• [digest] 2026 Week 46

    From IACR ePrint Archive@noreply@example.invalid to sci.crypt on Mon Nov 16 03:32:21 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.crypt

    ## In this issue
    1. [2025/1498] One More Pair, More Information Gained: Improved ...
    2. [2026/2156] Cryptanalysis of Goldreich's PRGs with MAJrCoXOR ...
    3. [2026/2162] A Survey of Pseudorandom Codes
    4. [2026/2453] Revisiting Witness-Succinct UC-lifting Compilers
    5. [2026/2721] Authenticated Outsourced Incrementally Verifiable MPC
    6. [2026/2788] Differentially Private Distance-Sensitive ...
    7. [2026/2792] Independent Leakage Does Not Save Evasive LWE: ...
    8. [2026/2797] The Maximum Possible Nonlinearity for a Balanced ...
    9. [2026/2811] More Keys, Less Commitment: Key-Committing Attacks ...
    10. [2026/2812] Constructions of Boolean Correctors with Optimal ...
    11. [2026/2834] Undine: Distributed Extendable Merkle Tree Storage ...
    12. [2026/2835] Multi-Hop Functional Encryption
    13. [2026/2836] Doubly-Efficient Private Information Retrieval from ...
    14. [2026/2837] Adaptive Leaky LWE and Its Security
    15. [2026/2838] DKG: A Dual-Layer Knowledge Graph and LLM Co-Driven ...
    16. [2026/2839] Practical Confidential Clustering for Federated ...
    17. [2026/2840] MPCTM: MPC-Based Trajectory Matching on Unmanned ...
    18. [2026/2841] SEC: One-Share Everywhere-Short Secret Sharing from ...
    19. [2026/2842] Enabling Memory Encryption Using Ascon Derivatives
    20. [2026/2843] Adaptively Secure (Threshold) Batched IBE from ...
    21. [2026/2844] Antipodal necessity for rotation symmetric bent ...
    22. [2026/2845] On Composing Oracle Separations
    23. [2026/2846] The isodual constant of the LLL potential: exact ...
    24. [2026/2847] Access Cost Tradeoffs in Mixed-Mode Oblivious RAM
    25. [2026/2848] TUTTI: Parallel CKKS Bootstrapping in under 3 ms on CPU
    26. [2026/2850] Neural Cipher Bench: Cost and Portability of ...
    27. [2026/2851] Bounding the security of the Bromberg-Shpilrain- ...
    28. [2026/2852] A Tutorial on Oblivious Random Access Memory
    29. [2026/2853] ASCENT: Algebraic Structured Compilation of Exact ...
    30. [2026/2854] Homomorphism in Expectation: Leveled Homomorphic ...
    31. [2026/2855] DetTreeChain: Parallel Block Production on an N-ary ...
    32. [2026/2856] A New Class of PRFs and Efficient VRFs from ...
    33. [2026/2857] When One Bit Is (Almost) Enough: A Low Leakage ...
    34. [2026/2858] Revisiting Fiat-Shamir NIZKPs and Signatures from ...
    35. [2026/2859] A Single-Trace Side-Channel Attack on the KpqC ...
    36. [2026/2860] Delegatable Keyed-Verification Anonymous Credentials
    37. [2026/2861] $\mathsf{SVP}_\infty$ Is NP-Hard for Power-of-two ...
    38. [2026/2862] An improvement to the KLPT2 algorithm
    39. [2026/2863] Affine Combiners for Reed-Solomon Proximity Gaps
    40. [2026/2864] Tightly Secure and Modular Post-Quantum TLS Handshakes
    41. [2026/2865] HIT: Single-Pass Inference for Single-Trace NTT ...
    42. [2026/2866] Anamorphic NIZK: Definition, Construction and More
    43. [2026/2867] Collision Attacks on SHA-2: 39-Step SHA-256 below ...
    44. [2026/2868] Bulletproofs are Optimal: Lower Bounds for Vector ...
    45. [2026/2869] From Dependent Ciphertexts to Sharp Bounds for ...
    46. [2026/2870] BMRaccoon: Blind Multi-Signatures from Lattices
    47. [2026/2871] The Price of Geometry for Private Distance- ...
    48. [2026/2872] On the Security of the Cubic UOV Variant CML
    49. [2026/2873] Optimized Solving Strategy and Two-Step Estimator ...
    50. [2026/2874] Triads below the ISA: Optimizing Cryptographic ...
    51. [2026/2875] Security Analysis of Anonymous Authentication in ...
    52. [2026/2876] Encrypted Authorship Attribution for Fraud Detection
    53. [2026/2877] Toward EN4acient Post-Quantum Bitcoin Bridges
    ## 2025/1498
    * Title: One More Pair, More Information Gained: Improved Attacks on LowMC with Full S-box Layers Using Two Plaintext/Ciphertext Pairs
    * Authors: Yimeng Sun, Jiamin Cui, Shiyao Chen, Meiqin Wang, Longzheng Cui, Chao Niu
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1498)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1498.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Motivated by LowMC cryptanalysis challenge, research in recent years focuses more on attacking LowMC in \PICNIC application setting, \ie an attacker can see only a single plaintext/ciphertext pair. It can be noted that in the security proof of \PICNIC, LowMC is required to be secure under two plaintexts, it is thus meaningful to investigate the security of LowMC in this direction. Pioneered by Liu, Isobe and Meier at Crypto 2021, they combined algebraic techniques with difference enumeration attack, which could attack all three 4-round LowMC instances adopting full S-Box layers in \PICNIC with only two chosen plaintexts. However, the research on cryptanalysis of LowMC using two plaintext/ciphertext pairs is yet far from complete. Previous works using a single known plaintext are better than those with two plaintexts in terms of attack complexity or attacked rounds when considering a comparable success probability.
    In this paper, to address such counter-intuitive gaps between existing attacks on LowMC with full S-box layers using a single and two plaintext/ciphertext pairs, we first develop an algebraic key-derived attack framework, where an algebraic property of the key-derived difference is utilized to build an equation system with lower algebraic degree. This directly contributes to less cost for solving equation system and naturally works under known-plaintext setting, which can be further enhanced with chosen-plaintext attack setting. We then present an improved difference enumeration attack framework. Instead of enumerating all possible differences in the second round, variables for part of S-boxes in the second and third rounds are introduced to derive cubic equations, which will lead to fewer variables for the last round. Finally, applying our new attack frameworks to LowMC, we propose \text{8-round} attacks on LowMC for the very first time, which remain under known-plaintext setting. Moreover, we give the first attacks on three LowMC instances, \ie 129-bit block size of 6 rounds and 129-/192-bit block size of 7 rounds, which cannot be obtained using previous attacking methods. Also, previous attacks on LowMC from 4 to 7 rounds could be improved for almost all three LowMC instances in this paper. All these results, we believe, could be a positive answer that given one more pair, more information indeed can be gained to improve attacks on LowMC when compared to those using only a single plaintext. As well as our newly proposed algebraic key-derived attack framework, we hope that, could provide more insights into the cryptanalysis of LowMC with low allowable data complexity.
    ## 2026/2156
    * Title: Cryptanalysis of Goldreich's PRGs with MAJrCoXOR Predicates
    * Authors: Tianning Wang, Haoyang Wang, Fukang Liu, Willi Meier
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2156)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2156.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Goldreich's pseudorandom generators (PRGs) expand a secret \(n\)-bit seed into \(m\) output bits by applying the same local predicate to each selected subset of seed bits. We develop a pooled recovery framework for \(\mathrm{MAJ}\)rCo\(\mathrm{XOR}\) predicates. The method guesses that a set of seed bits has the same value and pools outputs whose majority inputs sufficiently overlap this set. Under a correct guess, Bias-Amplified Pooled Recovery (BAPR) exploits the amplified bias of the resulting noisy XOR equations. When the guessed bits force the selected majority outputs to a constant, its noiseless special case, Deterministic Pooled Recovery (DPR), uses exact equations. For \(m=n^s\) with fixed \(s>1\), majority locality \(a\in\omega(1)\cap O(\log n)\), and fixed XOR locality \(b\ge3\), we establish a worst-case \(2^{o(n)}\)-time recovery bound for BAPR when the input sets are sampled uniformly and independently across outputs. Under the stated cost models, our concrete recovery estimates for balanced seeds fall below the claimed security levels for the \(\mathrm{MAJ}_7\oplus\mathrm{XOR}_4\) challenge and selected \(\mathrm{THR}_{64,32}\oplus\mathrm{XOR}_{10}\) instances collected by Boura et al. (ToSC 2025), as well as selected challenge instances proposed by Fu et al. (EUROCRYPT 2026). We then generalize DPR to fixed predicates satisfying explicit affine-restriction conditions and prove subexponential recovery without an additional rank assumption. Our analysis of alternative predicates highlights the potential use of exact or approximate affine relations in attacks, suggesting that such structure should also be considered in predicate design.
    ## 2026/2162
    * Title: A Survey of Pseudorandom Codes
    * Authors: Miranda Christ
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2162)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2162.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    A pseudorandom code (PRC) is a cryptographic primitive combining pseudorandom encryption and error-correcting codes (Christ and Gunn, CRYPTO 2024). That is, any polynomial number of codewords are pseudorandom, and decryption tolerates a constant rate of bit-flips. Although this might seem like a natural combination of standard properties, it is a fundamentally new object: PRCs are black-box separated from many primitives, including one-way functions, public-key encryption, and even virtual black-box obfuscation (D||ttling et al., Garg et al., TCC 2025).

    Pseudorandom codes were introduced to build watermarks for AI-generated content. In particular, they imply watermarks that preserve the model's quality in a strong sense and withstand modification of the content. This relationship makes pseudorandom codes an inviting area for researchers: improvements to this simple theoretical object yield better watermarks. Beyond watermarks, PRCs have been used to construct error-correcting codes against computationally bounded channels (Lu et al., CRYPTO 2026), and techniques underlying them have led to new public-key encryption schemes (D||ttling et al., CRYPTO 2026, Dyseryn et al. ASIACRYPT 2026).
    This survey aims to equip the interested researcher with tools to make progress in the area. We detail the current landscape of definitions, techniques, and applications. A main contribution is introducing new tricks and assembling existing tricks to generically strengthen PRCs (e.g., from substitution-robustness to random-deletion-robustness). We also show natural weakenings of PRCs that can be constructed from OWFs or even unconditionally. We conclude with a number of concrete open questions.
    ## 2026/2453
    * Title: Revisiting Witness-Succinct UC-lifting Compilers
    * Authors: Davide Li Calsi, Luigi Russo, Dominique Schr||der, Federico Valbusa * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2453)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2453.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Zero-knowledge succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (zkSNARKs) are increasingly used within larger cryptographic protocols, making security under composition essential. Generic compilation to Universal Composability (UC) requires straight-line, black-box extraction while preserving succinctness and controlling prover cost.
