waiting for AI lawyer to sue web sites that put those annoying
"checking that you are not a robot" boxes.
You just need an AI "captcha-bot"
<https://aibeat.co/bots-solving-captchas-better/>
On 11/2/2026 9:27 PM, Edward Rawde wrote:
"Don Y" <blockedofcourse@foo.invalid> wrote in message news:11cbjph$3e9k6$1@dont-email.me...
Yet. Perhaps they are educating their potential victims so that
when those folks are "threatened", they capitulate even if the
systems involved are not vulnerable?
I doubt it because then the food will still be frozen and will be monitored
locally to make sure it remains so.
So, the staff in the store has to add "watch the coolers" to their current >>> list of responsibilities?
Only when there is an external "threat".
But they don't know WHEN that threat will materialize. Like locking
the door to your house ONLY when you think a thief might be in the area.
How do they know if something is wonky?
Just make sure the freezers don't stay in defrost for too long.
Is there a big light that illuminates to tell them when this is happening? Or, do they have to visit the freezer to check on it?
"Just make sure no one steals anything from the store..." <grin>
And what
do they *do* about it??
Pull the cable out of the Internet provider's modem.
Will that disconnect any other systems that should REMAIN connected?
The next step is to weaponize these attacks to cause confusion and/or >>>>>>> cripple key systems and infrastructure. Imagine someone attacking >>>>>>> the cellular network, power grid, etc.
So let's hope that the people in charge of those things are getting the point
that not only do you have to install a door (firewall) you have to be aware of
exactly who or what goes in and out of the door. Otherwise there was no >>>>>> point installing the door at all. Why would a power grid in country A be >>>>>> connectable from an IP address in country B? Sure the attacker could be >>>>>> in country A (or using a proxy so that they appear to be in country A) >>>>>> but that's why you can't simply install a door and expect it to keep attackers
First step is to decide what *needs* to be accessible.
You don't get a choice about that because you didn't design the vulnerable >>>> controller yourself.
I can have a say in anything I design or advise on designs.
But you didn't design the vulnerable controller.
It may be true that you could design your own controller but most stores with
freezers don't employ their own people who could.
They should be selecting devices that address these issues from vendors
who will stand by their products (and not fall on the "we'll sell you
a new and improved version" excuse -- will THAT guard against future
hacks beyond the one we're experiencing NOW?)
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2017/07/27/criminals-hacked-a-fish-tank-to-steal-data-from-a-casino/>Many details about how the network was set up and what actually happened are missing.
Of course. It's a fluff piece. But, chances are, the folks designing
and deploying kit with "network connectivity" make the same mistakes
for a variety of rationalizations.
Now we actually
*have* formal processes (and certifications OF those processes).
And most systems can send packets to any other system in the world.
But have no *need* to do so! Or, interact with more than one (or two)
remote hosts (clients?) at a time.
I don't permit outbound to a big list of countries unless a specific IP or network is whitelisted.
If it causes me an issue I just watch the firewall log to see where the attempted outbound
connection from my PC was trying to go. I can then decide whether to whitelist it or not.
Only two of us using *this* computer and I trust us to have common sense about
where we take it.
Running a torrrent may find me talking with other hosts
anywhere on the globe -- I won't refuse their connections just based on geography (as long as the torrent pieces don't fail their hashes)
Although I don't use Facebook, other people on my network do. I haven't bothered to
whitelist these because there have been no complaints:
https://www.abuseipdb.com/check/57.144.138.5
It's clear that most people assume that no-one knows where their packets might be going
or why they are going where they are going.
Most people only look at results. I run a VPN from time to time. I'm sure SWMBO is clueless as to which country is hosting my endpoint.
So, why use software that was designed for general purpose computers
when you aren't such a device?
It's a lot cheaper than a custom design.
But "customization", in this case, is just FURTHER constraining an already constrained set of operating conditions. You're not asking for it to
do some OTHER/additional function.
I think people understand behaviors that cost them money (which can beWhen Windows first went online it was not designed to be on an
untrusted network at all.
But, most Manglement folks are still ignorant and don't understand WHY >>>>> these things are important.
Yes
They will understand when they start incurring losses and have to answer >>> to their superiors, stock-holders, customers, etc. When your competitors' >>> bottom lines are better than yours, eventually folks lose jobs.
True but I can't see anything changing. One reason is the big gap between
management and anyone who has a clue how anything works.
real dollars, lost opportunity, bad customer relations, etc.).
A cousin offered a billing service to doctors in her area. One of the initial adopters apparently didn't think they had to PAY for that
equipment (because he was well known in the area and his use of it was
like an endorsement).
When he ran out of disk space, his office called for support. (ballsy
given that he hadn't paid for the equipment -- likely wouldn't pay for
the support, either?)
When the disk was upgraded, he discovered he was locked out of his
records. For nonpayment.
Wanna litigate? And explain why you haven't paid for the original
product? How many weeks/months will you be locked out of your
business records while the case makes its way through the docket?
*She* got paid. Whether he learned anything (or WHAT he learned)
remains to be seen. But, his *actions* were altered by *her*
activities.
On 02/11/2026 18:08, Jeroen Belleman wrote:
On 11/2/26 14:15, Don Y wrote:
<https://apnews.com/article/europe-supermarkets-freezers-cyberattacks-a8ea5b30d67da47957769f29101fe686>
"...its fridges and freezers had been hacked and set to 50 degrees Celsius" >>>
And, why would a temperature controller for a FREEZER ever allow
such a high temperature? In case you wanted to convert them to
walk-in ovens???
Who *specifies* such systems and who naively implements those specifications?
[The last batch of targets used "older technology"... so, nothing
was learned in the revisions that followed?]
In the UK at least they have been tightening up security on supermarket fridges and freezers. But you are stuck with whatever
"security" the manufacturer provides - they are too expensive to replace en mass.
They're just simple programmable temperature controllers.
You wouldn't expect those to be able to detect that anything
is amiss. They should't have been accessible from the general
internet, is all.
More likely that it wasn't provided with a secure enough password for engineering remote access. Something like "engineer" pw =
"eng1neer".
Managers like remote access it makes it possible to control the whole system without having to visit the site. However, they don't
seem to have even considered that hostile actors *will* try to hack them.
I think the Binance hack is *way* more significant $6bn is a lot more!
--
Martin Brown
"John R Walliker" <jrwalliker@gmail.com> wrote in message news:11ccht5$3nbj2$1@dont-email.me...
On 03/11/2026 04:27, Edward Rawde wrote:
"Don Y" <blockedofcourse@foo.invalid> wrote in message news:11cbjph$3e9k6$1@dont-email.me...
Yet. Perhaps they are educating their potential victims so that
when those folks are "threatened", they capitulate even if the
systems involved are not vulnerable?
I doubt it because then the food will still be frozen and will be monitored
locally to make sure it remains so.
So, the staff in the store has to add "watch the coolers" to their current >>>> list of responsibilities?
Only when there is an external "threat".
How do they know if something is wonky?
Just make sure the freezers don't stay in defrost for too long.
And what
do they *do* about it??
Pull the cable out of the Internet provider's modem.
But then you can't sell anything because the payment systems will
stop working.
Better that than lose everything to defrost.
The next step is to weaponize these attacks to cause confusion and/or >>>>>>>> cripple key systems and infrastructure. Imagine someone attacking >>>>>>>> the cellular network, power grid, etc.
So let's hope that the people in charge of those things are getting the point
that not only do you have to install a door (firewall) you have to be aware of
exactly who or what goes in and out of the door. Otherwise there was no >>>>>>> point installing the door at all. Why would a power grid in country A be
connectable from an IP address in country B? Sure the attacker could be >>>>>>> in country A (or using a proxy so that they appear to be in country A) >>>>>>> but that's why you can't simply install a door and expect it to keep attackers
First step is to decide what *needs* to be accessible.
You don't get a choice about that because you didn't design the vulnerable
controller yourself.
I can have a say in anything I design or advise on designs.
But you didn't design the vulnerable controller.
It may be true that you could design your own controller but most stores with
freezers don't employ their own people who could.
As a network stack is now a commodity (30 years ago, you had to roll
your own), people think nothing of just including it in their design.
But, without really understanding how it works and what problems
it brings to a project.
Cache poisoning? SYN-flood? IP/MAC masquerading?
Can your product support a NIC running "flat out" -- even if only incoming >>>> traffic (over which you h ave no control)? How big is your ARP cache? >>>> Can I push enough endpoints at it to cause it to lose track of the
bindings that actually "make sense" for your application?
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2017/07/27/criminals-hacked-a-fish-tank-to-steal-data-from-a-casino/>
Many details about how the network was set up and what actually happened are missing.
to the access. It is also the case that someone or something has to actively
follow up on the report produced by the firewall so as to be sure whether the
access was legitimate or not. It is true that much of this can be automated but
it is also true that most places don't do it at all because no-one knows how
to do it or why it's necessary.
Convenience trumps security.
So does ignorance of why security is required.
But, drawing attention to security is often dismissed: "Who the hell would
want to hack our fishtank???"
Anyone who wants a presence on your internal network.
And one reason for this is the use of c.
In c you can easily create a buffer, but nothing tells you about checking to make sure
you haven't overfilled it.
The reason for it is lack of discipline and testing on the part of developers.
Which is never going to change.
I disagree. In the 60's, everything was "cowboy coder".
And most systems were not connected to any other system at all.
They were connected but typically with UUCP (e.g., bang mail) and BBS style
interfaces.
Now we actually
*have* formal processes (and certifications OF those processes).
And most systems can send packets to any other system in the world.
But have no *need* to do so! Or, interact with more than one (or two) >>>> remote hosts (clients?) at a time.
I don't permit outbound to a big list of countries unless a specific IP or network is whitelisted.
If it causes me an issue I just watch the firewall log to see where the attempted outbound
connection from my PC was trying to go. I can then decide whether to whitelist it or not.
Although I don't use Facebook, other people on my network do. I haven't bothered to
whitelist these because there have been no complaints:
https://www.abuseipdb.com/check/57.144.138.5
It's clear that most people assume that no-one knows where their packets might be going
or why they are going where they are going.
So, why use software that was designed for general purpose computers
when you aren't such a device?
It's a lot cheaper than a custom design.
When Windows first went online it was not designed to be on an
untrusted network at all.
But, most Manglement folks are still ignorant and don't understand WHY >>>>>> these things are important.
Yes
They will understand when they start incurring losses and have to answer >>>> to their superiors, stock-holders, customers, etc. When your competitors' >>>> bottom lines are better than yours, eventually folks lose jobs.
True but I can't see anything changing. One reason is the big gap between >>> management and anyone who has a clue how anything works.
On 03/11/2026 15:49, Edward Rawde wrote:
"John R Walliker" <jrwalliker@gmail.com> wrote in message news:11ccht5$3nbj2$1@dont-email.me...
On 03/11/2026 04:27, Edward Rawde wrote:
"Don Y" <blockedofcourse@foo.invalid> wrote in message news:11cbjph$3e9k6$1@dont-email.me...
Yet. Perhaps they are educating their potential victims so that >>>>>>> when those folks are "threatened", they capitulate even if the
systems involved are not vulnerable?
I doubt it because then the food will still be frozen and will be monitored
locally to make sure it remains so.
So, the staff in the store has to add "watch the coolers" to their current
list of responsibilities?
Only when there is an external "threat".
How do they know if something is wonky?
Just make sure the freezers don't stay in defrost for too long.
And what
do they *do* about it??
Pull the cable out of the Internet provider's modem.
But then you can't sell anything because the payment systems will
stop working.
Better that than lose everything to defrost.
That depends on the value of the frozen goods versus all the
other stuff that they have to stop selling because they can't
take payment.
However I imagine that these freezer hacks have been done at
night when there is nobody there to notice.
The next step is to weaponize these attacks to cause confusion and/or >>>>>>>>> cripple key systems and infrastructure. Imagine someone attacking >>>>>>>>> the cellular network, power grid, etc.
So let's hope that the people in charge of those things are getting the point
that not only do you have to install a door (firewall) you have to be aware of
exactly who or what goes in and out of the door. Otherwise there was no
point installing the door at all. Why would a power grid in country A be
connectable from an IP address in country B? Sure the attacker could be
in country A (or using a proxy so that they appear to be in country A) >>>>>>>> but that's why you can't simply install a door and expect it to keep attackers
First step is to decide what *needs* to be accessible.
You don't get a choice about that because you didn't design the vulnerable
controller yourself.
I can have a say in anything I design or advise on designs.
But you didn't design the vulnerable controller.
It may be true that you could design your own controller but most stores with
freezers don't employ their own people who could.
As a network stack is now a commodity (30 years ago, you had to roll >>>>> your own), people think nothing of just including it in their design. >>>>> But, without really understanding how it works and what problems
it brings to a project.
Cache poisoning? SYN-flood? IP/MAC masquerading?
Can your product support a NIC running "flat out" -- even if only incoming
traffic (over which you h ave no control)? How big is your ARP cache? >>>>> Can I push enough endpoints at it to cause it to lose track of the
bindings that actually "make sense" for your application?
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2017/07/27/criminals-hacked-a-fish-tank-to-steal-data-from-a-casino/>
Many details about how the network was set up and what actually happened are missing.
to the access. It is also the case that someone or something has to actively
follow up on the report produced by the firewall so as to be sure whether the
access was legitimate or not. It is true that much of this can be automated but
it is also true that most places don't do it at all because no-one knows how
to do it or why it's necessary.
