• [digest] 2026 Week 43

    From IACR ePrint Archive@noreply@example.invalid to sci.crypt on Mon Oct 26 02:25:08 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.crypt

    ## In this issue
    1. [2026/229] ANIMAGUS: A Provably Secure Tweakable Wide-Block Mode
    2. [2026/1141] DASTE: Decentralized Ad-Hoc Access-Structured ...
    3. [2026/1171] Forensic categories: a framework for SQIsign-like ...
    4. [2026/1190] CMoSS: Composable Modular Security Specifications ...
    5. [2026/1876] AH-BKZ: A Lattice Reduction Algorithm with ...
    6. [2026/2523] GKS Fully Homomorphic Encryption: Security Analysis
    7. [2026/2524] Homomorphic Encryption for High-precision ...
    8. [2026/2535] Quantum State Search with Classical Interactive Advice
    9. [2026/2539] Implementing Predicate Encryption for Branching ...
    10. [2026/2540] Efficient and Compact High-order Masking Raccoon on ...
    11. [2026/2557] Energy Consumption of Post-Quantum Cryptography on ...
    12. [2026/2560] Graphs and cycles in curve-based collision walks
    13. [2026/2562] A New Approach to Reducing Modulus Requirements in ...
    14. [2026/2570] Membership Inference in Privacy-Preserving Vector ...
    15. [2026/2571] A Spectral Theory of Local-to-Global Leakage
    16. [2026/2572] DISCO*: DIstributed and SCalable Oblivious Joins ...
    17. [2026/2573] Hidden parabolic subgroups of $\mathrm{GL}_n$ over ...
    18. [2026/2574] Broadcast and Trace from Lattices: Collusion- ...
    19. [2026/2575] RDK-CKKS: A Framework for Rigorous Error Analysis ...
    20. [2026/2576] Reverse Engineering IVXV: A Specification and ...
    21. [2026/2577] Back to the Bits: Revisiting MAYOrCOs Data ...
    22. [2026/2578] HAETAE on a Diet: Less Stack, Less Time on Low-End ...
    23. [2026/2579] Active and Passive Attacks against TPM 2.0-based ...
    24. [2026/2580] Table-Free Constant-Work BCH Decoding by Algebraic ...
    25. [2026/2581] Post-Quantum Sublinear Lookup Arguments from ...
    26. [2026/2582] SoK: Design-Level Backdoors in Block Ciphers ...
    27. [2026/2583] Rounded Gaussians are Discrete Gaussians
    28. [2026/2584] SHAKEing SLH-DSA with Non-profiled SCAs
    29. [2026/2585] Verifiable Post-Quantum TLS Handshake: Recognizing ...
    30. [2026/2586] Modeling Modular Multiplication for Monomial ...
    31. [2026/2587] RingTrace: Model-Free Spatio-Temporal Detection and ...
    32. [2026/2588] Eras MPC: Granular Preprocessing and Abort Recovery ...
    33. [2026/2589] Cyclic isogeny walks on genus-zero modular curves
    34. [2026/2590] Rerandomizable Garbling for Arithmetic Circuits
    35. [2026/2591] Sotto Maschera: Masking the Sota-Voce Fixed-Weight ...
    36. [2026/2592] A Post Quantum Vector Commitment Scheme with ...
    37. [2026/2593] Efficient Laconic Oblivious Transfer with Malicious ...
    38. [2026/2594] Registered Functional Encryption for Circuits with ...
    39. [2026/2595] Getting to the right root: radical isogenies of ...
    40. [2026/2596] ANNULAR: Post-Quantum Private Transactions from ...
    41. [2026/2597] The Good, the Bad, and the Noisy: A Systematic ...
    42. [2026/2598] The Distributed Producer-Consumer Model Is All You ...
    43. [2026/2599] Linear Cryptanalysis of TFHE-Friendly Cipher FRAST ...
    44. [2026/2600] High-Precision Bootstrapping for GCKKS
    45. [2026/2601] Integer Coordinate Families and Threshold RSA ...
    46. [2026/2602] A Probabilistic Extension of the Division Property: ...
    47. [2026/2603] PPAD Hardness from SIS
    48. [2026/2604] Balsamic: One-round Threshold UOV from GPU- ...
    49. [2026/2605] M|!mir: A Stateless Private Search Engine
    50. [2026/2606] On the $s$-projected Goppa Codes and their ...
    51. [2026/2607] Quantum Cryptomania with Classical Communication ...
    52. [2026/2608] Pairwise Independence of Ten-Round AES
    53. [2026/2609] SoK: Optimization Tools for the Hydra Multiplayer ...
    54. [2026/2610] A Crypto-Agile Mixed-Radix NTT Accelerator for ...
    55. [2026/2611] For Thirty Pieces of Silver: Overcoming Non-IID via ...
    56. [2026/2612] Tritone: Pairwise Garbled Disputes for Multi-Party ...
    57. [2026/2613] Learning with Quantization and Worst Case Lattice ...
    58. [2026/2614] Tight Post-Quantum Multi-Key Security of the FX ...
    59. [2026/2615] Faster and Smaller Anonymous Credentials from ...
    60. [2026/2616] Descent-PBS: Programmable Bootstrapping beyond the ...
    61. [2026/2617] Mutual Correlated Agreement and List-Decoding: ...
    62. [2026/2618] Efficient (Functional) Bootstrapping for CKKS over ...
    63. [2026/2619] Smaller Share Size for Evolving Secret Sharing: ...
    ## 2026/229
    * Title: ANIMAGUS: A Provably Secure Tweakable Wide-Block Mode
    * Authors: G|+lnihal |uzt|+rk, Onur Ko|oak, O-fuz Yayla
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/229)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/229.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Motivated by the accordion mode approach, we propose a length preserving tweakable wide block mode based on the hash-encrypt-hash paradigm. The construction uses AES and HMAC-SHA3-256 with five purpose separated working keys derived from a single master key, replacing algebraic universal hashing with a cryptographic keyed hash. An encrypted internal seed couples two separately keyed head branches and determines the counter mode keystream. The head layers permit parallel evaluation, while inter-branch dependence is retained even when the tail is empty. The mode supports every bit length within its specified range, starting from $2n$ bits without padding, where $n$ is the block size. Variable length external information is incorporated into a fixed length core tweak through application specific preprocessing. We establish birthday bound tweakable variable-input-length strong pseudorandom permutation security under the stated block cipher, keyed hash, and key derivation assumptions. The analysis covers adaptive encryption and decryption queries, varying message lengths, repeated tweaks, and reused internal values. We also describe derived interfaces for authenticated encryption with associated data, tweakable encryption, and deterministic authenticated encryption, distinguishing their additional security requirements from the core guarantee.
    ## 2026/1141
    * Title: DASTE: Decentralized Ad-Hoc Access-Structured Threshold Encryption with Dynamic Policy Evolution
    * Authors: Anil Kumar Pradhan, Abhraneel Dutta
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1141)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1141.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    We introduce DASTE, a decentralized encryption primitive for auditable access control in settings where users independently generate public keys, register them on an immutable ledger, and decrypt only through collaboration.
    In DASTE, a sender encrypts under an access structure (e.g., an access tree / LSSS) whose leaves are concrete registered public keys selected at encryption time.
    A ciphertext can therefore be opened only by a qualifying coalition of registered key holders that jointly reconstructs the masking secret.
    DASTE is designed for dynamic policy-governed environments in which access conditions may need to change after encryption.
    To support this, we provide ciphertext-only policy evolution operations, including semantically neutral insertion, threshold escalation, subtree revocation, and ciphertext rerandomization, that update ciphertexts without reissuing user secret keys and without requiring plaintext access.
    We give two instantiations: a classical discrete-log-based construction, included as a conceptual baseline, and a post-quantum construction based on decisional Ring-LWE. For the RLWE construction, we prove coalition-bounded IND-CPA security via a standard hybrid argument.
    Together, these results yield a ledger-anchored, access-structured, post-quantum threshold encryption framework suitable for decentralized key management and governance-oriented decryption workflows.
    ## 2026/1171
    * Title: Forensic categories: a framework for SQIsign-like primitives
    * Authors: Andrea Basso, Luca De Feo, Sikhar Patranabis, Ilinca Radulescu, Benjamin Wesolowski
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1171)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1171.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Using the language of categories, we introduce a novel framework abstracting the key algorithmic features of the Deuring correspondence between supersingular elliptic curves and quaternion orders and of the post-quantum signature scheme SQIsign based on it. We then show how to construct an interactive identification scheme and digital signature within this framework, and also instantiate more advanced primitives, such as a chameleon hash function. We present two distinct instantiations of the framework based on isogenies of supersingular elliptic curves: the first recovers (one-dimensional) SQIsign, while the second leads to the recently published SQInstructor.
    ## 2026/1190
    * Title: CMoSS: Composable Modular Security Specifications Framework
    * Authors: Sara Wr||tniak, Hemi Leibowitz, Ewa Syta, Amir Herzberg
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1190)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1190.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    CMoSS facilitates modular specifications, design and analysis of cryptographic protocols. Modular design and analysis is achieved by supporting provably-secure compositions of protocols; typically, a protocol uses a blackbox subprotocol, and is proven secure when composed with any subprotocol meeting the blackbox specifications. For modularity of specifications, CMoSS extends the approach of the MoSS framework: protocol specifications are defined modularly, by a set of independent predicates (games) for each model (assumption) and requirement (goal). CMoSS makes it feasible to rigorously specify, develop and analyze realistic applied cryptographic protocols, supporting real-time concurrency and involving different attacker capabilities, delays, faults and synchronization challenges. CMoSS specifications provide a precise formalization of the informal specifications used by practitioners, facilitating provable security for practical protocols.
    ## 2026/1876
    * Title: AH-BKZ: A Lattice Reduction Algorithm with Asynchronous Hybrid Processing
    * Authors: Renya Hashimoto, Junji Shikata, Atsushi Takayasu, Yuntao Wang
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1876)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1876.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Evaluating the hardness of the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) is essential for selecting secure parameters in lattice-based cryptography. The fastest current SVP solvers are based on variants of G6K, but their large memory consumption remains a major bottleneck, making high-dimensional executions difficult. A common strategy for alleviating this memory bottleneck is strong basis reduction preprocessing before a sieve-based algorithm. This strategy can solve SVP instances in higher dimensions than standalone G6K under the same memory constraints, but the time required for basis reduction becomes a major issue. ProPnjBKZ, a fast basis reduction algorithm optimized by Wang et al., is currently used as a promising preprocessing method for solving high-dimensional SVP instances. In this paper, we identify that, in the ProPnjBKZ-based SVP-solving pipeline, memory resources can remain underutilized during the preprocessing phase, since ProPnjBKZ requires less memory than the subsequent high-dimensional sieving process. Based on this observation, we propose AH-BKZ, which exploits such unused computational resources by asynchronously running multiple SVP oracles, thereby accelerating basis reduction. Our experiments show that, compared with ProPnjBKZ-based preprocessing, AH-BKZ reduces the overall runtime by up to 23.1% and by 18.6% on average among successful runs for dimensions 124-148 under comparable peak memory constraints. Moreover, in a supplementary experiment conducted in a larger computational environment, AH-BKZ set new solving records for dimension 163 in the TU Darmstadt SVP Challenge and for dimension 164 in the Ideal Lattice Challenge.
    ## 2026/2523
    * Title: GKS Fully Homomorphic Encryption: Security Analysis
    * Authors: John Graham, Soundes Marzougui, Milos Pavlovic, Vladimir Shpilrain
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2523)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2523.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    All traditional encryption schemes share a fundamental operational vulnerability: encrypted data must be decrypted before it can be used. Fully homomorphic encryption eliminates this vulnerability by enabling computation directly on encrypted data, but existing FHE schemes impose substantial practical constraints that limit deployment.
    This paper presents a formal security analysis of the Gribov-Kahrobaei-Shpilrain (GKS) private-key FHE scheme. GKS requires no bootstrapping or de-linearization, produces bit-exact decryption, supports native encrypted search, and scales to unbounded depth.
    ## 2026/2524
    * Title: Homomorphic Encryption for High-precision Arithmetic of Approximate Numbers
    * Authors: Shihe Ma, Jiaming Liu, Anyu Wang, Xiaoyun Wang
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2524)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2524.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    The CKKS fully homomorphic encryption scheme enables efficient arithmetic over complex numbers, but each homomorphic multiplication consumes a large modulus to ensure enough precision, limiting both the circuit depth and precision supported by CKKS.
    This work addresses this problem by proposing Generalized CKKS (GCKKS), a CKKS analogue of the GBFV scheme (EUROCRYPT 2025) that trades the number of slots for reduced modulus consumption.
    Despite its high-level similarity to GBFV, GCKKS faces new challenges caused by the different encoding and encryption structures of CKKS. We address these challenges with novel techniques not present in GBFV.
    Our plaintext encoding starts with an improved and SIMD version of Costache, Smart, and Vivek's encoding in 2017.
    Namely, it rounds complex values to cyclotomic integers instead of Gaussian integers, and reduces the rounding problem to solving CVP instances.
    This encoding allows storing high-precision complex values in polynomials with small canonical norms.
    As an important observation, the encoding can be simplified to a sparse CKKS encoding followed by multiplication with a polynomial constructed from a short vector in the encoding lattice.
