From Newsgroup: sci.crypt
## In this issue
1. [2024/1583] Efficient Pairing-Free Adaptable k-out-of-N ...
2. [2025/1983] SCORE: A SlotToCoeff Optimization for Real-Vector ...
3. [2026/279] On the Concrete Hardness Gap Between MLWE and LWE
4. [2026/1547] Silent Distributed Cryptography for DNFs and ...
5. [2026/1997] LibFWHT: From Exact Walsh Spectra to Key Dependence ...
6. [2026/2090] Refining Probabilistic-Linearization TIDA for ...
7. [2026/2145] Fully Anonymous Perfect Secret-Sharing
8. [2026/2232] Cryptanalysis of the ICCS NGCC Round-1 Public-Key ...
9. [2026/2237] Lower Bounds on Random-Oracle-Model Signature Length
10. [2026/2240] Improved Cryptanalysis of Local PRGs
11. [2026/2256] Affine-Padding Rabin-Oracle Factoring in ...
12. [2026/2261] A Provable Subexponential-Time Algorithm for LWE ...
13. [2026/2262] NOMOS: Secure Non-Interactive $k$NN under CKKS
14. [2026/2263] Levis: Extension-Free Multi-Key Fully Homomorphic ...
15. [2026/2264] THEMIS: A Co-Designed System for Encrypted ...
16. [2026/2265] The Illusion of Payload Blindness: Why MEV ...
17. [2026/2266] Chinese NGCC Algorithms: The First Week of AI ...
18. [2026/2267] Impersonation Resilience of Subversion-Resilient UC ...
19. [2026/2268] Kopis: A KEM for Obfuscation
20. [2026/2269] Consensus in One Shot: Fast Agreement Beyond ...
21. [2026/2270] UC PAKE and Concrete Security
22. [2026/2271] Exact SVP on Haar-Random Lattices at the Heuristic ...
23. [2026/2272] Attacking UOV-based Signatures over divided power ...
24. [2026/2273] Slashable Secrecy for Witness Encryption over ...
25. [2026/2274] zk-BAN: An efficient anonymous blocklisting system ...
26. [2026/2275] Defeating Time-Average Selfish Mining Across Epoch ...
27. [2026/2276] Concurrently secure variants of blind ...
28. [2026/2277] Non-Interactive Atomic Swaps from Standard ...
29. [2026/2278] Masked CROSS: Masking the CROSS Digital Signature ...
30. [2026/2279] A Cryptographic Perspective on Fingerprinting ...
31. [2026/2280] Natural Barriers to Quantum Extraction: On the ...
32. [2026/2281] Poisoned Cryptography: Solving Direct-Sum LIP in ...
33. [2026/2282] DAVINCI: A Decentralized Cryptographic Voting Protocol
34. [2026/2283] A Kleptographic Attack on CSIDH
35. [2026/2284] Randomized Early-Stopping Byzantine Agreement with ...
36. [2026/2285] Bandwidth Fee Mechanisms for Certified Transaction ...
37. [2026/2286] Non-Interactive Black-Box Witness-Indistinguishable ...
38. [2026/2287] KnuthrCoYao masked (Gaussian) sampling
39. [2026/2288] Kettle: Short Post-Quantum Threshold Signatures ...
40. [2026/2289] A Subexponential Algorithm for Binary LWE with ...
41. [2026/2290] Jambon: Asynchronous Universally Composable ...
42. [2026/2291] Evidence on Demand: Selectively Disclosable ...
43. [2026/2292] Nonstop Multihop? Constructions and Lower Bounds ...
44. [2026/2293] Nonce Misuse Resilience of GCM with Rijndael-256-256
45. [2026/2294] Deniable Secret Sharing: Towards Practical Faking
46. [2026/2295] Context-Blind Device-Bound Anonymous Credentials ...
47. [2026/2296] iX3DH: Post-Quantum Subversion-Resilient X3DH Key- ...
48. [2026/2297] An Analysis of the ITU-T Multiple Cryptographic ...
49. [2026/2298] Pseudorandom Correlation Generators for Matrix Triples
50. [2026/2299] Can AI Oversight Be Zero Knowledge?
51. [2026/2300] DuraShare: BIP39-native secret sharing with full ...
52. [2026/2301] Breaking the Bounded Entanglement Barrier for ...
53. [2026/2302] CAROUSEL: GPU-Accelerated Private Vector Search via ...
54. [2026/2303] On the pseudorandomness of simple quantum processes
55. [2026/2304] Gram Moments and Pairwise Mixing of AES
56. [2026/2305] Revisiting Partitioning: Output-Adaptive ABE for ...
57. [2026/2306] Post-Quantum Time-Lock Puzzle from Isogenies
58. [2026/2307] Functional Verification of Additive FFT Assembly ...
59. [2026/2308] Multiparty Homomorphic Secret Sharing From ...
60. [2026/2309] Three-Move Blind Signatures from DL
61. [2026/2310] Low-Noise Multi-Value Bootstrapping via Log-Unit ...
62. [2026/2311] Breaking the $n^2$ Barrier: Information-Theoretic ...
63. [2026/2312] ECLIPSE: Strongly Unforgeable Isogeny Signatures ...
64. [2026/2313] When Masking Preimage Computation IsnrCOt Enough: A ...
65. [2026/2314] An Input-Fed AES-Round Family for Fixed-Length Hashing
66. [2026/2315] Expander-Based Codes at the GilbertrCoVarshamov Bound
67. [2026/2316] Fast Linear Codes over Large Fields: Addition-Only ...
68. [2026/2317] SPIN: Fast Codes for Correlation Generation and ...
## 2024/1583
* Title: Efficient Pairing-Free Adaptable k-out-of-N Oblivious Transfer Protocols
* Authors: Keykhosro Khosravani, Taraneh Eghlidos, Mohammad reza Aref
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1583)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1583.pdf)
### Abstract
Oblivious Transfer (OT) is one of the fundamental building blocks in cryptography that enables various privacy-preserving applications. Constructing efficient OT schemes has been an active research area. This paper presents three efficient two-round pairing-free k-out-of-n oblivious transfer protocols with standard security. Our constructions follow the minimal communication pattern: the receiver sends k messages to the sender, who responds with n+k messages, achieving the lowest data transmission among pairing-free k-out-of-n OT schemes. Furthermore, our protocols support adaptivity and enable the sender to encrypt the n messages offline, independent of the receiverrCOs variables, offering significant performance advantages in one-sender-multiple-receiver scenarios. We provide security proofs under the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) and RSA assumptions, without relying on the Random Oracle Model. Our protocols combine minimal communication rounds, adaptivity, offline encryption capability, and provable security, making them well-suited for privacy-preserving applications requiring efficient oblivious transfer.
## 2025/1983
* Title: SCORE: A SlotToCoeff Optimization for Real-Vector Encryption in CKKS
* Authors: Tim Seur|-
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1983)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1983.pdf)
### Abstract
We present SCORE, a tweaked version of the SlotToCoeff operation tailored to the context of encrypted real vectors in the CKKS scheme, where SCORE stands for rCLSlotToCoeff Optimization for Real-Vector EncryptionrCY. This approach accelerates CKKS bootstrapping algorithms that employ the SlotToCoeff operation as their final step, provided the inputs are encryptions of real vectors. SCORE constitutes a conceptually simple refinement of the conventional SlotToCoeff step that can be seamlessly incorporated into existing bootstrapping algorithms. Despite its minimal nature, the technique yields tangible performance improvements. We demonstrate its utility through proof-of-concept implementations for two such algorithms: the conventional bootstrapping algorithm and the SPRU algorithm, which is particularly efficient for ciphertexts containing a small number of encrypted slots. Our results indicate notable performance gains of up to $2\times$ compared to the original formulations of the algorithms.
## 2026/279
* Title: On the Concrete Hardness Gap Between MLWE and LWE
* Authors: Tabitha Ogilvie
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/279)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/279.pdf)
### Abstract
Concrete security estimates for Module LWE (MLWE) over an appropriate ring are often obtained by translating to an "equivalent" unstructured LWE instance, which implicitly treats algebraic structure as a pure efficiency gain with no impact on security. We show that this heuristic fails for realistic parameters. In common MLWE/RLWE instantiations, an attacker can exploit symmetries to obtain hybrid attacks that are strictly stronger than the best corresponding attack on LWE, translating to a concrete hardness gap between MLWE and LWE.
Our starting point is the observation that many cryptographically relevant rings admit coefficient isometries: ring elements whose multiplication acts as a signed permutation on coefficient vectors and preserves the secret and error distributions of interest. Multiplying an MLWE instance by such an isometry creates many derived instances that share the same public matrix and are therefore compatible with the same expensive offline preprocessing in hybrid attacks. We formalise this mechanism and incorporate it into both primal and dual hybrid frameworks.
We instantiate coefficient isometries for power-of-two cyclotomic rings, and quantify the resulting advantage in two regimes. For sparse-secret RLWE (popular in homomorphic encryption), isometry-enabled hybrids yield gaps of up to 14.2 bits over LWE-based estimates. For the standardised Kyber/ML-KEM parameters, we obtain an MLWE hardness reduction of around 1 bit due to the ring structure. Our results demonstrate that the widely assumed equivalence between LWE and MLWE in power-of-two cyclotomics does not hold, with real world consequences for deployed schemes.
## 2026/1547
* Title: Silent Distributed Cryptography for DNFs and Threshold Policies from Lattices
* Authors: Abtin Afshar, Rishab Goyal, Saikumar Yadugiri
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1547)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1547.pdf)
### Abstract
We study two central problems in threshold cryptography from lattices: (1) threshold encryption with silent setup for general thresholds $t \geq 2$, where no post-quantum constructions were previously known, and (2) threshold fully homomorphic encryption (TFHE) with sublinear parameters, an open problem since the work of [Boneh et al.; CRYPTO'18].
We introduce $\textit{$(\alpha,\beta)$-Scaled Linear Secret Sharing Schemes}$ (LSSS), a relaxation of standard LSSS in which each authorized set $S$ reconstructs a scaled version of the secret, $\gamma_S \cdot k$, where both the reconstruction coefficients and the set-dependent scaling factor $\gamma_S$ are bounded over the integers. Unlike prior approaches based on bit decomposition, this preserves the uniform distribution of unauthorized shares. Building on this, we obtain:
1. $\textbf{Silent Threshold and Distributed monotone-policy encryption.}$ We provide the first post-quantum construction supporting: (i) threshold policies with ciphertexts growing as $\tau^{16} \cdot \mathsf{poly}(\lambda, \log N)$, where $\tau = \min(t^2,N{-}t)$, and (ii) DNF formulas with fully compact parameters. Our constructions are proven secure under the decomposed LWE assumption in the random oracle model. If we additionally rely on a common reference string, then the ciphertext size for our threshold policy scheme can be reduced to $\tau^4 \cdot \mathsf{poly}(\lambda, \log N)$ under the Succinct LWE assumption.
2. $\textbf{Decentralized TFHE with silent setup.}$ We provide the first $\textit{decentralized}$ TFHE, for threshold policies and DNFs, from the decomposed LWE assumption. Our construction supports homomorphic evaluation of arbitrary circuits, one-round distributed decryption, and silent setup. This was left as an open problem by [Boneh et al.; CRYPTO'18] and, prior to this work, we did not have any non-trivial construction for decentralized TFHE from any assumption.
3. $\textbf{Sublinear centralized TFHE from LWE.}$ We also extend our techniques to $\textit{centralized}$ TFHE. We provide a TFHE scheme under the standard LWE assumption, where all parameters are simultaneously sublinear in $N$ for any threshold $t$ as long as $\min(t^2,N{-}t)=o(N^{1/6})$. This breaks the $\omega(N)$ barrier that has persisted in the TFHE literature since 2018.
## 2026/1997
* Title: LibFWHT: From Exact Walsh Spectra to Key Dependence in Differential-Linear Correlations
* Authors: Hosein Hadipour, Saleh Khalaj Monfared, Jens Alich, Jan Vorloeper
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1997)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1997.pdf)
### Abstract
The Walsh-Hadamard transform (WHT) computes the correlation of a Boolean function with every linear function at once. Cryptanalytic workflows transform large arrays repeatedly, in batches. However, available tools specialize in particular data types, platforms, or ecosystems. We present LibFWHT, an open-source C library for dense WHTs, with Python bindings and a command-line interface. It includes vectorized, multicore, and graphics processing unit (GPU) backends, batch operations, and routines for Boolean functions and substitution boxes (S-boxes). With one central processing unit (CPU) core, LibFWHT is 2.5 to 3.3 times faster than FFTW; on batched Boolean spectra with eight threads, it is up to 3.7 times faster than sboxU. On an NVIDIA H200, its device-resident GPU backend reaches 1.8 trillion operations per second and runs the same Boolean workload about 600 times faster than the CPU-only sboxU. We demonstrate LibFWHT in linear and differential-linear cryptanalysis of reduced-round SIMON-32, KATAN-32, BEANIE, KeeLoq, and RC5-16, all with 32-bit blocks. To the best of our knowledge, we report the first exact differential-linear distinguishers for KATAN-32, BEANIE, KeeLoq, and RC5-16. We measure these correlations over many sampled keys and ask which key bits make them vary.
Using the geometric approach to cryptanalysis, we search for key-dependent trails to propose candidate round-key bits. The search alone does not show how much these bits affect the correlation, because contributions from trails that depend on the same bits can cancel. For an 84-round KATAN-32 distinguisher, the lowest-weight key-dependent trails we enumerated have contributions that sum to exactly zero. We therefore check the proposed bits using exact correlations on independently sampled master keys, with round keys derived by the cipher's key schedule. For a 13-round differential-linear distinguisher of SIMON-32, two round-key bits explain 93.1% of the variance in the measured signed correlations. They identify a low-correlation class containing about a quarter of the sampled keys. A single root-mean-square (RMS) correlation over all sampled keys hides this difference. For the low-correlation group, the usual data estimate is about 40 times the estimate based on the overall RMS. This compares group estimates and does not guarantee success for each key. Key dependence therefore belongs in the analysis, and we report distributions over keys rather than single numbers.