Convenience trumps security.
So does ignorance of why security is required.
But, drawing attention to security is often dismissed: "Who the hell would
want to hack our fishtank???"
Anyone who wants a presence on your internal network.
And one reason for this is the use of c.
In c you can easily create a buffer, but nothing tells you about checking to make sure
you haven't overfilled it.
The reason for it is lack of discipline and testing on the part of developers.
Which is never going to change.
I disagree. In the 60's, everything was "cowboy coder".
And most systems were not connected to any other system at all.
They were connected but typically with UUCP (e.g., bang mail) and BBS style
interfaces.
But have no *need* to do so! Or, interact with more than one (or two) >>>>> remote hosts (clients?) at a time.Now we actually
*have* formal processes (and certifications OF those processes).
And most systems can send packets to any other system in the world. >>>>>
I don't permit outbound to a big list of countries unless a specific IP or network is whitelisted.
If it causes me an issue I just watch the firewall log to see where the attempted outbound
connection from my PC was trying to go. I can then decide whether to whitelist it or not.
Although I don't use Facebook, other people on my network do. I haven't bothered to
whitelist these because there have been no complaints:
https://www.abuseipdb.com/check/57.144.138.5
It's clear that most people assume that no-one knows where their packets might be going
or why they are going where they are going.
So, why use software that was designed for general purpose computers >>>>> when you aren't such a device?
It's a lot cheaper than a custom design.
When Windows first went online it was not designed to be on an
untrusted network at all.
But, most Manglement folks are still ignorant and don't understand WHY >>>>>>> these things are important.
Yes
They will understand when they start incurring losses and have to answer >>>>> to their superiors, stock-holders, customers, etc. When your competitors'
bottom lines are better than yours, eventually folks lose jobs.
True but I can't see anything changing. One reason is the big gap between >>>> management and anyone who has a clue how anything works.
"Don Y" <blockedofcourse@foo.invalid> wrote in message news:11ccbms$3l50o$1@dont-email.me...
On 11/2/2026 9:27 PM, Edward Rawde wrote:
"Don Y" <blockedofcourse@foo.invalid> wrote in message news:11cbjph$3e9k6$1@dont-email.me...
Yet. Perhaps they are educating their potential victims so that
when those folks are "threatened", they capitulate even if the
systems involved are not vulnerable?
I doubt it because then the food will still be frozen and will be monitored
locally to make sure it remains so.
So, the staff in the store has to add "watch the coolers" to their current >>>> list of responsibilities?
Only when there is an external "threat".
But they don't know WHEN that threat will materialize. Like locking
the door to your house ONLY when you think a thief might be in the area.
How do they know if something is wonky?
Just make sure the freezers don't stay in defrost for too long.
Is there a big light that illuminates to tell them when this is happening? >> Or, do they have to visit the freezer to check on it?
A big light which says "this freezer is in defrost" would be a good idea. Maybe use the internal lights but have them flash.
Hardware limits on length and period of defrost time and defrost
temperature would be a good idea too but that won't happen because it's
much easier to configure the hardware using software.
"Just make sure no one steals anything from the store..." <grin>
Make sure they are on camera.
And what
do they *do* about it??
Pull the cable out of the Internet provider's modem.
Will that disconnect any other systems that should REMAIN connected?
Who cares if it means the food is not defrosted.
But it's true that that is an extreme measure which a properly configured setup
should never need.
The next step is to weaponize these attacks to cause confusion and/or >>>>>>>> cripple key systems and infrastructure. Imagine someone attacking >>>>>>>> the cellular network, power grid, etc.
So let's hope that the people in charge of those things are getting the point
that not only do you have to install a door (firewall) you have to be aware of
exactly who or what goes in and out of the door. Otherwise there was no >>>>>>> point installing the door at all. Why would a power grid in country A be
connectable from an IP address in country B? Sure the attacker could be >>>>>>> in country A (or using a proxy so that they appear to be in country A) >>>>>>> but that's why you can't simply install a door and expect it to keep attackers
First step is to decide what *needs* to be accessible.
You don't get a choice about that because you didn't design the vulnerable
controller yourself.
I can have a say in anything I design or advise on designs.
But you didn't design the vulnerable controller.
It may be true that you could design your own controller but most stores with
freezers don't employ their own people who could.
They should be selecting devices that address these issues from vendors
who will stand by their products (and not fall on the "we'll sell you
a new and improved version" excuse -- will THAT guard against future
hacks beyond the one we're experiencing NOW?)
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2017/07/27/criminals-hacked-a-fish-tank-to-steal-data-from-a-casino/>Many details about how the network was set up and what actually happened are missing.
Of course. It's a fluff piece. But, chances are, the folks designing
and deploying kit with "network connectivity" make the same mistakes
for a variety of rationalizations.
The casino likely has much better security for keeping people under control when they just lost their winnings and for keeping cash under control in case an individual finds a way to try to cheat or steal it. They will also have to make
sure that only individuals above a certain age are permitted in the casino. But you don't have to be a casino manager to know that these things are necessary in a casino.
Everything changes when you introduce complex technology which operates
in ways that almost no-one understands.
The casino manager won't have been asked many questions about IT security
in their interview. Most likely it will not have been mentioned at all.
Now we actually
*have* formal processes (and certifications OF those processes).
And most systems can send packets to any other system in the world.
But have no *need* to do so! Or, interact with more than one (or two) >>>> remote hosts (clients?) at a time.
I don't permit outbound to a big list of countries unless a specific IP or network is whitelisted.
If it causes me an issue I just watch the firewall log to see where the attempted outbound
connection from my PC was trying to go. I can then decide whether to whitelist it or not.
Only two of us using *this* computer and I trust us to have common sense about
where we take it.
Computers can make decisions about what to connect to without asking the user.
Running a torrrent may find me talking with other hosts
anywhere on the globe -- I won't refuse their connections just based on
geography (as long as the torrent pieces don't fail their hashes)
I have a dedicated PC for torrents which hasn't been used for a few years.
It does not have any outbound blocking and has one port forwarded inbound.
Although I don't use Facebook, other people on my network do. I haven't bothered to
whitelist these because there have been no complaints:
https://www.abuseipdb.com/check/57.144.138.5
It's clear that most people assume that no-one knows where their packets might be going
or why they are going where they are going.
Most people only look at results. I run a VPN from time to time. I'm sure >> SWMBO is clueless as to which country is hosting my endpoint.
I haven't used Tor Browser for a long time but it's there if I have a need to be
anonymous. I don't use and don't advise anyone else to bother using the kind of "VPN" pushed by web browsers and unnecessary virus scanners.
If you do use these services my firewall likely has you already brick walled due to the abuse that these services are often used for.
I sometimes get amused when young people tell me I should use a VPN and
I could be hacked if someone else knows my IP address.
So, why use software that was designed for general purpose computers
when you aren't such a device?
It's a lot cheaper than a custom design.
But "customization", in this case, is just FURTHER constraining an already >> constrained set of operating conditions. You're not asking for it to
do some OTHER/additional function.
Customization costs money.
I think people understand behaviors that cost them money (which can beWhen Windows first went online it was not designed to be on an
untrusted network at all.
But, most Manglement folks are still ignorant and don't understand WHY >>>>>> these things are important.
Yes
They will understand when they start incurring losses and have to answer >>>> to their superiors, stock-holders, customers, etc. When your competitors' >>>> bottom lines are better than yours, eventually folks lose jobs.
True but I can't see anything changing. One reason is the big gap between >>> management and anyone who has a clue how anything works.
real dollars, lost opportunity, bad customer relations, etc.).
But they don't understand that those behaviours are caused by complex technology which they don't understand and they don't understand that
the reason they don't understand this is because they don't understand the complex technology.
Casinos have LOTS of IT specialists! Aside from the tables, all ofA cousin offered a billing service to doctors in her area. One of the
initial adopters apparently didn't think they had to PAY for that
equipment (because he was well known in the area and his use of it was
like an endorsement).
When he ran out of disk space, his office called for support. (ballsy
given that he hadn't paid for the equipment -- likely wouldn't pay for
the support, either?)
When the disk was upgraded, he discovered he was locked out of his
records. For nonpayment.
Wanna litigate? And explain why you haven't paid for the original
product? How many weeks/months will you be locked out of your
business records while the case makes its way through the docket?
*She* got paid. Whether he learned anything (or WHAT he learned)
remains to be seen. But, his *actions* were altered by *her*
activities.
Anything you don't understand must be easy and therefore there can't
be any need to pay a lot for it. So the casino doesn't need an on-site
IT specialist because no-one knows what such an individual would do.
It follows that that individual is not necessary.
"Don Y" <blockedofcourse@foo.invalid> wrote in message news:11ccq58$3qi9v$1@dont-email.me...
On 11/3/2026 6:48 AM, Waldek Hebisch wrote:
Edward Rawde <invalid@invalid.invalid> wrote:
AI Lawyers are coming. I wonder whether they will be just as bad?
I am waiting for AI lawyer to sue web sites that put those annoying
"checking that you are not a robot" boxes.
You just need an AI "captcha-bot"
<https://aibeat.co/bots-solving-captchas-better/>
Yes that's going to be interesting.
Something non-intellectual will be needed which only a physically
able human can do. But I cannot think of anything which meets that requirement which could work as a captcha replacement.
Web sites may just have to concede that they can't tell whether they
have a human visitor or not.
This is likely to increase the push to "please log in using your whatever account"
before you can access anything at all.
<https://apnews.com/article/europe-supermarkets-freezers-cyberattacks- a8ea5b30d67da47957769f29101fe686>
"...its fridges and freezers had been hacked and set to 50 degrees Celsius"
And, why would a temperature controller for a FREEZER ever allow
such a high temperature?-a In case you wanted to convert them to
walk-in ovens???
Who *specifies* such systems and who naively implements those specifications?
[The last batch of targets used "older technology"... so, nothing
was learned in the revisions that followed?]
On 11/2/2026 9:32 AM, Edward Rawde wrote:
The next step is to weaponize these attacks to cause confusion and/or
cripple key systems and infrastructure.-a Imagine someone attacking
the cellular network, power grid, etc.
Whoever released Blaster obviously waited until just after MS had
released XP Service Pack 2.
Without Blaster it's likely that this wouldn't have happened:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows_Firewall
You can still find the reason for most of those issues:
https://www.google.com/search?q="unchecked+buffer"+site%3Amicrosoft.com
And one reason for this is the use of c.
In c you can easily create a buffer, but nothing tells you about
checking to make sure
you haven't overfilled it.
The reason for it is lack of discipline and testing on the part of developers.
On 11/2/2026 11:39 AM, Edward Rawde wrote:
Remote access has always been a vulnerability.-a My Telebits relied on
"call back" to ensure folks couldn't just dial in to them from any
available telephone.-a I.e., relying on the constancy of the PSTN to effectively act as authenticator.
Yet.-a Perhaps they are educating their potential victims so that
when those folks are "threatened", they capitulate even if the
systems involved are not vulnerable?
I doubt it because then the food will still be frozen and will be
monitored
locally to make sure it remains so.
So, the staff in the store has to add "watch the coolers" to their current list of responsibilities?-a How do they know if something is wonky?-a And what
do they *do* about it??
You don't get a choice about that because you didn't design the vulnerable >>> controller yourself.
I can have a say in anything I design or advise on designs.
But you didn't design the vulnerable controller.
It may be true that you could design your own controller but most stores with freezers don't employ their own people who could.
On 11/2/2026 9:27 PM, Edward Rawde wrote:
"Don Y" <blockedofcourse@foo.invalid> wrote in message
news:11cbjph$3e9k6$1@dont-email.me...
A cousin offered a billing service to doctors in her area.-a One of the initial adopters apparently didn't think they had to PAY for that
equipment (because he was well known in the area and his use of it was
like an endorsement).
When he ran out of disk space, his office called for support.-a (ballsy
given that he hadn't paid for the equipment -- likely wouldn't pay for
the support, either?)
When the disk was upgraded, he discovered he was locked out of his
records.-a For nonpayment.
Wanna litigate?-a And explain why you haven't paid for the original product?-a How many weeks/months will you be locked out of your
business records while the case makes its way through the docket?
*She* got paid.-a Whether he learned anything (or WHAT he learned)
remains to be seen.-a But, his *actions* were altered by *her*
activities.
On 03/11/2026 15:49, Edward Rawde wrote:
"John R Walliker" <jrwalliker@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:11ccht5$3nbj2$1@dont-email.me...
And what
do they *do* about it??
Pull the cable out of the Internet provider's modem.
But then you can't sell anything because the payment systems will
stop working.
Better that than lose everything to defrost.
That depends on the value of the frozen goods versus all the
other stuff that they have to stop selling because they can't
take payment.
However I imagine that these freezer hacks have been done at
night when there is nobody there to notice.
The next step is to weaponize these attacks to cause confusion >>>>>>>>> and/or
On Tue, 3 Nov 2026 00:52:24 +1100, Bill Sloman <bill.sloman@ieee.org>
wrote:
On 3/11/2026 12:15 am, Don Y wrote:
<https://apnews.com/article/europe-supermarkets-freezers-cyberattacks-a8ea5b30d67da47957769f29101fe686>
"...its fridges and freezers had been hacked and set to 50 degrees Celsius" >>>
And, why would a temperature controller for a FREEZER ever allow
such a high temperature?-a In case you wanted to convert them to
walk-in ovens???
