From Newsgroup: sci.crypt
## In this issue
1. [2023/1402] Fully Homomorphic Encryption: A Mathematical ...
2. [2026/256] Adams Bridge (V2.0) Accelerator: Bridging the Post- ...
3. [2026/265] Catalytic Tree Evaluation From Matching Vectors
4. [2026/1109] SoK: Cryptographic Erasure on Public Ledgers: ...
5. [2026/1877] Otter: A Provably MEV-Resilient Automated Market ...
6. [2026/1884] Correction of parameters in ``Computing Optimal Ate ...
7. [2026/1946] Quantum Evolving Secret Sharing - revisited
8. [2026/1990] Bounded Information: PAC Certification of ...
9. [2026/2431] Flying, Not Floating: Precise Fixed-Point Falcon on ...
10. [2026/2686] Provable Recovery from Integer Quotients: Improved ...
11. [2026/2690] Gaussian Difference Dynamics: Breaking the ...
12. [2026/2693] Rotom: A Microcontroller-Oriented Tweakable Block ...
13. [2026/2702] The Authentication Complexity of Byzantine Consensus
14. [2026/2710] Hidden Curves and Short Duals: Cubic Jets, Dual ...
15. [2026/2711] Fast Provable Algorithms for Approximate CVP and ...
16. [2026/2732] MuCPay: Breaking the Quadratic Bottleneck in ...
17. [2026/2739] Archive Certificates for ML-DSA-87 Authorizations ...
18. [2026/2741] Leakage-Resilient Computation via Matrix Refreshing
19. [2026/2742] Differentially $2^t$-uniform quadrinomials with ...
20. [2026/2743] Challenge Binding in FRESCO SPDZ2k: A Message-Level ...
21. [2026/2744] Phantom Timing Leaks on Cortex-M4: A Pre-registered ...
22. [2026/2745] The Price of Agreement in Secure Multiparty Computation
23. [2026/2746] Differential Cryptanalysis of SPEEDY: Revised ...
24. [2026/2747] MODDIV-WC: Unit-Anchored Toeplitz/Hankel Rounding ...
25. [2026/2748] TFNP in the Random Oracle Model
26. [2026/2749] Shielded Bitcoin: Private Transfers on the Bitcoin L1
27. [2026/2750] Practical Optimal Bucket Sets with Power-of-Two ...
28. [2026/2751] An efficient Failure Probability Estimator for LWE- ...
29. [2026/2752] Information Loss Is All You Need: TCrU# ...
30. [2026/2753] Correlation Power Analysis on SHA-2-Based SLH-DSA
31. [2026/2754] A note on zero-knowledge ring switching
32. [2026/2755] Blockchain-Anchored Proactive Refresh for Dynamic ...
33. [2026/2756] Refined Bounds for the Smoothing Parameter of Lattices
34. [2026/2757] Affine Advantage in Guess-type Attacks on ...
35. [2026/2758] Fine-Grained Proof Complexity for Elementary ...
36. [2026/2759] Differentially Oblivious Graph Ball Queries
37. [2026/2760] Syndrome Decoding out of the Head: Structure-Aided ...
38. [2026/2761] Superlattice methods for the shortest vector ...
39. [2026/2762] AirBB: Lightweight Threshold Anonymous Credentials ...
40. [2026/2763] On Key Recovery from Exposed Neural XOR Activations ...
41. [2026/2764] Trapdoors Beyond Inversion: Recoverable Information ...
42. [2026/2765] BASTION: Lock-Step, Staggered and Sequential Share ...
43. [2026/2766] Keyber: Recovering the Signal by Amplifying the ...
44. [2026/2767] HqcLethe: Streaming HQC Encapsulation for Tiny ...
45. [2026/2768] Cryptanalysis of Pairing-Based Additive Masking ...
46. [2026/2769] Projective Jet Geometry and Hold-Out Rank of Binary ...
47. [2026/2770] Sumcheck bit packing
48. [2026/2771] Can Fully Homomorphic Encryption on Public ...
49. [2026/2772] STIR/SHAKEN: A Cocktail of Cryptographic Clumsiness
50. [2026/2773] Vectorized (2, 2)-Isogenies in the Theta Model ...
51. [2026/2774] Separating Pseudorandom Codes from Quantum Random ...
52. [2026/2775] Quadratic Extractors
53. [2026/2776] One-Way Functions and Local Descriptions of Random Data
54. [2026/2777] Tamper-Resilient Quantum Key Encapsulation with ...
55. [2026/2778] Breaking $\mathsf{TraintoDefend}$ via Adaptive ...
56. [2026/2779] Optimizations and First-Order Masking of AIMer on ...
## 2023/1402
* Title: Fully Homomorphic Encryption: A Mathematical Introduction
* Authors: Sara Logsdon
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1402)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1402.pdf)
### Abstract
We provide a mathematical introduction to fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), which enables computations to be performed on encrypted data without requiring decryption. We begin with a brief overview of the historical development of FHE, then focus on Fully Homomorphic Encryption over the Torus (TFHE), describing its underlying mathematical structure and fundamental homomorphic operations. Particular attention is given to key switching and bootstrapping, including their roles in managing ciphertext noise and supporting computations of greater depth. Our aim is to provide an accessible mathematical foundation for understanding the mechanisms underlying TFHE and their significance in the development of practical fully homomorphic encryption.
## 2026/256
* Title: Adams Bridge (V2.0) Accelerator: Bridging the Post-Quantum Transition * Authors: Mojtaba Bisheh-Niasar, Emre Karabulut, Kiran Upadhyayula, Michael Norris, Bharat Pillilli
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/256)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/256.pdf)
### Abstract
Quantum computing threatens widely deployed public-key cryptosystems, driving the urgent adoption of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) in cloud and hardware-accelerated security infrastructures. This paper presents \emph{Adams Bridge}, an industry-grade hardware accelerator for lattice-based PQC that integrates ML-KEM and ML-DSA within a unified architecture to maximize hardware reuse and silicon efficiency. The design features a staged, pipelined datapath that exploits multi-level parallelism to accelerate polynomial operations shared by both schemes. An optimized NTT/INTT and point-wise multiplication engine is tightly coupled with a high-throughput Keccak core and efficient hardware sampling, reducing memory overhead and eliminating pipeline stalls.
Synthesized in 5\,nm technology and operating at 600\,MHz, Adams Bridge achieves the best reported Area-Time (AT) efficiency among unified designs under an iso-security comparison, improving AT by 1.4$\times$ (ML-KEM) and 2.7$\times$ (ML-DSA) over state-of-the-art architectures. The three phases of ML-DSA complete in 26, 61, and 31~$\mu$s, respectively, while ML-KEM takes 11, 14, and 20~$\mu$s for its corresponding stages. When scaled to 1~GHz, Adams Bridge achieves up to 1.22$\times$ and 2.21$\times$ performance improvements for ML-KEM and ML-DSA, respectively.
To address physical attack vectors, the accelerator embeds hardware-level side-channel countermeasures, including masking, shuffling, and constant-time control and arithmetic, mitigating information leakage without compromising performance. Empirical TVLA evaluation up to one million traces confirms the elimination of first-order leakage in critical datapaths. Targeted for deployment within the open-source Caliptra Root of Trust (RoT), Adams Bridge represents the first open-source PQC accelerator under the Apache 2.0 license designed for real-world hardware security systems.
## 2026/265
* Title: Catalytic Tree Evaluation From Matching Vectors
* Authors: Alexandra Henzinger, Edward Pyne, Seyoon Ragavan
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/265)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/265.pdf)
### Abstract
We give new algorithms for tree evaluation (S. Cook et al. TOCT 2012) in the catalytic-computing model (Buhrman et al. STOC 2014). Two existing approaches aim to solve tree evaluation (TreeEval) in low space: on the one hand, J. Cook and Mertz (STOC 2024) give an algorithm for TreeEval running in super-logarithmic space $O(\log n\log\log n)$ and super-polynomial time $n^{O(\log\log n)}$. On the other hand, an earlier algorithm of J. Cook and Mertz (STOC 2020), run on a catalytic tape, solves TreeEval in logarithmic $O(\log n)$ free space and polynomial time, but with polynomial $O(\sqrt{n})$ catalytic space.
We show that the latter result can be improved. We give a catalytic algorithm for TreeEval with logarithmic $O(\log n)$ free space, polynomial runtime, and subpolynomial $2^{O(\log^\epsilon n)}$ catalytic space (for any $\epsilon > 0$). Our result also implies an improved simulation of time by \textit{catalytic} space, via the reduction of Williams (STOC 2025).
Our TreeEval algorithm comes from a framework, inspired by private information retrieval, that generically reduces tree evaluation to two combinatorial objects: matching-vector families and \emph{decoders} (a new object we define that closely resembles decoding polynomials). These ingredients' parameters directly govern an algorithm's resources: the vectors' dimension determines its catalytic space, and the decoder's sparsity determines its free space and runtime. In addition to enabling our new algorithm, this framework explains existing tradeoffs, for example why the CookrCoMertz algorithm needs super-logarithmic space but no catalytic tape. It also lets better matching-vector families or decoders plug in directly to give better algorithms.
## 2026/1109
* Title: SoK: Cryptographic Erasure on Public Ledgers: Application-Layer Architectures, Key-Lifecycle Adversaries, and GDPR Art. 17 Sufficiency
* Authors: Yitebeier Aikebaier
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1109)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1109.pdf)
### Abstract
Public permissionless ledgers are append-only by design, yet are increasingly asked to host data subject to statutory erasure obligations (GDPR Art. 17, EDPB Guidelines 02/2025). The prevailing cryptographic response, redacting the chain itself, needs either a different chaining hash or the cooperation of every node, neither of which a controller on Bitcoin or Ethereum mainnet commands. This SoK systematizes the orthogonal application-layer design space, in which the ledger is left untouched and erasure is achieved by destroying the key material required to read the on-chain bytes. We organise the literature along two axes, data locus (on-chain ciphertext, anchor-only, or hybrid), key custody (single-custodian or threshold), and access gate (none, time, or witness), into a twelve-cell grid with canonical constructions from 1996 to 2026. We extend standard IND-CCA security with a key-lifecycle adversary model parametrised by HSM side-channel leakage, coercion fraction over the custody committee, and algorithmic-break horizon, give the security experiment as pseudo-code with adaptive corruption, cumulative leakage across key rotations, a decryption oracle, and a stronger post-destruction adversary class, and prove that the resulting Destruction-IND-CCA notion suffices for a semantic-security formalisation of the EDPB "render unrecoverable" criterion. We state what is provable per custody model: a concrete bound for single-custodian AEAD, a bound for Shamir threshold custody that grows with the number of rotations, an impossibility result for delay-only designs, and a reduction showing witness-gated erasure needs extractable witness encryption.
Evaluating seven reference architectures against eleven engineering, cryptographic, and regulatory criteria, including a production RegTech engine measured at 2.6 |u 10^3 events/s single-threaded (10^4 projected with connection pooling), we find that the literature has concentrated on chain-rewriting while the application-layer branch lacks a common threat-model vocabulary. We close this gap and identify five open problems: post-quantum destruction security, the leakage threshold of a custody scheme, decentralised lifecycle audit (with a multi-custody extension covering encrypted mempools), composition with ZKP selective disclosure, and erasure under multi-regime retention conflict.
## 2026/1877
* Title: Otter: A Provably MEV-Resilient Automated Market Maker via Surplus Redistribution
* Authors: Elaine Shi, Mengqian Zhang, Hao Chung, Yuhao Li
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1877)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1877.pdf)
### Abstract
Miner extractable value (MEV) in automated market makers allows block builders to profit from transaction ordering and injected trades, imposing costs on users and contributing to builder centralization. We introduce Otter (Optimal Truthful Trading with Excess Redistribution), a two-asset batch AMM that achieves provable MEV resilience when the consensus layer provides censorship resilience and block space is uncongested. In particular, Otter makes truthful behavior a dominant strategy for both users and builders. Consequently, a builder cannot profit from strategic deviations, including reordering bids or injecting sybil bids. These guarantees continue to hold even when the builder is itself a trader with intrinsic value. Moreover, we show that our mechanism maximizes social welfare, in a strong sense, within a natural class of mechanisms satisfying the desired game-theoretic properties.
To achieve these guarantees, we introduce a new paradigm called surplus redistribution, which provably prevents residual surplus from being captured as MEV by redirecting it to the broader community. Specifically, the pool's output tokens need not be distributed entirely among the users in the current batch. Instead, any residual surplus may be transferred, for example, to a smart contract governed by the decentralized community. The accumulated surplus can subsequently be used to benefit community members in ways that preserve the mechanism's game-theoretic guarantees --- for example, by subsidizing traders' transaction fees, rewarding liquidity providers, or returning assets to the pool to reduce price impact and slippage for future traders.