    We show that by integrating this encoding format into GCKKS decryption, most GCKKS homomorphic operations and the corresponding noise analyses reduce to their CKKS counterparts.
    This relieves GCKKS from any heavy computational or noise overhead.
    In experiments, GCKKS provides 7 levels with 1000-bit precision at ring dimension $2^{14}$, where each multiplication takes less than 30 ms.
    To our knowledge, this precision has never been achieved before.
    It can be used to preserve enough precision after noise flooding, a necessary ingredient for CKKS circuit privacy and a common approach to secure threshold CKKS and to provide IND-CPA$^\text{D}$ security.
    ## 2026/2535
    * Title: Quantum State Search with Classical Interactive Advice
    * Authors: Mohammed Barhoush
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2535)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2535.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    We study whether a quantum verifier can find a hidden quantum state by exchanging classical messages with an unbounded prover who knows the state. The verifier has access to a reflection oracle about the target. For a Haar-random $n$-qubit target, we prove that achieving constant average fidelity with the target requires $(q+1)^2(B+1)=\Omega(2^n)$, where $q$ is the number of verifier queries and $B$ is the total prover-to-verifier communication. The bound allows arbitrary classical interaction and unrestricted computation between queries. Our proof extends the lower bound of Aaronson and Kuperberg (ToC'07) from a single classical proof to an arbitrary classical interaction.
    As a result, we obtain a quantum-oracle separation of QMA from QCIP. In particular, we give a unitary oracle $\mathcal{U}$ such that there exists a language $L\in\mathrm{QMA}^{\mathcal{U}}$ but $L\notin\mathrm{QCIP}^{\mathcal{U}}$. Our separation holds even for UniqueQMA, the restriction of QMA to verification with a unique quantum witness, which is known to be strictly weaker than QMA in the quantum black-box setting.
    We further give an oracle construction for a notion known as QMA--QCIP[2] gap problem. This gives average case hardness for a QMA language under classical access to a QCIP[2] decision oracle and is used in establishing negative results on witness encryption and quantum indistinguishability obfuscation.
    ## 2026/2539
    * Title: Implementing Predicate Encryption for Branching Programs: Private Computation over Key-Homomorphic Encodings Without FHE
    * Authors: Sora Suegami
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2539)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2539.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Predicate encryption (PE) encrypts a message under an attribute that the ciphertext hides, allowing a secret key for a predicate to recover the message only when the attribute satisfies the predicate. Existing public-key implementations support useful specialized predicates, but enforcing heterogeneous conditions with one key requires an attribute representation fixed before encryption, which grows with the supported types of conditions and cannot express types it does not anticipate, such as regular expressions. Lattice-based PE for general circuits is far more expressive, but existing constructions rely on fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), typically evaluated as a Boolean circuit over key-homomorphic encodings, which expands the computation and amplifies noise growth and leads to impractically large parameters. Existing PE thus offers either practicality for restricted predicates or expressiveness at an impractical cost.
    We present a lattice-based PE scheme for branching programs that avoids FHE entirely and combines heterogeneous conditions in a single predicate over a common attribute representation. It rests on two techniques: asymmetric multiplication, which multiplies a hidden program state by an encrypted attribute symbol through decryption inside an encoding, and lookup tables over exponents, which evaluate arbitrary state transitions on a single encoding by ring automorphisms. Under circular Ring-LWE, the scheme is selectively weakly attribute-hiding against polynomially many colluding unauthorized keys.
    We give, to our knowledge, the first implementation of PE for a predicate class as expressive as branching programs. On a single NVIDIA A100 GPU, for a predicate that combines a range check and a regular-expression check on a $10$-bit attribute, with parameters targeting $128$-bit security against known Ring-LWE attacks, encryption takes $4.06$ hours, key generation $4.70$ hours, and decryption $4.23$ hours, with $342.25$ GB ciphertexts. These costs remain large, but compared with a single FHE multiplication evaluated as a Boolean circuit over encodings, the basic step of PE that evaluates FHE over encodings, whose ciphertexts alone occupy tens of exabytes per attribute bit, our ciphertexts are at least $2\times10^9$ times smaller per attribute bit, and our decryption needs at least $2\times10^{16}$ times fewer $64$-bit integer multiplications.
    ## 2026/2540
    * Title: Efficient and Compact High-order Masking Raccoon on Memory Constrained Devices
    * Authors: Junhao Huang, Yiteng Sun, Jipeng Zhang, Weijia Wang, Donglong Chen, Haiyang Xue, Guomin Yang
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2540)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2540.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Raccoon, presented at CRYPTO 2024, is a provably secure lattice-based signature scheme featuring an $O(d \log{d})$ masking overhead. Although it did not advance beyond the first-round of NIST's additional call for post-quantum digital signatures, Raccoon remains a promising candidate due to its low masking overhead and strong provable side-channel resistance.

    This paper proposes the first efficient and compact implementation of high-order Raccoon on the ARM Cortex-M4, with a focus on optimizing its polynomial multiplication, sampling, and memory consumption.
    1) For polynomial multiplication, we present a consecutive 32-bit NTT/INTT implementation for the two moduli in Raccoon, enabling optimal 3+3+3 layer merging to reduce memory-access overhead, together with extensive lazy reduction to minimize modular reductions. As a side contribution, we propose a novel negative double Montgomery reduction technique to accelerate double modular reductions in multi-moduli NTT.
    2) For polynomial sampling, we identify and resolve a previously overlooked performance bottleneck caused by frequent incremental SHAKE256 invocations for small data chunks on ARM Cortex-M4. By transitioning to the one-shot approach, we achieve speedups of at least $1.80\times$ across all sampling routines in Raccoon.
    3) Finally, we explore memory-saving techniques to enable the practical deployment of high-order masked Raccoon (up to 32 orders) on resource-constrained IoT devices.

    The proposed implementations outperform the Raccoon reference implementation by $1.85\times$-$2.25\times$. Notably, high-order masked Raccoon-192 outperforms masked Dilithium3 by $3.12\times, 8.07\times$, and $2.71\times$ at masking orders $d=2$, $4$, and $8$, respectively. Finally, the leakage evaluations confirm that the second-order Raccoon implementation provides strong resistance to differential power analysis (DPA) once micro-architectural transitional leakages are mitigated.
    ## 2026/2557
    * Title: Energy Consumption of Post-Quantum Cryptography on Constrained and General-Purpose Architectures
    * Authors: Olivier Gillot, William J. Buchanan, Madjid G. Tehrani
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2557)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2557.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    With Q-day approaching, the transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) has begun, with governments across the US, UK and EU mandating migration to quantum-resistant standards. This paper benchmarks the three NIST-standardised PQC algorithmsrCoFIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA)rCoacross key generation, signing and verification operations, measuring both computational performance and energy consumption on a range of constrained IoT-class devices, from the 32-bit Raspberry Pi 1 and Zero to the 64-bit Raspberry Pi 4, as well as commodity laptop hardware. Using the FNIRSI FNB58 USB power meter and OpenSSL 3.5, results show that ML-KEM and ML-DSA achieve energy and speed efficiency comparable to classical elliptic-curve cryptography across all tested architectures. However, SLH-DSA signing is inadvisable on constrained hardware: energy costs for SLH-DSA signing on 32-bit devices were up to 243% higher than on equivalent 64-bit hardware, making it impractical for resource-limited IoT deployments. These findings have direct implications for IoT security practitioners planning PQC migration.
    ## 2026/2560
    * Title: Graphs and cycles in curve-based collision walks
    * Authors: Sebastiano Boscardin, Jolijn Cottaar, Monika Trimoska
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2560)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2560.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    In this work, we look at collision-based attacks both for elliptic curve and isogeny problems. Our main focus is on attacks in the multi-user setting, i.e., where one tries to recover all secret keys of a large set of $L$ public keys simultaneously, in a faster way than the total time required to attack each key individually. We consider three different problems: (1) the discrete logarithm problem on elliptic curves, (2) the isogeny pathfinding problem on supersingular $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$-curves, (3) the isogeny pathfinding problem on supersingular $\mathbb{F}_p$-curves. We first survey the existing van Oorschot and Wiener style attacks on these three problems. Then we propose versions of the pseudorandom walks that are better suited for isogeny pathfinding problems without additional restrictions. We then apply these new walks to the multi-user setting and analyse which properties we can achieve compared to the discrete logarithm case where we show that we can extract all $L$ public keys with $L$ useful collisions and without an infiltrator (a user for which we know the secret key). Specifically, for (2) we can extract $L$ public keys with approximately $L + \log(L)$ useful collisions and no infiltrator needed. Our analysis shows however that heuristic and infiltrator-aided strategies are more efficient while enjoying practically similar gains. For (3) we can extract approximately $0.75L$ public keys with $L$ useful collisions, but with an infiltrator.
    ## 2026/2562
    * Title: A New Approach to Reducing Modulus Requirements in Homomorphic Computation: Precision Allocation in CKKS
    * Authors: Zhaoyang Liang, Runkun Liu, Jingwei Fang, Dan Ding
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2562)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2562.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) enables computation over encrypted data subject to the prescribed security and precision requirements (allowable deviations from ideal results). Among all FHE schemes, CKKS is a representative scheme for approximate arithmetic, allowing the same operation on multiple values packed into a single RLWE ciphertext.
    Reducing ciphertext modulus \(Q\) for given output precision requirements under RLWE security constraints is a central challenge in homomorphic computation. However, despite advances in plaintext and ciphertext representations, algorithmic optimizations, and modulus management, the budget in most existing approaches remains dependent on the highest required precision and cannot reduce the baseline modulus cost to overcome encryption noise.
    In this work, we make average rather than maximum precision requirements govern the modulus budget and achieve savings in the baseline cost. Under decryption correctness constraints, we make these possible by allocating arbitrary output precision among independent values and quantify the modulus savings arising from differences in their precision requirements.
    As a bonus, our construction preserves the standard CKKS ciphertext format, which helps maintain compatibility with existing optimizations. And the construction inherits the IND-CPA security of CKKS without additional cryptographic assumptions.
    With a 64-bit average precision requirement, we transfer 75 bits of precision without reducing evaluation depth and up to 735 bits while preserving correct initial recovery, raising the precision allocated to the target values to 2,269 bits. For six successive squarings of 256 messages targeting 224-bit precision, our implementation reduces the initial modulus bit length by 67\% compared with standard CKKS, allowing a fourfold reduction in ring dimension.
    ## 2026/2570
    * Title: Membership Inference in Privacy-Preserving Vector Search
    * Authors: Georg Fuchsbauer, Carter Luck, Adam O'Neill, Ian Rapko
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2570)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2570.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Vector retrieval increasingly runs over sensitive embedding databases. Backend-compatible protections are desirable in such settings in that they transform the plaintext vectors while leaving the search algorithm itself unchanged. However, the protected database then leaks some geometry, that is, information about the distances between the stored vectors. We study membership-inference attacks on such leakage given a single database snapshot and known plaintexts. Our central finding is that membership privacy depends on how much geometry is revealed and on whether known plaintexts can be linked to positions in the snapshot, and that the effect of each of these depends on the other.
    We first break the prior Scale-and-Perturb (SAP) scheme of Fuchsbauer et al. (FGHO, SCN 2022) with no known plaintexts. Empirically, our attack achieves advantage 0.997 on MS-MARCO. We then introduce Rotate-and-Perturb (RAP), a special case of a scheme FGHO call SAP-I and leave unanalyzed. For uniform data on the sphere, we prove perfect membership privacy with no known plaintexts. For fixed noise parameter +# ree (0, 2], achieving constant advantage requires a number of known plaintext-ciphertext pairs at least logarithmic in the database size, provided that number is below the embedding dimension. Empirically, our attack reaches advantage 0.5 with 3 such pairs at database size 100 and 7 at 100,000 on text embeddings.
    We also study two more approaches, namely ideal distance-comparison-revealing encryption (DCRE) and an encrypted HNSW index using function-hiding inner-product functional encryption. Ideal DCRE remains vulnerable to known plaintext-ciphertext pairs. On the tested MS-MARCO databases, our attack on the encrypted HNSW index requires knowing 19rCo32% of the database and their corresponding index vertices to reach advantage 0.5.
    Finally, we study augmentations to these schemes to mitigate our attacks, shuffling and secret projection. Together, they substantially increase the number of known plaintexts needed by our tested attacks on RAP and comparison-only leakage.
    ## 2026/2571
    * Title: A Spectral Theory of Local-to-Global Leakage
    * Authors: Rei Ueno
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2571)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2571.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    This paper studies how local leakages characterize the global leakage in additive secret sharing over a finite abelian group, which is a special case of linear secret sharing and side-channel masking. Our main finding is structural: local-to-global leakage is governed by two disjoint components---the magnitude of local leakage and its spectral alignment across shares, while existing literature attempted to characterize the global leakage only by local mutual information (MI). We first give an exact decomposition of leakage in additive secret sharing. The decomposition reveals a structural parameter invisible to MI, while previous literature conjectured that the local MI alone suffices to characterize global leakage. We then show that this missing parameter is indispensable: two leakage channels with identical local MI can induce exponentially different global leakage. Our exact decomposition identifies the missing structural quantity and completely characterizes this phenomenon.
