From Newsgroup: sci.crypt
## In this issue
1. [2026/240] Revisiting Generic Transforms for Committing ...
2. [2026/309] Hash Function Constructions from Lightweight Block ...
3. [2026/406] Putting the OPTI in Round Optimal IA-MPC in the ...
4. [2026/408] Smoothing the degree of regularity for polynomial ...
5. [2026/1036] Resettable Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge: Attacks ...
6. [2026/1451] Lightweight Hardware Accelerator for the UOV ...
7. [2026/1571] LAMP: Linear Verification of Matrix Multiplication ...
8. [2026/1723] De-SyRIS: A Decentralized Sybil-Resistant Identity ...
9. [2026/1778] HOVER: Higher-Order Vanishing Endomorphism Recovery
10. [2026/1881] Constant-Time Conditions for Left-to-Right Scalar ...
11. [2026/1992] Bridging the Cryptographic Transition: A Unified ...
12. [2026/2053] Weighted Batch Threshold Encryption with Efficient DKG
13. [2026/2175] $\mathsf{Rotor}$: SNARKs for Power-of-Two Rings
14. [2026/2318] Beyond MoscarCOs Heuristic: Supported Is Not ...
15. [2026/2377] MIKE: a fast and compact post-quantum NIKE
16. [2026/2378] AsyncLS: an iUC Framework for Wallet-Based ...
17. [2026/2379] Settling Conjectures on Linear Structures of ...
18. [2026/2380] The Graded Monoidal Action for Cryptography
19. [2026/2381] The Lattice Isomorphism Problem with Hints
20. [2026/2382] Differential-Neural Cryptanalysis of ChaCha and ...
21. [2026/2383] The Post-Quantum Cost of Garbled-Circuit Bitcoin ...
22. [2026/2384] A Security-Aware PQC Benchmarking Framework on ...
23. [2026/2385] SkrrtPIR: Doubly-Stateless Batch PIR from Single- ...
24. [2026/2386] Provable Subexponential Algorithms for NIST Third- ...
25. [2026/2387] Quantum Time-Lock Puzzles in the Quantum Random ...
26. [2026/2388] Faster Provable Lattice Sieving with Spherical Codes
27. [2026/2389] Lifting Bounded-Collusion Security to Full Security ...
28. [2026/2390] A Universal Forgery Attack on the Origami Signature ...
29. [2026/2391] Retention Choices for Quantum CHAM Key Search under ...
30. [2026/2392] Fair and Efficient Helper-Aided MPC with Cheater ...
31. [2026/2393] Round Optimal MPC With Provable Cheater Identification
32. [2026/2394] Post-Quantum Dropout-Resilient Verifiable Secure ...
33. [2026/2395] The Price of Privacy: Randomness Complexity of ...
34. [2026/2396] Hide Now, Trace Later: Retrospective Attribution in ...
35. [2026/2397] Hashing Beats Trees: Practical Oblivious ...
36. [2026/2398] Note on Extractability of PST Polynomial Commitment ...
37. [2026/2399] A Note on Extractable Witness Encryption in Generic ...
38. [2026/2400] Simple Byzantine Lattice Agreement in $O(\frac{\log ...
39. [2026/2401] New infinite families of APN functions from the ...
40. [2026/2402] Revisiting Lattice-based Blind Signatures Again
41. [2026/2403] Practical and Efficient MPC from FHE, without ZKPoKs
42. [2026/2404] The Geometry of Collusion Leakage in Inner-Product ...
43. [2026/2405] Game-Theoretically Fair Coin Toss from Random Walk ...
44. [2026/2406] Time-Space Tradeoffs For Probabilistic Proofs
45. [2026/2407] Language Modeling is Monotone Compression
46. [2026/2408] Separating One-Way Functions from Verifiable Delay ...
47. [2026/2409] Mercury: Fuzzy Private Set Intersection with ...
48. [2026/2410] KIFA: Kernel-based Integral Fault Analysis on GIFT- ...
49. [2026/2411] Average-Case Hardness of Lattice Problems in ...
50. [2026/2412] Barely Sublinear RAM-FHE from Plain LWE
51. [2026/2413] Fast Polynomial Arithmetic in the Exponent without ...
52. [2026/2414] Reverse-Bleichenbacher: Bleichenbacher Attacks are ...
53. [2026/2415] The Power of Multislices in Monotone Computation
54. [2026/2416] New Constructions of Quadratic and Cubic ...
55. [2026/2417] Unpredictability from Parity: Understanding Linear ...
56. [2026/2418] Individual Cryptography from Iterated Squaring
57. [2026/2419] Optimal Statistical Oblivious RAM and Search Tree ...
## 2026/240
* Title: Revisiting Generic Transforms for Committing Authenticated Encryption * Authors: Kazuhiko Minematsu, Akiko Inoue
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/240)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/240.pdf)
### Abstract
Committing security for authenticated encryption (AE) captures the difficulty of constructing a distinct input tuple, including the key, that yields the same ciphertext. This notion is relatively new but has attracted significant attention due to its practical relevance. A promising direction is to design generic transforms that convert any AE scheme into a committing one.
A common approach to generic transforms, initiated by the CTX transform (Chan and Rogaway, ESORICS 2022), is to add a hash function that uses part of the AE input/output, assuming the hash is ideal, i.e., a random oracle. Because the baseline AE is assumed to be secure in the standard model, this approach inherently mixes standard-model and idealized-model assumptions.
We revisit this approach. We show that a number of state-of-the-art generic transforms relying on a mixed model (Chen and Karad++i-c, Eurocrypt 2025, and Bhattacharjee et al., ePrint 2024), proposed after CTX, are vulnerable once the hash function is instantiated, by presenting practical counterexamples enabling efficient attacks. Our attacks/counterexamples exploit the fact that the baseline AE may depend on the instantiation of the generic transform, whereas the opposite is not true for the principle of the generic transform. In most cases, the attacks are effective with any instantiation, and the baseline AEs in the attacks have a natural structure, such as Enc-then-MAC with a counter mode encryption.
We also demonstrate how to rectify these damaged transforms with minimal algorithmic modifications, relying solely on the standard-model assumptions.
## 2026/309
* Title: Hash Function Constructions from Lightweight Block Ciphers for Fully Homomorphic Encryption
* Authors: Olivier Bernard, Marc Joye
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/309)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/309.pdf)
### Abstract
This paper investigates hash-function constructions derived
from lightweight block ciphers, that are suitable for evaluation in fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) settings. We focus on PRINCEv2, a 64-bit lightweight block cipher with 128-bit keys and low algebraic complexity, which is particularly amenable to FHE evaluation. However, the small block size of such ciphers limits the applicability of standard hash-function transforms. Indeed, achieving 128-bit collision resistance in the $(n, 2n)$ setting, i.e., with 64-bit blocks, requires a quadruple-block-length (QBL) compression function, for which no generic construction is known.
In this work, we propose a concrete QBL compression construction tailored to PRINCEv2 and analyze its collision resistance. Candidate QBL designs inspired from existing double-block-length constructions are also outlined. As a further contribution, we describe a carefully optimized homomorphic circuit design for PRINCEv2. The resulting implementation outperforms previous works in both operation counts and computational depth. Experimental timings demonstrate the practical feasibility of evaluating the corresponding hash constructions under FHE with low latency, while providing cryptographically small failure probability.
## 2026/406
* Title: Putting the OPTI in Round Optimal IA-MPC in the Plain Model
* Authors: Yashvanth Kondi, Divya Ravi, Jure Sternad, Sophia Yakoubov
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/406)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/406.pdf)
### Abstract
We advance the study of best-possible security guarantees of two-round secure multiparty computation in the plain model.
While Goel et al. (TCC '21) showed the infeasibility of Identifiable Abort in two rounds in the plain model with a standard honest majority (i.e. $t < n/2$), the effect of relaxing the setting to an honest supermajority has not been established. In this work, we close this gap.
When $t < n/3$, we show that two rounds are sufficient to achieve identifiable abort. Notably, ours is the first two-round general-purpose MPC construction in the plain model tolerating more than one corruption that achieves a guarantee stronger than unanimous abort.
We obtain our construction via a new compiler that lifts any protocol with unanimous abort to one that achieves identifiable abort. A core building block for our compiler is Oblivious Public Transfer with Intermediaries (OPTI), a new primitive that we introduce which may be of independent interest.
## 2026/408
* Title: Smoothing the degree of regularity for polynomial systems
* Authors: Samuel Jaques, Lars Ran, Simona Samardjiska, Melvin Seitner
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/408)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/408.pdf)
### Abstract
The complexity of many algebraic algorithms for solving non-linear polynomial systems of equations over finite fields, such as the XL (eXtended Linearization) algorithm or variants of the F4/F5 algorithms, is directly determined by the so called degree of regularity. In essence, we can form the Macaulay matrix at this degree, which can be thought of as the linearization of monomial multiples of the polynomials from the problem instance, and then solve the obtained linear system. The degree of regularity guarantees we can solve the system, however, it is a rather coarse parameter. This means that, sometimes, in order to provably show that we achieve overdeterminess, we end up with a heavily overdetermined Macaulay matrix which unnecessarily increases the computational cost.
To reduce this coarseness, and thus avoid the unnecessary computational cost, we propose a technique for ``smoothing'' the degree of regularity that can be seen as operating at a degree in-between two integer values. Instead of the full Macaulay matrix, we consider specific submatrices that we show are sufficient to solve the given system. Under a mild assumption that generalizes the notion of semi-regularity, which we experimentally verify for a range of parameters, we show that our approach smooths the complexity of XL for the MQ (Multivariate Quadratic) problem. Finally, we apply our results to a recent UOV attack and demonstrate improvement of a few bits.
## 2026/1036
* Title: Resettable Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge: Attacks and Defenses
* Authors: Behzad Abdolmaleki, Matteo Campanelli, Quang Dao, Shadman Mohammadi, Nahid Roustaeifar
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1036)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1036.pdf)
### Abstract
As zero-knowledge proofs are used in real-world systems, they face threats such as resetting attacks, where an attacker manipulates the prover's randomness. While resettable security has been studied for interactive protocols, whether modern non-interactive systems such as zkSNARKs remain secure under resets is still unclear. This work provides the first systematic study of resettable security for NIZK arguments with three main contributions:
- New Definition: We define strong resettable NIZK (srNIZK), which captures adversaries that can selectively reset the prover's randomness, so that some parts are reused while others are generated afresh. This goes beyond the whole-tape resets considered in standard rZK and is motivated by fault injection on secure hardware and incomplete state restoration in virtualized environments.