Our approach relies on the underlying consensus layer to provide censorship resilience. We motivate the necessity of this assumption through an impossibility result showing that the desired game-theoretic guarantees become unattainable when the builder is additionally allowed to censor transactions. Thus, our results also provide a mathematically formal demonstration of how consensus-level security guarantees can fundamentally expand what is achievable at the application (i.e., smart-contract) layer. Finally, we establish additional results characterizing the builder fee structures compatible with our desired incentive guarantees.
## 2026/1884
* Title: Correction of parameters in ``Computing Optimal Ate Pairings on Elliptic Curves with Embedding Degree 9, 15 and 27''
* Authors: Walid Haddaji
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1884)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1884.pdf)
### Abstract
We correct two errors in Section~8 of the above-mentioned paper
concerning the seed parameters proposed for BLS27 elliptic curves
(embedding degree \(k=27\)) at the 256-bit and 192-bit security levels.
In both instances, the disclosed seeds produce a composite \(r(x)\),
violating the primality condition essential for constructing
pairing-friendly curves. Additionally, for the 192-bit seed, the characteristic \(p(x)\) is also composite. We provide verified corrected
seeds for each security level, obtained by exhaustive search, and confirm
with SageMath that both \(p(x)\) and \(r(x)\) are prime in each case. Furthermore, we correct the formula for the final exponentiation cost
that was adopted from Zhang et al. in the original paper.
## 2026/1946
* Title: Quantum Evolving Secret Sharing - revisited
* Authors: Efrat Cohen, Anat Paskin-Cherniavsky
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1946)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1946.pdf)
### Abstract
In evolving secret sharing, introduced by Komargodski et
al., an infinite set of parties share a secret according to an infinite access structure (where minimal qualified sets are finite). In such schemes, par-
ties arrive one by one, and and are given a share by the dealer. There is
no additional communication incurred to a given party until the time of reconstruction, where share holders who show up combine their shares
to reconstruct the secret if they form a qualified set.
In this work, we revisit the notion of quantum evolving secret sharing
schemes, we dub QESS, where a quantum secret is shared. Smoothly
generalizing the above setting runs into difficulties due to the no-cloning theorem. In particular, values handed to previously arriving parties can
not be copied by the dealer and used in the evaluation of future partiesrCO shares, as often done in evolving secret sharing schemes from the liter-
ature. Indeed, attempts to formalize quantum evolving secret sharing,
such as that on Chaudhury for the so called dynamic threshold setting
and by Cohen et al. for general evolving access structures fell short from adhering to the minimally interactive communication pattern above.
In this paper, we take a different approach, and consider a setting where several (possibly infinitely many) copies of a secret (known to the dealer)
are generated by need. This approach has been used by Cakan et al. for
(finite) quantum secret sharing (QSSS), allowing to circumvent the im- possibility of devising QSSS for monotone access structures which are not no-cloning - those that have disjoint pair of qualified sets. This setting is plausible in many applications, where the secret is known to the dealer
at sharing time. Cakan et al. demonstrate that at most n copies of the
secret prepared by the dealer, suffice to implement any monotone access structure. In the evolving setting, it is not clear how to devise QESS even
for evolving no-cloning access structures. Introducing multiple copies of
the secret allows to define QESS with a communication pattern similar
to the classical setting, in which arbitrary (not necessarily no cloning) evolving access structures can be implemented. using c(t) ren t copies of
the secret used to generate the shares of the first t parties - similarly to the finite setting.
We study the copy number landscape for various evolving access struc-
tures. For general access structures, c(t) ren t copies of the secret suffice to
generate the shares of the first t parties - similarly to the finite setting. On the lower bound side, the no-cloning theorem implies c(t) = t is nec-
essary for QESS. The main question we leave open is whether a single
copy suffices for no-cloning evolving access structures, while 1 is the ex-
act number of the finite setting. We prove that every no-cloning evolving access structure has a QESS with a finite copy number c(t) ren C, where
the constant C depends on the particular access structure. Furthermore,
for every T0, there exists a QESS as above with c(t) ren 1 for t ren T0.
Our techniques generalize the hybrid technique of Cakan et al. abstract-
ing their implicit approach of treating the access structure as a union of no-cloning access structures, and implementing each via exiting quantum
erasure codes (QECC), which provide not privacy. Then, a copy of the
secret, masked by a classical random key (via QOTP) is encoded by each
of these codes. The classical keys are then classically shared via each of
the access structure to provide privacy. While they rely on a union of no-cloning threshold access structures, we use arbitrary ones. This often reduces the resulting copy number already in the finite setting. Special
care is required to share the QOTP keys for each access structure in the
union, while keeping every partyrCOs share finite.
## 2026/1990
* Title: Bounded Information: PAC Certification of Multivariate Side-Channel Traces
* Authors: Kuheli Pratihar, Nimish Mishra, Debdeep Mukhopadhyay
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1990)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1990.pdf)
### Abstract
Side-channel leakage certification aims to quantify what an attacker can learn about a secret variable from observed leakage. Existing information-theoretic estimators, such as perceived information (PI), hypothetical information (HI), and nonparametric mutual information (MI), aim to quantify distributional leakage, but they become unstable in high-dimensional traces and do not provide a finite-sample certificate of the best attacker. We introduce \emph{Bounded Information} (BI), a probably approximately correct (PAC)-style finite-sample certification method that upper-bounds the exact-recovery success of a fixed attacker scope on unseen traces. The attacker suite certificate, $\mathrm{BI}^{\mathrm{suite}}$, applies a KL-binomial confidence interval with a union bound over a fixed suite that contains every trained attacker, preprocessing choice, and hyperparameter. BI therefore turns standard profiled-attack evaluation into an auditable certificate with an explicit attacker scope and confidence level. We further define $\mathrm{BI}^{\mathrm{loc}}(\varepsilon)$ to bound the recovery success of attackers whose normalized scores differ by at most $\varepsilon$ from those of a model in the suite. Across eight side-channel benchmarks with trace dimensions up to $7{,}000$, BI provides stable certificates without density estimation, and its tightness diagnostics tell an evaluator whether a certified value is a genuine measurement of leakage or a conservative bound that more attack traces would tighten.
## 2026/2431
* Title: Flying, Not Floating: Precise Fixed-Point Falcon on Embedded Processors
* Authors: Stef Halmans, Amit Kumar, Tim G|+neysu
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2431)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2431.pdf)
### Abstract
The Falcon digital signature scheme, under standardization as FN-DSA, requires real-number arithmetic during signing, with its security dependent on numerical precision. Recently, De Almeida Braga et al. (CRYPTO 2026) showed that Falcon-512 can sign in 64.64 fixed-point arithmetic on 64-bit hosts.
In this work, we present the first fixed-point FN-DSA signer for microcontrollers, using 32.64 arithmetic in constant-time Cortex-M4 assembly for Falcon-512 and Falcon-1024. Although a straightforward fixed-point implementation is less precise than double precision, our new techniques successfully restore precision. They keep reciprocals, inverse square roots and small constants wide and round once at the consumer.
We evaluate them with known techniques on both arithmetics and both degrees. Our signer needs around $45\%$ fewer cycles than double-precision emulation for Falcon-512 Falcon-1024, and its measured precision supports $2^{99.7}$ $2^{96.7}$ queries per key, against $2^{61.5}$ $2^{58.7}$ for double precision and the target of $2^{64}$.
Our $12$-byte words raise signing RAM from $59n$ to $83n$ bytes.
We also show which implementation choices lift double-precision c-fn-dsa above $2^{64}$ while making it faster. We derive key generation bounds for Falcon-1024, accepting $72.3\%$ of keys where the Falcon-512 values accept $8.5\%$, and provide recommendations for the fixed-point FN-DSA that NIST plans.
## 2026/2686
* Title: Provable Recovery from Integer Quotients: Improved Bounds for Nonlinear Hidden Number Problems
* Authors: Taehun Kang, Changmin Lee
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2686)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2686.pdf)
### Abstract
The hidden number problem (HNP) asks whether a secret can be recovered from partial information about values linked to it by known algebraic relations. In cryptosystems where partial information about secret values or internal randomness is leaked across various scenarios, HNP techniques provide a foundational framework for security analysis and key-recovery attacks. For some HNPs with nonlinear relations, provable polynomial-time recovery guarantees have long remained unimproved, requiring a substantial fraction of the leading bits.
We extend the provable recovery ranges for the modular inversion HNP (MIHNP), elliptic curve HNP (EC-HNP), and HNP with hidden multipliers (HNPHM), all modulo a prime $p$. For any sufficiently small constant $\varepsilon > 0$, we increase the tolerable fraction of unrevealed lower bits: for MIHNP, from $1/3-\varepsilon$ to $1/2-\varepsilon$; for EC-HNP, from $1/6-\varepsilon$ to $1/5-\varepsilon$; and for HNPHM, from $1/5-\varepsilon$ to $1/3-\varepsilon$.
Our algorithm constructs polynomials that vanish modulo $p$ at the unrevealed lower bits, and reduces recovery to bounding their possible integer quotients by $p$ over the candidate range. While such a search can branch in general, we exploit the algebraic relations of each problem to prove that the expected search cost remains polynomial in $\log p$ over randomly sampled inputs. On every valid input, the algorithm returns the exact set of consistent secrets, achieving unique recovery with probability $1-o(1)$ as $p \to \infty$ for every fixed secret.
## 2026/2690
* Title: Gaussian Difference Dynamics: Breaking the $2^{n/2}$ Barrier for the Shortest Vector Problem and Discrete Gaussian Sampling
* Authors: Yiming Gao, Xuyuan Han, Honggang Hu
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2690)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2690.pdf)
### Abstract
We give classical randomized algorithms in a word-RAM model that break the $2^{n/2}$ barrier for both discrete Gaussian sampling (DGS) and the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP). For every fixed $\alpha>1$, shifted DGS on arbitrary lattices at width $\sigma\ge\alpha\eta_{1/2}(L)$ takes
$$
(3/2)^{n/2+o(n)}\text{ time}
\qquad\text{and}\qquad
(4/3)^{n/2+o(n)}\text{ space}.
$$
These bounds match the Becker--Ducas--Gama--Laarhoven (BDGL) heuristic sieving exponents. At widths at least $3\eta_{1/2}(L)/2$, the same total cost suffices for an entire batch of $\lfloor(4/3)^{n/2}\rfloor$ samples jointly close to independent target Gaussians.
For SVP on arbitrary lattices, our algorithm returns a shortest nonzero vector with high probability in
$$
2^{0.4130n+o(n)}\text{ time}
\qquad\text{and}\qquad
2^{0.3138n+o(n)}\text{ space}.
$$
As a corollary, we obtain centered DGS at every width with the same exponents, answering a question of Stephens-Davidowitz (SODA 2016).
We introduce Gaussian difference dynamics (GDD), a framework for tracking expected counts and pairwise clustering of vectors through repeated differencing. A closed recursion for the first two counting moments controls these quantities relative to a Gaussian reference, without requiring independence within intermediate lists. Accurate moment bounds let us extract a Gaussian sample by weighted selection, while the weaker bounds needed to establish a shortest vector representation allow us to retain more differences. We perform these transitions on thin spherical shells, where the Gaussian rejection weights can be renormalized at subexponential cost. For batch sampling, we combine this geometry with the double rejection technique of Doulgerakis and Laarhoven to control the joint distribution of outputs while reusing vectors.
## 2026/2693
* Title: Rotom: A Microcontroller-Oriented Tweakable Block Cipher Using Modular Multiplication (Full Version)
* Authors: Kento Morita, Kazuhiko Minematsu, Kosei Sakamoto, Kazuma Taka, Rei Ueno, Takanori Isobe
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2693)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2693.pdf)
### Abstract
We propose Rotom, a family of 128-bit tweakable block ciphers designed for efficient software implementation on 32-bit microcontrollers.
The central design idea is to use modular multiplication as a compact and software-efficient source of strong nonlinearity.
Rotom instantiates this idea with a fixed 16-bit S-box built from odd constant multiplication modulo $2^{16}$ interleaved with lightweight linear maps, and combines it with a software-friendly recursive linear layer over four 32-bit words, a compact tweakey schedule, and modular-addition boundary key mixing. In contrast to typical ARX-based ciphers, Rotom provides explicit differential and linear characteristic bounds by design. These bounds are obtained by exhaustively computing the local transition probabilities of its fixed 16-bit S-box and combining them with
active-S-box bounds induced by its recursive linear layer.
Implementation results on ARM Cortex-M3 and Cortex-M4 show that Rotom achieves cycle counts close to Speck, substantially lower than those of MSX, and faster than representative fixsliced AES implementations, while providing tweak support and cipher-level differential and linear bounds. Overall, Rotom combines the efficiency of software-oriented arithmetic instructions with the explicit security evaluation enabled by a fixed-S-box structure.