    We then show the separation theorem with its realizability---local MI, despite governing the classical leakage bounds, does not even determine the exponential rate at which leakage vanishes under homomorphic composition. More strongly, we establish a universal separation theorem: even when all permutation-invariant scalar measures of local leakage agree, the global leakage can exhibit exponentially different decay rates.
    We further provide the characterization of the spectral alignment factor and derive its lower bound through character-order multiplicity and M||bius inversion. We then extend the framework to automorphism-weighted sharing. We establish that automorphism-weighted sharing can achieve perfect leakage cancellation with finitely many shares, even for non-trivial full-support local leakage channels. In sharp contrast, such perfect cancellation is impossible for ordinary additive sharing with non-trivial i.i.d local leakage channels and finitely many shares.
    Consequently, local leakage magnitudes correctly measure the average amount of local leakage, but discard the compatibility structure needed for composition. Magnitude-only bounds must optimize over structural alignments that the actual leakage channel does not realize.
    ## 2026/2572
    * Title: DISCO*: DIstributed and SCalable Oblivious Joins and Oblivious Primitives
    * Authors: Apostolos Mavrogiannakis, Xian Wang, Ioannis Demertzis, Dimitrios Papadopoulos, Minos Garofalakis
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2572)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2572.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) let clients outsource computation to untrusted clouds, but they remain vulnerable to side-channel and leakage-abuse attacks. Recent work closes this gap by combining hardware enclaves with oblivious computation, which offers strong security guarantees yet struggles to meet the performance and scalability demands of real-world deployments. In this work, we present DISCO, the first scalable, distributed, and fully oblivious database system that seamlessly combines hardware enclaves with cutting-edge oblivious primitives and novel optimizations that significantly reduce inter-server communication overheads. What distinguishes DISCO from prior work is a suite of distributed frameworks that unlock parallel computation and fundamentally shift the design paradigm of distributed oblivious systems, enabling practical deployment at scales that were unattainable with previous solutions. We provide a thorough evaluation of the performance of our system on both synthetic and real-world datasets. Our evaluation demonstrates that our design significantly reduces the gap between theory and practice, achieving 88|u speedup over Jodes and 180|u over SODA on non-foreign key joins with N = 2-#rU| elements. Most importantly, we report, for the first time, results for computations at the terabyte scale.
    ## 2026/2573
    * Title: Hidden parabolic subgroups of $\mathrm{GL}_n$ over finite chain rings * Authors: Muhammad Imran
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2573)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2573.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    We give a bounded-error quantum polynomial-time algorithm for finding hidden parabolic subgroups of $\mathrm{GL}_n(R)$ over any effectively presented finite chain ring $R$. We call auxiliary group elements or subgroups used to extract information through oracle queries \emph{probes}. For chain length at least two, elementary abelian socle probes first recover the complete flag modulo the maximal ideal. When the residue field has size $q\ge3$, we reconstruct the flag recursively, lifting rank-one terminal members one digit at a time. The intermediate digits reduce to abelian hidden subgroup problems, while the final digit is a finite-field multiple-shift problem solved using learning from subset and Fourier sampling. For $q=2$, where distinct flags can have the same stabilizer, we instead lift the conjugate parabolic subgroup through the congruence filtration. A final linear system determines it modulo normalizer directions. The algorithm outputs generators with probability at least $1-\epsilon$ in time $\mathrm{poly}(n,\log|R|,\log(1/\epsilon))$. Consequences include $\mathrm{GL}_n(\mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z})$ for every $N\ge2$ and, with an explicit maximal-order presentation, $\mathrm{GL}_n(\mathcal{O}_K/N\mathcal{O}_K)$ for number fields $K$.
    ## 2026/2574
    * Title: Broadcast and Trace from Lattices: Collusion-Resistant and Publicly Traceable
    * Authors: Jeffrey Champion
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2574)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2574.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    A broadcast and trace scheme combines broadcast encryption with accountability. Specifically, broadcast encryption is augmented with an algorithm for tracing traitors within a specified set, even if the given pirate decoder is created by an arbitrary collusion of users. As in broadcast encryption, the size of the ciphertext should be sublinear in the total number of users $N$.
    In this work, we generically construct collusion-resistant broadcast and trace that supports public tracing from attribute-based encryption with succinct ciphertexts and lockable obfuscation, both of which are known from the decomposed LWE assumption. Our scheme has ciphertext size $\sqrt{N}\cdot\mathsf{poly}(\lambda, \log N)$, while the master public key and secret keys have size $\mathsf{poly}(\lambda, \log N)$. Previously, collusion-resistant broadcast and trace with public tracing required pairing-based assumptions, positional witness encryption, or indistinguishability obfuscation. In particular, we provide the first construction that relies on a simple and instance-independent lattice assumption.
    At the heart of our construction is a novel way to use nested lockable obfuscations, taking inspiration from the recent work of Nassar, Waters, and Wu that constructs positional witness encryption from indistinguishability obfuscation for null programs.
    ## 2026/2575
    * Title: RDK-CKKS: A Framework for Rigorous Error Analysis for CKKS Computation * Authors: Taeyeong Noh, Aimad Chabounia, Guillaume Hanrot, Alain Passel|?gue
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2575)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2575.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    The CKKS scheme allows approximate arithmetic on encrypted data, and has found widespread use in privacy-preserving computation. A rigorous control of its homomorphic error is critical for both precision and security guarantees. In particular, in some settings such as IND-CPA^D or threshold settings, the latter computation error should be hidden at the time of decryption. This is achieved by noise flooding techniques, which require a precise upper bound on the computational error magnitude. When dealing with discrete data and a single decryptor, this is addressed by ensuring statistical correctness, which also requires a precise error management. Yet, current approaches to CKKS error analysis provide either rigorous worst-case bounds that are far off empirical measures, or average-case bounds that rely on various heuristics and do not provide strong enough guarantees for security.
    In this work, we develop a framework based on so-called randomization keys (RDKs), which are encryptions of zero injected at key-switching and rescaling steps to render the homomorphic error amenable to rigorous probabilistic analysis. Combined with tail bounds, this yields, to our knowledge, the first fully rigorous error analysis framework for CKKS computations. Our framework is modular: RDKs make the error of each elementary operation amenable to rigorous bounds, after which the error of a circuit follows by standard numerical error propagation.
    Our rigorous bounds are comparable to heuristic ones and closely match empirical measures, but cost additional evaluation material (RDKs) generated by the secret key holder. In the context of rigorous bootstrapping, this induces a communication overhead of 27% over the bootstrapping keys for a single evaluation, and of a further 8% for each additional evaluation. We show that, when a circuit is evaluated repeatedly, most of these keys can be reused across evaluations.
    As our main application, we derive a complete and rigorous analysis of binary CKKS bootstrapping, and a full, rigorous, parameter set for the bootstrap-and-clean technique. Compared to a standard Gaussian-type heuristic approach, our parameters only require a modulus increase for bootstrapping of $\approx 3\%$, while providing rigorous precision estimates.
    ## 2026/2576
    * Title: Reverse Engineering IVXV: A Specification and Security Analysis of EstoniarCOs Internet Voting System
    * Authors: Tingfeng Yu, Thomas Haines
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2576)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2576.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    EstoniarCOs IVXV system is one of the worldrCOs longest-running and largest-scale deployments of internet voting, yet it lacks a precise public specification of the protocol as implemented or security claims, which has left it difficult to audit independently. We address this as follows:
    First, we reverse engineer a detailed specification of IVXV as implementedrCocovering the setup, voting, tallying, and audit phasesrCocomprising protocol-flow diagrams, pseudocode algorithms, and the core data structures, reconstructed from the public source code, official documentation, and configuration examples.
    Second, we complement the specification with an executable TLA+ model of the setup, voting, and tally phases, which we check with TLC for basic executability and correctness and
    which serves as an extensible basis for modelling concrete attack scenarios. Third, using the reconstructed specification, we carry out a systematic security analysis under a broad range of threat models spanning individual verifiability, universal verifiability,
    privacy, coercion resistance, and eligibility verifiability, and we reassess previously known attacks against the current protocol.
    Fourth, we compare IVXV against two of the most extensively studied deployed systems, Belenios and Swiss Post, across these properties in order to situate its guarantees.
    Fifth, we discover numerous previously unknown, vulnerabilitiesrCospanning ballot privacy, individual verifiability, and universal verifiability, many of them arising from inconsistent validation logic across components, encoding discrepancies, and unchecked cryptographic parametersrCoand validate selected findings with proof-of-concept tests that exercise the real implementation.
    Finally, we propose concrete mitigations for the attacks we identify.
    ## 2026/2577
    * Title: Back to the Bits: Revisiting MAYOrCOs Data Representation for GPU and Tensor-Core Acceleration
    * Authors: JunHyeok Choi, DongCheon Kim, Seog Chung Seo
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2577)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2577.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    MAYO, a multivariate quadratic signature scheme with small public keys and signatures, is a third-round candidate in the additional signature standardization process of the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Cloud and application servers receiving many independent signing requests need to batch them on Graphics Processing Units (GPUs). MAYO's nibble-sliced representation suits CPU shuffle instructions or multiplication tables, but on GPUs it costs a memory access or several instructions per $\mathbb{F}_{16}$ multiplication. The existing GPU implementation cuMAYO (CHES 2026) uses the second-round nibble-sliced representation and looks up a shared-memory table per $\mathbb{F}_{16}$ multiplication. Our GPU implementation keeps all keys and intermediate values in the bitsliced representation yet matches the official Known Answer Test vectors. Its bitsliced multiply-accumulate circuit computes matrix products $32$ coefficients at a time with only word-wide AND and XOR. One thread block handles one instance; KeyGen, Sign, and Verify each run as a single kernel from the expansion of the compact key to the output; and representation conversion is confined to reading and writing specification-defined byte strings. For same-key batches, an additional tensor path decomposes $\mathbb{F}_{16}$ matrix products into binary ones and computes the large Sign and Verify matrix products on Tensor Cores. To our knowledge, the tensor path is the first use of Tensor Cores for MAYO, and ours is the first GPU implementation of the third-round specification. On an RTX 4090, the bitsliced implementation achieves $2.75\times$ to $6.73\times$ higher throughput and $6.99\times$ to $34.35\times$ lower single-shot latency than cuMAYO for all three operations of the four parameter sets. In same-key batches, the tensor path, including key preparation, reaches $13.75\times$ to $30.62\times$ the throughput of cuMAYO on distinct-key batches.
    ## 2026/2578
    * Title: HAETAE on a Diet: Less Stack, Less Time on Low-End Microcontrollers
    * Authors: MinGi Kim, YoungBeom Kim, DongHyun Shin, Seog Chung Seo
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2578)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2578.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    HAETAE has shorter public keys and signatures than ML-DSA, but the signing stack of its reference implementation reaches $158\, \mathrm{KiB}$ on Cortex-M4. The Low-Stack HAETAE implementation presented at CHES'26 brings the signing stack down to $5.7$-$5.9\,\mathrm{KiB}$; yet even HAETAE-2 still needs $8,718\,\mathrm{B}$ in a realistic IoT scenario, where the secret key and the signature buffer share the same SRAM. Gaussian regeneration further increases signing time by up to a factor 2.6 relative to the C reference. Although HAETAE's modulus $q = 64\,513$ fits in 16 bits, signing and verification also need values modulo $2q$, so existing implementations keep 32-bit working polynomials. We store them in 16 bits and lift each coefficient to modulo $2q$ in a register only when it is consumed, and let objects with disjoint lifetimes share buffers, which lowers peak stack usage without any additional Gaussian regeneration. Exact Gaussian replay and caching method then record the acceptance decisions and partial CDT ranks of the first generation in the unused space of the signature buffer, so that the original samples are restored from the same random stream with less recomputation. For Cortex-M4, Cortex-M3, MSP430, and AVR, we further design NTT modular multiplication and butterflies that preserve 16-bit storage, and optimize the arithmetic of the FFT and the Gaussian sampler. We validate our implementation on $8\,\mathrm{KiB}$ hardware: a single C firmware image on the ATmega2560 runs HAETAE-2 key generation, signing with the generated key, and verification, and uses a total of $8,070\,\mathrm{B}$ of SRAM, including the secret key, the signature buffer, static data, and the stack. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first standardization-track PQC-DSA implementation that signs within $8\,\mathrm{KiB}$ of total SRAM on physical hardware. Compared with Low-Stack HAETAE on Cortex-M4, Cortex-M3, MSP430, and AVR, our implementation reduces stack usage by up to 34% and runs key generation and signing 1.18-2.51$\times$ faster wherever Low-Stack can run them.