## 2026/2090
* Title: Refining Probabilistic-Linearization TIDA for 5-Round SHA3-384 Collision Attacks (Full Version)
* Authors: Luhan Yan, Zhenzhen Bao, Huina Li
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2090)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2090.pdf)
### Abstract
Since the SHA-3 family was standardized by NIST in 2015, its collision resistance has been extensively studied. The previous best-known collision attack on 5-round SHA3-384 is based on internal differentials and the probabilistic-linearization variant of two-block Target Internal Differential Algorithm (TIDA). Its connector replaces deterministic affine restrictions that guarantee S-box differential validity by higher-dimensional affine relaxations, reducing the number of linear constraints and preserving more degrees of freedom. The price is that solutions of the linearized system are only probabilistically valid. In particular, once the first message block fixes the inner part variables, the remaining affine solution space cannot be treated as a set of independent trials; only part of its freedom effectively contributes to the connector probability.
This paper refines the probabilistic-linearization framework in two ways. We first propose SA-PIDS, a simulated-annealing-based search for affine-subspace assignments, improving the trade-off among capacity constraints, the product-density estimate, and the remaining solution-space dimension. We then give a structural evaluation of the actual connector probability, explaining how the effective remaining freedom in the solution space after fixing the first block could be used and counted.
Using the same target internal differential characteristic as the previous 5-round SHA3-384 attack, our refinements reduce the theoretical complexity from $2^{170.73}$ to $2^{164.11}$.
## 2026/2145
* Title: Fully Anonymous Perfect Secret-Sharing
* Authors: Roni Con, Ray Li, Noam Mazor
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2145)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2145.pdf)
### Abstract
Fully anonymous secret-sharing schemes ensure two properties at once: for any fixed secret, the combined shares of every unauthorized set of participants are uniformly random, and every authorized set can reconstruct the secret exactly using only the share values, without needing to know which participant holds which share or in what order the shares appear. It was previously open whether such schemes exist for nontrivial exact-threshold parameters 2 < t < n. For the smallest previously open threshold, t= 3, we give, for every nreN4, an explicit fully anonymous scheme for one-bit secrets, with 2rielog nrie-bit shares and a perfect reconstruction algorithm running in poly(log n) time.
The next result, found by ChatGPT, shows that for every 1 rent renn there exists a fully anonymous perfect (t,n) threshold secret-sharing scheme for one-bit secrets, in which each share has length O(tlog n) bits. The proof is purely existential and does not provide an efficient construction. Moreover, ChatGPT identified a simple construction of a fully anonymous perfect scheme for every access structure A; if A contains rao authorized sets, then each share consists of rao2 bits. The authors subsequently verified and streamlined the proofs on their own and take full responsibility for their correctness.
## 2026/2232
* Title: Cryptanalysis of the ICCS NGCC Round-1 Public-Key Candidates
* Authors: Zhenyu Xiong, Mingsheng Wang
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2232)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2232.pdf)
### Abstract
The ICCS Next-Generation Commercial Cryptography (NGCC) round-1 call received 84 public-key candidates for public evaluation. We present a design-level assessment that targets weaknesses no local code fix can close, identifying eight such flaws. Each recurs a pitfall already known from NIST PQC standardization: reducible-ring sub-ring projections that break IND-CPA below the claimed level; public data that fixes a value meant to remain secret, enabling public-key-only forgery or keyless decapsulation; static-key reuse without a chosen-ciphertext transform; and rejection sampling whose sign handling leaks an equivalent signing key. All findings were obtained with AI assistance. Artifacts:
https://github.com/acprk/ngcc-round1-cryptanalysis.
## 2026/2237
* Title: Lower Bounds on Random-Oracle-Model Signature Length
* Authors: Alon Chayet, Iftach Haitner, Mathias Marty, Eylon Yogev
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2237)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2237.pdf)
### Abstract
Hash-based signatures offer a conservative foundation for post-quantum authentication, but their large signatures impose substantial communication and storage costs. For security parameter $\lambda$, discrete-logarithm-based signatures have length $O(\lambda)$, while known hash-based constructions have quadratic signature length, up to logarithmic factors, even for one-time signing. Is this gap inherent?
We prove what are, to the best of our knowledge, the first lower bounds on the length of signature schemes in the (pure) random oracle model. Our bounds apply to schemes with non-adaptive verifiers and a natural security property called salted soundness: a scheme with such security is unforgeable even against an adversary that is granted a limited ability to resample and restore oracle answers. This class essentially captures all known hash-based constructions (possibly after low-cost modifications). We show that the combined public-key and signature length of a one-time signature scheme must be $\Omega(\lambda^2/\log\lambda)$. For many-time signatures, we prove the stronger conclusion that the signature length alone must satisfy the same lower bound, irrespective of the public-key length. More precisely, if the relevant length is $o(\lambda^2/\log\lambda)$, then an adversary making $2^{o(\lambda)}$ random-oracle queries breaks salted soundness with inverse-polynomial probability.
Our proof uses the high-entropy hitting lemma of Haitner, Nukrai, and Yogev (Crypto 22) to transform a short signature scheme into a scheme whose verifier makes only a few
queries. We then apply the Barak and Mahmoody-Ghidary (FOCS 07) attack on one-time signatures with a low-query verifier. Balancing these two steps yields the
near-quadratic lower bounds.
## 2026/2240
* Title: Improved Cryptanalysis of Local PRGs
* Authors: Shihan Lyu, Mo LI, Chuhan Ma, Ximing Fu
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2240)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2240.pdf)
### Abstract
We present two seed-recovery attacks on a family of local PRGs, which map an $n$-bit random seed to an $m$-bit pseudorandom string by applying $\XorMaj$ predicates.
For PRGs with large locality, we extend the Group-and-Solve (GAS, Eurocrypt 26) framework to Guess-Filter-Solve (GFS).
GFS first guesses that a set of seed bits are all $1$s and then filters for outputs whose inputs to $\Maj$ contain a sufficiently large subset of the guessed bits. Then high-bias noisy equations can be collected for the correct guess and solved by specific solvers.
Compared with GAS, GFS collects substantially more noisy equations with high bias and hence outperforms GAS significantly, especially when the output is short.
For example, for the challenge parameter $n=256$ and $m=2^{16}$ (STOC 16), the complexity for GFS is $2^{68.78}$ while it is $2^{157.91}$ for GAS. In addition, the asymptotic complexity of GFS is $2^{0.15n+o(n)}$.
Independently, inspired by the Guess-and-Decode (GADec, TIT 22), we propose the Filter-Guess-Propagate (FGP) attack. Compared with GADec, FGP introduces two speed-up techniques at each iteration of Belief Propagation (BP): a filter scheme to reduce the number of equations and a dynamic-programming technique to update the log-likelihood ratios of variables efficiently.
Together, these improvements enable FGP to perform fast BP and outperform GADec significantly.
For $\XorMaj_{10,64}$ with $n=256$ and $m=2^{40}$ (Eurocrypt 24), the total complexity of FGP is $2^{52.66}$, whereas even a single BP iteration of GADec costs $2^{106.42}$.
We further extend FGP to $\XorMod$ predicates and experimentally
evaluate the resulting attack complexity. We also apply FGP to a ZKP protocol from Eurocrypt 25 and QuietOT from Asiacrypt 24, with only a small computational overhead. For the ZKP protocol, FGP leads to an attack on witness indistinguishability, while for QuietOT, it similarly yields an attack on OT receiver privacy.
## 2026/2256
* Title: Affine-Padding Rabin-Oracle Factoring in $L_n\!\left(\frac{1}{3},\sqrt[3]{\frac{32}{9}}\right)$
* Authors: Alexandra-Ioana Buz-a+coiu, Diana Maimu+c, David Naccache
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2256)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2256.pdf)
### Abstract
The 2007 algorithm of Joux, Naccache, and Thom|- (\textsc{jnt}) shows that, with subexponential access to
an $e$-th root oracle, one can forge \textsc{rsa} signatures for \emph{odd} $e$ in time close to the
special number field sieve, without factoring the modulus; a recent \textsc{jnt}
implementation by Shea et al.~\cite{Forge26} carried that attack to $1024$-bit \textsc{rsa}. We revisit the \textsc{jnt} construction at $e=2$, the Rabin case, where an $e$-th root oracle is a
square-root oracle. A \emph{raw} square-root oracle factors $n=pq$ in one query, so it is of
no interest; the interesting object is a \emph{redundancy-constrained} (affine-padded) Rabin
oracle that returns a single canonical root and thereby resists the one-query attack. We show
that a one-sided number field sieve against such an oracle produces a congruence of squares
$X^2\equiv Y^2\pmod n$ with $X\not\equiv\pm Y$ with probability $\tfrac12$ per dependency, and
hence \emph{factors} $n$ in special-number-field-sieve time
\[
L_n \left(\frac{1}{3},{\sqrt[3]{\frac{32}{9}}}\right)\simeq L_n(1/3,{1.526\ldots}),
\]
strictly below the general number field sieve's
\[
L_n \left(\frac{1}{3},{\sqrt[3]{\frac{64}{9}}}\right)\simeq L_n(1/3,{1.923\ldots}).
\]
The mechanism is a pleasant inversion: the sign ambiguity that the odd-$e$ algorithm must
suppress becomes, at $e=2$, the very quantity that \textsl{leaks the factorization}. We give the
algorithm in full --- \textsc{lll} polynomial selection for a quadratic field, a line sieve producing
prime-ideal relations, quadratic characters, $\mathbb F_2$ linear algebra, and an exact
number-field square root --- prove the half-rate splitting, and
analyse the complexity, including the precise reason the attack collapses when the padding is
a hash rather than an affine function of an attacker-chosen message. An open-source
implementation realises every step. A small toy example run of it, from the padded modulus
to the recovered factors, is given in Appendix~\ref{app:example}. Our implementation confirms a
clear performance improvement in factoring speed.
## 2026/2261
* Title: A Provable Subexponential-Time Algorithm for LWE from \(n+o(n)\) Samples via Wagner-Style Gaussian Sampling
* Authors: Xuyuan Han, Yiming Gao, Honggang Hu
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2261)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2261.pdf)
### Abstract
We give a randomized subexponential-time algorithm for decision Learning with Errors (LWE) in two complementary parameter regimes. For polynomial prime modulus \(q=n^{\kappa+o(1)}\) with any fixed \(\kappa>1/2\), the algorithm handles independent discrete Gaussian errors drawn from \(D_{\mathbb Z,s_e}\), with Gaussian parameter \(s_e\) satisfying \(\ln(2+s_e)=(\ln n)^{a+o(1)}\) for any fixed \(0\le a<1\). Conversely, polynomial error \(s_e=n^{\gamma+o(1)}\), for any fixed \(\gamma>0\), can be handled with a quasipolynomial prime modulus \(q=\exp\!\left((\ln n)^{1+\eta+o(1)}\right)\) for any fixed \(\eta>0\). In both regimes, for an arbitrary secret distribution, the algorithm succeeds with probability \(1-o(1)\) using \(m=n+\Theta(n/\ln\ln n)\) original samples, with expected time and space \(2^{\Theta(n/\ln\ln n)}\).
Our starting point is the Wagner-style Gaussian sampler of Ducas, Engelberts, and Loyer (CRYPTO 2025). We instantiate its auxiliary extensions with random \(P\)-ary lattices whose improved smoothing bound supports the accuracy required for LWE without increasing the leading list size exponent. At the smaller Gaussian width enabled by this geometry, the basis-dependent condition of the exact sampler used in prior work is no longer available. We therefore use the statistically approximate shifted discrete Gaussian sampler of Aggarwal, Dadush, and Stephens-Davidowitz (FOCS 2015) and control its error for adaptively chosen shifts. Finally, a martingale analysis applies the Aharonov--Regev Fourier distinguisher (JACM 2005) directly to the dependent output, avoiding the loss incurred by comparison with an independent product distribution.
Our analysis applies to unstructured LWE with independent uniform public vectors. In particular, it does not directly apply to ML-KEM, whose security is based on the Module-LWE problem: the algebraic dependencies arising from its module structure are not covered by our analysis.
## 2026/2262
* Title: NOMOS: Secure Non-Interactive $k$NN under CKKS
* Authors: Shihao Li, Wenhao Wang, Xiaomei Tang, Jian Liu, Rongmao Chen, Lu Li, zhigang chen, Guangfu Sun
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2262)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2262.pdf)
### Abstract
The $k$-nearest neighbor ($k$NN) algorithm is a core primitive for similarity search over sensitive data, but evaluating $k$NN under fully homomorphic encryption remains expensive because it requires distance computation, encrypted ranking, and top-$k$ extraction. CKKS is attractive for this setting because it natively supports packed approximate arithmetic, yet existing CKKS-based systems such as Engorgio (USENIX Security 2025) incur high overhead when used for reranking candidate sets.
We present NOMOS, an encrypted $k$NN protocol for candidate sets that targets the ranking and top-$k$ extraction bottleneck. NOMOS builds on Mazzone et al.'s matrix-based ranking method (USENIX Security 2025), but introduces a gap-amplified sign approximation that focuses precision on near-zero distance gaps, where $k$NN rank decisions are most sensitive. NOMOS integrates this primitive into a complete encrypted $k$NN pipeline, using slot-index alignment and ReLU-based top-$k$ extraction to avoid full sorting. For large databases, offline k-means preprocessing forms fixed-capacity candidate sets, allowing NOMOS to avoid global top-$k$ extraction and reduce sign-approximation calls from quadratic global growth to near-linear clustered scaling. With these techniques, NOMOS outperforms state-of-the-art encrypted ranking and top-$k$ baselines. Across the Mazzone-style ranking benchmark and candidate-set workloads compared with Engorgio, NOMOS reduces latency by nearly $8\times$ and up to $828\times$, respectively. On the real-world SIFT dataset, NOMOS achieves $100\%$ top-1 and top-8 retrieval accuracy on evaluated candidate sets, showing consistent retrieval quality on real data.