## 2026/2702
* Title: The Authentication Complexity of Byzantine Consensus
* Authors: Kecheng Shi
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2702)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2702.pdf)
### Abstract
Byzantine broadcast and Byzantine agreement are fundamental problems in distributed computing and building blocks for secure multiparty computation. In complete synchronous networks of $n$ parties with channels identifying the immediate sender, classical results establish how authentication changes resilience to $t$ Byzantine faults. Without initially authenticated public keys, both tasks are possible if and only if $n>3t$~\cite{PSL80}. With a complete public-key infrastructure (PKI), broadcast tolerates every $t<n$~\cite{DS83}, and agreement is possible if and only if $n>2t$. These thresholds leave a substantial gap: \emph{how much initial authentication is necessary for a given fault bound, and how does its distribution affect feasibility?}
We study this question by allowing each party's designated public verification key to be initially authenticated to any subset of the other parties. We represent this setup by a directed authentication graph $G$ whose vertices are parties, with an edge $x\to y$ exactly when $y$ is a \emph{verifier} of $x$: that is, $x$'s designated public verification key is initially authenticated to $y$. We count each edge as one unit and define
\emph{authentication complexity} as the \emph{minimum} total bindings over all setups and protocols achieving the required task and fault tolerance. Protocols may establish further authentication during execution without adding initial cost.
We give a tight graph characterization of the initial authentication setups that support agreement, including when each party knows only its own initial key table and is not given the authentication graph. For $2t<n\le3t$ and $r=n-2t$, we show that agreement has authentication complexity
$\Theta(\min\{n^2,(n^2/r)\ln(en/r)\})$ and give a protocol with polynomial local computation. At $n=2t+1$, broadcast requires $\Omega(n\ln^2 n/\ln\ln n)$ initial authentications, and has a construction using $O(n^{3/2}\sqrt{\ln n})$ initial authentications. At this threshold, we also show a complete PKI setup is necessary for agreement. Surprisingly, broadcast has subquadratic authentication complexity even when $t=n/2+o(n)$. For every fixed fault fraction $\alpha\in(1/2,1)$, we show its authentication complexity is $\Theta_\alpha(n^2)$. We also determine the exact authentication complexity of broadcast at maximum resilience: $\binom n2-1$ initial authentications suffice and are necessary to tolerate $t=n-1$ faults.
## 2026/2710
* Title: Hidden Curves and Short Duals: Cubic Jets, Dual Leaks, and the Limits of Masked-Code Encryption
* Authors: Yongge Wang
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2710)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2710.pdf)
### Abstract
Masked-code encryption hides a decodable code behind a transformation meant to make it look random. We study the two masks proposed as compact alternatives
to Goppa codes---Wang's RLCE and the $(U\,|\,U{+}V)$ construction of UVW-KEM---over the decodable hidden codes they have been or could be applied to, and find that, among the families examined, none yields a compact trapdoor. Over Reed--Solomon and algebraic-geometry codes the mask hides a \emph{curve}, and curves are not hidden from jets. We explain the October 2026 key recovery of UVW-KEM (NGCC) and show it is not specific to UVW: for \emph{hidden-pairing codes} we bound from below the dependencies among order-$r$ jets of degree-$d$ forms at the columns of any shortening---for cubics $2k_1-k_2-k_l+2$ (UVW) and $2(n{-}k)-w-k_l+2$ (RLCE), attained in every regime tested, and we prove that the structured part of the dependency space carries the pairing and the secret ratios in closed form. Every proposed UVW parameter set has the predicted cubic deficiency (key recovery has been demonstrated at UVW-KEM-128). RLCE's long-key regime $w\ge n-k$, out of reach of the square-code attack for eight years, falls
at degree three: on a full-size Level-1 parameter set we recover an
equivalent key from the public key alone and decrypt fresh ciphertexts. HermitianRLCE is
distinguished the same way. A forcing law, a master count and a redundancy law make the \emph{jet degree} an invariant of hidden-pairing codes: within that model, each unit of structural depth costs a unit of redundancy.
Without a curve the masks fail differently: both \emph{preserve the dual} of the hidden code, at most doubling the weight of every dual word. polarRLCE at rate $\le2/3$ leaks dual words found in $47$--$94$ bits; at higher rates no certified decoding radius supports $143$-bit security up to length $16384$,
and at $32768$ the key is $58$\,MiB, $234\times$ Classic McEliece. LDPC codes leak their sparse checks, MDPC codes are better left unmasked, and UVW carries a matched-pair subspace for every hidden code. Reed--Muller-heavy codes under RLCE resist every attack here at $4$\,MiB keys, but only if a decoder at $3.4\times$ the bounded-distance radius exists.
## 2026/2711
* Title: Fast Provable Algorithms for Approximate CVP and Exact SVP on Random \(q\)-ary Lattices
* Authors: Jiseung Kim, Junhyuk Kwon, Changmin Lee, JeongHwan Lee
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2711)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2711.pdf)
### Abstract
We give provable randomized algorithms for the $\gamma$-approximate Closest Vector Problem ($\gamma$-CVP) with $\gamma=5/3$ and the exact Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) in the Euclidean norm on random $q$-ary lattices. These lattices consist of the integer vectors mapped to zero modulo $q$ by a uniformly random matrix $\mathbf{H}\in(\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z})^{m\times n}$, for any integer $q\ge2$. For input density $\delta=m\log_2q/n$ with $0\le\delta\le1$, the running times are $2^{0.2668n+o(n)}$ for $5/3$-CVP and $2^{0.2741n+o(n)}$ for exact SVP, with polynomial input-length factors suppressed. For $1<\delta\le3/2$, the respective bounds are $2^{0.56n+o(n)}$ and $2^{0.468n+o(n)}$. For all but a negligible fraction of matrices, both algorithms succeed with overwhelming probability over their internal randomness.
Notably, for $0\le\delta\le1$, our provable bounds fall below even the $2^{0.2925n+o(n)}$ heuristic estimate for classical lattice sieving.
As a cryptographic application, we prove that signatures in the original construction of Gentry, Peikert, and Vaikuntanathan (GPV) can be forged in time $2^{0.0534n+o(n)}$ for $n\ge5m\log_2q$. For a $128$-bit security target, a leading-term estimate gives $n\approx2400$ and a public key of roughly $144$ kB, indicating a substantial storage burden.
## 2026/2732
* Title: MuCPay: Breaking the Quadratic Bottleneck in Scriptless Multi-Party Oracle-Based Conditional Payments
* Authors: Yaning Wang, Na Wang, Chuan Li, Yongda Zhang, Junsong Fu
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2732)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2732.pdf)
### Abstract
Oracle-based conditional payments triggered by real-world events support decentralized finance applications. However, dense independent bilateral deployments require $\Theta(Nn^2)$ outcome authorizations and $\Theta(n^2)$ settlement signatures for $n$ parties and $N$ outcomes. To go beyond two-party settings, we propose MuCPay, a multi-party oracle-based conditional payment protocol combining (i) $\Theta(Nn)$ off-chain signing shares with one on-chain settlement signature and (ii) BIP340-compatible scriptless settlement on Bitcoin. At its core, MuCPay introduces hash-bound adaptor multi-signatures (HB-AMS) that aggregate parties' conditional authorizations into a compact joint pre-signature. Its single-nonce structure and hash-bound adaptor integration enable efficient multi-party pre-signing. Unlike Double-Layer AMS (EuroS&P'26), HB-AMS produces a standard BIP340 signature under an aggregate public key, enabling direct Taproot key-path settlement. Under static corruption with one honest signer, we prove concurrent new-message unforgeability (CUF) and early-settlement resistance (ES) under our stated algebraic random-oracle model. For 128 parties and 16 outcomes, median complete local preparation takes 2.093 s. For protocol preparation (1.862 s for MuCPay), native-profile projections place VweTS (NDSSrCO23) and ParaSwap (USENIXrCO25) work at 1.67 |u 10rU| and 5.05 |u 10rU| times MuCPay's, respectively. Settlement uses one 64-byte signature, while the modeled independent-DLC deployment requires 281.5|u as many transaction vbytes. These results demonstrate practical, scalable multi-party oracle-based conditional payments.
## 2026/2739
* Title: Archive Certificates for ML-DSA-87 Authorizations from an Exact Bounded Relation
* Authors: Yacine Alloul
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2739)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2739.pdf)
### Abstract
A blockchain that signs every transaction with FIPS 204 ML-DSA-87 keeps 4,627 bytes of signature per transaction forever. We describe and measure an archive certificate: one hash-based proof, for a range of already validated blocks, of knowledge of canonical FIPS 204 signatures on exactly the recorded messages under the keys resolved from chain state. Fresh blocks keep native verification. The construction starts from an exact bounded relation for ML-DSA-87 verification once the high bits $u = w'_1$ are fixed. The main certificate keeps $u$ hidden and proves the SHAKE256 challenge hash inside the proof, by a GKR argument for Keccak-f[1600] over the same WHIR commitment as the lattice relation.
For 65,536 signatures we measured 104.09 bytes per signature in a Johnson-regime family, which has a classical bound only, and 126.89 in a unique-decoding family, against 4,627 bytes raw. The price is a slow prover and a verifier slower than native verification. At $2^{64}$ queries and $2^{20}$ verification submissions, under the compiler, coding and extractor-efficiency hypotheses specified in the security analysis, the classical random-oracle extraction error is below $2^{-188.07}$ for the Johnson family and below $2^{-201.99}$ for unique decoding. In the quantum random oracle model we state, for the unique-decoding family only, an extraction-failure bound below $2^{-129.67}$ at $2^{64}$ quantum queries and $2^{20}$ verification submissions; it is not a work factor.
Lean 4 checks Lemmas 1 to 4 and the WHIR steps at the scopes detailed in the formal-verification section, the registered interactive theorem's conditions K1rCoK4, exact ledger arithmetic, and conditional compiler compositions. The extractor's efficiency condition K5 is derived in a defined bit-cost model from two implementation premises that remain open. The link between the interactive predicate and the ledger is proved within an abstract compiler interface; concrete compiled security games and correspondence with the Rust verifier remain outside the checked result. The bundles identified in that section are also verified with AXLE. An external review is outstanding, and certificate-only bootstrap remains disabled under the stated deployment conditions.
## 2026/2741
* Title: Leakage-Resilient Computation via Matrix Refreshing
* Authors: Stefan Dziembowski, Sebastian Faust
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2741)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2741.pdf)
### Abstract
Leakage-resilient cryptography protects secrets against side-channel attacks, in which a physical implementation reveals partial information about its internal state. A fundamental primitive in this area is a leakage-resilient storage, which allows a secret to be stored in a way that remains secure even if an adversary learns some information about the storage's internal state. A popular approach represents a secret as the inner product of two $n$-bit vectors, called shares. The shares are stored and processed separately by two parts of the implementation, called the left and right parties. Because leakage accumulates over time, the shares must be refreshed repeatedly. We prove that a simple refresh, in which the left party multiplies its share by a uniform invertible matrix $M$ and the right party multiplies its share by $M^{-1}$, is secure under continual local leakage. After $T$ refreshes, each allowing at most $\lambda$ bits of leakage per party, the transcripts for two stored secrets are at statistical distance at most $C\cdot T\cdot 2^{6\lambda-n/9}$ for an absolute constant $C$.
We also obtain a Boolean-circuit compiler with statistical privacy error at most $C\cdot S\cdot 2^{18\lambda-n/27}$ for $S$ operations and at most $\lambda$ bits of local leakage per party per operation. The guarantee covers repeated stateful evaluations with adaptively chosen public inputs, with $S$ counting all operations across invocations. Thus, for polynomial-size circuits, a constant leakage fraction is tolerated with share length depending only on the security parameter. We formalize the refreshing bound, the composition and compiler guarantees, and the expected-work bounds in Lean 4. Our results also provide efficient simulation: the leakage can be reproduced from the public inputs and the circuit outputs alone, with expected polynomial overhead.
## 2026/2742
* Title: Differentially $2^t$-uniform quadrinomials with high nonlinearity
* Authors: Niki Spithaki, Enrico Piccione, Lilya Budaghyan, Alexander Kholosha * [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2742)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2742.pdf)
### Abstract
In this paper, we discuss some cryptographic properties of a family of quadrinomials constructed as a generalization of a known family of APN quadrinomials. In particular, we show that this family produces differentially $2^t$-uniform quadrinomials with the same Walsh spectrum as the Gold power function $x^{2^t+1}$ over $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$. We also discuss whether this family provides permutations.