Who *specifies* such systems and who naively implements those
specifications?
[The last batch of targets used "older technology"... so, nothing
was learned in the revisions that followed?]
The software would presumably have blocked those high temperatures, but
it had been hacked. Fridges and freezers use heat pumps to control the
temperature and these are bi-directional.
It's unlikely that the refrigeration gear in a supermarket frozen-food
case is reversable. My fridge certainly will not heat above room temp.
Setting it to 50C just turned off the cooling.
On Mon, 2 Nov 2026 11:46:15 -0500, "Edward Rawde"
<invalid@invalid.invalid> wrote:
"john larkin" <jl@glen--canyon.com> wrote in message news:g1fheld2tgm8u9p2v964v38614dglpof7k@4ax.com...
On Tue, 3 Nov 2026 00:52:24 +1100, Bill Sloman <bill.sloman@ieee.org>
wrote:
It's unlikely that the refrigeration gear in a supermarket frozen-food
case is reversable. My fridge certainly will not heat above room temp.
Setting it to 50C just turned off the cooling.
I think you'll find they put it into defrost mode which has a heater to remove frost.
Whether or not they also overwrote software limits for length of time and maximum
temperature I do not know but if you own the controller then you can tell the
hardware to do anything you can tell it to do.
Defrost is usually some resistive elements that melt ice on the
cooling coils. It doesn't reverse the heat pump and it doesn't heat up
the frozen peas.
A reversable heat pump is expensive.
"Don Y" <blockedofcourse@foo.invalid> wrote in message news:11ccq58$3qi9v$1@dont-email.me...
On 11/3/2026 6:48 AM, Waldek Hebisch wrote:
Edward Rawde <invalid@invalid.invalid> wrote:
AI Lawyers are coming. I wonder whether they will be just as bad?
I am waiting for AI lawyer to sue web sites that put those annoying
"checking that you are not a robot" boxes.
You just need an AI "captcha-bot"
<https://aibeat.co/bots-solving-captchas-better/>
Yes that's going to be interesting.
Something non-intellectual will be needed which only a physically
able human can do. But I cannot think of anything which meets that requirement which could work as a captcha replacement.
Web sites may just have to concede that they can't tell whether they
have a human visitor or not.
This is likely to increase the push to "please log in using your
whatever account" before you can access anything at all.
On 11/2/2026 11:00 AM, someone wrote:
Another consideration you're not aware of is the international market
for these systems. Depending upon the country, and even the locale
within a single country, there are public health regulations governing
storage temperatures of the various kinds of products being
refrigerated. So making everything programmable allows the systems to
be adapted any and everywhere. They should be logging the temperature
histories too for the same compliance and liability issues.
Regardless, there are still sensible limits that can be extracted from any regulatory documentation.-a They were just sloppy and didn't install
specific limits at time of deployment (why would there even be a 50C
setting
supported on a controller deployed for a FREEZER???-a If you want to turn it OFF, then have an ON/OFF switch!)
On 11/2/2026 3:00 PM, someone wrote:
The controllers of the individual units do have limits. They were
overwritten by the hackers. You're overlooking the fact of the
controllers being universal. So a limit that may make sense as
reasonable for one particular model may be catastrophic for another
model. All the units certainly had overtemperature alarms, especially
the freezers, but they were obviously silenced or not reported on the
display. I'm pretty sure they don't want an audible alarm going off on
the store floor, so it would have to be reduced to a beep on their
display.
The "site/installation/application specific" limits shouldn't be
adjustable remotely.-a You turn a "universal product" into a
*tailored* product before deployment.
On 11/3/2026 3:47 AM, Don Y wrote:
People are just now seeing that they *are* hackable.-a It will be a bit
longer before they realize the reasons why (and, even longer to realize
how they can be used/leveraged for OTHER hacks)
<https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/attack-of-the-zombie-baby-
monitors/>
<https://github.com/jgamblin/Mirai-Source-Code>--
My boss ordered me to install a "virus" in the client computer. I just did a date check, and if six months had passed, it simulated an error and they had toWhen the ransom malware was en vogue, a friend came to me after
call maintenance. But you did not pay us, there is no maintenance.
That was with MsDOS, so trivial to fake the date, anyway.
On 2026-11-03 00:15, Don Y wrote:
On 11/2/2026 3:00 PM, someone wrote:
The controllers of the individual units do have limits. They were
overwritten by the hackers. You're overlooking the fact of the controllers >>> being universal. So a limit that may make sense as reasonable for one
particular model may be catastrophic for another model. All the units
certainly had overtemperature alarms, especially the freezers, but they were
obviously silenced or not reported on the display. I'm pretty sure they >>> don't want an audible alarm going off on the store floor, so it would have >>> to be reduced to a beep on their display.
The "site/installation/application specific" limits shouldn't be
adjustable remotely.-a You turn a "universal product" into a
*tailored* product before deployment.
The home heating of the flat I'm living at this week, is remotely managed. The
manufacturer logs many parameters of the boiler, and can adjust things. They certainly can change the temperature, but they don't. I can do the temp adjustment in my phone. I can program it somehow (I have not looked). There is
a knob in the wall I can turn and set the temperature, but nothing else (no access to the program).
This remote monitoring means that the technician comes every two years instead
of yearly. Cheaper for me.
I just hope it is secure enough.
On 2026-11-03 11:49, Don Y wrote:The hack isn't running up your electric bill but, rather, the fact that
On 11/3/2026 3:47 AM, Don Y wrote:
People are just now seeing that they *are* hackable.-a It will be a bit
longer before they realize the reasons why (and, even longer to realize
how they can be used/leveraged for OTHER hacks)
<https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/attack-of-the-zombie-baby-
monitors/>
-2It sounds useful and wondrous. It's quite possible, however, that your Internet-connected baby monitor instead spent last night teaming up with millions of other devicesrCocameras, printers, routers, speakers, air conditioners, DVRs, and morerCoto censor journalists; take down music, social
media, or movie sites such as Twitter or Netflix; sabotage open-source software
projects; knock almost a million German houses off-line; or bring down cell- phone communications in Liberia. With all this extra stealth activity, it's also running up your electricity bill.-+
...running up the electricity bill? Really?
On 2026-11-03 01:26, Don Y wrote:
On 11/2/2026 11:39 AM, Edward Rawde wrote:
Remote access has always been a vulnerability.-a My Telebits relied on
"call back" to ensure folks couldn't just dial in to them from any
available telephone.-a I.e., relying on the constancy of the PSTN to
effectively act as authenticator.
Year 2000. A technician friend demonstrated to me remotely accessing a big telephone exchange where he had worked. He only need to phone with a modem, there was no security beyond knowing the phone number.
I also saw, on other exchanges, technicians enabling password control
On 2026-11-02 18:57, Don Y wrote:Be honest. No one likes testing. And, most "testing" is just "checking to
On 11/2/2026 9:32 AM, Edward Rawde wrote:
The next step is to weaponize these attacks to cause confusion and/or
cripple key systems and infrastructure.-a Imagine someone attacking
the cellular network, power grid, etc.
Whoever released Blaster obviously waited until just after MS had
released XP Service Pack 2.
Without Blaster it's likely that this wouldn't have happened:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows_Firewall
You can still find the reason for most of those issues:
https://www.google.com/search?q="unchecked+buffer"+site%3Amicrosoft.com
And one reason for this is the use of c.
In c you can easily create a buffer, but nothing tells you about checking to
make sure
you haven't overfilled it.
The reason for it is lack of discipline and testing on the part of developers.
The developers only do the testing they are paid to do, in their paid time.
On 2026-11-02 14:15, Don Y wrote:
<https://apnews.com/article/europe-supermarkets-freezers-cyberattacks-
a8ea5b30d67da47957769f29101fe686>
"...its fridges and freezers had been hacked and set to 50 degrees Celsius" >>
And, why would a temperature controller for a FREEZER ever allow
such a high temperature?-a In case you wanted to convert them to
walk-in ovens???
It is the defrosting cycle.
Who *specifies* such systems and who naively implements those specifications?
[The last batch of targets used "older technology"... so, nothing
was learned in the revisions that followed?]
It is amazing that they did this twice, and no countermeasures were implemented
in between, or did not work.
On 11/3/2026 12:31 PM, Carlos E. R. wrote:
On 2026-11-02 18:57, Don Y wrote:Be honest.-a No one likes testing.-a And, most "testing" is just "checking to see if the latest code stanza actually does what you hope".
On 11/2/2026 9:32 AM, Edward Rawde wrote:
The next step is to weaponize these attacks to cause confusion and/or
cripple key systems and infrastructure.-a Imagine someone attacking
the cellular network, power grid, etc.
Whoever released Blaster obviously waited until just after MS had
released XP Service Pack 2.
Without Blaster it's likely that this wouldn't have happened:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows_Firewall
You can still find the reason for most of those issues:
https://www.google.com/search?q="unchecked+buffer"+site%3Amicrosoft.com >>>>
And one reason for this is the use of c.
In c you can easily create a buffer, but nothing tells you about
checking to make sure
you haven't overfilled it.
The reason for it is lack of discipline and testing on the part of
developers.
The developers only do the testing they are paid to do, in their paid
time.
REAL testing is a "pen's down" activity -- you don't twiddle the codebase while testing as that invalidates all of the tests you ran prior to
your latest "twiddle".
When your contract with a client hinges on the details of whether or
not your implementation conforms to a WRITTEN specification, it's really important to know that before the client holds your feet to the fire
(legally and morally).
[It's also a safeguard against clients who suddenly decide they want something
DIFFERENT:-a "Hey, this is what we agreed to.-a If you want to design something
ELSE, we can discuss that as a followup project.-a But, THIS project
comes to
a contractual close, first!"]
I spent less than 20% of my project time writing code.-a And, when I *am* writing, I already know what the code has to do IN DETAIL because that
was formally specified BEFORE starting to write code.
The other 80 % of the time is spent writing specifications and testing (40+40).--
So, an AI that can write code offers me very littie in terms of
productivity.
And, it likely can't *create* specifications (though it may be able to
help with the prose).
So, the big POTENTIAL win comes in testing -- a tedious, repetitive
activity (i.e., ideally suited to automating) that I would gladly
surrender to a COMPETENT surrogate.
On 11/3/2026 12:20 PM, Carlos E. R. wrote:
On 2026-11-02 14:15, Don Y wrote:
<https://apnews.com/article/europe-supermarkets-freezers-
cyberattacks- a8ea5b30d67da47957769f29101fe686>
"...its fridges and freezers had been hacked and set to 50 degrees
Celsius"
And, why would a temperature controller for a FREEZER ever allow
such a high temperature?-a In case you wanted to convert them to
walk-in ovens???
It is the defrosting cycle.
Who *specifies* such systems and who naively implements those
specifications?
[The last batch of targets used "older technology"... so, nothing
was learned in the revisions that followed?]
It is amazing that they did this twice, and no countermeasures were
implemented in between, or did not work.
Fool me once, shame on me; fool me twice...
On 2026-11-04 03:13, Don Y wrote:I learned (on someone else's dime) the cost of an "evolving specification". Weekly (2hr) status meetings with client that allowed them to be fickle with their stated goals -- led to a project timeline that kept getting extended
On 11/3/2026 12:31 PM, Carlos E. R. wrote:
On 2026-11-02 18:57, Don Y wrote:see if the latest code stanza actually does what you hope".
On 11/2/2026 9:32 AM, Edward Rawde wrote:
The next step is to weaponize these attacks to cause confusion and/or
cripple key systems and infrastructure.-a Imagine someone attacking
the cellular network, power grid, etc.
Whoever released Blaster obviously waited until just after MS had
released XP Service Pack 2.
Without Blaster it's likely that this wouldn't have happened:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows_Firewall
You can still find the reason for most of those issues:
https://www.google.com/search?q="unchecked+buffer"+site%3Amicrosoft.com >>>>>
And one reason for this is the use of c.
In c you can easily create a buffer, but nothing tells you about checking
to make sure
you haven't overfilled it.
The reason for it is lack of discipline and testing on the part of developers.
The developers only do the testing they are paid to do, in their paid time. >> Be honest.-a No one likes testing.-a And, most "testing" is just "checking to
REAL testing is a "pen's down" activity -- you don't twiddle the codebase
while testing as that invalidates all of the tests you ran prior to
your latest "twiddle".
When your contract with a client hinges on the details of whether or
not your implementation conforms to a WRITTEN specification, it's really
important to know that before the client holds your feet to the fire
(legally and morally).
[It's also a safeguard against clients who suddenly decide they want something
DIFFERENT:-a "Hey, this is what we agreed to.-a If you want to design something
ELSE, we can discuss that as a followup project.-a But, THIS project comes to
a contractual close, first!"]
I spent less than 20% of my project time writing code.-a And, when I *am*
writing, I already know what the code has to do IN DETAIL because that
was formally specified BEFORE starting to write code.
One project the specs changed as it was passed a few times down to another subcontractor layer.
An airport wanted a machine to test the lamps used for landing: they show a colour in one direction, none or another colour in another direction. They wanted the machine to say if the lamp was good or bad. They paid millions.
When it reached me, I got about a thousand euros (one month salary) and had a
fuzzy spec of drawing a graph of luminance vs direction (3D). My boss got about
20Kre4.
When we installed the machine they were appalled.