    We introduce verifiable reconstructible straightline codes (VRSCs), a
    primitive that separates public hiding, transcript-based reconstruction, binding, and proof non-rerandomizability. This abstraction exposes a missing security requirement in the witness-succinct UC compiler of Ganesh et al. (EUROCRYPT 2023). Permuting previously revealed evaluation openings produces a fresh accepting proof with non-negligible probability without violating non-extrapolation, invalidating the claimed simulation argument. Proof non-rerandomizability captures this attack at the certificate level. Our construction prevents transfers between repetitions through verifier-enforced disjoint evaluation domains.
    We formulate a generic UC lifting theorem in terms of VRSCs and give a pairing-based instantiation using a Fischlin-style search over authenticated codeword symbols. Structured Reed--Solomon encoding and jointly computed KZG openings reduce certificate-generation work from quadratic to \(O_{\lambda}(n\log n)\), where \(n\) is the witness size. Only a linear-time encoding check enters the underlying SNARK circuit. To our knowledge, this is the first generic UC lifting compiler that simultaneously achieves quasi-linear prover overhead and constant additional proof size and verification work with respect to the witness size.
    ## 2026/2721
    * Title: Authenticated Outsourced Incrementally Verifiable MPC
    * Authors: Anders Dalskov, Anders Kalles|+e, Hamidreza Khoshakhlagh
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2721)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2721.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Many privacy-preserving applications such as iterative machine learning training require executing ongoing computations over a secret state for long periods of time. While MPC enables secure computation, long-lived secret state is vulnerable to adaptive corruptions, requiring periodic share refreshes and committee rotation. In many settings, it is desirable for external parties to be able to verify that these state updates and rotations are performed correctly, but existing approaches for such public verifiability incur high overhead as they require MPC nodes to generate expensive proofs over secret-shared data.
    We propose Authenticated Outsourced Incrementally Verifiable MPC (IV-MPC), a framework for efficient public verification of long-running MPC computation. Our approach decouples private proof computation (run by MPC nodes) from public tasks within the proof generation that can be delegated to a single external prover $P^*$. To realize this architecture, we introduce three main components: (1) a Private-opening Polynomial Commitment Scheme (PoPCS) that lets an incoming committee prove they received the correct state shares without revealing the underlying data; (2) an efficient distributed proof system based on the sumcheck protocol and compressed $\Sigma$-protocols to verify state updates; and (3) a stateless handover technique that anchors committee transfers to a fixed state commitment, preventing proof sizes from growing over time. Combined with an incrementally verifiable computation (IVC) proof run by the external prover $P^*$, IV-MPC enables external auditors to verify correctness of MPC computation at every round with verification time asymptotically independent of the total number of epochs.
    ## 2026/2788
    * Title: Differentially Private Distance-Sensitive Representations for General Metrics
    * Authors: Paul Cesaretti
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2788)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2788.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    A distance-sensitive set representation stores a set $S$ from a metric space $(U,d)$ and answers queries of the form "is some element of $S$ within distance $r$ of $q$?''. Existing differentially private constructions are confined to Hamming space, because they route the query through a signature map built for that metric. We give a framework that removes this restriction. The released object records only the occupancy of a fixed public partition of $U$, so privacy transfers unchanged from an off-the-shelf private membership structure, and the entire metric dependence collapses into one packing quantity, the straddle number $\kappa$: the largest number of cells a ball of radius $r$ can meet. Any metric admitting a partition of width at most $(c-1)r$ and straddlenumber $\kappa$ then has an $\varepsilon$-differentially private $(c,r)$-representation with $\varepsilon =\ln(2\kappa/\alpha)$ in $O(k\log(\kappa/\alpha))$ bits.
    Instantiating $\kappa$ gives matching upper and lower bounds in $\ell_\infty$ for partition-based constructions ($\varepsilon=O(\log d)$ at $c=\Theta(d)$, against $\varepsilon=\Omega(d)$ at constant $c$), and a randomized, dimension-free construction for every $\ell_p$ (one probe and $\varepsilon=\ln(2/\alpha)$ regardless of $d$) at the cost of a weaker, non-oblivious guarantee whose price is exactly this $\log d$ gap. For metrics available only through a distance oracle, we build the partition from a public net and a public navigable graph, and show that greedy search on that graph both locates and enumerates the cells a query must probe; on a $\lambda$-doubling metric this gives $\varepsilon\le 5\ln\lambda+\ln(2/\alpha)$. We further show that the per-query form of the guarantee is forced rather than chosen: any representation correct on all queries simultaneously requires $\varepsilon\ge\ln M+\ln(1/\alpha)-O(1)$ for $M$ the packing number of the whole space, and on doubling metrics this is achievable up to an additive $O(dim_D\log\frac{c}{c-1})$. Finally, the space bound is optimal in $k$ and $\alpha$.
    ## 2026/2792
    * Title: Independent Leakage Does Not Save Evasive LWE: Refuting Folklore Fixes in the Private-Coin Setting
    * Authors: Yao-Ching Hsieh
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2792)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2792.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    The evasive learning with errors (evasive LWE) assumption has enabled a wide range of advanced cryptographic constructions from lattices in the past few years. The simple intuition that LWE remains secure even when additional ``non-zeroizing'' short preimages are given has proved highly versatile in applications. Unfortunately, recent counterexamples have refuted its general private-coin formulations, showing that having the short preimages along with arbitrary auxiliary leakage about the secret and target matrices can invalidate this intuition.
    To preserve important applications, particularly witness encryption, the community has sought to repair the assumption by restricting the allowed leakage. One folklore proposal requires the secret and target matrices, together with their respective leakage, to be generated independently. This restriction appears to preserve the application to witness encryption while ruling out all previously known counterexamples.
    In this work, we refute this proposal. Assuming LWE and indistinguishability obfuscation, we show that both the binding and hiding variants of private-coin evasive LWE are false even with the independent sampler restriction. Our counterexamples exploit only auxiliary leakage about the target matrix. We sample the secret honestly from a standard uniform or Gaussian distribution, independently of the target and its leakage, and we use no auxiliary information about the secret.
    ## 2026/2797
    * Title: The Maximum Possible Nonlinearity for a Balanced Boolean Function in 10 Variables is 492
    * Authors: Youle Xu, Qichun Wang
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2797)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2797.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Determining the maximum nonlinearity of 10-variable balanced Boolean functions has been a long-standing open problem. In this paper, we resolve it by proving that the maximum nonlinearity is exactly 492, thereby confirming DobbertinrCOs conjecture in dimension 10. To exclude nonlinearity 494, we derive a quadratic residue for the Walsh spectrum and refine a local energy table from four-block concatenation by retaining the signs of the Walsh coefficients. The resulting bounds exclude all but the largest polar rank; a product inequality and a parity argument eliminate the remaining case.
    ## 2026/2811
    * Title: More Keys, Less Commitment: Key-Committing Attacks on BBB Accordions via Encode-then-Encipher and a Key-Committing Transform
    * Authors: Donghoon Chang, Yukihito Hiraga, Yusuke Naito, Yu Sasaki, Takeshi Sugawara
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2811)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2811.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Cryptographic accordions with beyond-birthday-bound (BBB) security are being actively studied in connection with NISTrCOs ongoing standardization effort.
    We show that BBB security of an accordion does not necessarily strengthen key commitment of AE built from it: in many BBB accordions, additional keys introduced for BBB security give an adversary extra degrees of freedom.
    Exploiting this observation, we present $O(1)$ key-committing attacks on a broad range of AE schemes built from BBB accordions, mostly via the Encode-then-Encipher (EtE) paradigm, including CHCTR2, eCTR-based accordions, THCTR, HCTR+, TCT2, and bbb-ddd-AES under a natural polynomial-hash instantiation.
    To address this issue, we propose CACH, a black-box transform from BBB-secure accordions to robust AE (RAE) with key-committing security.
    CACH achieves BBB multi-user RAE security and achieves $t/2$-bit key-committing security with a $t$-bit tag for $n \le t \le 2n$ in the ideal-cipher model.
    CACH uses only AES-based components and supports all AES key sizes, making it compatible with NISTrCOs design goals.
    We instantiate CACH with CHCTR2. CACH-CHCTR2 with AES-256 outperforms EtE-HCTR2 with Rijndael-256 and EtE-CHCTR2 for short messages.
    ## 2026/2812
    * Title: Constructions of Boolean Correctors with Optimal Nonlinearity and Vectorial Correctors Beyond Optimal Linear Correction Order
    * Authors: Zhaole Li, Deng Tang
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2812)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2812.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Correctors are postprocessing functions that reduce or eliminate statistical bias in raw bitstreams produced by physical noise sources in true random number generators. In this paper, we develop a framework based on binary Krawtchouk polynomials for analyzing and constructing Boolean and vectorial correctors. This framework reformulates the Walsh-layer criterion into finite moment constraints on support-layer counts and preimage-layer counts. We also establish universal upper bounds on the nonlinearity of correctors, and necessary conditions on the achievable correction order. For Boolean functions, we prove that $(n-1)$-correctors are either the parity function or its complement. Then we characterize the support-layer profiles of $(n-2)$- and $(n-3)$-correctors and establish upper bounds on nonlinearity. For $n=2^k\ge 8$, a self-addressing construction yields $(n-2)$-correctors achieving the optimal nonlinearity $2^{n-1}-2^{n-1}/n$ with resiliency $n/2-2$ and algebraic degree $k+1$. Notably, this provides the first known infinite family of nonlinear correctors achieving both optimal correction order and optimal nonlinearity for that order, while having a resiliency strictly lower than the correction order. Furthermore, using constant-weight addressing, we construct $(n-d-1)$-correctors that asymptotically meet the nonlinearity upper bounds for every fixed $d\ge 1$. Our profile characterization also reveals inherent limitations of injective Maiorana--McFarland constructions at correction order $n-3$. For vectorial functions, we construct nonlinear $(s(2^m-1),m,s2^{m-1}+\ell-1)$-correctors for every $m\ge 2$ under certain conditions on $s$ and $\ell$, with resiliency at most $s2^{m-1}-2$. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first infinite family of nonlinear correctors whose correction order simultaneously exceeds that of optimal linear corrector and its own resiliency. Finally, we introduce a secondary construction that lifts these vectorial correctors to larger input dimensions while preserving their correction-order advantage. This approach yields a nonlinearity of $2^{n-1}-2^{n-n_0-1}$, where $n_0$ is the input dimension of the base corrector, along with explicit resiliency and a flexible algebraic degree.