    ## 2026/2579
    * Title: Active and Passive Attacks against TPM 2.0-based Full Disk Encryption * Authors: Sven Freud, Lennart Hein, Dominik Klein
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2579)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2579.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Trusted Platform Module (TPM) 2.0-based full-disk encryption (FDE) has gained renewed importance with the rise of bring-your-own-device environments. Aside from Windows Bitlocker, which uses the TPM since the days of Windows Vista, FDE has also been recently adopted by several Linux distributions. We revisit tamper attacks against TPM 2.0-based FDE systems and analyze the security of current Windows and Linux implementations. We examine TPM 2.0 sealing mechanisms and demonstrate passive and active attacks against systems using discrete TPMs (dTPMs) connected via SPI, using a mini PC and a notebook platform as case studies. While dTPMs are highly tamper-resistant, they remain vulnerable to attacks on the communication bus. We further show that active attacks are not limited to dTPM bus interception but can also affect firmware TPMs (fTPMs). Specifically, we present a prototype attack in a virtualized QEMU environment targeting UEFI firmware rather than bus communication, impacting both Windows and modern Linux systems. These attacks enable us to break not only BitLocker-based full-disk encryption on Windows, but also all current Linux implementations, including those that utilize parameter encryption to secure the bus communication. Our findings expose weaknesses in current TPM 2.0 FDE implementations and motivate stronger specification-level protections.
    ## 2026/2580
    * Title: Table-Free Constant-Work BCH Decoding by Algebraic Index Elimination
    * Authors: Vincent Cheng, Zhaohui Cheng, Junfeng Fan, Kaixin Xiong
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2580)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2580.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Algebraic error-correcting codes such as BCH let lattice-based key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) reduce bandwidth and the decryption-failure rate. The decoderrCOs input is determined jointly by the long-term secret and a ciphertext that an adversary may choose. Variable work or table accesses that reveal error positions can enable key recovery even when the KEM uses implicit rejection. Walters and Sinha Roy (WSR) gave a constant-work BCH decoder whose fixed-address realization scans the entire field per protected lookup.
    We introduce algebraic index elimination, a table-free realization of WSRrCOs paired BerlekamprCoMassey schedule in which received-word-dependent selections become fixed circuits over public addresses. We prove bounded-distance correctness through radius t and source-level trace regularity for the parameterized decoder. We instantiate the construction with length-511 subcodes of dimension k , using ( k,t ) = (384 , 14) and (320 , 22). Their implementations eliminate, respectively, 5.2 and 7.2 KiB of received-word-selected field and encoder tables required by matched fixed-address WSR baselines. On WSRrCOs published parameter sets, an Intel i7-13700 runs the deterministic cores 35.7rCo82.4 |u faster than the fixed-address WSR baselines. In the identity-based lattice KEMs ANSA-IBKEM1 and ANSA-IBKEM2, decapsulation is 25.5 |u and 10.9 |u faster than with fixed-address WSR baselines for the same 384-dimensional subcode. Index elimination does not equalize operands. Ordinary C masks compiled to received-word-dependent branches under Apple Clang 21; a compiler-opaque primitive prevented this transformation in the audited builds. At the measured radii, scalar binaries of both codes pass the x86-64, Cortex-A76 and Cortex-M4 mean-timing screens, and the Apple M5 screens with Data Independent Timing (DIT) enabled.
    ## 2026/2581
    * Title: Post-Quantum Sublinear Lookup Arguments from Polynomial Preprocessing * Authors: Adarsh Basumata, Chaya Ganesh, Varun Narayanan, Sikhar Patranabis, Surbhi Shaw, Nitin Singh
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2581)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2581.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Lookup arguments with sublinear prover time typically rely on bilinear pairings. The only exception is the recent work of Campanelli, Carrillo, Cascudo, Fiore, Francati, and Gennaro (ePrint 2025/238); however, they rely on general-purpose SNARKs to certify expensive preprocessing, which requires non-black-box usage of cryptographic primitives. Thus practical realizations of sublinear lookups with post-quantum security remain challenging. We develop the first plausibly post-quantum sublinear lookup arguments that avoid general-purpose SNARKs via polynomial preprocessing and a novel adaptation of proximity testing for Reed-Muller codes into the Interactive Oracle Proof (IOP) framework.
    Our starting point is a knowledge-sound polynomial commitment scheme (PCS) with prover-side preprocessing based on the Kedlaya-Umans framework. Rather than proving the expensive preprocessing computation inside a general-purpose SNARK, we directly certify its output using Reed-Muller proximity testing and an associated evaluation protocol. For polynomials of size $N$, our approach yields multivariate and univariate PCS with $N^{1+\epsilon}\mathsf{polylog}(N)$ preprocessing and only $\mathsf{polylog}(N)$ online prover time, while retaining $\mathsf{polylog}(N)$ proof size and verification.
    We leverage this PCS to obtain a lookup argument for \textit{static} tables of size $N$ and $k\ll N$ lookups with $k\cdot\mathsf{polylog}(N)$ online prover time and $\mathsf{polylog}(N)$ verification and proof size. We further extend the approach to \textit{updatable} tables, obtaining $O(k(N^\epsilon+\mathsf{polylog}(N)))$ amortized prover time for a $k$-sized batch of reads and writes, where $\epsilon \in (0,1)$. We retain $\mathsf{polylog}(N)$ proof size and verification. The IOPs underlying our lookup arguments satisfy round-by-round (knowledge) soundness, which can be compiled into plausibly post-quantum arguments in the (quantum) random oracle model with transparent setup.
    ## 2026/2582
    * Title: SoK: Design-Level Backdoors in Block Ciphers Constructions, Detection, and Key Recovery
    * Authors: Shah Fahd
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2582)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2582.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    A block cipher is trusted once it resists every published attack and its S-boxes pass the standard tests. A design-level backdoor turns this trust against its users. Its designer hides a structure that only they can
    exploit, and that the usual tests miss.
    Four such backdoors have been published, by Rijmen and Preneel, Paterson, Bannier and Filiol, and Peyrin and Wang. Each paper shows what the hidden structure gives its designer. Everyone else needs answers to two other questions. Does the structure also weaken the cipher against ordinary cryptanalysis? Can an evaluator who holds only the specification find it? Neither has been answered for all four designs, so an S-box that passes
    the usual tests is trusted by default.
    In this paper we answer both questions. We place the four designs in one taxonomy and in Beyne's correlation-matrix framework. We give an algorithm
    that recovers a partition trapdoor from the S-box tables, and prove that it never reports a false one and, below an explicit cap, never misses one. We
    show that inversion and affine equivalence preserve a trapdoor, while
    extended affine and CCZ equivalence can erase it. We then attack KG-DES (Paterson's S-boxes in DES), BEA-1 and LowMC-M.
    The answer to the first question depends on the rest of the cipher. In
    KG-DES the trapdoor makes ordinary attacks far stronger. The best
    $16$-round differential characteristic has probability $2^{-21.23}$,
    against $2^{-61.97}$ for DES, and a two-stage attack recovers the $56$-bit
    key in minutes. In BEA-1 the trapdoor opens no useful trail. However, for
    every key both ciphers act as an exact smaller cipher on the cosets, and
    fall to known-plaintext distinguishers from about $2^{16.5}$ and
    $2^{20.5}$ texts. An independent MILP model confirms every optimum it can prove, and shows that single characteristics put the KG-DES boomerang at $2^{-36.79}$ when it returns with probability $1$.
    The answer to the second question depends on where the backdoor sits. Our algorithm finds Paterson's trapdoor and BEA-1's four in the S-boxes that
    carry them. Rijmen and Preneel's trapdoor needs unbalanced S-boxes, which linear algebra exposes. LowMC-M's MALICIOUS backdoor sits in the linear
    layers instead. With an ideal XOF a backdoored instance is distributed as
    an honest one, so no test of the primitive finds it. Its holder recovered
    the key from $35$ to $409$ queries in seven full-size measurements.
    A deterministic trapdoor in the S-boxes therefore leaves a trace that a
    sound algorithm finds. A trapdoor in unexplained linear layers leaves none,
    and only constants derived verifiably from a public seed rule it out. We recommend both as routine checks. Probabilistic trapdoors and trapdoors in
    only some S-boxes remain open.
    ## 2026/2583
    * Title: Rounded Gaussians are Discrete Gaussians
    * Authors: Corentin Jeudy
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2583)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2583.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Many lattice-based cryptographic schemes still require sampling integers following a Gaussian-like distribution. Depending on the application, this sampling should be generic to tackle variable (and possibly large) standard deviations and centers, with a low memory footprint, easily implementable in constant-time, and with the highest throughput. Combining all these features is very challenging, as shown by the numerous works on optimizing discrete Gaussian samplers. In contrast, the rounded Gaussian (and associated samplers), formalized by H|+lsing, Lange and Smeets (PKC'18), seems to satisfy these criteria, but its formal definition makes security analyses of the schemes using it more complex, thus explaining why they are rarely used in practice.
    In this paper, we show that a small correction on the parameter $\sigma$ of the rounded Gaussian yields a distribution that is close to a discrete Gaussian of parameter $s$. More formally, defining $\sigma = s - 1/(24s)$ yields a R|-nyi divergence between the two distributions evolving as $1 + O(1/s^8)$. As a result, for mild to large parameters $s$, one can use the corrected rounded Gaussian sampler, while still analyzing security with an ideal discrete Gaussian at a very mild loss. It then readily gives a discrete Gaussian sampler that benefits from all the features of rounded Gaussian samplers.
    ## 2026/2584
    * Title: SHAKEing SLH-DSA with Non-profiled SCAs
    * Authors: Rafael Carrera Rodriguez, Jad Zahreddine, Andr|- Monthieu, Aur|-lien Vasselle, Pierre-Yvan Liardet
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2584)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2584.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    SLH-DSA is a hash-based digital signature algorithm, standardised by NIST as a post-quantum signature scheme. While prior work has analysed the vulnerability of its pseudorandom function (PRF) to differential side-channel analysis (SCA), no prior work has thoroughly examined this vulnerability under SHAKE as the PRF, nor recovered a full secret seed in practice. In this work, we address this gap by first analysing the differential SCA vulnerability of SLH-DSA-SHAKE, examining the inputs to the PRF and the possible selection functions for an attack. Then, based on this analysis, we propose a methodology to efficiently apply correlation power analysis (CPA) on every parameter set of SLH-DSA-SHAKE with three main steps: a strategy of averaging subtraces of the same signature to increase the signal-to-noise ratio; a partial-then-total CPA approach to reduce the complexity; and an efficient algorithm for the remaining exhaustive search to recover a full secret seed, which enables universal forgery. We then provide experimental results in simulation and on a 32-bit microcontroller. Our attack requires on average from $280$ to $559$ signatures, and in our experiments the exhaustive search completes within $45$ minutes on $72$ cores.
    ## 2026/2585
    * Title: Verifiable Post-Quantum TLS Handshake: Recognizing Implementation Errors of Cryptographic Verification Steps
    * Authors: Runze Zhao, Siqi Lu, Yijian Liu, Zhaoxuan Li, Kaibo Liu, Hongbo Liu, Qingjun Yuan, Yongjuan Wang, Xianhui Lu
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2585)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2585.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    The migration to post-quantum cryptography is becoming unavoidable for security protocols. Yet as the historical "goto fail" incident illustrates, deploying new primitives is not sufficient: subtle implementation bugs, especially in verification logic, can yield systems that remain fully interoperable while compromising security silently. Existing confirmation code techniques make certain errors observable, but they do not cover post-quantum signatures and provide limited protection in multi-stage handshakes.
    Therefore, we present a migration-oriented solution that spans both the algorithm and protocol layers. At the algorithm layer, we develop two generic confirmation-code construction frameworks for FiatrCoShamir signatures and GPV-style Hash-and-Sign signatures, instantiated with ML-DSA and Falcon. For KEMs, we further propose a protocol-friendly, KEM-level confirmation-code method, instantiated with ML-KEM, HQC, and DAWN (NTRU-based KEM). We then prove confirmation-code unpredictability for each instantiation. At the protocol layer, we design PQCD-TLS, a post-quantum TLS handshake that binds confirmation codes into chained key derivation, ensuring that any verification fault induces key mismatch and causes handshake failure. We then extend a multi-stage authenticated key-exchange model with error-injection capabilities to formalize matching correctness with implementation errors, and prove that PQCD-TLS exposes such internal errors without compromising protocol security. Our implementation evaluates 48 configurations combining confirmation code-enhanced PQC algorithms and authentication modes. Results show that handshake latency overhead remains below 1% across all tests, while turning silent verification bugs into observable handshake failures.
    ## 2026/2586
    * Title: Modeling Modular Multiplication for Monomial Prediction and Impossible Differentials, with Application to MSX
    * Authors: Emanuele Bellini, Mohamed Rachidi, Sharwan K. Tiwari
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2586)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2586.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    MSX is a recent family of lightweight block ciphers for microcontrollers, and its round function draws nonlinearity from modular addition and modular multiplication on $32$-bit words. The multiplication is the distinctive part of the design because it turns the round function into a strongly universal hash function, and from this, the designers prove ideal strong differential and linear properties. The same operation also kept MSX out of reach of automated cryptanalysis, since no exact bit-level model of a modular multiplication was available.
    We give two such models for $z=(x\cdot y)\bmod 2^n$. Both work at the bit level and, to the best of our knowledge, both are new. The first is for monomial prediction under the three-subset division property without an unknown subset (3SDP-woU), and it assigns an exact parity to every monomial without using a truth table. The second is a deterministic truncated model for impossible differential search, and we prove that it is not merely sound but exact for two independent operands, so every incompatibility a miss-in-the-middle search reports through a multiplication is genuine.