- Concrete Attacks: We demonstrate that widely used NIZK constructions are vulnerable to resetting attacks. We show witness-recovery attacks against (i) Fiat-Shamir-compiled $\Sigma$-protocols (e.g., Schnorr), (ii) succinct proof systems using independently sampled masks (e.g., PLONK and Bulletproofs), and (iii) salted Fiat-Shamir compilations of a broad class of interactive arguments.
- Generic Defense: Our simple compiler transforms any NIZK into an srNIZK by modifying only randomness generation, using a pseudorandom function (PRF) secure under partial key resets. This prevents resetting attacks without changing proof size or verification.
Our results demonstrate that resetting attacks must be considered in NIZK systems, and provide a simple defense with minor prover overhead.
## 2026/1451
* Title: Lightweight Hardware Accelerator for the UOV Signature Scheme with Oil Space Blinding
* Authors: Florian Krieger, Maciej Czuprynko, Sujoy Sinha Roy
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1451)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1451.pdf)
### Abstract
In reaction to the emerging quantum threat, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) seeks post-quantum secure digital signature schemes. NIST's ongoing competition recently advanced to the third round, in which the Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar scheme (UOV) is a promising candidate due to UOV's conservative design, small signatures, and performant signing and verification. While these benefits make UOV attractive, the implementation aspects for compact hardware acceleration of UOV remain underexplored. Existing hardware accelerators optimize for performance and have large memory footprints. Yet, constrained devices require compact and low-memory hardware support. At the same time, lowering the memory consumption of UOV without sacrificing performance is challenging due to UOV's large public keys and intermediate results. In addition, low-end devices are prone to power side-channel attacks and benefit from lightweight countermeasures. In this work, we focus on the open challenges of compact UOV hardware acceleration. We design a low-memory UOV architecture with runtime-flexible support of NIST security levels 1 to 5. Our architecture uses a load-balanced 16-lane datapath supporting the critical matrix operations of UOV. In addition, we lower UOV's peak memory consumption using a slicing technique and enable on-the-fly data generation via streamlined data realignment. We also include a pipelined Gaussian Elimination unit and a streaming approach for the large public keys needed for signature verification. In addition to compact hardware acceleration, we defend against differential power analysis attacks through a lightweight blinding countermeasure relying on UOV's equivalent keys. Our blinding requires random non-singular matrices, which are not trivial to sample efficiently in hardware. We therefore assess existing sampling approaches and propose a novel technique based on the lower-upper decomposition of matrices. The resulting blinding solely re-uses existing datapath components and limits the runtime overhead to less than 30%. Compared to existing UOV accelerators, our efficient FPGA design reaches up to 5.1x lower signing and 3.2x lower verification latency, while reducing the memory consumption between 2.2x and 16x.
## 2026/1571
* Title: LAMP: Linear Verification of Matrix Multiplication via Proximity Testing
* Authors: Kyeongtae Lee, Byeongkyu Han, Jihye Kim, Hyunok Oh
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1571)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1571.pdf)
### Abstract
Verifiable computation systems often need to prove large matrix multiplication statements, but a direct SNARK arithmetization of a \(k \times k\) product requires \(\mathcal{O}(k^3)\) constraints. Freivalds' randomized check reduces the algebraic computation to vector-matrix products, but proving those products inside a SNARK still costs \(\mathcal{O}(k^2)\) constraints.
We present LAMP, a matrix-multiplication checking protocol that combines Freivalds' randomized check with proximity testing over linear error-correcting codes. The prover commits to encoded matrices and intermediate vectors before the sampled query positions are derived. The CP-SNARK circuit then checks only the sampled codeword positions and commits to the values used inside the circuit, while Merkle openings and CP-Link proofs ensure consistency between the in-circuit witnesses and the externally committed values. We prove soundness for this committed-input setting under the soundness of the SNARK backend, the binding of the commitments, the correctness of the CP-Link checks, and the relative distance and unique-decoding radius of the Reed--Solomon code.
For a fixed number \(t\) of sampled positions, the main in-circuit SNARK relation has \(\mathcal{O}(tk+E_{\mathsf{code}})\) constraints, with additional \(\mathcal{O}(t\log n)+E_{\mathsf{link}}(k,t)\) backend work for Merkle openings and CP-Link checks. We implement LAMP in Go and compare it with a Freivalds-based SNARK circuit. In the matrix benchmark at \(k=2^{12}\), LAMP reduces the constraint count by \(9.68\times\) and shortens proof generation time by \(5.81\times\); verification remains approximately \(0.13\,\text{s}\) across the measured range.
## 2026/1723
* Title: De-SyRIS: A Decentralized Sybil-Resistant Identity System Using Mutual Facial Biometric Verification and Social Graph Analysis
* Authors: Michal -+a+i, Ivan Homoliak, Juraj Mariani
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1723)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1723.pdf)
### Abstract
While decentralized identity management systems strive for autonomy, most still rely on centralized mechanisms (e.g., phone numbers or government-issued IDs) to achieve Sybil resistance and prevent fake identity attacks. This article proposes a novel approach for decentralized identity management that ensures robust Sybil resistance, unlike the systems currently in widespread use. Our approach is based on a social graph of connected users. The main novelty resides in pairwise mutual facial biometric verification for connected users and anti-Sybil social graph analysis. By leveraging blockchain technology, zero-knowledge proofs, and privacy-preserving smart contract platforms, the system ensures the uniqueness, anonymity, and privacy of registered users without relying on centralized authorities. We implemented a proof-of-concept prototype of our approach using fast Plonky2 zero-knowledge proofs and evaluated its functionality through simulations on heterogeneous social graph models with 1000 entities. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to propose a Sybil-resistant identity system that neither sacrifices decentralization nor privacy and does not rely on any centralized credential issuers.
## 2026/1778
* Title: HOVER: Higher-Order Vanishing Endomorphism Recovery
* Authors: Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1778)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1778.pdf)
### Abstract
Higher-Order Vanishing (HOV), introduced by Hemmert and Wiemers at CRYPTO 2026, distinguishes Goppa codes and was recently extended to McEliece key recovery. We introduce a new variant of HOV, HOVER (Higher-Order Vanishing Endomorphism Recovery), that replaces the costly low-rank direction-search phase of HOV with a much faster linear algebra step. Our attack is based on the observation that the first catalecticants (the coefficient matrices of first partial derivatives) of the public HOV kernel define a contraction tensor; HOVER computes the coefficient endomorphisms that preserve all relations of this tensor. In the clean case, in which the scalar-extended HOV kernel is spanned by exactly the $m$ hidden Frobenius directions, this public algebra is $\mathbb{F}_{2^m}$, and the eigenspaces of a field generator are exactly those directions, already ordered by Frobenius. We give a basis-invariant construction, a structural classification of its possible matrix-algebra outputs, and explicit acceptance conditions that return $\bot$ rather than an uncertified output. During our end-to-end public-only experiments, we recovered keys for five Technology Innovation Institute (TII) McEliece challenges, including TII-252, whose label originally represented a $2^{252}$ brute-force enumeration model. However, our analysis does not indicate that HOVER would threaten Classic McEliece parameters in its present form. Lastly, we note that HOVER's main cryptanalytic shortcut was discovered with a large language model, underscoring the strong potential of AI cryptanalysis.
## 2026/1881
* Title: Constant-Time Conditions for Left-to-Right Scalar Multiplication
* Authors: Sergey Agievich
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1881)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1881.pdf)
### Abstract
We consider methods for scalar multiplication on an elliptic curve where the scalar digits are processed from left to right, that is, from most significant to least significant. We analyze exceptions that may arise during point addition and doubling throughout the multiplication. Eliminating such exceptions is critical for achieving constant-time execution and preventing timing attacks. We establish conditions under which exceptions occur only at the final addition or not at all. Guided by these conditions, one can ensure constant-time behavior by performing all doublings and all intermediate additions using fast formulas that require no exception handling. We examine two variants of the Comb method: SAB-Set and LSB-Set. For both variants, we prove that the constant-time conditions are satisfied under mild restrictions on the base point order and Comb parameters. Additionally, we propose a convenient scalar recoding algorithm for the SAB-Set variant.
## 2026/1992
* Title: Bridging the Cryptographic Transition: A Unified Framework for Post-Quantum Key Exchange
* Authors: Benjamin Dowling, Bhagya Wimalasiri
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1992)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1992.pdf)
### Abstract
In a widely publicized recent announcement, Google established a formal 2029 deadline for completing its post-quantum cryptography (PQC) migration---one that deliberately preempts the 2035 deadline set by NIST and the US federal government to complete the deprecation of classical public-key algorithms. Google cited faster-than-expected progress across three fronts: quantum computing hardware development; quantum error correction; and revised estimates of the resources required for quantum computers to break current cryptographic schemes; as motivation for setting an ambitious internal target ahead of the regulatory horizon. This tightened deadline places particular pressure on existing cryptographic protocols that rely on classical key exchange primitives for secure communication. Our work aims to ease this transition by constructing a unified, formally analyzed security framework for migrating classical key exchange constructions to their post-quantum counterparts.
## 2026/2053
* Title: Weighted Batch Threshold Encryption with Efficient DKG
* Authors: Alexander Frolov, Aditi Partap, Max Resnick, Ertem Nusret Tas
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2053)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2053.pdf)
### Abstract
Batch threshold encryption allows a committee to decrypt a selected batch of ciphertexts using one short pre-decryption key per party, while ciphertexts outside the batch remain private. This makes batch threshold encryption attractive for building encrypted mempools for blockchains, where validators reveal transactions selected for a block while pending transactions remain private. However, in proof-of-stake systems like Solana or Ethereum, authorization depends on each validator's stake, which motivates a weighted version of batch threshold encryption. Naive approaches to weighting existing batch threshold encryption schemes lead to communication costs proportional to the weight assigned to each party. Existing schemes that avoid this cost either associate every ciphertext with a batch label or an encryption-time index.