## 2026/2743
* Title: Challenge Binding in FRESCO SPDZ2k: A Message-Level Case Study
* Authors: Mingzhao Huang
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2743)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2743.pdf)
### Abstract
FRESCO's SPDZ2k suite derives its batched MAC-check coefficients from a setup-time public seed, making the stream predictable before opening shares are sent. We examine this implementation path at a pinned revision. A source-level derivation accounts for low-limb carries and high-bit corrections and shows that the value-share shifts $e=(r_j,-r_i)$ preserve the check residual while retaining the original MAC shares. A message-level harness executes this deviation against unmodified honest opening code. The recorded sum/product outputs violate a relation required for every possible input of the corrupt party, and the test framework records normal completion. The retained evidence includes two-, three-, and four-party executions with dummy preprocessing. The predictable-seed attack template appears in Rushing at SPDZ, and FRESCO's issue tracker recorded the per-check randomness requirement in 2018; our contribution is the SPDZ2k public-seed path, its explicit kernel witness, and the implementation evidence. We also give a conditional single-opening analysis and assess a four-file candidate mitigation that rejects seven recorded tampering scenarios while preserving four honest baselines. Audit tools and descriptive corpora provide context. The proof concerns the specified value-share deviation; unrestricted malicious behavior, production preprocessing, and a complete mitigation argument remain outside the established result.
## 2026/2744
* Title: Phantom Timing Leaks on Cortex-M4: A Pre-registered Evaluation of ML-KEM Decapsulation
* Authors: Amadou Tidiane Anne
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2744)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2744.pdf)
### Abstract
Fixed-versus-random timing tests in the style of dudect are a cheap first check of constant-time behaviour, and on microcontrollers the cycle counter makes them exact to the cycle. We report a pre-registered evaluation of ML-KEM decapsulation on an STM32F411 (Cortex-M4) covering nine implementations of PQM4 (clean, m4fspeed, m4fstack for ML-KEM-512/768/1024) and a positive control in which we restored the pre-KyberSlash division formulas. Each of the 44 campaigns used in the analysis has 100,000 trials and checks every result. With invalid ciphertexts (random bytes, or one modified byte), no difference is detected in 18 of 18 campaigns, and both classes always have exactly the same cycle count, while the control is detected every time (|t| up to 1,877). With fresh valid ciphertexts, however, all nine implementations are flagged, with differences of 4 to 15 cycles and |t| >= 19,000 (or infinite, when both classes have zero variance). A matched control, in which both classes run the same code before the measured call, removes the difference for seven of the nine. An A/A test, in which both classes decapsulate the same bytes, still yields |t| = 12,864 for one implementation. Deterministic few-cycle differences can therefore come from the measurement harness alone: on a part with flash wait states, an instruction cache and prefetching, they can appear when the code around the measured call changes. We also show that per-trial correctness checks matter: they exposed a functional bug in PQM4's ML-KEM-1024 m4fstack (220 wrong shared secrets out of 49,830), which upstream had fixed shortly before. We report every deviation from the pre-registration, including a build error of our own, and publish data, binaries and code (
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23921418).
## 2026/2745
* Title: The Price of Agreement in Secure Multiparty Computation
* Authors: Ran Cohen, Pouyan Forghani, Juan Garay, Vassilis Zikas
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2745)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2745.pdf)
### Abstract
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) cannot guarantee output delivery, in general, in the dishonest-majority setting. Security of MPC is therefore relaxed to security with abort, where the adversary may prevent honest parties from obtaining their output. The standard notion of \emph{unanimous abort} (UA-MPC) ensures that either all honest parties obtain their output or all of them abort. Goldwasser and Lindell [JCRYPT '05] introduced the relaxed notion of \emph{selective abort}, allowing some honest parties to abort and others to obtain their output. While two-round SA-MPC can be achieved over point-to-point channels, two-round UA-MPC necessitates the second round to be over broadcast. The price of agreement in dishonest-majority MPC is thus tied to the round complexity of broadcast with unanimous abort (UA-broadcast).
The round complexity of broadcast has been extensively studied for more than four decades. Garay, Katz, Koo, and Ostrovsky [FOCS '07] (GKKO) proved that the expected round complexity of broadcast protocols tolerating $t$ corruptions is at least $2n/(n-t)-1$. Their argument, however, relies on all honest parties obtaining an honest sender's input, and does not extend to UA-broadcast. Recently, Cohen {\em et al.} [TCC '26] showed that UA-MPC is possible in an expected constant number of rounds when a constant fraction of the parties is honest, and asked whether this extends to $n-o(n)$ corruptions.
In this work we answer this question in the negative: Agreement alone already incurs the GKKO barrier. Concretely, we prove that for $t\leq n-2$, UA-broadcast---and hence UA-MPC---requires at least $t/(2(n-t))$ rounds in expectation, matching the asymptotic bound for broadcast without abort.
As a corollary, expected-constant-round UA-MPC is possible if and only if a constant fraction of the parties is honest.
Next, we consider UA-broadcast protocols that terminate in an {\em a-priori} known round, and show that the bound that the argument of GKKO gives for broadcast holds for them exactly. Combined with the broadcast protocol of Dolev and Strong [SICOMP '83], our bound is tight for arbitrarily many corruptions.
## 2026/2746
* Title: Differential Cryptanalysis of SPEEDY: Revised Security Evaluation and Improved Key Recovery Attack
* Authors: Xinwei Yu, Wentao Zhang, Zairui Zhang, Chunning Zhou
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2746)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2746.pdf)
### Abstract
The resistance of a block cipher against differential cryptanalysis (DC) is a fundamental criterion for evaluating its security. SPEEDY is a family of low-latency SPS-type block ciphers designed by Leander et al. The designers presented two evaluations of SPEEDY against DC: the first restricted 1-bit-to-1-bit differential propagations through the S-box and used the higher-order branch numbers to estimate the maximum expected differential probability (EDP) of differential trails; the second imposed a structural restriction and assumed that all 1-bit-to-1-bit propagations through an active S-box are possible to estimate the minimum number of active S-boxes. Zhang later exhibited a counterexample to the designers' first evaluation and introduced the notion of partition branch number, relaxing some of the propagation restrictions to allow multi-bit-to-1-bit transitions on some S-box layers and refining the evaluation. However, these evaluations consider only restricted spaces of differential characteristics and therefore inaccurately estimate the security of SPEEDY against DC, which means that the resistance of SPEEDY against DC remains unclear so far. To address this problem, we propose an efficient search method based on search patterns. Unlike previous evaluations, our method imposes no a priori structural restrictions on the allowed differential characteristics; it uses computational pruning to keep the search tractable and performs a conservative security evaluation of the pruned region, thereby providing an accurate evaluation over the global space. At the framework level, we decompose an r-round differential characteristic into an (r-1)-round core trail and an r-round extended trail. By extending a core trail independently at both ends, the two additional S-box layers are handled by two separate models, each containing only one S-box layer and solvable efficiently. At the implementation level, we further introduce a short-round reuse via hash-map concatenation technique, which concatenates short-round core trails to construct longer-round core trails, thereby avoiding expensive long-round MILP models. For 4 rounds, we narrow the minimum number of active S-boxes from the previously reported 35 to [33,34] and find a characteristic with 34 active S-boxes outside the previous search spaces. We also obtain the highest-probability differential characteristics known to date for 2 to 5 rounds. In particular, the 2-, 3-, and 4-round characteristics disprove the designers' branch-number-based security claims. Furthermore, using the quasidifferential framework, we evaluate the found characteristics and obtain several 5-round distinguishers outperforming those used in existing key recovery attacks in terms of EDP. Finally, we optimize the probabilistic extension parameters used in a previous key recovery attack, which yields the best known key recovery attack on SPEEDY-7-192, with data complexity $2^{173.48}$ and time complexity $2^{173.69}$ encryptions.
## 2026/2747
* Title: MODDIV-WC: Unit-Anchored Toeplitz/Hankel Rounding with Exact Binary-LWE Masking and an IND-CCA Security Route
* Authors: Samir Bouftass
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2747)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2747.pdf)
### Abstract
\begin{abstract}
We present MODDIV-WC, a public-key encryption and key-encapsulation candidate based on a widened Hankel linear map followed by deterministic integer division, together with an implicit-rejection Fujisaki--Okamoto wrapper, MODDIV-WC-FO. The construction uses a secret vector whose first coordinate is fixed to one and whose remaining coordinates are sampled from a positive interval. This unit anchor makes the Hankel map surjective for every admissible secret, a property that is central to the proof.
The security analysis has four layers. First, we give an exact embedding of binary-secret LWE into the widened Hankel map using a parity mask that reproduces the MODDIV-WC secret distribution without statistical loss. Second, in an ideal public-key hybrid, a strong leftover-hash argument hides the challenge key. Third, adapting the Renyi-divergence boundary method of prior LWR and MP-LWR work, we prove a transfer lemma for the unit-anchored MODDIV-WC secret distribution. This avoids the earlier requirement that the probability of crossing a rounding boundary be negligible and instead preserves one-way success probabilities with a multiplicative Renyi loss. Fourth, we combine one-way chosen-plaintext security with the implicit-rejection modular Fujisaki--Okamoto analysis of Hofheinz, Hovelmanns, and Kiltz to derive IND-CCA security in the classical random-oracle model.
For an explicit asymptotic family, the correctness, Renyi, leftover-hash, binary-secret-LWE, and random-oracle losses are simultaneously negligible, while the source LWE noise remains inverse-polynomial. Together with classical worst-case-to-LWE reductions and the binary-secret/modulus transformations of Brakerski, Langlois, Peikert, Regev, and Stehle, this yields an internally audited candidate route from polynomial-factor worst-case lattice hardness to IND-CCA security. No practical 128-bit parameters, QROM proof, or deployment claim is made.
\end{abstract}
## 2026/2748
* Title: TFNP in the Random Oracle Model
* Authors: Noah Fleming, Mika G||||s, Ziyi Guan, Oliver Korten, Daniel Mitropolsky, Toniann Pitassi, Artur Riazanov, Dmitry Sokolov, Tianqi Yang, Weiqiang Yuan
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2748)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2748.pdf)
### Abstract
We determine which major TFNP classes are hard in the random oracle model (ROM). Prior work establishes average-case hardness of highly structured subclasses of TFNP from strong cryptographic assumptions such as LWE and indistinguishability obfuscation. It is not known whether weaker assumptions such as one-way functions imply hardness of any of the standard TFNP subclasses, even in the worst case. The ROM, where all parties have query access to a random function, lies, morally, between these two regimes: a random function is one-way, but public-key cryptography cannot be built from it in a black-box way. We refer to this setting as \emph{Romantica}.
Our first result settles a long-standing open problem: PPAD, the class of total search problems reducible to finding a Nash equilibrium, is hard on average in Romantica. Combined with the known hardness of PLS (local search), this gives average-case hardness of EoPL = PPAD \cap PLS. In contrast, we show that UEoPL can be solved in Romantica with polynomially many oracle queries by a computationally unbounded solver, a sharp distinction between EoPL and UEoPL. This resolves the black-box hardness landscape of all major TFNP classes in Romantica.
Finally, we initiate the study of separations between TFNP subclasses in Romantica: PWPP and PPA do not reduce to PLS under \emph{public-coin} reductions.
## 2026/2749
* Title: Shielded Bitcoin: Private Transfers on the Bitcoin L1
* Authors: Clara Shikhelman, Mikhail Komarov, Aleksei Moskvin
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2749)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2749.pdf)
### Abstract
This paper introduces Shielded Bitcoin, a protocol for private transfer of Bitcoin directly on the Bitcoin L1, requiring no changes to Bitcoin consensus. Its design borrows from the architecture of Zcash and earlier shielded-note systems: value is held as encrypted notes, spends are marked by public nullifiers, and validity is established by zero-knowledge proofs. Unlike Zcash, Shielded Bitcoin introduces no dedicated consensus chain: all protocol data is published on Bitcoin, transfer validity is enforced through PIPEs v2 [ACG+26], and shielded state is reconstructed by deterministic replay of accepted transfers in Bitcoin order. At the metaprotocol transfer level, Shielded Bitcoin is non-custodial: spending authority remains with user-controlled wallet keys encrypted in a ciphertext, and neither indexers nor the replay layer receive authority to spend user notes.
A shielded transfer does not publicly reveal its amount, sender, receiver, and place in the transfer graph, while keeping the validity of every encrypted state transition publicly verifiable. Shielded state, comprising the note tree, nullifier set, and block-level root history, is maintained entirely off-chain: any two correct implementations replaying the same Bitcoin history derive identical protocol state without coordination. The paper defines the transfer model, note structure, ciphertext-derived note leaves, nullifier rules, transaction binding, replay semantics, and publication assumptions. Peg-in and peg-out, the mechanisms by which value enters and exits the shielded transfer system, belong to the broader system and fall outside the scope of this paper.