## 2026/2263
* Title: Levis: Extension-Free Multi-Key Fully Homomorphic Encryption in the Plain Model
* Authors: Baoyu Li, Binwu Xiang, Kang Yang
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2263)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2263.pdf)
### Abstract
Multi-key fully homomorphic encryption (MKFHE) enables computation over ciphertexts encrypted under keys independently generated by different parties. Recently, Min, Park, and Song (MPS, CRYPTO 2026) constructed the first RLWE-based MKFHE scheme in the plain model, i.e., without trusted or interactive setup. Their construction requires each local compact Gentry-Sahai-Waters (GSW) ciphertext to be extended to a joint-key GSW-like ciphertext before evaluation, incurring $O(dk^2)$ gadget products per input for $k$ parties and gadget length $d$.
In this paper, we first construct an extension-free MKFHE scheme (called Levis-fast) in the plain model, eliminating the $O(dk^2)$ gadget products required for joint-key ciphertext extension before homomorphic evaluation. Our core technique is a compatibility technique, termed Cofactor Compatibility, which establishes a common projective decryption relation across ciphertexts encrypted under independently generated local keys, enabling their direct homomorphic evaluation. We further present a compact variant (named as Levis-small) that reduces the communication of each fresh ciphertext from $O(dk^2)$ to $O(d)$ ring elements with only a lightweight lifting operation. A proof-of-concept implementation shows that, compared with MPS, for $k\in\{2,4,8\}$, our construction Levis-fast achieves evaluation speedups of $67.7\times$, $52.8\times$, and $139.4\times$, respectively, while our compact variant Levis-small reduces communication by a factor of $2.5\times$, $8.7\times$ and $14.2\times$, and achieves evaluation speedups of $11.8\times$, $19.7\times$, and $54.4\times$, respectively.
## 2026/2264
* Title: THEMIS: A Co-Designed System for Encrypted Transformer Inference
* Authors: Shihao Li, Wenhao Wang, Lu Li, Xiaomei Tang, Jian Liu, Rongmao Chen, Cheng Hong, Guangfu Sun
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2264)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2264.pdf)
### Abstract
Secure Transformer inference can be made non-interactive under fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), but the computation is extremely expensive. Existing FHE-based systems reduce that cost by optimizing individual stages in isolation, each within its own component rather than against the CKKS level budget they all share. A local gain therefore may not translate into an end-to-end speedup.
We present THEMIS, a co-designed system for encrypted Transformer inference organized around two design principles, one bounding the depth each kind of stage may spend and one fixing where on the modulus chain it runs. THEMIS generalizes coefficient-encoded plaintext-ciphertext matrix multiplication (PCMM) to slot-encoded ciphertexts without format conversion, retaining the same accelerated coefficient-side backend and amortizing its nearly fixed cost through multi-batch packing. Two attention ciphertext-ciphertext matrix multiplication (CCMM) kernels combine the idle imaginary lane of each slot with baby-step giant-step accumulation and hoisting, so the attention multiplications issue far fewer key switches. For softmax, THEMIS conditions the first denominator with a calibrated row-wise offset and reserves high precision for the final normalization alone, which cuts the depth the reciprocal path consumes while keeping the precision of the returned probabilities. For a single stage, THEMIS accelerates PCMM and the attention CCMMs by $21.66\times$ and up to $7.39\times$ over MOAI (ICLR'26), and by up to $23.02\times$ and $16.49\times$ over Euston (S&P'26), while THEMIS's softmax runs $2.57\times$ faster than THOR (CCS'25) at higher precision. For the complete pipeline, THEMIS serves BERT-base on a CPU in $400.06$ amortized seconds per input, with accuracy on GLUE tasks comparable to plaintext. Of that latency, the stages around bootstrapping account for only $10.83\%$, which is the lowest share among all works compared here.
## 2026/2265
* Title: The Illusion of Payload Blindness: Why MEV Mitigations Fail in Practice
* Authors: Simona -ie+ikov|i, Martin Pere+i|!ni, Ivan Homoliak
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2265)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2265.pdf)
### Abstract
In public blockchains, the ability to order visible transactions allows block producers to extract value from users, a problem known as Maximal Extractable Value (MEV). Proposer-Builder Separation has turned that right into a formalized auction, and the leading protocol-level mitigations answer it with payload blindness: encrypted mempools, verifiable permutations, and block delay hide or scramble transactions before the order is fixed. Every such mitigation carries a security argument that assumes an adversary who learns nothing before the order commits. Deployed systems face a different adversary, and this paper measures the cost of that difference. We evaluate the three families of mitigations against a single adversary hierarchy, using closed-form analysis and simulations calibrated to Ethereum. Against a fully blind adversary, the outcome follows from the definitions: encryption with a permutation removes the attack classes that depend on transaction content, and block delay increases extraction rather than reducing it. Once that idealization is dropped, deployment problems dominate. The unencrypted envelope identifies the sender, so past behavior restores a usable guess at hidden content. Optional encryption gives builders a reason to starve the transactions it protects, and voluntary adoption then collapses. Key rotation turns a cryptographic parameter into a source of queueing congestion. Suppressing extraction, finally, removes far more producer revenue than it returns to users in lower fees, so the cost of every mitigation falls on the party that controls its deployment. The binding obstacles to MEV-free blockchains are therefore liveness and deployment incentives rather than cryptography.
## 2026/2266
* Title: Chinese NGCC Algorithms: The First Week of AI Cryptanalysis
* Authors: Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2266)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2266.pdf)
### Abstract
On September 20, 2026, the Chinese Institute of Commercial Cryptography Standards published the 119 first-round candidates of its Next-generation Commercial Cryptographic Algorithms (NGCC) program: 34 signature schemes, 41 key encapsulation mechanisms, 9 key exchange protocols, and 35 hash functions. The program follows the template of the open NIST competitions for AES, SHA-3, and post-quantum cryptography. It opened just after cryptographers' ``Lee Sedol moment'' in the summer of 2026, when AI analysis overtook humans in analyzing the HAWK signature scheme. During the first 7 days of the NGCC competition, according to our harvested sources, 191 active findings were published for 89 candidates, 78 of them rated Critical: universal forgeries, signing-key recovery, trivial hash collisions, broken implicit rejection, and seeds too short for the claimed security level. Our independent evaluation effort discovered, verified, and disclosed 110 of those issues (47 Critical) using the agentic workflow described in this work; outside researchers, some AI-assisted, found the rest. Early AI-assisted findings mostly concerned implementations; by the end of the week, reproduced AI-assisted attacks also included new design-level key recovery. We describe the workflow, review loop, classification ruleset, and observed failure modes. As part of the evaluation, we also benchmarked all algorithm candidates and found that NGCC hash selection may significantly affect final public-key performance, as candidate implementations spend a large share of their cycles on ``placeholder'' hashes.
## 2026/2267
* Title: Impersonation Resilience of Subversion-Resilient UC Protocols
* Authors: Paula Arnold, Sebastian Berndt, J||rn M|+ller-Quade, Astrid Ottenhues, Johannes Ottenhues
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2267)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2267.pdf)
### Abstract
Subversion attacks where the attacker aims to replace parts of a cryptographic system by manipulated parts in an undetectable manner have been shown to model both theoretical and practical attacks such as supply chain attacks. Originally proposed by Young and Yung (CRYPTO 1996), interest in them has increased dramatically after the revelations about the inner workings of intelligence agencies due to Snowden and the following paper by Bellare, Paterson, and Rogaway (CRYPTO 2014).
One of the most promising countermeasures against such attacks are cryptographic reverse firewalls, proposed by Mironov and Stephens-Davidowitz (EUROCRYPT 2015), which are small devices used by the parties with the aim to rerandomize the protocol message to remove possible leakage. A wide range of protocols and corresponding firewalls have been developed based on this notion. The usage of such firewalls, however, also introduces another attack surface as an attacker might also corrupt these firewalls. In most works, this problem is either not addressed or treated as if in this case, the complete party using the firewall is compromised. However, as firewalls typically only perform rerandomization without knowledge of secret key material, this is a very coarse over-approximation, as an honest party Alice is now treated as maliciously corrupted. Instead, the main security problem comes from the fact that the firewall can impersonate Alice.
In this paper, we introduce the notion of impersonation resilience, which allows us to develop protocols that are also secure against such a corrupted firewall and thus result in an honest complete party. We show a generic compiler that transforms subversion-resilient protocols for commitment or coin toss into protocols that are also impersonation resilient. Following a recent research line, our protocols and security analysis are built on the Universal Composability (UC) framework of Canetti. Of independent interest, we show that existing UC subversion models are either too strong and do not allow secure string commitments, or too weak and allow trivially secure protocols. We addressed this by developing a new, intermediate UC subversion model.
## 2026/2268
* Title: Kopis: A KEM for Obfuscation
* Authors: Andrea Basso, Michael Rosenberg
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2268)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2268.pdf)
### Abstract
Password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) and obfuscated key exchange (OKEX) are widely used protocols, appearing in passport access control, Tor's censorship evasion, and more. As quantum threats grow nearer, there have been an increasing number of proposals for post-quantum PAKE and OKEX. All such protocols are similar in that they build on a KEM, obfuscating public keys and/or ciphertexts sent over the wire, e.g., by adding a random mask or applying an ideal cipher. Many propose instantiation with ML-KEM, a NIST-standardized lattice-based KEM.
Unfortunately, ML-KEM is a poor fit for these obfuscating protocols. The algebraic structure of ML-KEM public keys and ciphertexts means that obfuscating these values requires custom procedures for hash-to-vector, matrix expansion, serialization/deserialization, and randomized ciphertext decompression. In order to be broadly useful, these procedures also must be constant-time to prevent side channels and must be standardized to permit interoperability. No such set of procedures exists today.
We observe that the barriers to instantiating PAKE and OKEX disappear if some of the KEM's algebraic structure is removed, i.e., if ML-KEM is replaced with a KEM whose public keys and ciphertexts appear to be uniform as bytestrings.
In this work, we specify Kopis, a Module Learning-with-Rounding (MLWR) KEM with public keys and ciphertexts that are uniform as bytestrings. Kopis is intended to be a drop-in replacement for ML-KEM, in size, speed, and security. Kopis is nearly identical to Saber, a NIST PQC finalist, and thus inherits its years of cryptanalysis.
We demonstrate that Kopis bears the security properties needed for use in various PAKE and OKEX schemes and provide a formally verified Rust implementation complete with portable, AVX2, and NEON backends, and a non-formally-verified C implementation for Cortex-M4. We perform benchmarks and find that Kopis is comparable to and often outperforms the fastest known ML-KEM implementations.
## 2026/2269
* Title: Consensus in One Shot: Fast Agreement Beyond Classical Limits
* Authors: Omri Shmueli, Ilan Tennenhouse
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2269)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2269.pdf)
### Abstract
Good-case latency, studied in early fast-consensus protocols (Martin and Alvisi, DSN 2005) and formalized by Abraham, Nayak, Ren, and Xiang (DISC 2020), captures a natural efficiency goal: when the sender is honest, agreement should be reached quickly for the honest parties. In the standard classical model, however, there exists a barrier for any $f\geq n/3$ corrupted parties. Specifically, synchronous broadcast requires good-case latency at least $\Delta+\delta$ for $f\geq n/3$, where $\delta$ is the actual, unknown message-delay bound and $\Delta \gg \delta$ is its known, conservative upper bound. Under partial synchrony, consistency and liveness cannot even both hold for $f \geq n/3$ (Dwork, Lynch, and Stockmeyer, JACM 1988).
In this work we study the use of quantum information to get past these classical barriers, and specifically using one-shot signatures (OSS) (Amos et al., STOC 2020, Shmueli and Zhandry, CRYPTO 2025). OSS prevents even a corrupt signer from issuing signatures on different messages under the same verification key, which provides cryptographic non-equivocation without trusted hardware assumptions.
Assuming OSS and a public-key infrastructure, we obtain two main results against quantum polynomial-time static corruptions. First, under synchrony, we construct a state-machine replication (SMR) protocol without clients, with optimal $\delta$ good-case latency, tolerating any $f<n$ corruptions among $n$ parties. Second, under partial synchrony, we obtain SMR with $2\cdot \delta$ good-case latency which is consistent under any number of corruptions and live assuming $2n>f$. Specifically, a corrupt majority may cause progress to stop, but cannot create conflicting histories. Such an always consistent protocol is impossible classically (without assumptions like trusted hardware) even if liveness is only required to hold against a single corrupt party. In both our SMR protocols, communication is entirely classical, with only local quantum computation.
## 2026/2270
* Title: UC PAKE and Concrete Security
* Authors: Tingfei Feng, Jiayu Xu
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2270)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2270.pdf)
### Abstract
The Universal Composability (UC) framework provides a paradigm for security definitions that allows for arbitrary composition, but has been criticized for being unamicable to the concrete security approach, as the meaning of a concrete UC-security statement is hard to interpret in practice. This work aims at alleviating this concern in the context of Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE): we show that any concrete UC-security statement for PAKE can be easily converted to a concrete game-based security statement, whose real-life meaning is clearer. We also briefly discuss potential generalizations of our result to other cryptographic primitives.
## 2026/2271
* Title: Exact SVP on Haar-Random Lattices at the Heuristic Sieving Exponents
* Authors: Yang Zhou, Zhedong Wang, Mingsheng Wang
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2271)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2271.pdf)
### Abstract
We give a Monte Carlo algorithm for exact Euclidean SVP on Haar-random lattices with arithmetic time $(3/2)^{n/2+o(n)}$ and space $(4/3)^{n/2+o(n)}$, up to polynomial factors in the logarithmic condition number of the input basis. The leading exponents match those of heuristic lattice sieving. For a set of lattices of Haar measure $1-o(1)$, the algorithm succeeds with probability $1-o(1)$ on every input basis.