Who *specifies* such systems and who naively implements those specifications?
[The last batch of targets used "older technology"... so, nothing
was learned in the revisions that followed?]
It is amazing that they did this twice, and no countermeasures were
implemented in between, or did not work.
Fool me once, shame on me; fool me twice...
To be fair, the first time was in France, and the second on other countries.
<https://apnews.com/article/europe-supermarkets-freezers-cyberattacks- a8ea5b30d67da47957769f29101fe686>
"...its fridges and freezers had been hacked and set to 50 degrees Celsius"
On 2026-11-02 14:15, Don Y wrote:
<https://apnews.com/article/europe-supermarkets-freezers-cyberattacks-
a8ea5b30d67da47957769f29101fe686>
"...its fridges and freezers had been hacked and set to 50 degrees Celsius"
I found an article where they describe what happened, technically, but it is in
Spanish. You can read it with an automated translator, of course.
<https://www.mmadrigal.com/cuando-la-nevera-se-vuelve-un-horno-lo-que-hay- detras-de-los-ataques-a-los-supermercados-europeos/>
-a*When the fridge turns into an oven: what lies behind the attacks on European
supermarkets*
At 13:26 on 3 November, according to the messagerCOs timestamp, the Z-Pentest
Telegram channel reposted a message from NoName057(16), the pro-Russian hacktivist group known for its denial-of-service attacks (taking down a website
by flooding it with traffic). I have translated the key points from Russian.
On 11/4/2026 11:53 AM, Carlos E. R. wrote:
On 2026-11-02 14:15, Don Y wrote:
<https://apnews.com/article/europe-supermarkets-freezers-
cyberattacks- a8ea5b30d67da47957769f29101fe686>
"...its fridges and freezers had been hacked and set to 50 degrees
Celsius"
I found an article where they describe what happened, technically, but
it is in Spanish. You can read it with an automated translator, of
course.
<https://www.mmadrigal.com/cuando-la-nevera-se-vuelve-un-horno-lo-que-
hay- detras-de-los-ataques-a-los-supermercados-europeos/>
-a-a*When the fridge turns into an oven: what lies behind the attacks on
European supermarkets*
Thanks!
<https://www-mmadrigal-com.translate.goog/cuando-la-nevera-se-vuelve-un- horno-lo-que-hay-detras-de-los-ataques-a-los-supermercados-europeos/? _x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en-US&_x_tr_pto=wapp>
-a-a "REACHED (emphasis mine) temperatures of around 50 degrees Celsius for
-a-a approximately six hours".
This sounds like more than just a mechanism to dislodge built-up ice!
-a-a "in addition to the administrator password, a "daily code"
calculated from
-a-a the date. Anyone who reconstructed the formula gained access with a master
-a-a key that is renewed daily, but whose formula is the calendar."
Wow, that's almost as stupid as the old telephone "calling cards"
wherein you could bill ANY user whose phone number you knew!
Gotta wonder what the end-of-life date for your TV, DVR, thermostat,
security camera, etc. happen to be as they obviously need to be DISCARDED
at that point!
-a-a "Convenience, once again, as a backdoor"
As I've repeatedly said:-a "Convenience trumps security."
Maybe they'll lose another shitload of product -- and customer patience
-- and
FINALLY wake up to their ignorance!-a Hard to have sympathy for idiocy!
-a-a-a "REACHED (emphasis mine) temperatures of around 50 degrees Celsius for
-a-a-a approximately six hours".
This sounds like more than just a mechanism to dislodge built-up ice!
Sure, they abused the system.
-a-a-a "in addition to the administrator password, a "daily code" calculated from
-a-a-a the date. Anyone who reconstructed the formula gained access with a master
-a-a-a key that is renewed daily, but whose formula is the calendar."
Wow, that's almost as stupid as the old telephone "calling cards"
wherein you could bill ANY user whose phone number you knew!
I'm sure that when the system was designed it was thought impossible to find the formula.
Maybe someone got access to the firmware and decoded the formula via reverse engineering.
It is the sort of thing I might have designed myself in the 90's, not knowing
anything about cryptography, if my boss refused to hire an expert to do that code.
Maybe they'll lose another shitload of product -- and customer patience -- and
FINALLY wake up to their ignorance!-a Hard to have sympathy for idiocy!
It is worse: it was found afterwards that someone had hacked into the refrigeration system of blood banks in France, but an external temperature alarm triggered and they could restore the fridges to normality before they did
actual damage. They must keep some -90-#C, IIRC.
On 11/4/2026 4:50 PM, Carlos E. R. wrote:
-a-a-a "REACHED (emphasis mine) temperatures of around 50 degrees
Celsius for
-a-a-a approximately six hours".
This sounds like more than just a mechanism to dislodge built-up ice!
Sure, they abused the system.
But you have to wonder why the system would LET that happen -- for a
FREEZER
CONTROLLER.
-a-a-a "in addition to the administrator password, a "daily code"
calculated from
-a-a-a the date. Anyone who reconstructed the formula gained access with >>> a master
-a-a-a key that is renewed daily, but whose formula is the calendar."
Wow, that's almost as stupid as the old telephone "calling cards"
wherein you could bill ANY user whose phone number you knew!
I'm sure that when the system was designed it was thought impossible
to find the formula.
Anyone who has access to it (and it must be relatively simplistic if a technician can come up with a valid code on-the-spot) can leak that information.-a And, there are mechanisms to easily distribute it.
E.g., the telephone credit card code relied on clandestine channels
to share that information; no web sites on which to publish it.
So, the distribution was severely limited.
Maybe someone got access to the firmware and decoded the formula via
reverse engineering.
It is the sort of thing I might have designed myself in the 90's, not
knowing anything about cryptography, if my boss refused to hire an
expert to do that code.
Put some salt into the algorithm and write the salt ON the unit's case.
If it is intended for on-site access, then you can bend over and READ the salt while preventing anyone remote from doing so (unless they have prior knowledge of THAT unit)
Maybe they'll lose another shitload of product -- and customer
patience -- and
FINALLY wake up to their ignorance!-a Hard to have sympathy for idiocy!
It is worse: it was found afterwards that someone had hacked into the
refrigeration system of blood banks in France, but an external
temperature alarm triggered and they could restore the fridges to
normality before they did actual damage. They must keep some -90-#C, IIRC.
If you don't want to design secure systems, then put "Not to be used in
any application where the integrity of the product or process has any
value"
on the device and related product literature so the buyer won't be
surprised when there *is* no security!
Like selling doorknobs that don't contain locking mechanisms -- fine for
a closet door but usually not for much beyond that!
But you have to wonder why the system would LET that happen -- for a FREEZER >> CONTROLLER.
Why not? You are the human in control, you decide, the machine obeys. Blindly.
It is not a smart system, it is just a controller.
The machine can defrost, either by switching on a resistance coil, or by inverting some valves. You decide the temp and the time, because you know what
is in the freezer and everything. You decide.
-a-a-a "in addition to the administrator password, a "daily code" calculated from
-a-a-a the date. Anyone who reconstructed the formula gained access with a master
-a-a-a key that is renewed daily, but whose formula is the calendar."
Wow, that's almost as stupid as the old telephone "calling cards"
wherein you could bill ANY user whose phone number you knew!
I'm sure that when the system was designed it was thought impossible to find
the formula.
Anyone who has access to it (and it must be relatively simplistic if a
technician can come up with a valid code on-the-spot) can leak that
information.-a And, there are mechanisms to easily distribute it.
No, they can't. They just know that the password changes every day, somehow, and that the password for today is XYZ. They do not know what it will be tomorrow.
Someone with a brighter mind found out how to find the algorithm and predict the passwords.
Like selling doorknobs that don't contain locking mechanisms -- fine for
a closet door but usually not for much beyond that!
In the 90's, I did not put any lock on the systems I designed. There was no internet, either. I relied on the man guarding the premises.
We all did that.
Computers did not have passwords. MsDOS did not have passwords. I don't remember if Windows 95 had a password (but the one on NT was breakable).
It all depends on the year these things were designed. In the article I posted,
it says that the manufacturer had released security updates years ago. Why did
the clients not update the fridges?
But you have to wonder why the system would LET that happen -- for a
FREEZER
CONTROLLER.
Why not? You are the human in control, you decide, the machine obeys.
Blindly. It is not a smart system, it is just a controller.
Why can't I set my house thermostat to 305 degrees?-a The control algorithm doesn't care!
The machine can defrost, either by switching on a resistance coil, or
by inverting some valves. You decide the temp and the time, because
you know what is in the freezer and everything. You decide.
Why can't I shift into reverse while driving down the highway?
We build constraints into all sorts of things.-a Someone just got lazy.
-a-a-a "in addition to the administrator password, a "daily code"
calculated from
-a-a-a the date. Anyone who reconstructed the formula gained access >>>>> with a master
-a-a-a key that is renewed daily, but whose formula is the calendar." >>>>>
Wow, that's almost as stupid as the old telephone "calling cards"
wherein you could bill ANY user whose phone number you knew!
I'm sure that when the system was designed it was thought impossible
to find the formula.
Anyone who has access to it (and it must be relatively simplistic if a
technician can come up with a valid code on-the-spot) can leak that
information.-a And, there are mechanisms to easily distribute it.
No, they can't. They just know that the password changes every day,
somehow, and that the password for today is XYZ. They do not know what
it will be tomorrow.
SOMEONE has to know the formula by which the daily password is calculated
in order to tell them what today's password is -- assuming they can't
compute it "locally".
Someone with a brighter mind found out how to find the algorithm and
predict the passwords.
Like selling doorknobs that don't contain locking mechanisms -- fine for >>> a closet door but usually not for much beyond that!
In the 90's, I did not put any lock on the systems I designed. There
was no internet, either. I relied on the man guarding the premises.
We all did that.
*I* didn't.-a Because the things I was designing had high value and
you wouldn't want a casual user to be able to dick with them.
Computers did not have passwords. MsDOS did not have passwords. I
don't remember if Windows 95 had a password (but the one on NT was
breakable).
Computers were single-user machines.-a People opted to share them with the knowledge that anything could be done *to* them by the "guest user".
It all depends on the year these things were designed. In the article
I posted, it says that the manufacturer had released security updates
years ago. Why did the clients not update the fridges?
I was designing pharmaceutical, medical and industrial kit in the 80's.
Not
only did you NOT want someone to casually be able to dick with things
but you
also wanted to be able to track WHO made which changes to the process/ product
so they could be held accountable -- maybe not "fired" but definitely reeducated or reassigned based on their (in)ability to accurately interact with a particular process.
Walk away from the system for N minutes and the interface locks -- to prevent
someone interacting with it without authorization *or* identification.
I designed the software for computers that controlled electric motors
with 100KW power. Start it at the wrong moment, when somebody is
tightening nuts, and you can kill somebody.
The room had a key.
<https://apnews.com/article/europe-supermarkets-freezers-cyberattacks-a8ea5b30d67da47957769f29101fe686>
"...its fridges and freezers had been hacked and set to 50 degrees Celsius"
And, why would a temperature controller for a FREEZER ever allow
such a high temperature? In case you wanted to convert them to
walk-in ovens???
Who *specifies* such systems and who naively implements those specifications?
[The last batch of targets used "older technology"... so, nothing
was learned in the revisions that followed?]
On 2026-11-05 03:37, Don Y wrote:
But you have to wonder why the system would LET that happen -- for a FREEZER
CONTROLLER.
Why not? You are the human in control, you decide, the machine obeys.
Blindly. It is not a smart system, it is just a controller.
Why can't I set my house thermostat to 305 degrees?-a The control algorithm >> doesn't care!
Because the hardware is not capable. The hardware of industrial freezers is capable of +50-#C because the clients demand that capability for defrosting.
The machine can defrost, either by switching on a resistance coil, or by >>> inverting some valves. You decide the temp and the time, because you know >>> what is in the freezer and everything. You decide.
Why can't I shift into reverse while driving down the highway?
You can, actually.
We build constraints into all sorts of things.-a Someone just got lazy.
It costs money. Bigger software, more hours to design. It takes more capable hardware.
Ah, "closed source software". And, that software likely runs on a PC?-a-a-a "in addition to the administrator password, a "daily code" calculated
from
-a-a-a the date. Anyone who reconstructed the formula gained access with a
master
-a-a-a key that is renewed daily, but whose formula is the calendar." >>>>>>
Wow, that's almost as stupid as the old telephone "calling cards"
wherein you could bill ANY user whose phone number you knew!
I'm sure that when the system was designed it was thought impossible to >>>>> find the formula.
Anyone who has access to it (and it must be relatively simplistic if a >>>> technician can come up with a valid code on-the-spot) can leak that
information.-a And, there are mechanisms to easily distribute it.
No, they can't. They just know that the password changes every day, somehow,
and that the password for today is XYZ. They do not know what it will be >>> tomorrow.
SOMEONE has to know the formula by which the daily password is calculated
in order to tell them what today's password is -- assuming they can't
compute it "locally".
Yes, someone knows the password for tomorrow, but he does not need to know the
formula. Some closed source software tells him the next password, or the passwords for this week.
It can be that the technician is given a special clock in hardware that tells
him today's password.
Someone with a brighter mind found out how to find the algorithm and predict
the passwords.
Like selling doorknobs that don't contain locking mechanisms -- fine for >>>> a closet door but usually not for much beyond that!
In the 90's, I did not put any lock on the systems I designed. There was no
internet, either. I relied on the man guarding the premises.