We present the first weighted batch threshold encryption schemes that require neither batch/epoch labels nor encryption-time ciphertext indices, while keeping each party's communication independent of its weight. We obtain two constructions by virtualizing prior schemes: the BTX construction of Agarwal et al. and the partial-fraction construction of Boneh et al. In both schemes' decryption procedures, each party communicates a single group element for an entire batch, regardless of its assigned weight. We prove correctness, robustness, and security under weighted variants of the original schemes' assumptions, and analyze the assumptions in generic bilinear groups. For the BTX-based construction, we also give a specialized distributed key generation protocol that avoids the general purpose MPC-based setup required by the previous state-of-the-art schemes. Finally, we implement our schemes to demonstrate their practical performance at parameter sizes relevant to blockchains.
## 2026/2175
* Title: $\mathsf{Rotor}$: SNARKs for Power-of-Two Rings
* Authors: Chongrong Li, Yun Li, Pengfei Zhu, Zhechen Li, Michael Dong, Alan Li, Yuncong Hu
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2175)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2175.pdf)
### Abstract
Succinct proofs for arithmetic modulo powers of two are crucial for verifying machine-word computations in practice. However, designing SNARKs over such rings is challenging, since they lack the algebraic properties that common SNARKs over fields rely on to achieve negligible soundness error. Existing approaches either work over Galois rings, whose arithmetic is expensive, or lift the statement to the integers and prove it over a large random prime field, which is also several times slower than the structured primes used in practice.
We present $\mathsf{Rotor}$, an efficient SNARK for circuits over $\mathbb Z_{2^k}$. Unlike prior work, $\mathsf{Rotor}$ operates natively over power-of-two rings and derives its soundness from three levels of ring precision. To prove statements over $\mathbb Z_{2^k}$, we first construct a sumcheck-style interactive oracle proof with tensor queries over a larger ring $\mathbb Z_{2^m}$. We then establish a weakened proximity gap for linear codes, in which proximity testing over a still larger ring $\mathbb Z_{2^\ell}$ ensures that the underlying vectors are close to the code after reduction to $\mathbb Z_{2^m}$. This yields a Brakedown-style commitment with tensor evaluation proofs over $\mathbb Z_{2^m}$. In both cases, a sufficiently large gap between the precisions guarantees negligible soundness error. Finally, we introduce compatible commitments, which link ring witnesses to their binary-field representations and enable permutation checks over fields to verify permutations over $\mathbb Z_{2^k}$, completing the construction of $\mathsf{Rotor}$.
## 2026/2318
* Title: Beyond MoscarCOs Heuristic: Supported Is Not Protected in Post-Quantum Migration
* Authors: Abdoul Ahad FALL
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2318)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2318.pdf)
### Abstract
Post-quantum (PQ) migration is usually tracked per asset, with MoscarCOs inequality and a share of rCLmigratedrCY systems. For a flow of sensitive data, the relevant questions are different: is every session that carries it keyed by a quantum-safe secret, what evidence supports that claim, and what can an assessor establish from outside? We propose an assessment method whose unit is the data path and whose verdicts are tied to evidence. Key lineage is an algebra on break dates: a derived key falls when all its inputs fall, and a key falls when any of its copies falls.
This covers TLS 1.3 resumption, key transport and keys wrapped several times. A verdict is a pair of strong-Kleene evaluations, one taking claims at face value and one admitting only claims that meet an evidence policy; the reachable pairs form four ordered labels. We characterize what an external probe can establish. A probe of the server decides a hop only if the server enforces PQ or cannot negotiate it; enforcement must be shown by a negative test paired with a positive control; a server that resumes sessions without a fresh key exchange
leaves the layer undecided; and behind a load balancer the confidence of a negative test follows a sampling bound only under an independence assumption that a default balancer violates.
We implement the probe and validate its inference rules on 22 configurations of five server stacks built on three TLS libraries, including confounders and a heterogeneous load balancer. The same nominal configuration yields different states across implementations, so declared configuration cannot replace runtime evidence. A protocol for an internet-scale enforcement study accompanies the paper
## 2026/2377
* Title: MIKE: a fast and compact post-quantum NIKE
* Authors: Andrea Basso, Pierrick Dartois, Max Duparc, Jonathan Komada Eriksen, Sabrina Kunzweiler, Michael Meyer, Giacomo Pope, Krijn Re-|nders, Damien Robert, Ryan Rueger, Sina Schaeffler
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2377)
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https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2377.pdf)
### Abstract
We introduce MIKE (Module Isogeny Key Exchange), a post-quantum NIKE (Non Interactive Key Exchange) whose security relies on the CDH problem for the rank-$2$ Hermitian module action on supersingular elliptic curves.
For NIST level~$1$, MIKE has very compact public keys of 80B, and using our constant time C implementation, the key generation takes 0.65ms and the shared secret takes 4.9ms (including key validation) on a AMD CPU at 3.3GHz.
## 2026/2378
* Title: AsyncLS: an iUC Framework for Wallet-Based Asynchronous Ledger Services
* Authors: Keyang Liu, Li Duan
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2378)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2378.pdf)
### Abstract
We define an asynchronous ledger service ($\mathsf{AsyncLS}$) in the IITM-based universal composability (iUC) framework. The wallet-based service exposes a general state machine for a decentralized ledger-based application through registration, reads of committed application state, authenticated submission, and status queries with immutable final results. Each logical request binds the user's authorization to a finalized checkpoint and the applicable execution context. A confirmed outcome identifies the first eligible transaction and records application success or rejection. Strict expiry requires complete processing beyond the eligible height window with no recorded outcome, and certifies that the request has no application effect.
We construct a protocol $\mathbf{\Pi}_{\mathsf{AsyncLS}}$ that realizes the ideal service using four components: Wallet, Relay, Adapter, and Replay. The proof separates the service construction from the implementations of Relay and Adapter while preserving ledger, clock, authentication, and setup interactions. We prove realization for the trusted and local implementations under their respective execution and trust assumptions.
We use the service to construct an ORDI interactive payment and a parameterized execution layer above transaction ordering. These examples distinguish the ledger interaction protocol from the application state and effects exposed by the service. Each use requires the stated authorization, setup, ledger, clock, authentication, and ledger-effect assumptions.
## 2026/2379
* Title: Settling Conjectures on Linear Structures of Inverse ChiChi Generalizations Four Proofs and a Counterexample
* Authors: Hui Wang, Ricardo Rodriguez Reveco, Kai Hu
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2379)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2379.pdf)
### Abstract
Belkheyar et al. introduced ChiChi as the even-dimensional, low-latency nonlinear core of ChiLow (Eurocrypt 2025), and Andreoli et al. generalized it into the SWAP and 4-cycle families (ToSC 2025/3), conjecturing five bounds on the linear height and component linear nullity of their inverses, supported by experiments in small dimensions. We settle all five conjectures: Conjectures 1rCo4 hold for every admissible branch length, and Conjecture 5 is false. In addition, we derive consequences for ChiLow's design and correct one value in the data of Andreoli et al.
## 2026/2380
* Title: The Graded Monoidal Action for Cryptography
* Authors: Jonathan Komada Eriksen, Emil August Hovd Olaisen
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2380)
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https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2380.pdf)
### Abstract
We give a new framework for constructing post-quantum protocols based on graded monoidal actions. An essential difference between the graded monoidal action framework and the cryptographic group action framework is that our higher-rank problems give rise to infinite structures, where elements do not admit inverses, while cryptographic group actions are finite by definition. Nevertheless, we show that the hard problems for cryptographic group actions reduces to the corresponding family of hard problems for graded monoidal actions. However, the main motivation is that for general graded monoidal actions, the relevant problems admit no known subexponential quantum attacks, while still having enough structure to formulate some protocols based on cryptographic group actions, such as the Diffie-Hellman key-exchange.
Our framework can, to the extent we make clear in the paper, be instantiated with the module-action on oriented principally polarized abelian varieties (PPAV's), generalizing the class group action on oriented elliptic curves. Although the theory involving the module-action is quite involved, the formulation of a graded monoidal action is strikingly simple, making it a suitable abstraction for constructing protocols in, which can then be instantiated with the module-action.
## 2026/2381
* Title: The Lattice Isomorphism Problem with Hints
* Authors: M|-lissa Rossi
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2381)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2381.pdf)
### Abstract
The Lattice Isomorphism Problem (LIP) is a relatively new problem that has gained increasing attention in the field of lattice-based cryptography. It is the underlying hard problem of the Hawk signature scheme, which has been submitted to the second NIST call for post-quantum signatures. In this paper, we propose to study the security of LIP in the presence of partial information on the secret solution, which can be obtained through side-channel attacks or by design. We propose a new cryptanalysis approach for LIP that embeds it into a shortest vector problem (SVP) based on a different lattice than the one considered in the specifications of Hawk, allowing to integrate hints. We also introduce conversion techniques that transform hints expressed on arbitrary linear combinations of the secret key coefficients into hints on the target lattice, enabling the integration of a broader class of linear leakages on sensitive values. We implement our attack and predictions using the LeakyLWEEstimator tool (Crypto 2020) and obtain concrete security estimates for Hawk in the key-recovery setting. We also observe that Hawk signatures carry intrinsic information about the secret key and show that this can be exploited as a source of hints, yielding a refined key-recovery complexity, thereby eroding the original security estimates. For example, we estimate a security loss of around 11 bits for Hawk-1024. Finally, we apply our framework to side-channel analysis results on Hawk, solving an open problem raised in a recent analysis (TCHES 2024) and discuss further attack paths enabled by fault-injection techniques.
We believe that this new cryptanalysis approach for LIP and the integration of hints provide new insights towards a better understanding of its security.
## 2026/2382
* Title: Differential-Neural Cryptanalysis of ChaCha and Related ARX Stream Ciphers
* Authors: Nimai Parsa, Nitin Kumar Sharma
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2382)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2382.pdf)
### Abstract
The paper presents the first-ever differential neural cryptanalysis of the Latin Dances family of Salsa, ChaCha, and Forr||. First, we provide a systematic differential-neural study of the ARX stream cipher ChaCha. We train and compare six neural architectures, viz.: Gohr's residual network, DBitNet, an Inception network, an MLP-ResNet, an SE-ResNet, and a self-attention network on a 3-round reduced version of ChaCha. We train in both the classical single-pair setting and a multi-pair setting that combines up to sixteen ciphertext pairs through a log-odds rule. We extend the study for breadth to other ARX ciphers, Salsa, *ChaCha, and Forr||. We provide the first-ever distinguisher for 4.5 rounds of Salsa with accuracy of 0.53 for one pair and 0.60 for 16 pairs. Also, for Forr|| the first-ever distinguisher for 1.25 rounds of Salsa with accuracy of 1 for single and multiple pairs. We also introduce a family of experimental round-1-XOR variants (\emph{XOR-1}) that isolate the contribution of the first round's diffusion to distinguishability. Finally, we investigate the trained 3-round ChaCha distinguisher with four explainability experiments and show that, although the output difference is its dominant feature, it is not a pure differential distinguisher: its decision is interpretable as a learned mixture of round-1 truncated differentials, five of which already account for $99\%$ of the high-confidence ciphertext pairs.