    ## 2026/2834
    * Title: Undine: Distributed Extendable Merkle Tree Storage with Private Retrieval and Efficient Reconfiguration
    * Authors: Nicolas Alhaddad, Harry Eldridge, Julia Guskind, Eran Tromer, Mayank Varia
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2834)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2834.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Clients of transparency logs, public-key directories, and shielded blockchain pools require authenticated access to an ever-changing Merkle tree, without storing it in full or revealing which entry they open. We seek to distribute storage and query work across independent servers as the data grows and participants join, leave, change their shares, or misbehave.
    We present Undine, which combines a distributed Merkle tree encoding with private retrieval from independently-maintained fragments. Maintainers can choose and efficiently adjust the size of their stored fragments, to offer a flexible tradeoff against the number of maintainer replies needed for authenticated data reconstruction by clients. Maintainers can also perform authenticated updates and appends, at a write cost of just twice the number of modified Merkle nodes.
    Undine uses a linear encoding of the Merkle tree nodes to divide evenly the storage and retrieval load across maintainers. This is combined with a private information retrieval (PIR) protocol that operates directly over the linearly-encoded fragments. Undine avoids repeated storage and computation for nodes shared by Merkle paths across records, producing the same PIR replies with work over tree values linear in the filled prefix. Record sizes adapt as the prefix grows to balance query and reply sizes.
    Clients verify against the Merkle root, without commitments to individual PIR databases. Computational query privacy holds against any coalition. Undine is also secure against selective-failure leakage (i.e., deductions from acceptance), up to the PIR backend's correctness error, given enough timely honest replies, fixed public timing, and no reply-dependent follow-up.
    We evaluate UndineLog, our append-only implementation of Undine combined with YPIR. On a height-50 sparse Merkle tree with a 4GiB prefix of nonempty 32-byte leaves and a reconstruction threshold of 64, a maintainer replies in 100ms (single-core); a client can process 192 replies from maintainers and reconstruct a verified opening in 380ms, even with 64 corrupted replies. Scaled up to 1TiB and 256 threshold , a maintainer answers in 1.13s. Existing shielded pools can use this service without consensus changes.
    ## 2026/2835
    * Title: Multi-Hop Functional Encryption
    * Authors: Pratish Datta, Jiaxin Guan, Alexis Korb, Amit Sahai
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2835)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2835.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    In this paper, we initiate the study of multi-hop functional encryption ($\mathsf{MHFE}$), a new primitive for computing over encrypted data in recursive and multi-stage workflows while enabling controlled release of intermediate outputs. $\mathsf{MHFE}$ supports dynamic directed-acyclic computation graphs in which each node is labeled by a function and is equipped with a restricted secret key that reveals only that node's output, yet the computation can continue downstream on a forwardable encrypted state. In doing so, $\mathsf{MHFE}$ simultaneously overcomes (i) multi-hop fully homomorphic encryption's need for a globally trusted, always-online decryption key to reveal intermediate values, (ii) standard FE's lack of a native mechanism for forwarding reusable encrypted state across stages and handling evolving datasets without a fresh recomputation, and (iii) Multi Party Computation's deployment friction stemming from interaction and liveness/coordination requirements (at the cost of a central key-issuing authority).
    We formalize $\mathsf{MHFE}$ security via the simulation paradigm extending standard FE collusion resistance to the multi-hop setting; this simulation-based notion captures the intended information flow in recursive computations most accurately by characterizing an adversary's entire view as simulatable given only the authorized intermediate outputs. Our security games impose a natural topological-order on queries: a hop key for a node may be requested only after the ciphertexts/keys on all incoming edges to that node have been fixed. We then give the first generic simulation-secure construction of public-key $\mathsf{MHFE}$ for all polynomial-size circuits from any IND-secure standard FE for circuits.
    ## 2026/2836
    * Title: Doubly-Efficient Private Information Retrieval from Modular Forms
    * Authors: Alexandra Henzinger, Seyoon Ragavan
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2836)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2836.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    We present new information-theoretic protocols for $s$-server, doubly-efficient private information retrieval (PIR) in sublinear server time and one extra bit of space on the servers, for every constant $s \geq 2$. On an $n$-bit database, each of the $s$ PIR servers first builds and stores a preprocessing data structure consisting of $n+1$ bits (which is unique to each server, and after which the server may discard the original database). Then, each server answers a PIR query in time $T_s(n)$, by reading at most $T_s$ bits of its data structure and sending them to the user.

    In the two server setting ($s=2$), our PIR protocols achieve $T_2 = n^{0.82}$, matching the server time of the state-of-the-art schemes of Henzinger and Ragavan (EUROCRYPT 2026) while shrinking their storage from $O(n\sqrt{\log n})$ to $n+1$ bits. With $s \geq 3$ servers, our PIR protocols retain the $n+1$ bits of storage and additionally improve on the server time of all prior information-theoretic $s$-server schemes with $n^{1+o(1)}$ storage: for example, achieving $T_3 = n^{0.74}$ and $T_{10} = n^{0.61}$ (previously $n^{0.79}$ and $n^{0.75}$). Asymptotically, as the server count $s$ grows, we shrink the number of servers required to achieve a given server-work exponent from $s^{3.9}$ to $s$.
    Our results draw inspiration from matching-vector techniques (Efremenko, STOC 2009), which we generalize to handle degree-two computations in the exponent. Using this generalization, we build doubly-efficient PIR from the new intermediate abstraction of Fourier-sparse cone-delta functions. Then, we construct such Fourier-sparse cone-delta functions via a connection to modular forms and complex analysis: if a Fourier-sparse cone-delta function does not exist, then there exists a modular form which has too many roots, contradicting the valence formula.
    ## 2026/2837
    * Title: Adaptive Leaky LWE and Its Security
    * Authors: Chuanqi Zhang, Muhammed F. Esgin, Ron Steinfeld
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2837)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2837.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    The Leaky LWE problem, proposed by Lai, Swarnakar, and Woo (CiC '25), studies whether LWE samples remain pseudorandom in the presence of noisy linear information about their secrets and errors. In Leaky LWE, the leakage matrix may depend on the public matrix, but must be chosen before the LWE challenge is revealed. We study $t$-round adaptive Leaky LWE, where each leakage matrix may depend on the challenge and all preceding leakage answers. Under explicit norm, smoothing, and sampling conditions, we reduce Gaussian-secret LWE to this problem at the corresponding source parameters for polynomially many rounds. The reduction preserves the public-matrix distribution and access to its correlated oracle, and supports rectangular leakage matrices and non-spherical discrete Gaussians over arbitrary orders in number fields.
    ## 2026/2838
    * Title: DKG: A Dual-Layer Knowledge Graph and LLM Co-Driven Framework for Fully Automated Side-Channel Analysis of Cryptosystems
    * Authors: Wenquan Zhou, An Wang, Yaoling Ding, Jiakun Li, Jingqi Zhang, Liehuang Zhu
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2838)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2838.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Cryptographic algorithms underpin billions of devices, from payment smartcards to smartphone secure enclaves and industrial controllers. Yet their physical implementations risk leaking secret keys. Non-profiled side-channel analysis (SCA) evaluates whether such leakage enables key recovery, but executing it end-to-end remains expert-intensive. Large language model (LLM) agents now automate complex workflows across many domains, yet reliable key recovery requires specialized SCA knowledge that must be extracted and organized from scattered technical literature. In this paper, we propose DKG, a dual-layer knowledge graph and LLM co-driven key-recovery agent framework. We introduce the first graph schema designed specifically for SCA: an upper layer of configuration components and a lower layer of diagnostic strategies, joined by cross-layer relationships. An LLM-driven three-step extraction pipeline (Locate & Rewrite, Triple Extraction, and Knowledge Fusion) builds the graph from raw technical documents without manual annotation, and at runtime the retrieved knowledge drives a closed-loop autonomous attack workflow. Built from a corpus of 166 technical documents, the graph contains 1,334 entities and 1,813 relationships. On eight datasets covering AES, DES, and SM4 across smartcards, FPGAs, and MCUs, DKG with DeepSeek-V3.2 achieves a 97.5% end-to-end key-recovery success rate. By comparison, ReAct-RAG, a text-retrieval-augmented agent, achieves only 68.8%. Across the open-weights backbones DeepSeek-V3.2, GLM-5, and Qwen3.5, DKG achieves an average success rate of 93.3%. To the best of our knowledge, DKG is the first framework to achieve consistent end-to-end automated key recovery across diverse implementations. Its automated pipeline lets the graph grow with new literature, and its dual-layer organization provides a basis for extending DKG to additional SCA techniques.
    ## 2026/2839
    * Title: Practical Confidential Clustering for Federated Learning using Efficient Secret-Sharing
    * Authors: C|-dric Prigent, Sonia Ben Mokhtar
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2839)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2839.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Federated Learning (FL) often suffers from statistical heterogeneity, where diverging data distributions prevent a single global model from achieving high utility for all participants. Clustered Federated Learning (CFL) addresses this problem by grouping similar clients to train personalized sub-models, yet performing such clustering while ensuring strict confidentially with minimal communication overhead remains a significant challenge. This paper introduces CCFL, a framework for Confidential Clustering that executes clustering logic, including distance computations and centroid updates, entirely within the encrypted domain using Replicated Secret Sharing (RSS). CCFL orchestrates a unified pipeline that integrates client-side feature extraction, an anonymization server for oblivious shuffling, and Multi-Party Computation (MPC)-based clustering to ensure both input privacy and participant unlinkability. By employing a ring-based Euclidean distance optimization, CCFL significantly reduces interactive rounds, achieving up to $46.7\times$ computational speedup under realistic LAN and WAN constraints. Our one-shot clustering approach decouples heavy cryptographic computation from the training loop, allowing the system to scale seamlessly to thousands of clients with negligible edge overhead. Finally, downstream evaluations confirm that CCFL achieves a superior privacy-utility trade-off, matching or outperforming state-of-the-art personalized FL paradigms without exposing sensitive feature geometries.
    ## 2026/2840
    * Title: MPCTM: MPC-Based Trajectory Matching on Unmanned Autonomous Systems
    * Authors: Dominik Roy George, Martin Zbudila, Barry Van Leeuwen
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2840)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2840.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Emerging technologies such as Unmanned Autonomous Systems (UASs) are increasingly being deployed across several application domains. Their deployment, however, introduces safety risks, especially when unmanned vehicles operate in shared operational spaces (e.g., air, land, or maritime) and may follow collision-prone paths. This creates the need for solutions that can detect possible collisions among pre-planned trajectories, thereby improving operational safety and reducing risk. At the same time, revealing trajectories in plaintext leaks sensitive information, such as traversal patterns, deployment and infrastructure locations, and potentially private user data. In this paper, we present a privacy-preserving trajectory matching protocol based on Multi-Party Computation (MPC). We introduce an end-to-end secure scheme for collision detection that reveals no information beyond the prescribed output. Our solution models the behaviour of UASs along their paths, accurately capturing collisions that may occur between discretely sampled points. We further propose a lightweight, MPC-friendly model and discuss the trade-off between accuracy and efficiency for the two approaches. We provide a proof-of-concept implementation of our scheme and compare it to the closest state-of-the-art solution. Our evaluation shows that our work MPCTM, in the dealer mode, improves the online latency upon previous work by over 2x in our modelled protocol and by 8x in our lightweight protocol. In autonomous mode, our protocol results in a slow-down of 2.5-3x, while providing a more expressive model with no false negatives and fully preserving privacy of the trajectory data.
