• Re: So, what is it about freezers that's so appealing?

    From Don Y@blockedofcourse@foo.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Mon Nov 2 20:18:05 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    Yet. Perhaps they are educating their potential victims so that
    when those folks are "threatened", they capitulate even if the
    systems involved are not vulnerable?

    I doubt it because then the food will still be frozen and will be monitored locally to make sure it remains so.

    So, the staff in the store has to add "watch the coolers" to their current
    list of responsibilities? How do they know if something is wonky? And what
    do they *do* about it??

    The next step is to weaponize these attacks to cause confusion and/or
    cripple key systems and infrastructure. Imagine someone attacking
    the cellular network, power grid, etc.

    So let's hope that the people in charge of those things are getting the point
    that not only do you have to install a door (firewall) you have to be aware of
    exactly who or what goes in and out of the door. Otherwise there was no
    point installing the door at all. Why would a power grid in country A be >>> connectable from an IP address in country B? Sure the attacker could be
    in country A (or using a proxy so that they appear to be in country A)
    but that's why you can't simply install a door and expect it to keep attackers

    First step is to decide what *needs* to be accessible.

    You don't get a choice about that because you didn't design the vulnerable controller yourself.

    I can have a say in anything I design or advise on designs.

    As a network stack is now a commodity (30 years ago, you had to roll
    your own), people think nothing of just including it in their design.
    But, without really understanding how it works and what problems
    it brings to a project.

    Cache poisoning? SYN-flood? IP/MAC masquerading?

    Can your product support a NIC running "flat out" -- even if only incoming traffic (over which you h ave no control)? How big is your ARP cache?
    Can I push enough endpoints at it to cause it to lose track of the
    bindings that actually "make sense" for your application?

    <https://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2017/07/27/criminals-hacked-a-fish-tank-to-steal-data-from-a-casino/>

    to the access. It is also the case that someone or something has to actively
    follow up on the report produced by the firewall so as to be sure whether the
    access was legitimate or not. It is true that much of this can be automated but
    it is also true that most places don't do it at all because no-one knows how
    to do it or why it's necessary.

    Convenience trumps security.

    So does ignorance of why security is required.

    But, drawing attention to security is often dismissed: "Who the hell would want to hack our fishtank???"

    And one reason for this is the use of c.
    In c you can easily create a buffer, but nothing tells you about checking to make sure
    you haven't overfilled it.

    The reason for it is lack of discipline and testing on the part of developers.

    Which is never going to change.

    I disagree. In the 60's, everything was "cowboy coder".

    And most systems were not connected to any other system at all.

    They were connected but typically with UUCP (e.g., bang mail) and BBS style interfaces.

    Now we actually
    *have* formal processes (and certifications OF those processes).

    And most systems can send packets to any other system in the world.

    But have no *need* to do so! Or, interact with more than one (or two)
    remote hosts (clients?) at a time.

    So, why use software that was designed for general purpose computers
    when you aren't such a device?

    When Windows first went online it was not designed to be on an
    untrusted network at all.

    But, most Manglement folks are still ignorant and don't understand WHY
    these things are important.

    Yes

    They will understand when they start incurring losses and have to answer
    to their superiors, stock-holders, customers, etc. When your competitors' bottom lines are better than yours, eventually folks lose jobs.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Edward Rawde@invalid@invalid.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Mon Nov 2 23:27:05 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    "Don Y" <blockedofcourse@foo.invalid> wrote in message news:11cbjph$3e9k6$1@dont-email.me...
    Yet. Perhaps they are educating their potential victims so that
    when those folks are "threatened", they capitulate even if the
    systems involved are not vulnerable?

    I doubt it because then the food will still be frozen and will be monitored >> locally to make sure it remains so.

    So, the staff in the store has to add "watch the coolers" to their current list of responsibilities?

    Only when there is an external "threat".

    How do they know if something is wonky?

    Just make sure the freezers don't stay in defrost for too long.

    And what
    do they *do* about it??

    Pull the cable out of the Internet provider's modem.


    The next step is to weaponize these attacks to cause confusion and/or >>>>> cripple key systems and infrastructure. Imagine someone attacking
    the cellular network, power grid, etc.

    So let's hope that the people in charge of those things are getting the point
    that not only do you have to install a door (firewall) you have to be aware of
    exactly who or what goes in and out of the door. Otherwise there was no >>>> point installing the door at all. Why would a power grid in country A be >>>> connectable from an IP address in country B? Sure the attacker could be >>>> in country A (or using a proxy so that they appear to be in country A) >>>> but that's why you can't simply install a door and expect it to keep attackers

    First step is to decide what *needs* to be accessible.

    You don't get a choice about that because you didn't design the vulnerable >> controller yourself.

    I can have a say in anything I design or advise on designs.

    But you didn't design the vulnerable controller.
    It may be true that you could design your own controller but most stores with freezers don't employ their own people who could.


    As a network stack is now a commodity (30 years ago, you had to roll
    your own), people think nothing of just including it in their design.
    But, without really understanding how it works and what problems
    it brings to a project.

    Cache poisoning? SYN-flood? IP/MAC masquerading?

    Can your product support a NIC running "flat out" -- even if only incoming traffic (over which you h ave no control)? How big is your ARP cache?
    Can I push enough endpoints at it to cause it to lose track of the
    bindings that actually "make sense" for your application?

    <https://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2017/07/27/criminals-hacked-a-fish-tank-to-steal-data-from-a-casino/>

    Many details about how the network was set up and what actually happened are missing.


    to the access. It is also the case that someone or something has to actively
    follow up on the report produced by the firewall so as to be sure whether the
    access was legitimate or not. It is true that much of this can be automated but
    it is also true that most places don't do it at all because no-one knows how
    to do it or why it's necessary.

    Convenience trumps security.

    So does ignorance of why security is required.

    But, drawing attention to security is often dismissed: "Who the hell would want to hack our fishtank???"

    Anyone who wants a presence on your internal network.


    And one reason for this is the use of c.
    In c you can easily create a buffer, but nothing tells you about checking to make sure
    you haven't overfilled it.

    The reason for it is lack of discipline and testing on the part of developers.

    Which is never going to change.

    I disagree. In the 60's, everything was "cowboy coder".

    And most systems were not connected to any other system at all.

    They were connected but typically with UUCP (e.g., bang mail) and BBS style interfaces.

    Now we actually
    *have* formal processes (and certifications OF those processes).

    And most systems can send packets to any other system in the world.

    But have no *need* to do so! Or, interact with more than one (or two)
    remote hosts (clients?) at a time.

    I don't permit outbound to a big list of countries unless a specific IP or network is whitelisted.
    If it causes me an issue I just watch the firewall log to see where the attempted outbound
    connection from my PC was trying to go. I can then decide whether to whitelist it or not.
    Although I don't use Facebook, other people on my network do. I haven't bothered to
    whitelist these because there have been no complaints: https://www.abuseipdb.com/check/57.144.138.5
    It's clear that most people assume that no-one knows where their packets might be going
    or why they are going where they are going.


    So, why use software that was designed for general purpose computers
    when you aren't such a device?

    It's a lot cheaper than a custom design.


    When Windows first went online it was not designed to be on an
    untrusted network at all.

    But, most Manglement folks are still ignorant and don't understand WHY
    these things are important.

    Yes

    They will understand when they start incurring losses and have to answer
    to their superiors, stock-holders, customers, etc. When your competitors' bottom lines are better than yours, eventually folks lose jobs.

    True but I can't see anything changing. One reason is the big gap between management and anyone who has a clue how anything works.


    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Martin Brown@'''newspam'''@nonad.co.uk to sci.electronics.design on Tue Nov 3 10:01:43 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 02/11/2026 18:08, Jeroen Belleman wrote:
    On 11/2/26 14:15, Don Y wrote:
    <https://apnews.com/article/europe-supermarkets-freezers-cyberattacks-a8ea5b30d67da47957769f29101fe686>

    "...its fridges and freezers had been hacked and set to 50 degrees
    Celsius"

    And, why would a temperature controller for a FREEZER ever allow
    such a high temperature?-a In case you wanted to convert them to
    walk-in ovens???

    Who *specifies* such systems and who naively implements those
    specifications?

    [The last batch of targets used "older technology"... so, nothing
    was learned in the revisions that followed?]

    In the UK at least they have been tightening up security on supermarket fridges and freezers. But you are stuck with whatever "security" the manufacturer provides - they are too expensive to replace en mass.

    They're just simple programmable temperature controllers.
    You wouldn't expect those to be able to detect that anything
    is amiss. They should't have been accessible from the general
    internet, is all.

    More likely that it wasn't provided with a secure enough password for engineering remote access. Something like "engineer" pw = "eng1neer".

    Managers like remote access it makes it possible to control the whole
    system without having to visit the site. However, they don't seem to
    have even considered that hostile actors *will* try to hack them.

    I think the Binance hack is *way* more significant $6bn is a lot more!
    --
    Martin Brown

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Don Y@blockedofcourse@foo.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Tue Nov 3 03:06:17 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 11/2/2026 9:27 PM, Edward Rawde wrote:
    "Don Y" <blockedofcourse@foo.invalid> wrote in message news:11cbjph$3e9k6$1@dont-email.me...
    Yet. Perhaps they are educating their potential victims so that
    when those folks are "threatened", they capitulate even if the
    systems involved are not vulnerable?

    I doubt it because then the food will still be frozen and will be monitored >>> locally to make sure it remains so.

    So, the staff in the store has to add "watch the coolers" to their current >> list of responsibilities?

    Only when there is an external "threat".

    But they don't know WHEN that threat will materialize. Like locking
    the door to your house ONLY when you think a thief might be in the area.

    How do they know if something is wonky?

    Just make sure the freezers don't stay in defrost for too long.

    Is there a big light that illuminates to tell them when this is happening?
    Or, do they have to visit the freezer to check on it?

    "Just make sure no one steals anything from the store..." <grin>

    And what
    do they *do* about it??

    Pull the cable out of the Internet provider's modem.

    Will that disconnect any other systems that should REMAIN connected?

    The next step is to weaponize these attacks to cause confusion and/or >>>>>> cripple key systems and infrastructure. Imagine someone attacking >>>>>> the cellular network, power grid, etc.

    So let's hope that the people in charge of those things are getting the point
    that not only do you have to install a door (firewall) you have to be aware of
    exactly who or what goes in and out of the door. Otherwise there was no >>>>> point installing the door at all. Why would a power grid in country A be >>>>> connectable from an IP address in country B? Sure the attacker could be >>>>> in country A (or using a proxy so that they appear to be in country A) >>>>> but that's why you can't simply install a door and expect it to keep attackers

    First step is to decide what *needs* to be accessible.

    You don't get a choice about that because you didn't design the vulnerable >>> controller yourself.

    I can have a say in anything I design or advise on designs.

    But you didn't design the vulnerable controller.
    It may be true that you could design your own controller but most stores with freezers don't employ their own people who could.

    They should be selecting devices that address these issues from vendors
    who will stand by their products (and not fall on the "we'll sell you
    a new and improved version" excuse -- will THAT guard against future
    hacks beyond the one we're experiencing NOW?)
    <https://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2017/07/27/criminals-hacked-a-fish-tank-to-steal-data-from-a-casino/>
    Many details about how the network was set up and what actually happened are missing.

    Of course. It's a fluff piece. But, chances are, the folks designing
    and deploying kit with "network connectivity" make the same mistakes
    for a variety of rationalizations.

    Now we actually
    *have* formal processes (and certifications OF those processes).

    And most systems can send packets to any other system in the world.

    But have no *need* to do so! Or, interact with more than one (or two)
    remote hosts (clients?) at a time.

    I don't permit outbound to a big list of countries unless a specific IP or network is whitelisted.
    If it causes me an issue I just watch the firewall log to see where the attempted outbound
    connection from my PC was trying to go. I can then decide whether to whitelist it or not.

    Only two of us using *this* computer and I trust us to have common sense about where we take it. Running a torrrent may find me talking with other hosts anywhere on the globe -- I won't refuse their connections just based on geography (as long as the torrent pieces don't fail their hashes)

    Although I don't use Facebook, other people on my network do. I haven't bothered to
    whitelist these because there have been no complaints: https://www.abuseipdb.com/check/57.144.138.5
    It's clear that most people assume that no-one knows where their packets might be going
    or why they are going where they are going.

    Most people only look at results. I run a VPN from time to time. I'm sure SWMBO is clueless as to which country is hosting my endpoint.

    So, why use software that was designed for general purpose computers
    when you aren't such a device?

    It's a lot cheaper than a custom design.

    But "customization", in this case, is just FURTHER constraining an already constrained set of operating conditions. You're not asking for it to
    do some OTHER/additional function.

    When Windows first went online it was not designed to be on an
    untrusted network at all.

    But, most Manglement folks are still ignorant and don't understand WHY >>>> these things are important.

    Yes

    They will understand when they start incurring losses and have to answer
    to their superiors, stock-holders, customers, etc. When your competitors' >> bottom lines are better than yours, eventually folks lose jobs.

    True but I can't see anything changing. One reason is the big gap between management and anyone who has a clue how anything works.
    I think people understand behaviors that cost them money (which can be
    real dollars, lost opportunity, bad customer relations, etc.).

    A cousin offered a billing service to doctors in her area. One of the
    initial adopters apparently didn't think they had to PAY for that
    equipment (because he was well known in the area and his use of it was
    like an endorsement).

    When he ran out of disk space, his office called for support. (ballsy
    given that he hadn't paid for the equipment -- likely wouldn't pay for
    the support, either?)

    When the disk was upgraded, he discovered he was locked out of his
    records. For nonpayment.

    Wanna litigate? And explain why you haven't paid for the original
    product? How many weeks/months will you be locked out of your
    business records while the case makes its way through the docket?

    *She* got paid. Whether he learned anything (or WHAT he learned)
    remains to be seen. But, his *actions* were altered by *her*
    activities.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Don Y@blockedofcourse@foo.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Tue Nov 3 03:47:05 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 11/3/2026 3:01 AM, Martin Brown wrote:
    On 02/11/2026 18:08, Jeroen Belleman wrote:
    On 11/2/26 14:15, Don Y wrote:
    <https://apnews.com/article/europe-supermarkets-freezers-cyberattacks-
    a8ea5b30d67da47957769f29101fe686>

    "...its fridges and freezers had been hacked and set to 50 degrees Celsius" >>>
    And, why would a temperature controller for a FREEZER ever allow
    such a high temperature?-a In case you wanted to convert them to
    walk-in ovens???

    Who *specifies* such systems and who naively implements those specifications?

    [The last batch of targets used "older technology"... so, nothing
    was learned in the revisions that followed?]

    In the UK at least they have been tightening up security on supermarket fridges
    and freezers. But you are stuck with whatever "security" the manufacturer provides - they are too expensive to replace en mass.

    But, you can add a layer "in front of" a subnet that serves just those devices. That can be an arbitrary appliance that doesn't have to know anything about
    the appliances that it is protecting!

    They're just simple programmable temperature controllers.
    You wouldn't expect those to be able to detect that anything
    is amiss. They should't have been accessible from the general
    internet, is all.

    More likely that it wasn't provided with a secure enough password for engineering-a remote access. Something like "engineer" pw = "eng1neer".

    Given that one can likely get access to almost ANY sort of networkable
    device to evaluate attack strategies, they likely uncovered *an* exploit
    that could be applied to all similar models. Perhaps relying on Shodan to
    hunt down the pertinent instances (to save themselves the effort of
    probing the IP space).

    In school, we used to hack pinball machines and other vending machines;
    quickly developing a "catalog" of the various exploits to which each type
    of machine was vulnerable. Then, deploying whatever was appropriate to "handle" the machines available to us at any given instant.

    It's not like we had deliberately *targeted* a particular device (or
    class of devices) but, rather, took advantage of whatever was available.

    Managers like remote access it makes it possible to control the whole system without having to visit the site. However, they don't seem to have even considered that hostile actors *will* try to hack them.

    "Why would anyone want to hack my {freezer, baby monitor, pacemaker, fishtank, thermostat, oven, automobile, airline entertainment system, etc.}?"

    People are just now seeing that they *are* hackable. It will be a bit
    longer before they realize the reasons why (and, even longer to realize
    how they can be used/leveraged for OTHER hacks)

    <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/attack-of-the-zombie-baby-monitors/>

    I think the Binance hack is *way* more significant $6bn is a lot more!

    But likely affected fewer people. Imagine all of the customers who
    visited those stores EXPECTING to purchase refrigerated items, only
    to discover they'd have to find another (unhacked) store to purchase
    the items they wanted.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Don Y@blockedofcourse@foo.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Tue Nov 3 03:49:25 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 11/3/2026 3:47 AM, Don Y wrote:
    People are just now seeing that they *are* hackable.-a It will be a bit longer before they realize the reasons why (and, even longer to realize
    how they can be used/leveraged for OTHER hacks)

    <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/attack-of-the-zombie-baby-monitors/>
    <https://github.com/jgamblin/Mirai-Source-Code>
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From John R Walliker@jrwalliker@gmail.com to sci.electronics.design on Tue Nov 3 11:52:05 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 03/11/2026 04:27, Edward Rawde wrote:
    "Don Y" <blockedofcourse@foo.invalid> wrote in message news:11cbjph$3e9k6$1@dont-email.me...
    Yet. Perhaps they are educating their potential victims so that
    when those folks are "threatened", they capitulate even if the
    systems involved are not vulnerable?

    I doubt it because then the food will still be frozen and will be monitored >>> locally to make sure it remains so.

    So, the staff in the store has to add "watch the coolers" to their current >> list of responsibilities?

    Only when there is an external "threat".

    How do they know if something is wonky?

    Just make sure the freezers don't stay in defrost for too long.

    And what
    do they *do* about it??

    Pull the cable out of the Internet provider's modem.

    But then you can't sell anything because the payment systems will
    stop working.


    The next step is to weaponize these attacks to cause confusion and/or >>>>>> cripple key systems and infrastructure. Imagine someone attacking >>>>>> the cellular network, power grid, etc.

    So let's hope that the people in charge of those things are getting the point
    that not only do you have to install a door (firewall) you have to be aware of
    exactly who or what goes in and out of the door. Otherwise there was no >>>>> point installing the door at all. Why would a power grid in country A be >>>>> connectable from an IP address in country B? Sure the attacker could be >>>>> in country A (or using a proxy so that they appear to be in country A) >>>>> but that's why you can't simply install a door and expect it to keep attackers

    First step is to decide what *needs* to be accessible.

    You don't get a choice about that because you didn't design the vulnerable >>> controller yourself.

    I can have a say in anything I design or advise on designs.

    But you didn't design the vulnerable controller.
    It may be true that you could design your own controller but most stores with freezers don't employ their own people who could.


    As a network stack is now a commodity (30 years ago, you had to roll
    your own), people think nothing of just including it in their design.
    But, without really understanding how it works and what problems
    it brings to a project.

    Cache poisoning? SYN-flood? IP/MAC masquerading?

    Can your product support a NIC running "flat out" -- even if only incoming >> traffic (over which you h ave no control)? How big is your ARP cache?
    Can I push enough endpoints at it to cause it to lose track of the
    bindings that actually "make sense" for your application?

    <https://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2017/07/27/criminals-hacked-a-fish-tank-to-steal-data-from-a-casino/>

    Many details about how the network was set up and what actually happened are missing.


    to the access. It is also the case that someone or something has to actively
    follow up on the report produced by the firewall so as to be sure whether the
    access was legitimate or not. It is true that much of this can be automated but
    it is also true that most places don't do it at all because no-one knows how
    to do it or why it's necessary.

    Convenience trumps security.

    So does ignorance of why security is required.

    But, drawing attention to security is often dismissed: "Who the hell would >> want to hack our fishtank???"

    Anyone who wants a presence on your internal network.


    And one reason for this is the use of c.
    In c you can easily create a buffer, but nothing tells you about checking to make sure
    you haven't overfilled it.

    The reason for it is lack of discipline and testing on the part of developers.

    Which is never going to change.

    I disagree. In the 60's, everything was "cowboy coder".

    And most systems were not connected to any other system at all.

    They were connected but typically with UUCP (e.g., bang mail) and BBS style >> interfaces.

    Now we actually
    *have* formal processes (and certifications OF those processes).

    And most systems can send packets to any other system in the world.

    But have no *need* to do so! Or, interact with more than one (or two)
    remote hosts (clients?) at a time.

    I don't permit outbound to a big list of countries unless a specific IP or network is whitelisted.
    If it causes me an issue I just watch the firewall log to see where the attempted outbound
    connection from my PC was trying to go. I can then decide whether to whitelist it or not.
    Although I don't use Facebook, other people on my network do. I haven't bothered to
    whitelist these because there have been no complaints: https://www.abuseipdb.com/check/57.144.138.5
    It's clear that most people assume that no-one knows where their packets might be going
    or why they are going where they are going.


    So, why use software that was designed for general purpose computers
    when you aren't such a device?

    It's a lot cheaper than a custom design.


    When Windows first went online it was not designed to be on an
    untrusted network at all.

    But, most Manglement folks are still ignorant and don't understand WHY >>>> these things are important.

    Yes

    They will understand when they start incurring losses and have to answer
    to their superiors, stock-holders, customers, etc. When your competitors' >> bottom lines are better than yours, eventually folks lose jobs.

    True but I can't see anything changing. One reason is the big gap between management and anyone who has a clue how anything works.



    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From antispam@antispam@fricas.org (Waldek Hebisch) to sci.electronics.design on Tue Nov 3 13:48:04 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    Edward Rawde <invalid@invalid.invalid> wrote:
    "john larkin" <jl@htigct.com> wrote in message news:c5mhelt53q23ml6ohlgerjruk2s2j56p45@4ax.com...
    On Mon, 2 Nov 2026 12:46:54 -0500, "Edward Rawde"
    <invalid@invalid.invalid> wrote:

    "john larkin" <jl@glen--canyon.com> wrote in message news:2eihelp8ql138updhf4i3240dad4j4j1iq@4ax.com...
    On Mon, 2 Nov 2026 11:46:15 -0500, "Edward Rawde"
    <invalid@invalid.invalid> wrote:

    "john larkin" <jl@glen--canyon.com> wrote in message news:g1fheld2tgm8u9p2v964v38614dglpof7k@4ax.com...
    On Tue, 3 Nov 2026 00:52:24 +1100, Bill Sloman <bill.sloman@ieee.org> >>>>>> wrote:

    On 3/11/2026 12:15 am, Don Y wrote:
    <https://apnews.com/article/europe-supermarkets-freezers-cyberattacks-a8ea5b30d67da47957769f29101fe686>

    "...its fridges and freezers had been hacked and set to 50 degrees Celsius"

    And, why would a temperature controller for a FREEZER ever allow >>>>>>>> such a high temperature? In case you wanted to convert them to >>>>>>>> walk-in ovens???

    Who *specifies* such systems and who naively implements those
    specifications?

    [The last batch of targets used "older technology"... so, nothing >>>>>>>> was learned in the revisions that followed?]

    The software would presumably have blocked those high temperatures, but >>>>>>>it had been hacked. Fridges and freezers use heat pumps to control the >>>>>>>temperature and these are bi-directional.

    It's unlikely that the refrigeration gear in a supermarket frozen-food >>>>>> case is reversable. My fridge certainly will not heat above room temp. >>>>>>
    Setting it to 50C just turned off the cooling.

    I think you'll find they put it into defrost mode which has a heater to remove frost.
    Whether or not they also overwrote software limits for length of time and maximum
    temperature I do not know but if you own the controller then you can tell the
    hardware to do anything you can tell it to do.


    Defrost is usually some resistive elements that melt ice on the
    cooling coils.

    Yes

    It doesn't reverse the heat pump

    Yes

    and it doesn't heat up
    the frozen peas.

    I'm seeing pictures of many items being thrown out.
    Why do that if they are still frozen?

    Lawyers.


    AI Lawyers are coming. I wonder whether they will be just as bad?

    I am waiting for AI lawyer to sue web sites that put those annoying
    "checking that you are not a robot" boxes.
    --
    Waldek Hebisch
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Don Y@blockedofcourse@foo.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Tue Nov 3 07:12:56 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 11/3/2026 6:48 AM, Waldek Hebisch wrote:
    Edward Rawde <invalid@invalid.invalid> wrote:

    AI Lawyers are coming. I wonder whether they will be just as bad?

    I am waiting for AI lawyer to sue web sites that put those annoying
    "checking that you are not a robot" boxes.

    You just need an AI "captcha-bot"

    <https://aibeat.co/bots-solving-captchas-better/>

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Edward Rawde@invalid@invalid.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Tue Nov 3 10:49:02 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    "John R Walliker" <jrwalliker@gmail.com> wrote in message news:11ccht5$3nbj2$1@dont-email.me...
    On 03/11/2026 04:27, Edward Rawde wrote:
    "Don Y" <blockedofcourse@foo.invalid> wrote in message news:11cbjph$3e9k6$1@dont-email.me...
    Yet. Perhaps they are educating their potential victims so that
    when those folks are "threatened", they capitulate even if the
    systems involved are not vulnerable?

    I doubt it because then the food will still be frozen and will be monitored
    locally to make sure it remains so.

    So, the staff in the store has to add "watch the coolers" to their current >>> list of responsibilities?

    Only when there is an external "threat".

    How do they know if something is wonky?

    Just make sure the freezers don't stay in defrost for too long.

    And what
    do they *do* about it??

    Pull the cable out of the Internet provider's modem.

    But then you can't sell anything because the payment systems will
    stop working.

    Better that than lose everything to defrost.



    The next step is to weaponize these attacks to cause confusion and/or >>>>>>> cripple key systems and infrastructure. Imagine someone attacking >>>>>>> the cellular network, power grid, etc.

    So let's hope that the people in charge of those things are getting the point
    that not only do you have to install a door (firewall) you have to be aware of
    exactly who or what goes in and out of the door. Otherwise there was no >>>>>> point installing the door at all. Why would a power grid in country A be >>>>>> connectable from an IP address in country B? Sure the attacker could be >>>>>> in country A (or using a proxy so that they appear to be in country A) >>>>>> but that's why you can't simply install a door and expect it to keep attackers

    First step is to decide what *needs* to be accessible.

    You don't get a choice about that because you didn't design the vulnerable >>>> controller yourself.

    I can have a say in anything I design or advise on designs.