## 2026/2750
* Title: Practical Optimal Bucket Sets with Power-of-Two Radices for LFG-Based MSM Algorithms
* Authors: Guiwen Luo
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2750)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2750.pdf)
### Abstract
Fixed point multi-scalar multiplication (MSM) is a major computational component of pairing-based SNARK proof generation. The Luo--Fu--Gong (LFG) framework is a variant of Pippenger's bucket method that uses a multiplier set $M$ and precomputed point multiples to reduce the number of buckets and online point additions. For radix $q$ and a positive multiplier set $M$, covering all digit residues requires a bucket set of size at least $q/(2|M|)$. Previous constructions approaching this bound based on primitive roots or power-residue classes impose radix restrictions that exclude $q=2^c$, thereby requiring additional binary-to-radix conversion in software implementations.
We present two main bucket set constructions for power-of-two radices $q=2^c$, using the multiplier sets $M=\{1,2,3\}$ and $M=\{1,3\}$, respectively. Their cardinalities are $q/6+O(\log q)$ and $q/4+2$, respectively, so both asymptotically attain the counting bound $q/(2|M|)$ while allowing efficient radix-digit extraction through shifts and masks.
We further give two generalizations. Using consecutive powers of $3$ as multipliers yields bucket sets of size $q/(2\ell)+O(\log q)$ for every fixed positive integer $\ell$. For $\ell=2^d$ and $c\ge d+2$, consecutive odd multipliers yield bucket sets of size $q/(2\ell)+d+1$.
We also present scalar conversion and two strategies for handling the leading digit, allowing the bucket set constructions to be used within the LFG framework.
## 2026/2751
* Title: An efficient Failure Probability Estimator for LWE-based encryption, and application to IBE
* Authors: Julien CAM
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2751)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2751.pdf)
### Abstract
In recent years, lattice-based cryptography has proven to be a source of post-quantum cryptosystems. In particular, the blueprint of Learning With Errors (LWE) encryption enabled the creation of Kyber, chosen by NIST to be standardized as ML-KEM. Because of the structure of LWE encryption, the decryption of a ciphertext can give an incorrect plaintext. This event (a decryption failure) happens randomly with some probability. Since this is a problem for both functionality and security, we must ensure that this failure probability is cryptographically negligible. Usually, this is assessed with theoretical approximations and upper-bounds. The authors of Kyber used a Python program to compute that probability more precisely, enabling to fine-tune the compression of the ciphertext, hence reducing its size. However, because of its performances, this program has been limited to Kyber, and all the other schemes are still studied theoretically. In this paper, we design a more efficient Failure Probability Estimator, that we implement in low-level languages (C and CUDA C++), to reach higher parameters used in real schemes based on structured LWE. We illustrate some benefits of our tool with two Identity-Based Encryption schemes. For the first scheme, our tool allows to reduce the size of the ciphertext by about 20%. For the second one, we reduce the failure probability (thus improving security) without impacting the scheme (key size, ciphertext size, etc.).
## 2026/2752
* Title: Information Loss Is All You Need: TCrU# Pseudorandomness from Worst-Case Lattices
* Authors: Chen Qian
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2752)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2752.pdf)
### Abstract
Pseudorandomness plays a central role in algorithms, complexity theory, and cryptography. We ask whether deterministic information loss alone can yield post-quantum pseudorandomness with $\mathrm{TC}^0$ evaluation. Learning with errors (LWE) hides linear measurements with random noise. Learning with rounding (LWR) replaces noise with deterministic rounding, but a standard polynomial-modulus hardness reduction requires parameters tailored to a predetermined sample bound. Decisional DiffierCoHellman offers a noiseless algebraic route to pseudorandomness, but its standard instantiations are vulnerable to quantum algorithms. We show that deterministic rounding achieves this under quantum worst-case lattice hardness, with fixed polynomial parameters and no predetermined sample bound.
We introduce the learning with algebraic rounding (LAR) assumption, which applies an explicit integer rounding map to blocks of secret-dependent linear measurements and encodes the result in a lattice quotient. For one fixed family with polynomially bounded modulus and dimensions, its deterministic labels on exactly uniform, secret-independent public matrices are computationally indistinguishable from independent uniform labels for every polynomial number of classical random examples. Our classical reduction from Gaussian LWE, combined with the quantum worst-case reduction to LWE, bases LAR on GapSVP and SIVP over general lattices at approximation factor $\widetilde{O}(q)$, where $q$ is the modulus.
To prove this, we develop a source-independent affine transport framework that may be of independent interest. Using public affine maps sampled independently of the hidden errors, it transports the Gaussian error law close to uniform on the rounding maprCOs zero-label fiber while preserving exactly uniform public matrices. For every fixed inverse-polynomial accuracy, we give a polynomial-time sampler for the same public parameter family.
This yields the first post-quantum weak pseudorandom function with joint key-and-input evaluation in $\mathrm{TC}^0$, secure against uniform quantum polynomial-time distinguishers given any polynomial number of classical uniform random examples. We also establish the hardness of learning polynomial-size two-hidden-layer ReLU networks from noiseless uniform random examples, even for quantum polynomial-time improper learners.
## 2026/2753
* Title: Correlation Power Analysis on SHA-2-Based SLH-DSA
* Authors: Jinwook Chang, Minjeong Lee, JIN YONG MIN, Dong-Guk Han
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2753)
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https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2753.pdf)
### Abstract
The stateless hash-based digital signature algorithm (SLH-DSA) repeatedly processes a fixed secret seed with varying public addresses. This paper presents non-profiled correlation power analysis of the address-based pseudorandom function for all six SHA-2 parameter sets, using separate recovery paths through SHA-256 compression rounds and message-schedule expansion. The procedures account for the input layout in which a 22-byte compressed address precedes the secret seed. For the 256-bit sets, a two-stage joint procedure recovers two 16-bit secret portions. We evaluate an STM32F303 ARM Cortex-M4 implementation using 30 secret seeds and 5,000 measured power traces per seed for each evaluated condition. Each recovery stage is evaluated with the required preceding secret values supplied correctly; the reported rates are therefore conditional stage-wise results, not end-to-end seed recovery rates. Compression-round stages achieve 100% success under both forest-of-random-subsets and Winternitz one-time-signature-plus address conditions. Under forest-of-random-subsets addresses, all message-schedule stages achieve 100% success for the 128- and 192-bit sets. For both 256-bit variants, joint recovery achieves 100%, whereas recovery of message word $W_{12}$ achieves 66.7%; recovery of $W_7$ achieves 70.0% and 80.0% for the fast and small variants, respectively. An alternative first stage is also provided for 128-bit Winternitz one-time-signature-plus addresses. These results show that side-channel protection must cover both compression rounds and message-schedule expansion.
## 2026/2754
* Title: A note on zero-knowledge ring switching
* Authors: Andrei Kochergin
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2754)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2754.pdf)
### Abstract
We make the ring-switching technique of Diamond and Posen zero knowledge, resolving a problem left open in the literature. Over $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$, our technique uses $n-1$ auxiliary masks and $n-1$ quadratic constraints, checked in zero knowledge by the underlying commitment scheme.
## 2026/2755
* Title: Blockchain-Anchored Proactive Refresh for Dynamic Threshold Services
* Authors: Seunghyun Cho, Jaeyeon Lee, Myeongjun Kim, Hyunseok Jeong, Young-Sik Kim
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2755)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2755.pdf)
### Abstract
A long-lived threshold service must issue shares to participants that join after deployment, refresh them against a mobile adversary, and allow participants offline during a refresh to recover missed updates. We show that charging exposure solely to committed epochs is fundamentally insufficient: an aborted refresh attempt that publishes candidate update tokens can reveal the secret even if no committed epoch exceeds its corruption budget. To eliminate this exposure leakage, we index security by fine-grained states covering both committed epochs and aborted attempts. Each state's budget bounds all participants whose local material or public update records originate from that state, enforced via an append-only, durable release ledger that is never rolled back upon abort. A fixed dealer committee anchors encrypted update records in blockchain blob storage, enabling non-interactive recovery for offline participants without contacting dealers, while an interactive bisection dispute protocol deterministically attributes faulty records on chain. Our core cryptographic result is an explicit distribution-preserving shift of the actual generation transcript, establishing proactive secrecy and past-share unforgeability after dealer-state disclosure without idealizing the underlying subprotocols. An end-to-end Rust implementation benchmarks complete lifecycles across up to 1,280 participants on an EVM chain, demonstrating sub-second group recovery and practical gas costs.
## 2026/2756
* Title: Refined Bounds for the Smoothing Parameter of Lattices
* Authors: Shanxiang Lyu
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2756)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2756.pdf)
### Abstract
The smoothing parameter $\eta_\varepsilon(\Lambda)$ is a fundamental invariant in lattice-based cryptography. Zheng, Zhao, and Xu (AAECC 2021) proved $\eta_\varepsilon(\mathbb{Z}) \le \sqrt{\ln(\frac{2}{\varepsilon} + \frac{\varepsilon}{44})/\pi}$ and $\eta_\varepsilon(\Lambda) \le \sqrt{\ln(n - 1 + \frac{2n}{\varepsilon})/\pi}\,\mathrm{bl}(\Lambda)$. Guo, Liu, Wang, and Tian (PLOS One 2025) proposed $\eta_\varepsilon(\mathbb{Z}) \le \sqrt{\ln(\frac{2}{\varepsilon} + \frac{\varepsilon}{m})/\pi}$ for $0 < \varepsilon \le \frac{4}{m} - \frac{172}{m^6}$ ($m \ge 3$) and $\eta_\varepsilon(\Lambda) \le \sqrt{\ln((n - 1)(1 + \frac{2}{\varepsilon}))/\pi}\,\mathrm{bl}(\Lambda)$ under $\sqrt{\frac{24n+1}{n^2-1}} \le \varepsilon \le \sqrt{2}-1$. We establish three strictly sharper bounds that uniformly dominate both while removing the artificial lower bound on $\varepsilon$. First, for $0 < \varepsilon \le \rho(\mathbb{Z})-1 \approx 0.086435$,
\[
\sqrt{\frac{\ln\!\left(\frac{2}{\varepsilon} + \frac{\varepsilon^2}{4} - \frac{3\varepsilon^5}{32}\right)}{\pi}}
< \eta_\varepsilon(\mathbb{Z}) \le
\sqrt{\frac{\ln\!\left(\frac{2}{\varepsilon} + \frac{\varepsilon^2}{4}\right)}{\pi}};
\]
since Guo et al.'s condition forces $\frac{\varepsilon}{m} > \frac{\varepsilon^2}{4}$, our bound is strictly tighter for all admissible $(\varepsilon, m)$, improving the worst-case gap from $O(\varepsilon^2)$ to $O(\varepsilon^6)$. Second, for all $n \ge 2$ and $0 < \varepsilon < \min\{1, (\rho(\mathbb{Z})-1)n\}$,
\[
\eta_\varepsilon(\Lambda) \le \sqrt{\frac{\ln\!\left(\frac{2}{\delta_n} + \frac{\delta_n^2}{4}\right)}{\pi}}\,\mathrm{bl}(\Lambda)
< \sqrt{\frac{\ln\!\left(\frac{2n}{\varepsilon} + (n - 1) - \frac{(n^2 - 1)\varepsilon}{6n(1 + \varepsilon)}\right)}{\pi}}\,\mathrm{bl}(\Lambda),
\]
where $\delta_n = (1+\varepsilon)^{1/n} - 1$; the rational bound is strictly tighter than Guo et al.'s across $100\%$ of their validity window, while remaining valid as $\varepsilon \to 0^+$. Third, for any basis $\mathbf{B}$ with Gram--Schmidt vectors $\mathbf{b}_i^*$ and $M = \max_i \|\mathbf{b}_i^*\|$, define $N_\varepsilon(\mathbf{B}) = \sum_{i=1}^n (\varepsilon/2)^{M^2/\|\mathbf{b}_i^*\|^2 - 1} \in [1, n]$; then
\[
\eta_\varepsilon(\Lambda) \le \sqrt{\ln\!\left(\frac{2}{\delta_{\mathrm{eff}}} + \frac{\delta_{\mathrm{eff}}^2}{4}\right)/\pi}\,M,
\]
where $\delta_{\mathrm{eff}} = \frac{n}{N_\varepsilon(\mathbf{B})}((1+\varepsilon)^{1/n}-1)$. For reduced bases with geometrically decaying Gram--Schmidt lengths, $N_\varepsilon(\mathbf{B}) = O(1)$ is independent of $n$, eliminating the $O(n)$ factor inside the logarithm.
## 2026/2757
* Title: Affine Advantage in Guess-type Attacks on GoldreichrCOs PRGs: Generalization, Characterization and Countermeasures
* Authors: Ximing Fu, Mo LI, Shihan Lyu
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2757)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2757.pdf)
### Abstract
The recent guess-type attack (Eurocrypt'26) on Goldreich's pseudorandom generators exploits the strong bias toward constants that can arise when some inputs of majority-based predicates are fixed.
