• [digest] 2026 Week 13

    From IACR ePrint Archive@noreply@example.invalid to sci.crypt on Mon Mar 30 02:26:21 2026
    From Newsgroup: sci.crypt

    ## In this issue
    1. [2025/1065] High-Order and Cortex-M4 First-Order ...
    2. [2026/572] Earpicks: Tightly Secure Two-Round Multi- and ...
    3. [2026/573] Two-Party BBS+ Signature in Two Passes
    4. [2026/574] A Universal Blinder: One-round Blind Signatures ...
    5. [2026/575] RoKoko: Lattice-based Succinct Arguments, a ...
    6. [2026/576] Radical 3-isogenies for the ideal class group ...
    7. [2026/577] Two Decades of Identity-Based Identification ...
    8. [2026/578] How Much Verifier's Dilemma and Staking Pools ...
    9. [2026/579] PRIVADA: Private user-centric Data Aggregation
    10. [2026/580] Exploiting noisy single-bit leakage in ML-DSA
    11. [2026/581] vkproof: Succinct verification of indexed verifying ...
    12. [2026/582] FrozenTRU: Cold Boot Attacks on NTRU-Based Hash- ...
    13. [2026/583] SoK: Updatable Public-Key Encryption
    14. [2026/584] Analyzing the WebRTC Ecosystem and Breaking ...
    15. [2026/585] Format-Preserving Compression-Tolerating ...
    16. [2026/586] Bulletproofs*: Verifier-Efficient Arithmetic ...
    17. [2026/587] Speeding Up Sum-Check Proving (Extended Version)
    18. [2026/588] Tailored Limb Counts, Faster Arithmetic: Improved ...
    19. [2026/589] FROSTLASS: Flexible Ring-Oriented Schnorr-like ...
    20. [2026/590] On the Security of Constraint-Friendly Map-to-Curve ...
    21. [2026/591] A Note on HCTR++
    22. [2026/592] Performance Analysis of Parameterizable HQC ...
    23. [2026/593] Three-Move Blind Signatures in Pairing-Free Groups
    24. [2026/594] Efficient Compilers for Verifiable Dynamic ...
    25. [2026/595] Registration-Optimized Dynamic Group Time-based ...
    26. [2026/596] Gryphes: Hybrid Proofs for Modular SNARKs with ...
    27. [2026/597] Efficiency Improvement of Deniable FHE: Tighter ...
    28. [2026/598] Triangulating Meet-in-the-Middle Attack
    29. [2026/599] Proving modern code-based dual attacks with second- ...
    30. [2026/600] Hadal: Centralized Label DP Training without a ...
    31. [2026/601] Cryptanalysis of the Lightweight Stream Cipher RRSC
    32. [2026/602] Confidential Transfers for Multi-Purpose Tokens on ...
    33. [2026/603] Oblivious SpaceSaving: Heavy-Hitter Detection over ...
    34. [2026/604] CatCrypt: From Rust to Cryptographic Security in Lean
    35. [2026/605] Adaptively-Secure Proxy Re-Encryption with Tight ...
    36. [2026/606] PD-Net: Learning Device-Invariant Representations ...
    37. [2026/607] Refined Approx-SVP Rank Reduction Conditions and ...
    38. [2026/608] Can Adaptive Communication Graphs Lower the ...
    39. [2026/609] Post-Quantum Blockchains with Agility in Mind
    40. [2026/610] Concrete Estimation of Correctness and IND-CPA-D ...
    41. [2026/611] A Comparative Evaluation of DATA and Microwalk for ...