We all did that.
*I* didn't.-a Because the things I was designing had high value and
you wouldn't want a casual user to be able to dick with them.
There was a person with a gun guarding the premises. The client did not ask for
passwords.
Computers did not have passwords. MsDOS did not have passwords. I don't >>> remember if Windows 95 had a password (but the one on NT was breakable).
Computers were single-user machines.-a People opted to share them with the >> knowledge that anything could be done *to* them by the "guest user".
It all depends on the year these things were designed. In the article I >>> posted, it says that the manufacturer had released security updates years >>> ago. Why did the clients not update the fridges?
I was designing pharmaceutical, medical and industrial kit in the 80's. Not >> only did you NOT want someone to casually be able to dick with things but you
also wanted to be able to track WHO made which changes to the process/ product
so they could be held accountable -- maybe not "fired" but definitely
reeducated or reassigned based on their (in)ability to accurately interact >> with a particular process.
Walk away from the system for N minutes and the interface locks -- to prevent
someone interacting with it without authorization *or* identification.
I designed the software for computers that controlled electric motors with 100KW power. Start it at the wrong moment, when somebody is tightening nuts, and you can kill somebody.
The room had a key.
On Mon, 2 Nov 2026 06:15:55 -0700, Don Y <blockedofcourse@foo.invalid>Depends how they are finding their targets. E.g., I don't think Shodan
wrote:
<https://apnews.com/article/europe-supermarkets-freezers-cyberattacks-a8ea5b30d67da47957769f29101fe686>
"...its fridges and freezers had been hacked and set to 50 degrees Celsius" >>
And, why would a temperature controller for a FREEZER ever allow
such a high temperature? In case you wanted to convert them to
walk-in ovens???
Who *specifies* such systems and who naively implements those specifications?
[The last batch of targets used "older technology"... so, nothing
was learned in the revisions that followed?]
Seems they've performed the same majestic feat on a
blood bank's chillers.
They've got alarms, so caught it in time.
Takes real genius to pull that kind of vandalism.
Just like visiting a web site tells the site what browser you are
using (and version), what OS, what fonts you have installed, etc.
Enough detail to uniquely identify your machine, even if your
IP changes.
On 11/5/2026 6:12 AM, legg wrote:
On Mon, 2 Nov 2026 06:15:55 -0700, Don Y <blockedofcourse@foo.invalid>Depends how they are finding their targets.-a E.g., I don't think Shodan reveals anything about the owner or (specific) physical location and use
wrote:
<https://apnews.com/article/europe-supermarkets-freezers-
cyberattacks-a8ea5b30d67da47957769f29101fe686>
"...its fridges and freezers had been hacked and set to 50 degrees
Celsius"
And, why would a temperature controller for a FREEZER ever allow
such a high temperature?-a In case you wanted to convert them to
walk-in ovens???
Who *specifies* such systems and who naively implements those
specifications?
[The last batch of targets used "older technology"... so, nothing
was learned in the revisions that followed?]
Seems they've performed the same majestic feat on a
blood bank's chillers.
They've got alarms, so caught it in time.
Takes real genius to pull that kind of vandalism.
of a particular type of IoT device.-a Rather, just logs the IP and some identifying information (e.g., a sign-on banner, etc.).
My ISP knows which model router I use because the router advertises
itself and he's decided that watching for those advertisements is
useful to his business.-a But, he doesn't know my name, the type of
equipment "behind" the router, my location, etc.
But, they still don't know *who* you are, where you are located,
what "other stuff" is on your network (or the computer hosting the
browser).
They can make (likely *good*) guesses -- e.g., if you're running
Windows, then you probably have solitaire on your machine (so they
could try to target *it* with malware) while the chances of
"leisure Suit Larry" being there are pretty slim.
I bought a couple of electric heaters with internet control.-a TheThe risk, there, is that -- if the heater somehow NEEDS to know where you
only way to install them is using an mobile phone app which
insists on geo-location being turned on.-a As the initial communication
uses Bluetooth which is short range the manufacturer DOES know where
the heaters were initially installed.-a This might not be where they
ended up of course.>
On 11/5/2026 4:17 AM, Carlos E. R. wrote:
On 2026-11-05 03:37, Don Y wrote:
But you have to wonder why the system would LET that happen -- for
a FREEZER
CONTROLLER.
Why not? You are the human in control, you decide, the machine
obeys. Blindly. It is not a smart system, it is just a controller.
Why can't I set my house thermostat to 305 degrees?-a The control
algorithm
doesn't care!
Because the hardware is not capable. The hardware of industrial
freezers is capable of +50-#C because the clients demand that
capability for defrosting.
But that's no reason to limit the *controller* -- if your argument is
that it
costs extra to CUSTOMIZE it (and thereby LIMIT it to the capabilities of
the plant) then why not just design a generic temperature controller
KNOWING that attepting to set it beyond the limits of the plant will just cause the "system" to fail to reach its setpoint?
[You'll note that I described a few DOZEN "customizations" that our run
of the mill household thermostat had -- including support for heat pumps, multistage heating and cooling, dehumidification, ventilation, etc. Obviously, someone spent time writing all that code and including all of those
customization hooks -- yet was competing with other "retail" thermostats
in terms of *price*!]
The machine can defrost, either by switching on a resistance coil,
or by inverting some valves. You decide the temp and the time,
because you know what is in the freezer and everything. You decide.
Why can't I shift into reverse while driving down the highway?
You can, actually.
No, you have to be very "determined" to do so.
We build constraints into all sorts of things.-a Someone just got lazy.
It costs money. Bigger software, more hours to design. It takes more
capable hardware.
See above.
Ah, "closed source software".-a And, that software likely runs on a PC?-a-a-a "in addition to the administrator password, a "daily code" >>>>>>> calculated from
-a-a-a the date. Anyone who reconstructed the formula gained access >>>>>>> with a master
-a-a-a key that is renewed daily, but whose formula is the calendar." >>>>>>>
Wow, that's almost as stupid as the old telephone "calling cards" >>>>>>> wherein you could bill ANY user whose phone number you knew!
I'm sure that when the system was designed it was thought
impossible to find the formula.
Anyone who has access to it (and it must be relatively simplistic if a >>>>> technician can come up with a valid code on-the-spot) can leak that
information.-a And, there are mechanisms to easily distribute it.
No, they can't. They just know that the password changes every day,
somehow, and that the password for today is XYZ. They do not know
what it will be tomorrow.
SOMEONE has to know the formula by which the daily password is
calculated
in order to tell them what today's password is -- assuming they can't
compute it "locally".
Yes, someone knows the password for tomorrow, but he does not need to
know the formula. Some closed source software tells him the next
password, or the passwords for this week.
And, it is simply not possible to get a copy of that software prior to
its installation or AFTER?
It can be that the technician is given a special clock in hardware
that tells him today's password.
It "could" be lots of things.-a Just as easily as it could be exactly what
I am claiming!
And, its likely (your argument) that EVERY controller uses the same
algorithm so acquiring access to one copy of it (in whatever hardware, software or algorithmic form) is sufficient to now -- and forever -- hack
all such controllers.
Someone with a brighter mind found out how to find the algorithm and
predict the passwords.
Like selling doorknobs that don't contain locking mechanisms --
fine for
a closet door but usually not for much beyond that!
In the 90's, I did not put any lock on the systems I designed. There
was no internet, either. I relied on the man guarding the premises.
We all did that.
*I* didn't.-a Because the things I was designing had high value and
you wouldn't want a casual user to be able to dick with them.
There was a person with a gun guarding the premises. The client did
not ask for passwords.
So, you opted for physical security.-a How is that any different?
You're still restricting access -- in a more visible and costly manner.
On Mon, 2 Nov 2026 06:15:55 -0700, Don Y <blockedofcourse@foo.invalid>
wrote:
<https://apnews.com/article/europe-supermarkets-freezers-cyberattacks-a8ea5b30d67da47957769f29101fe686>
"...its fridges and freezers had been hacked and set to 50 degrees Celsius" >>
And, why would a temperature controller for a FREEZER ever allow
such a high temperature? In case you wanted to convert them to
walk-in ovens???
Who *specifies* such systems and who naively implements those specifications?
[The last batch of targets used "older technology"... so, nothing
was learned in the revisions that followed?]
Seems they've performed the same majestic feat on a
blood bank's chillers.
They've got alarms, so caught it in time.
Takes real genius to pull that kind of vandalism.
On 05/11/2026 14:55, Don Y wrote:
I bought a couple of electric heaters with internet control.-a The
only way to install them is using an mobile phone app which
insists on geo-location being turned on.-a As the initial communication
uses Bluetooth which is short range the manufacturer DOES know where
the heaters were initially installed.-a This might not be where they
ended up of course.
I have driven cars with almost no
electronics besides the radio.
Carlos E. R. <robin_listas@es.invalid> wrote:
[...]
I have driven cars with almost no
electronics besides the radio.
That makes me feel old - when I learned to drive there were NO
electronics in most cars. A few luxury models had a radio (valve, of
course) but 'ordinary' cars didn't.
The first electonic device I fitted to my car was a windscreen wiper
delay circuit using a BC108 and a thyristor.
Sounds like a Honeywell, the $300 model. Thankfully, most parameters are preset
to a workable default, so it can be set up pretty fast.
Both incidents highlight the vulnerability of refrigeration systemsBut, to answer the question I posed in the subject line...
connected to remote monitoring and control software, although no
connection between the two has been established.
On 11/6/2026 4:58 PM, Nicolas Paul Colin de Glocester wrote:
Both incidents highlight the vulnerability of refrigeration systemsBut, to answer the question I posed in the subject line...
connected to remote monitoring and control software, although no
connection between the two has been established.
I suspect freezers are more noticeable.-a Would anyone notice
a "warming tray" that suddenly had been turned off, allowing
the warmed items to "cool"?
I suspect the perpetrators want to be *seen* and not just prove
(to themselves -- which would be immediately apparent once they'd
access <whatever>) that they could do these things.
If you hacked the electric grid, you'd likely evoke an
aggressive response.-a Ditto telecom or any media distribution
system.
Freezers are noticeable events without getting everyone
riled up about the breach.-a So, you can "practice" for the
time when you want to have more devastating results and
still put fear in the populace.
But, again, what is the strategic point? To "strike terror" inFreezers are noticeable events without getting everyone
riled up about the breach.-a So, you can "practice" for the
time when you want to have more devastating results and
still put fear in the populace.
As of this afternoon the French Foreign Ministry is directly accusing Iran of
being behind the cyber attacks on their fridges.
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cmg474vk6dyqo
On 11/9/2026 12:18 PM, Martin Brown wrote:
But, again, what is the strategic point?-a To "strike terror" inFreezers are noticeable events without getting everyone
riled up about the breach.-a So, you can "practice" for the
time when you want to have more devastating results and
still put fear in the populace.
As of this afternoon the French Foreign Ministry is directly accusing
Iran of being behind the cyber attacks on their fridges.
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cmg474vk6dyqo
the hearts of people who can no longer buy chocolate ice cream?
Is it just "practice" (you don't want to squander any successes on a
REAL target alerting them to your abilities and their vulnerabilities)?
Is it a manifestation of the LIMITS of their abilities?-a Or, an insinuation of what MORE they might be able to do?
Carlos E. R. <robin_listas@es.invalid> wrote:
[...]
I have driven cars with almost no
electronics besides the radio.
That makes me feel old - when I learned to drive there were NO
electronics in most cars. A few luxury models had a radio (valve, of
course) but 'ordinary' cars didn't.
The first electonic device I fitted to my car was a windscreen wiper
delay circuit using a BC108 and a thyristor.
On 07/11/2026 16:45, Don Y wrote:
On 11/6/2026 4:58 PM, Nicolas Paul Colin de Glocester wrote:
Freezers are noticeable events without getting everyone
riled up about the breach.-a So, you can "practice" for the
time when you want to have more devastating results and
still put fear in the populace.
As of this afternoon the French Foreign Ministry is directly accusing
Iran of being behind the cyber attacks on their fridges.
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cmg474vk6dyqo
On 2026-11-09 20:18, Martin Brown wrote:
On 07/11/2026 16:45, Don Y wrote:
On 11/6/2026 4:58 PM, Nicolas Paul Colin de Glocester wrote:
Freezers are noticeable events without getting everyone
riled up about the breach.a So, you can "practice" for the
time when you want to have more devastating results and
still put fear in the populace.
As of this afternoon the French Foreign Ministry is directly accusing
Iran of being behind the cyber attacks on their fridges.
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cmg474vk6dyqo
Does not ring me as believable.
Is it a manifestation of the LIMITS of their abilities?-a Or, an insinuation >> of what MORE they might be able to do?
I wouldn't underestimate their capabilities. After Stuxnet the Iranians will be
looking to inflict equivalent damage on the West at some point.
On 11/10/2026 2:50 AM, Martin Brown wrote:
Is it a manifestation of the LIMITS of their abilities?-a Or, an
insinuation
of what MORE they might be able to do?
I wouldn't underestimate their capabilities. After Stuxnet the
Iranians will be looking to inflict equivalent damage on the West at
some point.
Yes, but why do *anything* publicly?-a What is the expected gain?
Surely, citizens aren't going to cringe in fear at the prospect
of not being able to purchase ice cream.
And, the "response" doesn't likely involve many government resources.