    But you didn't design the vulnerable controller.
    It may be true that you could design your own controller but most stores with
    freezers don't employ their own people who could.


    As a network stack is now a commodity (30 years ago, you had to roll
    your own), people think nothing of just including it in their design.
    But, without really understanding how it works and what problems
    it brings to a project.

    Cache poisoning? SYN-flood? IP/MAC masquerading?

    Can your product support a NIC running "flat out" -- even if only incoming >>> traffic (over which you h ave no control)? How big is your ARP cache?
    Can I push enough endpoints at it to cause it to lose track of the
    bindings that actually "make sense" for your application?

    <https://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2017/07/27/criminals-hacked-a-fish-tank-to-steal-data-from-a-casino/>

    Many details about how the network was set up and what actually happened are missing.


    to the access. It is also the case that someone or something has to actively
    follow up on the report produced by the firewall so as to be sure whether the
    access was legitimate or not. It is true that much of this can be automated but
    it is also true that most places don't do it at all because no-one knows how
    to do it or why it's necessary.

    Convenience trumps security.

    So does ignorance of why security is required.

    But, drawing attention to security is often dismissed: "Who the hell would >>> want to hack our fishtank???"

    Anyone who wants a presence on your internal network.


    And one reason for this is the use of c.
    In c you can easily create a buffer, but nothing tells you about checking to make sure
    you haven't overfilled it.

    The reason for it is lack of discipline and testing on the part of developers.

    Which is never going to change.

    I disagree. In the 60's, everything was "cowboy coder".

    And most systems were not connected to any other system at all.

    They were connected but typically with UUCP (e.g., bang mail) and BBS style >>> interfaces.

    Now we actually
    *have* formal processes (and certifications OF those processes).

    And most systems can send packets to any other system in the world.

    But have no *need* to do so! Or, interact with more than one (or two)
    remote hosts (clients?) at a time.

    I don't permit outbound to a big list of countries unless a specific IP or network is whitelisted.
    If it causes me an issue I just watch the firewall log to see where the attempted outbound
    connection from my PC was trying to go. I can then decide whether to whitelist it or not.
    Although I don't use Facebook, other people on my network do. I haven't bothered to
    whitelist these because there have been no complaints:
    https://www.abuseipdb.com/check/57.144.138.5
    It's clear that most people assume that no-one knows where their packets might be going
    or why they are going where they are going.


    So, why use software that was designed for general purpose computers
    when you aren't such a device?

    It's a lot cheaper than a custom design.


    When Windows first went online it was not designed to be on an
    untrusted network at all.

    But, most Manglement folks are still ignorant and don't understand WHY >>>>> these things are important.

    Yes

    They will understand when they start incurring losses and have to answer >>> to their superiors, stock-holders, customers, etc. When your competitors' >>> bottom lines are better than yours, eventually folks lose jobs.

    True but I can't see anything changing. One reason is the big gap between
    management and anyone who has a clue how anything works.





    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Edward Rawde@invalid@invalid.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Tue Nov 3 10:58:43 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    "Don Y" <blockedofcourse@foo.invalid> wrote in message news:11ccq58$3qi9v$1@dont-email.me...
    On 11/3/2026 6:48 AM, Waldek Hebisch wrote:
    Edward Rawde <invalid@invalid.invalid> wrote:

    AI Lawyers are coming. I wonder whether they will be just as bad?

    I am waiting for AI lawyer to sue web sites that put those annoying
    "checking that you are not a robot" boxes.

    You just need an AI "captcha-bot"

    <https://aibeat.co/bots-solving-captchas-better/>


    Yes that's going to be interesting.
    Something non-intellectual will be needed which only a physically
    able human can do. But I cannot think of anything which meets that
    requirement which could work as a captcha replacement.
    Web sites may just have to concede that they can't tell whether they
    have a human visitor or not.
    This is likely to increase the push to "please log in using your whatever account"
    before you can access anything at all.


    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Edward Rawde@invalid@invalid.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Tue Nov 3 11:39:42 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    "Don Y" <blockedofcourse@foo.invalid> wrote in message news:11ccbms$3l50o$1@dont-email.me...
    On 11/2/2026 9:27 PM, Edward Rawde wrote:
    "Don Y" <blockedofcourse@foo.invalid> wrote in message news:11cbjph$3e9k6$1@dont-email.me...
    Yet. Perhaps they are educating their potential victims so that
    when those folks are "threatened", they capitulate even if the
    systems involved are not vulnerable?

    I doubt it because then the food will still be frozen and will be monitored
    locally to make sure it remains so.

    So, the staff in the store has to add "watch the coolers" to their current >>> list of responsibilities?

    Only when there is an external "threat".

    But they don't know WHEN that threat will materialize. Like locking
    the door to your house ONLY when you think a thief might be in the area.

    How do they know if something is wonky?

    Just make sure the freezers don't stay in defrost for too long.

    Is there a big light that illuminates to tell them when this is happening? Or, do they have to visit the freezer to check on it?

    A big light which says "this freezer is in defrost" would be a good idea.
    Maybe use the internal lights but have them flash.
    Hardware limits on length and period of defrost time and defrost
    temperature would be a good idea too but that won't happen because it's
    much easier to configure the hardware using software.


    "Just make sure no one steals anything from the store..." <grin>

    Make sure they are on camera.


    And what
    do they *do* about it??

    Pull the cable out of the Internet provider's modem.

    Will that disconnect any other systems that should REMAIN connected?

    Who cares if it means the food is not defrosted.
    But it's true that that is an extreme measure which a properly configured setup should never need.


    The next step is to weaponize these attacks to cause confusion and/or >>>>>>> cripple key systems and infrastructure. Imagine someone attacking >>>>>>> the cellular network, power grid, etc.

    So let's hope that the people in charge of those things are getting the point
    that not only do you have to install a door (firewall) you have to be aware of
    exactly who or what goes in and out of the door. Otherwise there was no >>>>>> point installing the door at all. Why would a power grid in country A be >>>>>> connectable from an IP address in country B? Sure the attacker could be >>>>>> in country A (or using a proxy so that they appear to be in country A) >>>>>> but that's why you can't simply install a door and expect it to keep attackers

    First step is to decide what *needs* to be accessible.

    You don't get a choice about that because you didn't design the vulnerable >>>> controller yourself.

    I can have a say in anything I design or advise on designs.

    But you didn't design the vulnerable controller.
    It may be true that you could design your own controller but most stores with
    freezers don't employ their own people who could.

    They should be selecting devices that address these issues from vendors
    who will stand by their products (and not fall on the "we'll sell you
    a new and improved version" excuse -- will THAT guard against future
    hacks beyond the one we're experiencing NOW?)
    <https://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2017/07/27/criminals-hacked-a-fish-tank-to-steal-data-from-a-casino/>
    Many details about how the network was set up and what actually happened are missing.

    Of course. It's a fluff piece. But, chances are, the folks designing
    and deploying kit with "network connectivity" make the same mistakes
    for a variety of rationalizations.

    The casino likely has much better security for keeping people under control when they just lost their winnings and for keeping cash under control in case an individual finds a way to try to cheat or steal it. They will also have to make
    sure that only individuals above a certain age are permitted in the casino.
    But you don't have to be a casino manager to know that these things are necessary in a casino.
    Everything changes when you introduce complex technology which operates
    in ways that almost no-one understands.
    The casino manager won't have been asked many questions about IT security
    in their interview. Most likely it will not have been mentioned at all.


    Now we actually
    *have* formal processes (and certifications OF those processes).

    And most systems can send packets to any other system in the world.

    But have no *need* to do so! Or, interact with more than one (or two)
    remote hosts (clients?) at a time.

    I don't permit outbound to a big list of countries unless a specific IP or network is whitelisted.
    If it causes me an issue I just watch the firewall log to see where the attempted outbound
    connection from my PC was trying to go. I can then decide whether to whitelist it or not.

    Only two of us using *this* computer and I trust us to have common sense about
    where we take it.

    Computers can make decisions about what to connect to without asking the user.

    Running a torrrent may find me talking with other hosts
    anywhere on the globe -- I won't refuse their connections just based on geography (as long as the torrent pieces don't fail their hashes)

    I have a dedicated PC for torrents which hasn't been used for a few years.
    It does not have any outbound blocking and has one port forwarded inbound.


    Although I don't use Facebook, other people on my network do. I haven't bothered to
    whitelist these because there have been no complaints:
    https://www.abuseipdb.com/check/57.144.138.5
    It's clear that most people assume that no-one knows where their packets might be going
    or why they are going where they are going.

    Most people only look at results. I run a VPN from time to time. I'm sure SWMBO is clueless as to which country is hosting my endpoint.

    I haven't used Tor Browser for a long time but it's there if I have a need to be
    anonymous. I don't use and don't advise anyone else to bother using the kind
    of "VPN" pushed by web browsers and unnecessary virus scanners.
    If you do use these services my firewall likely has you already brick walled due to the abuse that these services are often used for.
    I sometimes get amused when young people tell me I should use a VPN and
    I could be hacked if someone else knows my IP address.


    So, why use software that was designed for general purpose computers
    when you aren't such a device?

    It's a lot cheaper than a custom design.

    But "customization", in this case, is just FURTHER constraining an already constrained set of operating conditions. You're not asking for it to
    do some OTHER/additional function.

    Customization costs money.


    When Windows first went online it was not designed to be on an
    untrusted network at all.

    But, most Manglement folks are still ignorant and don't understand WHY >>>>> these things are important.

    Yes

    They will understand when they start incurring losses and have to answer >>> to their superiors, stock-holders, customers, etc. When your competitors' >>> bottom lines are better than yours, eventually folks lose jobs.

    True but I can't see anything changing. One reason is the big gap between
    management and anyone who has a clue how anything works.
    I think people understand behaviors that cost them money (which can be
    real dollars, lost opportunity, bad customer relations, etc.).

    But they don't understand that those behaviours are caused by complex technology which they don't understand and they don't understand that
    the reason they don't understand this is because they don't understand the complex technology.


    A cousin offered a billing service to doctors in her area. One of the initial adopters apparently didn't think they had to PAY for that
    equipment (because he was well known in the area and his use of it was
    like an endorsement).

    When he ran out of disk space, his office called for support. (ballsy
    given that he hadn't paid for the equipment -- likely wouldn't pay for
    the support, either?)

    When the disk was upgraded, he discovered he was locked out of his
    records. For nonpayment.

    Wanna litigate? And explain why you haven't paid for the original
    product? How many weeks/months will you be locked out of your
    business records while the case makes its way through the docket?

    *She* got paid. Whether he learned anything (or WHAT he learned)
    remains to be seen. But, his *actions* were altered by *her*
    activities.

    Anything you don't understand must be easy and therefore there can't
    be any need to pay a lot for it. So the casino doesn't need an on-site
    IT specialist because no-one knows what such an individual would do.
    It follows that that individual is not necessary.


    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Edward Rawde@invalid@invalid.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Tue Nov 3 11:52:52 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    "Martin Brown" <'''newspam'''@nonad.co.uk> wrote in message news:11ccbe9$3kra2$1@dont-email.me...
    On 02/11/2026 18:08, Jeroen Belleman wrote:
    On 11/2/26 14:15, Don Y wrote:
    <https://apnews.com/article/europe-supermarkets-freezers-cyberattacks-a8ea5b30d67da47957769f29101fe686>

    "...its fridges and freezers had been hacked and set to 50 degrees Celsius" >>>
    And, why would a temperature controller for a FREEZER ever allow
    such a high temperature? In case you wanted to convert them to
    walk-in ovens???

    Who *specifies* such systems and who naively implements those specifications?

    [The last batch of targets used "older technology"... so, nothing
    was learned in the revisions that followed?]

    In the UK at least they have been tightening up security on supermarket fridges and freezers. But you are stuck with whatever
    "security" the manufacturer provides - they are too expensive to replace en mass.

    They're just simple programmable temperature controllers.
    You wouldn't expect those to be able to detect that anything
    is amiss. They should't have been accessible from the general
    internet, is all.

    More likely that it wasn't provided with a secure enough password for engineering remote access. Something like "engineer" pw =
    "eng1neer".

    Managers like remote access it makes it possible to control the whole system without having to visit the site. However, they don't
    seem to have even considered that hostile actors *will* try to hack them.

    If the manager lives locally then I will ask them which ISP they use.
    In the case of a small local ISP I will restrict remote access so it can
    only come from that ISP's networks. In the case of a larger ISP I will
    attempt to find out what IP addresses they are likely to be allocated
    and restrict access from only those networks.
    Restricting access so it can only come from a few million IP addresses
    is a much better idea than allowing it from the entire Internet. And if there is clearly no reason why the manager would ever need access from certain
    other countries then those countries will be blocked.


    I think the Binance hack is *way* more significant $6bn is a lot more!

    --
    Martin Brown



    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From John R Walliker@jrwalliker@gmail.com to sci.electronics.design on Tue Nov 3 17:26:20 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 03/11/2026 15:49, Edward Rawde wrote:
    "John R Walliker" <jrwalliker@gmail.com> wrote in message news:11ccht5$3nbj2$1@dont-email.me...
    On 03/11/2026 04:27, Edward Rawde wrote:
    "Don Y" <blockedofcourse@foo.invalid> wrote in message news:11cbjph$3e9k6$1@dont-email.me...
    Yet. Perhaps they are educating their potential victims so that
    when those folks are "threatened", they capitulate even if the
    systems involved are not vulnerable?

    I doubt it because then the food will still be frozen and will be monitored
    locally to make sure it remains so.

    So, the staff in the store has to add "watch the coolers" to their current >>>> list of responsibilities?

    Only when there is an external "threat".

    How do they know if something is wonky?

    Just make sure the freezers don't stay in defrost for too long.

    And what
    do they *do* about it??

    Pull the cable out of the Internet provider's modem.

    But then you can't sell anything because the payment systems will
    stop working.

    Better that than lose everything to defrost.

    That depends on the value of the frozen goods versus all the
    other stuff that they have to stop selling because they can't
    take payment.
    However I imagine that these freezer hacks have been done at
    night when there is nobody there to notice.



    The next step is to weaponize these attacks to cause confusion and/or >>>>>>>> cripple key systems and infrastructure. Imagine someone attacking >>>>>>>> the cellular network, power grid, etc.

    So let's hope that the people in charge of those things are getting the point
    that not only do you have to install a door (firewall) you have to be aware of
    exactly who or what goes in and out of the door. Otherwise there was no >>>>>>> point installing the door at all. Why would a power grid in country A be
    connectable from an IP address in country B? Sure the attacker could be >>>>>>> in country A (or using a proxy so that they appear to be in country A) >>>>>>> but that's why you can't simply install a door and expect it to keep attackers

    First step is to decide what *needs* to be accessible.

    You don't get a choice about that because you didn't design the vulnerable
    controller yourself.

    I can have a say in anything I design or advise on designs.

    But you didn't design the vulnerable controller.
    It may be true that you could design your own controller but most stores with
    freezers don't employ their own people who could.


    As a network stack is now a commodity (30 years ago, you had to roll
    your own), people think nothing of just including it in their design.
    But, without really understanding how it works and what problems
    it brings to a project.

    Cache poisoning? SYN-flood? IP/MAC masquerading?

    Can your product support a NIC running "flat out" -- even if only incoming >>>> traffic (over which you h ave no control)? How big is your ARP cache? >>>> Can I push enough endpoints at it to cause it to lose track of the
    bindings that actually "make sense" for your application?

    <https://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2017/07/27/criminals-hacked-a-fish-tank-to-steal-data-from-a-casino/>

    Many details about how the network was set up and what actually happened are missing.


    to the access. It is also the case that someone or something has to actively
    follow up on the report produced by the firewall so as to be sure whether the
    access was legitimate or not. It is true that much of this can be automated but
    it is also true that most places don't do it at all because no-one knows how
    to do it or why it's necessary.

    Convenience trumps security.

    So does ignorance of why security is required.

    But, drawing attention to security is often dismissed: "Who the hell would
    want to hack our fishtank???"

    Anyone who wants a presence on your internal network.


    And one reason for this is the use of c.
    In c you can easily create a buffer, but nothing tells you about checking to make sure
    you haven't overfilled it.

    The reason for it is lack of discipline and testing on the part of developers.

    Which is never going to change.

    I disagree. In the 60's, everything was "cowboy coder".

    And most systems were not connected to any other system at all.

    They were connected but typically with UUCP (e.g., bang mail) and BBS style
    interfaces.

    Now we actually
    *have* formal processes (and certifications OF those processes).

    And most systems can send packets to any other system in the world.

    But have no *need* to do so! Or, interact with more than one (or two) >>>> remote hosts (clients?) at a time.

    I don't permit outbound to a big list of countries unless a specific IP or network is whitelisted.
    If it causes me an issue I just watch the firewall log to see where the attempted outbound
    connection from my PC was trying to go. I can then decide whether to whitelist it or not.
    Although I don't use Facebook, other people on my network do. I haven't bothered to
    whitelist these because there have been no complaints:
    https://www.abuseipdb.com/check/57.144.138.5
    It's clear that most people assume that no-one knows where their packets might be going
    or why they are going where they are going.


    So, why use software that was designed for general purpose computers
    when you aren't such a device?

    It's a lot cheaper than a custom design.


    When Windows first went online it was not designed to be on an
    untrusted network at all.

    But, most Manglement folks are still ignorant and don't understand WHY >>>>>> these things are important.

    Yes

    They will understand when they start incurring losses and have to answer >>>> to their superiors, stock-holders, customers, etc. When your competitors' >>>> bottom lines are better than yours, eventually folks lose jobs.

    True but I can't see anything changing. One reason is the big gap between >>> management and anyone who has a clue how anything works.






    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Edward Rawde@invalid@invalid.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Tue Nov 3 12:37:27 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    "John R Walliker" <jrwalliker@gmail.com> wrote in message news:11cd5ft$4gd$1@dont-email.me...
    On 03/11/2026 15:49, Edward Rawde wrote:
    "John R Walliker" <jrwalliker@gmail.com> wrote in message news:11ccht5$3nbj2$1@dont-email.me...
    On 03/11/2026 04:27, Edward Rawde wrote:
    "Don Y" <blockedofcourse@foo.invalid> wrote in message news:11cbjph$3e9k6$1@dont-email.me...
    Yet. Perhaps they are educating their potential victims so that >>>>>>> when those folks are "threatened", they capitulate even if the
    systems involved are not vulnerable?

    I doubt it because then the food will still be frozen and will be monitored
    locally to make sure it remains so.

    So, the staff in the store has to add "watch the coolers" to their current
    list of responsibilities?

    Only when there is an external "threat".

    How do they know if something is wonky?

    Just make sure the freezers don't stay in defrost for too long.

    And what
    do they *do* about it??

    Pull the cable out of the Internet provider's modem.

    But then you can't sell anything because the payment systems will
    stop working.

    Better that than lose everything to defrost.

    That depends on the value of the frozen goods versus all the
    other stuff that they have to stop selling because they can't
    take payment.
    However I imagine that these freezer hacks have been done at
    night when there is nobody there to notice.

    Yes I agree that the hackers would have told the systems to remain
    in defrost overnight. So the best solution is to make sure that only
    properly authorized people can access the freezer controllers remotely.
    For me that would mean a proper firewall with access blocked from
    countries which don't need it and selective access from countries which do. You'd still need proper access credentials to get access through the firewall to a freezer controller. And you'd still have to log in to the freezer controller.




    The next step is to weaponize these attacks to cause confusion and/or >>>>>>>>> cripple key systems and infrastructure. Imagine someone attacking >>>>>>>>> the cellular network, power grid, etc.

    So let's hope that the people in charge of those things are getting the point
    that not only do you have to install a door (firewall) you have to be aware of
    exactly who or what goes in and out of the door. Otherwise there was no
    point installing the door at all. Why would a power grid in country A be
    connectable from an IP address in country B? Sure the attacker could be
    in country A (or using a proxy so that they appear to be in country A) >>>>>>>> but that's why you can't simply install a door and expect it to keep attackers

    First step is to decide what *needs* to be accessible.

    You don't get a choice about that because you didn't design the vulnerable
    controller yourself.

    I can have a say in anything I design or advise on designs.

    But you didn't design the vulnerable controller.
    It may be true that you could design your own controller but most stores with
    freezers don't employ their own people who could.


    As a network stack is now a commodity (30 years ago, you had to roll >>>>> your own), people think nothing of just including it in their design. >>>>> But, without really understanding how it works and what problems
    it brings to a project.

    Cache poisoning? SYN-flood? IP/MAC masquerading?

    Can your product support a NIC running "flat out" -- even if only incoming
    traffic (over which you h ave no control)? How big is your ARP cache? >>>>> Can I push enough endpoints at it to cause it to lose track of the
    bindings that actually "make sense" for your application?

    <https://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2017/07/27/criminals-hacked-a-fish-tank-to-steal-data-from-a-casino/>

    Many details about how the network was set up and what actually happened are missing.


    to the access. It is also the case that someone or something has to actively
    follow up on the report produced by the firewall so as to be sure whether the
    access was legitimate or not. It is true that much of this can be automated but
    it is also true that most places don't do it at all because no-one knows how
    to do it or why it's necessary.

    Convenience trumps security.

    So does ignorance of why security is required.

    But, drawing attention to security is often dismissed: "Who the hell would
    want to hack our fishtank???"

    Anyone who wants a presence on your internal network.


    And one reason for this is the use of c.
    In c you can easily create a buffer, but nothing tells you about checking to make sure
    you haven't overfilled it.

    The reason for it is lack of discipline and testing on the part of developers.

    Which is never going to change.

    I disagree. In the 60's, everything was "cowboy coder".

    And most systems were not connected to any other system at all.

    They were connected but typically with UUCP (e.g., bang mail) and BBS style
    interfaces.

    Now we actually
    *have* formal processes (and certifications OF those processes).

    And most systems can send packets to any other system in the world. >>>>>
    But have no *need* to do so! Or, interact with more than one (or two) >>>>> remote hosts (clients?) at a time.

    I don't permit outbound to a big list of countries unless a specific IP or network is whitelisted.
    If it causes me an issue I just watch the firewall log to see where the attempted outbound
    connection from my PC was trying to go. I can then decide whether to whitelist it or not.
    Although I don't use Facebook, other people on my network do. I haven't bothered to
    whitelist these because there have been no complaints:
    https://www.abuseipdb.com/check/57.144.138.5
    It's clear that most people assume that no-one knows where their packets might be going
    or why they are going where they are going.


    So, why use software that was designed for general purpose computers >>>>> when you aren't such a device?

    It's a lot cheaper than a custom design.


    When Windows first went online it was not designed to be on an
    untrusted network at all.

    But, most Manglement folks are still ignorant and don't understand WHY >>>>>>> these things are important.

    Yes

    They will understand when they start incurring losses and have to answer >>>>> to their superiors, stock-holders, customers, etc. When your competitors'
    bottom lines are better than yours, eventually folks lose jobs.

    True but I can't see anything changing. One reason is the big gap between >>>> management and anyone who has a clue how anything works.








    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Don Y@blockedofcourse@foo.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Tue Nov 3 11:27:18 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 11/3/2026 9:39 AM, Edward Rawde wrote:
    "Don Y" <blockedofcourse@foo.invalid> wrote in message news:11ccbms$3l50o$1@dont-email.me...
    On 11/2/2026 9:27 PM, Edward Rawde wrote:
    "Don Y" <blockedofcourse@foo.invalid> wrote in message news:11cbjph$3e9k6$1@dont-email.me...
    Yet. Perhaps they are educating their potential victims so that
    when those folks are "threatened", they capitulate even if the
    systems involved are not vulnerable?

    I doubt it because then the food will still be frozen and will be monitored
    locally to make sure it remains so.

    So, the staff in the store has to add "watch the coolers" to their current >>>> list of responsibilities?

    Only when there is an external "threat".

    But they don't know WHEN that threat will materialize. Like locking
    the door to your house ONLY when you think a thief might be in the area.

    How do they know if something is wonky?

    Just make sure the freezers don't stay in defrost for too long.

    Is there a big light that illuminates to tell them when this is happening? >> Or, do they have to visit the freezer to check on it?

    A big light which says "this freezer is in defrost" would be a good idea. Maybe use the internal lights but have them flash.

    .;.. for the *current* hack.

    What of the hack becomes "the freezer is set to 33 degrees" (and everything is slowly thawing)

    Machines are ideal for "watching" things that would be tedious for a human
    to monitor. Instead of making a "big light" and circuit to drive it,
    just fix the root problem!

    Hardware limits on length and period of defrost time and defrost
    temperature would be a good idea too but that won't happen because it's
    much easier to configure the hardware using software.

    "Just make sure no one steals anything from the store..." <grin>

    Make sure they are on camera.

    If you are about to be robbed, at gunpoint, them being on camera is
    little consolation; you may be dead when they review the film!

    And what
    do they *do* about it??

    Pull the cable out of the Internet provider's modem.

    Will that disconnect any other systems that should REMAIN connected?

    Who cares if it means the food is not defrosted.

    If you are making your money selling cigarettes, gasoline, lottery tickets, impulse buys, etc. (like a convenience store) the value of the potential
    sales "in the cooler" may be relatively small.

    If you are a butcher shop and virtually ALL of your product is refrigerated (and potentially higher valued), then the balance shifts.

    But it's true that that is an extreme measure which a properly configured setup
    should never need.

    The next step is to weaponize these attacks to cause confusion and/or >>>>>>>> cripple key systems and infrastructure. Imagine someone attacking >>>>>>>> the cellular network, power grid, etc.

    So let's hope that the people in charge of those things are getting the point
    that not only do you have to install a door (firewall) you have to be aware of
    exactly who or what goes in and out of the door. Otherwise there was no >>>>>>> point installing the door at all. Why would a power grid in country A be
    connectable from an IP address in country B? Sure the attacker could be >>>>>>> in country A (or using a proxy so that they appear to be in country A) >>>>>>> but that's why you can't simply install a door and expect it to keep attackers

    First step is to decide what *needs* to be accessible.

    You don't get a choice about that because you didn't design the vulnerable
    controller yourself.

    I can have a say in anything I design or advise on designs.

    But you didn't design the vulnerable controller.
    It may be true that you could design your own controller but most stores with
    freezers don't employ their own people who could.