    ## 2026/2841
    * Title: SEC: One-Share Everywhere-Short Secret Sharing from Lossless Expanders * Authors: Muhammad Arzaki, Muhammed F. Esgin, Amin Sakzad, Ron Steinfeld
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2841)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2841.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    We introduce \(\mathsf{SEC}\), an expander-code-based ramp secret sharing scheme over \(\mathbb{Z}\)-modules, particularly suitable for lattice-based distributed cryptography. It is everywhere-short: bounded secret coefficients yield bounded share coefficients, and the integer reconstruction vectors have bounded entries. Moreover, each participant receives exactly one share, regardless of the number of parties and the privacy and reconstruction thresholds. This improves on prior schemes with bounded share coefficients and bounded entries in the integer reconstruction vectors, in which the number of sub-shares or shares per participant grows either with the number of parties and the threshold or with the security parameter. The construction rests on a coding-theoretic observation: in the bi-adjacency matrix of a lossless bipartite expander, unique-neighbor peeling completes every sufficiently small set of columns to a square unimodular submatrix. We prove correctness, everywhere-shortness, and linearity, and give a publicly computable entrywise bound on the reconstruction vector our algorithm returns for each authorized set. For privacy, we introduce hard-core local leakage resilience, which strengthens the leakage-resilience notion of Nielsen and Simkin (EUROCRYPT 2020) to protect a hard-core function of the secret, and we prove that \(\mathsf{SEC}\) satisfies it against correlated multi-query local leakage under the \(\mathsf{MatrixHint\text{-}MLWE}\) problem, which admits a reduction from the standard \(\mathsf{MLWE}\) problem. For \(n=60\) participants and security parameter \(\kappa = 128\), \(\mathsf{SEC}\) achieves privacy threshold \(6\) against \(2^{64}\) leakage queries and empirical reconstruction threshold \(46\). The ideal entropy-coded secret and share sizes are about \(3.5\) KiB and \(6.4\) KiB, respectively.
    ## 2026/2842
    * Title: Enabling Memory Encryption Using Ascon Derivatives
    * Authors: Sergej Deutsch, Christoph Dobraunig, David Durham, Simon Johnson, Krystian Matusiewicz, Carlos Rozas, Alexander Tereschenko
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2842)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2842.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Keeping data stored in memory confidential is a tough challenge when assuming an adversary with physical access to it. First, we have fine-grained access to typically 256 to 512 bits at once, so nonces or tags of the typical sizes used for authenticated encryption would lead to a sizeable overhead. Second, we have stringent performance requirements, including low latency that directly impacts CPU performance and, more generally, strict area and energy constraints, especially for the high bandwidth of memory interfaces. Currently, memory encryption solutions typically rely on the AES block cipher. In this paper, we explore ways of using Ascon as a building block for memory encryption. Our analysis shows that Ascon-based constructions achieve better performance than AES-based HCTR2 and can also compete with XTS-AES while providing larger block sizes.
    ## 2026/2843
    * Title: Adaptively Secure (Threshold) Batched IBE from Static Assumptions
    * Authors: Sourav Das, Pratish Datta, Aditi Partap, Swagata Sasmal
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2843)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2843.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Batched identity-based encryption (batched IBE) lets a key authority release one short decryption key for a set of identities and a batch label/epoch. It has been used to mitigate maximal extractable value (MEV) attacks on public blockchains. Existing constructions either use the generic-group and/or random-oracle models, or rely on $q$-type assumptions whose size grows with the batch-size bound.
    In this paper, we present the first adaptively secure batched IBE scheme from static assumptions. Our scheme supports an exponential identity space and an exponential epoch space, and its ciphertexts, digests, and batch keys consist of a constant number of group elements independent of the batch size. Our scheme relies on composite-order bilinear groups, and we prove its adaptive security assuming hardness of static subgroup decision assumptions and a static pairing assumption, with a security loss polynomial in the security parameter $\lambda$ and the number of key queries. Our proof does not rely on $q$-type assumptions, random oracles, generic-group arguments, or complexity leveraging. We also present a threshold version with adaptive challenge security under static corruption, and translate our scheme to prime-order bilinear groups under the static MDDH assumption.
    ## 2026/2844
    * Title: Antipodal necessity for rotation symmetric bent functions of degree at most three
    * Authors: Filipe Martins Vono
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2844)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2844.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    The conjecture that every homogeneous rotation symmetric bent Boolean function has degree two remains open in general. We prove a necessary condition that settles the degree-three case of this conjecture. Let $n>0$ be even. If a rotation symmetric Boolean function of degree at most three in $n$ variables is bent, then its algebraic normal form contains the antipodal quadratic orbit $\sum_{i<n/2} x_i x_{i+n/2}$. A homogeneous cubic has no quadratic terms, so no homogeneous rotation symmetric cubic Boolean function is bent, in any even number of variables. The condition also applies to nonhomogeneous functions with arbitrary lower-degree terms compatible with rotation symmetry; it neither classifies these functions nor addresses degree four and higher. The proof uses only finite Fourier analysis and linear algebra over the binary field. Restriction to the fixed space of a rotation of odd order reduces the problem to a power-of-two number of variables. There, Parseval's identity and a rigidity property of rotation symmetric quadratic forms impose incompatible conditions on a single fiber of the function. A second proof replaces the final fiber argument by descent through a single unipotent Jordan block. Examples illustrate the hypotheses. A Lean formalization of the original proof is provided as supplementary material; the Jordan proof has not been formalized.
    ## 2026/2845
    * Title: On Composing Oracle Separations
    * Authors: Willy Quach, Felix Rohrbach
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2845)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2845.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Black-box separations constitute very powerful technical barriers against constructing primitives from specific building blocks. However, they give surprisingly little indication on the usefulness of \emph{combining} several such building blocks in a single construction.
    We propose a set of technical conditions, under which (fully) black-box separations compose with each other. That is, if two black-box separations $P_1 \stackrel{BB}{\nRightarrow} Q$ and $P_2 \stackrel{BB}{\nRightarrow} Q$ satisfy our conditions, then $Q$ is also separated from black-box combinations of $P_1$ and $P_2$. When applicable, these conditions can be established without unpacking the full technical details of the base separations.
    As our main application, we show that combining indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) with collision resistant hash functions is unlikely to yield hard problems in the complexity class $SZK$, and thus unlikely to suffice for primitives such as lossy functions or fully homomorphic encryption. Previous lower bounds on iO only applied to combinations of iO with one-way permutations (Asharov-Segev, FOCS '15 and Bitansky-Degwekar-Vaikuntanathan, SIAM Journal on Computing '21).
    ## 2026/2846
    * Title: The isodual constant of the LLL potential: exact values and structure * Authors: Nick Howgrave-Graham
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2846)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2846.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    The LLL potential $\Psi^2(B)=\prod_k\det\mathrm{Gram}(b_1,\dots,b_k)$, minimized over the bases of a lattice $L$ and normalized by its determinant, defines an isodual lattice invariant $\eta(L)$. Its supremum $\eta_n$ over $n$-dimensional lattices, introduced in ePrint
    2007/105, is the staircase case of the generalized Hermite constants of Watanabe and Meyer, for which explicit values were known only for $n\le4$. We prove that $\eta_5=6$, attained only by $D_5$ and its dual: the flag analogue of Korkine and Zolotarev's value of
    $\gamma_5$. The natural reduction to four-dimensional lattices, through a function $\Phi_5$, does not suffice: the global maximum of $\Phi_5$ is $2^{16}/(3^4\cdot5^3)\approx6.4727$, attained not at $D_4$ but at an even $135$-modular lattice $M_*$, which we have not
    found in the literature. A second stage, over the lifts of the remaining region, completes the proof; both stages are computer-assisted, with about $9\times10^9$ leaves, each re-proved in interval arithmetic by a separately written checker; code and data are public. We
    also prove $\eta_8=2304$, attained by $E_8$, and show that $E_6$, $E_7$, $E_8$ and their duals are strict local maxima of $\eta$ (for $n=6,7$ these are the conjectured extremal lattices). Asymptotically, $\log\eta_n=(\frac14+o(1))\,n^2\log n$.
    For lattice reduction we introduce the $\Psi$-Hermite constant $\mu_m$, the largest first GramrCoSchmidt norm in a potential-minimal basis of an $m$-dimensional lattice, and bound it through $\eta_m$. This gives $\mu_m=\gamma_m$, Hermite's constant, for $m\le5$, and
    $\mu_m\le\exp(O(\log^2 m))$ in general.
    ## 2026/2847
    * Title: Access Cost Tradeoffs in Mixed-Mode Oblivious RAM
    * Authors: Wojciech Ciszewski, Emanuele Ragnoli
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2847)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2847.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    A mixed-mode oblivious RAM (ORAM) lets each memory request be marked public or private: public requests disclose their addresses, private requests hide them. We ask how much work such a scheme must do, and which requests must do it, in the cell-probe modelrCowith a passive server that only reads and overwrites addressed words. We examine the expected amortized per-request cost on randomized workloads with independent modes and uniformly random addresses. For array size $n$ and client memory $m\le n^{1-\varepsilon}$ words, let $H=\log_2(2+n/(m+1))$.
    Our main result is a tight tradeoff between the cost of public reads and private writes. We show that if a request is private with probability $0<p\le1/2$ and private requests cost at most $Q$ probes on average, then every scheme with $m\le n^{1-\varepsilon}$ has expected public-read cost\[
    \Omega\!\left(\max\left\{1,
    \frac{H}{\log_2(2+1/p+Q/H)}\right\}\right),
    \]even when the server learns the kind (read/write) of each private request. For polynomial $m$, we provide constructions that match this bound whenever $Q$ exceeds a threshold that we identify for both $Q$ treated as an expectation over the workload and as the average cost for the worst-case workload. In particular, at constant private frequency $p$ a logarithmic private budget forces logarithmic public-read cost, and constant public-read cost requires private cost $(n/(m+1))^{\Omega(1)}$. This answers, for passive servers, the question posed by Zhang, Wang, and Weng, whose PIR-based scheme achieves constant public and logarithmic private bandwidth with server computation. Our lower bound proof fixes the public query and changes its private history; crucially, we charge them separately. Our constructions combine a public cache with linear merges of hash tables.