    Both properties are deterministic, so our results are exact, whereas the designers' own analysis provides bounds and estimates, with no explicit trail. Using the two models, we analyze MSX. As far as we know, this is its first independent cryptanalysis. For MSX-128 we obtain a $7$-round deterministic integral distinguisher of data complexity $2^{96}$, where a $96$-bit cube leaves $64$ of the $128$ output bits balanced, and we extend it to key recoveries on $8$ and $9$ of the $18$ rounds that recover the $256$-bit master key in about $2^{228}$ operations, improving over the MSX designers' generic yoyo key recovery attack on seven rounds.
    Searching all $16,384$ single-bit pairs at each round count, we also find $1,984$ impossible differentials at seven rounds and none at eight. Both models are implemented in the CLAASP library, so they can be used on any included primitive that uses modular multiplication.
    ## 2026/2587
    * Title: RingTrace: Model-Free Spatio-Temporal Detection and Core Attribution for Cache Side-Channels
    * Authors: Zhaoxue Zhang, Yiwen Gao, Yuejun Liu, Wei Cheng, Yongbin Zhou, Sylvain Guilley
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2587)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2587.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    The widespread adoption of shared last-level caches in modern multi-core processors improves memory efficiency but introduces timing channels between untrusted programs. In particular, Flush+Reload serves as a high-resolution cache side channel and a fundamental data leakage mechanism in transient-execution attacks. Existing detection approaches predominantly rely on aggregate hardware performance counters, which discard spatial context, fail to locate the malicious core, and often confuse stealthy attacks with benign cache-intensive workloads. This paper addresses these gaps by proposing RingTrace, a system-level monitoring framework that synergizes core-local and uncore telemetry. We capture and normalize per-core cache misses alongside distributed slice activity across uncore CBoxes. Through Joint Spatio-Temporal Attribution (JSTA), we formulate an interpretable joint-activity matrix that captures spatial concentration and co-activity without requiring model training. In the hierarchical response, the largest entry of this matrix serves as the initial screening score, while its row sums identify a candidate core. Our approach reliably identifies victim-independent flush activity prior to secret leakage, effectively suppresses false alarms under severe concurrent memory pressure, and achieves rapid process confirmation with negligible application runtime overhead on commodity processors. This work introduces an interpretable and tamper-resilient hardware-assisted defense model, bridging local CPU execution with physical uncore traffic to provide robust protection against cache side channels.
    ## 2026/2588
    * Title: Eras MPC: Granular Preprocessing and Abort Recovery with Dynamic Committees
    * Authors: Ivan Damgard, Bernardo David, Rahul Satish
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2588)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2588.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    MPC with dynamic committees achieves scalability by having small committees execute each round of the computation, instead of involving all parties in the entire execution. However, achieving Guaranteed Output Delivery in efficient information theoretical protocols requires larger honest majority committees, limiting scalability. Moreover, using preprocessed correlated randomness to speed up the computation is prohibitively expensive due to the cost of transferring such randomness to parties that have not yet joined the execution.
    We propose Eras MPC, a model where small dishonest majority computation committees execute one or more rounds of the computation with the help of honest majority preprocessing and checkpointing committees. The computation is carried out in "Eras", which are sets of shorter epochs. In the beginning of each Era's first epoch, a preprocessing committee generates correlated randomness for the computation epochs to be executed by different computation committees. In the end of an Era, checkpoint committees verify the current state of the computation, save this state if it is valid and provide the latest valid state to the next Era.
    We show an Eras MPC protocol where the preprocessing is carried out using an honest majority MPC protocol to generate authenticated Beaver triples, requiring only enough rounds of interaction to perform two subsequent batches of multiplications. The computation is done via the SPDZ online phase executed in each epoch by a small dishonest majority committee. Finally, intermediate state is checkpointed by verifying the validity of wire shares and saving wire values in $4$ rounds, each executed by a different honest majority checkpoint committee.
    ## 2026/2589
    * Title: Cyclic isogeny walks on genus-zero modular curves
    * Authors: Aleksei Udovenko
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2589)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2589.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Isogeny-based cryptography implementations have to navigate a large space of options for representing elliptic curves and isogenies and for the corresponding arithmetic. This work collects, completes, and organizes the set of algebraic maps and relations available when working with genus-zero modular curves $X_0(N)$, which parametrize cyclic $N$-isogenies of elliptic curves and can be represented by a single field element. This abstract notion covers many single-parameter curve models, such as Montgomery, Edwards, Jacobi quartic, Hessian curve, Deuring normal form. Such single-parameter models for the same modular curve are related by degree-1 rational maps, which limits the remaining options for improving the expressions. This representation is universal in the sense that it can be obtained from any other algebraic parametrization of such isogenies, or simply from the $j$-invariants through which the isogeny passes, away from singularities. We propose a method to derive rational maps for computing such lifting from the $j$-line to $X_0(N)$.
    Our main technical contribution is the definition, analysis, and computation of non-backtracking modular polynomials over these curves obtained using an extended method of Elkies. In addition to characterizing cyclic extensions of isogenies, they have many other useful properties, such as having lower degree and being sparser than other typical modular polynomials, smoother walk models (being better at distinguishing different isogenies), carrying additional isogeny of different degree along the walk. We also propose radical representations of the same relation, which sheds new light on a few existing radical isogeny formulas.
    We illustrate the use of the framework by achieving more compact R1CS encodings for isogeny proofs of knowledge.
    ## 2026/2590
    * Title: Rerandomizable Garbling for Arithmetic Circuits
    * Authors: Anasuya Acharya, Pierre Meyer, Claudio Orlandi, Lawrence Roy
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2590)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2590.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Rerandomizable garbling is a powerful extension of YaorCOs garbled circuits that allows a garbled circuit to be refreshed without changing its functionality, while preserving privacy as long as at least one rerandomization step is honest. Existing constructions, however, are limited to Boolean circuits and incur significant communication overhead.
    In this work, we initiate the study of rerandomizable garbling for arithmetic circuits. We present the first rerandomizable arithmetic garbling scheme, based on techniques inspired by recent advances in garbling from homomorphic secret sharing. Our construction departs fundamentally from previous approaches and achieves communication complexity $O(|\mathbf{C}|\log B)$ for circuits $\mathbf{C}$ with $B$-bounded computation. Concretely, our scheme requires 17 group elements per multiplication gate, while addition gates are free. Our scheme can be instantiated under standard subgroup-indistinguishability assumptions, including the Decisional Composite Residuosity (DCR) assumption and assumptions over class groups.
    ## 2026/2591
    * Title: Sotto Maschera: Masking the Sota-Voce Fixed-Weight Vector Sampling
    * Authors: Ben Brooksnieder, Dina Hesse, Markus Krausz, Tim G|+neysu
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2591)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2591.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Sparse fixed-weight vector sampling is a highly critical primitive in several post-quantum cryptography schemes. It has also been the target of multiple side-channel attacks, demonstrating the need for robust implementations. While such implementations do exist, they are not necessarily practical in terms of runtime, and some have already been shown to be insecure. At CHES 2026, Filho et al. presented a runtime-optimized, but not side-channel protected, sparse fixed-weight vector sampling algorithm named Sota Voce. It consists of the Sota support sampler and MWSupport support-to-vector conversion, where the latter is planned to be included in the next HQC implementation. This work explores how both parts of Sota Voce can be transformed into a power side-channel protected implementation using masking gadgets for embedded devices. At the same time, we aim to preserve its competitive performance advantage over other masked implementations. By bitslicing core components of the algorithm, including sorting, merging, and compaction, we achieve high parallelism of the computation, improving the overall runtime. Moreover, we avoid slow masking conversions by masking exclusively in the Boolean domain. Thereby, our masked implementation is orders of magnitude faster than the state-of-the-art, while showing no power side-channel leakage in TVLA evaluations. For instance, for HQC, we achieve a speedup of up to 45x in comparison to previous work.
    ## 2026/2592
    * Title: A Post Quantum Vector Commitment Scheme with Efficient Insertions and Deletions
    * Authors: Vir Pathak, Sushmita Ruj
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2592)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2592.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Vector Commitments (VCs) are a cryptographic primitive that allows users to commit to a tuple and later provide proofs about entries of the committed tuple. Literature on VCs provides many secure constructions with properties attractive for decentralized applications. These include fast commitment/proof update algorithms after a value in the committed vector changes, algorithms to aggregate position proofs, generating proofs for subvectors, commitment hiding, and many more. However, these works assume a static setting, where only vector values change and the length of the committed vector never changes. We initiate the study of designing VCs which support efficient updates to commitments and proofs after a change in vector length occurs (i.e. an insertion or a deletion of a vector value at an \textit{arbitrary} position). In order to construct such a primitive, we formalize a VC framework implicitly considered in VC based verifiable decentralized storage constructions. Parties control a subset of positions in the committed vector. A proof for an inserted vector value at a given position may only be generated via participation from enough honest parties. We call such primitives \textit{Multiparty Dynamic Vector Commitments}. Our work provides formal definitions for multiparty dynamic VC functionality and security. In particular, standard VC binding does not extend to our dynamic setting. This motivates us to define the \textit{dynamic multiparty binding} security notion. We also comment on how multiparty dynamic VCs can be applied to extend existing VC based instantiations of verifiable storage. Finally, we provide a vector commitment construction and show that it possesses multiparty dynamic binding under standard lattice assumptions.
    ## 2026/2593
    * Title: Efficient Laconic Oblivious Transfer with Malicious Security
    * Authors: Yijian Zhang, Zuoxia Yu, Rupeng Yang, Willy Susilo
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2593)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2593.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Laconic Oblivious Transfer (OT) enables a receiver to compress a large database into a short digest, allowing a sender to generate a succinct ciphertext that reveals only a single indexed message. While prior works achieve efficient constructions in the semi-honest model, known solutions for malicious security rely on inherently heavy non-black-box techniques, such as garbled circuits or succinct arguments, resulting in impractical schemes.
    In this work, we present the first construction of maliciously secure laconic OT that makes fully black-box use of its underlying primitives. Our construction is based on a simple and widely used paradigm combining vector commitments with witness encryption, previously known to yield efficient semi-honest protocols. We show that this approach can in fact achieve malicious security by introducing two minimal yet powerful enhancements: equivocal vector commitments and maliciously secure witness encryption. We prove that these properties suffice to obtain laconic OT with security against malicious senders in the universal composability model and against malicious receivers in the context model.
    We instantiate our framework from standard assumptions, including LWE and bilinear Diffie-Hellman variants, obtaining schemes in the standard model. Notably, our constructions avoid heavy non-black-box tools mentioned before, and therefore achieve efficiency comparable to the state-of-the-art black-box constructions with merely semi-honest security. In particular, in certain settings, we obtain malicious security at essentially no additional asymptotic cost.
    Our results resolve a central question on the feasibility of practical, maliciously secure laconic OT, and provide a unifying pathway for efficiently achieving malicious security in laconic cryptography.
    ## 2026/2594
    * Title: Registered Functional Encryption for Circuits with Dynamic Bounded Collusion
    * Authors: Yijian Zhang, Rupeng Yang, Zuoxia Yu, Willy Susilo
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2594)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2594.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Registered Functional Encryption (Reg-FE) eliminates the key escrow issue in traditional functional encryption by allowing users to generate their own public/secret keys without the help of a central authority. The public key is then registered to the system along with a function, and all the registered public keys will be aggregated to a compact master public key by a transparent key curator. Messages are encrypted under the master public key, and users can learn functions of encrypted data from the ciphertext using their own secret keys.
    Prior constructions of Reg-FE either become insecure when more than one malicious users collude or require the heavy machinery of indistinguishability obfuscation. In this work, we construct the first collusion-resistant Reg-FE without obfuscations. The schemes are secure if the number of colluded users is bounded, and the collusion bound can be either a global parameter or specified by the encryption algorithm dynamically. In both settings, we provide generic constructions of Reg-FE from registered attribute-based encryption and instantiate them from either the standard $k$-Lin assumption or the succinct LWE assumption.
    ## 2026/2595
    * Title: Getting to the right root: radical isogenies of every degree
    * Authors: Thomas Decru
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2595)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2595.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Class group actions on supersingular elliptic curves over $\mathbb F_p$ as in CSIDH are typically evaluated as long chains of isogenies of small prime degree. Radical isogeny formulae compute such chains using a single $N$th root per step, without sampling torsion points. Compact formulae of linear size had been conjectured for all odd $N$. We prove a corrected version of these formulae for every $N\ge4$, odd and even, over every field of characteristic coprime to $2N$. In our formulation, every building block is a twisted sum of a discrete Kronecker function over $\mathbb Z/N\mathbb Z$, and the formulae follow from a distribution relation for the Kronecker theta function.
    For even $N$, the $N$th root is only determined up to sign over $\mathbb F_p$, and the sign decides whether the walk stays on the surface of the $2$-isogeny volcano. We show that the radical times a $2$-torsion coordinate of the next curve is a square, which yields the horizontal choice for all even $N$; previously this was only known for $N\le14$. Algorithmically, one radical step costs about $12.5N$ multiplications and one exponentiation, without inversions. For horizontal $2$-isogeny walks, radical $2^m$-isogenies with $m\in\{5,6,7\}$ are optimal for primes of $512$ to $4096$ bits. Finally, we show how to evaluate radical isogenies on points. As a consequence, a class group action can be computed from two given points, one on the curve and one on its quadratic twist, without ever sampling torsion points.