    They should be selecting devices that address these issues from vendors
    who will stand by their products (and not fall on the "we'll sell you
    a new and improved version" excuse -- will THAT guard against future
    hacks beyond the one we're experiencing NOW?)
    <https://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2017/07/27/criminals-hacked-a-fish-tank-to-steal-data-from-a-casino/>
    Many details about how the network was set up and what actually happened are missing.

    Of course. It's a fluff piece. But, chances are, the folks designing
    and deploying kit with "network connectivity" make the same mistakes
    for a variety of rationalizations.

    The casino likely has much better security for keeping people under control when they just lost their winnings and for keeping cash under control in case an individual finds a way to try to cheat or steal it. They will also have to make
    sure that only individuals above a certain age are permitted in the casino. But you don't have to be a casino manager to know that these things are necessary in a casino.

    Casinos are probably the most heavily surveilled CLASS of locations; even moreso than banks. Casinos want to give the impression that you are unconstrained in your movements and activities -- whereas you likely
    feel "oppressed" in a bank (see that rent-a-cop sitting by the door?)

    Everything changes when you introduce complex technology which operates
    in ways that almost no-one understands.
    The casino manager won't have been asked many questions about IT security
    in their interview. Most likely it will not have been mentioned at all.

    You can bet the casino manager, pit bosses, equipment technicians, etc.
    are *heavily* versed in technology as well as the implementations of
    the (non human) gaming mechanisms that pay their salaries. They aren't "figureheads" but actively monitor what is happening in the facility.
    The guy who is sitting at a machine "going through the motions" of
    playing -- but, no real monies are leaving his possession (what
    is he doing -- fishing for free drinks? watching some other gambler
    to target -- pick pocket? Has he found a clandestine way to hack a
    machine in a way that you are failing to notice?)

    Now we actually
    *have* formal processes (and certifications OF those processes).

    And most systems can send packets to any other system in the world.

    But have no *need* to do so! Or, interact with more than one (or two) >>>> remote hosts (clients?) at a time.

    I don't permit outbound to a big list of countries unless a specific IP or network is whitelisted.
    If it causes me an issue I just watch the firewall log to see where the attempted outbound
    connection from my PC was trying to go. I can then decide whether to whitelist it or not.

    Only two of us using *this* computer and I trust us to have common sense about
    where we take it.

    Computers can make decisions about what to connect to without asking the user.

    Of course. And, running software that you can't examine leaves you at the mercy of the author of that software.

    OTOH, if you don't have anything "at risk" then the only real issue is
    if your host is comandeered for a botnet.

    Running a torrrent may find me talking with other hosts
    anywhere on the globe -- I won't refuse their connections just based on
    geography (as long as the torrent pieces don't fail their hashes)

    I have a dedicated PC for torrents which hasn't been used for a few years.
    It does not have any outbound blocking and has one port forwarded inbound.

    There's a machine on the living room floor running torrents, presently.
    Many of the things that I want are easier to DL as torrents than to risk
    a 10GB download via FTP/HTTP.

    Although I don't use Facebook, other people on my network do. I haven't bothered to
    whitelist these because there have been no complaints:
    https://www.abuseipdb.com/check/57.144.138.5
    It's clear that most people assume that no-one knows where their packets might be going
    or why they are going where they are going.

    Most people only look at results. I run a VPN from time to time. I'm sure >> SWMBO is clueless as to which country is hosting my endpoint.

    I haven't used Tor Browser for a long time but it's there if I have a need to be
    anonymous. I don't use and don't advise anyone else to bother using the kind of "VPN" pushed by web browsers and unnecessary virus scanners.

    I use Proton when I need to "be somewhere else".

    If you do use these services my firewall likely has you already brick walled due to the abuse that these services are often used for.

    Use of a VPN isn't /prima facie/ evidence of a crime -- or suspicious intent. If I want to order something from a Sam's Club in New England, it's easier to *be* in New England than to have to sort through a list of national branch addresses.
    I sometimes get amused when young people tell me I should use a VPN and
    I could be hacked if someone else knows my IP address.

    So, why use software that was designed for general purpose computers
    when you aren't such a device?

    It's a lot cheaper than a custom design.

    But "customization", in this case, is just FURTHER constraining an already >> constrained set of operating conditions. You're not asking for it to
    do some OTHER/additional function.

    Customization costs money.

    Buy a thermostat for your home. It is customizable -- by the installer.
    He can even put his name and contact number *in* the device so you
    remember to call HIM when you have a problem.

    A technician has to be on site to install the controllers and the
    freezers. Expecting him to type in a few limits doesn't seem
    like a big ask -- assuming it wasn't done before the kit was
    shipped to the site.

    When Windows first went online it was not designed to be on an
    untrusted network at all.

    But, most Manglement folks are still ignorant and don't understand WHY >>>>>> these things are important.

    Yes

    They will understand when they start incurring losses and have to answer >>>> to their superiors, stock-holders, customers, etc. When your competitors' >>>> bottom lines are better than yours, eventually folks lose jobs.

    True but I can't see anything changing. One reason is the big gap between >>> management and anyone who has a clue how anything works.
    I think people understand behaviors that cost them money (which can be
    real dollars, lost opportunity, bad customer relations, etc.).

    But they don't understand that those behaviours are caused by complex technology which they don't understand and they don't understand that
    the reason they don't understand this is because they don't understand the complex technology.

    I don't understand how my body does all of the things that it does.
    I don't know why certain blood components change in quantity and ratio.

    But, I know there are professionals who have studied this and made
    careers out of it. I consult with them to tell me what the numbers
    mean and how I should adjust my behavior or what it heralds, going
    forward.

    The same applies to your HVAC system, plumbing, electronics, computers,
    etc. We willingly acknowledge ignorance in many fields so why would "automation" be any different?

    A cousin offered a billing service to doctors in her area. One of the
    initial adopters apparently didn't think they had to PAY for that
    equipment (because he was well known in the area and his use of it was
    like an endorsement).

    When he ran out of disk space, his office called for support. (ballsy
    given that he hadn't paid for the equipment -- likely wouldn't pay for
    the support, either?)

    When the disk was upgraded, he discovered he was locked out of his
    records. For nonpayment.

    Wanna litigate? And explain why you haven't paid for the original
    product? How many weeks/months will you be locked out of your
    business records while the case makes its way through the docket?

    *She* got paid. Whether he learned anything (or WHAT he learned)
    remains to be seen. But, his *actions* were altered by *her*
    activities.

    Anything you don't understand must be easy and therefore there can't
    be any need to pay a lot for it. So the casino doesn't need an on-site
    IT specialist because no-one knows what such an individual would do.
    It follows that that individual is not necessary.
    Casinos have LOTS of IT specialists! Aside from the tables, all of
    the electronic gambling is networked and monitored in real time;
    they can tell how many coins are in the (slot) machine's hopper,
    how many have been diverted thru to the pedestal base, what
    percentage of payout the machine is experiencing, etc.

    [The payout percentage is controlled by the local gaming authority;
    the machine can't rape you -- it has to rely on The Grind to empty
    your pockets!]
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Don Y@blockedofcourse@foo.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Tue Nov 3 11:37:05 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 11/3/2026 8:58 AM, Edward Rawde wrote:
    "Don Y" <blockedofcourse@foo.invalid> wrote in message news:11ccq58$3qi9v$1@dont-email.me...
    On 11/3/2026 6:48 AM, Waldek Hebisch wrote:
    Edward Rawde <invalid@invalid.invalid> wrote:

    AI Lawyers are coming. I wonder whether they will be just as bad?

    I am waiting for AI lawyer to sue web sites that put those annoying
    "checking that you are not a robot" boxes.

    You just need an AI "captcha-bot"

    <https://aibeat.co/bots-solving-captchas-better/>

    Yes that's going to be interesting.

    Imagine all of the other areas where an AI can "hack the powers that be"
    (skip TV/radio commercials, skip TV/radio programs that likely wouldn't
    appeal to me, summarize The News so I don't have to watch a bunch of commercials just to get the content, find the best price/time of day to
    make a specific purchase, predict when a particular item will be sold
    at a discount -- sale, etc.)

    Something non-intellectual will be needed which only a physically
    able human can do. But I cannot think of anything which meets that requirement which could work as a captcha replacement.

    Noticing the *limitations* of the human actor will be a differentiator.
    AIs will have to learn to "not be too good" (fast, accurate, etc.)

    Web sites may just have to concede that they can't tell whether they
    have a human visitor or not.

    They have to reevaluate why/IF this actually matters.

    If the AI has already "learned" all of the content you have to offer,
    the captcha just makes it hard for humans -- the AI won't bother.

    It's arguable whether or not AI *agents* should be able to act on behalf
    of humans -- e.g., to access your bank account, purchase supplies,
    make appointments, review "statements", etc

    This is likely to increase the push to "please log in using your whatever account"
    before you can access anything at all.



    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Carlos E. R.@robin_listas@es.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Tue Nov 3 20:20:13 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 2026-11-02 14:15, Don Y wrote:
    <https://apnews.com/article/europe-supermarkets-freezers-cyberattacks- a8ea5b30d67da47957769f29101fe686>

    "...its fridges and freezers had been hacked and set to 50 degrees Celsius"

    And, why would a temperature controller for a FREEZER ever allow
    such a high temperature?-a In case you wanted to convert them to
    walk-in ovens???

    It is the defrosting cycle.


    Who *specifies* such systems and who naively implements those specifications?

    [The last batch of targets used "older technology"... so, nothing
    was learned in the revisions that followed?]

    It is amazing that they did this twice, and no countermeasures were implemented in between, or did not work.
    --
    Cheers,
    Carlos E.R.
    ESEfc-Efc+, EUEfc-Efc|.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Carlos E. R.@robin_listas@es.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Tue Nov 3 20:31:41 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 2026-11-02 18:57, Don Y wrote:
    On 11/2/2026 9:32 AM, Edward Rawde wrote:

    The next step is to weaponize these attacks to cause confusion and/or
    cripple key systems and infrastructure.-a Imagine someone attacking
    the cellular network, power grid, etc.

    Whoever released Blaster obviously waited until just after MS had
    released XP Service Pack 2.

    Without Blaster it's likely that this wouldn't have happened:
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows_Firewall

    You can still find the reason for most of those issues:
    https://www.google.com/search?q="unchecked+buffer"+site%3Amicrosoft.com

    And one reason for this is the use of c.
    In c you can easily create a buffer, but nothing tells you about
    checking to make sure
    you haven't overfilled it.

    The reason for it is lack of discipline and testing on the part of developers.

    The developers only do the testing they are paid to do, in their paid time.
    --
    Cheers,
    Carlos E.R.
    ESEfc-Efc+, EUEfc-Efc|.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Carlos E. R.@robin_listas@es.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Tue Nov 3 20:41:31 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 2026-11-03 01:26, Don Y wrote:
    On 11/2/2026 11:39 AM, Edward Rawde wrote:


    Remote access has always been a vulnerability.-a My Telebits relied on
    "call back" to ensure folks couldn't just dial in to them from any
    available telephone.-a I.e., relying on the constancy of the PSTN to effectively act as authenticator.

    Year 2000. A technician friend demonstrated to me remotely accessing a
    big telephone exchange where he had worked. He only need to phone with a modem, there was no security beyond knowing the phone number.

    I also saw, on other exchanges, technicians enabling password control
    --
    Cheers,
    Carlos E.R.
    ESEfc-Efc+, EUEfc-Efc|.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Carlos E. R.@robin_listas@es.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Tue Nov 3 20:46:50 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 2026-11-03 04:18, Don Y wrote:
    Yet.-a Perhaps they are educating their potential victims so that
    when those folks are "threatened", they capitulate even if the
    systems involved are not vulnerable?

    I doubt it because then the food will still be frozen and will be
    monitored
    locally to make sure it remains so.

    So, the staff in the store has to add "watch the coolers" to their current list of responsibilities?-a How do they know if something is wonky?-a And what
    do they *do* about it??

    They removed the stuff and stored it in lorries with freezers while
    somebody else worked on restoring the machines to normality.

    The second time.
    --
    Cheers,
    Carlos E.R.
    ESEfc-Efc+, EUEfc-Efc|.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Carlos E. R.@robin_listas@es.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Tue Nov 3 20:53:37 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 2026-11-03 05:27, Edward Rawde wrote:


    You don't get a choice about that because you didn't design the vulnerable >>> controller yourself.

    I can have a say in anything I design or advise on designs.

    But you didn't design the vulnerable controller.
    It may be true that you could design your own controller but most stores with freezers don't employ their own people who could.

    They hired a reputable firm specialized in controllers for fridges,
    among many other controllers and industrial automation.

    I don't remember the name now.


    I worked in industrial automation and data acquisition back in the 90's.
    We did not implement any security, it was up to the clients to hire
    security guards limiting access to the rooms. We didn't have Internet to
    worry about yet.
    --
    Cheers,
    Carlos E.R.
    ESEfc-Efc+, EUEfc-Efc|.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Carlos E. R.@robin_listas@es.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Tue Nov 3 20:59:13 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 2026-11-03 11:06, Don Y wrote:
    On 11/2/2026 9:27 PM, Edward Rawde wrote:
    "Don Y" <blockedofcourse@foo.invalid> wrote in message
    news:11cbjph$3e9k6$1@dont-email.me...


    A cousin offered a billing service to doctors in her area.-a One of the initial adopters apparently didn't think they had to PAY for that
    equipment (because he was well known in the area and his use of it was
    like an endorsement).

    When he ran out of disk space, his office called for support.-a (ballsy
    given that he hadn't paid for the equipment -- likely wouldn't pay for
    the support, either?)

    When the disk was upgraded, he discovered he was locked out of his
    records.-a For nonpayment.

    Wanna litigate?-a And explain why you haven't paid for the original product?-a How many weeks/months will you be locked out of your
    business records while the case makes its way through the docket?

    *She* got paid.-a Whether he learned anything (or WHAT he learned)
    remains to be seen.-a But, his *actions* were altered by *her*
    activities.

    My boss ordered me to install a "virus" in the client computer. I just
    did a date check, and if six months had passed, it simulated an error
    and they had to call maintenance. But you did not pay us, there is no maintenance.

    That was with MsDOS, so trivial to fake the date, anyway.
    --
    Cheers,
    Carlos E.R.
    ESEfc-Efc+, EUEfc-Efc|.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Carlos E. R.@robin_listas@es.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Tue Nov 3 21:07:25 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 2026-11-03 18:26, John R Walliker wrote:
    On 03/11/2026 15:49, Edward Rawde wrote:
    "John R Walliker" <jrwalliker@gmail.com> wrote in message
    news:11ccht5$3nbj2$1@dont-email.me...


    And what
    do they *do* about it??

    Pull the cable out of the Internet provider's modem.

    But then you can't sell anything because the payment systems will
    stop working.

    Better that than lose everything to defrost.

    That depends on the value of the frozen goods versus all the
    other stuff that they have to stop selling because they can't
    take payment.
    However I imagine that these freezer hacks have been done at
    night when there is nobody there to notice.

    The first time, yes. Or a weekend. The second time, I dunno.




    The next step is to weaponize these attacks to cause confusion >>>>>>>>> and/or

    The rest of your post is a very long quote without new material. Please,
    would you be so kind to delete it before sending?

    ...
    --
    Cheers,
    Carlos E.R.
    ESEfc-Efc+, EUEfc-Efc|.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Carlos E. R.@robin_listas@es.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Tue Nov 3 21:09:20 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 2026-11-02 17:41, john larkin wrote:
    On Tue, 3 Nov 2026 00:52:24 +1100, Bill Sloman <bill.sloman@ieee.org>
    wrote:

    On 3/11/2026 12:15 am, Don Y wrote:
    <https://apnews.com/article/europe-supermarkets-freezers-cyberattacks-a8ea5b30d67da47957769f29101fe686>

    "...its fridges and freezers had been hacked and set to 50 degrees Celsius" >>>
    And, why would a temperature controller for a FREEZER ever allow
    such a high temperature?-a In case you wanted to convert them to
    walk-in ovens???

    Who *specifies* such systems and who naively implements those
    specifications?

    [The last batch of targets used "older technology"... so, nothing
    was learned in the revisions that followed?]

    The software would presumably have blocked those high temperatures, but
    it had been hacked. Fridges and freezers use heat pumps to control the
    temperature and these are bi-directional.

    It's unlikely that the refrigeration gear in a supermarket frozen-food
    case is reversable. My fridge certainly will not heat above room temp.

    Setting it to 50C just turned off the cooling.

    No. These machines can indeed reverse the valves and head the contents
    for quick defrosting.

    Other machines use resistances.
    --
    Cheers,
    Carlos E.R.
    ESEfc-Efc+, EUEfc-Efc|.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Carlos E. R.@robin_listas@es.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Tue Nov 3 21:10:50 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 2026-11-02 18:37, john larkin wrote:
    On Mon, 2 Nov 2026 11:46:15 -0500, "Edward Rawde"
    <invalid@invalid.invalid> wrote:

    "john larkin" <jl@glen--canyon.com> wrote in message news:g1fheld2tgm8u9p2v964v38614dglpof7k@4ax.com...
    On Tue, 3 Nov 2026 00:52:24 +1100, Bill Sloman <bill.sloman@ieee.org>
    wrote:


    It's unlikely that the refrigeration gear in a supermarket frozen-food
    case is reversable. My fridge certainly will not heat above room temp.

    Setting it to 50C just turned off the cooling.

    I think you'll find they put it into defrost mode which has a heater to remove frost.
    Whether or not they also overwrote software limits for length of time and maximum
    temperature I do not know but if you own the controller then you can tell the
    hardware to do anything you can tell it to do.


    Defrost is usually some resistive elements that melt ice on the
    cooling coils. It doesn't reverse the heat pump and it doesn't heat up
    the frozen peas.

    A reversable heat pump is expensive.

    Not anymore.
    --
    Cheers,
    Carlos E.R.
    ESEfc-Efc+, EUEfc-Efc|.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Jim Jackson@jj@franjam.org.uk to sci.electronics.design on Tue Nov 3 20:14:17 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 2026-11-03, Edward Rawde <invalid@invalid.invalid> wrote:
    "Don Y" <blockedofcourse@foo.invalid> wrote in message news:11ccq58$3qi9v$1@dont-email.me...
    On 11/3/2026 6:48 AM, Waldek Hebisch wrote:
    Edward Rawde <invalid@invalid.invalid> wrote:

    AI Lawyers are coming. I wonder whether they will be just as bad?

    I am waiting for AI lawyer to sue web sites that put those annoying
    "checking that you are not a robot" boxes.

    You just need an AI "captcha-bot"

    <https://aibeat.co/bots-solving-captchas-better/>


    Yes that's going to be interesting.
    Something non-intellectual will be needed which only a physically
    able human can do. But I cannot think of anything which meets that requirement which could work as a captcha replacement.
    Web sites may just have to concede that they can't tell whether they
    have a human visitor or not.

    So AI agent are now passing the Turing test in spades!

    This is likely to increase the push to "please log in using your
    whatever account" before you can access anything at all.


    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Carlos E. R.@robin_listas@es.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Tue Nov 3 21:15:12 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 2026-11-02 19:04, Don Y wrote:
    On 11/2/2026 11:00 AM, someone wrote:
    Another consideration you're not aware of is the international market
    for these systems. Depending upon the country, and even the locale
    within a single country, there are public health regulations governing
    storage temperatures of the various kinds of products being
    refrigerated. So making everything programmable allows the systems to
    be adapted any and everywhere. They should be logging the temperature
    histories too for the same compliance and liability issues.

    Regardless, there are still sensible limits that can be extracted from any regulatory documentation.-a They were just sloppy and didn't install
    specific limits at time of deployment (why would there even be a 50C
    setting
    supported on a controller deployed for a FREEZER???-a If you want to turn it OFF, then have an ON/OFF switch!)


    You don't know that.

    The limits could be set in the software that does the remote monitoring
    and control, centrally.

    Obviously they will rethink the strategy and deploy new software or
    perhaps new controllers. Sell that as a new improved version.
    --
    Cheers,
    Carlos E.R.
    ESEfc-Efc+, EUEfc-Efc|.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Carlos E. R.@robin_listas@es.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Tue Nov 3 21:22:18 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 2026-11-03 00:15, Don Y wrote:
    On 11/2/2026 3:00 PM, someone wrote:
    The controllers of the individual units do have limits. They were
    overwritten by the hackers. You're overlooking the fact of the
    controllers being universal. So a limit that may make sense as
    reasonable for one particular model may be catastrophic for another
    model. All the units certainly had overtemperature alarms, especially
    the freezers, but they were obviously silenced or not reported on the
    display. I'm pretty sure they don't want an audible alarm going off on
    the store floor, so it would have to be reduced to a beep on their
    display.

    The "site/installation/application specific" limits shouldn't be
    adjustable remotely.-a You turn a "universal product" into a
    *tailored* product before deployment.

    The home heating of the flat I'm living at this week, is remotely
    managed. The manufacturer logs many parameters of the boiler, and can
    adjust things. They certainly can change the temperature, but they
    don't. I can do the temp adjustment in my phone. I can program it
    somehow (I have not looked). There is a knob in the wall I can turn and
    set the temperature, but nothing else (no access to the program).

    This remote monitoring means that the technician comes every two years
    instead of yearly. Cheaper for me.

    I just hope it is secure enough.
    --
    Cheers,
    Carlos E.R.
    ESEfc-Efc+, EUEfc-Efc|.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Carlos E. R.@robin_listas@es.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Tue Nov 3 21:36:46 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 2026-11-03 11:49, Don Y wrote:
    On 11/3/2026 3:47 AM, Don Y wrote:
    People are just now seeing that they *are* hackable.-a It will be a bit
    longer before they realize the reasons why (and, even longer to realize
    how they can be used/leveraged for OTHER hacks)

    <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/attack-of-the-zombie-baby-
    monitors/>

    -2It sounds useful and wondrous. It's quite possible, however, that your Internet-connected baby monitor instead spent last night teaming up with millions of other devicesrCocameras, printers, routers, speakers, air conditioners, DVRs, and morerCoto censor journalists; take down music,
    social media, or movie sites such as Twitter or Netflix; sabotage
    open-source software projects; knock almost a million German houses
    off-line; or bring down cell-phone communications in Liberia. With all
    this extra stealth activity, it's also running up your electricity bill.-+

    ...running up the electricity bill? Really?


    <https://github.com/jgamblin/Mirai-Source-Code>
    --
    Cheers,
    Carlos E.R.
    ESEfc-Efc+, EUEfc-Efc|.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Don Y@blockedofcourse@foo.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Tue Nov 3 17:04:25 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 11/3/2026 12:59 PM, Carlos E. R. wrote:
    My boss ordered me to install a "virus" in the client computer. I just did a date check, and if six months had passed, it simulated an error and they had to
    call maintenance. But you did not pay us, there is no maintenance.

    That was with MsDOS, so trivial to fake the date, anyway.
    When the ransom malware was en vogue, a friend came to me after
    having lent his ToughBook (work for Federal Gummit) to one of
    HIS friends. It came back with a big splash screen demanding
    ransom.

    But, it was easily defeated -- likely a cheap copycat hoping for
    a score.

    I wonder how he would have explained it to his boss given his
    day-to-day responsibilities.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Don Y@blockedofcourse@foo.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Tue Nov 3 17:39:31 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 11/3/2026 1:22 PM, Carlos E. R. wrote:
    On 2026-11-03 00:15, Don Y wrote:
    On 11/2/2026 3:00 PM, someone wrote:
    The controllers of the individual units do have limits. They were
    overwritten by the hackers. You're overlooking the fact of the controllers >>> being universal. So a limit that may make sense as reasonable for one
    particular model may be catastrophic for another model. All the units
    certainly had overtemperature alarms, especially the freezers, but they were
    obviously silenced or not reported on the display. I'm pretty sure they >>> don't want an audible alarm going off on the store floor, so it would have >>> to be reduced to a beep on their display.

    The "site/installation/application specific" limits shouldn't be
    adjustable remotely.-a You turn a "universal product" into a
    *tailored* product before deployment.

    The home heating of the flat I'm living at this week, is remotely managed. The
    manufacturer logs many parameters of the boiler, and can adjust things. They certainly can change the temperature, but they don't. I can do the temp adjustment in my phone. I can program it somehow (I have not looked). There is
    a knob in the wall I can turn and set the temperature, but nothing else (no access to the program).

    Our old thermostat had an "installer mode" (password protected). It allowed:

    commercial vs. residential
    symbolic name of device
    programmable vs non-programmable
    F vs C
    outdoor temperature sensor support enabled?
    {conv forced air, heat pump, radiant heat, other, cool only}
    0/1/2 cooling stages
    0/1 heating stages
    equipment controls fan/thermostat controls fan
    manual changeover (heat<->cool) vs automatic
    advanced (additional) options vs basic options
    finish with high cool stage enable/disable
    cooling stage differential: {comfort, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3, 3.5 degree}
    cooling stage 1 cycles per hour {1,2,3,4,5,6}
    cooling stage 2 cycles per hour {1,2,3,4,5,6}
    heat cycles per hour {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12}
    compressor dead time (off,1,2,3,4,5 mins}
    extended fan cool run time {0,0.5,1,1.5,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15 mins} extended fan heat run time {0,0.5,1,1.5,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15 mins} schedule periods per day {2, 4}
    adaptivce recovery enable/disable
    MINIMUM COOL SETPOINT (!!!) {50-99}
    MAXIMUM HEAT SETPOINT (!!!) {40-90}
    keypad lockout {none, partial, full}
    wired sensor attached yes/no
    filter type {none, media, electronic cleaner}
    number of filters {1,2}
    filter reminder {off,10,20,30,45,60days,3,4,5,6,9,12,15months}
    humidifer reminder {off,6,12months}
    dehumidifier reminder {off,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12months}
    ventilation type {none,passive/fan}
    ventlation filter reminder {off,3,6,9,12months}
    number of UV devices {0,1,2}
    reminders:
    spring service (date, etc.)
    additional custom reminders?
    backlighting {continuous, on demand}
    clock {12,24hr}
    DST enable/disable
    indoor temperature offset {-3,-2,-1,0,1,2,3}
    alert indicator enable/disable
    password
    dealer name
    dealer phone
    dealer email
    dealer website

    Note the constraints that can be imposed on heating and cooling control.

    There are other "settings" that the *user*/occupant can set as well
    (that are not "password protected")

    [One useful feature is "clean screen" which disables the touchscreen
    for 30? seconds -- which it indicates with a countdown timer -- while
    you wipe it clean! Yay! Were that everyone was that smart!!!]