    Two further groups of results concern public writes and total work. Firstly, we give a cost tradeoff between public writes and private reads. Secondly, for workloads mixing private operations, public reads, and public writes with probabilities $p,r,a$, we show that every scheme with $m\le n^{1-\varepsilon}$ has total cost per request $\Omega(\max\{1,H/\log_2(2+1/p)\})$ when private request kinds are hidden, and a construction with polynomial client memory matches this bound with a constant independent of $p,r,a$. We also separately bound the costs of reads and writes in this workload.
    Lastly, public requests can in some cases be made cheaper by offloading their cost to preparation in earlier requests or cleanup in later ones. For both public reads and writes, we show localized tradeoffs constrained to a subset of requests, which demonstrate some of the limitations of such offloading.
    ## 2026/2848
    * Title: TUTTI: Parallel CKKS Bootstrapping in under 3 ms on CPU
    * Authors: Robin K||stler, Antonio Guimar|ues
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2848)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2848.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    This paper introduces TUTTI, a new CKKS bootstrapping procedure that outperforms previous low-latency solutions in multi-threaded latency for any number of messages and, most notably, has a lower latency than TFHE when bootstrapping a single one.
    Our bootstrapping builds upon SPRU (CK, TCHES 2027), improving it with new methods for exploiting parallelism and increasing the number of messages, as well as with a refined security analysis, of independent interest, of the block-binary secret keys of LMSS (AsiaCCS 2023).
    \tutti bootstraps $4096$ real-number messages in $46$ to $83.4$ ms on $192$ threads to restore $1$ to $9$ multiplicative levels, outperforming SHIP (CHKS, Eurocrypt 2025) by a factor of up to $3$ on the same machine.
    Unlike SHIP, TUTTI gains immediately from bootstrapping fewer messages, with a $256$-message bootstrapping taking just $15$ to $34$ ms on $32$ threads.
    For a single message, TUTTI takes $4.6$ ms on $32$ threads, whereas TFHE-rs needs $7.3$ ms for a $4$-bit bootstrapping on the same machine and thread count.
    We show that this advantage persists across different architectures: on an Apple M5 Pro laptop (ARM), TUTTI takes $2.4$ ms on $14$ threads, against $4.5$ ms for TFHE-rs.
    Differences between CKKS and lightweight schemes such as TFHE remain on several fronts, from functionality to key sizes and security assumptions, but our work shows that multi-threaded latency is no longer one of them, closing a long-standing gap in the practical FHE literature.
    ## 2026/2850
    * Title: Neural Cipher Bench: Cost and Portability of Corner-ReLU Cipher Implementation
    * Authors: Siwoo Eum, Minwoo Lee, Gyeongju Song, Seungwon Lee, Uijae Kim, Doyun Park, Minseo Kim, Wai Kong Lee, Zhe Liu, Anupam Chattopadhyay, Hwajeong Seo
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2850)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2850.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Edge and Internet of Things (IoT) devices run neural networks on GPUs, neural processing units (NPUs), and microcontrollers (MCUs) through machine learning (ML) runtimes. Deep Neural Cryptography (DNC, EUROCRYPT 2026) expressed AES as a bit-exact ReLU network with fixed weights, using a corner-ReLU construction that keeps the cipher inside the affine+ReLU operators such runtimes execute. What this construction costs on edge and IoT hardware, and whether real ML backends execute it correctly, had not been measured. We implement SM4, ARIA, Camellia, and ChaCha20 (spanning substitutionrCopermutation, Feistel, and addrCorotaterCoXOR structures) alongside AES on a shared corner-ReLU core under one construction policy, derive a cost model for width, depth, and neuron count, and measure five execution paths on four platforms. All ciphers admit bit-exact networks whose width and depth diverge with cipher structure, and the model's width predicted where GPU throughput drops. Every configuration passing the correctness check fell below its classical baseline (best 0.80|u, SM4 on the GPU), by hundreds to thousands of times for the S-box ciphers on the MCU, and keeping the activations on chip through fusion raised throughput 1.4rCo3.5|u and moved the peak past the predicted cache limit without closing the gap. Some AES configurations on the Apple Neural Engine returned valid-looking but incorrect outputs with no error or warning, a failure reproduced in a minimal graph without project code. Mathematical bit-exactness therefore does not guarantee backend-level bit-exactness, and exact workloads offloaded to edge NPUs require output validation.
    ## 2026/2851
    * Title: Bounding the security of the Bromberg-Shpilrain-Vdovina hash function * Authors: Eilidh McKemmie
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2851)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2851.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    The Bromberg-Shpilrain-Vdovina hash functions are a family of Cayley hash functions indexed by an integer parameter $k\ge 2$. Hashes are matrices in $SL_2(p)$ where $p$ is a large prime. We present an attack which finds collisions of length $O(\log p)$ whose average-case time complexity is $O(p^{0.28})$ when $k=2$ and $O(p^{0.36})$ when $k=3$ under an assumption in the spirit of Zaremba's Conjecture on continued fractions. This is an improvement on the more general attacks of Mullan-Tsaban and Slaughter which have average-case time complexity $O(\sqrt{p})$. For any $k$, the average-case time complexity of our attack is $O(p^{1-\delta_k+o(1)})$ where $\delta_k$ is the Hausdorff dimension of a certain Cantor set. This tends to $O(\sqrt{p})$ as $k\to\infty$, so our attack has time complexity comparable to Mullan-Tsaban and Slaughter's attacks as $k$ grows. We give examples of collisions for large primes found by our attack when $k=2, 3$.
    ## 2026/2852
    * Title: A Tutorial on Oblivious Random Access Memory
    * Authors: Elaine Shi, Srinivas Devadas
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2852)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2852.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    AbstractrCoOblivious RAM (ORAM) is a key technique for pro-
    tecting memory access patterns in systems with untrusted mem-
    ory, including secure processors, trusted execution environments,
    and multi-party computation. This article presents a tutorial
    overview of ORAM concepts and designs from an algorithmic
    and cryptographic perspective. We review the security goals and
    threat models underlying ORAM, describe the most popular
    ORAM constructions and their core mechanisms, and discuss
    practical considerations for implementing ORAM. The tutorial
    aims to provide readers with a clear foundation for understanding
    ORAM-based memory protection and its applications.
    ## 2026/2853
    * Title: ASCENT: Algebraic Structured Compilation of Exact Norms for Succinct Lattice Proofs
    * Authors: Lizhen Zhang, Shang Gao, Bin Xiao
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2853)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2853.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Norm bounds are semantic constraints in lattice cryptography: satisfying the modular equations is not enough unless the witness also satisfies the prescribed shortness bound.
    Existing norm reductions either introduce slack, or rely on general sumcheck style machinery whose transcript cost grows with the witness length.
    We introduce a reduction-of-knowledge compiler for exact $\ell_2$-norm constraints.
    It compiles the original norm language for a committed lattice witness into a narrow structured relation consisting only of commitment-opening constraints, tensor-structured witness-public inner-product claims, and relaxed admissible shortness bounds.
    Exact norm soundness is enforced inside the reduction, so the remaining proof obligation is structured and algebraic.
    The compiler adds only $O(1)$ prover-to-verifier communication, measured in ring and field elements, independent of the witness length $N$, and requires only $O(\log N)$ verifier work.
    The same techniques can also extend to a folding mechanism for broader quadratic relations, including R1CS-type circuits.
    At $128$-bit security, our concrete estimates give transcripts of about $27.69\mathrm{KB}$ for exact norm reduction and $27.75\mathrm{KB}$ for the R1CS folding application.
    This is about $3$--$4\times$ smaller than LatticeFold+, about $2$--$3\times$ smaller than SALSAA, and remains close to the compact estimates reported for Cyclo.
    ## 2026/2854
    * Title: Homomorphism in Expectation: Leveled Homomorphic Encryption with Range-Relative Correctness
    * Authors: Zeyu Liu, Xianhui Lu, Ruida Wang, Xinxuan Zhang
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2854)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2854.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Lattices have dominated the development of homomorphic encryption for deep computation. We introduce $\textit{Homomorphism in Expectation (HIE)}$, a new construction showing that encrypted addition suffices for both addition and multiplication in deep real-valued computation.
    Given any additively homomorphic encryption scheme over $\mathbb{Z}_2$, we construct range-relatively correct leveled homomorphic encryption for arithmetic circuits $C$ of $\textit{arbitrary}$ polynomial depth. For depth bound $d$ and any chosen public input bound $r>0$, our scheme supports inputs in $[-r,r]$. Outputs lie in $[-\eta_C,\eta_C]$, where $\eta_C=C(r,\ldots,r)$ is the circuit's maximum output range magnitude over this input range. Decryption returns an answer with error at most $\varepsilon\cdot\eta_C$ except with probability $\delta$. Each input requires $\ell_{\mathsf{in}}=O(d+\log(1/\varepsilon))$ base ciphertexts, and each output requires $\ell_{\mathsf{out}}=O(\varepsilon^{-2}\log(1/\delta))$ base ciphertexts. For $n$ inputs, online evaluation uses only ${\sim}\ell_{\mathsf{out}}\cdot n\cdot\ell_{\mathsf{in}}$ ciphertext additions and ${\sim}\ell_{\mathsf{out}}\cdot |C|\cdot\ell_{\mathsf{in}}$ memory accesses.
    Our construction begins by encoding real-valued inputs as encrypted bitstreams, allowing multiplication through encrypted bit addition. The direct approach incurs costs exponential in circuit depth, limiting efficient evaluation to logarithmic depth and requiring non-compact input ciphertexts. We overcome these limitations with new encoding and circuit evaluation techniques, which eliminate the exponential overhead, enabling compact homomorphic arithmetic at arbitrary polynomial depth from additive encryption alone.