    ## 2026/2596
    * Title: ANNULAR: Post-Quantum Private Transactions from Isogenies with Recursive Batch Verification
    * Authors: Dustin Ray
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2596)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2596.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    ANNULAR is a shielded pool built on isogeny-based primitives. Notes are committed in a Merkle tree and spent by nullifier with hidden amounts, following the structure of Zcash's Sapling, but every primitive is post-quantum: spends are authorised by the prime-degree PRISM signature of Basso et al., note ciphertexts are keyed by the MIKE non-interactive key exchange, and each transaction carries a STARK proved natively over the isogeny field. The transaction proofs of a block are then folded into a single recursive proof. A ledger need record and verify only this one proof, 426 KB in 15 ms, whatever the batch holds, and check each transaction's two signatures alongside it. A transaction's body is the size of Sapling's at the same memo length (2,685 bytes against 2,756 with a 512-byte memo); its share of the batch proof adds under 500 bytes.
    A move to post-quantum primitives is generally expected to raise a pool's operating cost. We argue that the post-quantum change and the scaling change are complementary: with a STARK as the proof system, proofs fold, and with isogeny keys, the per-transaction data remains small. The cost moves to the sender, whose proof takes 1.4 s on sixteen cores, and to one aggregator per batch, which we measure: 1,248 transactions in 99 s on one GPU. Each proof in the tree carries 100 bits of round-by-round soundness and the batch about 90 under a union bound; under FiatrCoShamir that is the work an adversary needs. The constraints of the leaf circuit are proven in Lean 4 to encode the spend statement, while the soundness of the STARK itself rests on a paper argument. The scheme's claims rest on the signature's existential unforgeability; its strong unforgeability, argued by the construction's authors and not yet proved, is not relied on.
    ## 2026/2597
    * Title: The Good, the Bad, and the Noisy: A Systematic Analysis of Ring-Oscillator-Based Noise Generators
    * Authors: Florian Stolz, Dina Hesse, Julius Hermelink, Tim G|+neysu, Elisabeth Oswald
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2597)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2597.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Hiding countermeasures, alongside masking, play an important role in modern hardware security for protecting against side-channel attacks. Additive noise generators are one such hiding countermeasure. They increase the noise, thereby lowering the signal-to-noise ratio and, simultaneously, amplifying the effectiveness of masking countermeasures. Among the different design options for additive noise generators, ring-oscillator-based designs feature regularly in scientific publications. These existing works not only differ in their designs, but also in their evaluation methods; therefore, they do not permit fair comparisons or enable systematic evaluations. Thus, it is currently not possible to design ring-oscillators for noise generation in an informed and tailored way.
    In this paper, we address this lack of systematic comparisons of existing designs, and discuss the possibility of filtering out the generated noise and further limitations of ring-oscillator-based noise generators. We find that many existing designs do not consider the need to amplify the output signal or the risk of filtering. As a consequence, the existing designs do not sufficiently lower the signal-to-noise ratio in our experiments. However, using these results, we provide a guideline for tailoring and configuring ring-oscillators so that they efficiently add noise in the desired frequency spectrum. This includes deciding on the inverter chain length, the amplification of the output, and the randomization of the output frequency. Finally, we apply this methodology to build a tailored ring-oscillator-based noise generator for an exemplary AES implementation and find that it significantly outperforms existing ring-oscillator-based designs.
    ## 2026/2598
    * Title: The Distributed Producer-Consumer Model Is All You Need: A Compiler for Asynchronous BFT
    * Authors: Liang Zhang, Binyang Hou, Zhengxuan Guo, Xiaohai Dai, Haibin Kan, Jiheng Zhang, Moti Yung
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2598)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2598.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Building an Asynchronous Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) protocol requires establishing payload availability with total order despite Byzantine faults and arbitrarily delayed messages. Although many BFT systems separate payload dissemination from agreement, they often couple their composition to protocol-specific selection or scheduling mechanisms. We present the Distributed Producer-Consumer Model (DPCM), an event-driven abstraction that separates payload-specific certified availability from payload-oblivious binary finalization. We prove that DPCM compiles any producerrCoconsumer pair satisfying interfaces specified herein into an asynchronous BFT object log. DPCM batch-finalizes certified heights, deterministically refining failed batches until each height yields a normal or evidence-backed dummy entry. We instantiate DPCM as Octopus, which combines parallel consistent broadcast producers with batched asynchronous binary agreement (ABA). To achieve performance advantages, Octopus lets producers certify blocks without waiting for consumer decisions and keeps payload recovery off the agreement path. One ABA optimistically finalizes multiple consecutive producer columns, while failures trigger parallel row-wise refinement with logarithmic bisection depth. Across an eight-region WAN with $n\in\{8,16,32\}$ and 2200-transaction blocks, Octopus remains within 6.5% of Dumbo-NG's (ACM CCS'22) fault-free throughput. With the maximum tested number of silent faulty parties, it outperforms Dumbo-NG by 25.9% and 18.7% at $n=8$ and $n=16$, respectively, and remains within 1% at $n=32$. At $n=16$ and $n=32$, Dumbo-NG's latency is 1.9--2.5$\times$ that of Octopus. Across all evaluated settings, Octopus achieves 2.9--16.8$\times$ the throughput of Alea-BFT (USENIX NSDI'24), whose latency is 2.4--15.2$\times$ that of Octopus.
    ## 2026/2599
    * Title: Linear Cryptanalysis of TFHE-Friendly Cipher FRAST in the Average Key Setting
    * Authors: Xingwei Ren, Zhenyu Xiong, Bo Xu, Yongqiang Li, Mingsheng Wang
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2599)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2599.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    In the average key setting, a linear attack of Bak et al. on the TFHE-friendly stream cipher FRAST let wrong guesses pass, which they left as an open problem. The S-boxes of FRAST are public and random for every keystream block. For the mask on the least significant bit, we show that key differences fall into five indistinguishable classes per round. The filter of Bak et al. gives some wrong classes of the right parity a nonzero expected score. We compute the trail correlation exactly through the real cipher and bound the success of our statistic for every fixed master key. We bound its false alarms for a fixed master key with the last round kept and no filter, and for every attack against an ideal keystream.
    With known XOF inputs, our algorithm Contract recovered the classes of a branch pair of 15 rounds and the master key of ten rounds. A cost model gives class recovery for every sampled key at 26 rounds with known inputs and for a third at 38 rounds with chosen inputs. In the accounting of Bak et al., it reaches full FRAST on weak master keys of density $2^{-11.8}$ to $2^{-5.4}$ within the claimed security. A distinguisher of full FRAST has a proved advantage on these keys, and its time over the advantage stays below the claimed security as well. Independent branch S-boxes remove the cheap classes at a cost in TFHE.
    ## 2026/2600
    * Title: High-Precision Bootstrapping for GCKKS
    * Authors: Shihe Ma, Jiaming Liu, Anyu Wang, Xiaoyun Wang
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2600)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2600.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Generalized CKKS (GCKKS) trades slot count for reduced modulus consumption in high-precision approximate arithmetic.
    However, designing a GCKKS bootstrapping algorithm with reduced modulus consumption throughout its computation remains a challenging problem.
    We construct high-precision bootstrapping for GCKKS using low-precision overflow extraction followed by iterative precision enhancement.
    Our main ingredient is a ciphertext-conversion framework for changing the decryption factor and slot count without requiring the factors to be units.
    A slot-aware analysis bounds unused-slot magnitudes proportionally to the corresponding evaluations of the decryption factor, which is essential to ensure the unused-slot values remain well-bounded after conversion.
    We combine precision doubling with ciphertext splitting and develop a joint evaluation procedure that produces two error-cleaned outputs at the cost of only one evaluation of the cleaning polynomial.
    We also give a useful-slot-preserving conversion from CKKS to GCKKS that simultaneously resets unused slots through component-wise re-encoding.
    Underlying these constructions, we also improve the construction of the decryption factors by searching directly in the canonical embedding and obtain depth-free conjugation with non-unit factors. For target encoding precision $p$ and $2N/k$ useful slots in a ring of dimension $N$, the precision-dependent stages of the bootstrapping use $O(k)$ homomorphic operations and consume $O((p/k)\log k)$ modulus bits.
    ## 2026/2601
    * Title: Integer Coordinate Families and Threshold RSA Signatures for Any Prime Exponent
    * Authors: Shivansh Jaiswal, Somitra Sanadhya
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2601)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2601.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    At CT-RSA 2026, Ng and Lau introduced $(t,n)$-integer coordinate families for threshold RSA signatures with $e=3$, and found some families by heuristic search for $2\le t \le n \le 9$. They asked whether such families always exist and, if so, can they be constructed efficiently. We answer both of these questions positively. We prove that a $(t,n)$-integer coordinate family is also a $(t+1,n)$-integer coordinate family. We construct such families for $t=2$, and $2\le n < 19$, using a polynomial time algorithm in $n$ and its output bit length. Answering another question raised in the Ng-Lau work, we prove super-polynomial lower bounds on coordinates of pairwise families. We also find the minimum families for $n \le 9$.
    Ng and Lau proposed a threshold signature scheme based on integer coordinate families. We show that the Ng-Lau scheme admits trivial forgeries, and has a flawed proof. We give a repaired scheme $\mathrm{PiIC}$ which does not suffer from these issues. Finally, we propose an integer secret-sharing scheme $\mathrm{PiZ}$ that works for every prime $e$ and every $(t,n)$, without relying on any special coordinate family. We prove that both the schemes $\mathrm{PiIC}$ and $\mathrm{PiZ}$ are TS-UF-CMA secure under the standard RSA assumption.
    ## 2026/2602
    * Title: A Probabilistic Extension of the Division Property: Integral Distinguishers with Key-Independent Bounds
    * Authors: Jules Baudrin, Christina Boura, Patrick Derbez, Gregor Leander, Yevhen Perehuda
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2602)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2602.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Classical integral cryptanalysis relies on zero-sum properties that, for every key, hold with probability one. Existing arguments against such deterministic integrals, based on the division property and its algebraic variants, only exclude this extreme case: once the zero-sum probability falls below one, they say nothing about its actual value, nor about a probabilistic bias that could still be exploited. We develop a tool combining MILP-based trail search with a recursive evaluation of assignments to the constant inputs. It estimates the probability that no valid trail remains and uses an additional heuristic to predict the zero-sum probability. Applying this tool to PRESENT and GIFT, we obtain probabilistic integral distinguishers for 6 to 9 rounds, including 6- and 7-round PRESENT distinguishers using $2^4$ and $2^{12}$ plaintexts per structure, respectively. For the ASCON permutation, we obtain 4- and 5-round distinguishers using as few as $2$ and $2^{12}$ inputs per structure. We further explain algebraically the large bias of the 6-round PRESENT distinguisher, showing how the S-box and bit permutation restrict the way active variables combine. Finally, we show how these distinguishers can be used for key recovery, reducing both the data and time complexities compared to their deterministic variants for PRESENT and GIFT-64.
    ## 2026/2603
    * Title: PPAD Hardness from SIS
    * Authors: Arka Rai Choudhuri
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2603)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2603.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Understanding the hardness of the complexity class PPAD is an important question in complexity theory given that it contains problems such as computing a Nash equilibrium. Evidence of hardness, however, has come primarily from cryptography, through a long line of work. Most recently, Chen, Freitag, Jin and Wichs (STOC 2025) based the hardness of PPAD on the polynomial hardness of the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem, together with a fine-grained average-case hardness assumption.
    In this work, we base the hardness of PPAD on a different lattice problem, the Short Integer Solution (SIS) problem, which, unlike the assumptions underlying prior work, is not known to imply public-key encryption. Specifically, we show that PPAD is hard on average assuming either:
    (i) polynomially hard SIS with a quasi-polynomial norm bound and a fine-grained average-case hardness assumption; or
    (ii) subexponentially hard SIS alone.
    Our main technical contribution is a succinct, incrementally updatable proof system for a class of exponentially large circuits with short descriptions. Building on the work of Wee (CRYPTO 2025) for succinct proof systems for circuits from SIS, we show how to make such proof systems satisfy these properties while preserving the unambiguity guarantee of the underlying scheme: it is hard to find two distinct accepted states for the same computation and time. Together, these are crucial for our PPAD hardness reductions.
    ## 2026/2604
    * Title: Balsamic: One-round Threshold UOV from GPU-Accelerated FHE
    * Authors: Jaehyung Kim, Charles Gouert, Jean-Luc Watson, G. Edward Suh
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2604)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2604.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Universal thresholdizers offer one-round threshold signatures, but require evaluating an entire signer under fully homomorphic encryption (FHE). We present Balsamic, a complete homomorphic Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar (UOV) signer and its application to one-round threshold UOV signature. UOV's short salted target hash shifts the encrypted workload to finite-field linear solving, which we integrate with coin derivation and hashing in a packed discrete-CKKS circuit. Our paired-pivot solver selects both pivots before first-pivot normalization, then applies their coupled update with one inversion stage per pair and cubic field work. Pivot-success certificates enable encrypted retry selection without residual evaluation. In 2-out-of-3 semihonest threshold UOV signing, each partial signing (online) takes $10.7$ seconds on NVIDIA RTX 6000 Ada and $7.77$ seconds on NVIDIA GB300, with $5.25$ MB per response. These measurements demonstrate that complete homomorphic signing can provide the computational core of one-round threshold signatures without intermediate openings or per-signature interactive preprocessing.