    And, this is a "generic" thermostat, not a "smart, wifi enabled device!

    I.e., one can build the hooks that allow a device to be targeted to
    a specific sub-application into a generic device and just have it
    configured (ham-strung) at deployment. Only the installer needs
    to understand all the settings available AND NONE NEED TO BE REMOTABLE!

    This remote monitoring means that the technician comes every two years instead
    of yearly. Cheaper for me.

    I just hope it is secure enough.


    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Don Y@blockedofcourse@foo.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Tue Nov 3 17:49:17 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 11/3/2026 1:36 PM, Carlos E. R. wrote:
    On 2026-11-03 11:49, Don Y wrote:
    On 11/3/2026 3:47 AM, Don Y wrote:
    People are just now seeing that they *are* hackable.-a It will be a bit
    longer before they realize the reasons why (and, even longer to realize
    how they can be used/leveraged for OTHER hacks)

    <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/attack-of-the-zombie-baby-
    monitors/>

    -2It sounds useful and wondrous. It's quite possible, however, that your Internet-connected baby monitor instead spent last night teaming up with millions of other devicesrCocameras, printers, routers, speakers, air conditioners, DVRs, and morerCoto censor journalists; take down music, social
    media, or movie sites such as Twitter or Netflix; sabotage open-source software
    projects; knock almost a million German houses off-line; or bring down cell- phone communications in Liberia. With all this extra stealth activity, it's also running up your electricity bill.-+

    ...running up the electricity bill? Really?
    The hack isn't running up your electric bill but, rather, the fact that
    you have such a device installed.

    All of these things run 24/7 -- even if only drawing a few watts.
    How many do you have?

    E.g., as all of my (similar) devices are remotely powered, I can remove
    power from them when they aren't needed. No need to walk around the house turning off an assortment of "daemons".
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Don Y@blockedofcourse@foo.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Tue Nov 3 19:06:42 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 11/3/2026 12:41 PM, Carlos E. R. wrote:
    On 2026-11-03 01:26, Don Y wrote:
    On 11/2/2026 11:39 AM, Edward Rawde wrote:


    Remote access has always been a vulnerability.-a My Telebits relied on
    "call back" to ensure folks couldn't just dial in to them from any
    available telephone.-a I.e., relying on the constancy of the PSTN to
    effectively act as authenticator.

    Year 2000. A technician friend demonstrated to me remotely accessing a big telephone exchange where he had worked. He only need to phone with a modem, there was no security beyond knowing the phone number.

    I also saw, on other exchanges, technicians enabling password control

    I designed an add-on device, in the early 80's, to allow remote management
    of PBX's (internal modem, etc.). At the time, there was just a serial
    port to talk to the switch. So, instead of attaching a dumb modem,
    you could attach my device (which also included some other monitors)
    and put a layer of security between you and the switch's "control port"

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Don Y@blockedofcourse@foo.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Tue Nov 3 19:13:01 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 11/3/2026 12:31 PM, Carlos E. R. wrote:
    On 2026-11-02 18:57, Don Y wrote:
    On 11/2/2026 9:32 AM, Edward Rawde wrote:

    The next step is to weaponize these attacks to cause confusion and/or
    cripple key systems and infrastructure.-a Imagine someone attacking
    the cellular network, power grid, etc.

    Whoever released Blaster obviously waited until just after MS had
    released XP Service Pack 2.

    Without Blaster it's likely that this wouldn't have happened:
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows_Firewall

    You can still find the reason for most of those issues:
    https://www.google.com/search?q="unchecked+buffer"+site%3Amicrosoft.com

    And one reason for this is the use of c.
    In c you can easily create a buffer, but nothing tells you about checking to
    make sure
    you haven't overfilled it.

    The reason for it is lack of discipline and testing on the part of developers.

    The developers only do the testing they are paid to do, in their paid time.
    Be honest. No one likes testing. And, most "testing" is just "checking to
    see if the latest code stanza actually does what you hope".

    REAL testing is a "pen's down" activity -- you don't twiddle the codebase
    while testing as that invalidates all of the tests you ran prior to
    your latest "twiddle".

    When your contract with a client hinges on the details of whether or
    not your implementation conforms to a WRITTEN specification, it's really important to know that before the client holds your feet to the fire
    (legally and morally).

    [It's also a safeguard against clients who suddenly decide they want something DIFFERENT: "Hey, this is what we agreed to. If you want to design something ELSE, we can discuss that as a followup project. But, THIS project comes to
    a contractual close, first!"]

    I spent less than 20% of my project time writing code. And, when I *am* writing, I already know what the code has to do IN DETAIL because that
    was formally specified BEFORE starting to write code.

    The other 80 % of the time is spent writing specifications and testing
    (40+40).

    So, an AI that can write code offers me very littie in terms of
    productivity.

    And, it likely can't *create* specifications (though it may be able to
    help with the prose).

    So, the big POTENTIAL win comes in testing -- a tedious, repetitive
    activity (i.e., ideally suited to automating) that I would gladly
    surrender to a COMPETENT surrogate.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Don Y@blockedofcourse@foo.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Tue Nov 3 20:49:38 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 11/3/2026 12:20 PM, Carlos E. R. wrote:
    On 2026-11-02 14:15, Don Y wrote:
    <https://apnews.com/article/europe-supermarkets-freezers-cyberattacks-
    a8ea5b30d67da47957769f29101fe686>

    "...its fridges and freezers had been hacked and set to 50 degrees Celsius" >>
    And, why would a temperature controller for a FREEZER ever allow
    such a high temperature?-a In case you wanted to convert them to
    walk-in ovens???

    It is the defrosting cycle.


    Who *specifies* such systems and who naively implements those specifications?

    [The last batch of targets used "older technology"... so, nothing
    was learned in the revisions that followed?]

    It is amazing that they did this twice, and no countermeasures were implemented
    in between, or did not work.

    Fool me once, shame on me; fool me twice...

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Carlos E. R.@robin_listas@es.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Wed Nov 4 11:39:43 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 2026-11-04 03:13, Don Y wrote:
    On 11/3/2026 12:31 PM, Carlos E. R. wrote:
    On 2026-11-02 18:57, Don Y wrote:
    On 11/2/2026 9:32 AM, Edward Rawde wrote:

    The next step is to weaponize these attacks to cause confusion and/or
    cripple key systems and infrastructure.-a Imagine someone attacking
    the cellular network, power grid, etc.

    Whoever released Blaster obviously waited until just after MS had
    released XP Service Pack 2.

    Without Blaster it's likely that this wouldn't have happened:
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows_Firewall

    You can still find the reason for most of those issues:
    https://www.google.com/search?q="unchecked+buffer"+site%3Amicrosoft.com >>>>
    And one reason for this is the use of c.
    In c you can easily create a buffer, but nothing tells you about
    checking to make sure
    you haven't overfilled it.

    The reason for it is lack of discipline and testing on the part of
    developers.

    The developers only do the testing they are paid to do, in their paid
    time.
    Be honest.-a No one likes testing.-a And, most "testing" is just "checking to see if the latest code stanza actually does what you hope".

    REAL testing is a "pen's down" activity -- you don't twiddle the codebase while testing as that invalidates all of the tests you ran prior to
    your latest "twiddle".

    When your contract with a client hinges on the details of whether or
    not your implementation conforms to a WRITTEN specification, it's really important to know that before the client holds your feet to the fire
    (legally and morally).

    [It's also a safeguard against clients who suddenly decide they want something
    DIFFERENT:-a "Hey, this is what we agreed to.-a If you want to design something
    ELSE, we can discuss that as a followup project.-a But, THIS project
    comes to
    a contractual close, first!"]

    I spent less than 20% of my project time writing code.-a And, when I *am* writing, I already know what the code has to do IN DETAIL because that
    was formally specified BEFORE starting to write code.


    One project the specs changed as it was passed a few times down to
    another subcontractor layer.

    An airport wanted a machine to test the lamps used for landing: they
    show a colour in one direction, none or another colour in another
    direction. They wanted the machine to say if the lamp was good or bad.
    They paid millions.

    When it reached me, I got about a thousand euros (one month salary) and
    had a fuzzy spec of drawing a graph of luminance vs direction (3D). My
    boss got about 20Kre4.

    When we installed the machine they were appalled.

    The other 80 % of the time is spent writing specifications and testing (40+40).

    So, an AI that can write code offers me very littie in terms of
    productivity.

    And, it likely can't *create* specifications (though it may be able to
    help with the prose).

    So, the big POTENTIAL win comes in testing -- a tedious, repetitive
    activity (i.e., ideally suited to automating) that I would gladly
    surrender to a COMPETENT surrogate.
    --
    Cheers,
    Carlos E.R.
    ESEfc-Efc+, EUEfc-Efc|.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Carlos E. R.@robin_listas@es.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Wed Nov 4 11:44:06 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 2026-11-04 04:49, Don Y wrote:
    On 11/3/2026 12:20 PM, Carlos E. R. wrote:
    On 2026-11-02 14:15, Don Y wrote:
    <https://apnews.com/article/europe-supermarkets-freezers-
    cyberattacks- a8ea5b30d67da47957769f29101fe686>

    "...its fridges and freezers had been hacked and set to 50 degrees
    Celsius"

    And, why would a temperature controller for a FREEZER ever allow
    such a high temperature?-a In case you wanted to convert them to
    walk-in ovens???

    It is the defrosting cycle.


    Who *specifies* such systems and who naively implements those
    specifications?

    [The last batch of targets used "older technology"... so, nothing
    was learned in the revisions that followed?]

    It is amazing that they did this twice, and no countermeasures were
    implemented in between, or did not work.

    Fool me once, shame on me; fool me twice...


    To be fair, the first time was in France, and the second on other countries.
    --
    Cheers,
    Carlos E.R.
    ESEfc-Efc+, EUEfc-Efc|.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Don Y@blockedofcourse@foo.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Wed Nov 4 04:25:41 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 11/4/2026 3:39 AM, Carlos E. R. wrote:
    On 2026-11-04 03:13, Don Y wrote:
    On 11/3/2026 12:31 PM, Carlos E. R. wrote:
    On 2026-11-02 18:57, Don Y wrote:
    On 11/2/2026 9:32 AM, Edward Rawde wrote:

    The next step is to weaponize these attacks to cause confusion and/or
    cripple key systems and infrastructure.-a Imagine someone attacking
    the cellular network, power grid, etc.

    Whoever released Blaster obviously waited until just after MS had
    released XP Service Pack 2.

    Without Blaster it's likely that this wouldn't have happened:
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows_Firewall

    You can still find the reason for most of those issues:
    https://www.google.com/search?q="unchecked+buffer"+site%3Amicrosoft.com >>>>>
    And one reason for this is the use of c.
    In c you can easily create a buffer, but nothing tells you about checking
    to make sure
    you haven't overfilled it.

    The reason for it is lack of discipline and testing on the part of developers.

    The developers only do the testing they are paid to do, in their paid time. >> Be honest.-a No one likes testing.-a And, most "testing" is just "checking to
    see if the latest code stanza actually does what you hope".

    REAL testing is a "pen's down" activity -- you don't twiddle the codebase
    while testing as that invalidates all of the tests you ran prior to
    your latest "twiddle".

    When your contract with a client hinges on the details of whether or
    not your implementation conforms to a WRITTEN specification, it's really
    important to know that before the client holds your feet to the fire
    (legally and morally).

    [It's also a safeguard against clients who suddenly decide they want something
    DIFFERENT:-a "Hey, this is what we agreed to.-a If you want to design something
    ELSE, we can discuss that as a followup project.-a But, THIS project comes to
    a contractual close, first!"]

    I spent less than 20% of my project time writing code.-a And, when I *am*
    writing, I already know what the code has to do IN DETAIL because that
    was formally specified BEFORE starting to write code.


    One project the specs changed as it was passed a few times down to another subcontractor layer.

    An airport wanted a machine to test the lamps used for landing: they show a colour in one direction, none or another colour in another direction. They wanted the machine to say if the lamp was good or bad. They paid millions.

    When it reached me, I got about a thousand euros (one month salary) and had a
    fuzzy spec of drawing a graph of luminance vs direction (3D). My boss got about
    20Kre4.

    When we installed the machine they were appalled.
    I learned (on someone else's dime) the cost of an "evolving specification". Weekly (2hr) status meetings with client that allowed them to be fickle with their stated goals -- led to a project timeline that kept getting extended
    as they "imagined" more functionality and features than they had originally contracted.

    Management ignorance (of what is actually involved in a design) ended up significantly penalizing the project as all of the changes effectively
    came out of "overtime" charges as parts of the design had to be reworked
    to fit their changing requirements. And, while the money was great, it
    got to a point where control over my *time* was worth far more to me!

    So, when I started out on my own, I *initially* offered clients a choice:
    time & materials vs fixed cost. The former gives flexibility in the specification while leaving the *cost* (and schedule) completely undefined;
    it will take as long as it takes and cost as much as it costs! The latter giving them a firm cost and timetable -- but, removing any possibility for changes after the point where the contract is signed.

    "Anything NOT specified in the specification is left to the SOLE
    discretion of the implementation -- regardless of suitability to
    the stated application!"

    It is amusing to watch clients squirm when they realize I can take the easy (lowest cost to me) way out of any situation that they don't want to think about IN DETAIL prior to contract signing.

    "Why would I want to do anything more than NOTHING to address some
    design aspect that you didn't consider worth thinking about ahead
    of time?"

    When the lawyers reviewed contracts, they screamed about how "generous"
    they were to me, trying to pressure their clients to add language to
    shift the balance back in their favor:

    "Sure! If we add language indicating the cost and timetable are
    just suggestions with an allowance for either party to back out
    of the agreement when those limits are encountered. This limits
    BOTH of our commitments to the project!"

    I.e., I can quit the project at that point and you can abandon it, as
    well. ("But, then we are left with an incomplete product!" "Yes,
    you have the freedom to find someone ELSE to finish it for you -- with
    terms that you can decide at that point!")

    "Really, do you think *I* am going to assume YOUR risk if YOU
    aren't willing to assume it, yourself?? What portion of the
    PROFITS from the device are you offering for that risk? Oh!
    The profits are ALL yours?!"

    [This actually worked out surprisingly well. It kept "interference"
    to a minimum ("No, I'm not interested in your ideas as to how these
    unspecified issues should be resolved -- I'll find some EASY/QUICK
    way to resolve them") and let me better plan HOW I tackled the project
    (in terms of technology, tools and timeframe)]
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Don Y@blockedofcourse@foo.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Wed Nov 4 04:27:05 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 11/4/2026 3:44 AM, Carlos E. R. wrote:
    Who *specifies* such systems and who naively implements those specifications?

    [The last batch of targets used "older technology"... so, nothing
    was learned in the revisions that followed?]

    It is amazing that they did this twice, and no countermeasures were
    implemented in between, or did not work.

    Fool me once, shame on me; fool me twice...

    To be fair, the first time was in France, and the second on other countries.

    But the exploit wasn't kept a secret. What responsibility do folks have to evaluate THEIR exposure to a published hack?

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Carlos E. R.@robin_listas@es.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Wed Nov 4 19:53:52 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 2026-11-02 14:15, Don Y wrote:
    <https://apnews.com/article/europe-supermarkets-freezers-cyberattacks- a8ea5b30d67da47957769f29101fe686>

    "...its fridges and freezers had been hacked and set to 50 degrees Celsius"

    I found an article where they describe what happened, technically, but
    it is in Spanish. You can read it with an automated translator, of course.

    <https://www.mmadrigal.com/cuando-la-nevera-se-vuelve-un-horno-lo-que-hay-detras-de-los-ataques-a-los-supermercados-europeos/>

    *When the fridge turns into an oven: what lies behind the attacks on European supermarkets*

    At 13:26 on 3 November, according to the messagerCOs timestamp, the
    Z-Pentest Telegram channel reposted a message from NoName057(16), the pro-Russian hacktivist group known for its denial-of-service attacks
    (taking down a website by flooding it with traffic). I have translated
    the key points from Russian.
    --
    Cheers,
    Carlos E.R.
    ESEfc-Efc+, EUEfc-Efc|.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Don Y@blockedofcourse@foo.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Wed Nov 4 12:15:00 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 11/4/2026 11:53 AM, Carlos E. R. wrote:
    On 2026-11-02 14:15, Don Y wrote:
    <https://apnews.com/article/europe-supermarkets-freezers-cyberattacks-
    a8ea5b30d67da47957769f29101fe686>

    "...its fridges and freezers had been hacked and set to 50 degrees Celsius"

    I found an article where they describe what happened, technically, but it is in
    Spanish. You can read it with an automated translator, of course.

    <https://www.mmadrigal.com/cuando-la-nevera-se-vuelve-un-horno-lo-que-hay- detras-de-los-ataques-a-los-supermercados-europeos/>

    -a*When the fridge turns into an oven: what lies behind the attacks on European
    supermarkets*

    Thanks!

    <https://www-mmadrigal-com.translate.goog/cuando-la-nevera-se-vuelve-un-horno-lo-que-hay-detras-de-los-ataques-a-los-supermercados-europeos/?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en-US&_x_tr_pto=wapp>

    "REACHED (emphasis mine) temperatures of around 50 degrees Celsius for
    approximately six hours".

    This sounds like more than just a mechanism to dislodge built-up ice!

    "in addition to the administrator password, a "daily code" calculated from
    the date. Anyone who reconstructed the formula gained access with a master
    key that is renewed daily, but whose formula is the calendar."

    Wow, that's almost as stupid as the old telephone "calling cards"
    wherein you could bill ANY user whose phone number you knew!

    Gotta wonder what the end-of-life date for your TV, DVR, thermostat,
    security camera, etc. happen to be as they obviously need to be DISCARDED
    at that point!

    "Convenience, once again, as a backdoor"

    As I've repeatedly said: "Convenience trumps security."

    Maybe they'll lose another shitload of product -- and customer patience -- and FINALLY wake up to their ignorance! Hard to have sympathy for idiocy!


    At 13:26 on 3 November, according to the messagerCOs timestamp, the Z-Pentest
    Telegram channel reposted a message from NoName057(16), the pro-Russian hacktivist group known for its denial-of-service attacks (taking down a website
    by flooding it with traffic). I have translated the key points from Russian.


    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Carlos E. R.@robin_listas@es.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Thu Nov 5 00:50:21 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 2026-11-04 20:15, Don Y wrote:
    On 11/4/2026 11:53 AM, Carlos E. R. wrote:
    On 2026-11-02 14:15, Don Y wrote:
    <https://apnews.com/article/europe-supermarkets-freezers-
    cyberattacks- a8ea5b30d67da47957769f29101fe686>

    "...its fridges and freezers had been hacked and set to 50 degrees
    Celsius"

    I found an article where they describe what happened, technically, but
    it is in Spanish. You can read it with an automated translator, of
    course.

    <https://www.mmadrigal.com/cuando-la-nevera-se-vuelve-un-horno-lo-que-
    hay- detras-de-los-ataques-a-los-supermercados-europeos/>

    -a-a*When the fridge turns into an oven: what lies behind the attacks on
    European supermarkets*

    Thanks!

    <https://www-mmadrigal-com.translate.goog/cuando-la-nevera-se-vuelve-un- horno-lo-que-hay-detras-de-los-ataques-a-los-supermercados-europeos/? _x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en-US&_x_tr_pto=wapp>

    -a-a "REACHED (emphasis mine) temperatures of around 50 degrees Celsius for
    -a-a approximately six hours".

    This sounds like more than just a mechanism to dislodge built-up ice!

    Sure, they abused the system.


    -a-a "in addition to the administrator password, a "daily code"
    calculated from
    -a-a the date. Anyone who reconstructed the formula gained access with a master
    -a-a key that is renewed daily, but whose formula is the calendar."

    Wow, that's almost as stupid as the old telephone "calling cards"
    wherein you could bill ANY user whose phone number you knew!

    I'm sure that when the system was designed it was thought impossible to
    find the formula.

    Maybe someone got access to the firmware and decoded the formula via
    reverse engineering.

    It is the sort of thing I might have designed myself in the 90's, not
    knowing anything about cryptography, if my boss refused to hire an
    expert to do that code.


    Gotta wonder what the end-of-life date for your TV, DVR, thermostat,
    security camera, etc. happen to be as they obviously need to be DISCARDED
    at that point!

    -a-a "Convenience, once again, as a backdoor"

    As I've repeatedly said:-a "Convenience trumps security."

    Maybe they'll lose another shitload of product -- and customer patience
    -- and
    FINALLY wake up to their ignorance!-a Hard to have sympathy for idiocy!

    It is worse: it was found afterwards that someone had hacked into the refrigeration system of blood banks in France, but an external
    temperature alarm triggered and they could restore the fridges to
    normality before they did actual damage. They must keep some -90-#C, IIRC.
    --
    Cheers,
    Carlos E.R.
    ESEfc-Efc+, EUEfc-Efc|.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Don Y@blockedofcourse@foo.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Wed Nov 4 18:00:58 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 11/4/2026 4:50 PM, Carlos E. R. wrote:
    -a-a-a "REACHED (emphasis mine) temperatures of around 50 degrees Celsius for
    -a-a-a approximately six hours".

    This sounds like more than just a mechanism to dislodge built-up ice!

    Sure, they abused the system.

    But you have to wonder why the system would LET that happen -- for a FREEZER CONTROLLER.

    -a-a-a "in addition to the administrator password, a "daily code" calculated from
    -a-a-a the date. Anyone who reconstructed the formula gained access with a master
    -a-a-a key that is renewed daily, but whose formula is the calendar."

    Wow, that's almost as stupid as the old telephone "calling cards"
    wherein you could bill ANY user whose phone number you knew!

    I'm sure that when the system was designed it was thought impossible to find the formula.

    Anyone who has access to it (and it must be relatively simplistic if a technician can come up with a valid code on-the-spot) can leak that information. And, there are mechanisms to easily distribute it.

    E.g., the telephone credit card code relied on clandestine channels
    to share that information; no web sites on which to publish it.
    So, the distribution was severely limited.

    Maybe someone got access to the firmware and decoded the formula via reverse engineering.

    It is the sort of thing I might have designed myself in the 90's, not knowing
    anything about cryptography, if my boss refused to hire an expert to do that code.

    Put some salt into the algorithm and write the salt ON the unit's case.
    If it is intended for on-site access, then you can bend over and READ the
    salt while preventing anyone remote from doing so (unless they have prior knowledge of THAT unit)
    Maybe they'll lose another shitload of product -- and customer patience -- and
    FINALLY wake up to their ignorance!-a Hard to have sympathy for idiocy!

    It is worse: it was found afterwards that someone had hacked into the refrigeration system of blood banks in France, but an external temperature alarm triggered and they could restore the fridges to normality before they did
    actual damage. They must keep some -90-#C, IIRC.

    If you don't want to design secure systems, then put "Not to be used in any application where the integrity of the product or process has any value"
    on the device and related product literature so the buyer won't be
    surprised when there *is* no security!

    Like selling doorknobs that don't contain locking mechanisms -- fine for
    a closet door but usually not for much beyond that!

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Carlos E. R.@robin_listas@es.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Thu Nov 5 02:51:25 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 2026-11-05 02:00, Don Y wrote:
    On 11/4/2026 4:50 PM, Carlos E. R. wrote:
    -a-a-a "REACHED (emphasis mine) temperatures of around 50 degrees
    Celsius for
    -a-a-a approximately six hours".

    This sounds like more than just a mechanism to dislodge built-up ice!

    Sure, they abused the system.

    But you have to wonder why the system would LET that happen -- for a
    FREEZER
    CONTROLLER.

    Why not? You are the human in control, you decide, the machine obeys.
    Blindly. It is not a smart system, it is just a controller.

    The machine can defrost, either by switching on a resistance coil, or by inverting some valves. You decide the temp and the time, because you
    know what is in the freezer and everything. You decide.


    -a-a-a "in addition to the administrator password, a "daily code"
    calculated from
    -a-a-a the date. Anyone who reconstructed the formula gained access with >>> a master
    -a-a-a key that is renewed daily, but whose formula is the calendar."

    Wow, that's almost as stupid as the old telephone "calling cards"
    wherein you could bill ANY user whose phone number you knew!

    I'm sure that when the system was designed it was thought impossible
    to find the formula.

    Anyone who has access to it (and it must be relatively simplistic if a technician can come up with a valid code on-the-spot) can leak that information.-a And, there are mechanisms to easily distribute it.

    No, they can't. They just know that the password changes every day,
    somehow, and that the password for today is XYZ. They do not know what
    it will be tomorrow.

    Someone with a brighter mind found out how to find the algorithm and
    predict the passwords.


    E.g., the telephone credit card code relied on clandestine channels
    to share that information; no web sites on which to publish it.
    So, the distribution was severely limited.

    Maybe someone got access to the firmware and decoded the formula via
    reverse engineering.

    It is the sort of thing I might have designed myself in the 90's, not
    knowing anything about cryptography, if my boss refused to hire an
    expert to do that code.

    Put some salt into the algorithm and write the salt ON the unit's case.
    If it is intended for on-site access, then you can bend over and READ the salt while preventing anyone remote from doing so (unless they have prior knowledge of THAT unit)
    Maybe they'll lose another shitload of product -- and customer
    patience -- and
    FINALLY wake up to their ignorance!-a Hard to have sympathy for idiocy!

    It is worse: it was found afterwards that someone had hacked into the
    refrigeration system of blood banks in France, but an external
    temperature alarm triggered and they could restore the fridges to
    normality before they did actual damage. They must keep some -90-#C, IIRC.

    If you don't want to design secure systems, then put "Not to be used in
    any application where the integrity of the product or process has any
    value"
    on the device and related product literature so the buyer won't be
    surprised when there *is* no security!

    Like selling doorknobs that don't contain locking mechanisms -- fine for
    a closet door but usually not for much beyond that!


    In the 90's, I did not put any lock on the systems I designed. There was
    no internet, either. I relied on the man guarding the premises.

    We all did that.

    Computers did not have passwords. MsDOS did not have passwords. I don't remember if Windows 95 had a password (but the one on NT was breakable).

    It all depends on the year these things were designed. In the article I posted, it says that the manufacturer had released security updates
    years ago. Why did the clients not update the fridges?
    --
    Cheers,
    Carlos E.R.
    ESEfc-Efc+, EUEfc-Efc|.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Don Y@blockedofcourse@foo.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Wed Nov 4 19:37:45 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    But you have to wonder why the system would LET that happen -- for a FREEZER >> CONTROLLER.