    ## 2026/2855
    * Title: DetTreeChain: Parallel Block Production on an N-ary Block Tree with Bounded Lane Divergence
    * Authors: Mahesh Karri, Nikhileswara Rao Sulake
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2855)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2855.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Nakamoto-style blockchains append one block at a time to a single chain, and raising the block rate increases forking and weakens security. We present DetTreeChain, a ledger in which up to $N$ blocks are produced in parallel and placed without later merging or reordering. Blocks form an $N$-ary tree in which each block's slot follows from its parent and its lane. A locally derived Parent Queue Pool lets only two consecutive parents receive children, so lanes never drift more than one parent apart, and links between consecutive blocks of a lane make each lane a hash chain. As in several earlier designs, transactions are routed by what they spend, here a hash of the spent locking scripts, so blocks of different lanes cannot conflict and payments to other lanes need no cross-lane protocol. The rules are consensus-agnostic. Under proof of work, miners choose their lane, and an adversary with more than $1/(N+1)$ of the total hash power can outpace one lane. In a 25-minute run of our Rust prototype, six nodes converged on identical trees and difficulty targets, and 65% of slots were filled against 63% predicted. In simulation with delays of 5% of the lane interval, a single chain at the same block rate wasted 1.7 to 3.3 times as much work as 2 to 8 lanes, although nodes more often held later-discarded blocks. Among Bitcoin transactions whose spent scripts could be rebuilt, about 95% kept their inputs in one lane, mostly because they spend a single output.
    ## 2026/2856
    * Title: A New Class of PRFs and Efficient VRFs from Isogeny-based Group Actions
    * Authors: Junbo Yang, Willy Susilo, Dung Hoang Duong, Partha Sarathi Roy, Yannan Li, Kazuhide Fukushima, Shinsaku Kiyomoto
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2856)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2856.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Polynomial-in-exponent pseudorandom functions (Poly-style PRFs) based on group actions have recently emerged as a promising framework for post-quantum cryptography, offering compact keys and efficient verifiability. However, the security of these constructions over composite-order class groups remains poorly understood. Prior work suggested that security is governed by the largest prime factor of the group order.
    In this work, we show that this intuition is flawed. We present two generic attacks demonstrating that the effective security of Poly-style PRFs is determined instead by the smallest prime factor of the group order. As a consequence, existing parameter choices, including CSIDH-512 and SCALLOP-based settings used in recent VRF constructions, are insecure. Our enhanced attack achieves advantage close to one with complexity $O(\sqrt{p})$, where $p$ is the smallest prime factor of the group order.
    To address this inherent vulnerability, we introduce a new design paradigm, {\em restrict-then-expand}, and formalize a general class of multivariate polynomial PRFs (\textsf{MP}-PRFs) from group actions. The key idea is to eliminate exploitable structure via carefully restricted input domains, and then recover expressiveness through a provably secure expansion technique. We show that \textsf{MP}-PRFs unify and generalize existing constructions, including Naor-Reingold-style and Poly-style PRFs (with restricted input domains), while achieving security in the generic group action model with twists ($\mathrm{GGAM}^{\mathsf{T}}$) for arbitrary composite-order groups. In addition to this,
    our construction supports flexible polynomial-size input spaces with fixed output length and admits efficient and compact proofs of correct evaluation. Building on this framework, we obtain new group-action-based VRFs that are both practical and provably secure. At a proof-soundness level close to 128 bits, our VRF instantiation requires 320 group-action evaluations for either proof generation or verification, compared with approximately 69,000--109,500 group-action evaluations in prior work, while retaining short keys and proofs.
    Overall, our results establish a robust and efficient approach to constructing post-quantum PRFs and VRFs from group actions, resolving fundamental limitations of existing Poly-style designs.
    ## 2026/2857
    * Title: When One Bit Is (Almost) Enough: A Low Leakage Chosen Plaintext Side Channel Attack on AES
    * Authors: Antoine Wurcker
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2857)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2857.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    In order to thwart Side Channel Attacks (SCA) and keep secret safe, countermeasures such as masking can be implemented to hide information. However, when a defect occurs in software or in hardware, a portion of the information may still leak. If the leak is sufficient, the state-of-the-art techniques can still be performed up to a potential brute force search to cover a missing part. However, if only a short portion of the information leaks, the completion of the attack can be hard, and considered as failed.
    In this paper, we describe a new chosen plaintext strategy on AES algorithm to recover the secret key even in very low leakage condition. As an example, but not limited to, we describe the methodology adapted to one of the worst case scenario: only one bit position leaks over the 128-bit output of SubBytes AES sub-operation along rounds. As a drawback, a heavier cost in terms of number of traces is required due to the chosen plaintext approach.
    ## 2026/2858
    * Title: Revisiting Fiat-Shamir NIZKPs and Signatures from Seed-Friendly Sigma Protocols
    * Authors: Andrea Flamini, Federico Pintore, Edoardo Signorini
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2858)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2858.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Seed-friendly sigma protocols have a small challenge space, and when compiled into NIZKP, they require parallel repetition to reduce extraction error. Fiat-Shamir proofs obtained from seed-friendly Sigma protocols can be made more compact with fixed-weight parallel repetitions, and seed-tree compression. So far, these have been presented as compression techniques for the proof size, but standard analysis of the extraction property of NIZKP still relies on the Forking Lemma and rewinding.
    In this work, we show that not only fixed-weight parallel repetition and seed-tree compression improve the compactness of the proofs, but also improve their security. Interestingly, when the prover randomness is generated from a salted seed tree, interacting with a random oracle, the standard Fiat-Shamir compilation is straight-line extractable in the classical random-oracle model, without any additional proof field or proof-of-work.
    We further show that the Fiat-Shamir NIZKP from seed-friendly Sigma protocols satisfies multi-proof zero knowledge, and that its straight-line extractability does not require the underlying seed-friendly Sigma protocol to have unique responses.
    ## 2026/2859
    * Title: A Single-Trace Side-Channel Attack on the KpqC Digital Signature Scheme AIMer v3
    * Authors: Jinnuo Li, Yiteng Sun, Chi Cheng, Weijia Wang, Hao Cheng
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2859)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2859.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    The Korean Post-Quantum Cryptography (KpqC) competition selected AIMer, a post-quantum digital signature scheme based on the MPC-in-the-Head paradigm, as one of its final algorithms in 2025. However, detailed side-channel analysis (SCA) of AIMer remains limited, particularly for its latest version, AIMer v3. In this paper, we present, to the best of our knowledge, the first side-channel attack on AIMer v3. Specifically, we demonstrate a single-trace power analysis attack using deep learning to exploit power leakage from bits of the secret preimage during the computation of AIM3's input affine layer. Using a ChipWhisperer-HuskyPlus, we recover the full secret key from a single signature on an ARM Cortex-M4 processor with a success rate of 100%. We further evaluate the attack performance under different noise levels and propose potential countermeasures.
    ## 2026/2860
    * Title: Delegatable Keyed-Verification Anonymous Credentials
    * Authors: Omid Mirzamohammadi, Varesh Mishra, Jan Bobolz, Emad Heydari Beni, Aysajan Abidin, Dave Singel|-e, Bart Preneel
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2860)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2860.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Keyed-verification anonymous credentials (KVACs) are a variant of anonymous credentials (ACs) in which the issuer and the verifier are either the same entity or mutually trusted entities. Due to this design, KVACs can avoid some of the practical burdens of publicly verifiable ACs, such as requiring bilinear pairings, making them more practical in certain settings. Delegation of credentials is a powerful feature that enables applications where users, holding a credential, can delegate a restricted version of their credential to another user. This paper proposes the first delegatable keyed-verification anonymous credentials (DKVAC). We provide formal definitions of DKVAC, we design two pairing-free DKVAC constructions with delegation capability, we prove them secure, and we demonstrate their practicality with implementation benchmarks. Our two constructions present trade-offs between expressiveness and performance.
    ## 2026/2861
    * Title: $\mathsf{SVP}_\infty$ Is NP-Hard for Power-of-two Cyclotomic Ideals
    * Authors: Yansong Feng, Jiaqi Liu, Hengyi Luo, Yanbin Pan
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2861)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2861.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    We prove that exact decision-$\mathsf{SVP}$ in the coefficient $\ell_\infty$-norm is $\mathsf{NP}$-complete for principal ideals and free modules of rank two over the cyclotomic rings $R_n=\mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^n+1)$, where $n$ ranges over powers of two. For each case, we give a deterministic polynomial-time many-one reduction from the Subset Sum problem. For an instance with $s$ positive input integers, the output lattice has dimension $O(s)$. A solution to the original Subset Sum instance can be recovered in polynomial time from any nonzero output lattice vector of norm at most the specified bound.
    We also transfer these reductions from $R_n$ to the power-of-two cyclic rings $S_{2n}=\mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^{2n}-1)$. This gives $\mathsf{NP}$-completeness of decision-$\mathsf{SVP}$ in the coefficient $\ell_\infty$-norm for principal ideals and free modules of any fixed positive rank over these rings.
    ## 2026/2862
    * Title: An improvement to the KLPT2 algorithm
    * Authors: Abel Laval
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2862)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2862.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    In this short note, we present a tweak to the KLPT2 algorithm that reduces the size of the output from $O(p^{15.5})$ to $\tilde O(p^{14.5})$.Then, we show that the recent improvement by Nakagawa, Yoshizumi and Onuki to the KLPT algorithm is compatible with the Hermitian module splitting approach, further lowering the reduced degree bound to $\tilde O(p^{14})$.
    ## 2026/2863
    * Title: Affine Combiners for Reed-Solomon Proximity Gaps
    * Authors: Alessandro Chiesa, Guy Weissenberg, Eylon Yogev, Kai Zhe Zheng
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2863)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2863.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    ReedrCoSolomon proximity gaps establish soundness guarantees for protocols that test received words through random combinations. For length-$n$ codes over $\mathbb{F}_q$, classical scalar combiners achieve error $O(n/q)$ in the unique-decoding regime, with larger known bounds near the Johnson radius.
    We prove smaller error bounds using affine combiners, which combine two received words $f,g$ as $f(x)+(\alpha+\beta x)g(x)$, where $\alpha,\beta$ are independent uniform elements of $\mathbb{F}_q$. For output degree bound $d=\rho n$, fixed $\rho\in(0,1)$ and $0<\eta<1-\sqrt{\rho}$, and sufficiently large block length $n$, we prove mutual correlated agreement (MCA) with one coordinate of agreement loss at threshold $A=\lceil(\sqrt{\rho}+\eta)n\rceil$, with error $O_{\rho,\eta}\left(\frac{1}{q}+\frac{n^2}{q^2}\right)$. The result holds over arbitrary evaluation domains in every finite field, including prime and binary extension fields. The agreement threshold can approach the Johnson threshold, beyond unique decoding.
    For $q\ge n^2$, our error is $O_{\rho,\eta}(1/q)$, an asymptotic factor-$n$ separation from scalar combiners: we prove that their worst-case MCA error is $\Omega_{\rho,\eta}(n/q)$ at the same agreement threshold and with the same one-coordinate loss. We also prove that affine combiners incur worst-case error $\Omega_{\rho,\eta}(n/q)$ when no agreement loss is allowed. Thus one coordinate of agreement loss is necessary for our guarantee; this relaxation of standard MCA reduces the guaranteed common agreement fraction by at most $1/n$. We also extend the result to $k$-variate ReedrCoMuller codes on subfield grids, obtaining MCA error $O_{\rho,\eta,k}(q^{-k})$ for fixed $\rho,\eta,k$, sufficiently large $n$, and $q\ge n^{k+1}$, with agreement loss $n^{1-1/k}$.