## 2026/2383
* Title: The Post-Quantum Cost of Garbled-Circuit Bitcoin Bridges
* Authors: Mukesh Tiwari, Aaron Feickert
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2383)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2383.pdf)
### Abstract
Recent Bitcoin bridge designs rely on verification of succinct proofs to process withdrawals. This requires off-chain garbled circuit evaluation of a succinct proof, the input labels for which must be encoded on chain in a manner compatible with malicious security. We assess the post-quantum vulnerability of these cryptographic components, and examine the costs of secure alternatives. Circuit sizes for post-quantum proving systems can be made smaller than the current pairing-based baseline, but at the cost of significantly higher proof sizes that incur greater cost and require multiple Bitcoin blocks to encode. We suggest avenues of future research to improve efficiency of proofs, circuit representations, and input encodings.
## 2026/2384
* Title: A Security-Aware PQC Benchmarking Framework on Dual-Core Xtensa Silicon
* Authors: Gertrude Nabasirye, Hristina Mihajloska Trpcheska, E. Fatih Yetkin
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2384)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2384.pdf)
### Abstract
Deploying memory-heavy post-quantum cryptography (PQC) at the smart grid edge threatens real-time substation determinism, directly conflicting with the strict $\le 3 ms$ GOOSE tripping window of the IEC 61850 standard. To resolve this architectural tension, we propose a security-aware, hardware-in-the-loop benchmarking framework on the dual-core Xtensa LX7 (ESP32-S3) SoC running FreeRTOS. To prevent inter-core resource contention, the framework employs an asymmetric task-isolation design, pinning cryptographic operations to Core 1 while leaving Core 0 responsive to line-rate grid interrupts. Additionally, we define a programmatic heap-auditing methodology to model how heap_4.c maps key-state allocations across physical DRAM fragments while preserving the primary 128 KB contiguous system heap. Finally, we formulate an analytical latency model of the external Octal-SPI PSRAM interface, mathematically characterizing the CPU stall overhead ($C_{\text{stall}}$) induced when side-channel masking forces secret polynomial shares to spill over the external bus during non-sequential Cooley-Tukey NTT strides. This framework provides a rigorous methodology to characterize micro-architectural trade-offs, enabling utility engineers to plan post-quantum migration pathways without violating real-time grid constraints.
## 2026/2385
* Title: SkrrtPIR: Doubly-Stateless Batch PIR from Single-Key RLWE Unpacking
* Authors: Keewoo Lee, Yongha Son
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2385)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2385.pdf)
### Abstract
Batch Private Information Retrieval (Batch PIR) allows a client to privately retrieve multiple entries from a public database while amortizing query costs. However, concretely efficient schemes typically rely on per-client server state, such as client-specific evaluation keys, which makes queries linkable across sessions and complicates deployment. In this work, we initiate the study of doubly-stateless Batch PIR, where the server stores no per-client state and the client maintains no database-dependent hint. For this model, we construct a communication-efficient scheme that substantially reduces communication compared with the natural baseline of adapting off-the-shelf Batch PIR schemes by sending fresh evaluation keys with each batch query. The core technical ingredient is a single-key RLWE unpacking procedure that replaces the traditional tree-based approach, which requires logarithmically many Galois keys, with a linear walk over a cyclic Galois subgroup requiring only a single Galois key.
## 2026/2386
* Title: Provable Subexponential Algorithms for NIST Third-Round Lattice Families
* Authors: Yiming Gao, Xuyuan Han, Honggang Hu
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2386)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2386.pdf)
### Abstract
We give provable classical subexponential algorithms for secret recovery in growing parameter families associated with NIST third-round lattice candidates. For the Kyber/ML-KEM, FrodoKEM, SABER, NTRU LPRime, and Dilithium/ML-DSA families studied here, polynomial moduli and polylogarithmic coefficient scales yield recovery of the short secret component in expected time and space $2^{(1/2+o(1))n/\ln\ln n}$.
For noisy or rounded linear relations, we exploit an exact gap in the squared Euclidean norm of a comparison vector defined by each coordinate guess. One Gaussian list suffices to identify every secret coordinate by binary search, without enumerating the others. We establish the required sampling guarantees through new geometric bounds for structured public operators over prime and power of two moduli. The construction builds on the Wagner-style Gaussian sampling framework of Ducas, Engelberts, and Loyer (CRYPTO 2025) and the low-error decision-LWE algorithm of Han, Gao, and Hu (2026).
For quotient relations of NTRU type, we develop an affine slice search: fixing coordinates restricts candidate pairs to slices of the public lattice, and their estimated Gaussian masses guide the choice of each next coordinate. In the stated modulus window, Falcon's key generation quality condition supplies the required mass bound. The algorithm then recovers an equivalent signing key with high probability in time and space $2^{O(n/\ln\ln n)}$. The same search recovers the short key core for cyclic NTRU-HPS/HRSS.
Together, these results give subexponential algorithms for problem families associated with all seven NIST third-round lattice candidates. Despite the subexponential complexity, our results do not establish a reduction in the concrete security of the currently specified parameter sets.
## 2026/2387
* Title: Quantum Time-Lock Puzzles in the Quantum Random Oracle Model
* Authors: Prabhanjan Ananth, Yao-Ting Lin
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2387)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2387.pdf)
### Abstract
A time-lock puzzle allows a sender to hide a message in a puzzle such that recovering the message requires substantially more sequential computation than the time required to generate the puzzle, even when parallel computation is allowed. Applications of time-lock puzzles include timed-release encryption, sealed-bid auctions, electronic voting, fair contract signing, coin flipping, and Byzantine consensus. However, time-lock puzzles are known to be impossible in the classical random oracle model.
To overcome the classical barrier, in this work we consider quantum time-lock puzzles, in which the puzzle itself is a quantum state. Our construction in the quantum random oracle model achieves generation in one oracle round, solving in at most $T$ oracle rounds, and security against polynomial-width quantum adversaries of depth $o(T)$ for every polynomially bounded delay $T$, resolving an open problem posed by Mahmoody, Moran, and Vadhan (2011).
## 2026/2388
* Title: Faster Provable Lattice Sieving with Spherical Codes
* Authors: Divesh Aggarwal, Aditya Morolia, Noah Stephens-Davidowitz
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2388)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2388.pdf)
### Abstract
We study the computational problem $\mu$-SVP, in which the goal is to find a $\mu$-approximate shortest non-zero vector in a lattice $\mathcal{L}$, for constant approximation factors $\mu > 1$. Prior to this work, there was a large gap between the fastest algorithms for this problem whose correctness had been proven and the fastest heuristic algorithms, whose correctness has not been proven (but which seem to work well in practice).
We construct a novel sieving algorithm that combines the key tool used in the fastest heuristic sieving algorithms (faster nearest neighbor subroutines) together with the perturbation argument used in sieving algorithms with proven correctness. The result is an algorithm whose correctness we prove and whose running time depends on a simple geometric quantity: the maximal size of certain spherical codes.
Under a reasonable assumption about the maximal size of spherical codes, our algorithm's running time is roughly $2^{0.3066n}$ for large constants $\mu$, which is quite close to the best heuristic running time of roughly $(3/2)^{n/2} \approx 2^{0.2925n}$ and much faster than both the previous best known algorithm with proven correctness, which runs in time roughly $2^{0.802n}$ [Liu, Wang, Xu, and Zheng, 2011] and the very recent concurrent and independent work showing a $2^{n/2}$-time algorithm [Hhan, 2026]. (However, the algorithm of Hhan also solves $\mu$-SVP for $\mu =1$, while our algorithm only works for large constant $\mu$.) Using the best proven upper bound on the size of such spherical codes (which is almost certainly quite loose), we obtain a running time of roughly $2^{0.6078n}$, which is much better than the previous best work but notably slower than the concurrent work of Hhan.
## 2026/2389
* Title: Lifting Bounded-Collusion Security to Full Security in Pairing-Based Encryption Schemes
* Authors: Roy Stracovsky, Brent Waters, David J. Wu
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2389)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2389.pdf)
### Abstract
Notions like identity-based encryption (IBE) and attribute-based encryption (ABE) augment public-key encryption to provide fine-grained access control to encrypted data. In these settings, there is a single master public key that anyone can encrypt to. Users in turn possess different secret keys that determine which ciphertexts they can decrypt. The standard, or full, security notion for these schemes stipulates that a ciphertext computationally hides the message if the adversary does not possess a key that is allowed to decrypt. A relaxed notion of security that is often much easier to achieve is bounded-collusion security, where we only require security against adversaries that have an a priori bounded number of keys (and the scheme parameters can grow with this bound). For instance, it is known that vanilla public-key encryption implies bounded-collusion IBE (and ABE) whereas there is a black-box separation between public-key encryption and fully secure IBE.
In this work, we develop a general methodology to upgrade a pairing-based encryption scheme with bounded-collusion security into one that is fully secure. We illustrate our methodology by applying it to two main applications: batched IBE and multi-authority ABE. First, in the case of batched IBE, we obtain the first pairing-based construction of batched IBE where there are no tag restrictions (in the generic bilinear group model). All previous pairing-based batched IBE schemes require attaching a tag to ciphertexts and secret keys, and moreover, restrict the adversary to an a priori bounded number of secret keys for each tag. Second, we use our techniques to obtain a multi-authority ABE scheme that supports conjunction policies in the generic bilinear group model. This is the first pairing-based scheme that makes fully black-box use of the group. Previous pairing-based multi-authority ABE schemes require a random oracle whose output is a group element (which implicitly assumes the underlying group supports a procedure for explainable oblivious sampling).