This attack has demonstrated substantial effectiveness against several concrete parameter instances (Eurocrypt'24\&'25, Asiacrypt'24).
In this paper, we generalize this attack paradigm to arbitrary affine approximations, characterize its capabilities, and develop a new predicate as a countermeasure.
We introduce a guess-and-affine-approximation (GAA) attack framework that generalizes existing guess-type attacks from constant approximations to arbitrary affine approximations of residual nonlinear predicates. To characterize the capacity of GAA attack, we introduce the bit-fixing affine advantage $\operatorname{adv}_{b'}(M_b)$, defined as the maximum affine advantage of a $b$-ary nonlinear predicate $M_b$ over all residuals with $b'$ unfixed inputs.
For polynomial stretch $m=n^s$ and logarithmic nonlinear arity $b=\gamma\log_2 n$, we obtain the optimal attack complexities $C^\star$ linking bit-fixing affine advantages: (1) $C^\star>2^{cn}$ for every $c<2^{-(s-1)/\gamma}$ iff $\operatorname{adv}_{\theta b}(M_b)\to 0$ for every constant $\theta\in(0,1]$;
(2) $C^\star=2^{o(n)}$ iff fixing only $o(b)$ predicate inputs can yield a residual with affine advantage $\frac{1}{2}-o(1)$, and the sufficient direction also holds for $b=\Omega(\log n)$. In particular, if $\operatorname{adv}_{b-r}(M_b) =\frac12- O\left(\frac{\log n}{n}\right)$ for $r\le s-1$, then $C^\star$ can further decrease to $n^{O(1)}$.
These results complement prior analyses for arities $O(1)$, $\omega(1)\cap O(\log n)$, and $\Omega(n^{1/s})$.
Guided by the results above, we introduce the $\XOR_a$--$\MODtwelve_b$ family as a predicate candidate.
We prove that every $b'$-input residual of its nonlinear component retains algebraic degree and algebraic immunity $\Theta(b')$, matching the asymptotic orders of $\MAJ$ (STOC'16).
Moreover, its bit-fixing affine advantage is at most $2^{-\Omega(b')}$, whereas $\operatorname{adv}_{\theta b}(\MAJ_b)\approx \frac12$ for every fixed $\theta\in(0,1)$.
Analysis shows that, for $n=1024$, $m=n^2$, and $b=54$, $\XOR$--$\MODtwelve$ can achieve $\log C^\star \approx 737$, while $\XOR$--$\MAJ$ and $\XOR$--$\MODthree$ have cost exponents of only $182$ and $599$, respectively, under the specified attack.
Furthermore, our experiments show that $\MODtwelve$ offers stronger resistance to belief-propagation-based attacks.
## 2026/2758
* Title: Fine-Grained Proof Complexity for Elementary Arithmetic in Extended Frege
* Authors: Andrew Krapivin, Jiatu Li, Elaine Shi
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2758)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2758.pdf)
### Abstract
Proof complexity has historically focused on qualitative results, such as whether natural mathematical statements (e.g. the Pigeonhole Principle) admit polynomial-size proofs in certain proof systems (e.g. Resolution or Frege). In contrast to the rich theory of algorithm design, there is little understanding of how to design quantitatively efficient proofs. We initiate the study of fine-grained propositional proof complexity. Our motivation comes from an emerging line of cryptographic constructions such as the elegant work of Jain and Jin (2022), in which the efficiency of the resulting scheme is governed by the size of the underlying Extended Frege proofs.
Our main result is that the basic laws of integer arithmetic rCocommutativity and associativity of addition and of multiplication, together with distributivity rCo admit Extended Frege proofs of quasi-linear
size, when addition is implemented by the schoolbook algorithm and multiplication by an FFT-based algorithm. This seemingly elementary result turns out to be surprisingly non-trivial: the natural paper-and-
pencil arguments for distributivity and for associativity of multiplication translate into Extended Frege proofs of quadratic size. To reach quasi-linear size, we develop a technique we call index generalization, which we believe will find wide application in the design of efficient propositional proofs.
## 2026/2759
* Title: Differentially Oblivious Graph Ball Queries
* Authors: Zimai Guo, Cheng Hong, Zhechen Li
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2759)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2759.pdf)
### Abstract
A graph ball query returns all vertices within distance $r$ of a source vertex. On $N$-vertex graphs with maximum degree at most $\Delta$, ordinary breadth-first search answers such queries with $O_{\Delta,r}(1)$ record accesses. These accesses depend on private edges and can reveal graph structure. Full obliviousness hides this dependence, but incurs substantial overhead. Differential obliviousness (DO) [Chan et al., SODA'2019] trades off between privacy and efficiency by relaxing full obliviousness to $(\varepsilon, \delta)$-differential privacy on the access traces of neighboring graphs.
We study DO graph ball queries under three widely-adopted edge-level neighboring relations: add/delete, replacement, and $2$-switch. Starting from padded adjacency records, we charge all observable accesses, including preprocessing. For fixed $\Delta,r\ge2$, error probability $0<\beta<1/2$, and $0\le\delta\le(1-2\beta)/2$, we prove an $\Omega_{\Delta,r,\beta}(1+Ne^{-\varepsilon})$ expected lower bound at every sufficiently large connected graph and every public source. For every fixed $r\ge2$, we give $(\varepsilon,0)$-DO sampling algorithms with expected cost $O_{\Delta,r,\beta}(1+Ne^{-\varepsilon/C})$ using constant size of hidden workspace, where $C$ depends only on $\Delta,r$ and the neighboring relation. Especially, for $r=2$, we have $C=1$, which indicates that the algorithm achieves the tight bound under all three relations. Finally, we consider repeated queries on the same graph, where the cost of protected preprocessing can be amortized across queries. For fixed $\Delta,r,\beta$, we construct a linear-size reusable index with $(\varepsilon,0)$-DO preprocessing and constant query cost. The expected preprocessing cost is linear in $N$ when $\varepsilon$ exceeds a sufficiently large constant multiple of $\log N$.
## 2026/2760
* Title: Syndrome Decoding out of the Head: Structure-Aided Side-Channel Witness Recovery on SDitH
* Authors: Jaeyeon Lee, Jaeho Jeon, Young-Sik Kim
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2760)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2760.pdf)
### Abstract
Regular syndrome decoding (RSD) underlies several code-based signature schemes, including SD-in-the-Head (SDitH). Its secret witness has exactly one nonzero coordinate per block, and the selected positions must satisfy a public syndrome equation. In this work, we show how these structural constraints can be exploited to recover the complete witness from imperfect side-channel information.
We present a profiled power analysis of the witness-embedding operation in the SDitH Round-3 reference implementation. We train convolutional neural networks (CNNs) to classify the mux digits encoding each regular block and use their outputs to rank candidate positions. To correct errors in these predictions, we combine the resulting rankings with the public syndrome and the regularity constraints. We formulate this recovery problem as an affine correction system with block-validity constraints and analyze its rank, consistency, and uniqueness for the systematic parity-check matrix used in SDitH. Based on this analysis, we develop a quotient-syndrome decoder that identifies blocks whose true positions fall outside the initial candidate lists, avoiding exhaustive enumeration of block subsets.
We evaluate our attack on an ARM Cortex-M4 using measured power traces. With a single target trace per key, our approach recovers all 100 test witnesses under -Os using 4,000 profiling traces, and 91 out of 100 under -O3 using 16,000 profiling traces. Each successful recovery matches all 616 serialized witness bits. These results demonstrate how the regular structure of RSD and the public syndrome can compensate for imperfect side-channel predictions, thereby enabling full-witness recovery.
## 2026/2761
* Title: Superlattice methods for the shortest vector problem and discrete Gaussian sampling
* Authors: Minki Hhan, Jiseung Kim, Sunyeop Kim, Thijs Laarhoven
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2761)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2761.pdf)
### Abstract
We give worst-case algorithms for the shortest vector problem (SVP) and discrete Gaussian sampling (DGS) at arbitrary widths. Both algorithms generate lists on a dense superlattice and combine vectors along a chain down to the input lattice. Random shifts let us control the expected number of representations of a vector regardless of the lattice. For SVP we balance these counts with a novel midpoint-shell test to ensure output distributions are sufficiently uniform. For DGS we use Gaussian weights and correct the probabilities of selecting entries from the final list.
For SVP, our optimized algorithm runs in time $2^{0.409 n+o(n)}$ and space $2^{0.259 n+o(n)}$, improving the best $2^{n/2 + o(n)}$ worst-case SVP complexities of Hhan [ePrint, 2026]. For Haar-random lattices, or assuming a natural upper bound on the kissing constant, the costs of the algorithm match the $2^{0.292 n+o(n)}$ time and $2^{0.208 n+o(n)}$ space of Becker-Ducas-Gama-Laarhoven [SODA 2016].
For quantum SVP, through a series of refinements and generalizations we obtain worst-case time and space $2^{0.247n+o(n)}$. This improves the best known heuristic quantum SVP time complexity of $2^{0.256n+o(n)}$ due to Bonnetain-Chailloux-Schrottenloher-Shen [Eurocrypt 2023], without requiring any heuristic assumptions.
For discrete Gaussian sampling, we provide a sampling algorithm at any width with distribution error $2^{-\kappa}$, running in worst-case time $2^{0.292 n+o(n)} \operatorname{poly}(\kappa)$ and space $2^{0.208 n+o(n)} \operatorname{poly}(\kappa)$, improving upon the previous best $2^{n + o(n)}$ cost for sampling at arbitrary widths of Aggarwal-Dadush-Regev-Stephens-Davidowitz [STOC 2015].
As further applications, we obtain fast algorithms for approximate-SVP/CVP, bounded distance decoding, and estimating the Gaussian mass and smoothing parameter of any lattice.
## 2026/2762
* Title: AirBB: Lightweight Threshold Anonymous Credentials without Random Oracles from BB Signatures
* Authors: Sebastian Faust, Jonas Hofmann, Philipp-Florens Lehwalder, Hussien Othmann
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2762)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2762.pdf)
### Abstract
Anonymous credentials are a well-studied cryptographic primitive enabling users to prove statements about their identity and selectively present personal information in an unlinkable manner. The issuer, however, is often a single point of failure. Threshold issuance addresses this by distributing the issuer across several parties such that a quorum of them must cooperate to issue credentials. Numerous constructions of single-issuer and threshold issuance anonymous credentials have been proposed. However, existing schemes each have at least one of the following weaknesses: (1) their presentations depend on the number of attributes, (2) they are not concretely efficient, or (3) they rely on the random oracle model (ROM) for non-interactive presentations.
In this work, we present a new construction of threshold anonymous credentials that has a constant presentation size of 240 bytes, rivals the efficiency of BBS, and does not rely on the random oracle model. We achieve this by combining techniques from set commitments with Boneh-Boyen (BB) signatures (Eurocrypt'04) and prove our scheme's security in the algebraic group model. This is on par with the tight security proofs of existing schemes, which typically rely on the AGM or GGM, or on assumptions justified in those models. Since signing uses linear operations, the scheme is easily thresholdizable, without requiring interaction between the issuers or preprocessing.
## 2026/2763
* Title: On Key Recovery from Exposed Neural XOR Activations in DES and TDES
* Authors: Kwangjo Kim
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2763)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2763.pdf)
### Abstract
We study the security of natural ReLU realizations of the
Data Encryption Standard (DES) and two-key Triple DES (TDES) when an adversary can submit non-binary inputs and observe selected intermediate neural values. The attack exploits the piecewise-linear extension
of XOR: paired inputs that differ in one expanded right-half bit reveal the corresponding round-key bit from the change in a natural XOR node. For DES, the resulting 48-bit first-round subkey leaves only the eight key-schedule bits omitted by PC-2; enumerating these bits and checking an intermediate value recovers the 56-bit effective master key. For two-key EDE TDES, the same technique recovers the first encryption subkey
of K_1 and the last DES subkey used by the middle decryption under K_2; two independent 2^8
completions then recover the full 112-bit key
pair. The exposed round subkey is recovered with a constant number of leakage observations per bit, giving query complexity linear in the targeted subkey length; the remaining searches are fixed-size for DES. Python experiments report exact recovery for 1,000 random DES keys and 1,000 random two-key TDES key pairs. These results concern a synthetic intermediate-oracle model for natural neural implementations and do not claim a physical attack on conventional DES/TDES hardware or software.