    ## 2025/1065
    * Title: High-Order and Cortex-M4 First-Order Implementations of Masked FrodoKEM
    * Authors: Fran|oois G|-rard, Morgane Guerreau
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1065)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1065.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    The key encapsulation mechanism FrodoKEM is a post-quantum algorithm based on plain LWE. While it has not been selected by the NIST for standardization, FrodoKEM shares a lot of similarities with the lattice-based standard ML-KEM and offers strong security assumptions by relying on the unstructured version of the LWE problem. This leads FrodoKEM to be recommended by European agencies ANSSI and BSI as a possible choice to obtain post-quantum security. In this paper, we discuss the practical aspects of incorporating side-channel protections in FrodoKEM by describing a fully masked version of the scheme based on several previous works on LWE-based KEMs. Furthermore, we propose an arbitrary order C implementation based on the reference code and a Cortex-M4 implementation with gadgets specialized at order 1 in low level assembly code that incorporates bespoke modifications to thwart (micro-)architectural leakages. Finally, we validate our order 1 gadgets by performing TVLA on a ChipWhisperer.
    ## 2026/572
    * Title: Earpicks: Tightly Secure Two-Round Multi- and Threshold Signatures
    * Authors: Renas Bacho, Yanbo Chen
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/572)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/572.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Multi-signatures are a fundamental cryptographic primitive in distributed systems, enabling a set of parties to jointly produce a compact signature on a common message. Of particular interest are constructions instantiated over pairing-free cyclic groups with a two-round signing protocol, as such schemes offer improved efficiency and deployability in practice. Support for key aggregation is an additional highly desirable property, allowing multiple public keys to be combined into a single succinct aggregate public key against which aggregate signatures can be verified. To improve concrete security guarantees, several works have proposed constructions with tight security reductions. However, existing tightly secure constructions have significant limitations. Notably, T-Spoon by Bacho and Wagner (Crypto 2025) is currently the only pairing-free two-round multi-signature scheme that simultaneously achieves tight security and supports key aggregation. Despite these advantages, T-Spoon incurs substantial efficiency overhead: its signatures comprise nine field elements and two group elements, resulting in prohibitively large signature sizes for many practical applications.
    In this work, we introduce Earpick-MS, a tightly secure two-round multi-signature scheme over pairing-free cyclic groups that supports key aggregation while achieving compact signatures. Concretely, signatures in Earpick-MS consist of only three field elements and a single bit, thereby reducing the signature size by a factor of approximately 3.5 compared to the state-of-the-art T-Spoon construction. We further present Earpick-TS, a threshold signature variant of our scheme. Earpick-TS retains the same compact signature size and constitutes the first pairing-free two-round threshold signature scheme with a tight security proof. Prior to our work, achieving tight security in pairing-free threshold signatures required at least three rounds of interaction (Chen, PKC 2025; Bacho and Wagner, CiC 2026). Finally, we propose Earpick-muMS, an additional variant that achieves tight security in the multi-user setting while retaining the same compact signature size.
    ## 2026/573
    * Title: Two-Party BBS+ Signature in Two Passes
    * Authors: Xiaofei Wu, Tian Qiu, Guofeng Tang, Yuqing Niu, Bowen Jiang, Jun Zhou, Haiyang Xue, Guomin Yang
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/573)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/573.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    The BBS+/BBS signature scheme is a key building block for anonymous credentials and privacy-preserving authentication and is currently being standardized and increasingly deployed in practice. To avoid the problem of single-point-of-failure, many threshold BBS+ protocols have been recently proposed for general $t$-out-of-$n$ settings. In practice, however, a $2$-out-of-$2$ policy between a server and a mobile device is sufficient to distribute trust while keeping the system lightweight. Yet, existing threshold designs still require at least three rounds/passes and multi-kilobyte communication in the two-party setting.
    In this work, we focus on the two-party setting and show that one can achieve reduced interaction while maintaining low computational and communication overhead.
    Specifically, we present a two-pass two-party BBS+ signing protocol that requires only 0.85KB of communication per signature, about 27% of the currently most bandwidth-efficient work (S&P'25) in the $2$-out-of-$2$ setting. It achieves competitive signing times (roughly 62ms for one party and 46ms for the other) and remains efficient even for large message vectors (e.g., $\ell = 500$), making it attractive for practical deployments. Overall, our protocol is only slower than the fastest OT-based design (S&P'23) but uses nearly two orders of magnitude less bandwidth. We provide a full simulation-based security proof in the standard real-ideal paradigm. As an extension, our protocol can be generalized to a $2$-out-of-$n$ threshold setting naturally.