    ## 2026/2864
    * Title: Tightly Secure and Modular Post-Quantum TLS Handshakes
    * Authors: Biming Zhou, Jinrong Chen, Haodong Jiang, Rongmao Chen, Yunlei Zhao * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2864)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2864.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    In the post-quantum (PQ) migration of the TLS~1.3 handshake, the classical Diffie--Hellman key exchange is replaced with a post-quantum key encapsulation mechanism (KEM). Furthermore, KEMTLS builds upon PQ TLS~1.3 by replacing signature-based authentication with KEM-based authentication.
    However, all existing analyses of PQ TLS~1.3 and KEMTLS incur at least quadratic reduction losses in the number of sessions, and achieving a tightly secure construction remains an open problem.
    To address this gap, we present the first unified, tight, and modular reduction framework for PQ TLS~1.3 in the standard model and KEMTLS in the random oracle model (ROM).
    Our framework tightly reduces the security of these protocols to the security of three core components:
    (i) the MUC-IND-1RCCA or MUC-IND-1CCA security of the underlying ephemeral KEM, (ii) the MU-(dual)-PRF security of HKDF (for PQ~TLS~1.3), and
    (iii) the MU-EUF-CMA$^c$ security of the signature scheme (for PQ TLS~1.3) or the MUC-OW-ChCCA$^*$ security of the static KEM (for KEMTLS).
    Furthermore, we establish the first concrete MU-(dual)-PRF bounds for HMAC and HKDF in the quantum-accessible random oracle model (QROM).
    Instantiating this framework with tightly secure LWE-based KEM and signature schemes yields the first (almost) tightly secure constructions of PQ TLS~1.3 and KEMTLS under the LWE assumption. Moreover, our framework demonstrates that the weaker IND-1RCCA security notion for the ephemeral KEM already suffices to achieve security for both PQ TLS~1.3 and KEMTLS, thereby enabling simpler instantiations.
    ## 2026/2865
    * Title: HIT: Single-Pass Inference for Single-Trace NTT Side-Channel Attacks
    * Authors: Yihan Nie, Yuxuan Wang, Yubo Zhao, Zixin He, Wenjing Zheng, Jintong Yu, Shifeng Sun, Chi Zhang, Pei Cao, Dawu Gu
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2865)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2865.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    In physical implementations of the post-quantum standards ML-KEM and ML-DSA, the Number-Theoretic Transform (NTT) directly processes secret polynomials and is a primary target for single-trace side-channel key recovery. Existing Soft Analytical Side-Channel Attacks (SASCA) apply loopy Belief Propagation (BP) over cyclic $\mathbb{Z}_q$ factor graphs, where BP fails under high noise and $O(q^2)$ updates make ML-DSA infeasible. We present the Hierarchical Inference Tree (HIT), a framework built on the insight that small secret inputs deterministically fix all NTT intermediates across the recursive butterfly network. Instead of loopy BP, HIT merges and prunes candidate inputs from leaves to root in a single pass on an acyclic binary tree. This approach eliminates belief oscillation, guarantees a constant runtime, and decouples complexity from $q$. On ML-KEM-768, HIT runs over $900\times$ faster than state-of-the-art SASCA and more than doubles noise tolerance. HIT also enables the first single-trace analytical attack on the ML-DSA NTT and recovers each polynomial in under one second. On physical ARM Cortex-M4 targets, HIT achieves over 98% polynomial recovery across both standards with only 20 to 80 profiling traces.
    ## 2026/2866
    * Title: Anamorphic NIZK: Definition, Construction and More
    * Authors: Wenhui Kong, Gongxian Zeng, Zhengan Huang
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2866)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2866.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Anamorphic encryption enables covert communication despite disclosure of ordinary decryption keys~\cite{PersianoPY22}. Work on anamorphic signatures extends this capability to settings permitting only authentication and shows that Fiat-Shamir preserves anamorphism~\cite{kutylowski2023anamorphicSignatures,fiat1986prove}. However, this result assumes an already anamorphic protocol and does not by itself ensure witness privacy against the recipient, motivating anamorphism directly in non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs (NIZKs).
    We introduce anamorphic NIZK (ANIZK), in which publicly verifiable proofs carry covert messages recoverable with a double key. The framework formalizes anamorphic security, strong robustness, and recipient anamorphic zero knowledge and simulation extractability. A generic construction in the random oracle model combines suitable Sigma protocols with authenticated encryption with associated data through a salted Fiat-Shamir transform. Applying ANIZK within the Naor-Yung paradigm \cite{NaorYung90} yields recipient anamorphic encryption satisfying STE-xCCA1, SIND-aCCA1, and SIND-nCCA security under the notions of~\cite{choi2026unified}. Finally, an asymmetric variant of ANIZK, termed ASY-ANIZK, combines a labeled NIZK with public-key encryption satisfying ciphertext pseudorandomness and random ciphertext rejection. It separates public embedding from secret recovery and achieves weak robustness, as public embedding precludes strong robustness.
    ## 2026/2867
    * Title: Collision Attacks on SHA-2: 39-Step SHA-256 below the Birthday Bound
    * Authors: Jiaying Gong, Yongzhuang Wei, Fengrong Zhang, Bohua Wei
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2867)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2867.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    SHA-2 is the most widely deployed family of hash functions, and its security margin is measured by the number of steps collision attacks reach. Li et al. gave the first classical collision attack on 38-step SHA-256, with an estimated complexity of $2^{104.3}$. The challenge is to extend the attack to more steps while retaining its advantage over generic collision search. In this paper, we show that collisions for 39-step SHA-256 can be found at an estimated cost below the $2^{128}$ birthday bound. We keep the published 39-step characteristic and change how its conditions are satisfied. We introduce joint message-word pinning, a technique that fixes two expanded message words, $W_{16}$ and $W_{17}$, to the values prescribed by the characteristic. For each chaining value, we solve for assignments to two state words that carry no direct condition, and every assignment returned gives both message words their prescribed values. To find these assignments, we first fix the value of a function with a small image and then solve the coupled equations for $W_{16}$ and $W_{17}$ in sequence. On 39-step SHA-256, pinning $W_{16}$ alone gives an estimated cost of $2^{123.4}$ scalar compressions per expected collision, and pinning both words reduces it by 14.6 bits to $2^{108.8}$. Under the uniform-chaining-value model, the measured probabilities and the cost of processing one first block give an upper bound of approximately $2^{124.6}$ on the expected cost of finding the first collision, even under worst-case clustering. For 38-step SHA-256, we reduce the estimated cost per expected collision from $2^{104.3}$ to $2^{90.9}$ by using a new differential characteristic and pinning $W_{16}$ alone. On SHA-512, pinning $W_{16}$ alone reduces this cost from $2^{125.4}$ to $2^{100.7}$ for 38 steps and from $2^{178}$ to $2^{131.3}$ for 39 steps.
    ## 2026/2868
    * Title: Bulletproofs are Optimal: Lower Bounds for Vector Commitments from Fiat-Shamir in Pairing-Free Groups
    * Authors: Marian Dietz, Emanuele Giunta
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2868)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2868.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Vector Commitments allow parties to commit to an (ordered) vector and to later succinctly open it at any desired position. In plain (i.e., known order and pairing-free) prime-order groups, all state-of-the-art constructions rely on the combination of a generalized Pedersen commitment and an inner product argument. This includes the celebrated constructions of Bootle et al. (EUROCRYPT 2016) and B|+nz et al. (S&P 2018), and subsequent improvements. All of these achieve proofs consisting of $\Theta(\log n)$ group elements, and further provide useful properties including malleability, subvector opening and transparent setup. However, breaking the $O(\log n)$ barrier in the plain discrete logarithm setting has proven to be a hard problem. This is in stark contrast with other settings, e.g. from pairing-friendly groups or groups of unknown order, where constructions with constant-size commitment and openings have been known for over a decade.
    In this work we investigate whether this limitation is inherent to constructions based on prime-order groups. Specifically we prove new lower bounds for any accumulator (a weaker object than vector commitments, thus making our result more general), with interactive public-coin membership proof in Maurer's Generic Group Model. An implication of our result is that in such setting at least one of the following must occur: (i) the commitment has super-constant size; (ii) the opening proof contains $\Omega(\log n)$ group elements; (iii) the opening proof has length $n^{1-o(1)}$.
    Our bound further extends to primitives that directly imply accumulators/VCs including polynomial/functional commitments and inner product arguments.
    ## 2026/2869
    * Title: From Dependent Ciphertexts to Sharp Bounds for Polynomial Evaluation in BGV
    * Authors: Chiara Marcolla, Nadir Murru, Matilda Urani
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2869)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2869.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    A central challenge in Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) is the selection of ciphertext moduli, which depends on accurately estimating noise growth during homomorphic evaluation. Choosing excessively large moduli reduces the efficiency and scalability of the scheme, whereas underestimating noise can result in decryption failures and potential security vulnerabilities. Average-case analyses have provided promising probabilistic estimates of noise growth in practical FHE computations. However, recent studies indicate that reliable estimates must account for dependencies among ciphertext errors, as neglecting these correlations can systematically underestimate noise.
    This work presents the first average-case analysis for the BGV scheme that accounts for both correlations induced by secret/public keys and ciphertext dependencies. We propose new variance estimates for the noise coefficients in homomorphic additions and multiplications involving dependent ciphertexts, and extend our framework to the homomorphic evaluation of polynomial functions, which is widely employed in FHE applications. Our theoretical estimates closely align with experimental observations, exhibiting discrepancies smaller than 1.2 bits.
    Finally, these estimates are adopted to choose the initial BGV parameters, leading to significantly smaller ciphertext moduli compared to those currently adopted in widely used FHE libraries, thus improving the efficiency of the scheme. Compared to OpenFHE, we obtain an average reduction of about 11.5% in the ciphertext modulus size, while relative to HElib, we reduce the ratio between consecutive moduli up to 23 bits per level in practical settings.
    ## 2026/2870
    * Title: BMRaccoon: Blind Multi-Signatures from Lattices
    * Authors: Keerthi Aiswarya Varshini, Kanchan Bisht, Palkesh Jain, Maria Francis, R. Kabaleeshwaran
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2870)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2870.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Blind multi-signatures (BMS) allow a user to obtain a compact signature on a hidden message through the joint participation of multiple signers, providing a basis for decentralized issuance of anonymous tokens.We present BMRaccoon, the first lattice-based post-quantum BMS construction, with a two-round signing protocol secure under concurrent sessions and signatures syntactically compatible with Raccoon under the sum of the signers' verification keys.