So, there doesn't seem to be any meaningful message (unless they
thought their adversaries didn't expect them to have ANY cyber
capabilities)
I wouldn't underestimate their capabilities. After Stuxnet the Iranians will
be looking to inflict equivalent damage on the West at some point.
Yes, but why do *anything* publicly?-a What is the expected gain?
Surely, citizens aren't going to cringe in fear at the prospect
of not being able to purchase ice cream.
Publicity for their cause assuming it was them...odd that they haven't so far
claimed responsibility.
It could equally well just be some modern script kiddies aided and abetted by
an AI agent capable of mounting such an attack en masse.
Don't underestimate the number of people who rely on immediate delivery of food
when they need it. Amazon Prime etc has created an expectation in the populous
that you can have anything anytime you want it.
And, the "response" doesn't likely involve many government resources.
So, there doesn't seem to be any meaningful message (unless they
thought their adversaries didn't expect them to have ANY cyber
capabilities)
I expect a more serious one against the UK National Grid (or the US equivalent)
at some stage. Generation I "smart" meters were always a disaster waiting to happen - insecure as hell. Their only redeeming feature was that they turned into dumb meters by changing supplier and now the discontinuation of 2G/-uG signal scuppers them completely.
It is a real tale of woe - you couldn't make it up!!
https://www.theregister.com/networks/2026/11/10/smart-meters-to-cost-the-uk- billions-2g-switch-off-means-replacing-12-13-million/5308728
On 11/12/2026 11:14 AM, Martin Brown wrote:
I wouldn't underestimate their capabilities. After Stuxnet the
Iranians will be looking to inflict equivalent damage on the West at
some point.
Yes, but why do *anything* publicly?-a What is the expected gain?
Surely, citizens aren't going to cringe in fear at the prospect
of not being able to purchase ice cream.
Publicity for their cause assuming it was them...odd that they haven't
so far claimed responsibility.
So, "kicking someone in the knee" is their way of getting sympathy???
I could understand it from a terror standpoint -- get people thinking about how vulnerable they are.-a But, I would think the bar would be a bit higher to get people to REALLY notice.
Crashing their corporate server(s) likely would have been far more consequential (had it actually been an adversarial action)
It could equally well just be some modern script kiddies aided and
abetted by an AI agent capable of mounting such an attack en masse.
But, again, why freezers?-a Why not petrol pumps?-a Or, baby monitors?
Or electronic doorbells?
Is it just the lowest hanging fruit?-a Or, the first of a series of
"waves" of vulnerability exploits?
I expect a more serious one against the UK National Grid (or the US
equivalent) at some stage. Generation I "smart" meters were always a
disaster waiting to happen - insecure as hell. Their only redeeming
feature was that they turned into dumb meters by changing supplier and
now the discontinuation of 2G/-uG signal scuppers them completely.
It is a real tale of woe - you couldn't make it up!!
https://www.theregister.com/networks/2026/11/10/smart-meters-to-cost-the-uk- billions-2g-switch-off-means-replacing-12-13-million/5308728
The article doesn't make clear what loss of connectivity would mean
*beyond*
"being able to manage your own energy consumption".-a Would the meters disconnect subscriber loads if communication was lost?-a Or, would it just complicate billing?
Obviously, if everyone was suddenly disconnected from the grid, there would be panic.-a OTOH, if the provider had to dispatch an old fashioned "meter reader" I suspect customers would be far less concerned.
[I worked on the design of a meter in the late 80's and we avoided the remote
telemetry due to costs and the lack of an existing tariff that could be leveraged.-a At the time, reading a meter was worth "50p" so not a big driver
of the design]
On 11/12/2026 11:14 AM, Martin Brown wrote:
I wouldn't underestimate their capabilities. After Stuxnet the
Iranians will be looking to inflict equivalent damage on the West at
some point.
Yes, but why do *anything* publicly?-a What is the expected gain?
Surely, citizens aren't going to cringe in fear at the prospect
of not being able to purchase ice cream.
Publicity for their cause assuming it was them...odd that they haven't
so far claimed responsibility.
So, "kicking someone in the knee" is their way of getting sympathy???
I could understand it from a terror standpoint -- get people thinking about how vulnerable they are.-a But, I would think the bar would be a bit higher to get people to REALLY notice.
E.g., our local Costco (a large "warehouse club" store) suffered a power failure (some on-site equipment) and was out of service for a day or so.
But, it was just an annoyance to most folks as they were open for business the next day.
Crashing their corporate server(s) likely would have been far more consequential (had it actually been an adversarial action)
It could equally well just be some modern script kiddies aided and
abetted by an AI agent capable of mounting such an attack en masse.
But, again, why freezers?-a Why not petrol pumps?-a Or, baby monitors?
Or electronic doorbells?
Is it just the lowest hanging fruit?-a Or, the first of a series of
"waves" of vulnerability exploits?
Don't underestimate the number of people who rely on immediate
delivery of food when they need it. Amazon Prime etc has created an
expectation in the populous that you can have anything anytime you
want it.
I suspect "need" is an overstatement; maybe "want" (I doubt anyone will go hungry if they don't get their FROZEN food delivery, today)
And, the "response" doesn't likely involve many government resources.
So, there doesn't seem to be any meaningful message (unless they
thought their adversaries didn't expect them to have ANY cyber
capabilities)
I expect a more serious one against the UK National Grid (or the US
equivalent) at some stage. Generation I "smart" meters were always a
disaster waiting to happen - insecure as hell. Their only redeeming
feature was that they turned into dumb meters by changing supplier and
now the discontinuation of 2G/-uG signal scuppers them completely.
It is a real tale of woe - you couldn't make it up!!
https://www.theregister.com/networks/2026/11/10/smart-meters-to-cost-
the-uk- billions-2g-switch-off-means-replacing-12-13-million/5308728
The article doesn't make clear what loss of connectivity would mean
*beyond*
"being able to manage your own energy consumption".-a Would the meters disconnect subscriber loads if communication was lost?-a Or, would it just complicate billing?
Obviously, if everyone was suddenly disconnected from the grid, there would be panic.-a OTOH, if the provider had to dispatch an old fashioned "meter reader" I suspect customers would be far less concerned.
[I worked on the design of a meter in the late 80's and we avoided the remote
telemetry due to costs and the lack of an existing tariff that could be leveraged.-a At the time, reading a meter was worth "50p" so not a big driver
of the design]
The big problem with smart meters when they are fully smart is that it
allows the supplier to do remote disconnection of the customer (eg for
non payment of bill) without visiting the premises to pull the fuse.
Martin Brown <'''newspam'''@nonad.co.uk> wrote:An adversary likely doesn't abide by those rules. So, unless the meters
[...]
The big problem with smart meters when they are fully smart is that it
allows the supplier to do remote disconnection of the customer (eg for
non payment of bill) without visiting the premises to pull the fuse.
I don't think that is seen by the suppliers as a problem, I think it was
the main reason for installing them. There was huge pressure in the UK
to install them but it suddenly stopped when the Government made remote disconnection without due process illegal.
Crashing their corporate server(s) likely would have been far more
consequential (had it actually been an adversarial action)
It could equally well just be some modern script kiddies aided and abetted >>> by an AI agent capable of mounting such an attack en masse.
But, again, why freezers?-a Why not petrol pumps?-a Or, baby monitors?
Or electronic doorbells?
Because they (bad enough guys) found how to do it.
Is it just the lowest hanging fruit?-a Or, the first of a series of
"waves" of vulnerability exploits?
Don't underestimate the number of people who rely on immediate delivery of >>> food when they need it. Amazon Prime etc has created an expectation in the >>> populous that you can have anything anytime you want it.
I suspect "need" is an overstatement; maybe "want" (I doubt anyone will go >> hungry if they don't get their FROZEN food delivery, today)
There are flats with no kitchen. Maybe a microwave to reheat packaged portions,
or have the food ready to eat delivered from many restaurants just in time.
It is a real tale of woe - you couldn't make it up!!
https://www.theregister.com/networks/2026/11/10/smart-meters-to-cost- the- >>> uk- billions-2g-switch-off-means-replacing-12-13-million/5308728
The article doesn't make clear what loss of connectivity would mean *beyond* >> "being able to manage your own energy consumption".-a Would the meters
disconnect subscriber loads if communication was lost?-a Or, would it just >> complicate billing?
Billing would be impossible.
Maybe, they can send a meter-man to read them manually, going home by home.
-2"Smart meters are already helping millions of consumers manage their energy
and save money on bills," they told The Reg. "The transition to 4G is a planned
upgrade that will continue to deliver the benefits that smart meters already provide to households and industry."-+
This is bollocks. It doesn't help me an iota (I'm in Spain, so not the same system). The only improvement I get is I get the invoice monthly instead of bimonthly.
Yes, I can get detailed info, so what? Not actually useful.
We can get billed for different prices at different hours. This is what they actually mean: you can shift your heavy usage to the hours when it is cheaper.
If you ignore this, maybe you end paying a lot more, so not beneficial.
Obviously, if everyone was suddenly disconnected from the grid, there would >> be panic.-a OTOH, if the provider had to dispatch an old fashioned "meter
reader" I suspect customers would be far less concerned.
[I worked on the design of a meter in the late 80's and we avoided the remote
telemetry due to costs and the lack of an existing tariff that could be
leveraged.-a At the time, reading a meter was worth "50p" so not a big driver
of the design]
In Spain, I think all electricity meters can be remotely read (and possibly programmed). But they don't use phones, they use a signal transported on the AC
lines.
My water meter was improved recently so that it can be read by a meter-man withIsn't it interesting how THEY save labor costs and YOU pay more?
a handheld reader, so probably using low power BT. It was also moved to be under the street public pavement, not inside my garden.
Now they ordered that all gas meters be updated as well. They have some years,
maybe a decade, to do it. And the monthly invoice will go up half an euro.
On 11/13/2026 10:57 AM, Liz Tuddenham wrote:
Martin Brown <'''newspam'''@nonad.co.uk> wrote:
[...]
The big problem with smart meters when they are fully smart is that it
allows the supplier to do remote disconnection of the customer (eg for
non payment of bill) without visiting the premises to pull the fuse.
I don't think that is seen by the suppliers as a problem, I think it was the main reason for installing them. There was huge pressure in the UKAn adversary likely doesn't abide by those rules. So, unless the meters
to install them but it suddenly stopped when the Government made remote disconnection without due process illegal.
have had that ability permanently disabled, it is still a rich attack surface.
On 11/13/2026 4:13 AM, Carlos E.R. wrote:
Crashing their corporate server(s) likely would have been far more
consequential (had it actually been an adversarial action)
It could equally well just be some modern script kiddies aided and
abetted by an AI agent capable of mounting such an attack en masse.
But, again, why freezers?-a Why not petrol pumps?-a Or, baby monitors?
Or electronic doorbells?
Because they (bad enough guys) found how to do it.
That suggests their toolkits aren't very deep; as if they "settled"
for something instead of *targeted* something.
Is it just the lowest hanging fruit?-a Or, the first of a series of
"waves" of vulnerability exploits?
Don't underestimate the number of people who rely on immediate
delivery of food when they need it. Amazon Prime etc has created an
expectation in the populous that you can have anything anytime you
want it.
I suspect "need" is an overstatement; maybe "want" (I doubt anyone
will go
hungry if they don't get their FROZEN food delivery, today)
There are flats with no kitchen. Maybe a microwave to reheat packaged
portions, or have the food ready to eat delivered from many
restaurants just in time.
I don't think that is the case, here -- except in dorm rooms or hotels.
Most homes have a kitchen or kitchenette.-a (Most dorms likely have a
hot plate, even if it is prohibited!).
For the most part, frozen (here) tends to be convenience -- having access
to something that is perishable or out-of-season or "quick" to prepare (having been pre-prepared prior to freezing)
It is a real tale of woe - you couldn't make it up!!
https://www.theregister.com/networks/2026/11/10/smart-meters-to-
cost- the- uk- billions-2g-switch-off-means-replacing-12-13-
million/5308728
The article doesn't make clear what loss of connectivity would mean
*beyond*
"being able to manage your own energy consumption".-a Would the meters
disconnect subscriber loads if communication was lost?-a Or, would it
just
complicate billing?
Billing would be impossible.
But, that's a temporary glitch.-a Push comes to shove, an army of
"meter readers" do it the old fashioned way.-a And/or, the subscribers
are charged with doing it under fear that misreporting will just make
the NEXT reading that much larger (more costly).
Maybe, they can send a meter-man to read them manually, going home by
home.
Until a few years ago, someone walked the neighborhood monthly,
glancing at the meter (mounted by the load center on the side of the house) and typed the reading into their datalogger.-a No doubt it had been
preloaded with names and addresses in the order in which those residences would be encountered (so, the effort is little more than *walking*
the area).
I htink the newer meters are now remotely read.
Water meters likelwise went through an upgrade; instead of lifting the
(cast iron) curbside meter cover and noting the reading, an electronic transducer has been fitted (along with new metering technology to
reduce error rates).-a But, I think those are read by a vehicle
driving through the neighborhood.
That may also be the case for the electric meters.
-2"Smart meters are already helping millions of consumers manage their
energy and save money on bills," they told The Reg. "The transition to
4G is a planned upgrade that will continue to deliver the benefits
that smart meters already provide to households and industry."-+
This is bollocks. It doesn't help me an iota (I'm in Spain, so not the
same system). The only improvement I get is I get the invoice monthly
instead of bimonthly.