    Why not? You are the human in control, you decide, the machine obeys. Blindly.
    It is not a smart system, it is just a controller.

    Why can't I set my house thermostat to 305 degrees? The control algorithm doesn't care!

    The machine can defrost, either by switching on a resistance coil, or by inverting some valves. You decide the temp and the time, because you know what
    is in the freezer and everything. You decide.

    Why can't I shift into reverse while driving down the highway?

    We build constraints into all sorts of things. Someone just got lazy.

    -a-a-a "in addition to the administrator password, a "daily code" calculated from
    -a-a-a the date. Anyone who reconstructed the formula gained access with a master
    -a-a-a key that is renewed daily, but whose formula is the calendar."

    Wow, that's almost as stupid as the old telephone "calling cards"
    wherein you could bill ANY user whose phone number you knew!

    I'm sure that when the system was designed it was thought impossible to find
    the formula.

    Anyone who has access to it (and it must be relatively simplistic if a
    technician can come up with a valid code on-the-spot) can leak that
    information.-a And, there are mechanisms to easily distribute it.

    No, they can't. They just know that the password changes every day, somehow, and that the password for today is XYZ. They do not know what it will be tomorrow.

    SOMEONE has to know the formula by which the daily password is calculated
    in order to tell them what today's password is -- assuming they can't
    compute it "locally".

    Someone with a brighter mind found out how to find the algorithm and predict the passwords.

    Like selling doorknobs that don't contain locking mechanisms -- fine for
    a closet door but usually not for much beyond that!

    In the 90's, I did not put any lock on the systems I designed. There was no internet, either. I relied on the man guarding the premises.

    We all did that.

    *I* didn't. Because the things I was designing had high value and
    you wouldn't want a casual user to be able to dick with them.

    Computers did not have passwords. MsDOS did not have passwords. I don't remember if Windows 95 had a password (but the one on NT was breakable).

    Computers were single-user machines. People opted to share them with the knowledge that anything could be done *to* them by the "guest user".

    It all depends on the year these things were designed. In the article I posted,
    it says that the manufacturer had released security updates years ago. Why did
    the clients not update the fridges?

    I was designing pharmaceutical, medical and industrial kit in the 80's. Not only did you NOT want someone to casually be able to dick with things but you also wanted to be able to track WHO made which changes to the process/product so they could be held accountable -- maybe not "fired" but definitely reeducated or reassigned based on their (in)ability to accurately interact
    with a particular process.

    Walk away from the system for N minutes and the interface locks -- to prevent someone interacting with it without authorization *or* identification.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Carlos E. R.@robin_listas@es.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Thu Nov 5 12:17:53 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 2026-11-05 03:37, Don Y wrote:
    But you have to wonder why the system would LET that happen -- for a
    FREEZER
    CONTROLLER.

    Why not? You are the human in control, you decide, the machine obeys.
    Blindly. It is not a smart system, it is just a controller.

    Why can't I set my house thermostat to 305 degrees?-a The control algorithm doesn't care!

    Because the hardware is not capable. The hardware of industrial freezers
    is capable of +50-#C because the clients demand that capability for defrosting.


    The machine can defrost, either by switching on a resistance coil, or
    by inverting some valves. You decide the temp and the time, because
    you know what is in the freezer and everything. You decide.

    Why can't I shift into reverse while driving down the highway?

    You can, actually.


    We build constraints into all sorts of things.-a Someone just got lazy.


    It costs money. Bigger software, more hours to design. It takes more
    capable hardware.

    -a-a-a "in addition to the administrator password, a "daily code"
    calculated from
    -a-a-a the date. Anyone who reconstructed the formula gained access >>>>> with a master
    -a-a-a key that is renewed daily, but whose formula is the calendar." >>>>>
    Wow, that's almost as stupid as the old telephone "calling cards"
    wherein you could bill ANY user whose phone number you knew!

    I'm sure that when the system was designed it was thought impossible
    to find the formula.

    Anyone who has access to it (and it must be relatively simplistic if a
    technician can come up with a valid code on-the-spot) can leak that
    information.-a And, there are mechanisms to easily distribute it.

    No, they can't. They just know that the password changes every day,
    somehow, and that the password for today is XYZ. They do not know what
    it will be tomorrow.

    SOMEONE has to know the formula by which the daily password is calculated
    in order to tell them what today's password is -- assuming they can't
    compute it "locally".


    Yes, someone knows the password for tomorrow, but he does not need to
    know the formula. Some closed source software tells him the next
    password, or the passwords for this week.

    It can be that the technician is given a special clock in hardware that
    tells him today's password.

    Someone with a brighter mind found out how to find the algorithm and
    predict the passwords.

    Like selling doorknobs that don't contain locking mechanisms -- fine for >>> a closet door but usually not for much beyond that!

    In the 90's, I did not put any lock on the systems I designed. There
    was no internet, either. I relied on the man guarding the premises.

    We all did that.

    *I* didn't.-a Because the things I was designing had high value and
    you wouldn't want a casual user to be able to dick with them.


    There was a person with a gun guarding the premises. The client did not
    ask for passwords.

    Computers did not have passwords. MsDOS did not have passwords. I
    don't remember if Windows 95 had a password (but the one on NT was
    breakable).

    Computers were single-user machines.-a People opted to share them with the knowledge that anything could be done *to* them by the "guest user".

    It all depends on the year these things were designed. In the article
    I posted, it says that the manufacturer had released security updates
    years ago. Why did the clients not update the fridges?

    I was designing pharmaceutical, medical and industrial kit in the 80's.
    Not
    only did you NOT want someone to casually be able to dick with things
    but you
    also wanted to be able to track WHO made which changes to the process/ product
    so they could be held accountable -- maybe not "fired" but definitely reeducated or reassigned based on their (in)ability to accurately interact with a particular process.

    Walk away from the system for N minutes and the interface locks -- to prevent
    someone interacting with it without authorization *or* identification.


    I designed the software for computers that controlled electric motors
    with 100KW power. Start it at the wrong moment, when somebody is
    tightening nuts, and you can kill somebody.

    The room had a key.
    --
    Cheers,
    Carlos E.R.
    ESEfc-Efc+, EUEfc-Efc|.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From liz@liz@poppyrecords.invalid.invalid (Liz Tuddenham) to sci.electronics.design on Thu Nov 5 12:44:31 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    Carlos E. R. <robin_listas@es.invalid> wrote:

    [...]
    I designed the software for computers that controlled electric motors
    with 100KW power. Start it at the wrong moment, when somebody is
    tightening nuts, and you can kill somebody.

    The room had a key.

    A very different situation: I once had to work on a fairly large CNC
    lathe where the only protection was a bit of blue towelling tied around
    the handle of the switchgear on the wall. Everyone in the factory knew
    what I was doing and they were knowledgeable and sensible, so the
    towelling just acted as a reminder; I felt competely safe.
    --
    ~ Liz Tuddenham ~
    (Remove the ".invalid"s and add ".co.uk" to reply)
    www.poppyrecords.co.uk
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From legg@legg@nospam.magma.ca to sci.electronics.design on Thu Nov 5 08:12:58 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On Mon, 2 Nov 2026 06:15:55 -0700, Don Y <blockedofcourse@foo.invalid>
    wrote:

    <https://apnews.com/article/europe-supermarkets-freezers-cyberattacks-a8ea5b30d67da47957769f29101fe686>

    "...its fridges and freezers had been hacked and set to 50 degrees Celsius"

    And, why would a temperature controller for a FREEZER ever allow
    such a high temperature? In case you wanted to convert them to
    walk-in ovens???

    Who *specifies* such systems and who naively implements those specifications?

    [The last batch of targets used "older technology"... so, nothing
    was learned in the revisions that followed?]

    Seems they've performed the same majestic feat on a
    blood bank's chillers.

    They've got alarms, so caught it in time.

    Takes real genius to pull that kind of vandalism.

    RL
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Don Y@blockedofcourse@foo.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Thu Nov 5 07:48:54 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 11/5/2026 4:17 AM, Carlos E. R. wrote:
    On 2026-11-05 03:37, Don Y wrote:
    But you have to wonder why the system would LET that happen -- for a FREEZER
    CONTROLLER.

    Why not? You are the human in control, you decide, the machine obeys.
    Blindly. It is not a smart system, it is just a controller.

    Why can't I set my house thermostat to 305 degrees?-a The control algorithm >> doesn't care!

    Because the hardware is not capable. The hardware of industrial freezers is capable of +50-#C because the clients demand that capability for defrosting.

    But that's no reason to limit the *controller* -- if your argument is that it costs extra to CUSTOMIZE it (and thereby LIMIT it to the capabilities of
    the plant) then why not just design a generic temperature controller
    KNOWING that attepting to set it beyond the limits of the plant will just
    cause the "system" to fail to reach its setpoint?

    [You'll note that I described a few DOZEN "customizations" that our run
    of the mill household thermostat had -- including support for heat pumps, multistage heating and cooling, dehumidification, ventilation, etc.
    Obviously, someone spent time writing all that code and including all of those customization hooks -- yet was competing with other "retail" thermostats
    in terms of *price*!]

    The machine can defrost, either by switching on a resistance coil, or by >>> inverting some valves. You decide the temp and the time, because you know >>> what is in the freezer and everything. You decide.

    Why can't I shift into reverse while driving down the highway?

    You can, actually.

    No, you have to be very "determined" to do so.
    We build constraints into all sorts of things.-a Someone just got lazy.

    It costs money. Bigger software, more hours to design. It takes more capable hardware.

    See above.

    -a-a-a "in addition to the administrator password, a "daily code" calculated
    from
    -a-a-a the date. Anyone who reconstructed the formula gained access with a
    master
    -a-a-a key that is renewed daily, but whose formula is the calendar." >>>>>>
    Wow, that's almost as stupid as the old telephone "calling cards"
    wherein you could bill ANY user whose phone number you knew!

    I'm sure that when the system was designed it was thought impossible to >>>>> find the formula.

    Anyone who has access to it (and it must be relatively simplistic if a >>>> technician can come up with a valid code on-the-spot) can leak that
    information.-a And, there are mechanisms to easily distribute it.

    No, they can't. They just know that the password changes every day, somehow,
    and that the password for today is XYZ. They do not know what it will be >>> tomorrow.

    SOMEONE has to know the formula by which the daily password is calculated
    in order to tell them what today's password is -- assuming they can't
    compute it "locally".

    Yes, someone knows the password for tomorrow, but he does not need to know the
    formula. Some closed source software tells him the next password, or the passwords for this week.
    Ah, "closed source software". And, that software likely runs on a PC?
    And, it is simply not possible to get a copy of that software prior to
    its installation or AFTER?

    It can be that the technician is given a special clock in hardware that tells
    him today's password.

    It "could" be lots of things. Just as easily as it could be exactly what
    I am claiming!

    And, its likely (your argument) that EVERY controller uses the same
    algorithm so acquiring access to one copy of it (in whatever hardware,
    software or algorithmic form) is sufficient to now -- and forever -- hack
    all such controllers.

    Someone with a brighter mind found out how to find the algorithm and predict
    the passwords.

    Like selling doorknobs that don't contain locking mechanisms -- fine for >>>> a closet door but usually not for much beyond that!

    In the 90's, I did not put any lock on the systems I designed. There was no
    internet, either. I relied on the man guarding the premises.

    We all did that.

    *I* didn't.-a Because the things I was designing had high value and
    you wouldn't want a casual user to be able to dick with them.

    There was a person with a gun guarding the premises. The client did not ask for
    passwords.

    So, you opted for physical security. How is that any different?
    You're still restricting access -- in a more visible and costly manner.

    Computers did not have passwords. MsDOS did not have passwords. I don't >>> remember if Windows 95 had a password (but the one on NT was breakable).

    Computers were single-user machines.-a People opted to share them with the >> knowledge that anything could be done *to* them by the "guest user".

    It all depends on the year these things were designed. In the article I >>> posted, it says that the manufacturer had released security updates years >>> ago. Why did the clients not update the fridges?

    I was designing pharmaceutical, medical and industrial kit in the 80's. Not >> only did you NOT want someone to casually be able to dick with things but you
    also wanted to be able to track WHO made which changes to the process/ product
    so they could be held accountable -- maybe not "fired" but definitely
    reeducated or reassigned based on their (in)ability to accurately interact >> with a particular process.

    Walk away from the system for N minutes and the interface locks -- to prevent
    someone interacting with it without authorization *or* identification.

    I designed the software for computers that controlled electric motors with 100KW power. Start it at the wrong moment, when somebody is tightening nuts, and you can kill somebody.

    The room had a key.

    See above.

    Why not just save on those costs and expect people to be "responsible"?
    Ans: because people aren't.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Don Y@blockedofcourse@foo.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Thu Nov 5 07:55:07 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 11/5/2026 6:12 AM, legg wrote:
    On Mon, 2 Nov 2026 06:15:55 -0700, Don Y <blockedofcourse@foo.invalid>
    wrote:

    <https://apnews.com/article/europe-supermarkets-freezers-cyberattacks-a8ea5b30d67da47957769f29101fe686>

    "...its fridges and freezers had been hacked and set to 50 degrees Celsius" >>
    And, why would a temperature controller for a FREEZER ever allow
    such a high temperature? In case you wanted to convert them to
    walk-in ovens???

    Who *specifies* such systems and who naively implements those specifications?

    [The last batch of targets used "older technology"... so, nothing
    was learned in the revisions that followed?]

    Seems they've performed the same majestic feat on a
    blood bank's chillers.

    They've got alarms, so caught it in time.

    Takes real genius to pull that kind of vandalism.
    Depends how they are finding their targets. E.g., I don't think Shodan
    reveals anything about the owner or (specific) physical location and use
    of a particular type of IoT device. Rather, just logs the IP and some identifying information (e.g., a sign-on banner, etc.).

    My ISP knows which model router I use because the router advertises
    itself and he's decided that watching for those advertisements is
    useful to his business. But, he doesn't know my name, the type of
    equipment "behind" the router, my location, etc.

    Just like visiting a web site tells the site what browser you are
    using (and version), what OS, what fonts you have installed, etc.
    Enough detail to uniquely identify your machine, even if your
    IP changes.

    But, they still don't know *who* you are, where you are located,
    what "other stuff" is on your network (or the computer hosting the
    browser).

    They can make (likely *good*) guesses -- e.g., if you're running
    Windows, then you probably have solitaire on your machine (so they
    could try to target *it* with malware) while the chances of
    "leisure Suit Larry" being there are pretty slim.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Don Y@blockedofcourse@foo.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Thu Nov 5 07:58:38 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 11/5/2026 7:55 AM, Don Y wrote:
    Just like visiting a web site tells the site what browser you are
    using (and version), what OS, what fonts you have installed, etc.
    Enough detail to uniquely identify your machine, even if your
    IP changes.

    <https://amiunique.org/fingerprint>

    "Yes. You are unique among the 5655968 fingerprints in our entire dataset."

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From John R Walliker@jrwalliker@gmail.com to sci.electronics.design on Thu Nov 5 15:22:01 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 05/11/2026 14:55, Don Y wrote:
    On 11/5/2026 6:12 AM, legg wrote:
    On Mon, 2 Nov 2026 06:15:55 -0700, Don Y <blockedofcourse@foo.invalid>
    wrote:

    <https://apnews.com/article/europe-supermarkets-freezers-
    cyberattacks-a8ea5b30d67da47957769f29101fe686>

    "...its fridges and freezers had been hacked and set to 50 degrees
    Celsius"

    And, why would a temperature controller for a FREEZER ever allow
    such a high temperature?-a In case you wanted to convert them to
    walk-in ovens???

    Who *specifies* such systems and who naively implements those
    specifications?

    [The last batch of targets used "older technology"... so, nothing
    was learned in the revisions that followed?]

    Seems they've performed the same majestic feat on a
    blood bank's chillers.

    They've got alarms, so caught it in time.

    Takes real genius to pull that kind of vandalism.
    Depends how they are finding their targets.-a E.g., I don't think Shodan reveals anything about the owner or (specific) physical location and use
    of a particular type of IoT device.-a Rather, just logs the IP and some identifying information (e.g., a sign-on banner, etc.).

    My ISP knows which model router I use because the router advertises
    itself and he's decided that watching for those advertisements is
    useful to his business.-a But, he doesn't know my name, the type of
    equipment "behind" the router, my location, etc.


    I bought a couple of electric heaters with internet control. The
    only way to install them is using an mobile phone app which
    insists on geo-location being turned on. As the initial communication
    uses Bluetooth which is short range the manufacturer DOES know where
    the heaters were initially installed. This might not be where they
    ended up of course.>
    But, they still don't know *who* you are, where you are located,
    what "other stuff" is on your network (or the computer hosting the
    browser).

    They can make (likely *good*) guesses -- e.g., if you're running
    Windows, then you probably have solitaire on your machine (so they
    could try to target *it* with malware) while the chances of
    "leisure Suit Larry" being there are pretty slim.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Don Y@blockedofcourse@foo.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Thu Nov 5 09:14:21 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 11/5/2026 8:22 AM, John R Walliker wrote:
    I bought a couple of electric heaters with internet control.-a The
    only way to install them is using an mobile phone app which
    insists on geo-location being turned on.-a As the initial communication
    uses Bluetooth which is short range the manufacturer DOES know where
    the heaters were initially installed.-a This might not be where they
    ended up of course.>
    The risk, there, is that -- if the heater somehow NEEDS to know where you
    are in order to set some initial defaults, etc. -- moving them to a different location invalidates any value that knowledge of your location could have provided. Given that they are likely portable units, one can expect them
    to "migrate" over their lifetimes. (unlike an HVAC plant)

    Chances are, the requirement is either an oversight or a means of collecting marketing information (North America vs. Canada vs Europe...) as it is easily rendered useless.

    [I've often sent beacons from products I've designed just to know when
    they were deployed, *if* they were still active, etc. But, if a customer manages to intercept those beacons, the product doesn't care and *I* don't care]
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Carlos E. R.@robin_listas@es.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Thu Nov 5 21:25:32 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 2026-11-05 15:48, Don Y wrote:
    On 11/5/2026 4:17 AM, Carlos E. R. wrote:
    On 2026-11-05 03:37, Don Y wrote:
    But you have to wonder why the system would LET that happen -- for
    a FREEZER
    CONTROLLER.

    Why not? You are the human in control, you decide, the machine
    obeys. Blindly. It is not a smart system, it is just a controller.

    Why can't I set my house thermostat to 305 degrees?-a The control
    algorithm
    doesn't care!

    Because the hardware is not capable. The hardware of industrial
    freezers is capable of +50-#C because the clients demand that
    capability for defrosting.

    But that's no reason to limit the *controller* -- if your argument is
    that it
    costs extra to CUSTOMIZE it (and thereby LIMIT it to the capabilities of
    the plant) then why not just design a generic temperature controller
    KNOWING that attepting to set it beyond the limits of the plant will just cause the "system" to fail to reach its setpoint?

    Very probably because the controllers does what the clients demanded.


    [You'll note that I described a few DOZEN "customizations" that our run
    of the mill household thermostat had -- including support for heat pumps, multistage heating and cooling, dehumidification, ventilation, etc. Obviously, someone spent time writing all that code and including all of those
    customization hooks -- yet was competing with other "retail" thermostats
    in terms of *price*!]

    The machine can defrost, either by switching on a resistance coil,
    or by inverting some valves. You decide the temp and the time,
    because you know what is in the freezer and everything. You decide.

    Why can't I shift into reverse while driving down the highway?

    You can, actually.

    No, you have to be very "determined" to do so.

    Maybe. I have a manual car. I have driven cars with almost no
    electronics besides the radio. Certainly no computer. It is possible to
    do it, but I don't want to destroy the gearbox, the car, or kill myself.

    We build constraints into all sorts of things.-a Someone just got lazy.

    It costs money. Bigger software, more hours to design. It takes more
    capable hardware.

    See above.

    -a-a-a "in addition to the administrator password, a "daily code" >>>>>>> calculated from
    -a-a-a the date. Anyone who reconstructed the formula gained access >>>>>>> with a master
    -a-a-a key that is renewed daily, but whose formula is the calendar." >>>>>>>
    Wow, that's almost as stupid as the old telephone "calling cards" >>>>>>> wherein you could bill ANY user whose phone number you knew!

    I'm sure that when the system was designed it was thought
    impossible to find the formula.

    Anyone who has access to it (and it must be relatively simplistic if a >>>>> technician can come up with a valid code on-the-spot) can leak that
    information.-a And, there are mechanisms to easily distribute it.

    No, they can't. They just know that the password changes every day,
    somehow, and that the password for today is XYZ. They do not know
    what it will be tomorrow.

    SOMEONE has to know the formula by which the daily password is
    calculated
    in order to tell them what today's password is -- assuming they can't
    compute it "locally".

    Yes, someone knows the password for tomorrow, but he does not need to
    know the formula. Some closed source software tells him the next
    password, or the passwords for this week.
    Ah, "closed source software".-a And, that software likely runs on a PC?
    And, it is simply not possible to get a copy of that software prior to
    its installation or AFTER?

    Possibly. Obviously somebody predicted the passwords.


    It can be that the technician is given a special clock in hardware
    that tells him today's password.

    It "could" be lots of things.-a Just as easily as it could be exactly what
    I am claiming!

    And, its likely (your argument) that EVERY controller uses the same
    algorithm so acquiring access to one copy of it (in whatever hardware, software or algorithmic form) is sufficient to now -- and forever -- hack
    all such controllers.

    It is possible. Considering the number of installations they hacked,
    possibly all used the same password, or could be found easily.


    Someone with a brighter mind found out how to find the algorithm and
    predict the passwords.

    Like selling doorknobs that don't contain locking mechanisms --
    fine for
    a closet door but usually not for much beyond that!

    In the 90's, I did not put any lock on the systems I designed. There
    was no internet, either. I relied on the man guarding the premises.

    We all did that.

    *I* didn't.-a Because the things I was designing had high value and
    you wouldn't want a casual user to be able to dick with them.

    There was a person with a gun guarding the premises. The client did
    not ask for passwords.

    So, you opted for physical security.-a How is that any different?
    You're still restricting access -- in a more visible and costly manner.


    Up to the client. The client did not ask for passwords. We were
    programming with MsDOS, so it was impossible to protect the machines. We
    might set a password on the application, but anybody with physical
    access to the machine could have subverted the files, or installed
    different software, or formatted the disk.

    We were naive, yes, same as all industrial players I met.

    ...
    --
    Cheers,
    Carlos E.R.
    ESEfc-Efc+, EUEfc-Efc|.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Carlos E. R.@robin_listas@es.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Thu Nov 5 21:26:17 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 2026-11-05 14:12, legg wrote:
    On Mon, 2 Nov 2026 06:15:55 -0700, Don Y <blockedofcourse@foo.invalid>
    wrote:

    <https://apnews.com/article/europe-supermarkets-freezers-cyberattacks-a8ea5b30d67da47957769f29101fe686>

    "...its fridges and freezers had been hacked and set to 50 degrees Celsius" >>
    And, why would a temperature controller for a FREEZER ever allow
    such a high temperature? In case you wanted to convert them to
    walk-in ovens???

    Who *specifies* such systems and who naively implements those specifications?

    [The last batch of targets used "older technology"... so, nothing
    was learned in the revisions that followed?]

    Seems they've performed the same majestic feat on a
    blood bank's chillers.

    They've got alarms, so caught it in time.

    Takes real genius to pull that kind of vandalism.

    And real malice.
    --
    Cheers,
    Carlos E.R.
    ESEfc-Efc+, EUEfc-Efc|.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Carlos E. R.@robin_listas@es.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Thu Nov 5 21:31:21 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 2026-11-05 16:22, John R Walliker wrote:
    On 05/11/2026 14:55, Don Y wrote:



    I bought a couple of electric heaters with internet control.-a The
    only way to install them is using an mobile phone app which
    insists on geo-location being turned on.-a As the initial communication
    uses Bluetooth which is short range the manufacturer DOES know where
    the heaters were initially installed.-a This might not be where they
    ended up of course.

    I understand that the Android permission to allow connecting by NFC
    easily to the device that is close to you happens to be "geo-location". Doesn't mean that the manufacturer gets your location, but he can.
    --
    Cheers,
    Carlos E.R.
    ESEfc-Efc+, EUEfc-Efc|.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From liz@liz@poppyrecords.invalid.invalid (Liz Tuddenham) to sci.electronics.design on Thu Nov 5 21:16:39 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    Carlos E. R. <robin_listas@es.invalid> wrote:

    [...]
    I have driven cars with almost no
    electronics besides the radio.

    That makes me feel old - when I learned to drive there were NO
    electronics in most cars. A few luxury models had a radio (valve, of
    course) but 'ordinary' cars didn't.

    The first electonic device I fitted to my car was a windscreen wiper
    delay circuit using a BC108 and a thyristor.
    --
    ~ Liz Tuddenham ~
    (Remove the ".invalid"s and add ".co.uk" to reply)
    www.poppyrecords.co.uk
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Don Y@blockedofcourse@foo.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Thu Nov 5 15:42:55 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 11/5/2026 2:16 PM, Liz Tuddenham wrote:
    Carlos E. R. <robin_listas@es.invalid> wrote:

    [...]
    I have driven cars with almost no
    electronics besides the radio.

    That makes me feel old - when I learned to drive there were NO
    electronics in most cars. A few luxury models had a radio (valve, of
    course) but 'ordinary' cars didn't.

    Points and a coil. I built a CDI and that was my first use of
    "electronics" in a vehicle -- yet still no "computer". DELCO
    radio with the black "lozenge" pushbutton selector.

    And, hand-cranked windows

    OTOH, I made a "programmable" thermostat with an 1802 at about the
    same time frame -- there being more "smarts" necessary in a
    thermostat than an ignition system (I hadn't considered the
    possibility of electronic timing advance, back then)

    The first electonic device I fitted to my car was a windscreen wiper
    delay circuit using a BC108 and a thyristor.