    As a building block, we introduce MRaccoon, the first Raccoon-based multi-signature and prove its strong unforgeability under the Algebraic One-More MISIS (AOM-MISIS) and MSIS assumptions in the random oracle and and knowledge-of-secret-key (KOSK) model. Our modular security analysis establishes one-more unforgeability of BMRaccoon via a straight-line reduction to the strong unforgeability of MRaccoon, modelling the user's blinding contribution as an auxiliary signer with a zero verification key. We additionally prove blindness against malicious, colluding signers. For up to $q_s = 2^{32}$ signing sessions and $n = 32$ signers, our concrete instantiation yields signatures of approximately $67$ KB and verification keys of approximately $15$ KB.
    ## 2026/2871
    * Title: The Price of Geometry for Private Distance-Sensitive Filters: $\ell_\infty$ versus $\ell_2$
    * Authors: Paul Cesaretti
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2871)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2871.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    A distance-sensitive set representation stores a set $S$ in a metric space and must accept points within distance $r$ of $S$ and reject points farther than $cr$, each with error probability at most $\alpha$. Under differential privacy, even exact membership costs a privacy loss of $\ln(1/\alpha)$; we ask how much \emph{more} the geometry of the space forces. Earlier lower bounds cover only restricted mechanisms, such as partition-based ones or those whose outputs contain no scattered false positives (``dust''). We prove lower bounds for every mechanism.

    In $\ell_\infty^d$ with $c<3$ the extra cost is $\Theta_c(d)$, which proves a recent conjecture in this range; when $\lfloor cr\rfloor-r+1$ divides $2r$, a randomly shifted grid is optimal up to $\tilde O(\alpha)$ per dimension. In $\ell_2^d$ the extra cost is instead $\Theta_c(\min(d,\ln(1/\alpha)))$: a new mechanism that outputs a single very large ball shows that dimensions beyond about $\ln(1/\alpha)$ are free, so partition-based constructions are optimal in $\ell_\infty$ but not in $\ell_2$. The same arguments bound the space of every correct representation of $k$-sets, private or not: $\Omega(k(\log(1/\alpha)+d))$ bits in $\ell_\infty^d$ with $c<3$, and $\Omega_c(k(\log(1/\alpha)+\min(d,\log(1/\alpha))))$ bits in every $\ell_p^d$.
    ## 2026/2872
    * Title: On the Security of the Cubic UOV Variant CML
    * Authors: Manit Gupta
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2872)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2872.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    CML is a cubic multivariate signature scheme proposed over $\mathbb{F}_q$ with $q = 2^8$. Earlier cubic Oil--Vinegar variants such as CUOV and CSSv were broken by differential and high-rank attacks. CML adds an $\ell$-invertible cycle system and a secret position-hiding map to hide the cubic positions. We show that the cubic homogeneous parts of the public key span a space of dimension at most two, so a publicly derived output combination has degree at most two. After restriction to the oil-direction space, the polar matrices of the publicly derived quadratic components span rank-two matrices associated with the edges of a path. This structure yields a procedure for recovering an equivalent key. Our implementation recovered an equivalent key in under 5~minutes for each tested parameter set, including the set targeting
    256-bit security.
    ## 2026/2873
    * Title: Optimized Solving Strategy and Two-Step Estimator for LWE with Hints
    * Authors: Hanbin Yang, Jinzheng Cao, Risheng Yin, Qingfeng Cheng
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2873)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2873.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Side-channel hints can reduce the cost of solving the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem. We optimize a two-step strategy for LWE with hints that uses BKZ reduction followed by final lattice sieving. Given a lattice constructed from the hints and a specified pair of reduction and sieving algorithms, the strategy jointly selects BKZ block sizes, tour counts, and a final sieving configuration. We also introduce a two-step estimator that predicts the reduced-basis profile and estimates the probability of secret recovery. We combine these estimates with cost models to select a strategy that meets the success-probability and resource constraints. Experiments show that our strategy significantly outperforms the methods of Cao et al. (CRYPTO 2025) and May and Nowakowski (ASIACRYPT 2023). For example, using BLASterBKZ for lattice reduction and the BGJ sieve for final sieving, our strategy recovers the secret for a CRYSTALS-KYBER 512 instance with 190 perfect hints in 7 minutes, compared with 1.6 hours reported by Cao et al. and 7.4 hours reported by May and Nowakowski. With 64 threads, our strategy recovers the secret with 170 perfect hints in 82 minutes. These results highlight the importance of accounting for side-channel leakage when assessing lattice-based cryptographic schemes.
    ## 2026/2874
    * Title: Triads below the ISA: Optimizing Cryptographic Software in CPU Microcode
    * Authors: Sabrina Manickam, Rowan Fimmano, Peter Schwabe, Yuval Yarom
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2874)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2874.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Cryptographic software is typically optimized for the instruction set architecture exposed by the processor. Modern processors, however, contain deeper execution layers with computational capabilities and constraints that differ from those of the instruction set architecture (ISA). This work explores the programmable microcode layer in x86 as an implementation target. We characterize the microcode domain as a distinct target architecture for cryptographic computation and adapt implementations to the state, operations, invocation interface, capacity, and scheduling resources it exposes.
    We instantiate this methodology on Intel Goldmont with Keccak f [1600] and X25519, two case studies with substantially different computational structures. Our Keccak implementation reduces permutation latency by 7.36% relative to the fastest native implementation in our comparison, with the improvement remaining visible in incomplete SHA3-256 computations. For X25519, our microcode multiplication and squaring kernels free the multiplier from fixed operand registers and restrictive carry-flag semantics, outperforming the native implementations we evaluate. The resulting complete X25519 implementation requires 7.3% fewer cycles than s2n-bignum and 9.8% fewer cycles than OpenSSL. Together, these results demonstrate that looking below the ISA exposes a distinct design space for cryptographic implementation and provide a systematic methodology for exploring it.
    ## 2026/2875
    * Title: Security Analysis of Anonymous Authentication in Apple's Private Cloud Compute
    * Authors: Callista Gratz, Anja Lehmann, Andrey Sidorenko
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2875)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2875.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Apple's Private Cloud Compute (PCC) offloads on-device computation, such as large language-model prompts, to the cloud while seeking to preserve the privacy users expect from local processing. At its core lies a custom authentication protocol that must reconcile three competing goals: restricting access to registered users within a rate limit, doing so without revealing user identities or linking their requests, and nonetheless retaining the ability to hold misbehaving users accountable. Apple's protocol combines blind RSA signatures in a hierarchical issuance with a salted-hash binding trick, but ships without any formal statement -- let alone proof -- of the guarantees it is meant to provide.
    In this work we close this gap by abstracting the desired authentication protocol as PORTA -- pseudonymously openable, rate-limited tokens for anonymous authentication. We formally define the desired privacy, security, and abuse-mitigation properties such a protocol should satisfy, including a new binding notion specific to the protocol's two-step issuance. We then cast Apple's protocol in this model and show that it achieves the rate-limiting goal and, with a small modification, all privacy goals. Its abuse-mitigation mechanism, which is not yet active in the deployed system, would however not provide the desired accountability guarantees even once enabled. Finally, we present an alternative construction based on anonymous credentials that provably achieves all properties and verifies the binding of tokens already at the gateway, so that a user's pseudonym is only revealed in case of abuse.
    ## 2026/2876
    * Title: Encrypted Authorship Attribution for Fraud Detection
    * Authors: Zita Baronnet, Leonard Schild
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2876)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2876.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Authorship attribution techniques are routinely used to re-
    late anonymous or disputed texts to known authors through characteris-
    tic writing styles. Within the financial sector, such techniques may sup-
    port investigations of phishing campaigns, impersonation attempts, in-
    vestment scams, or other forms of fraud. More concretely, these methods
    can be leveraged to determine whether newly observed communications
    are linked to previously identified actors. In practice, however, both the communications under investigation and the intelligence databases used
    for attribution may contain sensitive information that cannot be shared
    across organizational boundaries.
    In this work, we investigate the privacy-preserving evaluation of sty-
    lometric authorship attribution through fully homomorphic encryption
    (FHE). We focus on BurrowsrCO Delta, a widely studied authorship attribu-
    tion method based on token frequency statistics and z-score comparisons.
    We present a homomorphic implementation of BurrowsrCO Delta, describe
    a motivating fraud-analysis scenario together with its threat model and
    trust assumptions, and then analyze the resulting computational com-
    plexity. Finally, we evaluate the practicality of the proposed approach us-
    ing the CKKS homomorphic encryption scheme and show that the com-
    plete pipeline can be executed without bootstrapping while maintaining
    high numerical accuracy. Our results demonstrate that stylometric au-
    thorship attribution constitutes a realistic target for privacy-preserving outsourced analytics and illustrate how homomorphic encryption can
    support confidential fraud investigations.
    ## 2026/2877
    * Title: Toward EN4acient Post-Quantum Bitcoin Bridges
    * Authors: Stephen Duan, Vanhger Pham, Blake Hou, Ethan Zhu, Jingping Yin
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2877)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2877.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    BitVM-style protocols verify succinct proofs on Bitcoin by garbling a proof veriN4Uer oN4C-chain. What reaches the chain in a dispute is the proof itself: its bits under one-time keys, the scripts that authenticate them and the signatures that bind them to transactions. Existing designs garble elliptic-curve succinct non-interactive argument of knowledge (SNARK) veriN4Uers, which a quantum adversary breaks. Our goal is a post-quantum alternative: a hash-based scalable transparent argument of knowledge (STARK) veriN4Uer, garbled and fed with hash-based one-time keys, with no number-theoretic assumption anywhere in the veriN4Uer; its price is a far larger proof, and this paper measures and reduces that on-chain data. We compile the complete veriN4Uer for WHIR-based STARK proofs from Ziren into a Boolean circuit using free-XOR gadgets for binary-tower arithmetic and Blake3. Our implementation uses ZirenrCOs binary-N4Ueld proof stage and narrow recursion. For an Ethereum block proved through four recursion levels, the N4Unal recursive WHIR-proof veriN4Uer has 175.4M non-free gates and 520,832 input bits, corresponding
    to 2.81 GB of garbled tables, and publishing that input with translated Winternitz keys takes 3.93 million virtual bytes (MvB) for one key set, in 41 standard transactions. The costs are coupled: on-chain cost grows linearly with the input bits, oN4C-chain storage with the gate count, and proving time exponentially with the grinding that shortens the input. The WHIR schedule, the Merkle cap depth and the input encoding trade these costs against one another, and a model of proof size and proving time selects the setting, a step toward practical post-quantum Bitcoin bridges.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2