Yes, I can get detailed info, so what? Not actually useful.
I think it would depend on your tariff structure.-a E.g., ToU tariffs encourage the subscriber to "manually" shift their loads to off-peak hours. In reality, there isn't much of a savings in doing so -- but, there is a
big penalty for NOT doing so!
[One of the dirty little secrets about solar, here, is you end up
on a ToU tariff.-a Particularly damaging if your array can't keep up
with your demand during peak hours!]
We can get billed for different prices at different hours. This is
what they actually mean: you can shift your heavy usage to the hours
when it is cheaper. If you ignore this, maybe you end paying a lot
more, so not beneficial.
Many appliances include hooks for this, now.-a Some regions of the
country had tariffs where the provider could "control" those
loads (in times of peak demand) in exchange for some "con$ideration".
Obviously, if everyone was suddenly disconnected from the grid, there
would
be panic.-a OTOH, if the provider had to dispatch an old fashioned "meter >>> reader" I suspect customers would be far less concerned.
[I worked on the design of a meter in the late 80's and we avoided
the remote
telemetry due to costs and the lack of an existing tariff that could be
leveraged.-a At the time, reading a meter was worth "50p" so not a big
driver
of the design]
In Spain, I think all electricity meters can be remotely read (and
possibly programmed). But they don't use phones, they use a signal
transported on the AC lines.
Interfering with reading would just annoy the providers.-a To make a
real impact, you would need to annoy the *subscribers* -- disconnect their service!
My water meter was improved recently so that it can be read by aIsn't it interesting how THEY save labor costs and YOU pay more?
meter-man with a handheld reader, so probably using low power BT. It
was also moved to be under the street public pavement, not inside my
garden.
Now they ordered that all gas meters be updated as well. They have
some years, maybe a decade, to do it. And the monthly invoice will go
up half an euro.
On 12/11/2026 20:45, Don Y wrote:
On 11/12/2026 11:14 AM, Martin Brown wrote:
I wouldn't underestimate their capabilities. After Stuxnet the Iranians >>>>> will be looking to inflict equivalent damage on the West at some point. >>>>Yes, but why do *anything* publicly?-a What is the expected gain?
Surely, citizens aren't going to cringe in fear at the prospect
of not being able to purchase ice cream.
Publicity for their cause assuming it was them...odd that they haven't so >>> far claimed responsibility.
So, "kicking someone in the knee" is their way of getting sympathy???
I could understand it from a terror standpoint -- get people thinking about >> how vulnerable they are.-a But, I would think the bar would be a bit higher >> to get people to REALLY notice.
My instinct is that it is low hanging fruit/proof of concept and attacks will
scale up in severity and damage done. Today's Friday 13th Microsoft outage might even be the next example in the sequence.
Crashing their corporate server(s) likely would have been far more
consequential (had it actually been an adversarial action)
Malware locking of corporate servers took out UK retail giant Marks & Spencer
last year - their IT folk were on the ball and pulled the plug quickly to limit
damage but they still lost ~-u300M in the ensuing mess.
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c0el31nqnpvo https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c93x16zkl9do
Ransomeware is becoming big business in the blackhat community.
It could equally well just be some modern script kiddies aided and abetted >>> by an AI agent capable of mounting such an attack en masse.
But, again, why freezers?-a Why not petrol pumps?-a Or, baby monitors?
Or electronic doorbells?
Is it just the lowest hanging fruit?-a Or, the first of a series of
"waves" of vulnerability exploits?
I think both of them at once. Freezers were so trivial that pretty much anyone
could have done it even the old school script kiddies...
The article doesn't make clear what loss of connectivity would mean *beyond* >> "being able to manage your own energy consumption".-a Would the meters
disconnect subscriber loads if communication was lost?-a Or, would it just >> complicate billing?
The loss of comms makes them passive dumb meters that have to be read from time
to time. They don't send meter readers any more unless they suspect you are ripping them off. The customer is expected to read their own meter. Mine is about 12' up in the air where mains enters the house and can only be read from
a stepladder. It is Gen2 smartmeter so probably secure enough (although it is
hard to be confident of that).
The big problem with smart meters when they are fully smart is that it allows
the supplier to do remote disconnection of the customer (eg for non payment of
bill) without visiting the premises to pull the fuse.
Imagine what would happen if a peak evening domestic premises load was thrashed
on and off synchronously at say once per second...
The security on generation 1 units was risible!
[I worked on the design of a meter in the late 80's and we avoided the remote
telemetry due to costs and the lack of an existing tariff that could be
leveraged.-a At the time, reading a meter was worth "50p" so not a big driver
of the design]
The latest generation of smart meters have two modules the mains hot high current side for measurement and then the comms link module which talks to the
reporting network.
Unfortunately it still doesn't work properly in the north of England and Scotland due to inadequate investment. They use two different methods of communications mobile phone network in the south and RF elsewhere.
The latter does not work due to the north being hilly in parts!
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cq52382zd1no
It really is a national embarrassment.
I suspect "need" is an overstatement; maybe "want" (I doubt anyone will go >>>> hungry if they don't get their FROZEN food delivery, today)
There are flats with no kitchen. Maybe a microwave to reheat packaged
portions, or have the food ready to eat delivered from many restaurants just
in time.
I don't think that is the case, here -- except in dorm rooms or hotels.
Most homes have a kitchen or kitchenette.-a (Most dorms likely have a
hot plate, even if it is prohibited!).
Google says they are common in Thailand. It also says they exist in Spain and USA.
Sources:
<https://agnetwest.com/no-kitchens-future-homes/>
No Kitchens in Future Homes?
December 11, 2023This Land of Ours
Will our future homes be built without kitchens? ThatrCOs coming up on This Land
of Ours.
<https://metropolismag.com/projects/anna-puigjaner-kitchenless-home/>
This Spanish Architect Wants to Revolutionize the HomerCoby Getting Rid of Kitchens
Few spaces of the home are as coveted as the kitchen. But Anna Puigjaner is showing the way out of these wasteful private cooking boxes toward more efficient rCLsharedrCY alternatives.
<https://www.treehugger.com/alice-constance-austin-houses-without- kitchens-5201804>
Alice Constance Austin Designed Houses Without Kitchens in 1917
An underground electric railway delivered food from central kitchens to each house.
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single-kitchen_home>I think there would be a lot of resistance to that, here. Kitchens
Single-kitchen home
The single-kitchen home was a reform model of urban residential development in
which a centrally managed canteen kitchen within a multi-party house replaced
the kitchens of the individual apartments. The concept was based on the ideas
of the women's rights activist and social democrat Lily Braun. With the basic
idea of liberating women from housework, at the beginning of the 20th century
it was an explicit counter-design to the establishment of the isolated nuclear
family in mass housing. Single-kitchen houses, sometimes also called central kitchen houses, were implemented in various European large cities in isolated
and different ways until the 1950s. As key works of an idea of modern living,
some of these buildings were nominated for the European Heritage Label in 2009,
expressly as a network of common European architecture spread across various countries.
On 11/13/2026 3:47 AM, Martin Brown wrote:
On 12/11/2026 20:45, Don Y wrote:
On 11/12/2026 11:14 AM, Martin Brown wrote:
I wouldn't underestimate their capabilities. After Stuxnet the
Iranians will be looking to inflict equivalent damage on the West >>>>>> at some point.
Yes, but why do *anything* publicly?-a What is the expected gain?
Surely, citizens aren't going to cringe in fear at the prospect
of not being able to purchase ice cream.
Publicity for their cause assuming it was them...odd that they
haven't so far claimed responsibility.
So, "kicking someone in the knee" is their way of getting sympathy???
I could understand it from a terror standpoint -- get people thinking
about
how vulnerable they are.-a But, I would think the bar would be a bit
higher
to get people to REALLY notice.
My instinct is that it is low hanging fruit/proof of concept and
attacks will scale up in severity and damage done. Today's Friday 13th
Microsoft outage might even be the next example in the sequence.
Maybe air traffic control systems?
Crashing their corporate server(s) likely would have been far more
consequential (had it actually been an adversarial action)
Malware locking of corporate servers took out UK retail giant Marks &
Spencer last year - their IT folk were on the ball and pulled the plug
quickly to limit damage but they still lost ~-u300M in the ensuing mess.
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c0el31nqnpvo
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c93x16zkl9do
Ransomeware is becoming big business in the blackhat community.
Yes, but that has to target individual entities.-a And, has an
easily understood motive (money).
No one demanded a ransom for freezer-gate.-a It's like the early days
of malware where the goal was just to poke you in the eye.
It could equally well just be some modern script kiddies aided and
abetted by an AI agent capable of mounting such an attack en masse.
But, again, why freezers?-a Why not petrol pumps?-a Or, baby monitors?
Or electronic doorbells?
Is it just the lowest hanging fruit?-a Or, the first of a series of
"waves" of vulnerability exploits?
I think both of them at once. Freezers were so trivial that pretty
much anyone could have done it even the old school script kiddies...
We'll see.-a It has value in that it makes it clear to "people in charge" (and "people with stakes") that they are vulnerable.-a But, in most cases, people seem to think it will never be "them".
I had a laughable discussion with my MD about the security of their IT systems:
"Oh, we have a really GOOD staff!"-a (Wow, are you THAT naive to think
the BEST
folks are working for you and not banks, tech companies, etc.?)
This, despite one of the imaging companies, here, repeatedly being hacked.
(I guess they must not hire "really GOOD staff"?)
The article doesn't make clear what loss of connectivity would mean
*beyond*
"being able to manage your own energy consumption".-a Would the meters
disconnect subscriber loads if communication was lost?-a Or, would it
just
complicate billing?
The loss of comms makes them passive dumb meters that have to be read
from time to time. They don't send meter readers any more unless they
suspect you are ripping them off. The customer is expected to read
their own meter. Mine is about 12' up in the air where mains enters
the house and can only be read from a stepladder. It is Gen2
smartmeter so probably secure enough (although it is hard to be
confident of that).
In the past, ours were read semiregularly.-a "Estimated" if not read.
And, from time to time, WE were asked to read it (just draw the
positions of the indicators on the dials and THEY would interpret).
I think there is some legislative requirement that they have to
actually read them periodically to ensure fairness in billing.
Meters (gas, electric, water) tend to be in varying locations and
some folks have theirs in "secured" areas.-a So, reading can be
costly for a human reader (who has to gain entry to those areas)
The big problem with smart meters when they are fully smart is that it
allows the supplier to do remote disconnection of the customer (eg for
non payment of bill) without visiting the premises to pull the fuse.
When I was designing meter, the disconnect feature was too costly
to implement (100A+ on two conductors).-a The meter itself is the
"fuse" so it is removed when service is disconnected.-a A locking
ring holds the meter to the mating socket and the meter is replaced by
a blank cover (to protect from the bare line contacts) when it
is removed -- still secured by said ring)
Imagine what would happen if a peak evening domestic premises load was
thrashed on and off synchronously at say once per second...
I would question whether or not they could affect such control
over that many loads at that rate.-a It would seem an overprovisioned communication channel if such a "rare" event could be signalled
that often.
The security on generation 1 units was risible!
But that's true of most electronic devices.-a Security is most often
an afterthought.
Connectivity, decades ago, was largely point-to-point (serial ports,
HDLC, etc.)-a So, getting physical access to the "conductor" was
often a high enough hurdle.
Now, people put NICs in damn near everything, never thinking that
THEIR device would ever be hacked ("Who would want to hack a
'scope?"-a Ans:-a someone who wants to hack something ELSE in
that lab!)
[I worked on the design of a meter in the late 80's and we avoided
the remote
telemetry due to costs and the lack of an existing tariff that could be
leveraged.-a At the time, reading a meter was worth "50p" so not a big
driver
of the design]
The latest generation of smart meters have two modules the mains hot
high current side for measurement and then the comms link module which
talks to the reporting network.
Unfortunately it still doesn't work properly in the north of England
and Scotland due to inadequate investment. They use two different
methods of communications mobile phone network in the south and RF
elsewhere.
The latter does not work due to the north being hilly in parts!
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cq52382zd1no
It really is a national embarrassment.
Shoot the engineer?-a Or, the clown who specified the system??
I could understand it from a terror standpoint -- get people thinking about
how vulnerable they are.-a But, I would think the bar would be a bit higher
to get people to REALLY notice.
My instinct is that it is low hanging fruit/proof of concept and attacks >>> will scale up in severity and damage done. Today's Friday 13th Microsoft >>> outage might even be the next example in the sequence.
Maybe air traffic control systems?
That appears to be a coincidence and a manifestation of the pay peanuts get monkeys problem.
Yes, but that has to target individual entities.-a And, has an
easily understood motive (money).
No one demanded a ransom for freezer-gate.-a It's like the early days
of malware where the goal was just to poke you in the eye.
Indeed. It effectively launched the third party AV industry.
We'll see.-a It has value in that it makes it clear to "people in charge"
(and "people with stakes") that they are vulnerable.-a But, in most cases, >> people seem to think it will never be "them".
I had a laughable discussion with my MD about the security of their IT systems:
"Oh, we have a really GOOD staff!"-a (Wow, are you THAT naive to think the BEST
folks are working for you and not banks, tech companies, etc.?)
Have you seen the North Korean "FaceStealer" one that uses an AI fake zoom meeting with someone senior and known to you to get enough video to fake you to
someone else? It is making the news in Japan at the moment and several fairly
high profile cyber experts have fallen for it.
https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/news/20261113de75641/
About $400M stolen so far and its still running.