    ## 2026/2605
    * Title: M|!mir: A Stateless Private Search Engine
    * Authors: G||kberk Erdo-fan, Emma Munisamy, Kamil Kluczniak
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2605)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2605.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Private search engines allow a user to retrieve documents from a public database that are similar to a text query.
    Our cryptographic protocol M|!mir employs state-of-the-art homomorphic ciphertext switching techniques to realize the first stateless semantic private search engine for highly dynamic databases.
    The security of M|!mir relies on (Ring) Learning with Errors.
    M|!mir requires no offline communication, and it trades higher but highly parallelizable server computation for low per-query communication.
    When the database may change between queries, M|!mir matches Tiptoe's search quality with 84$\times$ less per-query communication (0.24 MiB).
    At Tiptoe's per-query communication, it reaches 64$\%$ instead of 36$\%$ of non-private search quality and is 4.2$\times$ faster (0.87s on a single multithreaded machine).
    Against PACMANN, M|!mir improves search quality from 76$\%$ to 81$\%$ of non-private with 72$\%$ of its per-query communication and a 9.54 MiB instead of 2.68 GiB one-time cost, but is 2.1$\times$ slower.
    M|!mir can achieve 59$\%$ of the non-private search quality with 8.13 MiB of per-query communication and 0.77s of total latency. This matches PACMANN's latency at a 7.6$\times$ smaller per-query communication, and outperforms Tiptoe in all three metrics.
    ## 2026/2606
    * Title: On the $s$-projected Goppa Codes and their Application to the Interactive Oracle Proofs of Proximity
    * Authors: Abhraneel Dutta, Veronika Kuchta, Edoardo Persichetti
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2606)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2606.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Error-correcting codes are a useful tool in cryptography, being used both to design schemes whose hardness relies on coding theory problems (the area typically known as code-based cryptography) and as a building block in other contexts, such as proof systems and associated cryptographic argument systems. Among all codes used in cryptography, Goppa codes stand out, notably in the well-known McEliece encryption scheme, where they have withstood the test of time as one of very few classes of codes to be considered secure for over 40 years.
    Therefore, a natural question is whether Goppa codes can also be used in the construction of proof systems or cryptographic argument systems.
    In the context of probabilistically checkable proofs (PCPs), codes are used to transform proofs into a format that requires only a constant number of queries for verification. This efficiency is often achieved using low-degree polynomial codes, which enable the verifier to check consistency through interpolation, ensuring correctness with minimal effort. This application underscores the importance of good codes in enhancing the robustness and verifiability of proof systems.
    Given their critical role, we take a closer look at how error-correcting codes are used in proof systems to find a new way of obtaining an interactive oracle proof system of proximity (IOPP) from Goppa codes.
    ## 2026/2607
    * Title: Quantum Cryptomania with Classical Communication without One-Way Functions
    * Authors: Mohammed Barhoush, Amit Behera
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2607)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2607.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    In classical cryptography, one-way functions are necessary for most of cryptography. In the quantum world, however, Kretschmer at TQC'21 and subsequent works have demonstrated that quantum versions of various primitives in minicrypt, such as signatures and private-key encryption, do not require quantum-computable one-way functions (qOWFs). However, the question of the necessity of qOWFs for primitives in Cryptomania like public-key encryption with classical public-keys and ciphertexts (qPKE) has remained open.
    We provide a comprehensive picture of the relationship between qPKE and qOWF. First, our main result is a black-box separation between qOWFs and qPKE. In particular, we show that relative to a unitary, real, and self-inverse oracle, there exists a qPKE scheme (with classical keys and ciphertexts), but qOWFs do not exist. Further, our oracles admit a point-function obfuscation construction, thus ruling out black-box construction of qOWF from point function obfuscations.
    On the positive side, we construct qPKE from quantum indistinguishability obfuscation for quantum circuits with classical obfuscated descriptions and efficiently verifiable one-way puzzles, which is known to be a potentially weaker assumption than qOWFs, due to an existing black-box separation. Our construction is the quantum analog of the classical construction of PKE from one-way functions and indistinguishability obfuscation in the quantum computation with classical communication (QCCC) setting.
    ## 2026/2608
    * Title: Pairwise Independence of Ten-Round AES
    * Authors: Zhongfeng Niu, Kai Hu
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2608)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2608.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    We prove that ten rounds of \AES{} with independent and uniform random round keys are $\varepsilon_{10}$-close to pairwise independent, with
    \[
    \varepsilon_{10}\leq\frac{3017}{2^{141}}<2^{-129}.
    \]
    For every two distinct plaintexts, the joint ciphertext distribution is therefore within this statistical distance of the uniform distribution on ordered pairs of distinct ciphertexts. The same sampled key tuple is used for both encryptions. The construction retains the \AES{} round transformations, including the omission of MixColumns in the final round, with input and output whitening. Let $E_{10}$ denote this random permutation and $\Omega$ the set of nonzero differences. We establish the result through the induced one-norm bound $\norm{\Dten-U}_1\leq3017/2^{140}$ on its averaged difference-distribution matrix restricted to $\Omega$, where $U$ projects onto the uniform distribution on $\Omega$. The proof groups the ten rounds into five superbox layers and decomposes the deviation from uniformity into fourteen orthogonal subspaces according to the number of active words and residual factors. Local Gram moments and MDS code constraints control the dependencies between word differences. Bounds for the distributions produced by the first rounds preserve their common source variables, while joint estimates for the last four rounds retain the constraints across two linear layers. The final conversion to statistical distance uses the support size of each component. Exact rational evaluation of the resulting finite recurrence establishes the stated bound.
    ## 2026/2609
    * Title: SoK: Optimization Tools for the Hydra Multiplayer Channel
    * Authors: Maxim Jourenko, Mario Larangeira
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2609)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2609.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Blockchain technology allows parties to use a consensus protocol to add transactions and data to a decentralized ledger that are immutable. However, the amount of transactions that can be processed within a consensus protocol and thus added to the ledger within a given time frame is limited. This is a scalability issue. Layer-2 protocols are a class of approaches that process transactions off-chain, i.e. without involvement of the consensus protocol, but allow usage of the consensus protocol as a backup for security. This potentially reduces the processing of $n\in\mathbb{N}$ transactions to only $\mathcal{O}(1)$ transactions being committed to the ledger. The basic building blocks of Layer 2 protocols are Payment Channels, whereas newer protocols as Hydra (FC'21) allow for multi-party channels that are not limited to payments but can execute smart contracts, i.e. program code. There has been substantial research proposing tools and improvements to Layer 2 protocols, but most assume the original two party Payment Channel design. This makes it unclear to what degree existing techniques can be utilized with Hydra style multi-party channels. This work (1) presents a survey of such such existing two party channel protocols and tools built on top of them. We use a didactic approach with a focus on explaining their core ideas. (2) This work identifies uses cases for which novel protocols for Hydra should be developed. (3) This work analyzes open problems for Hydra, lists relevant related work and proposes which existing tools can be used to address them or serve as a starting point for further research.
    ## 2026/2610
    * Title: A Crypto-Agile Mixed-Radix NTT Accelerator for Negacyclic and Trinomial Rings
    * Authors: JaeSeok Lee, DongHyun Shin, YoungBeom Kim, Seog Chung Seo
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2610)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2610.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Hardware accelerators for lattice-based post-quantum cryptography (PQC) have largely converged on the radix-2 number-theoretic transform (NTT). The spectrum of standards that crypto-agility must accommodate, however, extends beyond NIST. In response to advances in cryptanalysis and to reduce the attack surface, national authorities are standardizing or recommending lattice-based algorithms with alternative algebraic structures, as well as schemes built on entirely different primitives. For instance, NTRU+, selected in the Korean PQC competition and currently undergoing standardization, is defined over a trinomial ring whose degree is divisible by three and thus requires a mixed-radix NTT comprising both radix-2 and radix-3 layers, whereas SMAUG-T employs an NTT-unfriendly modulus. Support for heterogeneous algebraic structures is therefore no longer optional but a prerequisite for crypto-agile design; existing radix-2-centric accelerators, however, fail to meet this requirement. In this paper, we present a crypto-agile mixed-radix NTT accelerator that performs transforms over both negacyclic and trinomial rings on a single datapath. Our contributions are threefold. First, we design a unified butterfly unit that integrates two parallel radix-2 butterflies, one radix-3 butterfly, and the trinomial transform on shared arithmetic resources, in which a generic 17-bit Montgomery path and an ML-DSA-specific 23-bit reduction path share the same two DSPs. Second, we propose a conflict-free memory mapping that guarantees in-place parallel access across all mixed-radix layers with a single 1-bit bank-selection function, namely address parity for radix-2 and a fixed address bit for radix-3, and requires neither mapping tables, nor coefficient reordering, nor additional BRAMs. Third, we introduce a generalized modular constant division that combines the multiple alignment of Montgomery reduction with the quotient estimation of Barrett reduction to perform the $3^{-1}$ scaling of the radix-3 inverse NTT without any DSP. Implemented on an Artix-7 FPGA, the proposed core supports all security levels of ML-KEM, ML-DSA, HAETAE, SMAUG-T, and NTRU+ using 5,279 LUTs, 4 DSPs, and 9 BRAMs at 141.5~MHz. For NTRU+, it achieves a $4.1$--$13.0\times$ improvement in area-time product (ATP) over approaches that resort to radix-2-only cores via degree lifting, and new moduli of up to 17 bits can be integrated at the cost of fewer than 20 LUTs.
    ## 2026/2611
    * Title: For Thirty Pieces of Silver: Overcoming Non-IID via ZKP Sample-Level Auditing and Forcing Attackers into Traitors in Federated Learning
    * Authors: Jinghao Zhao, Hongwei Yang, Bobo Wang, Meng Hao, Hui He, Weizhe Zhang
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2611)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2611.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    As a privacy-preserving distributed learning paradigm, federated learning faces severe security threats, especially data poisoning, gradient tampering, distributed attacks, and adaptive attacks. Existing gradient-based detection methods encounter three major bottlenecks in practical applications. First, they cannot distinguish between benign and malicious gradients under distributed attacks in non-IID scenarios. Second, defenders lack prior knowledge of trigger patterns. Third, attackers can launch adaptive attacks against these defense mechanisms. To address these challenges, we propose a novel defense paradigm. This paradigm shifts away from gradient detection, instead leveraging zero-knowledge proofs to conduct sample-level inspections on the local datasets of clients, eliminating the defense degradation caused by distributed attacks under non-IID settings. Then, through a staking mechanism, attackers are forced to train on discovered malicious samples with flipped labels, generating counter-gradients to neutralize hidden malicious samples, achieving targeted backdoor removal without requiring any prior knowledge of backdoor features. Furthermore, through zero-knowledge proof commitments, training gradients must be generated based on the same locked data. This prevents dynamic adaptive attacks based on reference model parameters and precludes gradient tampering. Experimental results demonstrate that under the highly non-IID setting of $\text{Dir}(0.1)$, our proposed scheme successfully defends against distributed backdoor attacks and edge-case attacks on CIFAR-10, suppressing the attack success rate to below $6\%$. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first framework to achieve such defense results.
    ## 2026/2612
    * Title: Tritone: Pairwise Garbled Disputes for Multi-Party Proof Verification on Bitcoin
    * Authors: Oleksii Avramenko, Alessandro Baccarini, Torben Poguntke
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2612)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2612.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Bitcoin Script lacks native pairing operations for efficient direct verification of Groth16 proofs. Conventional federated bridges instead authorize withdrawals through a signing quorum, whose collusion can release funds without valid evidence. We present the Tritone protocol, which lets Bitcoin enforce the outcome of verifying a Groth16 proof for an NP relation fixed in a one-time trusted setup, with the locked funds secure as long as one of a fixed set of $N$ operators is honest. Verification is optimistic and off-chain, and every transaction is standard under current relay policy, so Tritone runs on Bitcoin today without consensus changes.
    Tritone generalizes the two-party BABE protocol to a fixed committee of $N$ operators, with one dispute instance per ordered pair. Cut-and-choose protects against malicious garblers, while Feldman verifiable secret sharing correlates input keys across candidates. Our new Lamport-adaptor gadget forces a challenging verifier to disclose the shares selected by the prover's committed proof element, providing the transaction-level binding left unspecified by BABE. A single set of disclosed shares then unlocks all retained candidates. We formalize the multi-party primitive, prove the protocol secure against up to $N-1$ statically corrupted operators, and specify its complete pre-signed transaction graph. We implement Tritone in Rust. On Bitcoin mainnet, when one verifier disputes a claim at every stage, the prover-candidate posts 9,607 vB and the verifier 18,160 vB of protocol transactions. In local benchmarks at 40-bit statistical security, the prover-candidate of each dispute instance retains as little as 112.83 MiB. Tritone thus replaces trust in a signing quorum with a single-honest-operator assumption wherever locked bitcoin is released to an operator against a Groth16 proof, with Bitcoin bridges as our showcase.