    ## 2026/574
    * Title: A Universal Blinder: One-round Blind Signatures from FHE
    * Authors: Dan Boneh, Jaehyung Kim
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/574)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/574.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    We construct compilers that convert any secure signature scheme into a single-round blind signature scheme. An important property of the construction is that the final blind signature has exactly the same format as the underlying signature scheme, making the blind signature scheme backwards compatible with the underlying scheme. Our compilers make use of (two-key) fully homomorphic encryption and zero-knowledge proofs to ensure unforgeability and blindness of the final scheme. We present three compilers where the main differences is which party does the bulk of the work: the client, the signer, or both. Along the way we introduce a new notion of verifiable FHE that we call committed verifiable FHE, where the verifier does not see the circuit in the clear.
    ## 2026/575
    * Title: RoKoko: Lattice-based Succinct Arguments, a Committed Refinement
    * Authors: Michael Klooss, Russell W. F. Lai, Ngoc Khanh Nguyen, Micha+e Osadnik, Lorenzo Tucci
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/575)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/575.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    We present RoKoko, a new lattice-based succinct argument system that achieves a linear-time prover alongside polylogarithmic communication and verifier complexity. Asymptotically, our construction improves upon RoK and Roll (ASIACRYPT 2025), the first post-quantum SNARK with $\tilde{O}(\lambda)$ proof size, by a multiplicative factor of $\Theta(\log \lambda)$. Practically, our system yields proofs of roughly $200$KB, while outperforming the state-of-the-art polynomial commitment scheme Greyhound (CRYPTO 2024) with a $100\times$ faster verification time, similar prover time, and competitive proof size. Our framework natively supports (tensor-)structured relations, such as polynomial evaluation and sumcheck relations.
    At a high level, our construction follows the recursive split-and-fold paradigm: the prover first splits the witness into $\rho$ sub-witnesses, sends the corresponding cross-terms, and then folds them into a single witness that is shorter by a factor of $\rho$ using verifier challenges. Prior works typically restrict $\rho = O(1)$ to preserve succinct verification and maintain the optimal $\tilde{O}(\lambda)$ proof size. We overcome this rCLconstant barrierrCY, which enables larger $\rho$ and thereby reduces the proof size. To achieve this, we introduce the following technical contributions.
    (i) Committed folding. Instead of sending $O(\rho)$ cross-terms in the clear, the prover commits to the messages and later proves that the committed vector satisfies the verification relations. This enables the use of a larger shrinking factor, thereby reducing the number of recursion rounds. While this strategy has been successfully used in LaBRADOR (CRYPTO 2023), additional care is required here to preserve succinct verification.
    (ii) Recursive commitments. We generalise the double-commitment technique from LaBRADOR into a framework for recursive commitments, yielding further compression in commitment size. This results in concrete improvements in communication within each recursion round.
    (iii) Sumcheck-driven structured recursion. We extend the sumcheck framework from SALSAA (ePrint 2025/2124) to prove substantially more complex constraints arising in our construction (and open for future extensions), including correctness of random projections, inner-product claims and well-formedness of recursive commitments. While expressing these constraints as sumcheck relations requires considerable technical effort, the resulting protocols compose seamlessly with the structured recursion, yielding both linear-time proving and succinct verification.
    ## 2026/576
    * Title: Radical 3-isogenies for the ideal class group actions on $(2, \varepsilon)$-structures
    * Authors: Masaomi Shibata, Hiroshi Onuki, Tsuyoshi Takagi
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/576)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/576.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Chenu and Smith introduced the notion of $(d,\varepsilon)$-structures, pairs consisting of an elliptic curve over $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ and an isogeny of degree $d$ from the curve to its Galois conjugate. They also defined an ideal class group action on a set of supersingular $(d,\varepsilon)$-structures, inherited from the action on oriented supersingular elliptic curves. As cryptographic applications of this action, they outlined extensions of the CSIDH key exchange and of the Delfs-Galbraith algorithm for the supersingular isogeny problem. In particular, their extension of the Delfs-Galbraith algorithm, called the generalized Delfs-Galbraith algorithm, is expected to be more efficient than the original one by a constant factor. Therefore, it is important to find efficient methods for evaluating the ideal class group action on $(d, \varepsilon)$-structures.