Our algorithm regenerates each sieve list by running a Markov chain on the nonzero lattice points in a smaller ball. The parent list supplies signed increments. Each step reports all admissible proposals and assigns each the same probability, with the remaining probability assigned to staying put. The resulting chain is symmetric and has uniform stationary distribution. Trajectories using independent transition randomness produce endpoints jointly close to independent uniform samples once the chain mixes. Matrix Chernoff bounds transfer a Laplacian gap from the full angular graph to the graph defined by the parent list. The main proof task is to establish the required graph estimates on Haar-random lattices. We do so by adapting Rogers's moment method to centered trace moments and lattice-point counts. Spherical filtering reports the complete proposal sets and the final short differences within the claimed bounds.
## 2026/2272
* Title: Attacking UOV-based Signatures over divided power algebras
* Authors: Peigen Li, Siyong Tao
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2272)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2272.pdf)
### Abstract
Merz and Ran derive additional equations
from divided powers of the public polar forms in characteristic two.
We extend this construction to finite fields of arbitrary characteristic and apply it to the security analysis of QR-UOV.
## 2026/2273
* Title: Slashable Secrecy for Witness Encryption over Ethereum Finality
* Authors: Yihsuan Wu
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2273)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2273.pdf)
### Abstract
Witness encryption over blockchain state aims to release a secret on a ledger condition without a key custodian. Validators with enough stake to construct a valid fork witness can obtain the secret although the condition never holds on the canonical chain. They finalize a private fork that satisfies the condition, and keeping the fork hidden withholds the conflicting votes that slashing needs. We propose slashable secrecy to address this gap with EthereumrCOs native slashing rules, without an additional key-custody committee or separate collateral. In executions where the condition never holds on the finalized canonical chain through completion, an information advantage yields evidence of those votes against keys the adversary controlled, or a solution to a designated hard problem. We give a construction from a witness KEM and prove slashable secrecy conditionally on its extraction interface. We bound the implicated historical stake under changing validator weights. For an archived Ethereum mainnet state, the historical evidence-weight floor exceeds 3.5 percent of its active stake, about 1.44 million ETH, under stated budget and coverage assumptions. Experiments on a synthetic Ethereum network confirm native processing of the evidence, without WE decryption. Two limitations remain. A witness KEM satisfying the full relation and extraction interface remains uninstantiated. Enforcement requires that the evidence is available, converted to native form and included while its signers remain eligible.
## 2026/2274
* Title: zk-BAN: An efficient anonymous blocklisting system with signature-based revocation
* Authors: Kosei Akama, Yoshimichi Nakatsuka, Koichi Moriyama, Keisuke Uehara
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2274)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2274.pdf)
### Abstract
Anonymous blocklisting enables services to revoke malicious users while preserving anonymity for honest users. Signature-based revocation supports revocation from past authentications, but existing systems incur substantial overhead at large scale and for users returning after long offline periods. Window-based alternatives reduce this overhead but impose restrictive revocation-timing policies. This work presents zk-BAN, a signature-based anonymous blocklisting system that reduces proof-generation and verification costs through two design improvements: constructing a carefully filtered revocation list and partially unifying PRF tags to reduce repeated zero-knowledge computations. We formalize zk-BAN and prove that it satisfies blocklistability and unlinkability. Under modeled large-scale real-world workloads, zk-BAN generates proofs in approximately 600 ms and verifies them in approximately 2 ms. We show zk-BAN displays 54.4 times faster proving than our naive baseline and 136-fold faster proving and 32-fold faster verification than prior work.
## 2026/2275
* Title: Defeating Time-Average Selfish Mining Across Epoch Boundaries in Nakamoto Consensus
* Authors: Ren Zhang
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2275)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2275.pdf)
### Abstract
Selfish mining profits in Nakamoto consensus because difficulty adjustment mechanisms (DAMs) misinterpret uncounted orphans as hash-rate contraction. Although orphan-aware DAMs record orphaned proof-of-work, strict same-epoch inclusion rules enable an orphan exclusion attack (OEA): an adversary can race private forks near epoch boundaries to permanently exclude honest tail orphans from retargeting, restoring substantial profits in short-epoch protocols. We propose the pipelined buffer difficulty adjustment mechanism (PB-DAM), which partitions each epoch into an accountable prefix and a settlement buffer of depth $d$. Pipelining estimation windows across epochs grants honest miners a grace period to report prefix uncles while advancing buffer work to subsequent retargets, closing the boundary gap without heuristic damping. Random-walk excursion bounds demonstrate that OEA success decays exponentially with $d$ for all $\alpha \le \alpha^\star < 1/2$, reducing the time-averaged profit advantage to $O(\varepsilon)$. Under stylized dynamic scheduling models, intermittent idling is analytically shown to be unable to raise the gross reward rate above $\alpha$. Simulations confirm that buffer depths $d = 16$ neutralize selfish mining even at $L = 64$ when $\alpha = 0.40$, and systems recover from a $50\%$ hash-rate crash within $2.2 \pm 0.8$ epochs, incurring under $1\%$ block capacity overhead.
## 2026/2276
* Title: Concurrently secure variants of blind (Okamoto-)Schnorr signatures
* Authors: Georg Fuchsbauer, Fabian Regen, Levente Sulyok
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2276)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2276.pdf)
### Abstract
We present variants of blind Schnorr and blind Okamoto-Schnorr signatures that are not susceptible to ROS-style attacks. We prove the schemes unforgeable in the algebraic group model and the random oracle model: the Okamoto-Schnorr variant under the discrete-logarithm assumption; the Schnorr variant under the algebraic one-more discrete-logarithm assumption. Our Schnorr variant improves on the communication complexity of Snowblind (CRYPTO 2023), the state-of-the-art "pairing-free" blind signature scheme, while matching its signature size. Moreover, we show that this communication complexity is optimal: any blind "Schnorr-like" scheme whose first message is a single group element is susceptible to a variant of the ROS attack by Benhamouda et al. (EUROCRYPT 2021).
## 2026/2277
* Title: Non-Interactive Atomic Swaps from Standard Signatures: Lower Bounds and Constructions
* Authors: Xiangyu Liu, Riccardo Zanotto, Vassilis Zikas
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2277)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2277.pdf)
### Abstract
Atomic swaps are the prototypical application of adaptor signatures. Practical constructions settle with two ordinary on-chain signatures and require no scripting, but they need two sequential online rounds: Alice samples a hard statement and sends its pre-signature, and Bob follows with his own pre-signature using the same statement. We ask whether the protocol can be compressed into a single online round (from Bob to Alice), which we call a non-interactive atomic swap, without relying on impractical universal adaptor signatures. In particular, we require that both parties continue to use standard signature schemes with unmodified verification algorithms.
Our main result is a lower bound: for statistically unlinkable adaptors with negligible faithfulness failure, Bob's valid-signature space per message must be superpolynomially larger than the relation's witness space. This (1) reaffirms the impossibility result by Erwig et al. [PKC 2021] for unique signatures as a trivial corollary, and (2) excludes non-interactive swaps using the same signature scheme on both sides. However, the bound does leave room for asymmetric instantiations. We give one in which Alice signs with BLS and Bob uses a pairing-Schnorr adaptor whose witness is Alice's BLS signature, and prove its security under the native unforgeability of BLS in the random oracle model.
To support more signature schemes in our non-interactive swap framework, we introduce atomic signature swaps with preprocessing: Alice publishes message-independent public data before the messages are chosen. These data, together with her public key and the messages, later determine a statement whose witnesses assemble into her native signature. The protocol requires a single online round carrying a pre-signature by Bob and falls into our non-interactive framework. We prove a Schnorr/Schnorr instantiation under the OMDL assumption in the random oracle model, and give a conditional ECDSA/Schnorr instantiation.
## 2026/2278
* Title: Masked CROSS: Masking the CROSS Digital Signature Scheme at Arbitrary Order
* Authors: Khan Keren Mengwi, Puja Mondal, Achille Ecladore Tchahou Tchendjeu, Emmanuel Fouotsa, Suparna Kundu
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2278)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2278.pdf)
### Abstract
CROSS is a code-based signature scheme built on the Restricted Syndrome Decoding Problem and is a second-round candidate in NIST's additional digital signature standardization process. Recent work shows that its reference implementation is vulnerable to side-channel analysis, allowing an attacker to recover the long-term secret key from a single power trace. No masking countermeasure has so far been designed for CROSS's restricted-syndrome framework, leaving its practical side-channel resistance unresolved.
In this work, we present a full sensitivity analysis and a gadget-based masking schedule ($G_0-G_8$) for the CROSS signing algorithm of the R-SDP(G) variant. One gadget in this schedule, the restriction-lift exponentiation, has no counterpart in prior masked multivariate- or lattice-based signatures: it masks $g^{\bar{\mathbf v}[i]}$ via table lookup, share-serial conversion, and ISW-multiplication sub-gadgets rather than via a fixed linear or bilinear map. We rigorously prove $t_{\mathrm{mask}}$-probing security for each gadget individually and for their full composition, using the NI, SNI, and NIo frameworks. We implement the resulting masked signer for an arbitrary number of shares $d$ and evaluate it on an x86-64 platform, measuring cycle overheads of $21.73\times$ at first order and $78.05\times$ at second order relative to the unmasked baseline. At first order, our masked CROSS is cheaper than a comparably masked Dilithium-2 ($38\times$), but Dilithium-2 overtakes it at second order ($70\times$). This crossover cost is driven by the $O(d^3)$ chained-ISW cost of $G_3$/$G_7$ compared to Dilithium's cheaper $O(d^2)$ scaling.
## 2026/2279
* Title: A Cryptographic Perspective on Fingerprinting Machine Learning Model Weights
* Authors: Huijia Lin, Kameron Shahabi
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2279)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2279.pdf)
### Abstract
We introduce a cryptographic framework for fingerprinting machine learning models, enabling model providers to train models that can later be attributed to them. Our framework captures an honest setting in which providers distribute base models that users may subsequently modify to adapt them to their own applications (e.g., through finetuning). We formalize three properties for fingerprinting schemes: (1) quality preservation or undetectability: fingerprinted models must remain computationally indistinguishable from models produced by an underlying training algorithm, (2) robustness: the fingerprint must remain detectable even after the model weights are subject to permitted modification, and (3) unforgeability: no computationally bounded trainer can forge the fingerprint except by applying a permitted modification to an existing fingerprinted model. Under the continuous learning with errors assumption (Bruna et al, 2021), we construct a robust and unforgeable fingerprinting scheme for modifications in $\ell_2$. The scheme achieves undetectability with respect to any given noisy training algorithm, meaning any algorithm whose output weights can be decomposed into independent Gaussian and non-Gaussian components.
Along the way, we introduce two new technical tools. The first is a form of steganography; we develop a method for undetectably modifying a noisy training algorithm so that its output weights secretly encode a message. The embedded message remains decodable even after bounded $\ell_2$ perturbations to the weights. Second, we introduce the pancake alignment problem, a "semi-search" variant of homogeneous continuous learning with errors (hCLWE). Given hCLWE samples generated from a random secret, the goal is to recover a direction that is sufficiently aligned with the secret. We provide evidence for the hardness of pancake alignment in certain parameter regimes via reductions from continuous learning with errors.
## 2026/2280
* Title: Natural Barriers to Quantum Extraction: On the Post-Quantum (In)security of (O)EKE and Masny-Rindal OT
* Authors: James Bartusek, Jake Januzelli
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2280)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2280.pdf)
### Abstract
Encrypted key exchange (EKE), introduced by Bellovin and Merritt (IEEE S\&P 1992), and Masny-Rindal OT, introduced by Masny and Rindal (ACM CCS 2019), are highly-efficient methods for compiling essentially any KEM into advanced cryptographic protocols, namely password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) and oblivious transfer (OT), by relying only on idealized symmetric-key primitives. They have become leading candidates for practically-implementable PAKE and OT due to (1) their simplicity, (2) their plug-and-play nature, allowing for flexibility in the choice of KEM, and (3) existing proofs of UC-security (in the classical adversarial model).
Due to point (2) above, these compilers yield attractive candidates for efficient \emph{post-quantum} PAKE and OT, especially given the recent post-quantum KEM standardization efforts. This motivates the question of whether the (UC-)security of these compilers translates to the quantum adversarial model. In this work, we show that it does not. In particular, we prove that a general family of (O)EKE protocols, as well as Masny-Rindal OT, are \emph{not} UC-secure against quantum polynomial-time adversaries, even when instantiated with a post-quantum KEM. To establish UC-insecurity, we devise an adversarial strategy that provably thwarts any attempt by the simulator to extract its input (the password in the case of PAKE, and the receiver's choice bit in the case of OT).
To complement these negative results, we establish that both compilers yield certain notions of \emph{game-based} security. In the PAKE setting, we consider OEKE instantiated with the ``2-Feistel'' cipher, and prove its stand-alone game-based security in the quantum random oracle model. We view these results as a proof of concept that security of (O)EKE and Masny-Rindal OT can yet be redeemed in the quantum setting, though we caution that the situation will be more subtle than in the classical setting due to the breakdown of simulation-based security. Along the way, we establish a novel ``advantage-tight'' one-way to hiding lemma that may be of independent interest.
## 2026/2281
* Title: Poisoned Cryptography: Solving Direct-Sum LIP in Half the Dimension
* Authors: Artyom Kuninets, Aleksandr Bakharev
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2281)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2281.pdf)
### Abstract
We analyse the Lattice Isomorphism Problem framework of Ducas and van Woerden when it is instantiated with the direct sum of two rescaled integral Barnes-Wall lattices, $\Lambda_{\mathbf{S}}=gBW^{\mathbb{Z}}_{m}\oplus(g+1)BW^{\mathbb{Z}}_{m}$. All primitives of the framework share the same key pair, a public form $\mathbf{P}=\mathbf{U}^{\top}\mathbf{S}\mathbf{U}$ and a secret unimodular matrix $\mathbf{U}$, so recovering $\mathbf{U}$ from $\mathbf{P}$ breaks each of them. We take the hash-and-sign signature scheme as an example, whose security rests on distinguishing the class of $\mathbf{S}=\operatorname{diag}(g^{2}\mathbf{R},(g+1)^{2}\mathbf{R})$ from that of the auxiliary form $\mathbf{Q}^{-1}=\operatorname{diag}(\mathbf{R},g^{2}(g+1)^{2}\mathbf{R})$. We show that the $g^{2}$-hull maps each of the two classes onto the other, is computable from the public key alone, and rescales the two blocks from $(g, g+1)$ to $(1, g(g+1))$ without changing the automorphism group, so that solutions of the transformed instance lift back. The transformed instance then splits into two isomorphism problems for the public Barnes-Wall lattice in half the dimension. At $d=1024$, $g=43$ the estimated cost of key recovery drops from $220$ to $124$ classical bits.