    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From someone@2a59d59e3809f827ce709d3815e3950eef4a6a93af5557a93a7fdfba71460843@example.com to sci.electronics.design on Fri Nov 6 16:30:02 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    Sounds like a Honeywell, the $300 model. Thankfully, most parameters are preset to a workable default, so it can be set up pretty fast.
    --
    For full context, visit https://www.electrondepot.com/electrodesign/so-what-is-it-about-freezers-that-s-so-appealing-4421489-.htm

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Don Y@blockedofcourse@foo.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Fri Nov 6 10:40:02 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 11/6/2026 9:30 AM, someone wrote:
    Sounds like a Honeywell, the $300 model. Thankfully, most parameters are preset
    to a workable default, so it can be set up pretty fast.

    No idea. I have a box of assorted thermostats; I quoted the configuration parameters from a cheat-sheet I had made when it was in use (so I don't
    have to re-research the issue at a later date)

    When I was designing my HVAC controller, I figured it was prudent to canvas existing offerings to see what people "in the industry" had considered to
    be important features and interface variations.

    Sadly, newer controls are moving to proprietary "communicating" protocols instead of the old 24V signalling system. So, attempting to create a "universal" interface is now a moot point.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Nicolas Paul Colin de Glocester@thanks-to@Taf.com to sci.electronics.design on Fri Nov 6 23:58:12 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    "Organized Crime
    rCo
    France
    Cyber Incident Disrupts French Blood Storage Systems
    A cybersecurity incident involving a refrigeration equipment provider
    altered temperature settings at three French Blood Establishment
    sites. The organization said its alarm systems prevented any damage to
    blood samples or products.


    Banner: Antonio Montuno/Flickr | A cyberattack affecting refrigeration
    systems at three French Blood Establishment sites prompted
    precautionary measures, but no blood products were damaged.
    REPORTED BY
    Sana Sbouai
    OCCRP
    Alena Koroleva
    OCCRP
    NOVEMBER 5, 2026
    |
    1 MIN READ

    Share Article

    Aa
    Text Settings
    The French Blood Establishment (EFS) said a cybersecurity incident
    involving one of its refrigeration equipment providers disrupted cold
    storage systems at three of its sites, causing temperature and defrost
    settings to rise to unusually high levels.

    The incident occurred on November 2, according to a statement
    published by EFS the following day. The organization said it was not
    directly targeted, but the attack on its provider affected systems
    used to monitor and control refrigeration units.

    EFS said its alarm systems enabled staff to respond promptly, ensuring
    that no blood samples or products were compromised. As a precaution,
    the contents of the affected refrigeration units were transferred to
    other facilities.

    The statement confirmed information reported earlier by the French
    satirical newspaper Le Canard encha|<n|-, which identified refrigeration equipment provider Coolworld as the apparent target of the incident.

    Coolworld also acknowledged a cybersecurity incident involving remote monitoring software used in refrigeration systems, although it did not explicitly link the incident to EFS.

    The company said the issue originated from a component supplied by a third-party provider, which it did not identify.

    Asked by email, Coolworld declined to provide further details about
    the nature of the incident or the identity of the third-party
    provider. However, the Paris public prosecutorrCOs office told OCCRP
    that its cybercrime section has taken up the matter on its own
    initiative, and investigations are currently underway.

    The incident comes just three weeks after a cyberattack targeting
    refrigeration systems at supermarkets across France.

    In that case, hackers exploited remotely accessible refrigeration
    controllers to raise freezer temperature settings to 50 degrees
    Celsius (122 degrees Fahrenheit), causing millions of euros in losses
    and prompting a national cybercrime investigation.

    Both incidents highlight the vulnerability of refrigeration systems
    connected to remote monitoring and control software, although no
    connection between the two has been established.

    NOTE: Story updated with the Paris Prosecutor's statement in the 7th graph.

    NOVEMBER 5, 2026
    Share Article:

    REPORTED BY
    Sana Sbouai
    OCCRP
    Alena Koroleva
    OCCRP"
    said HTTPS://WWW.OCCRP.org/en/news/cyber-incident-disrupts-french-blood-storage-systems

    (S. HTTP://Gloucester.Insomnia247.NL/ fuer Kontaktdaten!)
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Don Y@blockedofcourse@foo.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Sat Nov 7 09:45:40 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 11/6/2026 4:58 PM, Nicolas Paul Colin de Glocester wrote:

    Both incidents highlight the vulnerability of refrigeration systems
    connected to remote monitoring and control software, although no
    connection between the two has been established.
    But, to answer the question I posed in the subject line...

    I suspect freezers are more noticeable. Would anyone notice
    a "warming tray" that suddenly had been turned off, allowing
    the warmed items to "cool"?

    I suspect the perpetrators want to be *seen* and not just prove
    (to themselves -- which would be immediately apparent once they'd
    access <whatever>) that they could do these things.

    If you hacked the electric grid, you'd likely evoke an
    aggressive response. Ditto telecom or any media distribution
    system.

    Freezers are noticeable events without getting everyone
    riled up about the breach. So, you can "practice" for the
    time when you want to have more devastating results and
    still put fear in the populace.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?Q8OzaWzDrW4=?= =?UTF-8?B?IE5pb2Nsw6Fzw61u?= =?UTF-8?B?IEdsb3N0w6lpcg==?=@thanks-to@Taf.com to sci.electronics.design on Mon Nov 9 10:52:46 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    "Discussions, Science, No.24 Jan. 8, 2015
    The Truth behind the STAP Cell Case Reality of research institutions, international competition, morality of researchers rCo Why wasnrCOt the
    fraud avoidable?
    Panel discussion by SAKURA Osamu (Professor, Interfaculty Initiative
    in Information Studies, University of Tokyo), KATASE Kumiko (Science
    writer) and YASHIRO Yoshimi (Research Associate Professor, Center for
    iPS Cell Research and Application, Kyoto University)

    [. . .]

    Sakura Osamu

    Born in 1960. Graduated from the Department of Psychology at the
    University of Tokyo. PhD., Graduate School of Science at Kyoto
    University. [. . .] Authored books include [. . .] and Benri wa hito
    wo fukou ni suru (Convenience makes people unfortunate),"
    says
    HTTPS://WWW.JapanPolicyForum.Jp/discussions/pt201501080801404657.html

    (S. HTTP://Gloucester.Insomnia247.NL/ fuer Kontaktdaten!)
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Martin Brown@'''newspam'''@nonad.co.uk to sci.electronics.design on Mon Nov 9 19:18:43 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 07/11/2026 16:45, Don Y wrote:
    On 11/6/2026 4:58 PM, Nicolas Paul Colin de Glocester wrote:

    Both incidents highlight the vulnerability of refrigeration systems
    connected to remote monitoring and control software, although no
    connection between the two has been established.
    But, to answer the question I posed in the subject line...

    I suspect freezers are more noticeable.-a Would anyone notice
    a "warming tray" that suddenly had been turned off, allowing
    the warmed items to "cool"?

    I suspect the perpetrators want to be *seen* and not just prove
    (to themselves -- which would be immediately apparent once they'd
    access <whatever>) that they could do these things.

    If you hacked the electric grid, you'd likely evoke an
    aggressive response.-a Ditto telecom or any media distribution
    system.

    Freezers are noticeable events without getting everyone
    riled up about the breach.-a So, you can "practice" for the
    time when you want to have more devastating results and
    still put fear in the populace.

    As of this afternoon the French Foreign Ministry is directly accusing
    Iran of being behind the cyber attacks on their fridges.

    https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cmg474vk6dyqo
    --
    Martin Brown

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Don Y@blockedofcourse@foo.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Mon Nov 9 12:23:34 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 11/9/2026 12:18 PM, Martin Brown wrote:
    Freezers are noticeable events without getting everyone
    riled up about the breach.-a So, you can "practice" for the
    time when you want to have more devastating results and
    still put fear in the populace.

    As of this afternoon the French Foreign Ministry is directly accusing Iran of
    being behind the cyber attacks on their fridges.

    https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cmg474vk6dyqo
    But, again, what is the strategic point? To "strike terror" in
    the hearts of people who can no longer buy chocolate ice cream?

    Is it just "practice" (you don't want to squander any successes on a
    REAL target alerting them to your abilities and their vulnerabilities)?

    Is it a manifestation of the LIMITS of their abilities? Or, an insinuation
    of what MORE they might be able to do?
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Martin Brown@'''newspam'''@nonad.co.uk to sci.electronics.design on Tue Nov 10 09:50:43 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 09/11/2026 19:23, Don Y wrote:
    On 11/9/2026 12:18 PM, Martin Brown wrote:
    Freezers are noticeable events without getting everyone
    riled up about the breach.-a So, you can "practice" for the
    time when you want to have more devastating results and
    still put fear in the populace.

    As of this afternoon the French Foreign Ministry is directly accusing
    Iran of being behind the cyber attacks on their fridges.

    https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cmg474vk6dyqo
    But, again, what is the strategic point?-a To "strike terror" in
    the hearts of people who can no longer buy chocolate ice cream?

    I'd guess it is big enough to be very annoying without provoking a
    significant tactical response.

    Is it just "practice" (you don't want to squander any successes on a
    REAL target alerting them to your abilities and their vulnerabilities)?

    Very probably - picking the low hanging fruit (and they were hanging
    *very* low - default password was today's date on most of them).

    Is it a manifestation of the LIMITS of their abilities?-a Or, an insinuation of what MORE they might be able to do?

    I wouldn't underestimate their capabilities. After Stuxnet the Iranians
    will be looking to inflict equivalent damage on the West at some point.
    --
    Martin Brown

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Carlos E.R.@robin_listas@es.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Tue Nov 10 23:02:37 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 2026-11-05 22:16, Liz Tuddenham wrote:
    Carlos E. R. <robin_listas@es.invalid> wrote:

    [...]
    I have driven cars with almost no
    electronics besides the radio.

    That makes me feel old - when I learned to drive there were NO
    electronics in most cars. A few luxury models had a radio (valve, of
    course) but 'ordinary' cars didn't.

    But this was 1984.

    Renault had at least one lowly version of the Super 5 with a
    traditional, cheap motor with no electronics at all. Wait, I guess the alternator used diodes. Dunno about the alternator regulator. Maybe the blinkers?


    The first electonic device I fitted to my car was a windscreen wiper
    delay circuit using a BC108 and a thyristor.


    I added a circuit with two NAND gates (4000 series) to sound a buzzer if
    I left the lights on with ignition off. Two gates that could sink a
    largish current. Inserted it in the back of the cigarette ash tray,
    because it had a lighter that went active with the ignition, and a
    light, with the general lights. The two signals I needed.
    --
    Cheers, Carlos.
    ESEfc-Efc+, EUEfc-Efc|;
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Carlos E.R.@robin_listas@es.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Tue Nov 10 23:07:43 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 2026-11-09 20:18, Martin Brown wrote:
    On 07/11/2026 16:45, Don Y wrote:
    On 11/6/2026 4:58 PM, Nicolas Paul Colin de Glocester wrote:


    Freezers are noticeable events without getting everyone
    riled up about the breach.-a So, you can "practice" for the
    time when you want to have more devastating results and
    still put fear in the populace.

    As of this afternoon the French Foreign Ministry is directly accusing
    Iran of being behind the cyber attacks on their fridges.

    https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cmg474vk6dyqo


    Does not ring me as believable.
    --
    Cheers, Carlos.
    ESEfc-Efc+, EUEfc-Efc|;
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From john larkin@jl@glen--canyon.com to sci.electronics.design on Tue Nov 10 18:59:50 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On Tue, 10 Nov 2026 23:07:43 +0100, "Carlos E.R."
    <robin_listas@es.invalid> wrote:

    On 2026-11-09 20:18, Martin Brown wrote:
    On 07/11/2026 16:45, Don Y wrote:
    On 11/6/2026 4:58 PM, Nicolas Paul Colin de Glocester wrote:


    Freezers are noticeable events without getting everyone
    riled up about the breach.a So, you can "practice" for the
    time when you want to have more devastating results and
    still put fear in the populace.

    As of this afternoon the French Foreign Ministry is directly accusing
    Iran of being behind the cyber attacks on their fridges.

    https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cmg474vk6dyqo


    Does not ring me as believable.

    Were the freezers full of pork sausages? Dogfood?


    John Larkin
    Highland Tech Glen Canyon Design Center
    Lunatic Fringe Electronics
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Don Y@blockedofcourse@foo.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Wed Nov 11 14:31:47 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 11/10/2026 2:50 AM, Martin Brown wrote:
    Is it a manifestation of the LIMITS of their abilities?-a Or, an insinuation >> of what MORE they might be able to do?

    I wouldn't underestimate their capabilities. After Stuxnet the Iranians will be
    looking to inflict equivalent damage on the West at some point.

    Yes, but why do *anything* publicly? What is the expected gain?
    Surely, citizens aren't going to cringe in fear at the prospect
    of not being able to purchase ice cream.

    And, the "response" doesn't likely involve many government resources.

    So, there doesn't seem to be any meaningful message (unless they
    thought their adversaries didn't expect them to have ANY cyber
    capabilities)
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Martin Brown@'''newspam'''@nonad.co.uk to sci.electronics.design on Thu Nov 12 18:14:17 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 11/11/2026 21:31, Don Y wrote:
    On 11/10/2026 2:50 AM, Martin Brown wrote:
    Is it a manifestation of the LIMITS of their abilities?-a Or, an
    insinuation
    of what MORE they might be able to do?

    I wouldn't underestimate their capabilities. After Stuxnet the
    Iranians will be looking to inflict equivalent damage on the West at
    some point.

    Yes, but why do *anything* publicly?-a What is the expected gain?
    Surely, citizens aren't going to cringe in fear at the prospect
    of not being able to purchase ice cream.

    Publicity for their cause assuming it was them...odd that they haven't
    so far claimed responsibility.

    It could equally well just be some modern script kiddies aided and
    abetted by an AI agent capable of mounting such an attack en masse.

    Don't underestimate the number of people who rely on immediate delivery
    of food when they need it. Amazon Prime etc has created an expectation
    in the populous that you can have anything anytime you want it.

    And, the "response" doesn't likely involve many government resources.

    So, there doesn't seem to be any meaningful message (unless they
    thought their adversaries didn't expect them to have ANY cyber
    capabilities)

    I expect a more serious one against the UK National Grid (or the US equivalent) at some stage. Generation I "smart" meters were always a
    disaster waiting to happen - insecure as hell. Their only redeeming
    feature was that they turned into dumb meters by changing supplier and
    now the discontinuation of 2G/-uG signal scuppers them completely.

    It is a real tale of woe - you couldn't make it up!!

    https://www.theregister.com/networks/2026/11/10/smart-meters-to-cost-the-uk-billions-2g-switch-off-means-replacing-12-13-million/5308728
    --
    Martin Brown

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Don Y@blockedofcourse@foo.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Thu Nov 12 13:45:12 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 11/12/2026 11:14 AM, Martin Brown wrote:
    I wouldn't underestimate their capabilities. After Stuxnet the Iranians will
    be looking to inflict equivalent damage on the West at some point.

    Yes, but why do *anything* publicly?-a What is the expected gain?
    Surely, citizens aren't going to cringe in fear at the prospect
    of not being able to purchase ice cream.

    Publicity for their cause assuming it was them...odd that they haven't so far
    claimed responsibility.

    So, "kicking someone in the knee" is their way of getting sympathy???

    I could understand it from a terror standpoint -- get people thinking about
    how vulnerable they are. But, I would think the bar would be a bit higher
    to get people to REALLY notice.

    E.g., our local Costco (a large "warehouse club" store) suffered a power failure (some on-site equipment) and was out of service for a day or so.
    But, it was just an annoyance to most folks as they were open for business
    the next day.

    Crashing their corporate server(s) likely would have been far more consequential (had it actually been an adversarial action)

    It could equally well just be some modern script kiddies aided and abetted by
    an AI agent capable of mounting such an attack en masse.

    But, again, why freezers? Why not petrol pumps? Or, baby monitors?
    Or electronic doorbells?

    Is it just the lowest hanging fruit? Or, the first of a series of
    "waves" of vulnerability exploits?

    Don't underestimate the number of people who rely on immediate delivery of food
    when they need it. Amazon Prime etc has created an expectation in the populous
    that you can have anything anytime you want it.

    I suspect "need" is an overstatement; maybe "want" (I doubt anyone will go hungry if they don't get their FROZEN food delivery, today)

    And, the "response" doesn't likely involve many government resources.

    So, there doesn't seem to be any meaningful message (unless they
    thought their adversaries didn't expect them to have ANY cyber
    capabilities)

    I expect a more serious one against the UK National Grid (or the US equivalent)
    at some stage. Generation I "smart" meters were always a disaster waiting to happen - insecure as hell. Their only redeeming feature was that they turned into dumb meters by changing supplier and now the discontinuation of 2G/-uG signal scuppers them completely.

    It is a real tale of woe - you couldn't make it up!!

    https://www.theregister.com/networks/2026/11/10/smart-meters-to-cost-the-uk- billions-2g-switch-off-means-replacing-12-13-million/5308728

    The article doesn't make clear what loss of connectivity would mean *beyond* "being able to manage your own energy consumption". Would the meters disconnect subscriber loads if communication was lost? Or, would it just complicate billing?

    Obviously, if everyone was suddenly disconnected from the grid, there would
    be panic. OTOH, if the provider had to dispatch an old fashioned "meter reader" I suspect customers would be far less concerned.

    [I worked on the design of a meter in the late 80's and we avoided the remote telemetry due to costs and the lack of an existing tariff that could be leveraged. At the time, reading a meter was worth "50p" so not a big driver
    of the design]

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Martin Brown@'''newspam'''@nonad.co.uk to sci.electronics.design on Fri Nov 13 10:47:28 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 12/11/2026 20:45, Don Y wrote:
    On 11/12/2026 11:14 AM, Martin Brown wrote:
    I wouldn't underestimate their capabilities. After Stuxnet the
    Iranians will be looking to inflict equivalent damage on the West at
    some point.

    Yes, but why do *anything* publicly?-a What is the expected gain?
    Surely, citizens aren't going to cringe in fear at the prospect
    of not being able to purchase ice cream.

    Publicity for their cause assuming it was them...odd that they haven't
    so far claimed responsibility.

    So, "kicking someone in the knee" is their way of getting sympathy???

    I could understand it from a terror standpoint -- get people thinking about how vulnerable they are.-a But, I would think the bar would be a bit higher to get people to REALLY notice.

    My instinct is that it is low hanging fruit/proof of concept and attacks
    will scale up in severity and damage done. Today's Friday 13th Microsoft outage might even be the next example in the sequence.

    Crashing their corporate server(s) likely would have been far more consequential (had it actually been an adversarial action)

    Malware locking of corporate servers took out UK retail giant Marks &
    Spencer last year - their IT folk were on the ball and pulled the plug
    quickly to limit damage but they still lost ~-u300M in the ensuing mess.

    https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c0el31nqnpvo https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c93x16zkl9do

    Ransomeware is becoming big business in the blackhat community.

    It could equally well just be some modern script kiddies aided and
    abetted by an AI agent capable of mounting such an attack en masse.

    But, again, why freezers?-a Why not petrol pumps?-a Or, baby monitors?
    Or electronic doorbells?

    Is it just the lowest hanging fruit?-a Or, the first of a series of
    "waves" of vulnerability exploits?

    I think both of them at once. Freezers were so trivial that pretty much
    anyone could have done it even the old school script kiddies...
    I expect a more serious one against the UK National Grid (or the US
    equivalent) at some stage. Generation I "smart" meters were always a
    disaster waiting to happen - insecure as hell. Their only redeeming
    feature was that they turned into dumb meters by changing supplier and
    now the discontinuation of 2G/-uG signal scuppers them completely.

    It is a real tale of woe - you couldn't make it up!!

    https://www.theregister.com/networks/2026/11/10/smart-meters-to-cost-the-uk- billions-2g-switch-off-means-replacing-12-13-million/5308728

    The article doesn't make clear what loss of connectivity would mean
    *beyond*
    "being able to manage your own energy consumption".-a Would the meters disconnect subscriber loads if communication was lost?-a Or, would it just complicate billing?


    The loss of comms makes them passive dumb meters that have to be read
    from time to time. They don't send meter readers any more unless they
    suspect you are ripping them off. The customer is expected to read their
    own meter. Mine is about 12' up in the air where mains enters the house
    and can only be read from a stepladder. It is Gen2 smartmeter so
    probably secure enough (although it is hard to be confident of that).

    The big problem with smart meters when they are fully smart is that it
    allows the supplier to do remote disconnection of the customer (eg for
    non payment of bill) without visiting the premises to pull the fuse.

    Imagine what would happen if a peak evening domestic premises load was thrashed on and off synchronously at say once per second...

    The security on generation 1 units was risible!

    Obviously, if everyone was suddenly disconnected from the grid, there would be panic.-a OTOH, if the provider had to dispatch an old fashioned "meter reader" I suspect customers would be far less concerned.

    The possibility to disconnect everyone with a smart meter from the grid
    is the threat, but it could also be done in such a way as to damage the
    grid itself (in much the same way as switching a filament light on and
    off many times in a short period causes it to blow).

    [I worked on the design of a meter in the late 80's and we avoided the remote
    telemetry due to costs and the lack of an existing tariff that could be leveraged.-a At the time, reading a meter was worth "50p" so not a big driver
    of the design]

    The latest generation of smart meters have two modules the mains hot
    high current side for measurement and then the comms link module which
    talks to the reporting network.

    Unfortunately it still doesn't work properly in the north of England and Scotland due to inadequate investment. They use two different methods of communications mobile phone network in the south and RF elsewhere.
    The latter does not work due to the north being hilly in parts!

    https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cq52382zd1no

    It really is a national embarrassment.
    --
    Martin Brown

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Carlos E.R.@robin_listas@es.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Fri Nov 13 12:13:42 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 2026-11-12 21:45, Don Y wrote:
    On 11/12/2026 11:14 AM, Martin Brown wrote:
    I wouldn't underestimate their capabilities. After Stuxnet the
    Iranians will be looking to inflict equivalent damage on the West at
    some point.

    Yes, but why do *anything* publicly?-a What is the expected gain?
    Surely, citizens aren't going to cringe in fear at the prospect
    of not being able to purchase ice cream.

    Publicity for their cause assuming it was them...odd that they haven't
    so far claimed responsibility.

    So, "kicking someone in the knee" is their way of getting sympathy???

    I could understand it from a terror standpoint -- get people thinking about how vulnerable they are.-a But, I would think the bar would be a bit higher to get people to REALLY notice.

    E.g., our local Costco (a large "warehouse club" store) suffered a power failure (some on-site equipment) and was out of service for a day or so.
    But, it was just an annoyance to most folks as they were open for business the next day.

    Crashing their corporate server(s) likely would have been far more consequential (had it actually been an adversarial action)

    It could equally well just be some modern script kiddies aided and
    abetted by an AI agent capable of mounting such an attack en masse.

    But, again, why freezers?-a Why not petrol pumps?-a Or, baby monitors?
    Or electronic doorbells?

    Because they (bad enough guys) found how to do it.


    Is it just the lowest hanging fruit?-a Or, the first of a series of
    "waves" of vulnerability exploits?

    Don't underestimate the number of people who rely on immediate
    delivery of food when they need it. Amazon Prime etc has created an
    expectation in the populous that you can have anything anytime you
    want it.

    I suspect "need" is an overstatement; maybe "want" (I doubt anyone will go hungry if they don't get their FROZEN food delivery, today)

    There are flats with no kitchen. Maybe a microwave to reheat packaged portions, or have the food ready to eat delivered from many restaurants
    just in time.



    And, the "response" doesn't likely involve many government resources.

    So, there doesn't seem to be any meaningful message (unless they
    thought their adversaries didn't expect them to have ANY cyber
    capabilities)

    I expect a more serious one against the UK National Grid (or the US
    equivalent) at some stage. Generation I "smart" meters were always a
    disaster waiting to happen - insecure as hell. Their only redeeming
    feature was that they turned into dumb meters by changing supplier and
    now the discontinuation of 2G/-uG signal scuppers them completely.

    It is a real tale of woe - you couldn't make it up!!

    https://www.theregister.com/networks/2026/11/10/smart-meters-to-cost-
    the-uk- billions-2g-switch-off-means-replacing-12-13-million/5308728

    The article doesn't make clear what loss of connectivity would mean
    *beyond*
    "being able to manage your own energy consumption".-a Would the meters disconnect subscriber loads if communication was lost?-a Or, would it just complicate billing?

    Billing would be impossible.

    Maybe, they can send a meter-man to read them manually, going home by home.


    -2"Smart meters are already helping millions of consumers manage their
    energy and save money on bills," they told The Reg. "The transition to
    4G is a planned upgrade that will continue to deliver the benefits that
    smart meters already provide to households and industry."-+

    This is bollocks. It doesn't help me an iota (I'm in Spain, so not the
    same system). The only improvement I get is I get the invoice monthly
    instead of bimonthly.

    Yes, I can get detailed info, so what? Not actually useful.

    We can get billed for different prices at different hours. This is what
    they actually mean: you can shift your heavy usage to the hours when it
    is cheaper. If you ignore this, maybe you end paying a lot more, so not beneficial.


    Obviously, if everyone was suddenly disconnected from the grid, there would be panic.-a OTOH, if the provider had to dispatch an old fashioned "meter reader" I suspect customers would be far less concerned.

    [I worked on the design of a meter in the late 80's and we avoided the remote
    telemetry due to costs and the lack of an existing tariff that could be leveraged.-a At the time, reading a meter was worth "50p" so not a big driver
    of the design]


    In Spain, I think all electricity meters can be remotely read (and
    possibly programmed). But they don't use phones, they use a signal
    transported on the AC lines.

    My water meter was improved recently so that it can be read by a
    meter-man with a handheld reader, so probably using low power BT. It was
    also moved to be under the street public pavement, not inside my garden.

    Now they ordered that all gas meters be updated as well. They have some
    years, maybe a decade, to do it. And the monthly invoice will go up half
    an euro.
    --
    Cheers, Carlos.
    ESEfc-Efc+, EUEfc-Efc|;
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From liz@liz@poppyrecords.invalid.invalid (Liz Tuddenham) to sci.electronics.design on Fri Nov 13 17:57:33 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    Martin Brown <'''newspam'''@nonad.co.uk> wrote:

    [...]
    The big problem with smart meters when they are fully smart is that it
    allows the supplier to do remote disconnection of the customer (eg for
    non payment of bill) without visiting the premises to pull the fuse.