## 2026/2764
* Title: Trapdoors Beyond Inversion: Recoverable Information in Public-Key Cryptography
* Authors: Kanad Chakravarti, Shreyas Gupta, Bhavana Kanukurthi, Girisha Shankar
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2764)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2764.pdf)
### Abstract
Classical trapdoor functions recover complete preimages, whereas public-key decryption needs only designated information about an encryption input. We study this distinction through trapdoor hardcore functions (TDHFs), whose trapdoor recovers a prescribed value $h(x)$
from a public evaluation $f (x)$, while $h(x)$ remains pseudorandom given the public key and evaluation. For perfectly correct primitives, we show that adaptive TDHFs characterize IND-CCA2-secure public-key encryption. The constructive direction requires only a single recoverable bit and allows noninjective public evaluations. Extending the rejection-sampling approach, we show that adaptive pseudorandomness itself controls queries to unselected candidate evaluations, without requiring full inversion. We
also prove that lossy TDHFs characterize lossy public-key encryption, identifying statistical hiding of the designated recovered value as the relevant lossiness requirement. Fiber samplability together with fiber hiding yields a parameter-preserving correspondence with lossy encryption and, through the known long-message transformation, almost-always
lossy trapdoor functions when the recovered-value length exceeds the fiber-sampling randomness length. Ordinary TDHFs provide the corresponding characterization of IND-CPA encryption. Together, these results make explicit the roles of adaptive recovery, conditional sampling, and randomness costs in transformations between public-key encryption and full-inversion primitives.
## 2026/2765
* Title: BASTION: Lock-Step, Staggered and Sequential Share Schedules for a First-Order Masked ML-KEM NTT on FPGA
* Authors: Marcos L|izaro D|!az
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2765)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2765.pdf)
### Abstract
The Number Theoretic Transform (NTT) is the arithmetic core of ML-KEM (FIPS 203) and a prominent side-channel target in hardware. Because the transform is linear, first-order arithmetic masking applies share-wise without fresh randomness, which leaves one design decision open: when each share is processed. Published designs process the shares in sequence on one datapath, or on one datapath per share started a configurable delay apart and in random order; running both datapaths in lock-step is the third option. We implement the three schedules on one first-order masked NTT core for ML-KEM on Artix-7 and measure their cost and pre-silicon leakage under one synthesis flow. An iso-architectural unmasked control separates the cost of masking from that of parallelisation: the delivered lock-step core costs 1.56x the LUTs, 2.33x the slices and twice the DSPs of the control at an unchanged cycle count and 196.1 instead of 227.3 MHz, while the sequential core needs 9 LUTs more than the control at twice the cycles. We state when a set of samples combines both shares of a secret, measure the criterion on the RTL and use it as a cycle-accurate oracle. On a whole-design toggle model that sums both share domains, calibrated with injected flaws detected within 750 traces, no schedule leaks at first order in five pairs of runs of 10^5 traces. At second order the schedules form a scale: the lock-step core leaks in single samples, the sequential core only at the pair of samples that its public offset relates, and the staggered core in both ways at every delay we tested short of one transform. Every detected sample lies in the support view of the oracle, which flags up to 80% of the samples of a window for the univariate test, and some lie outside its form view, so lazy reduction matters. A check on the routed netlist finds no cell shared by the domains of the lock-step and staggered cores, and finds the cells that synthesis shares once the preservation attributes are removed. Silicon validation is left to future work.
## 2026/2766
* Title: Keyber: Recovering the Signal by Amplifying the Noise in ML-KEM
* Authors: Vipin Kumar, Prathamesh Ram, Suparna Kundu, Dhiman Saha
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2766)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2766.pdf)
### Abstract
ML-KEM (FIPS 203) is now being deployed in real-world applications to provide security against adversaries with quantum computers. Therefore, the resistance of ML-KEMrCOs implementations to physical attacks requires thorough evaluation. So far, fault attacks on ML-KEM have targeted the decapsulation operation. The key generation operation has received little attention from a fault-attack perspective.
In this work, we present Keyber, the first statistical ineffective fault attack (SIFA) on the key generation of ML-KEM. Keyber is a key-recovery attack that needs only a single fault in key generation. The fault adds a known value to the error vector. Thus, the public key becomes faulty, while the seed of the public matrix remains
intact. Every subsequent decapsulation, therefore, carries a known induced error. The adversary encapsulates locally and keeps only ciphertexts whose induced error peaks at exactly one coefficient. A decapsulation failure can then be attributed to that coefficient. Each query yields one linear inequality on the secret key, with no further faults.
We observe that approximately 0.2-27% of encapsulations are usable for different parameter sets of ML-KEM. The full secret key is recovered using up to 30,000 inequalities across all security levels. We also realise the attack for ML-KEM-512 on an ARM Cortex-M4 device using a single over-clock fault. We then recover the entire secret key end-to-end. A single fault in this one-time operation thus compromises the key for its entire lifetime. Protecting ML-KEM, therefore, demands hardening not only decapsulation, but also key generation.
## 2026/2767
* Title: HqcLethe: Streaming HQC Encapsulation for Tiny Stateless Servers
* Authors: Wind Wong, Klaus v. Gleissenthall
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2767)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2767.pdf)
### Abstract
Stateless post-quantum authenticated key exchanges such as post-quantum WireGuard hedge against unexpected cryptanalytic advances by combining a lattice KEM with code-based Classic McEliece. However, recent attacks have led Germany's BSI to advise against McEliece, which leaves these protocols with lattices alone. HQC, the code-based KEM that NIST selected, could restore diversity, but its keys do not fit in a single packet, so a server would have to buffer multi-packet handshakes. This would leave an attack surface for memory exhaustion, which is what WireGuard's stateless handshake was designed to avoid in the first place. McTiny demonstrated that stateless key encapsulation for Classic McEliece is possible by streaming key blocks one-at-a-time. However, HQC's encapsulation does not split as easily into individual packets, as cyclic polynomial multiplication, unlike matrix-vector multiplication, is inherently non-local.
We present HqcLethe, a stateless key exchange that streams an HQC encapsulation in packet-sized pieces. It uses the Chinese remainder theorem to split the polynomial multiplication into independent remainders, one per packet, and masks them so that they reveal no more than an ordinary HQC ciphertext, which we prove in Rocq with SSProve; we also verify session secrecy, server authentication and forward secrecy in ProVerif. Client puzzles bound CPU exhaustion, and HqcLethe removes memory exhaustion: on a Raspberry Pi 3B+, each worker runs in a fixed 1.2-1.6 MiB. At category 5 it sends 27x fewer bytes and uses 9.0x less server CPU than McTiny, the earlier stateless code-based design.
## 2026/2768
* Title: Cryptanalysis of Pairing-Based Additive Masking with Prime-Field Secrets
* Authors: Harliv Singh
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2768)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2768.pdf)
### Abstract
We analyze the public values generated by a pairing-based
multi-secret sharing construction in which each secret is
added to a power of a common pairing value. The secrets lie
in the prime subfield of the extension field containing the
public values. We show that the first two public values
determine the common mask whenever an explicit nonzero
condition holds. We also show that the exceptional case is
resolved for the parameter set considered in the numerical
example. Consequently, the complete public transcript
determines every secret, without requiring a participant
share or an initially compromised secret. We further
describe two related forms of leakage: recovery of all
secrets after disclosure of one suitable secret, and a
reduction in the possible values of a secret from a single
public value. Our conclusions concern the field-valued,
common-base masking construction analyzed here; they do
not imply that pairing-based secret sharing in general is
insecure.
## 2026/2769
* Title: Projective Jet Geometry and Hold-Out Rank of Binary Goppa Codes
* Authors: Yongge Wang
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2769)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2769.pdf)
### Abstract
We develop a projective-geometric and algebraic framework for the
higher-order polynomial relations among the public generator-matrix
columns of a binary Goppa code, the relations exploited by the recent structural distinguishers and key-recovery methods for Classic McEliece.
The alternant representation realizes the public columns as rational
points on a hidden curve parametrized over $\F_{2^m}$; higher-order
vanishing conditions become fat-point conditions, pulled back along the
hidden parametrization.
Our first contribution is an exact characterization of a
codimension-$t$ ambient space containing all products of $d$ code
polynomials: the products satisfy $(\pi^dh)'\equiv0\pmod{g^2}$ for the
support polynomial $\pi$ and the Goppa polynomial $g$, and the space of degree-$\le dD$ polynomials with this property has dimension $dD+1-t$
once $dD\ge2t-1$. Equality with the actual product space is proved in a
local regime, verified computationally on every instance tested, and
stated as a conjecture. Our second contribution is a Frobenius-descent theorem: a binary form vanishes on the hidden curve if and only if it
vanishes on the union of its $m$ Frobenius conjugates, with the $\F_2$-dimension of such forms equal to the $K$-dimension of the ideal of
the union; from it we derive Hilbert-function bounds, including a
multilinear version attained on all but one of the twenty-seven keys
with $t\ge5$ tested (and missed by one on that key), and the local
structure of the pulled-back forms at the roots of $g$.
We then analyze the universal dependencies among Hasse-jet conditions
in the multilinear setting of the attacks: a closed formula for the rank
at a single column, and an explicit family of $\binom{k}{2s-d-2}$
relations between the conditions at any two columns. At a held-out
column we prove an exact codimension formula for the Goppa subcode
generated by the gradients of the vanishing forms. Finally, running our experimental pipeline (the jet system of the attacks, without the
key-recovery steps) on six independently generated keys of a Classic-McEliece-shaped code shows that the kernel dimension is
comparable to that of a random control, while every kernel form exhibits
the predicted hidden-curve vanishing, the gradients span the predicted
subcode, and the first-order normal data of the kernel is nearly
independent of the key. Together these results explain the main
components of the nuisance space of the recent attacks and isolate the conjectures that remain for an exact description of the kernel.
## 2026/2770
* Title: Sumcheck bit packing
* Authors: Matteo Frigo, abhi shelat
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2770)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2770.pdf)
### Abstract
Circuit-based zero-knowledge proofs over large fields waste most of a field element when they commit to a single bit. We study the problem of committing to packed witnesses, in which $m$ bits are stored in one element of $GF(2^m)$, while still allowing the proof system to verify linear claims about the individual bits.
Prior approaches to this problem either (a) scale to packing only 4 bits[Fs24], (b) require tensor-structured claims and additional sumcheck rounds that incur larger soundness error [DP23,DP25], or (c) rely on Frobenius automorphisms [Koc26]. In contrast, we present a simpler reduction that exploits only the $GF(2)$-linearity of the field trace and achieves soundness error $2^{-m}$ for arbitrary bit-linear claims. We then use a characterization of trace-zero field elements to make the reduction zero-knowledge over any hiding linear commitment scheme: whereas previous constructions verify $O(m^2)$ or $O(m)$quadratic constraints in the commitment scheme, our protocol requires only linear constraints.
## 2026/2771
* Title: Can Fully Homomorphic Encryption on Public Blockchains Protect Sensitive Medical Consultations? A Security and Privacy Assessment
* Authors: Nizamuddeen Shahruddeen
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2771)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2771.pdf)
### Abstract %===================================================================== \begin{abstract}
People seeking care for stigmatised conditions often delay treatment because they fear exposure, yet digital health services routinely expose user data and metadata. Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) now allows smart contracts on public blockchains to hold encrypted data whose decryption is governed by contract rules. This paper assesses whether this approach can protect sensitive medical consultations. We present ConfidentialCare, a prototype built on Zama's fhEVM and the Ethereum Sepolia testnet, in which patients' symptoms are encrypted in the browser and only an authorised doctor may decrypt them. We evaluated three versions of the system through metadata inspection, access-control tests and attack experiments, asking what FHE protects and whether access to patient data can be controlled. Consultation content remained confidential in all tested cases, and the design collects no names, emails or accounts. However, public on-chain metadata revealed which wallet consulted which doctor, the doctor's specialty, when, and the approximate length of each message, and this history would be exposed permanently if the wallet were ever linked to the patient. We also found that a doctor granted access could re-share a patient's encrypted data, both through a confused-deputy flaw in the application contract, which we fixed, and directly through fhEVM's access control list, and that neither withdrawing access nor closing a consultation removed it. A redesign based on time-limited, revocable delegation prevented re-sharing, and Zama's live service enforced its revocation and expiry immediately. On Sepolia, Zama's key-management service refused decryption without a valid delegation, and revocation took effect within the same block in all six trials. We conclude that FHE protects what patients disclose, but not the fact or context of seeking care, and that in fhEVM a permission to decrypt is also a permission to share.
\end{abstract}
## 2026/2772
* Title: STIR/SHAKEN: A Cocktail of Cryptographic Clumsiness
* Authors: Josh Brown, Matthew Hardeman, Paul Grubbs
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2772)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2772.pdf)
### Abstract
Scams and fraudulent robocalls are rampant in the telephone system. Fraudsters often employ call spoofing to impersonate a known caller to the victim, making it difficult to detect and block the fraudsterrCOs calls. In an effort to combat call spoofing, the U.S. government in 2019 mandated the use of a new suite of protocols called STIR/SHAKEN.