## 2026/2390
* Title: A Universal Forgery Attack on the Origami Signature Scheme from the Public Key Alone
* Authors: Hugo Louiso, Hao Guo, Peigen Li, Pierre P|-bereau, Siyong Tao, Jintai Ding
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2390)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2390.pdf)
### Abstract
Origami is a multivariate signature scheme submitted to the NGCC round-1 public-key call. We show that the submitted bilinear construction is a Rainbow-type scheme whose central map is exposed. The verification map is the layered signing map in a public coordinate order. The public key therefore gives an equivalent secret key, allowing signature forgery at about the cost of one verification (about $0.01$s at Origami-128). Our attack exploits this public layered structure and succeeds against the unmodified reference implementation on all four parameter sets and the official test vectors. We also refute the security proof's inversion assumption in a bilinear independent-coefficient model. The hidden local algebras introduced by Origami do not prevent the attack. They raise a separate problem: the specification treats constrained matrix coordinates as independent, and honest signatures lie in a proper subspace.
## 2026/2391
* Title: Retention Choices for Quantum CHAM Key Search under a Global Qubit Budget
* Authors: Minseo Kim, Seungwon Lee, Subeen Cho, Hwajeong Seo
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2391)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2391.pdf)
### Abstract
Retaining intermediate values can shorten a quantum cipher oracle but increase the logical qubits required by each parallel search worker. We propose a joint selection procedure for 80-round and revised 112-round CHAM-128/128 under a fixed global logical-qubit budget. It selects retained round addends, feasible integer allocations of search workers, and execution plans to minimize maximum scheduled logical depth subject to a target probability of recovering and accepting the original key. We evaluate libraries of 83 and 99 retention sets against a baseline whose retention choices are restricted to no retention and full retention. Both comparison groups use the same implementation and execution rules. Across 654 budget, success-target, and Toffoli-decomposition conditions per round count, the mean depth reductions are 11.12% and 8.39%, with strict improvements in 606 and 588 conditions, respectively. The selected retention count need not increase with the budget, and a fixed-circuit capacity discontinuity can disappear after reselection. The findings concern the measured libraries under an ideal-cipher success model and logical-layer costs.
## 2026/2392
* Title: Fair and Efficient Helper-Aided MPC with Cheater Identification
* Authors: Maximilian Kamps, Protik Paul, Divya Ravi
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2392)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2392.pdf)
### Abstract
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) enables privacy-preserving tasks such as auctions and voting. In practice, more than half of the parties may collude, making security against a dishonest majority desirable. Unfortunately, dishonest-majority MPC suffers from high communication and can achieve only abort security. For instance, in an auction, an adversary may abort after learning the outcome and rerun the protocol with a higher bid.
Helper-aided MPC mitigates these limitations by introducing a semi-honest, non-colluding helper, a model that naturally fits settings with a central governing or coordinating entity and provides strong guarantees even when up to $n-1$ parties are malicious. The model assumes that the adversary can either semi-honestly corrupt the helper or maliciously corrupt up to $n-1$ parties (excluding the helper). While existing helper-aided protocols are fair i.e. either all parties receive the output or none do; they still allow the adversary to abort without any penalty and deny output to all parties. This behavior is undesirable in practice, as parties may incur the cost of computation without receiving the output.
In this work, we design efficient helper-aided MPC protocols that achieve identifiable fairness: either all parties obtain the output, orrCoif an abort occursrCono party receives the output, and the honest parties identify at least one common cheater.
We propose two protocols, $\mathsf{Alhena}$ for synchronous networks and $\mathsf{Wasat}$ for asynchronous networks which provide the stronger guarantee of identifiable fairness compared to the state-of-the-art fair protocols $\mathsf{Asterisk}$ (Kamarkar et al. IEEE S&P 2024) and $\mathsf{Castor}$ (Kamarkar et al. IEEE S&P 2026) in the respective network settings. Our experiments show that, in the online phase, $\mathsf{Alhena}$ and $\mathsf{Wasat}$ achieves speedups of $4-12.5\times$ and $2.5-5\times$ over $\mathsf{Asterisk}$ and $\mathsf{Castor}$ respectively. Furthermore, in the preprocessing phase, $\mathsf{Wasat}$ exhibits speedup of $\approx 3\times$ over $\mathsf{Castor}$. Notably, our protocols are designed in such a way that the online performance remains unaffected by active misbehaviour.
## 2026/2393
* Title: Round Optimal MPC With Provable Cheater Identification
* Authors: Yashvanth Kondi, Divya Ravi, Jure Sternad, Sophia Yakoubov
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2393)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2393.pdf)
### Abstract
Secure multiparty computation with provable identifiable selective abort (PISA), introduced by Kondi and Ravi (CCS 2025), guarantees that every honest party either obtains the computation output or a certificate that convinces any external auditor that a specific party cheated. Crucially, honest parties need not agree: some may get output while others receive evidence of cheating. In contrast, secure computation with identifiable abort (IA) requires just such unanimity; however, in the event that an honest party doesn't get output, it need merely be able to point to a cheater - not to prove their guilt.
Secure computation with IA classically requires broadcast. Kondi and Ravi demonstrated that secure computation with PISA, on the other hand, can be built over point-to-point channels alone.
While PISA is feasible exactly when guaranteed output delivery is, i.e. for $t < n / 2$, the best known construction over point-to-point channels requires six rounds. We settle the round complexity of PISA for all but a narrow band of thresholds. We prove that two rounds are impossible for $t \geq n /3$, even with arbitrary setup and computational assumptions; we give a three-round protocol for any $t < n/2$, which is therefore round-optimal for $n / 3 \leq t < n/2$; and we give a two-round protocol for $t < n/4$. The two-round protocol introduces a new primitive called one-or-nothing secret sharing with omissions.
## 2026/2394
* Title: Post-Quantum Dropout-Resilient Verifiable Secure Aggregation for Federated Learning
* Authors: Fateme Sadat Azimi, Hossein Pilaram, Javad Mohajeri
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2394)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2394.pdf)
### Abstract
Secure weighted aggregation is essential for privacy
preserving federated learning, yet existing schemes do not
simultaneously provide post-quantum security, resilience to client
dropouts, verifiability against malicious servers, and resistance
to bounded collusion between the server and clients. This paper
presents PQ-DVSA, a verifiable secure aggregation scheme that
provides post-quantum security and resilience to client dropouts.
PQ-DVSA protects both clientsrCO updated local models and
aggregation weights, enables reconstruction of the aggregate mask
for the active set after client dropouts, and allows clients to
verify the serverrCOs aggregation result under bounded collusion.
Experimental results show that PQ-DVSA achieves learning
performance comparable to exact weighted aggregation and
reduces the runtime for encrypted submission at each client
by up to 96% compared with SWAS, the closest existing scheme
to PQ-DVSA.
## 2026/2395
* Title: The Price of Privacy: Randomness Complexity of Graph-Based Multi-Secret Sharing
* Authors: Piotr Marszalik
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2395)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2395.pdf)
### Abstract
We study the randomness required to share possibly correlated secret bits
among parties connected by a graph. A dealer places shares on the edges
so that each party can recover its own secret from its incident shares
and learn nothing about the others beyond what its own secret reveals. Anilkumar et al. completely determined the minimum randomness required
for three binary secrets. We extend this study to four secrets and obtain results for arbitrary numbers of secrets on general graphs. For four
parties on a complete graph, we determine the minimum number of random
states for every set of permitted secret combinations: the possible
values are one, two, three and four. We also characterize when one random
bit suffices on an arbitrary graph.
## 2026/2396
* Title: Hide Now, Trace Later: Retrospective Attribution in Issuer-Hiding Credentials
* Authors: Stephan Krenn, Doryan Lesaignoux, Omid Mir, Gabriele Spini
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2396)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2396.pdf)
### Abstract
Attribute-based credentials (ABCs) enable privacy-preserving authentication by allowing users to prove statements about certified attributes without revealing unnecessary information. However, while ABCs hide undisclosed attributes, the credential verification process inherently reveals the issuer's identity, which can leak contextual information such as a user's nationality or residency. Issuer-hiding ABCs address this by concealing the issuer during verification, but introduce a critical accountability problem: if an issuer is compromised or acts maliciously, previously accepted presentations originating from that issuer cannot be singled out without significant privacy violation and high burden on the central authority performing the inspection.
We propose an issuer-inspection mechanism that enables retrospective attribution while preserving privacy. An inspection authority can release keys allowing verifiers to locally identify presentations originating from a specific compromised issuer and a defined time period, without affecting other issuers or earlier time periods. Concretely, we formalize the syntax and security requirements of issuer inspection and provide a generic construction from standard cryptographic building blocks; we further present a concrete pairing-based instantiation using Groth's randomizable structure-preserving signatures, Schnorr-style proofs and an adaptation of Gentry's anonymous identity-based encryption. Our analysis of computational and communication costs indicates that the proposed functionality remains practical for realistic parameter choices.
## 2026/2397
* Title: Hashing Beats Trees: Practical Oblivious Dictionaries in SGX
* Authors: Erik-Oliver Blass, Travis Mayberry
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2397)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2397.pdf)
### Abstract
Oblivious RAM (ORAM) is a powerful cryptographic primitive that hides both the contents of outsourced data and the access pattern to the data. However, it offers only a restrictive array-based interface. A principal obstacle to its deployment is building an efficient oblivious dictionary upon it. To build such a dictionary, the state-of-the-art layers an oblivious AVL tree over ORAM, avoids an expensive local position map, but forces every operation to traverse a full root-to-leaf path, costing $\Theta(\log n)$ ORAM accesses.
We show this trade-off to be suboptimal, particularly when deployed in a common setup within a trusted execution environment like SGX. There, a small amount of client memory can reduce the position map recursion depth to three levels or less, rendering its overhead relatively small. With low position map cost, probabilistic hash tables prevail as dictionary data structures due to their small, constant number of accesses compared to $\Theta(\log n)$ path traversal of a tree.
We implement and analyze oblivious, probabilistic hash tables over Path ORAM, including several different strategies: chaining, power-of-two-choices, stash-less cuckoo, and de-amortized cuckoo hashing. Execution of these algorithms within a secure enclave requires "double obliviousness", which in turn needs strict concrete maximum cost limits for each access that current literature does not provide. We derive these concrete padding parameters bounding the hash table rebuild probability to $\le 2^{-40}$ via large-scale simulation. In an SGX deployment, our constructions outperform oblivious trees by up to $20\times$ for $\mathsf{lookup}$s and $12\times$ for $\mathsf{insert}$s.