    I don't think that is seen by the suppliers as a problem, I think it was
    the main reason for installing them. There was huge pressure in the UK
    to install them but it suddenly stopped when the Government made remote disconnection without due process illegal.
    --
    ~ Liz Tuddenham ~
    (Remove the ".invalid"s and add ".co.uk" to reply)
    www.poppyrecords.co.uk
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Don Y@blockedofcourse@foo.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Fri Nov 13 12:16:16 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 11/13/2026 10:57 AM, Liz Tuddenham wrote:
    Martin Brown <'''newspam'''@nonad.co.uk> wrote:

    [...]
    The big problem with smart meters when they are fully smart is that it
    allows the supplier to do remote disconnection of the customer (eg for
    non payment of bill) without visiting the premises to pull the fuse.

    I don't think that is seen by the suppliers as a problem, I think it was
    the main reason for installing them. There was huge pressure in the UK
    to install them but it suddenly stopped when the Government made remote disconnection without due process illegal.
    An adversary likely doesn't abide by those rules. So, unless the meters
    have had that ability permanently disabled, it is still a rich attack surface. --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Don Y@blockedofcourse@foo.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Fri Nov 13 12:29:55 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 11/13/2026 4:13 AM, Carlos E.R. wrote:
    Crashing their corporate server(s) likely would have been far more
    consequential (had it actually been an adversarial action)

    It could equally well just be some modern script kiddies aided and abetted >>> by an AI agent capable of mounting such an attack en masse.

    But, again, why freezers?-a Why not petrol pumps?-a Or, baby monitors?
    Or electronic doorbells?

    Because they (bad enough guys) found how to do it.

    That suggests their toolkits aren't very deep; as if they "settled"
    for something instead of *targeted* something.

    Is it just the lowest hanging fruit?-a Or, the first of a series of
    "waves" of vulnerability exploits?

    Don't underestimate the number of people who rely on immediate delivery of >>> food when they need it. Amazon Prime etc has created an expectation in the >>> populous that you can have anything anytime you want it.

    I suspect "need" is an overstatement; maybe "want" (I doubt anyone will go >> hungry if they don't get their FROZEN food delivery, today)

    There are flats with no kitchen. Maybe a microwave to reheat packaged portions,
    or have the food ready to eat delivered from many restaurants just in time.

    I don't think that is the case, here -- except in dorm rooms or hotels.
    Most homes have a kitchen or kitchenette. (Most dorms likely have a
    hot plate, even if it is prohibited!).

    For the most part, frozen (here) tends to be convenience -- having access
    to something that is perishable or out-of-season or "quick" to prepare
    (having been pre-prepared prior to freezing)

    It is a real tale of woe - you couldn't make it up!!

    https://www.theregister.com/networks/2026/11/10/smart-meters-to-cost- the- >>> uk- billions-2g-switch-off-means-replacing-12-13-million/5308728

    The article doesn't make clear what loss of connectivity would mean *beyond* >> "being able to manage your own energy consumption".-a Would the meters
    disconnect subscriber loads if communication was lost?-a Or, would it just >> complicate billing?

    Billing would be impossible.

    But, that's a temporary glitch. Push comes to shove, an army of
    "meter readers" do it the old fashioned way. And/or, the subscribers
    are charged with doing it under fear that misreporting will just make
    the NEXT reading that much larger (more costly).

    Maybe, they can send a meter-man to read them manually, going home by home.

    Until a few years ago, someone walked the neighborhood monthly,
    glancing at the meter (mounted by the load center on the side of the house)
    and typed the reading into their datalogger. No doubt it had been
    preloaded with names and addresses in the order in which those residences
    would be encountered (so, the effort is little more than *walking*
    the area).

    I htink the newer meters are now remotely read.

    Water meters likelwise went through an upgrade; instead of lifting the
    (cast iron) curbside meter cover and noting the reading, an electronic transducer has been fitted (along with new metering technology to
    reduce error rates). But, I think those are read by a vehicle
    driving through the neighborhood.

    That may also be the case for the electric meters.
    -2"Smart meters are already helping millions of consumers manage their energy
    and save money on bills," they told The Reg. "The transition to 4G is a planned
    upgrade that will continue to deliver the benefits that smart meters already provide to households and industry."-+

    This is bollocks. It doesn't help me an iota (I'm in Spain, so not the same system). The only improvement I get is I get the invoice monthly instead of bimonthly.

    Yes, I can get detailed info, so what? Not actually useful.

    I think it would depend on your tariff structure. E.g., ToU tariffs
    encourage the subscriber to "manually" shift their loads to off-peak hours.
    In reality, there isn't much of a savings in doing so -- but, there is a
    big penalty for NOT doing so!

    [One of the dirty little secrets about solar, here, is you end up
    on a ToU tariff. Particularly damaging if your array can't keep up
    with your demand during peak hours!]

    We can get billed for different prices at different hours. This is what they actually mean: you can shift your heavy usage to the hours when it is cheaper.
    If you ignore this, maybe you end paying a lot more, so not beneficial.

    Many appliances include hooks for this, now. Some regions of the
    country had tariffs where the provider could "control" those
    loads (in times of peak demand) in exchange for some "con$ideration".

    Obviously, if everyone was suddenly disconnected from the grid, there would >> be panic.-a OTOH, if the provider had to dispatch an old fashioned "meter
    reader" I suspect customers would be far less concerned.

    [I worked on the design of a meter in the late 80's and we avoided the remote
    telemetry due to costs and the lack of an existing tariff that could be
    leveraged.-a At the time, reading a meter was worth "50p" so not a big driver
    of the design]

    In Spain, I think all electricity meters can be remotely read (and possibly programmed). But they don't use phones, they use a signal transported on the AC
    lines.

    Interfering with reading would just annoy the providers. To make a
    real impact, you would need to annoy the *subscribers* -- disconnect their service!

    My water meter was improved recently so that it can be read by a meter-man with
    a handheld reader, so probably using low power BT. It was also moved to be under the street public pavement, not inside my garden.

    Now they ordered that all gas meters be updated as well. They have some years,
    maybe a decade, to do it. And the monthly invoice will go up half an euro.
    Isn't it interesting how THEY save labor costs and YOU pay more?
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From liz@liz@poppyrecords.invalid.invalid (Liz Tuddenham) to sci.electronics.design on Fri Nov 13 20:29:10 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    Don Y <blockedofcourse@foo.invalid> wrote:

    On 11/13/2026 10:57 AM, Liz Tuddenham wrote:
    Martin Brown <'''newspam'''@nonad.co.uk> wrote:

    [...]
    The big problem with smart meters when they are fully smart is that it
    allows the supplier to do remote disconnection of the customer (eg for
    non payment of bill) without visiting the premises to pull the fuse.

    I don't think that is seen by the suppliers as a problem, I think it was the main reason for installing them. There was huge pressure in the UK
    to install them but it suddenly stopped when the Government made remote disconnection without due process illegal.
    An adversary likely doesn't abide by those rules. So, unless the meters
    have had that ability permanently disabled, it is still a rich attack surface.

    Definitely.
    --
    ~ Liz Tuddenham ~
    (Remove the ".invalid"s and add ".co.uk" to reply)
    www.poppyrecords.co.uk
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Carlos E.R.@robin_listas@es.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Fri Nov 13 21:47:45 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 2026-11-13 20:29, Don Y wrote:
    On 11/13/2026 4:13 AM, Carlos E.R. wrote:
    Crashing their corporate server(s) likely would have been far more
    consequential (had it actually been an adversarial action)

    It could equally well just be some modern script kiddies aided and
    abetted by an AI agent capable of mounting such an attack en masse.

    But, again, why freezers?-a Why not petrol pumps?-a Or, baby monitors?
    Or electronic doorbells?

    Because they (bad enough guys) found how to do it.

    That suggests their toolkits aren't very deep; as if they "settled"
    for something instead of *targeted* something.

    Give them time.


    Is it just the lowest hanging fruit?-a Or, the first of a series of
    "waves" of vulnerability exploits?

    Don't underestimate the number of people who rely on immediate
    delivery of food when they need it. Amazon Prime etc has created an
    expectation in the populous that you can have anything anytime you
    want it.

    I suspect "need" is an overstatement; maybe "want" (I doubt anyone
    will go
    hungry if they don't get their FROZEN food delivery, today)

    There are flats with no kitchen. Maybe a microwave to reheat packaged
    portions, or have the food ready to eat delivered from many
    restaurants just in time.

    I don't think that is the case, here -- except in dorm rooms or hotels.
    Most homes have a kitchen or kitchenette.-a (Most dorms likely have a
    hot plate, even if it is prohibited!).

    Google says they are common in Thailand. It also says they exist in
    Spain and USA.

    Sources:

    <https://agnetwest.com/no-kitchens-future-homes/>

    No Kitchens in Future Homes?

    December 11, 2023This Land of Ours

    Will our future homes be built without kitchens? ThatrCOs coming up on
    This Land of Ours.


    <https://metropolismag.com/projects/anna-puigjaner-kitchenless-home/>

    This Spanish Architect Wants to Revolutionize the HomerCoby Getting Rid of Kitchens

    Few spaces of the home are as coveted as the kitchen. But Anna Puigjaner
    is showing the way out of these wasteful private cooking boxes toward
    more efficient rCLsharedrCY alternatives.


    <https://www.treehugger.com/alice-constance-austin-houses-without-kitchens-5201804>

    Alice Constance Austin Designed Houses Without Kitchens in 1917

    An underground electric railway delivered food from central kitchens to
    each house.


    <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single-kitchen_home>

    Single-kitchen home

    The single-kitchen home was a reform model of urban residential
    development in which a centrally managed canteen kitchen within a
    multi-party house replaced the kitchens of the individual apartments.
    The concept was based on the ideas of the women's rights activist and
    social democrat Lily Braun. With the basic idea of liberating women from housework, at the beginning of the 20th century it was an explicit counter-design to the establishment of the isolated nuclear family in
    mass housing. Single-kitchen houses, sometimes also called central
    kitchen houses, were implemented in various European large cities in
    isolated and different ways until the 1950s. As key works of an idea of
    modern living, some of these buildings were nominated for the European Heritage Label in 2009, expressly as a network of common European
    architecture spread across various countries.


    For the most part, frozen (here) tends to be convenience -- having access
    to something that is perishable or out-of-season or "quick" to prepare (having been pre-prepared prior to freezing)

    It is a real tale of woe - you couldn't make it up!!

    https://www.theregister.com/networks/2026/11/10/smart-meters-to-
    cost- the- uk- billions-2g-switch-off-means-replacing-12-13-
    million/5308728

    The article doesn't make clear what loss of connectivity would mean
    *beyond*
    "being able to manage your own energy consumption".-a Would the meters
    disconnect subscriber loads if communication was lost?-a Or, would it
    just
    complicate billing?

    Billing would be impossible.

    But, that's a temporary glitch.-a Push comes to shove, an army of
    "meter readers" do it the old fashioned way.-a And/or, the subscribers
    are charged with doing it under fear that misreporting will just make
    the NEXT reading that much larger (more costly).

    Maybe, they can send a meter-man to read them manually, going home by
    home.

    Until a few years ago, someone walked the neighborhood monthly,
    glancing at the meter (mounted by the load center on the side of the house) and typed the reading into their datalogger.-a No doubt it had been
    preloaded with names and addresses in the order in which those residences would be encountered (so, the effort is little more than *walking*
    the area).

    They wanted to get rid of those few salaries, and possibly, the read errors.



    I htink the newer meters are now remotely read.

    Water meters likelwise went through an upgrade; instead of lifting the
    (cast iron) curbside meter cover and noting the reading, an electronic transducer has been fitted (along with new metering technology to
    reduce error rates).-a But, I think those are read by a vehicle
    driving through the neighborhood.


    I just asked google, and it says there is a mix. Some have a low power
    remote system that can be read centrally, using NB-IoT o LoRaWAN.

    Some are read from a vehicle, which can even be the garbage collection
    truck with a receiver. Some are read by a man that passes walking.

    Then Google offered to tell me what they use in my city. Those installed recently are read centrally, narrowband technology. Zones of the city
    that were installed some years ago, are walk-by or drive-by.



    That may also be the case for the electric meters.
    -2"Smart meters are already helping millions of consumers manage their
    energy and save money on bills," they told The Reg. "The transition to
    4G is a planned upgrade that will continue to deliver the benefits
    that smart meters already provide to households and industry."-+

    This is bollocks. It doesn't help me an iota (I'm in Spain, so not the
    same system). The only improvement I get is I get the invoice monthly
    instead of bimonthly.

    Yes, I can get detailed info, so what? Not actually useful.

    I think it would depend on your tariff structure.-a E.g., ToU tariffs encourage the subscriber to "manually" shift their loads to off-peak hours. In reality, there isn't much of a savings in doing so -- but, there is a
    big penalty for NOT doing so!

    [One of the dirty little secrets about solar, here, is you end up
    on a ToU tariff.-a Particularly damaging if your array can't keep up
    with your demand during peak hours!]

    We can get billed for different prices at different hours. This is
    what they actually mean: you can shift your heavy usage to the hours
    when it is cheaper. If you ignore this, maybe you end paying a lot
    more, so not beneficial.

    Many appliances include hooks for this, now.-a Some regions of the
    country had tariffs where the provider could "control" those
    loads (in times of peak demand) in exchange for some "con$ideration".

    Obviously, if everyone was suddenly disconnected from the grid, there
    would
    be panic.-a OTOH, if the provider had to dispatch an old fashioned "meter >>> reader" I suspect customers would be far less concerned.

    [I worked on the design of a meter in the late 80's and we avoided
    the remote
    telemetry due to costs and the lack of an existing tariff that could be
    leveraged.-a At the time, reading a meter was worth "50p" so not a big
    driver
    of the design]

    In Spain, I think all electricity meters can be remotely read (and
    possibly programmed). But they don't use phones, they use a signal
    transported on the AC lines.

    Interfering with reading would just annoy the providers.-a To make a
    real impact, you would need to annoy the *subscribers* -- disconnect their service!

    My water meter was improved recently so that it can be read by a
    meter-man with a handheld reader, so probably using low power BT. It
    was also moved to be under the street public pavement, not inside my
    garden.

    Now they ordered that all gas meters be updated as well. They have
    some years, maybe a decade, to do it. And the monthly invoice will go
    up half an euro.
    Isn't it interesting how THEY save labor costs and YOU pay more?

    Indeed!
    --
    Cheers, Carlos.
    ESEfc-Efc+, EUEfc-Efc|;
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Don Y@blockedofcourse@foo.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Fri Nov 13 20:56:14 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 11/13/2026 3:47 AM, Martin Brown wrote:
    On 12/11/2026 20:45, Don Y wrote:
    On 11/12/2026 11:14 AM, Martin Brown wrote:
    I wouldn't underestimate their capabilities. After Stuxnet the Iranians >>>>> will be looking to inflict equivalent damage on the West at some point. >>>>
    Yes, but why do *anything* publicly?-a What is the expected gain?
    Surely, citizens aren't going to cringe in fear at the prospect
    of not being able to purchase ice cream.

    Publicity for their cause assuming it was them...odd that they haven't so >>> far claimed responsibility.

    So, "kicking someone in the knee" is their way of getting sympathy???

    I could understand it from a terror standpoint -- get people thinking about >> how vulnerable they are.-a But, I would think the bar would be a bit higher >> to get people to REALLY notice.

    My instinct is that it is low hanging fruit/proof of concept and attacks will
    scale up in severity and damage done. Today's Friday 13th Microsoft outage might even be the next example in the sequence.

    Maybe air traffic control systems?

    Crashing their corporate server(s) likely would have been far more
    consequential (had it actually been an adversarial action)

    Malware locking of corporate servers took out UK retail giant Marks & Spencer
    last year - their IT folk were on the ball and pulled the plug quickly to limit
    damage but they still lost ~-u300M in the ensuing mess.

    https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c0el31nqnpvo https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c93x16zkl9do

    Ransomeware is becoming big business in the blackhat community.

    Yes, but that has to target individual entities. And, has an
    easily understood motive (money).

    No one demanded a ransom for freezer-gate. It's like the early days
    of malware where the goal was just to poke you in the eye.

    It could equally well just be some modern script kiddies aided and abetted >>> by an AI agent capable of mounting such an attack en masse.

    But, again, why freezers?-a Why not petrol pumps?-a Or, baby monitors?
    Or electronic doorbells?

    Is it just the lowest hanging fruit?-a Or, the first of a series of
    "waves" of vulnerability exploits?

    I think both of them at once. Freezers were so trivial that pretty much anyone
    could have done it even the old school script kiddies...

    We'll see. It has value in that it makes it clear to "people in charge"
    (and "people with stakes") that they are vulnerable. But, in most cases, people seem to think it will never be "them".

    I had a laughable discussion with my MD about the security of their IT systems: "Oh, we have a really GOOD staff!" (Wow, are you THAT naive to think the BEST folks are working for you and not banks, tech companies, etc.?)

    This, despite one of the imaging companies, here, repeatedly being hacked.
    (I guess they must not hire "really GOOD staff"?)

    The article doesn't make clear what loss of connectivity would mean *beyond* >> "being able to manage your own energy consumption".-a Would the meters
    disconnect subscriber loads if communication was lost?-a Or, would it just >> complicate billing?

    The loss of comms makes them passive dumb meters that have to be read from time
    to time. They don't send meter readers any more unless they suspect you are ripping them off. The customer is expected to read their own meter. Mine is about 12' up in the air where mains enters the house and can only be read from
    a stepladder. It is Gen2 smartmeter so probably secure enough (although it is
    hard to be confident of that).

    In the past, ours were read semiregularly. "Estimated" if not read.
    And, from time to time, WE were asked to read it (just draw the
    positions of the indicators on the dials and THEY would interpret).

    I think there is some legislative requirement that they have to
    actually read them periodically to ensure fairness in billing.

    Meters (gas, electric, water) tend to be in varying locations and
    some folks have theirs in "secured" areas. So, reading can be
    costly for a human reader (who has to gain entry to those areas)

    The big problem with smart meters when they are fully smart is that it allows
    the supplier to do remote disconnection of the customer (eg for non payment of
    bill) without visiting the premises to pull the fuse.

    When I was designing meter, the disconnect feature was too costly
    to implement (100A+ on two conductors). The meter itself is the
    "fuse" so it is removed when service is disconnected. A locking
    ring holds the meter to the mating socket and the meter is replaced by
    a blank cover (to protect from the bare line contacts) when it
    is removed -- still secured by said ring)

    Imagine what would happen if a peak evening domestic premises load was thrashed
    on and off synchronously at say once per second...

    I would question whether or not they could affect such control
    over that many loads at that rate. It would seem an overprovisioned communication channel if such a "rare" event could be signalled
    that often.

    The security on generation 1 units was risible!

    But that's true of most electronic devices. Security is most often
    an afterthought.

    Connectivity, decades ago, was largely point-to-point (serial ports,
    HDLC, etc.) So, getting physical access to the "conductor" was
    often a high enough hurdle.

    Now, people put NICs in damn near everything, never thinking that
    THEIR device would ever be hacked ("Who would want to hack a
    'scope?" Ans: someone who wants to hack something ELSE in
    that lab!)

    [I worked on the design of a meter in the late 80's and we avoided the remote
    telemetry due to costs and the lack of an existing tariff that could be
    leveraged.-a At the time, reading a meter was worth "50p" so not a big driver
    of the design]

    The latest generation of smart meters have two modules the mains hot high current side for measurement and then the comms link module which talks to the
    reporting network.

    Unfortunately it still doesn't work properly in the north of England and Scotland due to inadequate investment. They use two different methods of communications mobile phone network in the south and RF elsewhere.
    The latter does not work due to the north being hilly in parts!

    https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cq52382zd1no

    It really is a national embarrassment.

    Shoot the engineer? Or, the clown who specified the system??

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Don Y@blockedofcourse@foo.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Sat Nov 14 01:18:10 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 11/13/2026 1:47 PM, Carlos E.R. wrote:

    I suspect "need" is an overstatement; maybe "want" (I doubt anyone will go >>>> hungry if they don't get their FROZEN food delivery, today)

    There are flats with no kitchen. Maybe a microwave to reheat packaged
    portions, or have the food ready to eat delivered from many restaurants just
    in time.

    I don't think that is the case, here -- except in dorm rooms or hotels.
    Most homes have a kitchen or kitchenette.-a (Most dorms likely have a
    hot plate, even if it is prohibited!).

    Google says they are common in Thailand. It also says they exist in Spain and USA.

    Sources:

    <https://agnetwest.com/no-kitchens-future-homes/>

    No Kitchens in Future Homes?

    December 11, 2023This Land of Ours

    Will our future homes be built without kitchens? ThatrCOs coming up on This Land
    of Ours.


    <https://metropolismag.com/projects/anna-puigjaner-kitchenless-home/>

    This Spanish Architect Wants to Revolutionize the HomerCoby Getting Rid of Kitchens

    Few spaces of the home are as coveted as the kitchen. But Anna Puigjaner is showing the way out of these wasteful private cooking boxes toward more efficient rCLsharedrCY alternatives.


    <https://www.treehugger.com/alice-constance-austin-houses-without- kitchens-5201804>

    Alice Constance Austin Designed Houses Without Kitchens in 1917

    An underground electric railway delivered food from central kitchens to each house.


    <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single-kitchen_home>

    Single-kitchen home

    The single-kitchen home was a reform model of urban residential development in
    which a centrally managed canteen kitchen within a multi-party house replaced
    the kitchens of the individual apartments. The concept was based on the ideas
    of the women's rights activist and social democrat Lily Braun. With the basic
    idea of liberating women from housework, at the beginning of the 20th century
    it was an explicit counter-design to the establishment of the isolated nuclear
    family in mass housing. Single-kitchen houses, sometimes also called central kitchen houses, were implemented in various European large cities in isolated
    and different ways until the 1950s. As key works of an idea of modern living,
    some of these buildings were nominated for the European Heritage Label in 2009,
    expressly as a network of common European architecture spread across various countries.
    I think there would be a lot of resistance to that, here. Kitchens
    are one of the most "gifted" rooms in a home -- appliances, gadgets,
    etc.

    You will still end up with some sort of place to store foodstuffs and
    the means to eat them (and some limited means of preparing them).
    Hard to imagine refrigerators, freezers, ice makers, etc. going away.

    And, with young people struggling to *afford* a home, it's hard
    to believe they would "dine out" at a higher price vs. prepping
    their own meals. E.g., a purchased $15 burger is a bit
    excessive if you can't make your mortgage payment!
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Martin Brown@'''newspam'''@nonad.co.uk to sci.electronics.design on Sat Nov 14 13:47:39 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 14/11/2026 03:56, Don Y wrote:
    On 11/13/2026 3:47 AM, Martin Brown wrote:
    On 12/11/2026 20:45, Don Y wrote:
    On 11/12/2026 11:14 AM, Martin Brown wrote:
    I wouldn't underestimate their capabilities. After Stuxnet the
    Iranians will be looking to inflict equivalent damage on the West >>>>>> at some point.

    Yes, but why do *anything* publicly?-a What is the expected gain?
    Surely, citizens aren't going to cringe in fear at the prospect
    of not being able to purchase ice cream.

    Publicity for their cause assuming it was them...odd that they
    haven't so far claimed responsibility.

    So, "kicking someone in the knee" is their way of getting sympathy???

    I could understand it from a terror standpoint -- get people thinking
    about
    how vulnerable they are.-a But, I would think the bar would be a bit
    higher
    to get people to REALLY notice.

    My instinct is that it is low hanging fruit/proof of concept and
    attacks will scale up in severity and damage done. Today's Friday 13th
    Microsoft outage might even be the next example in the sequence.

    Maybe air traffic control systems?

    That appears to be a coincidence and a manifestation of the pay peanuts
    get monkeys problem.

    Crashing their corporate server(s) likely would have been far more
    consequential (had it actually been an adversarial action)

    Malware locking of corporate servers took out UK retail giant Marks &
    Spencer last year - their IT folk were on the ball and pulled the plug
    quickly to limit damage but they still lost ~-u300M in the ensuing mess.

    https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c0el31nqnpvo
    https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c93x16zkl9do

    Ransomeware is becoming big business in the blackhat community.

    Yes, but that has to target individual entities.-a And, has an
    easily understood motive (money).

    No one demanded a ransom for freezer-gate.-a It's like the early days
    of malware where the goal was just to poke you in the eye.

    Indeed. It effectively launched the third party AV industry.

    It could equally well just be some modern script kiddies aided and
    abetted by an AI agent capable of mounting such an attack en masse.

    But, again, why freezers?-a Why not petrol pumps?-a Or, baby monitors?
    Or electronic doorbells?

    Is it just the lowest hanging fruit?-a Or, the first of a series of
    "waves" of vulnerability exploits?

    I think both of them at once. Freezers were so trivial that pretty
    much anyone could have done it even the old school script kiddies...

    We'll see.-a It has value in that it makes it clear to "people in charge" (and "people with stakes") that they are vulnerable.-a But, in most cases, people seem to think it will never be "them".

    I had a laughable discussion with my MD about the security of their IT systems:
    "Oh, we have a really GOOD staff!"-a (Wow, are you THAT naive to think
    the BEST
    folks are working for you and not banks, tech companies, etc.?)

    Have you seen the North Korean "FaceStealer" one that uses an AI fake
    zoom meeting with someone senior and known to you to get enough video to
    fake you to someone else? It is making the news in Japan at the moment
    and several fairly high profile cyber experts have fallen for it.

    https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/news/20261113de75641/

    About $400M stolen so far and its still running.

    This, despite one of the imaging companies, here, repeatedly being hacked.
    (I guess they must not hire "really GOOD staff"?)

    It is remarkably easy to get hacked if the workplace culture isn't
    right. I allowed a whole day for delousing our Korean office every trip.

    The article doesn't make clear what loss of connectivity would mean
    *beyond*
    "being able to manage your own energy consumption".-a Would the meters
    disconnect subscriber loads if communication was lost?-a Or, would it
    just
    complicate billing?

    The loss of comms makes them passive dumb meters that have to be read
    from time to time. They don't send meter readers any more unless they
    suspect you are ripping them off. The customer is expected to read
    their own meter. Mine is about 12' up in the air where mains enters
    the house and can only be read from a stepladder. It is Gen2
    smartmeter so probably secure enough (although it is hard to be
    confident of that).

    In the past, ours were read semiregularly.-a "Estimated" if not read.
    And, from time to time, WE were asked to read it (just draw the
    positions of the indicators on the dials and THEY would interpret).