In STIR/SHAKEN, providers include a cryptographically-signed assertion about the callerrCOs identity and other metadata in call headers. This serves both to authentically convey this metadata between providers during call routing and to provide reportable, verifiable evidence of bad behavior by providers that originate fraudulent calls.
This paper asks whether STIR/SHAKEN achieves its security goals, and at what cost to the telephone system. On security we find serious structural weaknesses: a year of STIR/SHAKEN certificates observed in production call traffic shows a PKI riddled with noncompliancerConearly half of valid certificates violate the specificationsrCoa provider can prevent later verification of a STIR/SHAKEN assertion by taking its certificate offline, and a header-malleability flaw, which we verified in test calls placed with the help of a real telephone provider, causes a spoofed caller ID to be displayed as verified on some phones. The cost, meanwhile, has been steep: STIR/SHAKEN deployment has created systemic new harms to the privacy of all phone users.
These new privacy harms take two forms. First, signing call metadata renders it cryptographically non-repudiable: for the first time in the phone systemrCOs 150-year history, there is publicly verifiable proof that a call took place. Second, STIR/SHAKENrCOs complexity pushes providers to outsource signing and verificationrCoroughly half of the 29 providers we surveyed do so, most to a handful of dominant vendorsrCocausing widespread new leakage of sensitive call metadata to off-path third parties. (One such off-path third party, Neustar, was acquired in 2021 by TransUnion, one of the three nationwide U.S. credit bureaus. Neustar authenticates over 30 billion calls per monthrCoand TransUnion sells a rCLPhone Behavior IntelligencerCY product advertising rCLinsight into billions of call transactionsrCY obtained through its rCLdeep carrier relationships.rCY) These structural harms sit atop implementation failures: our tests also found implementations that completely break the federally-mandated *67 caller-privacy mechanism.
Finally, we propose solutions to the problems we identify. To fix the PKI, STIR/SHAKEN should adopt certificate transparency; a public certificate log also stops providers from taking certificates offline to defeat later verification. Our remaining solutions are cryptographic, and share a prerequisite STIR/SHAKEN cannot currently meet: the origin provider must learn the destination providerrCOs public key. We thus design a backwards-compatible key discovery mechanism that uses SIP error messages. We then attack the privacy harms directly: replacing STIR/SHAKENrCOs signatures with asymmetric message franking (AMF) makes call metadata deniable again, and issuing AMFs blindly keeps it hidden from outsourced signers. We design the first blind signing protocol for the AMF construction of Tyagi et al., along with new security definitions capturing requirements novel to the setting, such as verifier-hiding blindness. To our knowledge, we thereby initiate the formal study of blind signing for designated-verifier signatures; we believe this is of independent interest.
## 2026/2773
* Title: Vectorized (2, 2)-Isogenies in the Theta Model Using AVX-512 and Applications to SQIsign
* Authors: Marius A. Aardal, Diego F. Aranha, Patrick Longa, Giacomo Pope
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2773)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2773.pdf)
### Abstract
Higher-dimensional isogenies have emerged as a powerful building block for isogeny-based cryptography, with recent protocols such as SQIsign relying on the efficient evaluation of $(2^n, 2^n)$-isogenies. Despite their attractive security and compactness properties, these schemes remain computationally expensive and improving their performance is an important step for their real-world use.
In this work, we present a high-performance AVX-512 implementation of two-dimensional isogenies that effectively exploits their data-level parallelism.
We develop a code generator that produces efficient AVX-512 implementations of arithmetic over $\mathbb{F}_p$ and $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ for Montgomery-friendly primes of the form $p=c\cdot 2^e-1$ with $e\approx \log_2(p)$, covering the family of primes used by several protocols based on two-dimensional isogenies, including SQIsign. Building on this arithmetic, we vectorize the $(2^n, 2^n)$-isogeny formulas by Dartois et al. (ASIACRYPT 2024), achieving significant speedups over the corresponding, highly-optimized scalar implementation that uses x86-64 assembly. As an application, we accelerate the Round 2 version of SQIsign verification and obtain speedups of $2.5\times$ at NIST security level I and $3.2\times$ and $3.3\times$ at levels III and V, respectively.
Our code generator also readily supports the larger primes of Round 3 SQIsign, for which we obtain verification speedups between $3.1\times$ and $3.4\times$.
## 2026/2774
* Title: Separating Pseudorandom Codes from Quantum Random Oracles
* Authors: Nico D||ttling, Anne M|+ller, Mahesh Sreekumar Rajasree
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2774)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2774.pdf)
### Abstract
Pseudorandom codes (PRCs) combine two seemingly conflicting goals: robustness to noise and computational indistinguishability from random strings. Recent work has shown that classical symmetric-key PRCs over binary alphabets cannot be constructed from minimal cryptographic assumptions, such as one-way functions, via black-box reductions. In this work, we revisit this question in the presence of quantum computation and quantum information.
We first consider pseudorandom codes with classical codewords but quantum algorithms. We prove that symmetric-key pseudorandom codes robust to Bernoulli noise admit no black-box construction from quantum random oracles, and hence from quantum-secure one-way functions. This establishes that the classical black-box barrier for PRCs persists even in the quantum computational setting. Motivated by this separation, we investigate the notion of quantum pseudorandom codes (QPRCs), in which codewords are quantum states and security is defined via computational indistinguishability from Haar-random states.
We then present several positive results. Assuming quantum-secure one-way functions, we construct QPRCs that are secure against a single encoding query, allow multiple copies of the challenge state, and tolerate an error rate matching that of any classical uniquely decodable binary error-correcting code against a dephasing or bit-flip channel. We also show that the PRFS with proof of destruction due to Behera et al. (TCC 2023) can be extended to a 0-bit QPRC that is secure against multiple encoding queries and tolerates unbounded phase errors but only a constant number of bit-flip errors. Finally, assuming the existence of quantum-secure single-query pseudorandom states (1PRS), we construct single-query single-copy QPRC that tolerate arbitrary Pauli noise up to the decoding radius of a quantum error-correcting code
with unique decoding.
## 2026/2775
* Title: Quadratic Extractors
* Authors: Gautam Chandrasekaran, Jesse Goodman, David Zuckerman
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2775)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2775.pdf)
### Abstract
A quadratic source is a random variable $X\sim\mathbb{F}_2^n$ generated by applying $n$ quadratics to a hidden uniform string. Previously, the best-known explicit extractor for this model required min-entropy roughly $k=n-\sqrt{\log n}$. In this paper, we give an explicit construction for min-entropy $k=\mathrm{polylog}(n)$. Even for the special case of $2$-local sources, where each bit of $X$ depends on two hidden uniform bits, achieving an entropy requirement below $k=\sqrt{n}$ was an important open problem. This is because such sources provably cannot be reduced (in a black-box manner) to our most powerful general-purpose seedless extractor, known as a sumset extractor. Our new extractor bypasses this barrier, providing the first explicit construction to go beyond sumset extraction.
## 2026/2776
* Title: One-Way Functions and Local Descriptions of Random Data
* Authors: Dimitrios Myrisiotis
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2776)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2776.pdf)
### Abstract
Sample compression describes a labeled sample by retained examples and extra information from which a decoder recovers the labels. We show that estimating the length of the shortest such description of random data is hard on average if and only if one-way functions exist. As in Hirahara and Nanashima's (FOCS 2023) consistent pointwise programs, the decoder labels each sample point separately, as a hypothesis does, but in our main result the labels are random rather than given by a concept. To label a point, it sees only that point, the retained examples with one extra bit each, a program, and a public random string revealed before the description is chosen. The length counts the choice of retained examples, their extra bits and the program, not the examples themselves. The task is to output a number between the $1/2$ and $3/4$ quantiles of the shortest length over the public string, up to an additive $a\lceil\log_2m\rceil$ for $m$ points and a fixed integer $a\ge0$. The main result takes polynomially many, at least $8n$, uniform $n$-bit points with independent uniform labels and any large enough polynomial time bound per query. If one-way functions exist, every efficient randomized algorithm fails to output such a number for all large $n$ with probability above an inverse polynomial that is the same for all algorithms and time bounds. Otherwise, for every inverse polynomial, some such algorithm fails with at most that probability for infinitely many $n$. For hardness, labels derived from one-way functions look random yet have short local descriptions, which random labels rarely have. The converse inverts a function that generates descriptions. One-way functions also exist if and only if estimating between the quantiles is hard, at some suitable time bound, for some PAC-style samplable data of the same sizes, labeled by a concept independent of the points.
## 2026/2777
* Title: Tamper-Resilient Quantum Key Encapsulation with Coherent Ciphertexts from qOWFs in the QROM
* Authors: Shiyu He
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2777)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2777.pdf)
### Abstract
Kitagawa et al. (CRYPTO 2024) constructed the first tamper-resilient, chosen-ciphertext-secure public-key encryption from quantum-secure one-way functions (qOWFs). However, their construction assumes authenticated classical channels and measures intermediate signed-phase states to produce classical ciphertexts. Therefore we ask whether coherent quantum ciphertexts can support active security and certified deletion over unauthenticated classical and quantum channels.
We construct the first tamper-resilient quantum key-encapsulation mechanism (QKEM) from qOWFs with coherent quantum ciphertexts and genuine validity-feedback confidentiality in the quantum random-oracle model. Our scheme, designated Signed-Fourier QKEM, retains signed coherence through honest encapsulation to form a state-consuming quantum ciphertext. Aside from an authentic root verification key, all transmitted classical metadata and quantum registers are subject to arbitrary adversarial tampering and entanglement. With one quantum public key per independent signing domain and a challenge serial unused in pre-challenge decapsulation queries, we prove session-key confidentiality under genuine different-header decapsulation, including queries sharing the challenge serial, and genuine same-header validity feedback. We also establish fixed-header key robustness against adaptive decapsulation attacks, bounding wrong-key acceptance by a negligible probability.
Furthermore, our scheme provides publicly verifiable computational certified deletion, protecting session-key privacy against subsequent, complete exposure of the receiver's secret state. Finally, composing our QKEM with a classical one-time private data encapsulation mechanism yields header-restricted chosen-ciphertext confidentiality for arbitrary polynomial-length messages.
## 2026/2778
* Title: Breaking $\mathsf{TraintoDefend}$ via Adaptive Neuron Clustering in Cryptanalytic Model Extraction
* Authors: Haojie Wu, Haolin Liu, Tianshuo Cong, Guoyan Zhang
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2778)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2778.pdf)
### Abstract
Cryptanalytic model extraction poses a fundamental threat to deep learning model confidentiality by enabling precise parameter recovery with theoretical guarantees of functional equivalence. To counter this growing threat, $\mathsf{Train to Defend}$ (NeurIPS 2025) was proposed as the first dedicated defense against cryptanalytic extraction and remains the only defense believed to be effective to date. It encourages neurons to learn similar weights so that they switch activation states together, making their individual contributions harder to distinguish. However, we notice that neurons with similar weights need not switch activation states together under small perturbations. Instead, weight similarity can cause the original clustering rule to merge signatures from distinct neurons when only a subset of their normalized weight coordinates agree. Motivated by this observation, we introduce $\mathsf{SimBreak}$, an adaptive clustering rule that breaks the weight-similarity defense of $\mathsf{Train to Defend}$. $\mathsf{SimBreak}$ estimates a relative scale from all jointly observed weight coordinates and uses the same scale to test both weight direction and bias consistency. Across six protected fully connected networks trained on MNIST, $\mathsf{SimBreak}$ raises target layer signature recovery from $0\%$ to $100\%$, with a maximum relative recovery error of $2^{-22.27}$. Our work challenges the use of neuron weight similarity as a sufficient basis for protection and establishes adaptive evaluation as essential to assessing cryptanalytic extraction defenses.
## 2026/2779
* Title: Optimizations and First-Order Masking of AIMer on Cortex-M4
* Authors: DongCheon Kim, Jaeseung Han, Dong-Guk Han, Seog Chung Seo
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2779)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2779.pdf)
### Abstract
We optimize AIMer-128f on Cortex-M4 and propose first-order masking of its signing. Since squaring is a Frobenius map about $\times 16$ cheaper than multiplication, we restructure AIM2's inverse-Mersenne S-box into a Frobenius-shifted addition chain, cutting multiplications per S-box from 24/23 to 9/10. Since one multiplication-check operand is constant across $N = 16$ parties, we build the partial-product table once and reuse it. Both are orthogonal to single-multiplication acceleration, and with a Radix-16 multiplier on NUCLEO-L4R5ZI, keygen/sign/verify drop 18.55%/3.94%/7.30%. 1-PINI gadgets on every sensitive operation give first-order probing security. TVLA finds no first-order leakage in 100,000 traces. Masking costs $\times 10.5$, itself improved 5.20%.
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