    In this paper, we focus on the case $d=2$ and present explicit radical 3-isogenies for evaluating the action of the class of a prime ideal above 3. Our approach relies on two representations of $(2,\varepsilon)$-structures: (i) reductions of degree-2 $\mathbb{Q}$-curves and (ii) Montgomery curves. In particular, we show that any $(2,\varepsilon)$-structure can be represented as a pair of a curve coefficient (of a degree-2 $\mathbb{Q}$-curve or a Montgomery curve) and a single sign. From these representations, we derive radical 3-isogenies that efficiently implement the action of the class of a prime ideal above 3. As an application of our radical 3-isogenies, we give an explicit algorithm of the meet-in-the-middle method for finding an ideal class connecting two given $(2, \varepsilon)$-structures, which is a part of the generalized Delfs-Galbraith algorithm.
    ## 2026/577
    * Title: Two Decades of Identity-Based Identification Schemes- A Survey on Challenges and Advances
    * Authors: Apurva Kiran Vangujar, Paolo Palmieri, Ji-Jian Chin, Swee-Huay Heng * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/577)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/577.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Identity-based Identification (IBI) schemes have gained significant popularity in the field of cryptography due to their superior efficiency and scalability. However, the increasing number of proposed IBI schemes in recent years has made it challenging to compare and evaluate them effectively. To address this issue, this survey presents a comprehensive literature review and analysis of IBI schemes that offer security under various hardness assumptions. Employing a rigorous survey methodology, we introduce the first general taxonomy of IBI schemes, allowing for a systematic classification and evaluation of these schemes based on their security assumptions. Furthermore, we assess the computational and communication costs associated with the deployment of IBI schemes, considering the various challenges and limitations involved.
    For each class of schemes, we calculate and compare their security, efficiency, benefits, and drawbacks. Researchers and developers are actively involved in implementing and analysing the runtime of IBI, particularly in diverse applications such as mobile and IoT devices. We present implementations and provide essential insights for guiding future advancements in this dynamic field. The survey concludes by identifying current research gaps and proposing future directions for IBI schemes, providing researchers and practitioners with an in-depth understanding of the state-of-the-art in this rapidly evolving field.
    ## 2026/578
    * Title: How Much Verifier's Dilemma and Staking Pools Adversely Affect Decentralization of Ethereum PoS under Realistic Operational Costs? (Extended Version)
    * Authors: Ivan Homoliak, Martin Hruby, Martin Peresini, Kristian Kostal, Daria Smuseva
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/578)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/578.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Some consensus protocols, including Proof-of-Work (PoW) and Proof-of-Stake (PoS) designs of Ethereum, contain incentive misalignment because the protocol cannot technically verify whether a block producer or validator has executed (or omitted) validation of transaction correctness before producing a block or issuing an attestation. The incentive to omit validation stems from the risk of losing a fraction of the reward due to a late attestation in PoS, or the risk of missing timely block production (and thus its inclusion) in PoW.
    This problem is referred to as the VerifierrCOs Dilemma (VD), and it has been investigated in prior work in the context of PoW, as well as in hybrid PoW and PoS settings of Ethereum.
    In this work, we focus on Ethereum PoS, and we investigate how rational, minimally compliant validators affect long-term network decentralization due to VD and operational costs. Using evolutionary game theory and the replicator equation, we model competition among three validator phenotypes: the honest strategy, the lazy strategy, and the join pool strategy. While the honest strategy, which performs validation, requires the operational cost of expensive hardware to run a full validator node, which is currently about 20% of rewards earned, the lazy strategy, which omits validation (based on VD), enables operation of a reduced validator node at five times lower expense, which is currently about 4% of rewards earned. Moreover, the join pool strategy enables amortization of operational costs among pool members and can incorporate the lazy strategy to further reduce costs.