## 2026/2282
* Title: DAVINCI: A Decentralized Cryptographic Voting Protocol
* Authors: Pau Escrich, Marta Bell|-s-Mu|#oz, Roger Baig, Jordi Pi|#ana
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2282)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2282.pdf)
### Abstract
We present DAVINCI, a decentralized end-to-end verifiable voting protocol with no trusted coordinator.
The protocol is structured as a zero-knowledge (ZK) rollup: the election is a ZK-verified state machine in which every transition, from ballot submission to final tallying, is encoded as a circuit constraint, so that no actor can force the protocol into an invalid state without breaking the underlying proof system.
A decentralized set of sequencers handles ballot validation and aggregation off-chain, while Ethereum serves as a public bulletin board and a data-availability layer via EIP-4844 blobs.
For ballot secrecy, DAVINCI uses threshold ElGamal with distributed key generation; for receipt-freeness, sequencers re-encrypt ciphertexts before storing them, and voters may revote at any time.
To make revoting effective against bribery and coercion, DAVINCI introduces silent revoting on every state update, sequencers also re-randomize a random subset of stored ballots, and we quantify how well this hides overwrites among routine refreshes.
Our open-source implementation shows that DAVINCI supports large-scale elections with succinct on-chain verification and ballot proofs generated on commodity devices, under the honest-device assumption shared by several deployed verifiable-voting systems.
## 2026/2283
* Title: A Kleptographic Attack on CSIDH
* Authors: Trey Li
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2283)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2283.pdf)
### Abstract
This note reports an attack scenario for CSIDH that does not appear to have been considered in the literature. A subverted device of Alice can leak a shared curve between Alice and Bob through Alice's public curves in later CSIDH sessions. The attack adapts the Young--Yung kleptographic attack from classical Diffie--Hellman to CSIDH using the Goldreich--Levin theorem and rejection sampling. We prove that a CSIDH public curve $[\mathfrak a]\star E_0$ remains computationally indistinguishable from an honest public curve even when its secret class $[\mathfrak a]$ is rejection-sampled according to a hard-core bit of a hidden parallelization curve $[\mathfrak a][\mathfrak c]\star E_0$ formed by the same class $[\mathfrak a]$ together with an independent curve $[\mathfrak c]\star E_0$. The proofs rely only on the computational assumptions underlying CSIDH itself. We hope that this note provides a useful starting point for the study of algorithm-substitution attacks in isogeny-based cryptography, complementing existing work on side-channel and fault attacks.
## 2026/2284
* Title: Randomized Early-Stopping Byzantine Agreement with Applications to Round-Efficient MPC
* Authors: Michele Ciampi, Pouyan Forghani, Yun Lu, Vassilis Zikas
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2284)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2284.pdf)
### Abstract
We consider two main classes of synchronous round-efficient Byzantine Agreement (BA) protocols: \emph{expected constant rounds} and \emph{early-stopping}. Randomized protocols can terminate in expected constant rounds, and early-stopping protocols' worst-case round complexity depends on the actual number of corrupted parties $f\le t$, with $\min(t+1, f+2)$ being optimal. In this work, we combine the benefits of both classes, proposing a protocol that has constant round-complexity in expectation and $O(f)$ in the worst case. We present our protocol in the form of a compiler that can lift a broad class of expected-constant-round BA protocols, including Feldman--Micali and Katz--Koo, to {\em also} achieve near-optimal $O(f)$ worst-case complexity.
This yields the {\em first} treatment of perfectly secure BA protocols for $t<n/3$ that is both expected constant-round and near-optimal ($O(f)$) early stopping. Assuming a PKI, we show a variant of the compiler with a better round complexity, tolerating $t<n/2$ corruptions.
We also extend our results to parallel broadcast, also known as interactive consistency (IC). We give a compiler that runs $N$ Byzantine agreement instances in parallel while preserving both guarantees, expected constant rounds and $O(f)$ rounds in the worst case. Parallel broadcast then follows with one extra round for $t<n/2$. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first compiler of its kind, and the first IC protocol with such expected and worse round-complexity.
Finally, by combining our protocol with standard (fast) sequential composition techniques, we obtain a valid candidate to execute \emph{multi-party computation protocols} that require broadcast as their hybrid. By running existing MPC constructions using our broadcast protocol, we obtain the first MPC protocol that requires constant rounds of P2P communication in expectation and $O(f)$ rounds in the worst case.
## 2026/2285
* Title: Bandwidth Fee Mechanisms for Certified Transaction Dissemination
* Authors: Eleftheria Fassman, Mahimna Kelkar, Benjamin Marsh, Ke Wu
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2285)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2285.pdf)
### Abstract
We study bandwidth fee mechanisms (BFMs) for pricing threshold certified transaction dissemination before consensus. BFMs are analogous to transaction fee mechanisms (TFMs) introduced by Roughgarden (2021), except that they price blockchain communication rather than computation. Separately pricing this bandwidth is especially relevant when transaction dissemination is separated from consensus and execution. We model BFMs as a two-sided procurement auction between users who submit transactions and validators who receive and forward them. Any validator may be assigned as the source of a transaction and forward it to a threshold of attesters. The model accounts for the source validator's receipt of the user submitted transaction and the subsequent transfers between validators. It abstracts away unrestricted multi-hop gossip and network topology.
In this work, we focus on settings where transactions must be certified/attested by a threshold of network nodes before consensus, and we develop the following results.
- We characterize the limits of myopic incentive compatibility for BFMs: No non-trivial transcript-based BFM can prevent profitable collusion between two validators, and no non-trivial BFM can simultaneously satisfy incentive compatibility for individual user, individual validator, and coalition of one validator and one user.
- In contrast, once we restrict attention to unilateral deviations, we present a greedy-route posted-price mechanism that is incentive compatible for every individual user and validator.
\item We study how the bandwidth price should evolve across blocks. Assuming validators execute honestly, we propose an EIP-1559-style price-update rule and show that its fluid approximation has a unique fixed point, which is locally stable for small enough step sizes. In large markets, prices that start near this point stay near it with high probability over any fixed time horizon.
\end{itemize}
## 2026/2286
* Title: Non-Interactive Black-Box Witness-Indistinguishable Commit-and-Prove via Targeted Hitting-Set Generators
* Authors: Susumu Kiyoshima
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2286)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2286.pdf)
### Abstract
Targeted hitting-set generators (HSGs) are primitives that have recently attracted attention in the study of pseudorandomness and derandomization. Recent works have shown that sufficiently strong targeted HSGs can be used to soundly instantiate the Fiat--Shamir transformation, yielding non-interactive protocols against uniform PPT adversaries in the plain model (i.e., without any setup phase for selecting a cryptographic hash function). In particular, Chen et al. (STOC 2025) combined this paradigm with the MPC-in-the-head technique to construct a non-interactive witness-indistinguishable argument for NP from a non-interactive commitment scheme and a targeted HSG.
Inspired by these results, we explore other cryptographic applications of this paradigm. Our main result is a black-box construction of a non-interactive witness-indistinguishable commit-and-prove scheme against uniform PPT adversaries in the plain model. Following Chen et al., we obtain our construction by combining the MPC-in-the-head technique with the targeted-HSG-based Fiat--Shamir paradigm. The construction relies on an injective one-way function with efficiently recognizable range and a sufficiently strong targeted HSG. The latter is the same targeted HSG used by Chen et al. and can be instantiated under a very strong but plausible complexity-theoretic assumption.
## 2026/2287
* Title: KnuthrCoYao masked (Gaussian) sampling
* Authors: Calvin Abou Haidar, Cl|-ment Hoffmann
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2287)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2287.pdf)
### Abstract
Discrete Gaussian sampling remains one of the most delicate operations to protect against side-channel attacks in lattice-based cryptography. In this work, we present the first masked evaluation of the Knuth-Yao sampler, a generic building block for lattice-based schemes. Its random-walk formulation might seem fundamentally at odds with masking, since the walk's control flow depends precisely on the secret sample being produced. We show instead that its underlying tree structure is remarkably suited to it. Evaluated as a bitsliced Boolean circuit, the public tree prescribes an evaluation order requiring exactly L - 2 masked AND gadgets, where L is the total Hamming weight of the probability expansions of the target distribution. This makes the approach particularly effective for the narrow distributions used in lattice-based schemes. We provide a generic framework that compiles any finite-precision distribution into a masked C implementation with optimized linear-gate count. We use FrodoKEM and HAWK as case studies, and also compile the base samplers of Falcon and HAETAE. On ARM Cortex-M4, our sampler outperforms the state-of-the-art masked CDT approach for every distribution at masking orders 1 to 5, running up to 2.3 times as fast at order 1, even for distributions where it evaluates more non-linear gates. Finally, since the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform ties FrodoKEM to the exact randomness consumption of its specified sampler, we discuss the consequences of this constraint. We benchmarked an unmasked implementation and argue that the Knuth-Yao approach is competitive even without masking, while using identical input randomness.
## 2026/2288
* Title: Kettle: Short Post-Quantum Threshold Signatures from the HAWK Signature Scheme
* Authors: Calvin Abou Haidar, Daniel Escudero, Thomas Espitau, Cl|-ment Hoffmann, Kaoru Takemure, Mehdi Tibouchi, Hern|in Dar|!o Vanegas Madrigal
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2288)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2288.pdf)
### Abstract
HAWK is a lattice-based hash-and-sign signature scheme that
was a third round candidate in the NIST additional call for
post-quantum signatures. It has short signatures and keys, as
well as fast and portable signing and verification. However,
in response to a highly-publicized AI-driven cryptanalytic
result that reduced its security (roughly doubling the required
dimension to achieve a given security level), the authors de-
cided to withdraw from the competition. The need to increase
parameters was seen as limiting the size advantage of HAWK
compared to the already selected lattice schemes ML-DSA
and Falcon, which was one of its primary selling points along-
side speed and the lack of floating-point arithmetic.
In this paper, we identify another attractive aspect of the
HAWK design that is not affected by the AI attack and has
been overlooked so far: its surprising friendliness to multi-
party computation (MPC). Indeed, HAWK signing can be
achieved in a generic way from a small collection of basic
composable MPC functionalities (like integer multiplication,
uniform random generation, etc.) in such a way that instanti-
ating those functionalities using MPC protocols with given
security properties (semi-honest vs. malicious, honest vs. dis-
honest majority, etc.) yields a secure protocol for MPC signing
with those same properties.
As a result, we obtain Kettle, a UC-secure threshold signa-
ture protocol that outputs specification-compliant HAWK sig-
natures and scales to an arbitrary number of parties. It offers
essentially the shortest signature size so far for a lattice-based
threshold signature, while achieving significantly lower round
complexity and online communication cost than other thresh-
old protocols built from pre-existing, non-threshold lattice-
based signatures (like ML-DSA and Falcon): as low as 2
online rounds (a dozen rounds total) and 2 kB online com-
munication per party, depending on the specific setting and
optimization choices.
We also provide a proof-of-concept implementation of our
approach in the MP-SPDZ framework, which can be instanti-
ated with any number of parties, any threshold, and a variety
of security properties.
## 2026/2289
* Title: A Subexponential Algorithm for Binary LWE with Sublinear Samples
* Authors: Zhili Chen, Kaijie Jiang, Anyu Wang, Chuanqi Zhang
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2289)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2289.pdf)
### Abstract
We study Binary LWE with polynomial modulus in the regime of a linear number of samples. Prior work of Kirchner and Fouque and of Herold, Kirshanova, and May (CRYPTO '15, DCC '18) gives an algorithm running in time $\exp(O(n/\log\log n))$ using $O(n\log n)$ samples, leaving open whether the same complexity can be achieved with only $m=\Theta(n)$ samples.
We resolve this problem by showing that the same complexity is achievable with even a sublinear number of samples. Fix any constant $a>1/2$, let $q=n^{a+o(1)}$ be an odd prime, and let $m = \left\lceil n/\log \log n \right\rceil$. We give a randomized algorithm that distinguishes $\bigl(\mathbf{A},\mathbf{A}^{\top}\mathbf{s}+\mathbf{e}\bigr) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times m}\times\mathbb{Z}_q^m$ from a uniformly random pair, for every fixed secret--error pair satisfying $\lVert\mathbf{s}\rVert_2^2+\lVert\mathbf{e}\rVert_2^2 = O(m+n)$. Its expected running time and space are $\exp\left(O( n/\log \log n )\right)$.
A crucial component is a new instantiation of the auxiliary superlattices in the Gaussian--Wagner framework of Ducas, Engelberts, and Loyer (CRYPTO '25). These superlattices have sufficiently small smoothing parameters even when the approximation parameter for the entire output list is subexponentially small, while still admitting exact shifted discrete Gaussian sampling within the claimed running time. A Euclidean dual-minimum argument simultaneously controls the smoothing parameters of all projected relevant lattices. Combining the resulting short vectors with an Aharonov--Regev Fourier distinguisher yields the claimed sublinear sample LWE algorithm.
## 2026/2290
* Title: Jambon: Asynchronous Universally Composable Threshold FHE with Low Communication
* Authors: Jung Hee Cheon, Kevin Choi, Changmin Lee, JeongHwan Lee, Junho Lim, Duc Anh Luong
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2290)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2290.pdf)
### Abstract
Threshold fully homomorphic encryption distributes decryption authority among multiple parties, but achieving strong security can significantly increase the required ciphertext modulus and the size of each decryption response. Existing parameter analyses typically focus on threshold decryption alone. In particular, the recent work of Kim et al. (KLL$^+$26) analyzes correctness and strong simulation security of partial decryption without covering distributed key generation (DKG). When the parties generate the keys themselves, the DKG and partial-decryption protocols must satisfy their respective correctness and security requirements.