## 2026/2398
* Title: Note on Extractability of PST Polynomial Commitment Scheme
* Authors: Janno Siim, Pritam Pal
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2398)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2398.pdf)
### Abstract
A recent work by Belohorec et al. (Crypto, 2025) shows that the well-known PST multivariate polynomial commitment scheme is black-box extractable under falsifiable assumptions. They show that a minimally modified (extended) PST is extractable under an assumption ARSDH($n$), and that the canonical PST is extractable under an assumption GARSDH($n$). Both of these assumptions are new and more specialized than the original ARSDH assumption proposed by Lipmaa et al. (Eurocrypt, 2024) to prove black-box extractability of the univariate KZG polynomial commitment. A natural question is whether these assumptions are actually stronger than the original ARSDH assumption. We answer this negatively: we show that both ARSDH($n$) and GARSDH($n$) are equivalent to the original ARSDH assumption. Secondly, we point out a gap in the proof that canonical PST is extractable under GARSDH($n$) assumption.
## 2026/2399
* Title: A Note on Extractable Witness Encryption in Generic Groups
* Authors: Matteo Campanelli
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2399)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2399.pdf)
### Abstract
Hair and Sahai have recently proposed a construction of witness encryption for NP satisfying semantic security.
In this short note we observe that this recent witness-encryption construction is unconditionally extractable in the generic group model. This yields a construction of extractable witness encryption without assuming subexponential soundness of SNARGs, in contrast to the recent work of Jin (eprint:2026/2063), which requires this assumption. The result in this note, moreover, complements the concurrent work of Chen and Vaikuntanathan (eprint:2026/2346), who show the same construction to be public-coin extractable under a knowledge-style assumption; our argument is unconditional, but in the GGM.
## 2026/2400
* Title: Simple Byzantine Lattice Agreement in $O(\frac{\log f}{\log \log f})$ Rounds
* Authors: Yuval Efron, Jovan Komatovic
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2400)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2400.pdf)
### Abstract
Lattice agreement is a relaxed version of the standard consensus problem: correct processes need not decide the same value, but their decisions must be ``comparable''. Namely, every process proposes a value from a join semi-lattice, and correct processes decide values that (1) lie on a single chain, (2) include their own proposals, and (3) include nothing beyond what was proposed. Lattice agreement has important practical applications, as it underpins atomic snapshot objects and replicated state machines with commutative operations. Yet, the best known protocols decide in $O(\log f)$ rounds, where $f$ is an upper bound on the number of faulty processes.
In this paper, we break the logarithmic barrier. Namely, we present Join-IT, a synchronous Byzantine lattice agreement protocol that tolerates $f < n/3$ Byzantine processes and decides in $O\big( \frac{\log f}{\log \log f} \big)$ rounds. Join-IT uses no cryptography whatsoever, and its guarantees thus hold against a computationally unbounded adversary. Perhaps surprisingly, Join-IT is also remarkably simple. It sequentially composes two classical primitives: gradecast, which takes three rounds, and approximate agreement, which, at the precision Join-IT requires, takes $O\big( \frac{\log f}{\log \log f} \big)$ rounds. A single local step finally turns the output of approximate agreement into comparable decisions, at no additional cost in rounds.
## 2026/2401
* Title: New infinite families of APN functions from the switching construction in even dimension
* Authors: Tor Helleseth, Nadiia Ichanska, Nikolay Kaleyski
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2401)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2401.pdf)
### Abstract
We present the first new infinite family of APN functions obtained by applying the switching construction to a known family since the introduction of the Budaghyan-Carlet-Leander family in 2009. Our construction is also the first example of an infinite APN family obtained via the switching construction from an infinite family of non-power functions. More generally, we study families of APN functions that can be obtained from the Budaghyan-Helleseth-Kaleyski family by the addition of carefully selected perturbation terms. We perturb the known family by combinations of Frobenius conjugates of the relative norm and obtain four constructions, naturally arranged into two switching pairs. One of these families is EA-equivalent to the Li-Zhou-Li-Qu family, for which our construction yields a new univariate representation. Switching it by a norm-derived Boolean term produces a second family that we prove to be APN in every dimension where the base family is defined, and we show that this family is CCZ-inequivalent to all previously known constructions. Furthermore, we investigate two other infinite families that can be switched to one another, conjecture that they are APN for infinitely many dimensions, and obtain conditions that can be used to characterize their APN-ness. The new infinite APN family and the two conjectured APN families generalize previously known sporadic APN instances in dimension 10.
## 2026/2402
* Title: Revisiting Lattice-based Blind Signatures Again
* Authors: Yi-Fu Lai, Yu Yu
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2402)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2402.pdf)
### Abstract
We show an attack on a lattice-based blind signature proposed in Crypto'20. Formally it is a linear hash function based framework with a lattice-based instantiation. We first notice a bug in their security proof of blindness, which is overlooked these years. Then, we develop an attack under the honest key and the honest-but-curious signer setting against the blindness notion of the schemes by exploiting the coorelations between the leaves of the tree. We also discuss how to repair the scheme.
## 2026/2403
* Title: Practical and Efficient MPC from FHE, without ZKPoKs
* Authors: Kelong Cong, Nigel P. Smart, Titouan Tanguy, MIchael Walter
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2403)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2403.pdf)
### Abstract
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) enables one to implement low-round and low-communication complexity Multi-Party Computation (MPC) which is secure in the static malicious corruption model. By expanding on an idea presented in the full version of the FHE-based MPC protocol of Smart (IMA, 2023), we show how to completely remove the need for Zero-Knowledge Proofs-of-Knowledge in that protocol. This simplification makes the final security proof of the MPC protocol much simpler, and more modular. The new protocol makes use of an FHE scheme with an encrypted PRF functionality, and in addition to our main result we formalize the security of such encrypted PRFs and prove the construction of Deo et al. (CCS 2025) secure in this model.
## 2026/2404
* Title: The Geometry of Collusion Leakage in Inner-Product Functional Encryption
* Authors: Ferdinando Zullo
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2404)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2404.pdf)
### Abstract
Inner-product functional encryption (IPFE) allows the holder of a
functional key for a vector $y$ to learn $\langle x,y\rangle$ from an encryption of $x$, and nothing more. Keys, however, accumulate: a
coalition holding sufficiently many independent keys recovers the
plaintext. We model each institution by the span $W_i\leq\F_q^n$ of its authorized key vectors and show that a coalition $I$ determines the
plaintext exactly modulo $(\sum_{i\in I}W_i)^\perp$; for a uniform
plaintext it learns exactly $\dim\sum_{i\in I}W_i$ field symbols. The resulting leakage function is a representable and entropic polymatroid.
We then study authorization spaces of dimension $r$ whose pairwise intersections have dimension at most $h$. We prove that some coalition
of size $c\geq2$ always learns at least $\min\{n,2r-h+c-2\}$ dimensions,
and we give a Vandermonde-type construction in which every coalition of
size $c$ learns exactly this amount, for all $c$ simultaneously. Hence
the largest achievable reconstruction threshold is $n-2r+h+2$, which
gives an exact tradeoff between functional diversity and collusion
resistance. The optimal configuration is a sunflower, an equidistant
subspace code and a generalized arc; its orthogonal complements form a generalized dual arc, and for $r=1$ it reduces to Reed--Solomon secret
sharing.
## 2026/2405
* Title: Game-Theoretically Fair Coin Toss from Random Walk Against $n-1$ Corruptions
* Authors: Zirui Wang, Ke Wu
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2405)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2405.pdf)
### Abstract
Coin-tossing protocols allow mutually distrustful parties to generate trusted randomness. While strong fairness is impossible against a corrupted majority, Chung et al. (2018) introduced cooperative-strategy-proof (CSP) fairness for multi-party coin tossing, under the assumption that each party gets utility only when the outcome matches its public preference. CSP-fairness ensures that no PPT adversary can increase the expected joint utility of the corrupted parties through deviation. Since then, a line of work (Wu et al., 2022; Thyagarajan et al., 2024; Zhang and Wu, 2025) has explored the landscape of CSP-fair coin tossing and shown that CSP-fairness can be achieved even against a corrupted majority.
In this work, we study CSP-fair multi-sided coin tossing against up to $n-1$ corruptions when parties may have arbitrary utilities over the possible outcomes. Perhaps surprisingly, we show that CSP-fairness against any semi-malicious adversary corrupting up to $n-1$ parties is achievable for every full-row-rank utility matrix. More generally, we introduce an abort-safe opening order condition on the utility matrix that suffices for resilience against $n-1$ corruptions.
Our construction uses a public random walk whose state dynamically determines the distribution of the eventual outcome. The parties jointly generate randomness deciding each walk step using commit-and-reveal. When a party aborts, the protocol adjusts the transition distribution of the walk based on the parties' utilities. These adjustments, together with a carefully chosen opening order, prevent profitable deviations.
We also identify conditions on the utility matrix under which CSP-fair coin tossing is impossible. For three parties, our positive and negative results together give a complete characterization of the utility matrices for which CSP-fairness against two corruptions is achievable.
## 2026/2406
* Title: Time-Space Tradeoffs For Probabilistic Proofs
* Authors: Alessandro Chiesa, Ziyi Guan, Omer Paneth, Nicholas Spooner
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2406)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2406.pdf)
### Abstract
Many recent constructions of probabilistic proofs achieve fast proving times but have high space complexity (much higher than that of the computation being proved). Empirically this arises due to the fact that error-correcting codes, a key ingredient of such constructions, suffer from limiting time-space tradeoffs. It remained open, however, whether such time-space tradeoffs exist for proofs themselves.
We establish time-space tradeoffs for probabilistically checkable proofs (PCPs) as well as for their multi-round extension, interactive oracle proofs (IOPs), with straightline knowledge soundness. Our results hold for machine computations that have sequential input access, the same model for which similar tradeoffs hold for error-correcting codes. We complement this result by describing an IOP for R1CS that avoids the tradeoff but requires random access to the R1CS witness.
Our techniques build on and extend results for codes of Cook and Moshkovitz (CCC~2024). A key difficulty that we encounter in establishing our tradeoff is that distance of the code plays a key role in prior results, while for probabilistic proofs there is no natural notion of distance. Nevertheless, we show that, assuming the existence of collision-resistant hash functions, we can establish time-space tradeoffs by carefully relating a small-space machine's information flow to the proof system's properties.