This, despite one of the imaging companies, here, repeatedly being hacked. >> (I guess they must not hire "really GOOD staff"?)
It is remarkably easy to get hacked if the workplace culture isn't right. I allowed a whole day for delousing our Korean office every trip.
In the past, ours were read semiregularly.-a "Estimated" if not read.
And, from time to time, WE were asked to read it (just draw the
positions of the indicators on the dials and THEY would interpret).
I think there is some legislative requirement that they have to
actually read them periodically to ensure fairness in billing.
You still have dials on the meters? Electromechanical ones have been long gone
here. Mine even wrapped around before it was replaced.
Meters (gas, electric, water) tend to be in varying locations and
some folks have theirs in "secured" areas.-a So, reading can be
costly for a human reader (who has to gain entry to those areas)
We have somewhat insane water and sewerage arrangements where I live being on
the cusp of a watershed. Water comes to us from Northumbria (essentially limitless supply) but sewage goes to Yorkshire.
The upshot is the Yorkshire Water can never find the incoming water meter which
belongs to Northumbria and so do crazy estimates!
The big problem with smart meters when they are fully smart is that it
allows the supplier to do remote disconnection of the customer (eg for non >>> payment of bill) without visiting the premises to pull the fuse.
When I was designing meter, the disconnect feature was too costly
to implement (100A+ on two conductors).-a The meter itself is the
"fuse" so it is removed when service is disconnected.-a A locking
ring holds the meter to the mating socket and the meter is replaced by
a blank cover (to protect from the bare line contacts) when it
is removed -- still secured by said ring)
There is a separate 100/80/60A fuse on live of a UK domestic 240v installation.
Most towns and cities are three phase, my village is only two opposite phases
and neutral which isn't common any more. >
Imagine what would happen if a peak evening domestic premises load was
thrashed on and off synchronously at say once per second...
I would question whether or not they could affect such control
over that many loads at that rate.-a It would seem an overprovisioned
communication channel if such a "rare" event could be signalled
that often.
I don't know what it is capable of - the specification is unclear.
The security on generation 1 units was risible!
But that's true of most electronic devices.-a Security is most often
an afterthought.
Connectivity, decades ago, was largely point-to-point (serial ports,
HDLC, etc.)-a So, getting physical access to the "conductor" was
often a high enough hurdle.
They were rolled out late enough that it should have been obvious that they needed to be secure (but weren't). Doing something to roll them out immediately
was seen as far more important than doing the right thing.
Now, people put NICs in damn near everything, never thinking that
THEIR device would ever be hacked ("Who would want to hack a
'scope?"-a Ans:-a someone who wants to hack something ELSE in
that lab!)
I was amusing to find a Wifi chipset in my microwave oven when the service engineer had it in bits.
My limited experience with british culture suggests the higher upsUnfortunately it still doesn't work properly in the north of England and >>> Scotland due to inadequate investment. They use two different methods of >>> communications mobile phone network in the south and RF elsewhere.
The latter does not work due to the north being hilly in parts!
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cq52382zd1no
It really is a national embarrassment.
Shoot the engineer?-a Or, the clown who specified the system??
I expect the engineers knew perfectly well that it wouldn't work but were overruled by the bean counters and the management suits.
On 11/13/2026 1:47 PM, Carlos E.R. wrote:
I think there would be a lot of resistance to that, here.-a KitchensI suspect "need" is an overstatement; maybe "want" (I doubt anyone
will go
hungry if they don't get their FROZEN food delivery, today)
There are flats with no kitchen. Maybe a microwave to reheat
packaged portions, or have the food ready to eat delivered from many
restaurants just in time.
I don't think that is the case, here -- except in dorm rooms or hotels.
Most homes have a kitchen or kitchenette.-a (Most dorms likely have a
hot plate, even if it is prohibited!).
Google says they are common in Thailand. It also says they exist in
Spain and USA.
Sources:
<https://agnetwest.com/no-kitchens-future-homes/>
No Kitchens in Future Homes?
December 11, 2023This Land of Ours
Will our future homes be built without kitchens? ThatrCOs coming up on
This Land of Ours.
<https://metropolismag.com/projects/anna-puigjaner-kitchenless-home/>
This Spanish Architect Wants to Revolutionize the HomerCoby Getting Rid
of Kitchens
Few spaces of the home are as coveted as the kitchen. But Anna
Puigjaner is showing the way out of these wasteful private cooking
boxes toward more efficient rCLsharedrCY alternatives.
<https://www.treehugger.com/alice-constance-austin-houses-without-
kitchens-5201804>
Alice Constance Austin Designed Houses Without Kitchens in 1917
An underground electric railway delivered food from central kitchens
to each house.
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single-kitchen_home>
Single-kitchen home
The single-kitchen home was a reform model of urban residential
development in which a centrally managed canteen kitchen within a
multi-party house replaced the kitchens of the individual apartments.
The concept was based on the ideas of the women's rights activist and
social democrat Lily Braun. With the basic idea of liberating women
from housework, at the beginning of the 20th century it was an
explicit counter-design to the establishment of the isolated nuclear
family in mass housing. Single-kitchen houses, sometimes also called
central kitchen houses, were implemented in various European large
cities in isolated and different ways until the 1950s. As key works of
an idea of modern living, some of these buildings were nominated for
the European Heritage Label in 2009, expressly as a network of common
European architecture spread across various countries.
are one of the most "gifted" rooms in a home -- appliances, gadgets,
etc.
You will still end up with some sort of place to store foodstuffs and
the means to eat them (and some limited means of preparing them).
Hard to imagine refrigerators, freezers, ice makers, etc. going away.
And, with young people struggling to *afford* a home, it's hard
to believe they would "dine out" at a higher price vs. prepping
their own meals.-a E.g., a purchased $15 burger is a bit
excessive if you can't make your mortgage payment!
The big problem with smart meters when they are fully smart is that it
allows the supplier to do remote disconnection of the customer (eg for
non payment of bill) without visiting the premises to pull the fuse.
When I was designing meter, the disconnect feature was too costly
to implement (100A+ on two conductors).-a The meter itself is the
"fuse" so it is removed when service is disconnected.-a A locking
ring holds the meter to the mating socket and the meter is replaced by
a blank cover (to protect from the bare line contacts) when it
is removed -- still secured by said ring)
On 2026-11-14 09:18, Don Y wrote:
On 11/13/2026 1:47 PM, Carlos E.R. wrote:
I think there would be a lot of resistance to that, here.-a KitchensI suspect "need" is an overstatement; maybe "want" (I doubt anyone will go
hungry if they don't get their FROZEN food delivery, today)
There are flats with no kitchen. Maybe a microwave to reheat packaged >>>>> portions, or have the food ready to eat delivered from many restaurants >>>>> just in time.
I don't think that is the case, here -- except in dorm rooms or hotels. >>>> Most homes have a kitchen or kitchenette.-a (Most dorms likely have a
hot plate, even if it is prohibited!).
Google says they are common in Thailand. It also says they exist in Spain >>> and USA.
Sources:
<https://agnetwest.com/no-kitchens-future-homes/>
No Kitchens in Future Homes?
December 11, 2023This Land of Ours
Will our future homes be built without kitchens? ThatrCOs coming up on This
Land of Ours.
<https://metropolismag.com/projects/anna-puigjaner-kitchenless-home/>
This Spanish Architect Wants to Revolutionize the HomerCoby Getting Rid of >>> Kitchens
Few spaces of the home are as coveted as the kitchen. But Anna Puigjaner is
showing the way out of these wasteful private cooking boxes toward more >>> efficient rCLsharedrCY alternatives.
<https://www.treehugger.com/alice-constance-austin-houses-without-
kitchens-5201804>
Alice Constance Austin Designed Houses Without Kitchens in 1917
An underground electric railway delivered food from central kitchens to each
house.
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single-kitchen_home>
Single-kitchen home
The single-kitchen home was a reform model of urban residential development
in which a centrally managed canteen kitchen within a multi-party house >>> replaced the kitchens of the individual apartments. The concept was based on
the ideas of the women's rights activist and social democrat Lily Braun. >>> With the basic idea of liberating women from housework, at the beginning of
the 20th century it was an explicit counter-design to the establishment of >>> the isolated nuclear family in mass housing. Single-kitchen houses,
sometimes also called central kitchen houses, were implemented in various >>> European large cities in isolated and different ways until the 1950s. As key
works of an idea of modern living, some of these buildings were nominated >>> for the European Heritage Label in 2009, expressly as a network of common >>> European architecture spread across various countries.
are one of the most "gifted" rooms in a home -- appliances, gadgets,
etc.
You will still end up with some sort of place to store foodstuffs and
the means to eat them (and some limited means of preparing them).
Hard to imagine refrigerators, freezers, ice makers, etc. going away.
And, with young people struggling to *afford* a home, it's hard
to believe they would "dine out" at a higher price vs. prepping
their own meals.-a E.g., a purchased $15 burger is a bit
excessive if you can't make your mortgage payment!
A comunal kitchen that prepares the same dinner for everybody, is cheaper than
20 kitchens with their food stores.
Frozen food or ready to eat packages are not that expensive.
On 2026-11-14 04:56, Don Y wrote:
The big problem with smart meters when they are fully smart is that it
allows the supplier to do remote disconnection of the customer (eg for non >>> payment of bill) without visiting the premises to pull the fuse.
When I was designing meter, the disconnect feature was too costly
to implement (100A+ on two conductors).-a The meter itself is the
"fuse" so it is removed when service is disconnected.-a A locking
ring holds the meter to the mating socket and the meter is replaced by
a blank cover (to protect from the bare line contacts) when it
is removed -- still secured by said ring)
In the case of Spain, the meter has the ability to limit the Amps. It can switch off.
This is because the contract with the utility says how many Amps the client contracts, in steps of 5A, but written in Watts. And the monthly receipt charges an amount that is proportional to the number of days and the Watts. Thus we try to contract the minimum we can live with. I have 10A total because
it is a very old contract, but typical would be 20A.
The meter can be programmed remotely to a number or amps. If the limit is 15 and you draw more, it triggers and powers off the house for some time.
(I have a 10A contract, but the limiter seems to have a lower limit of 15, not
10).
Thus, they also have the ability to remotely switch off a client. Some clients
would then remove the meter and put a jumper, if they can access it.
On 11/14/2026 1:59 PM, Carlos E.R. wrote:
On 2026-11-14 04:56, Don Y wrote:
The big problem with smart meters when they are fully smart is that
it allows the supplier to do remote disconnection of the customer
(eg for non payment of bill) without visiting the premises to pull
the fuse.
When I was designing meter, the disconnect feature was too costly
to implement (100A+ on two conductors).-a The meter itself is the
"fuse" so it is removed when service is disconnected.-a A locking
ring holds the meter to the mating socket and the meter is replaced by
a blank cover (to protect from the bare line contacts) when it
is removed -- still secured by said ring)
In the case of Spain, the meter has the ability to limit the Amps. It
can switch off.
This is because the contract with the utility says how many Amps the
client contracts, in steps of 5A, but written in Watts. And the
monthly receipt charges an amount that is proportional to the number
of days and the Watts. Thus we try to contract the minimum we can live
with. I have 10A total because it is a very old contract, but typical
would be 20A.
The meter can be programmed remotely to a number or amps. If the limit
is 15 and you draw more, it triggers and powers off the house for some
time.
(I have a 10A contract, but the limiter seems to have a lower limit of
15, not 10).
A typical home, here, will have a 100A or 200A service.
Our "quiescent load" is probably close to 1000W (the house is
always active so there is no time when everything is "off";
there are usually 3 or 4 computers running, TV, etc.)
The air conditioner draws 15A @ 220VAC -- plus another kilowatt
for the blower motor.
The electric range/oven draws up to 3KW per stovetop burner;
probably comparable for the elements inside the ovens.
A hand-held hair dryer, 1000W.-a Ditto for a toaster.-a Or electric
frying pan.
[Each of my workstations has an 1100W power supply -- though that
isn't taxed significantly in any of them]
Thus, they also have the ability to remotely switch off a client. Some
clients would then remove the meter and put a jumper, if they can
access it.
A typical home, here, will have a 100A or 200A service.
Our "quiescent load" is probably close to 1000W (the house is
always active so there is no time when everything is "off";
there are usually 3 or 4 computers running, TV, etc.)
The air conditioner draws 15A @ 220VAC -- plus another kilowatt
for the blower motor.
Mine draws 200..300 watts to maintain the temperature. Cools 3 rooms. Can draw
up to 1200 W when the temp difference is "big".
Computers draw little. The biggest may be 100..200 watts normally, but I haven't measured it recently.
Standby things, maybe 50.
The electric range/oven draws up to 3KW per stovetop burner;
probably comparable for the elements inside the ovens.
I have to use one at a time, so 1 KW.
A hand-held hair dryer, 1000W.-a Ditto for a toaster.-a Or electric
frying pan.
Wait for your turn. :-)
My house is a special case. Typical house can have 15..25A. It is your choice,
but you pay for it. So, you choose as little as you can make with.
[Each of my workstations has an 1100W power supply -- though that
isn't taxed significantly in any of them]
Thus, they also have the ability to remotely switch off a client. Some
clients would then remove the meter and put a jumper, if they can access it.
| Sysop: | Amessyroom |
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