We revisit correctness and simulation-security requirements for threshold decryption when it is composed with DKG.
We then introduce Jambon, which applies deterministic rounding to partial decryptions to further reduce the modulus used for decryption responses.
The composed security bound accounts separately for setup and decryption errors.
We prove exact recovery for BFV and extend the approach to CKKS under an additional condition.
Under the stated temporary-HE assumptions and resource hybrids, we establish universally composable security with strong threshold privacy against static malicious corruption in the random-oracle model. We prove security for the DKG and its composition with verifiable partial decryption. Under the stated algebraic and statistical parameters, Jambon's numerical decryption responses are at least $60\%$ smaller than the native responses of the updated KLL$^+$26 strong-security construction at every threshold considered for $256$, $512$, and $1024$ parties. This comparison uses the specified sufficient bounds and excludes proof and setup traffic.
## 2026/2291
* Title: Evidence on Demand: Selectively Disclosable Watermarks for Generative AI
* Authors: Yuuki Fujita, Keisuke Hara
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2291)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2291.pdf)
### Abstract
Cryptographic watermarking for generative AI equips a generative model with a hidden mark that identifies its outputs as machine-generated, without affecting output quality.
This study proposes a new cryptographic watermarking method with selective disclosability.
Under this scheme, detection is restricted by default to the model owner, who can selectively issue a short token for any single output.
This token enables any third party to verify that the specific output is watermarked, while guaranteeing that all other outputs remain undetectable, even to the token holder.
This scheme is particularly useful in scenarios where a provider must certify a single controversial output without compromising the privacy of other outputs.
In addition to two existing security properties, namely robustness and unforgeability, we formalize two security properties, undetectability of undisclosed data and disclosure soundness, to achieve our goal.
We then propose our construction based on prior work (Lin, Shahabi, and Song, CRYPTO 2026) and prove it satisfies the four security notions.
Our construction is broadly applicable to autoregressive generative AI models, including LLMs.
## 2026/2292
* Title: Nonstop Multihop? Constructions and Lower Bounds for Re-Aggregatable Multisignatures
* Authors: Lucjan Hanzlik, Julian Loss, Omar Renawi
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2292)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2292.pdf)
### Abstract
Multisignatures compress many signatures on a common message into a single aggregate. In large distributed systems, aggregation occurs over multiple hops, where partial aggregates may overlap. The recent hint-free multisignatures of Hofheinz, Reichle, and Wagner (TCC~2026) eliminate aggregation-topology hints, but verification still requires the complete set of participating public keys. This leaves open whether the signer-set information itself can be eliminated. We answer this question negatively. We introduce idempotent multisignatures to capture unrestricted aggregation of overlapping aggregates and prove that any such scheme has a signature size linear in the number of signers.
To circumvent this lower bound, we introduce unique multisignatures, a sequential alternative that eliminates this metadata and retains constant-size signatures. We construct unique multisignatures using incrementally verifiable computations. Finally, replacing signature chains in authenticated Dolev-Strong Byzantine Broadcast with our primitive enables two-round termination when the sender is honest and reduces communication from $O(n^3)$ to $O(n^2)$ against $t<n$ adaptive corruptions.
## 2026/2293
* Title: Nonce Misuse Resilience of GCM with Rijndael-256-256
* Authors: Mario Marhuenda Beltr|in, Bart Mennink
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2293)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2293.pdf)
### Abstract
GCM is the leading authenticated encryption scheme. With its application in TLS alone, it finds millions of uses every day. However, in the last years, various shortcomings of GCM have been observed: mistakes in earlier proofs, non-optimal security degradation in case of shorter tags, the support for a $96$-bit nonce only (concatenated with a $32$-bit counter) for the most widely implemented variant, but most of all, the brittle resistance against nonce misuse. This latter shortcoming is particularly worrisome in applications where uniqueness of the nonce cannot be guaranteed (such as in distributed systems). In part to salvage this situation, the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is contemplating the idea of standardizing Rijndael-256-256. Indeed, sticking to the concept of a $32$-bit counter, this would allow the support of $224$-bit nonces next to the $32$-bit counter. Nonetheless, it may be observed that nonces may still be accidentally reused due to other causes and the larger block size does not solve the fatal effects of nonce misuse, among which the possibility to perform a subkey recovery.
To salvage this, we propose GCM-256. The fix is, as a matter of fact, rather simple and comes almost for free. In a nutshell: whereas a native generalization of GCM to $256$-bit blocks would mask the output of GHASH with only half of the output of the initial nonce based block cipher evaluation, we suggest to not discard the other half but use it as key to GHASH. As an effect, we demonstrate that GCM-256 does not only achieves classic confidentiality and authenticity, but as a bonus it achieves nonce misuse resilience, meaning that even if nonces are misused, the scheme still guarantees security for fresh nonces.
## 2026/2294
* Title: Deniable Secret Sharing: Towards Practical Faking
* Authors: Ignacio Amores, Tamar Ben David, Matteo Campanelli, Sebastian Kolby, Eran Omri, Anat Paskin-Cherniavsky, Sophia Yakobuov
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2294)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2294.pdf)
### Abstract
Deniable secret sharing (DSS; Canetti et al, TCC 2025) is designed for a scenario where an adversary is able to bribe or coerce all shareholders to divulge their shares of a secret. A deniable secret sharing scheme is equipped with a faking function that enables shareholders to produce fake shares that look like real shares, but do not actually reveal any additional information about the secret.
Existing DSS constructions require the fakers to jointly compute on their shares, without considering how this computation might be realized. In this paper, we investigate two crucial properties of such computations: the extent to which the fakers themselves learn information about the secret (privacy against fakers), and the number of messages they need to exchange (message complexity). Message complexity can be seen as a measure of faking conspicuousness, if the adversary is able to observe network traffic.
We prove that to obtain the strongest notion of DSS, any information-theoretic construction requires the fakers to exchange a non-zero number of messages, which could be large (depending on the access structure). We describe a general construction that matches this lower bound in many cases, e.g. for threshold access structures. Furthermore, for linear secret sharing schemes, we prove that certain unqualified sets must learn the secret as a result of faking.
Moving to the computational setting, we describe two constructions which require no interaction beyond the knowledge of who the fakers are. This implies that both inconspicuousness and privacy against fakers are achieved. The first construction requires the share size to be exponential in the number of shareholders, but assumes only a PRG. The second construction has small shares, but assumes virtual black-box obfuscation. We see the latter construction as a stepping stone for a future iO-based instantiation.
All of our lower bounds and constructions consider general access structures. ## 2026/2295
* Title: Context-Blind Device-Bound Anonymous Credentials from Signatures and Proofs
* Authors: Mark Manulis, Alan Pulval-Dady, Daniel Slamanig, Dave Wittig
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2295)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2295.pdf)
### Abstract
Anonymous credentials enable privacy preserving authentication, but their transferability motivates binding each credential to a key protected by a secure element (SE). Such binding should preserve privacy even when the SE is remote or corrupted: every presentation must require fresh SE participation without revealing its context to the SE (Friedrichs et al., EC'26). Existing so called context-blind device-bound constructions rely on classical assumptions, whereas existing plausibly post-quantum anonymous credentials do not provide this functionality.
We give a modular construction of context blind device-bound anonymous credentials from a position-binding vector commitment, a signature scheme, a round-optimal blind signature, and a non-interactive zero-knowledge argument. We prove correctness, one-more unforgeability, unlinkability against a colluding issuer, verifier, and fully corrupted SE, and SE-obliviousness. We instantiate the construction with the CAPSS framework (Feneuil and Rivain, TCHES'26), Griffin/Jive Merkle commitments, and an Aurora-based proof of the complete presentation relation.
We benchmark this concrete instantiation in one representative setting with 16 attributes and four disclosed attributes. Our non optimized prototype produces a $214.65$ KB presentation proof and requires $13.18$ s for the user and $1.37$ s for verification on our benchmark platform. We complement this benchmark with published results to explore the proof-size/proving-time trade-offs offered by alternative transparent plausibly post-quantum proof systems for relations of comparable size.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first concrete construction and evaluation of context-blind device-bound anonymous credentials assembled entirely from plausibly post-quantum components.
## 2026/2296
* Title: iX3DH: Post-Quantum Subversion-Resilient X3DH Key-Exchange from Isogenies
* Authors: Tako Boris Fouotsa, Trey Li, Bernardo Magri, Shancheng Zhang
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2296)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2296.pdf)
### Abstract
Secure messaging runs on commodity devices that can be subverted by malware or supply-chain attacks. Reverse firewalls address this threat by interposing a user-side device that mediates the communication of a potentially compromised end-point. Recently, Dodis et, al. (CRYPTO 2025) proposed a reverse firewall design for protecting Signal, including its Diffie-Hellman based X3DH handshake, against subversion. With Signal and other platforms now migrating to post-quantum cryptography, however, extending this protection to post-quantum, Signal-conforming authenticated key exchanges (AKE) remains a challenge.
We present iX3DH, a post-quantum X3DH-style protocol from commutative group-action Diffie-Hellman. Its public group-action values can be re-randomized by a reverse firewall, removing subliminal information from these values. We prove AKE security of iX3DH in the QROM against quantum polynomial-time adversaries, relying on the quantum-accessible group-action gap-CDH assumption, PRF security, and EU-CMA security of a PQ unique signature scheme. We then prove that the reverse firewalls are exfiltration-resistant and preserve security against subversions that maintain functionality and are explainable. To prevent subliminal channels within the signature transcript, we construct IBIS, the first candidate post-quantum unique signature scheme. By integrating IBIS with our firewall-friendly handshake, iX3DH achieves post-quantum AKE security under subversion attacks.
## 2026/2297
* Title: An Analysis of the ITU-T Multiple Cryptographic Algorithms X.509 Extensions for PQC Migration
* Authors: Falko Strenzke
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2297)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2297.pdf)
### Abstract
The 2019 edition of ITU-T X.509 adds three certificate extensions, colloquially called the Catalyst extensions, that let a single certificate carry a second, alternative public key and issuer signature beside the native ones, as a backwards-compatible path for migrating a public-key infrastructure to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). This paper collects the known problems of this multiple cryptographic algorithms (MCA) mechanism and adds several findings of its own. The central and previously known weakness is that a quantum attacker who recovers a single traditional certification-authority key can replace any certificate in a chain by a traditional-only one that a relying party still accepts. We give a precise attack model with a sub-CA and an end-entity-forgery variant to emphasize the inherent problem. As an example, we verify empirically that the susceptibility to this downgrade attack is present in the wolfSSL cryptographic library as a natural consequence. Our further findings concern the construction itself and details of the specification. For one, we analyze the formal violations of EUF-CMA that arise due to the possibility of re-purposing the extension signature to the established signed data format in X.509, which is formally manifest as soon as the alternative key in the extension is also certified as a native key. We show that several further aspects in the ITU-T mechanism remain undefined, which potentially leads to divergent behaviour of clients, and point out that a certificate accepted on its alternative signature alone, as allowed per ITU-T specification, can be invalid under RFC~5280 and potentially exposes an application to arbitrary injected data and even modified signatures chaining it to a certificate chosen by a non-quantum attacker in the positively validated certificate chain.
## 2026/2298
* Title: Pseudorandom Correlation Generators for Matrix Triples
* Authors: Maxime Bombar, Geoffroy Couteau, Nikolas Melissaris, Anuja Modi
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2298)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2298.pdf)
### Abstract
We introduce new pseudorandom correlation generators (PCGs) for matrix triples: shares of triples $(A,B,A\cdot B)$ where $A,B$ are random matrices over $\mathbb{F}^{n\times n}$ for a field $\mathbb{F}$ and an integer $n$. Matrix triples are consumed in a wide variety of secure computation protocols that involve matrix arithmetic, which occurs commonly in settings such as privacy-preserving machine-learning and statistics, threshold cryptography, secure linear algebra, and more. Previous PCGs for matrix triples are inefficient: their seed grows at least linearly in the matrix dimension, and their expansion is slow. In this work, we introduce two new PCGs with improved performances:
1. Our first construction, inspired by the recent work of (Gentry and Lee, Crypto 2026) on FHE for matrix arithmetic, relies on the quasi-abelian syndrome decoding (QASD) assumption introduced in (Bombar et al., Crypto 2023), an assumption which has since received a significant amount of attention. Our PCG generates $N$ matrix triples over $\mathbb{F}^{n\times n}$ from a seed of size $poly(\lambda,\log n,\log N)$ using $\Theta(n^3\log(n^3N))$ field operations per triple, removing the linear dependency on $n$ from the seed compared to previous works.
2. Our second construction is more mathematically involved, and builds upon an elegant and surprising connection with the Weyl-Pauli twisted algebra, a mathematical structure originally studied in (Weyl, Zeitschrift f|+r Physik, 1927) in the context of quantum kinematics. Our PCG relies on a new variant of the QASD assumption over the Weyl-Pauli twisted group algebra and exhibits impressive performances: it has the same seed size as our first construction and generates $N$ matrix triples at a cost only a small constant time larger than the cost of computing $N$ matrix triples in the clear.
We complement our results with an in-depth study of our new twisted QASD assumption and demonstrate the benefits of our PCGs in concrete applications such as privacy-preserving machine learning and threshold MAYO.
## 2026/2299
* Title: Can AI Oversight Be Zero Knowledge?