## 2026/2407
* Title: Language Modeling is Monotone Compression
* Authors: Noam Mazor, Andrew Morgan, Rafael Pass
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2407)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2407.pdf)
### Abstract
A long-standing hypothesis in artificial intelligence and neuroscience posits that intelligence is closely related to compression: the ability to compress information efficiently intuitively reflects capacities associated with intelligence and learning. Indeed, recent experimental works verify this intuition by showing connections between the capabilities of large language models (LLMs) and their ability as compressors: for instance, Deletang et al. (ICLR'24) demonstrate that LLMs can be used as powerful compressors, and Huang et al. (COLM'24) show that the compression ability of LLMs is highly correlated with their performance on benchmarks for knowledge and reasoning.
In this work, we initiate a theoretical study of this connection. Our main result is that LLMs (formally modeled as next-token predictors) are equivalent to monotone (a.k.a. order-preserving) compression algorithms---namely, compression algorithms where the encoding process preserves the ordering of the inputs---in the sense that the one can be constructed from the other while preserving the same error up to an additive gap of 2.
We next show that the monotonicity is required for this equivalence to hold if and only if cryptographic (infinitely-often) one-way functions exist.
As a direct corollary, we get a cryptographic result of independent interest: the notion of next-bit pseudoentropy (a computational analogue of entropy) of a distribution is equivalent to monotone incompressibility of the distribution. (Previously, it was only known (Haitner et al., ITCS'23) that incompressibility implies next-bit pseudoentropy.)
## 2026/2408
* Title: Separating One-Way Functions from Verifiable Delay Functions
* Authors: Hamza Abusalah, Nicholas Brandt, Ziyi Guan, Kristina Host|ikov|i
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2408)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2408.pdf)
### Abstract
Timed cryptography captures computations that inherently require a prescribed amount of time, even in the presence of parallelism, and has emerged as a central notion due to its broad applications in both practice and theory. A natural question is how timed cryptographic primitives relate to traditional cryptography, in particular to primitives in Minicrypt.
Guan and Montgomery (CRYPTO 2024) show that sequential functions do not imply one-way functions (OWFs) via black-box reductions. Their result, however, leaves open whether adding public verifiability (a substantially stronger requirement) suffices to imply OWFs. We study this question via verifiable delay functions (VDFs), which require substantial sequential time to evaluate, yet produce a unique output that is efficiently and publicly verifiable.
We show that VDFs do not imply OWFs via fully black-box, relativizing reductions. Combined with prior results showing that VDFs cannot be constructed in the random oracle model, this establishes that there is no black-box implication in either direction between VDFs and OWFs.
Our proof develops a new oracle separation technique that combines the random oracle with a carefully designed complexity-theoretic oracle inspired by Kolmogorov complexity.
## 2026/2409
* Title: Mercury: Fuzzy Private Set Intersection with Communication and Computation Logarithmic in the Threshold
* Authors: Qi Liu, Kang Yang, Binwu Xiang, Xiaojie Guo, Cheng Hong, Yu Yu
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2409)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2409.pdf)
### Abstract
Private Set Intersection (PSI) allows two mutually distrusting parties to compute the intersection of their sets without revealing any additional information and has found numerous applications. The approximate matching required by various applications has led to the development of Fuzzy PSI (FPSI), a variant of PSI that identifies approximate intersection elements under a public distance threshold \(\delta\). Reducing computation and communication costs remains an important challenge for FPSI. In this paper, we present a new FPSI protocol, called Mercury, which achieves logarithmic computation and communication complexity with respect to threshold \(\delta\). Our protocol exploits the correlation of the intersection and the point pairs held by the parties, and efficiently identifies the neighboring point pairs by a mixed protocol from homomorphic encryption and secure two-party computation using a "mask-then-compare" technique. We implemented Mercury and evaluated both its sender-private and standard FPSI variants.
For balanced two-dimensional inputs, Mercury-SP achieves \(9.0\sim63.9\times\) runtime speedups and reduces communication by a factor of \(8.7\sim26.1\) across the evaluated thresholds and set sizes in the LAN setting, compared to the FPSI protocol by Dang et al. (CCS'25). In the completed unbalanced experiments, Mercury-SP achieves \(55.7\sim132.4\times\) WAN runtime speedups compared to the FPSI protocol by Piske et al. (CCS'25).
## 2026/2410
* Title: KIFA: Kernel-based Integral Fault Analysis on GIFT-Family Ciphers
* Authors: Hanbeom Shin, Yunjae Hwang, Donggeun Kwon, Byoungjin Seok, Deukjo Hong, Jaechul Sung, Seokhie Hong, Dongjae Lee
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2410)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2410.pdf)
### Abstract
We present KIFA (Kernel-based Integral Fault Analysis), an integral fault attack framework that mines its balanced properties with the kernel-based miner of Hwang et al. in place of Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP). The miner handles only small input structures fixed in advance, and a fault model provides exactly such structures. For DEFAULT, we present attacks at fault penetration (FP) $9$ under a random-position nibble fault and FP $10$ under a random-position byte fault, beyond the prior best integral fault attack at FP $8$. They leave a single master-key candidate under the simple key schedule and reduce the key space to $2^{64}$ under the rotating key schedule. For GIFT-128, we present the first integral fault attacks, at FP $7$ and $8$, against the prior best of $5$. For GIFT-64, we extend the prior best FP $6$ to $7$ with a byte fault, leaving $2^{32}$ master-key candidates. For BAKSHEESH, we extend the prior best FP $7$ to $8$, also when the fault position is uncontrolled.
## 2026/2411
* Title: Average-Case Hardness of Lattice Problems in Special Genera of Fixed Rank
* Authors: Koen de Boer, Maxime Bombar, Aurel Page, Wessel van Woerden
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2411)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2411.pdf)
### Abstract
The distinguishing variant $\Delta$LIP of the Lattice Isomorphism Problem underlies the security proofs of a growing family of lattice-based schemes. As the special genus is the strongest efficiently computable invariant of a lattice, such a proof may replace the lattice used by the scheme with a random lattice of the same genus. This raises the question of how hard lattice problems actually are on such random lattices.
We answer it, under GRH, with a worst-case to average-case reduction inside any special genus $\mathcal{G}$ of Hermitian lattices of fixed rank $r \geq 2$ over a cyclotomic field $K$ of degree $d$: for each of $\mathrm{(H)SVP}$, $\mathrm{HCVP}$, $(\Delta)\mathrm{BDD}$, $\mathrm{DSP}$ and $\mathrm{DGS}$, solving the problem on a random class of $\mathcal{G}$, drawn from its natural distribution, is as hard as solving it on the worst-case lattice of $\mathcal{G}$, at the cost of a factor $p = \mathrm{poly}(d) \cdot {\det}_{\mathbb{Q}}(\Lambda)^{O_r(1)/d}$ in the approximation factor. The reduction is a random walk on the Kneser $\mathfrak{p}$-neighbour graph of $\mathcal{G}$: neighbours stay close enough to transfer problem instances, while the walk equidistributes quickly, a fact we deduce from spectral bounds for the associated Hecke operators.
As an application we give a direct and tight security proof for a minimal LIP-based KEM, resting on two independent assumptions: that the lattice it uses is indistinguishable from a random lattice of its genus, and that $\Delta$BDD is hard on that genus. Unlike existing LIP-based proofs, this requires neither an ad-hoc lattice of the form $q\Lambda \oplus (q+1)\Lambda$, nor the tightness loss caused by the dense sublattice such proofs rely on.
## 2026/2412
* Title: Barely Sublinear RAM-FHE from Plain LWE
* Authors: Keewoo Lee
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2412)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2412.pdf)
### Abstract
Fully Homomorphic Encryption for RAM programs (RAM-FHE), introduced by Hamlin, Holmgren, Weiss, and Wichs (Crypto 2019), allows a server to evaluate a RAM program on encrypted data at a per-step cost sublinear in the memory size $N$, whereas standard FHE must read the entire memory for every memory access. In a celebrated work, Lin, Mook, and Wichs (STOC 2023) gave the first, and to date the only, construction from a concrete assumption, namely Ring-LWE. In this work, we construct a RAM-FHE scheme from plain LWE that evaluates each step of a RAM program in $o(N/\log N)$ time. While the scheme is barely sublinear, even such a slight saving over the linear cost of standard FHE was not known to be achievable from unstructured, plain LWE. As Lin, Mook, and Wichs did, we build RAM-FHE by extending a Doubly-Efficient Private Information Retrieval (DEPIR) scheme. Since the only DEPIR from plain LWE, due to Lee (Crypto 2026), relies on a Common Reference String (CRS) that is incompatible with the extension, we show how to remove the CRS and obtain a DEPIR from plain LWE in the standard model, which may be of independent interest.
## 2026/2413
* Title: Fast Polynomial Arithmetic in the Exponent without Roots of Unity
* Authors: Diane Ducrocq, Pierrick Gaudry
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2413)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2413.pdf)
### Abstract
In cryptographic algorithms based on groups in which the discrete logarithm is supposed to be hard, it is frequent to perform polynomial arithmetic in the exponent of group elements. This old technique has become a critical operation in many recent advanced protocols, mostly related to commitments and zero-knowledge proofs, where polynomials of high degrees are involved. Number Theoretic Transform (NTT) techniques in the exponent are often implemented to gain speed. However, they require roots of unity to exist in the field GF(q) where q is the order
of the group.
In this work, we propose algorithms that preserve the quasi-linear complexity of the Fourier Transforms, even when no root of unity are available. For this, we develop a formalism for the algebraic structure of polynomials with coefficients in a group, that allows us to adapt asymptotically fast polynomial multiplication algorithms to the case of arithmetic in the exponent.
In particular, we design an algorithm inspired by the Sch||nhage-Strassen algorithm, which runs about twice slower than NTT but does not require any arithmetic property on the order of the group. We explain how this can be adapted to batched KZG commitment proofs and the Bayer-Groth verifiable mixnet used in e-voting.
## 2026/2414
* Title: Reverse-Bleichenbacher: Bleichenbacher Attacks are Practical Again
* Authors: Youheng L|+, Lorenz Hetterich, Riccardo Zanotto, Cas Cremers, Michael Schwarz, Lukas Gerlach
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2414)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2414.pdf)
### Abstract
Bleichenbacher's 1998 padding oracle attack against RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 has resurfaced repeatedly over the past decades, especially in TLS.
Although modern browsers prefer TLS 1.3, many servers and clients still permit RSA key exchange for backward compatibility, enabling active network attackers to decrypt recorded sessions. Still, practical man-in-the-middle attacks remain challenging. The classical attack narrows the plaintext interval from the top down, spending many queries on secret-independent padding bytes before reaching the PreMasterSecret in the low-order 46 bytes of the RSA plaintext. As a result, prior attacks required multiple vulnerable servers in parallel to avoid connection timeouts.