    I think there is some legislative requirement that they have to
    actually read them periodically to ensure fairness in billing.

    You still have dials on the meters? Electromechanical ones have been
    long gone here. Mine even wrapped around before it was replaced.

    Meters (gas, electric, water) tend to be in varying locations and
    some folks have theirs in "secured" areas.-a So, reading can be
    costly for a human reader (who has to gain entry to those areas)

    We have somewhat insane water and sewerage arrangements where I live
    being on the cusp of a watershed. Water comes to us from Northumbria (essentially limitless supply) but sewage goes to Yorkshire.

    The upshot is the Yorkshire Water can never find the incoming water
    meter which belongs to Northumbria and so do crazy estimates!

    The big problem with smart meters when they are fully smart is that it
    allows the supplier to do remote disconnection of the customer (eg for
    non payment of bill) without visiting the premises to pull the fuse.

    When I was designing meter, the disconnect feature was too costly
    to implement (100A+ on two conductors).-a The meter itself is the
    "fuse" so it is removed when service is disconnected.-a A locking
    ring holds the meter to the mating socket and the meter is replaced by
    a blank cover (to protect from the bare line contacts) when it
    is removed -- still secured by said ring)

    There is a separate 100/80/60A fuse on live of a UK domestic 240v installation. Most towns and cities are three phase, my village is only
    two opposite phases and neutral which isn't common any more. >
    Imagine what would happen if a peak evening domestic premises load was
    thrashed on and off synchronously at say once per second...

    I would question whether or not they could affect such control
    over that many loads at that rate.-a It would seem an overprovisioned communication channel if such a "rare" event could be signalled
    that often.

    I don't know what it is capable of - the specification is unclear.

    The security on generation 1 units was risible!

    But that's true of most electronic devices.-a Security is most often
    an afterthought.

    Connectivity, decades ago, was largely point-to-point (serial ports,
    HDLC, etc.)-a So, getting physical access to the "conductor" was
    often a high enough hurdle.

    They were rolled out late enough that it should have been obvious that
    they needed to be secure (but weren't). Doing something to roll them out immediately was seen as far more important than doing the right thing.


    Now, people put NICs in damn near everything, never thinking that
    THEIR device would ever be hacked ("Who would want to hack a
    'scope?"-a Ans:-a someone who wants to hack something ELSE in
    that lab!)

    I was amusing to find a Wifi chipset in my microwave oven when the
    service engineer had it in bits.

    [I worked on the design of a meter in the late 80's and we avoided
    the remote
    telemetry due to costs and the lack of an existing tariff that could be
    leveraged.-a At the time, reading a meter was worth "50p" so not a big
    driver
    of the design]

    The latest generation of smart meters have two modules the mains hot
    high current side for measurement and then the comms link module which
    talks to the reporting network.

    Unfortunately it still doesn't work properly in the north of England
    and Scotland due to inadequate investment. They use two different
    methods of communications mobile phone network in the south and RF
    elsewhere.
    The latter does not work due to the north being hilly in parts!

    https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cq52382zd1no

    It really is a national embarrassment.

    Shoot the engineer?-a Or, the clown who specified the system??

    I expect the engineers knew perfectly well that it wouldn't work but
    were overruled by the bean counters and the management suits.
    --
    Martin Brown

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Don Y@blockedofcourse@foo.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Sat Nov 14 11:19:17 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 11/14/2026 6:47 AM, Martin Brown wrote:
    I could understand it from a terror standpoint -- get people thinking about
    how vulnerable they are.-a But, I would think the bar would be a bit higher
    to get people to REALLY notice.

    My instinct is that it is low hanging fruit/proof of concept and attacks >>> will scale up in severity and damage done. Today's Friday 13th Microsoft >>> outage might even be the next example in the sequence.

    Maybe air traffic control systems?

    That appears to be a coincidence and a manifestation of the pay peanuts get monkeys problem.

    Yes, I was being facetious.

    Yes, but that has to target individual entities.-a And, has an
    easily understood motive (money).

    No one demanded a ransom for freezer-gate.-a It's like the early days
    of malware where the goal was just to poke you in the eye.

    Indeed. It effectively launched the third party AV industry.

    It was reminiscent of college hacks -- things done just to prove they
    could be done (but with no real merit).

    We'll see.-a It has value in that it makes it clear to "people in charge"
    (and "people with stakes") that they are vulnerable.-a But, in most cases, >> people seem to think it will never be "them".

    I had a laughable discussion with my MD about the security of their IT systems:
    "Oh, we have a really GOOD staff!"-a (Wow, are you THAT naive to think the BEST
    folks are working for you and not banks, tech companies, etc.?)

    Have you seen the North Korean "FaceStealer" one that uses an AI fake zoom meeting with someone senior and known to you to get enough video to fake you to
    someone else? It is making the news in Japan at the moment and several fairly
    high profile cyber experts have fallen for it.

    https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/news/20261113de75641/

    About $400M stolen so far and its still running.

    I am careful about "distributing" any biometrics. When interacting with
    IVR systems, I use the "numeric keypad" option instead of voice. And,
    when voice MUST be used (complex queries), I distort the fundamental
    and add creakiness.

    If the system can't cope with me, then a human is dragged into the mix.

    [Of course, there is nothing to prevent them from capturing audio
    during THAT transaction -- I capture the audio in all phone transactions
    and post process it to refine diarisation, identification and recognition algorithms (why not? it's free data and you already "know" the results!)]


    This, despite one of the imaging companies, here, repeatedly being hacked. >> (I guess they must not hire "really GOOD staff"?)

    It is remarkably easy to get hacked if the workplace culture isn't right. I allowed a whole day for delousing our Korean office every trip.

    Because there is no value placed on it and no consequence (to the organization with lax security). Send each victim a check for $1000 and you can bet your ass the number and breadth of breeches will drop overnight!

    [First question to ask yourself: why are you collecting this information? Second question: why does anyone have access to it, directly? I.e., if you want to verify my identity, take information from me, now, and let a machine validate it without disclosing the correct information to anyone -- go/no-go]

    In the past, ours were read semiregularly.-a "Estimated" if not read.
    And, from time to time, WE were asked to read it (just draw the
    positions of the indicators on the dials and THEY would interpret).

    I think there is some legislative requirement that they have to
    actually read them periodically to ensure fairness in billing.

    You still have dials on the meters? Electromechanical ones have been long gone
    here. Mine even wrapped around before it was replaced.

    The electric and water meters are all digital but the gas still has
    dials (in addition to the "digital interface". The industry supported
    an add-on option that allowed old meters to be upgraded to have that
    capability without a total meter replacement.
    Meters (gas, electric, water) tend to be in varying locations and
    some folks have theirs in "secured" areas.-a So, reading can be
    costly for a human reader (who has to gain entry to those areas)

    We have somewhat insane water and sewerage arrangements where I live being on
    the cusp of a watershed. Water comes to us from Northumbria (essentially limitless supply) but sewage goes to Yorkshire.

    The upshot is the Yorkshire Water can never find the incoming water meter which
    belongs to Northumbria and so do crazy estimates!

    Some parts of town (those with alleys) locate the meters outside the
    property where they can be accessed more easily. It always looks
    incredibly "vulnerable" to look down an alley and just see one meter
    after another, each *hidden* (by a property wall/fence) from the
    customer to which it is associated.

    The big problem with smart meters when they are fully smart is that it
    allows the supplier to do remote disconnection of the customer (eg for non >>> payment of bill) without visiting the premises to pull the fuse.

    When I was designing meter, the disconnect feature was too costly
    to implement (100A+ on two conductors).-a The meter itself is the
    "fuse" so it is removed when service is disconnected.-a A locking
    ring holds the meter to the mating socket and the meter is replaced by
    a blank cover (to protect from the bare line contacts) when it
    is removed -- still secured by said ring)

    There is a separate 100/80/60A fuse on live of a UK domestic 240v installation.
    Most towns and cities are three phase, my village is only two opposite phases
    and neutral which isn't common any more. >

    The meter is the first "thing" the utility encounters. Downstream from
    it is usually a main disconnect which interrupts the power (both legs)
    to the individual branch circuits fed from the breaker panel.

    I.e., the line side of the meter is not interrupted between that
    point and the distribution transformer. Working on the meter base
    requires a licensed electrician as you are interfacing to assets
    owned by the utility.

    Imagine what would happen if a peak evening domestic premises load was
    thrashed on and off synchronously at say once per second...

    I would question whether or not they could affect such control
    over that many loads at that rate.-a It would seem an overprovisioned
    communication channel if such a "rare" event could be signalled
    that often.

    I don't know what it is capable of - the specification is unclear.

    If designing such a mechanism, *I* would make such a "rare event"
    difficult to initiate, especially because of its high value.

    "Are you sure you want to do this?"

    "Are you REALLY sure?"

    "Are you REALLY REALLY sure??"

    The security on generation 1 units was risible!

    But that's true of most electronic devices.-a Security is most often
    an afterthought.

    Connectivity, decades ago, was largely point-to-point (serial ports,
    HDLC, etc.)-a So, getting physical access to the "conductor" was
    often a high enough hurdle.

    They were rolled out late enough that it should have been obvious that they needed to be secure (but weren't). Doing something to roll them out immediately
    was seen as far more important than doing the right thing.

    No doubt politicians involved in the tomfoolery.

    Now, people put NICs in damn near everything, never thinking that
    THEIR device would ever be hacked ("Who would want to hack a
    'scope?"-a Ans:-a someone who wants to hack something ELSE in
    that lab!)

    I was amusing to find a Wifi chipset in my microwave oven when the service engineer had it in bits.

    The hardware is now too trivial and inexpensive. Too much of an incentive to include it "just in case" (and upgrade the software, later).

    I don't see the need for remote *control* of devices -- though see value in remote *monitoring* of them.

    Unfortunately it still doesn't work properly in the north of England and >>> Scotland due to inadequate investment. They use two different methods of >>> communications mobile phone network in the south and RF elsewhere.
    The latter does not work due to the north being hilly in parts!

    https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cq52382zd1no

    It really is a national embarrassment.

    Shoot the engineer?-a Or, the clown who specified the system??

    I expect the engineers knew perfectly well that it wouldn't work but were overruled by the bean counters and the management suits.
    My limited experience with british culture suggests the higher ups
    wouldn't take kindly to being "told" they were wrong (it isn't
    encouraged in the US but it seems to be better tolerated, here)
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Carlos E.R.@robin_listas@es.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Sat Nov 14 20:56:52 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 2026-11-14 09:18, Don Y wrote:
    On 11/13/2026 1:47 PM, Carlos E.R. wrote:

    I suspect "need" is an overstatement; maybe "want" (I doubt anyone
    will go
    hungry if they don't get their FROZEN food delivery, today)

    There are flats with no kitchen. Maybe a microwave to reheat
    packaged portions, or have the food ready to eat delivered from many
    restaurants just in time.

    I don't think that is the case, here -- except in dorm rooms or hotels.
    Most homes have a kitchen or kitchenette.-a (Most dorms likely have a
    hot plate, even if it is prohibited!).

    Google says they are common in Thailand. It also says they exist in
    Spain and USA.

    Sources:

    <https://agnetwest.com/no-kitchens-future-homes/>

    No Kitchens in Future Homes?

    December 11, 2023This Land of Ours

    Will our future homes be built without kitchens? ThatrCOs coming up on
    This Land of Ours.


    <https://metropolismag.com/projects/anna-puigjaner-kitchenless-home/>

    This Spanish Architect Wants to Revolutionize the HomerCoby Getting Rid
    of Kitchens

    Few spaces of the home are as coveted as the kitchen. But Anna
    Puigjaner is showing the way out of these wasteful private cooking
    boxes toward more efficient rCLsharedrCY alternatives.


    <https://www.treehugger.com/alice-constance-austin-houses-without-
    kitchens-5201804>

    Alice Constance Austin Designed Houses Without Kitchens in 1917

    An underground electric railway delivered food from central kitchens
    to each house.


    <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single-kitchen_home>

    Single-kitchen home

    The single-kitchen home was a reform model of urban residential
    development in which a centrally managed canteen kitchen within a
    multi-party house replaced the kitchens of the individual apartments.
    The concept was based on the ideas of the women's rights activist and
    social democrat Lily Braun. With the basic idea of liberating women
    from housework, at the beginning of the 20th century it was an
    explicit counter-design to the establishment of the isolated nuclear
    family in mass housing. Single-kitchen houses, sometimes also called
    central kitchen houses, were implemented in various European large
    cities in isolated and different ways until the 1950s. As key works of
    an idea of modern living, some of these buildings were nominated for
    the European Heritage Label in 2009, expressly as a network of common
    European architecture spread across various countries.
    I think there would be a lot of resistance to that, here.-a Kitchens
    are one of the most "gifted" rooms in a home -- appliances, gadgets,
    etc.

    You will still end up with some sort of place to store foodstuffs and
    the means to eat them (and some limited means of preparing them).
    Hard to imagine refrigerators, freezers, ice makers, etc. going away.

    And, with young people struggling to *afford* a home, it's hard
    to believe they would "dine out" at a higher price vs. prepping
    their own meals.-a E.g., a purchased $15 burger is a bit
    excessive if you can't make your mortgage payment!


    A comunal kitchen that prepares the same dinner for everybody, is
    cheaper than 20 kitchens with their food stores.

    Frozen food or ready to eat packages are not that expensive.
    --
    Cheers, Carlos.
    ESEfc-Efc+, EUEfc-Efc|;
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Carlos E.R.@robin_listas@es.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Sat Nov 14 21:59:49 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 2026-11-14 04:56, Don Y wrote:
    The big problem with smart meters when they are fully smart is that it
    allows the supplier to do remote disconnection of the customer (eg for
    non payment of bill) without visiting the premises to pull the fuse.

    When I was designing meter, the disconnect feature was too costly
    to implement (100A+ on two conductors).-a The meter itself is the
    "fuse" so it is removed when service is disconnected.-a A locking
    ring holds the meter to the mating socket and the meter is replaced by
    a blank cover (to protect from the bare line contacts) when it
    is removed -- still secured by said ring)

    In the case of Spain, the meter has the ability to limit the Amps. It
    can switch off.

    This is because the contract with the utility says how many Amps the
    client contracts, in steps of 5A, but written in Watts. And the monthly receipt charges an amount that is proportional to the number of days and
    the Watts. Thus we try to contract the minimum we can live with. I have
    10A total because it is a very old contract, but typical would be 20A.

    The meter can be programmed remotely to a number or amps. If the limit
    is 15 and you draw more, it triggers and powers off the house for some time.

    (I have a 10A contract, but the limiter seems to have a lower limit of
    15, not 10).


    Thus, they also have the ability to remotely switch off a client. Some
    clients would then remove the meter and put a jumper, if they can access
    it.
    --
    Cheers, Carlos.
    ESEfc-Efc+, EUEfc-Efc|;
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Don Y@blockedofcourse@foo.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Sat Nov 14 14:46:38 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 11/14/2026 12:56 PM, Carlos E.R. wrote:
    On 2026-11-14 09:18, Don Y wrote:
    On 11/13/2026 1:47 PM, Carlos E.R. wrote:

    I suspect "need" is an overstatement; maybe "want" (I doubt anyone will go
    hungry if they don't get their FROZEN food delivery, today)

    There are flats with no kitchen. Maybe a microwave to reheat packaged >>>>> portions, or have the food ready to eat delivered from many restaurants >>>>> just in time.

    I don't think that is the case, here -- except in dorm rooms or hotels. >>>> Most homes have a kitchen or kitchenette.-a (Most dorms likely have a
    hot plate, even if it is prohibited!).

    Google says they are common in Thailand. It also says they exist in Spain >>> and USA.

    Sources:

    <https://agnetwest.com/no-kitchens-future-homes/>

    No Kitchens in Future Homes?

    December 11, 2023This Land of Ours

    Will our future homes be built without kitchens? ThatrCOs coming up on This
    Land of Ours.


    <https://metropolismag.com/projects/anna-puigjaner-kitchenless-home/>

    This Spanish Architect Wants to Revolutionize the HomerCoby Getting Rid of >>> Kitchens

    Few spaces of the home are as coveted as the kitchen. But Anna Puigjaner is
    showing the way out of these wasteful private cooking boxes toward more >>> efficient rCLsharedrCY alternatives.


    <https://www.treehugger.com/alice-constance-austin-houses-without-
    kitchens-5201804>

    Alice Constance Austin Designed Houses Without Kitchens in 1917

    An underground electric railway delivered food from central kitchens to each
    house.


    <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single-kitchen_home>

    Single-kitchen home

    The single-kitchen home was a reform model of urban residential development
    in which a centrally managed canteen kitchen within a multi-party house >>> replaced the kitchens of the individual apartments. The concept was based on
    the ideas of the women's rights activist and social democrat Lily Braun. >>> With the basic idea of liberating women from housework, at the beginning of
    the 20th century it was an explicit counter-design to the establishment of >>> the isolated nuclear family in mass housing. Single-kitchen houses,
    sometimes also called central kitchen houses, were implemented in various >>> European large cities in isolated and different ways until the 1950s. As key
    works of an idea of modern living, some of these buildings were nominated >>> for the European Heritage Label in 2009, expressly as a network of common >>> European architecture spread across various countries.
    I think there would be a lot of resistance to that, here.-a Kitchens
    are one of the most "gifted" rooms in a home -- appliances, gadgets,
    etc.

    You will still end up with some sort of place to store foodstuffs and
    the means to eat them (and some limited means of preparing them).
    Hard to imagine refrigerators, freezers, ice makers, etc. going away.

    And, with young people struggling to *afford* a home, it's hard
    to believe they would "dine out" at a higher price vs. prepping
    their own meals.-a E.g., a purchased $15 burger is a bit
    excessive if you can't make your mortgage payment!

    A comunal kitchen that prepares the same dinner for everybody, is cheaper than
    20 kitchens with their food stores.

    Frozen food or ready to eat packages are not that expensive.

    But that means surrendering your freedom to eat what you want,
    when you want, to some sort of "concensus".

    It's 2:45PM, here. I just ate breakfast -- a pulled pork sandwich.
    How many of the people who live within a *mile* of me would want to
    have a meal in the middle of the afternoon (regardless of what
    they called it). And, how many would want pulled pork on that
    menu?

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Don Y@blockedofcourse@foo.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Sat Nov 14 14:54:37 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 11/14/2026 1:59 PM, Carlos E.R. wrote:
    On 2026-11-14 04:56, Don Y wrote:
    The big problem with smart meters when they are fully smart is that it
    allows the supplier to do remote disconnection of the customer (eg for non >>> payment of bill) without visiting the premises to pull the fuse.

    When I was designing meter, the disconnect feature was too costly
    to implement (100A+ on two conductors).-a The meter itself is the
    "fuse" so it is removed when service is disconnected.-a A locking
    ring holds the meter to the mating socket and the meter is replaced by
    a blank cover (to protect from the bare line contacts) when it
    is removed -- still secured by said ring)

    In the case of Spain, the meter has the ability to limit the Amps. It can switch off.

    This is because the contract with the utility says how many Amps the client contracts, in steps of 5A, but written in Watts. And the monthly receipt charges an amount that is proportional to the number of days and the Watts. Thus we try to contract the minimum we can live with. I have 10A total because
    it is a very old contract, but typical would be 20A.

    The meter can be programmed remotely to a number or amps. If the limit is 15 and you draw more, it triggers and powers off the house for some time.

    (I have a 10A contract, but the limiter seems to have a lower limit of 15, not
    10).

    A typical home, here, will have a 100A or 200A service.
    Our "quiescent load" is probably close to 1000W (the house is
    always active so there is no time when everything is "off";
    there are usually 3 or 4 computers running, TV, etc.)

    The air conditioner draws 15A @ 220VAC -- plus another kilowatt
    for the blower motor.

    The electric range/oven draws up to 3KW per stovetop burner;
    probably comparable for the elements inside the ovens.

    A hand-held hair dryer, 1000W. Ditto for a toaster. Or electric
    frying pan.

    [Each of my workstations has an 1100W power supply -- though that
    isn't taxed significantly in any of them]
    Thus, they also have the ability to remotely switch off a client. Some clients
    would then remove the meter and put a jumper, if they can access it.


    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Carlos E.R.@robin_listas@es.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Sun Nov 15 22:07:55 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    On 2026-11-14 22:54, Don Y wrote:
    On 11/14/2026 1:59 PM, Carlos E.R. wrote:
    On 2026-11-14 04:56, Don Y wrote:
    The big problem with smart meters when they are fully smart is that
    it allows the supplier to do remote disconnection of the customer
    (eg for non payment of bill) without visiting the premises to pull
    the fuse.

    When I was designing meter, the disconnect feature was too costly
    to implement (100A+ on two conductors).-a The meter itself is the
    "fuse" so it is removed when service is disconnected.-a A locking
    ring holds the meter to the mating socket and the meter is replaced by
    a blank cover (to protect from the bare line contacts) when it
    is removed -- still secured by said ring)

    In the case of Spain, the meter has the ability to limit the Amps. It
    can switch off.

    This is because the contract with the utility says how many Amps the
    client contracts, in steps of 5A, but written in Watts. And the
    monthly receipt charges an amount that is proportional to the number
    of days and the Watts. Thus we try to contract the minimum we can live
    with. I have 10A total because it is a very old contract, but typical
    would be 20A.

    The meter can be programmed remotely to a number or amps. If the limit
    is 15 and you draw more, it triggers and powers off the house for some
    time.

    (I have a 10A contract, but the limiter seems to have a lower limit of
    15, not 10).

    A typical home, here, will have a 100A or 200A service.
    Our "quiescent load" is probably close to 1000W (the house is
    always active so there is no time when everything is "off";
    there are usually 3 or 4 computers running, TV, etc.)

    The air conditioner draws 15A @ 220VAC -- plus another kilowatt
    for the blower motor.

    Mine draws 200..300 watts to maintain the temperature. Cools 3 rooms.
    Can draw up to 1200 W when the temp difference is "big".

    Computers draw little. The biggest may be 100..200 watts normally, but I haven't measured it recently.

    Standby things, maybe 50.


    The electric range/oven draws up to 3KW per stovetop burner;
    probably comparable for the elements inside the ovens.

    I have to use one at a time, so 1 KW.


    A hand-held hair dryer, 1000W.-a Ditto for a toaster.-a Or electric
    frying pan.

    Wait for your turn. :-)


    My house is a special case. Typical house can have 15..25A. It is your
    choice, but you pay for it. So, you choose as little as you can make with.


    [Each of my workstations has an 1100W power supply -- though that
    isn't taxed significantly in any of them]
    Thus, they also have the ability to remotely switch off a client. Some
    clients would then remove the meter and put a jumper, if they can
    access it.


    --
    Cheers, Carlos.
    ESEfc-Efc+, EUEfc-Efc|;
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Don Y@blockedofcourse@foo.invalid to sci.electronics.design on Sun Nov 15 17:09:06 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.electronics.design

    A typical home, here, will have a 100A or 200A service.
    Our "quiescent load" is probably close to 1000W (the house is
    always active so there is no time when everything is "off";
    there are usually 3 or 4 computers running, TV, etc.)

    The air conditioner draws 15A @ 220VAC -- plus another kilowatt
    for the blower motor.

    Mine draws 200..300 watts to maintain the temperature. Cools 3 rooms. Can draw
    up to 1200 W when the temp difference is "big".

    It takes a lot of refrigeration to cool a few thousand square feet
    when the outdoor temperature is 110F.

    Computers draw little. The biggest may be 100..200 watts normally, but I haven't measured it recently.

    Each of my workstations has 3 monitors so the monitors alone eat up
    a good fraction of that -- plus the pair of GPUs to drive the monitors,
    the four spindles inside, etc.

    *This* computer is on all the time (never sleeping). There's another
    in my bedroom that does core network services. Router, modem, two
    printers.

    Standby things, maybe 50.

    There are a lot of parasitic loads in most houses, here. Ours, probably more than most.

    Each of my (39?) computers/servers/NASs/DASs/SANs draws some idle current
    to determine when you've pressed the POWER button. One has an annoying
    habit of keeping a *fan* running when I fail to pull the power cord! Five network switches (3x24 + 2x16). 18 monitors. 8 port KVM for interacting
    with my prototype (a set of 8 of the aforementioned machines).

    Three TVs with similar parasitic currents. Two scanners waiting to be
    "woken up". 12 UPSs. All of the kitchen/laundry appliances (stove/oven, refrigerator, microwave, dishwasher, clothes washer, clothes dryer) have
    MCUs inside waiting to turn on. Two multimedia computers (which tend to
    get left on because we can't easily TELL if they are on or off without
    turning on the associated TV and selecting that video source)

    Freezer chest, garage door opener (listening for an OPEN command), 3 cordless phone stations, chargers for the cell phones and eReaders, two HiFis, timepieces...

    etc.

    Electricity is relatively cheap (~15c/KWHr) and unplugging things that don't have real power switches is a real hassle! I've considered designing a
    small, self-powered galvanic switch to insert in each power cord but the time to design and fabricate exceeds the cost of just paying for the electricity!

    The electric range/oven draws up to 3KW per stovetop burner;
    probably comparable for the elements inside the ovens.

    I have to use one at a time, so 1 KW.

    Last nights dinner used three stovetop burners -- though not on "high".
    (Its a challenge to make sure everything is ready to eat at the same time)

    A hand-held hair dryer, 1000W.-a Ditto for a toaster.-a Or electric
    frying pan.

    Wait for your turn. :-)

    We rarely dry our hair as it's easier to just crack a window in the
    car and it dries in just a couple of minutes (low humidity). No need
    to dry it if you're staying home!
    My house is a special case. Typical house can have 15..25A. It is your choice,
    but you pay for it. So, you choose as little as you can make with.

    In general, americans are pretty wasteful of energy. (acknowledging that
    SWMBO & I are gluttonous; OTOH, we probably use less than 200 gallons of
    petrol annually for our *combined* needs). But, energy is relatively cheap
    and plentiful so convenience trumps cost.

    E.g., we could probably eat for the better part of a month on what we
    have in the two freezers and refrigerator. We drink "fresh squeezed"
    OJ all year long from our annual citrus harvest (by freezing it).

    [Each of my workstations has an 1100W power supply -- though that
    isn't taxed significantly in any of them]
    Thus, they also have the ability to remotely switch off a client. Some
    clients would then remove the meter and put a jumper, if they can access it.





    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2