* Authors: Alessandro Chiesa, Ziyi Guan, Burcu Y-#ld-#z
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2299)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2299.pdf)
### Abstract
AI systems increasingly produce outputs from confidential data, such as a fitness-for-duty assessment from medical records or the predicted properties of a drug candidate from its secret structure. It is important to verify that such outputs are correct without revealing the underlying data. A recent line of work studies verification of AI outputs via interactive proofs and debate for oracle-aided computation, where correctness may depend on an oracle such as human judgment, a physical experiment, or the web. These works focus on verification by a verifier that runs much faster than the computation. However, such efficient verification is impossible for general oracle-aided computation, and these works therefore rely on additional assumptions. We focus instead on privacy: allowing the verifier to run in time polynomial in the computation, we ask whether interactive arguments for oracle-aided computation can be zero knowledge, so that the verifier learns nothing about the confidential data beyond the correctness of the output.
We prove that, in general, they cannot. In the random oracle model, there are no zero-knowledge proofs for all oracle-aided computations, even if both the prover and the verifier are allowed to run much longer than the computation itself. The impossibility extends to debate, a canonical model for scalable oversight.
On the positive side, we show that if the oracle attaches a cryptographic signature to each of its answers, then every oracle-aided computation can be verified in zero knowledge with an efficient prover and verifier, assuming only collision-resistant hash functions. Beyond privacy, this also gives an alternative approach to scalable oversight that relies neither on an honest opponent, as in debate, nor on the robustness of the computation, as in prior single-prover protocols.
## 2026/2300
* Title: DuraShare: BIP39-native secret sharing with full manual fallback
* Authors: Jeroen van de Graaf, Renato Schiavinato Lopez
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2300)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2300.pdf)
### Abstract
BIP39 is a Bitcoin standard that turns a wallet's random seed of size between 128 and 256 bits into a human-readable sequence of 12 to 24 words, taken from a fixed 2048-word list. Each word corresponds to an index in that list. DuraShare allows the holder of this sequence to split it among $n$ Sharekeepers, each of whom receives one share. Any subset of $k$ Sharekeepers can combine their shares and reconstruct the original sequence, whereas $k-1$ colluding Sharekeepers obtain no (Shannon) information.
For everyday convenience we adopt a software-assisted model, while ensuring that a full manual fallback remains feasible for recovery, requiring nothing beyond paper, a calculator, and specific instructions. This matters because Sharekeepers may be family members or lawyers unfamiliar with crypto-technology, called upon only decades later, when no specific vendor, software, or hardware can be assumed to still exist.
DuraShare combines three existing, well-established cryptographic techniques: (1) Shamir Secret Sharing over $\mathbb{F}_{2053}$, the smallest prime larger than 2048; (2) 2D error detection, applying row and column checksums to each share to protect the data against transcription errors and physical damage; and (3) a simple affine inner-product MAC over $\mathbb{F}_{2053}$ to authenticate each share, preventing a Sharekeeper from tampering without being detected.
## 2026/2301
* Title: Breaking the Bounded Entanglement Barrier for Quantum Position Verification
* Authors: Amit Behera, Vipul Goyal
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2301)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2301.pdf)
### Abstract
Position verification, introduced by Chandran et al. (SIAM J. Computing 2014), allows verifiers to test a prover's claimed position by an interactive protocol. Classical position verification is impossible. Even for Quantum Position Verification (QPV), there always exists an LOCC (Local Operations and Classical Communication) attack if the adversary can hold an exponentially large amount of preshared entanglement.
Somewhat surprisingly, we show that we can circumvent this barrier in the idealized continuous-time model, where time is represented by a real-valued parameter and challenge messages can be sent at a time sampled uniformly from a real interval. In this model, we give a BB84-based protocol that remains secure against any finite coalition of LOCC adversaries with arbitrary finite (possibly exponential) quantum storage and entanglement.
Our construction can also be instantiated in the discrete-time model. Even though the previous impossibility results apply, we are able to obtain an information-theoretic QPV protocol in which the honest parties' total resources (communication and storage) can be significantly smaller than the adversarial resource bound. In fact, we can achieve any desired polynomial gap between honest parties and adversarial resources. To our knowledge, all previous protocols in the literature required resources of the honest parties to be at least as large as the adversarial entanglement.
Interestingly, the resource gap between the honest and adversarial party resources in our protocol depends on how precisely time can be measured. As the precision of the best-known clock improves with further research, the resource gap in our protocol keeps increasing. In particular, the adversarial resource bound keeps increasing while the honest parties' resources remain largely the same. We call this the "I sleep, you work" paradigm.
## 2026/2302
* Title: CAROUSEL: GPU-Accelerated Private Vector Search via Homomorphic Sketching
* Authors: Sohaib, Divyakant Agrawal, Amr El Abbadi, Soamar Homsi
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2302)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2302.pdf)
### Abstract
Vector search on untrusted infrastructure exposes the \emph{query embedding}, a faithful summary of the user's intent. Fully homomorphic encryption can hide the query, but existing approaches still require a full scan followed by ranking of encrypted scores. Scalable private systems avoid encrypted ranking by either sending scores from a single cluster to the client or moving the search to the client, which must first stream the entire vector index for preprocessing. We present Carousel, which instead scores the full corpus under encryption and compresses the results for client-side ranking. The server scores every vector under encryption, raises the scores to a power that preserves their order by magnitude while suppressing all but a handful, and compresses the resulting sparse vector into a logarithmic number of ciphertexts using homomorphic additions alone. Because every vector is scored, Carousel incurs no recall loss from discarding candidates. Since clients hold no database-dependent state, insertions and deletions take effect immediately at the cost of a single vector write. Carousel searches $1$ billion vectors of BIGANN SIFT1B across multiple GPUs and achieves recall@100 of $0.9715$. At $100$ million SIFT vectors, it achieves recall@100 of $0.9845$ with a query latency of $3.735$ seconds on a single GPU.
## 2026/2303
* Title: On the pseudorandomness of simple quantum processes
* Authors: Jesko Dujmovic, Jonas Haferkamp, Alexander Poremba
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2303)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2303.pdf)
### Abstract
Can simple processes appear highly complex? Gowers (Comb. Prob. Comp. '96) conjectured that repeatedly composing local random reversible operations can yield global permutations that are indistinguishable from random. In this work, we study the unitary quantum analog of this question, in an attempt to make new progress on this longstanding conjecture.
Our first result shows that statistical moment matching in the form of unitary designs does not generically lead to pseudorandomness---even for the simplest quantum processes: for every fixed $t$, we give an efficiently samplable family $\{\nu_n\}_n$ of distributions on one- and two-qubit gates such that, after $T=O_t(n^2\log^2 n)$ independent steps, the resulting $n$-qubit ensemble is an approximate unitary $t$-design with negligible error $\exp(-\Omega(\log^2 n))$, yet an efficient quantum algorithm distinguishes it from random using only $O_t(\log^2 n)$ queries. This refutes the unitary analog of the Hoory--Magen--Myers--Rackoff conjecture (ICALP '04) for permutations.
Our second result is a stronger separation between unitary designs and pseudorandom unitaries at polynomially bounded moments; our counterexample, however, requires highly structured ensembles, in contrast with the simple local walks from before. This suggests caution when using unitary designs to model information scrambling in black-hole physics, as even maximally scrambled systems can exhibit structure which is accessible to efficient experiments. Motivated by these findings, we then propose new conjectures for how pseudorandomness can plausibly emerge within simple quantum processes, such as random quantum circuits.
## 2026/2304
* Title: Gram Moments and Pairwise Mixing of AES
* Authors: Chongxu Ren, Hongbo Yu
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2304)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2304.pdf)
### Abstract
We prove that $4k+4$ rounds of AES with independent uniform round keys are $2^{-14-61k}$-close to pairwise independent, improving on Hurst's announced bound of $2^{-3.82-48.03k}$. Here, closeness is measured by the total variation distance between the outputs on any two distinct plaintexts and those of a uniform random permutation, with the round keys sampled once and retained across evaluations. Consequently, 12, 16, and 20 rounds suffice for statistical accuracy $2^{-128}$, $2^{-192}$, and $2^{-256}$, respectively. Our bound also holds for the complete view of any algorithm making at most two adaptive classical forward queries. We develop a general bound for local difference channels acting on additive MDS codes, expressed through the second moment of a Gram matrix. This bound controls the dependencies created by diffusion and refines the activity-space analysis of previous work. Combining the resulting contraction estimate with a sharper analysis of the initial difference distributions yields the stated mixing bound.
## 2026/2305
* Title: Revisiting Partitioning: Output-Adaptive ABE for Circuits from LWE
* Authors: Jiaqi Cheng, Rishab Goyal
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2305)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2305.pdf)
### Abstract
We introduce Output-Adaptive Security, a new intermediate security notion for Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) that bridges the gap between selective and full adaptive security. In our model, the adversary selectively commits to a policy function structure $f$ but adaptively chooses a long target output value $y$ during the challenge phase. We construct the first Output-Adaptive ABE scheme for general circuits from the standard Learning With Errors (LWE) assumption by revisiting classical partitioning techniques and applying them to the output space of circuit evaluation. Our result demonstrates that adaptivity for expressive policies can be achieved from standard lattices without complexity leveraging or heavy tools like witness encryption and indistinguishability obfuscation. Furthermore, we show that output-adaptivity is sufficient for many real-world applications, including biometric matching, weighted thresholds, and wildcard search, where system architecture is static while policy targets remain dynamic.
## 2026/2306
* Title: Post-Quantum Time-Lock Puzzle from Isogenies
* Authors: Shweta Agrawal, Andrea Basso, Sikhar Patranabis
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2306)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2306.pdf)
### Abstract
We construct the first (conjectured) post-quantum Time Lock Puzzle (TLP) from isogenies. Our construction avoids setup/preprocessing and achieves non-trivial efficiency, where puzzle generation runs in time $\sqrt{T}$ . We prove security in the quantum random oracle model (QROM)
under a new conjecture about the sequentiality of isogeny pushforward computations, for which we provide a thorough justification. The only other (conjectured) post-quantum TLP constructions rely on heavy cryptographic machinery from lattice-based assumptions.
We also provide, to the best of our knowledge, the first proof-of-concept implementation of a candidate post-quantum TLP. On an Apple M3 CPU, for a one-hour target delay, total puzzle generation, including setup,
takes 2.9 minutes serially and 100.5 seconds with four generation workers. Our experiments demonstrate the practicality of the complete design and show that the quadratic gap between puzzle generation and solving in theory also translates into a meaningful concrete separation.
As a stepping stone towards our main result, we provide a new TLP from isogenies in the preprocessing model from a combination of the sequentiality of isogeny walks in the $F_{p^2}$ graph and the hardness of computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) over cyclic prime-order groups. This improves the assumptions underlying the only known TLP from isogenies in the preprocessing model, which required pairing based assumptions instead of just discrete log. We further adapt this construction to achieve non-trivial efficiency of $\sqrt{T}$ in puzzle generation without setup/preprocessing.
## 2026/2307
* Title: Functional Verification of Additive FFT Assembly Implementations in Code-Based PQC
* Authors: Jiaxiang Liu, Kuang-Lin Pan, Xiaomu Shi, Ming-Hsien Tsai, Bow-Yaw Wang, Bo-Yin Yang
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2307)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2307.pdf)
### Abstract
We present the first formal verification results for the highly optimized additive Fast Fourier Transforms (FFTs) in two different code-based post-quantum cryptosystems: Classic McEliece and Hamming Quasi-Cyclic. Since Classic McEliece is already a standard and HQC is being standardized, they may both see wide adoption in the future. The Gao-Mateer and Frobenius additive FFTs during decoding are clearly the most intricate, error-prone components in the two cryptosystems respectively. They are not only complicated and mathematically intricate, but also aggressively optimized in practical implementations.
A main problem of this verification is the $>2^{14}$ independent bit-variables in each multiplicand. Aside from adding a vector syntax and improving various syntactic transformations to the open-source tool CryptoLine, we also formulate additive FFTs as Chinese Remainder Theorem decompositions which factors the verification problem into local checks feasible for computer algebra systems like Singular. The workload was also tractable: the calendar time for the formal verification in this paper was less than three months for our very limited workforce.
## 2026/2308
* Title: Multiparty Homomorphic Secret Sharing From Distributed Discrete Logarithm
* Authors: Pierre Meyer, Claudio Orlandi, Lawrence Roy, Peter Scholl
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2308)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2308.pdf)
### Abstract
Homomorphic secret sharing (HSS) enables non-interactive distributed evaluation of functions on secret-shared inputs. While two-party HSS is well understood, multiparty constructions remain limited in expressiveness and efficiency.
We present a general framework for constructing multiparty HSS from two-party semi-private HSS (which in turn can be instantiated using distributed discrete logarithms) via a new party virtualization paradigm. In a semi-private HSS, some designated inputs may be fully known to specific servers, while the remaining inputs remain hidden. Starting from two-party semi-private schemes, we obtain $N$-party semi-private HSS supporting compositions of polynomial computations and restricted multiplication straight-line programs, for $N = O(\log \lambda / \log \log \lambda)$.
We further upgrade semi-private HSS to fully private HSS for functions of polynomial degree and polynomially bounded Waring rank. As a consequence, we obtain multiparty distributed point functions with key size polynomial in $\lambda$ and $\log |D|$, for a domain $D$ of superpolynomial size. When the underlying two-party scheme supports offline/online sharing, the resulting multiparty DPFs are programmable.
Our framework admits instantiations under standard assumptions including DCR and class-group assumptions.
## 2026/2309
* Title: Three-Move Blind Signatures from DL
* Authors: Rutchathon Chairattana-Apirom, Michael Reichle, Stefano Tessaro
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2309)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2309.pdf)
### Abstract
This paper considers the problem of building blind signatures in pairing-free groups. We provide the first three-move blind signature which is provably one-more unforgeable, in the random-oracle model, under the minimal assumption that the discrete logarithm (DL) problem is hard. Our construction in fact achieves one-more strong unforgeability, and also supports partial blindness. Blindness is statistical, also in the ROM. Our construction makes black-box use of the underlying group and does not rely on non-black-box techniques. For most such constructions, three moves are necessary by a recent result of Dietz, Kastner, and Tessaro (CRYPTO '26).