    ## 2026/2613
    * Title: Learning with Quantization and Worst Case Lattice Problems
    * Authors: Ziwei Hong, Zhongqiu Fang
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2613)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2613.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Motivated by the MAMBA proposals, we study the worst case hardness of
    learning with quantization (LWQ) with public dither. We allow any
    efficiently computable dither function and efficiently samplable seed distribution; the matrix is uniform and independent of the secret and
    the seed.
    Using the randomized polar lattice quantizer of Lyu et al., we construct explicit families with polynomial power of two moduli. For the search
    family, polynomial time recovery of the uniformly chosen secret with
    inverse polynomial probability yields quantum polynomial time algorithms
    for the gap shortest vector problem (GapSVP) and the shortest independent vectors problem (SIVP) on arbitrary \(n\) dimensional lattices, with approximation factors \(O(n\log n)\) and \(O(n(\log n)^2)\), respectively. Under stronger parameter conditions, a second family admits a decision reduction: a polynomial time algorithm with inverse polynomial
    distinguishing advantage yields quantum polynomial time algorithms for
    the same lattice problems with factors \(O(n(\log n)^3)\) and
    \(O(n(\log n)^4)\), respectively. Conditional on the public seed, the comparison output is uniform in the prescribed dither coset and
    independent of the matrix.
    We also examine extensions to learning with errors (LWE) with interval uniform errors, as
    arising in MAMBA Frost. We identify obstacles caused by deterministic quantization boundaries and give a local perturbation bound with
    explicit dependence on the number of observations. This analysis does
    not establish a complete worst case reduction for these errors or
    hardness at the concrete MAMBA parameters.
    ## 2026/2614
    * Title: Tight Post-Quantum Multi-Key Security of the FX Construction
    * Authors: Rentaro Shiba, Tetsu Iwata
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2614)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2614.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    The FX construction (FX) is one of the simplest key-length extension schemes for block ciphers, introduced by Kilian and Rogaway as a generalization of DESX. By extending the key length without modifying the underlying block cipher, FX can improve security against adversaries that perform quantum computation but are restricted to classical queries to the keyed construction. Recently, Shiba and Iwata showed in their ToSC 2026 paper that FX with an $n$-bit block and a $\kappa$-bit internal key is secure up to approximately $2^{(n+\kappa-\log_2\mu)/3}$ total classical and quantum oracle queries in the quantum ideal cipher model, where $\mu\leq2^\kappa$ is the number of independently keyed instances. In this paper, we improve this bound to approximately $2^{(n+\kappa)/3}$ total oracle queries in the same model against fully adaptive adversaries, for every $\mu\geq1$ and $1\leq\kappa\leq2n$. The known attack based on the offline Simon's algorithm can target a single keyed instance and matches our bound in the exponent. Thus, the exponent of the total query complexity required to break FX is independent of the number of keyed instances in this parameter regime.
    ## 2026/2615
    * Title: Faster and Smaller Anonymous Credentials from Standardized Signatures * Authors: Chad Sharp, Paul Grubbs
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2615)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2615.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    We present GordieHowe, a system comprising a language, a certifying compiler, and a zero-knowledge proof protocol. GordieHowe is especially suitable for building anonymous credentials on top of standardized signature schemes like ECDSA, RSA, and ML-DSA.
    GordieHowe is the first system to achieve the following three properties simultaneously: provable security against quantum attackers, efficiency for statements spanning multiple fieldsrCoincluding proving and verifying in parallelrCoand automatic batching of structured computations.
    GordieHowe is high-assurance by design. The language is designed to enable static checking of bounds safety, preventing integer overflows. Its compiler emits a Lean certificate that its optimization decisions are semantics-preserving for the input program. The proof system's security theorems are machine-checked in Lean.
    GordieHowe is faster and has smaller proofs than comparable prior work. It proves, in parallel on four cores, an ECDSA-signed mobile driving license presentation in 64.8 ms with a 276 KiB proof, 10.1|u faster and 22% smaller than Google's Longfellow. With at least 101 bits of knowledge soundness in the random oracle model, GordieHowe proves knowledge of a 1 KiB SHA3-256 preimage in 5.0 ms with a 60 KiB proof, and of an RSA-2048 signature on a private 2 KiB message in 25.9 ms with a 210 KiB proof. With at least 116 bits against quantum adversaries, GordieHowe proves knowledge of an ML-DSA-44 signature on a private message in 87.3 ms with a 549 KiB proof, 70.2|u faster and 29% smaller than an optimized Longfellow circuit.
    In building GordieHowe we make a number of contributions of independent interest. We define a new notion of an interactive oracle proof (IOP) whose messages are partially ordered, which we call a series-parallel IOP. We extend the BCS transformation to series-parallel IOPs, and give knowledge soundness and ZK proofs in the QROM. We also show our BCS extension satisfies a form of simulation extractability in the QROM; we believe this is the first simulation extractability result of any kind for BCS in the QROM.
    ## 2026/2616
    * Title: Descent-PBS: Programmable Bootstrapping beyond the Ring Dimension
    * Authors: Zhenyu Xiong, Mingsheng Wang, Han Wang, Zhedong Wang
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2616)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2616.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Programmable bootstrapping (PBS) in FHEW/TFHE evaluates a lookup table (LUT) while refreshing a ciphertext, but a t-entry negacyclic table must fit, with redundancy, into the 2N signed rotation positions of a ring accumulator. Module bootstrappings, namely extended bootstrapping (PKC'23), monomial-matrix bootstrapping (TCC'25) and their successors, rotate a redundant table once in a module of rank tau, at a cost linear in both the rank and the redundancy. Meta-PBS (CCS'26) removes the redundancy by iterating the rotation in the ring, but supports plaintext moduli only up to 2N, and running it inside the module pays the rank in every rotation.
    We present Descent-PBS, which pays the module rank of a large table only in its first rotation. We prove that for a module secret embedded from the subring, truncation commutes with the secret, so one public functional key switch with merged columns repacks all tau_0 components of a module accumulator into the ring and removes the per-component factor tau_0 of repacking. The bootstrapping then continues with Meta-PBS refinements in the ring, at tau_0 + K instead of (K'+1) tau_0 external products per key. For block one-hot secrets, the first-rotation exponents are multiples of tau_0, so every combined key is a scalar matrix: the tau_0 components share one key per block, and since all exponents are public in advance, one pass over the bootstrapping key builds the keys of all rotations of a negacyclic table. Ties-to-even gadget rounding removes a refinement bias that we trace to half-up rounding on the FFT grid.
    In a TFHE-rs-based engine, Descent-PBS evaluates a 16-bit negacyclic LUT in 196 ms on one thread at 128-bit security and a model-predicted failure probability below 2^-64. With the same keys and failure budget, the descent alone makes it 1.44-2.40x faster than Meta-PBS run inside the module for dense secrets; for block one-hot secrets, the descent and the shared keys together make it 1.51-3.32x faster, and 1.37-3.57x against the same baseline re-planned for more conservative 131-bit parameters. General 13-16-bit LUTs take 179-368 ms, 3.8-6.6x faster than WoP-PBS in its authors' configuration on the same single-ciphertext interface, at about twice its memory. The failure probabilities are predictions of a model that we validate where failures are observable, and the 16-bit keys take 1,208 MB.
    ## 2026/2617
    * Title: Mutual Correlated Agreement and List-Decoding: Improvements and Separations
    * Authors: Ignacio Manzur
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2617)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2617.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    At a high level our contribution is threefold: we improve the quantitative MCA error bound for polynomial generators, we prove a refinement of the implication from list-decodability to MCA, and we clarify that in general, these two notions are distinct.
    We show that, for every finite field $\mathbb{F}$, every nonempty seed set $S\subseteq\mathbb{F}$, every linear code $\mathcal{C} \subseteq \mathbb{F}^{n}$ of relative minimum distance $\delta_{\mathcal{C}}$ and every degree $d \geq 1$, the univariate powers generator $G_{d}(x) := (1,x,\dots,x^{d})$ has mutual correlated agreement for $\mathcal{C}$ at relative proximity parameter $\gamma$ with error $O(d\max\{1,n\gamma\}/|S|)$ below the smaller of the unique decoding radius and the generalized Johnson radius $J_{d+2}(\delta_{\mathcal{C}}) := 1-(1-\delta_{\mathcal{C}})^{1/(d+2)}$, with a one-coordinate margin below the latter when it is smaller.
    Then, we show that list-decodability at radius $p$ with list size $L$ implies MCA slightly above $1-\sqrt{1-p}$ (the improvement on the radius is dependent on the list size). The previous state-of-the-art result of Gao, Cai, Xu and Kan showed that list-decodability at radius $p<\delta_{\mathcal{C}}$ with list size $L$ implies mutual correlated agreement at every proximity parameter strictly below $1-\sqrt{1-p}$.
    Finally we construct two families of codes that show obstructions to any improvement of the $1-\sqrt{1-p}$ bound, or to strong converse statements. Informally, a bound of the form $\epsilon_{\mathsf{MCA}}(1-(1-p)^\alpha)\leq Q(n, L)/|\mathbb{F}|$ for some polynomial $Q$ and $\alpha > 1/2$ cannot hold for all linear codes $\mathcal{C}$ under the sole hypothesis that $\mathcal{C}$ is $(p,L)$-list-decodable. Similarly, for any distance $0<\delta<1$ and any $1-\sqrt{1-\delta}<p<\gamma<1$, there exists a family of linear codes with fixed positive rate and relative distance tending to $\delta$ such that $|\mathbb{F}|\epsilon_{\mathsf{MCA}}(\gamma)\leq \mathrm{poly}(n)$ but the list size at radius $p$ is $n^{\omega(1)}$. Both counterexample families exist over fields of any characteristic. Both MCA errors are for the line generator.
    ## 2026/2618
    * Title: Efficient (Functional) Bootstrapping for CKKS over the Conjugate-Invariant Ring
    * Authors: Jiaming Liu, Shihe Ma, Anyu Wang, Xiaoyun Wang
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2618)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2618.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    The CKKS fully homomorphic encryption scheme enables efficient encrypted computation over complex-valued data.
    In many real-world cases, however, the computation only involves real data, and storing them inside complex slots wastes the encoding ability.
    This motivated the design of conjugate-invariant CKKS (CI-CKKS) instantiated over the conjugate-invariant ring (CIR), which provides the same number of real slots while halving the RLWE dimension.
    Despite its better efficiency in handling real data, CI-CKKS cannot be bootstrapped directly in CIR, since the CoeffToSlot and SlotToCoeff linear transformations used in bootstrapping require storing complex values in both plaintexts and ciphertexts.
    The existing method in Lattigo bootstraps two CI-CKKS ciphertexts by converting them to a standard CKKS ciphertext, bootstrapping there, and converting back.
    This bootstrapping is efficient only for batched inputs, and therefore suffers from limited flexibility.
    Another issue with CI-CKKS is that many existing functional bootstrapping methods encode intermediate values using complex roots of unity, whereas CI-CKKS provides only real-valued slots.
    Our first contribution is a real FFT algorithm over the conjugate-invariant ring, thereby enabling native bootstrapping in CI-CKKS.
    Our second contribution investigates functional bootstrapping over CI-CKKS. We adapt the real-valued AKP interpolant with radial correction and develop a single-cosine Hermite interpolation method using a single real ciphertext.
    We show existing complex-valued interpolation methods can be implemented using two real ciphertexts to simulate complex arithmetic. We also study the numerical behavior of real-valued interpolation and evaluate the tradeoffs between computational efficiency and precision.
    We implement our methods in Lattigo.
    Our native CI-CKKS bootstrapping achieves a $1.46$--$1.80\times$ speedup in single-ciphertext bootstrapping across different StC and CtS factorizations.
    Compared with state-of-the-art functional bootstrapping methods over standard CKKS, our methods achieve $1.16$--$1.68\times$ higher throughput.
    ## 2026/2619
    * Title: Smaller Share Size for Evolving Secret Sharing: General Thresholds and Threshold Three
    * Authors: Xiaozheng Wang
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2619)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2619.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Evolving secret sharing allows participants to join indefinitely
    without modifying previously distributed shares. We study the share
    size of perfectly secure evolving threshold secret sharing schemes
    and obtain two improvements.
    For general thresholds, we introduce a polynomial sharing method
    that shares two secrets with adjacent reconstruction thresholds
    using one polynomial. Combining this method with the evolving scheme
    of Cheng et al.\ (ASIACRYPT 2025), we obtain an evolving
    $k$-threshold scheme whose $t$-th share has size
    \[
    \left\lfloor \frac{k}{2} \right\rfloor \log_2 t
    + O_k\!\left(\ell+\log_2\log_2 t\right)
    \]
    bits for an $\ell$-bit secret. This reduces the leading coefficient
    of their general construction from $k-1$ to
    $\lfloor k/2\rfloor$.
    For threshold three, we give a separate construction that reduces
    the lower-order terms of the scheme of Cheng et al.
    We mask the short shares in all generations with the same random
    $\ell$-bit value $R$, which is shared through an evolving
    $2$-threshold scheme, we obtain
    \[
    \log_2 t+(2+o(1))\log_2\log_2 t
    \]
    bits per share for fixed $\ell$.
    Both constructions satisfy correctness and perfect
    information-theoretic security.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2