In this paper, we present Reverse-Bleichenbacher, a novel variant of the Bleichenbacher algorithm. In contrast to all previous Bleichenbacher-style algorithms, our algorithm recovers the least significant bytes first and terminates the search as soon as the target secret is recovered. When the secret occupies only a fraction of the plaintext, as with the TLS PreMasterSecret, this significantly reduces the number of required queries. Together with improved trimmers and a coverage-optimized search, this reduces the median number of oracle queries from 11.428 to 1801 against a standards-conforming PKCS#1 v1.5 oracle with 2048-bit keys, with an overall success rate of 84.8 %. Crucially, under realistic single-server conditions (a 2.6 ms median round-trip time we observe to vulnerable hosts and 2 round trips per query) 68.3% of all runs finish within a 30s timeout, compared with none of the prior algorithms. To remain feasible at higher latency, we parallelize independent queries: at 20 ms round-trip time, batching reduces the median end-to-end runtime from 59.3s to 8.3s, at the cost of additional queries.
We identify 640 vulnerable domains in the Tranco Top 1 Million, many behind Alibaba Cloud load balancers. We demonstrate end-to-end impact on real software distribution channels: a man-in-the-middle attacker can inject malicious updates and achieve remote code execution on a victim device.
## 2026/2415
* Title: The Power of Multislices in Monotone Computation
* Authors: Amos Beimel, Oded Nir
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2415)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2415.pdf)
### Abstract
Motivated by recent constructions and barriers in secret sharing, we study multislice functions. These functions, parametrized by a width parameter $w$, take the value 0 on inputs of Hamming weight below a base value $k$, 1 on inputs of weight above $k+w$, and are monotone in between.
We first investigate formulas over multislice gates, which generalize the formulas over slices model (Applebaum et al., TOCT 2026). We prove that, although multislices compute complicated functions, they do not help in computing the worst-case function when $w\ll n$; that is, there is an explicit monotone function such that for every $w$, every formula over multislice gates of width $w$ that computes it, regardless of its depth and gate fan-in, has size $2^{\Omega\left(n/((w+1)\log^2 n)\right)}$.
Our lower bound is based on a randomized Karchmer-Wigderson protocol for multislices that can be amortized across the formula.
As a complementary result, we show how to realize multislices using slice gates, i.e., multislice gates of width 0; the construction uses a simple peeling recursion. Consequently, every width-$w$ multislice on $n$ variables has a formula over slice gates of size at most $2n^{w+1}$ and depth $(w+1)$. The same construction allows to compute multislices with small monotone real formulas and circuits, two models introduced by Pudl\'ak (J. Symb. Log., 1997) in the context of proof complexity.
This result also has an application to secret sharing: it yields, for sufficiently long secrets, multilinear secret-sharing schemes for width-$w$ multislices with maximal information ratio $n^{O(w+1)}$, which is polynomial for every fixed $w$.
In addition, we prove that an explicit access structure requires shares of size $2^{\Omega(n)}$ in every secret-sharing scheme from a family of schemes that captures all currently known constructions for general access structures with share size $2^{cn+o(n)}$, for $c<1$. Our proof goes through an exponential lower bound on the size of formulas over so-called CDS gates and ideal linear gates.
## 2026/2416
* Title: New Constructions of Quadratic and Cubic Permutations Admitting Optimal Threshold Implementations
* Authors: Zhaole Li, Deng Tang
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2416)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2416.pdf)
### Abstract
Side-channel attacks can uncover sensitive data by analyzing information leakages of cryptographic hardware devices caused by the power consumption, timing, electromagnetic, glitches, etc. Threshold implementation (TI), introduced by Nikova et al. in 2006, was proposed to resist differential power analysis side-channel attack on hardware implementations of block ciphers and eliminate information leakage due to glitches. For a function of algebraic degree $t\ge 2$, a TI requires at least $t+1$ shares. However, achieving this bound without fresh randomness is challenging, and we refer to such TIs as optimal. While a universal construction using $t+2$ shares is available, attaining the $t+1$ lower bound depends on the target permutation.
In this paper, we present four constructions for optimal TIs of bijective S-boxes. We first demonstrate how adjoining identity coordinate functions enables optimal TIs, and then prove that $\mathcal{Q}_{30}^5$ admits optimal TIs. Second, we derive a matrix criterion for a class of quadratic permutations with optimal TIs, which covers all known examples, and can yield new $6$-bit quadratic classes with optimal TIs. Third, we introduce a weighted interpolation construction, which yields power permutations admitting optimal TIs, thereby providing counterexamples to the conjecture by Piccione et al. in 2023 that nonlinear power permutations cannot meet the $t+1$ lower bound. Finally, we present a derivative-uniform framework. Although this construction is not algebraic-degree-preserving for TIs and comes at a high cost of implementation, it is of significant theoretical interest and enables us to prove that every $4$-bit cubic permutation admits optimal TIs.
## 2026/2417
* Title: Unpredictability from Parity: Understanding Linear Correctors for Markovian Sources
* Authors: Maciej Skorski, Johannes Mittmann
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2417)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2417.pdf)
### Abstract
Linear correctors reduce the bias of random bits via parity (XOR), but their guarantees are known mostly for independent bits, an assumption violated by many physical entropy sources.
We give a general, exact formula for the parity bias of dependent bits from a (hidden, possibly non-homogeneous) Markov chain, as a product of twisted transfer kernels.
Under next-bit unpredictability, i.e. conditional bias at most $\beta$, the decay is governed by $\beta$ itself: sharp for a one-bit context, $|\mathrm{bias}|\le\beta^{\lceil n/2\rceil}$, and \emph{near-optimal} for an $m$-bit context, within a factor $3^{1/3}\approx1.44$ of the best possible per-bit rate, which is at least $\beta^{1/(m+1)}$ (attained by a noisy LFSR) and asymptotically equal to it as $\beta\to0$.
Against the best previous bound (Zhou and Bruck, ISIT 2011) we \emph{correct the exponent} and \emph{tighten the bound on $n$ bits by a factor of about $2^{\lfloor(n-1)/2\rfloor}/\beta$}, with a matching construction. The decay is non-monotone, so a corrector should be certified at every operating length, or via the envelope $\beta^{\lceil n/2\rceil}$.
Finally, bounded memory is necessary: if unpredictability is imposed on the full history, XOR-ing does not reduce the bias at all.
## 2026/2418
* Title: Individual Cryptography from Iterated Squaring
* Authors: Georg Fuchsbauer, Christoph U. G|+nther, Charlotte Hoffmann, Krzysztof Pietrzak, Fabian Regen
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2418)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2418.pdf)
### Abstract
Individual cryptography (Dziembowski et al.-aCrypto'23) and complete knowledge (Kelkar et al.-aCCS'24) aim at constructing protocols that ensure that some individual party must know a secret value in the clear, and so the computation cannot have been rCLoutsourcedrCY to an MPC computation.
Two central primitives are proofs of complete (or individual) knowledge, which enforce that some party actually knows the secret witness, and secret sharing with snitching, which enforces that whenever the secret is reconstructed, some party must learn a certificate of this fact.
The instantiations proposed by both papers (Crypto'23 and CCS'24) ensure that to compute a proof or reconstruct the shared secret, a large number of hash function evaluations is necessary.
Thus, at least one party must compute many of these rCLin the clearrCY (and not via MPC) and from the hash function inputs one can extract the secret (in the random oracle model).
In practice, they suggest using Bitcoin mining hardware.
Sequential proofs of complete knowledge have recently been proposed, which use proofs of sequential work to enforce that the hashes are performed sequentially. As a consequence, it suffices to require a much smaller number of hashes, and thus such primitives can be implemented on standard hardware.
Unfortunately, this approach does not work for primitives like secret sharing, as one would need to efficiently sample the challenge for the sequential computation together with its solution. In this work, we leverage ideas from time-lock puzzles to overcome this issue. We construct secret sharing with snitching and encryption with self-incriminating proofs where reconstruction/decryption is sequential.
The security of our scheme relies on a new knowledge assumption, which informally states that whenever parties that hold secret shares of an RSA modulus N=pq jointly compute 2^2^T N for some large T (too large to perform a sequential computation of length T in MPC), then at least one of them must have learned a multiple of N.
## 2026/2419
* Title: Optimal Statistical Oblivious RAM and Search Tree in the External-Memory Model
* Authors: Andrew Krapivin, Elaine Shi
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2419)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2419.pdf)
### Abstract
Oblivious RAM (ORAM) allows a trusted client to access (encrypted) data stored in untrusted memory, such that the access patterns reveal nothing about the data or the queries. It is well-known that any ORAM scheme must suffer from a logarithmic overhead. More precisely stated, each request must incur $\Omega(\log_B N)$ block transfers on average, where $N$ is the size of the logical memory and $B$ is the block size of the oblivious implementation. Moreover, the same lower bound extends to oblivious Search Trees (ST).
For upper bounds, however, we have been long stuck with a $(\log_B N)^2$ curse on two fronts:
(1) Log-squared curse for statistically secure ORAMs: although optimality is known for computationally secure ORAMs for $B = \Theta(1)$ or $B \geq \log^{1+\epsilon} N$ (where $\epsilon > 0$ is an arbitrarily small constant), progress has been stagnant when it comes to statistical security.
(2) Log-squared curse for oblivious search trees: for search trees, we do not know how to overcome the log-squared curse even when allowing computational assumptions.
In this paper, we break this long-standing log-squared curse for both oblivious search trees and statistically secure ORAM on broad parameter regimes:
(1) Our first result gives an optimal, statistically secure ORAM with $O(\log_B N)$ cost as long as $B \geq \log^{1+\epsilon} N$.
(2) Our second result gives an optimal, statistically secure oblivious search tree with $O(\log_B N)$ cost when $B \geq \log^{2+\epsilon} N$, matching the performance of the best known non-oblivious search trees in this parameter region. Notably, this means that for search trees, we can get obliviousness for free!
The assumptions on $B$ required to achieve optimality are standard and mild. They not only coincide with the standard wide cache-line assumption prevalent in the classical algorithms literature, but also align well with the hardware-enclave architectures that employ oblivious algorithms in practice, such as the implementations of Signal and Meta.
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