We build on recent work by Chairattana-Apirom, Reichle, and Tessaro (CRYPTO '26), which achieved the same combination of round complexity and security guarantees, but under the stronger decisional Diffie--Hellman (DDH) assumption. In particular, we follow the same paradigm of boosting the security of a weakly secure scheme (namely, the Okamoto--Schnorr blind signature) to a fully secure one by authenticating the initial nonce. We provide, however, a substantially different instantiation of this paradigm that dispenses with the use of DDH and establishes security from DL alone.
## 2026/2310
* Title: Low-Noise Multi-Value Bootstrapping via Log-Unit Lattice Search and LUT Shifting
* Authors: Olivier Bernard, Nolan Carouge, Marc Joye, Jean-Baptiste Orfila, Samuel Tap
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2310)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2310.pdf)
### Abstract
Programmable bootstrapping is a central procedure in the FHEW and TFHE families of fully homomorphic encryption schemes, but its computational cost remains a major performance bottleneck. Multi-value bootstrapping amortizes this cost by sharing a blind rotation among several functions evaluated on the same encrypted input. However, the standard choice of common factor for multi-value bootstrapping can produce unnecessarily large noise amplification for many collections of lookup tables, thereby reducing the practical benefits of sharing the blind rotation. The main contribution of this work is a log-unit lattice search for selecting common factors that substantially reduce this amplification. This search is complemented with LUT shifting, which generates alternative function-preserving test-polynomial representations and further enlarges the search space. Both optimizations are performed offline and leave the online procedure of multi-value bootstrapping essentially unchanged. The proposed construction is evaluated in TFHE at failure probability $2^{-128}$. For example, on 256-bit homomorphic integer multiplication, it achieves a latency speed-up of $1.47\times$ and a throughput improvement of $1.59\times$ relative to a baseline that evaluates each output with a separate programmable bootstrapping.
## 2026/2311
* Title: Breaking the $n^2$ Barrier: Information-Theoretic MPC with Sub-Quadratic Communication
* Authors: Alexander Bienstock, Yuval Efron, Kevin Yeo
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2311)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2311.pdf)
### Abstract
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) considers the problem of securely computing a function across $n$ parties such that no adversary controlling $t$ corrupted parties may learn any additional information beyond the function output. For information-theoretic security in the honest majority setting, recent works have made tremendous progress in reducing the MPC communication costs for large circuits obtaining as low as $\tilde{O}(|C|)$ total communication. To date, all information-theoretic MPC protocols require an additive $\tilde{\Omega}(n^2)$ communication independent of the circuit size that becomes the dominant cost for small circuits.
In this work, we consider the problem of building more efficient information-theoretic MPC protocols with $o(n^2)$ communication for small circuits. For corruption threshold $t< (1/2-\epsilon)\cdot n$, we present an information-theoretic MPC protocol secure against adaptive and malicious adversaries with subquadratic communication for a wide range of circuits, including those in which the number of input parties $I$ satisfies $|I| = o(n)$, circuit size $|C| = o(n^{1.5}/|I|)$, and circuit depth $\mathsf{depth}(C) = o(n)$; for example, $|C| = o(n^{3/4})$ and $|I| = o(n^{3/4})$ input parties. To our knowledge, this is the first information-theoretic MPC protocol with $o(n^2)$ communication for a wide-range of circuit classes. Furthermore, we note the requirement of sublinear input parties $|I| = o(n)$ is necessary to obtain $o(n^2)$ communication due to the $\Omega(|I| \cdot n)$ lower bound by Damg|Nrd {\em et al.} [EUROCRYPT'16]. To obtain our new MPC protocol, we develop new techniques for key MPC subroutines including randomness generation, player virtualization and output reconstruction with $o(n^2)$ communication leveraging the sublinear number of input parties, $|I| = o(n)$, and randomized output distribution with unpredictable communication patterns.
Finally, we also prove a separation showing that $o(n^2)$ communication MPC is impossible for adversaries with stronger than standard adaptive rushing capabilities even for constant-size circuits.
## 2026/2312
* Title: ECLIPSE: Strongly Unforgeable Isogeny Signatures from the Prime-Degree Variant of PRISM
* Authors: Dustin Ray
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2312)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2312.pdf)
### Abstract
ECLIPSE is the prime-degree signature construction that the PRISM authors describe next to their salted scheme, with that salt, implemented. It exists because a two-dimensional isogeny signature carries an auxiliary isogeny that the hash does not bind: the SQIsign round-3 specification states that SQIsign cannot achieve strong unforgeability for this reason, and PRISM's prime-degree variant was designed without the auxiliary isogeny but published without parameters, code or a verifier that runs. This paper gives the first implementation, on the SQIsign round-3 primes: a verifier that evaluates the paper's criterion through one isogeny chain and a pull-back, a canonical wire format with a strict decoder that recovers one coefficient from two Weil pairings with no residual bits, randomisable keys, and two independent implementations that accept each other's signatures. Signatures are 206 bytes at NIST level I, within 15 bytes of SQIsign at every matched compression and message-binding state. In one session against the SQIsign reference's assembly build, signing is 2.3 times faster than the reference's and verification costs twice as much, or 1.7 times as much with the public key prepared once. This work instantiates and measures ECLIPSE and leaves a formal argument for its strong unforgeability (SUF-CMA) to future work.
## 2026/2313
* Title: When Masking Preimage Computation IsnrCOt Enough: A Power Analysis Attack on Masked Implementations of Falcon
* Authors: Keng-Yu Chen
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2313)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2313.pdf)
### Abstract
In this paper, we present a novel power analysis attack targeting a Falcon implementation protected by a masked preimage computation. By analyzing the ratio between the real and imaginary parts of the public hash polynomial, we demonstrate that the leakage during the share recombination phase can be exploited to recover the secret key. We propose two attack variants: a chosen-message attack, where the adversary controls input messages to force extreme coefficient ratios, and a non-chosen-message attack that filters for naturally occurring vulnerable hashes. Through experimental evaluations using the ELMO leakage simulator for an ARM Cortex-M0 architecture, our experiments achieve a 98.3% success rate with 4,000 traces. Finally, while a fully masked implementation of Falcon prevents our attack, we propose a practical countermeasure based on rejection sampling to avoid the prohibitive computational overhead of a fully masked Gaussian sampler.
## 2026/2314
* Title: An Input-Fed AES-Round Family for Fixed-Length Hashing
* Authors: Peter Rindal
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2314)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2314.pdf)
### Abstract
Secure computation often hashes high-entropy fixed-length values in inner loops. A public permutation with terminal Davies--Meyer feed-forward can expose the permutation value when an application applies another feed-forward step. We study an input-fed alternative that injects the input after every AES round.
The base construction, $H_{128}:\{0,1\}^{128}\to\{0,1\}^{128}$, uses ten full AESENC-style rounds with keys $x+c_i$ and no AES key expansion. Its concrete analysis adapts differential, collision, linear, integral, and meet-in-he-middle (MITM) methods to this shared-input round-key interface. We prove a three-round integral distinguisher and give a five-round anchored MITM attack candidate with estimated time $2^{120}$; the remaining results provide reduced-round evidence rather than a proof of random-function behavior. On an AMD Ryzen 9 7950X, measured scalar and eight-lane AES-NI costs are within one percent of fixed-key AES-128; a sixteen-block VAES kernel is 2.3\% slower.
Two extensions use the same input-fed principle. The tweakable construction $H_{128}^{\mathsf{tw}}$ splits a 72-bit public counter into an eight-bit tweak and a 64-bit epoch. One public schedule serves 256 consecutive positions, and consecutive fixed-key AES outputs under a published key supply the epoch schedules. Within one epoch, a pair with different tweaks can cancel at most one complete boundary injection. The construction also admits an exact 256-query two-round integral distinguisher. The wide construction $H_{256}$ maps 256 bits to 256 bits. It uses two AES lanes and adopts the column permutation and round constants of Haraka-256 v2 [KLMR16]. We analyze the differential, integral, collision, slide, rebound, and MITM mechanisms introduced by these extensions.
A supporting ideal-permutation analysis shows that affine wrappers with one or two permutation calls fail generically. For three calls with independently uniform public constants, it gives a birthday-order bound when the distinguisher completes its primitive queries before querying the target. Finally, we define checkable punctured vectors and prove a GM-style protocol secure against static semi-honest corruptions in the ideal-OT and random-oracle model.
## 2026/2315
* Title: Expander-Based Codes at the GilbertrCoVarshamov Bound
* Authors: Peter Rindal
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2315)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2315.pdf)
### Abstract
We prove that Expand--Accumulate (EA) codes approach the Gilbert--Varshamov (GV) distance as the code length grows. The result holds over the binary field and every fixed finite field. At fixed rate, encoding uses $O(n\log n)$ expected field operations, with a tunable inverse-polynomial probability of sampling a bad code. Fixed-memory wrapped binary Expand--Convolute (EC) codes satisfy the same guarantee. Allowing $O(n\log^2 n)$ expected field operations makes sampling failure negligible in the code length.
These codes combine a sparse random linear map with an invertible recursive map. Our analysis uses exact input--output weight enumerators in place of the earlier concentration bounds. It also gives tighter constants in the logarithmic expected degree. For EA-based pseudorandom correlation functions, these bounds improve the degree--distance tradeoff that controls local evaluation cost.
Separately, we obtain finite-length bounds at small degrees by replacing independent incidence with regional regularity. At rate one half, a two-sided regular EC ensemble with left/right degrees $10/5$ and memory $15$ reaches $99.99\%$ of the binary GV distance. The probability of sampling a generator below this distance is less than $2^{-32.49}$.
We extend the construction to finite fields using independent nonzero edge labels and full-field convolution coefficients. These coefficients mix field components; scalar extension of a binary matrix does not. Over $\F_{2^{128}}$, degrees $24/12$ with memory $5$ reach $98.41\%$ of the rate-one-half GV distance with sampling failure below $2^{-45.03}$; degrees $26/13$ with memory $4$ reach the same distance with failure below $2^{-135.20}$. Every finite claim is certified with outward-rounded interval arithmetic. The results concern minimum distance of sampled ensembles; they do not provide a decoder or a complete protocol-security proof.
## 2026/2316
* Title: Fast Linear Codes over Large Fields: Addition-Only and Small-Coefficient Encoders
* Authors: Stanislav Peceny, Peter Rindal
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2316)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2316.pdf)
### Abstract
We construct fast linear codes over large fields using addition-only encoders and variants with small integer coefficients. A local precode is followed by rounds of a random permutation and a scan, a linear recurrence with a short feedback window. At dimension $2^{20}$, rate $1/2$, and $p=2^{128}-159$, two plain accumulators (unweighted prefix sums) give relative distance above $11.7\%$, except with probability below $2^{-49.64}$ over the sampling of the encoder. A binary subset-sum precode instead gives distance above $12.56\%$, except with probability below $2^{-22.05}$. These addition-only encoders use fewer than $6.8125n$ and $3.3125n$ field additions, respectively, for output length $n$. Both exceed the binary rate-$1/2$ Gilbert--Varshamov benchmark. The proof counts the supports and ranks of the zero equations a codeword must satisfy, retaining the dependence between cancellations.
Coefficient size and scan width extend the tradeoff. On one core, with a common implementation and setup failure below $2^{-40}$, encoding time ranges from $12.171$ ms at proved distance above $11.7\%$ to $32.342$ ms above $42.987\%$. A coefficient-independent upper bound limits every encoder with two width-one scans after the Newton precode to $39.6855\%$.
The distance and setup-failure bounds hold over $\mathbb F_p$ and every finite extension, covering all nonzero messages after setup. Timings are for $\mathbb F_p$. Extension preserves distance exactly because the encoder coefficients lie in the prime subfield. Changing characteristic requires a separate argument; we give field-transfer results in both directions, including counterexamples.
## 2026/2317
* Title: SPIN: Fast Codes for Correlation Generation and Polynomial Commitments * Authors: Stanislav Peceny, Rahul Rachuri, Srinivasan Raghuraman, Peter Rindal * [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2317)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2317.pdf)
### Abstract
Binary codes used in correlation generation and proof systems need strong distance, fast ordinary and transposed encoding, and regular memory access. We introduce Single-Permutation INterleaved (SPIN) codes, combining a blockwise outer encoder, one global interleaver, and a recursive inner.
Our main result is a Structured SPIN family with rate $1/2$ and $O(N)$ bit operations for ordinary and transposed encoding at its native output lengths $N$. With probability $1-o(1)$ over the random choice of the code, its minimum distance exceeds $0.11N$. The proof combines outer spectrum bounds with an analysis of structured support spreading and recursive state mixing. We formally verify these distance and rate guarantees in Lean.
For finite lengths, a BCH-derived outer constituent and a fixed recursive inner give rate $1/2$ and relative distance greater than $0.10$, with setup-failure probability below $2^{-40}$. We certify this bound at message lengths $2^{16}$, $2^{18}$, $2^{20}$, $2^{22}$, and $2^{24}$ using rigorous spectrum inequalities, without assuming the constituent's exact weight spectrum.
For pseudorandom correlation generators (PCGs), SPIN's transposed encoder computes $2^{20}$ $128$-bit correlation blocks in about $9.3$\,ms on one Ryzen 9 7950X thread after precomputation. This is approximately $3.4\times$ faster than the original rate-$1/2$ BAA codes of Kolesnikov et al.\ (CRYPTO 2026). Ordinary encoding has similar cost.
With a precomputed code, libOTe's regular-noise Silent OT sender achieves $89.0$ million hashed OTs per second on one core, in batches of $2^{18}$. Timings exclude initial setup, base-correlation generation, and network transport.
We also use SPIN in a Brakedown-style polynomial commitment scheme and integrate it into Flock. Commitment and one opening of $512$\,MiB take $509$\,ms on one core, with a 100-bit interactive fixed-matrix testing target; this excludes code-setup failure, extraction, and Fiat-shamir reductions. Within an optimized Flock implementation, replacing Ligerito with SPIN--Brakedown improves prover throughput by $1.63$--$2.29\times$ at the measured workloads, with larger proofs and slower verification. The comparison gives both backends the applicable shared implementation optimizations.
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