    We analyze the profits of these strategies co-occurring under varying late attestation rates and operational cost levels using our slot-level simulator. Our findings demonstrate that the lazy strategy consistently outperforms the honest strategy in earned profits. Our next experiments reveal that the join pool strategy, combined with a variant of the lazy strategy, forms an evolutionarily stable equilibrium that rapidly collapses the validator population into a single shared pool. These results suggest that Ethereum decentralization can erode through rational economic drift even in the absence of late attestations.
    ## 2026/579
    * Title: PRIVADA: Private user-centric Data Aggregation
    * Authors: Betul Askin Ozdemir, Beyza Bozdemir, Ionut Groza, Melek |unen
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/579)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/579.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Privacy-preserving data aggregation has become a fundamental tool for large-scale analytics in AI-driven and cloud-based systems. While existing solutions provide the default privacy guarantee, i.e., input confidentiality, most assure a semi-honest adversary model and fail to simultaneously ensure user anonymity, selective disclosure, and result privacy in the multiple data customers environment. In this work, we introduce PRIVADA, a maliciously secure data aggregation solution that uses MPC in the SPDZ framework. Unlike prior data aggregation schemes using MPC with/without SPDZ, PRIVADA supports multiple data customers while preventing inference of user participation and resisting collusions in real-world data aggregation applications. Moreover, our work guarantees user privacy and result privacy, in addition to input privacy. PRIVADA outperforms the state-of-the-art solutions by providing security against participating parties, including malicious data owners, aggregators, and data customers. Our proof-of-concept implementation also supports the new privacy-preserving data aggregation by combining malicious security, being available for multiple data customers, and ensuring strong privacy guarantees in large-scale deployments. The aggregation operation on the aggregator side becomes simpler with PRIVADA, and experimental results show a 12rCo15 times speedup compared to the state-of-the-art. This confirms that malicious security and strong privacy guarantees can be achievable without sacrificing practicality.
    ## 2026/580
    * Title: Exploiting noisy single-bit leakage in ML-DSA
    * Authors: Kaveh Bashiri, Jan Geuenich, Johannes Mittmann
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/580)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/580.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    ML-DSA implementations face a serious risk from partial leakage of the mask vector $\boldsymbol{y}$. Recent research has shown that this threat is practical. Even highly noisy, single-bit leakage accumulated over many signatures can suffice to recover the secret key. We carefully analyze the number of signatures with bit leakage required for successful key recovery using a stochastic model, rather than relying on a concrete attack method. On the practical side, we develop new attack methods capable of recovering the key using almost the minimal number of signatures required in theory. Our attacks work for bit-error probabilities as high as 0.49 and for leakage at every bit position of index at least four or five (depending on the ML-DSA parameter set), making them more widely applicable than prior attacks, which were not reported to succeed for bit positions below six. In the most favorable scenario, leakage at bit index four keeps our attack practical for leaked bits with an error probability of 0.499, and in the absence of noise reduces the signature requirement to below 1000.
    ## 2026/581
    * Title: vkproof: Succinct verification of indexed verifying keys using modular compilation and polynomial fingerprinting
    * Authors: Antonio Mejias Gil, Xueqin Zhao
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/581)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/581.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    We introduce vkproof, a preprocessing SNARG which enables verification of the Varuna verifying key (or that of any similar proof system based on Marlin [Chi+20]) for the R1CS compiled from a given higher-level program. It has constant proof size and affords linear verifier costs in the number of instructions of the program rather than the density of the compiled R1CS, which makes it especially appealing in contexts where complex-to-arithmetise functions (such as hashing) appear as program instructions frequently. This verifier succinctness is achieved through modular compilation of programs and the use of fingerprints to verify polynomial correctness. We augment the algebraic holographic proof (AHP) model of Marlin by allowing oracles to witness polynomials in the instance and queries to linear combinations of indexed polynomials, resulting in a primitive we refer to as extended algebraic holographic proofs (eAHP).
    ## 2026/582
    * Title: FrozenTRU: Cold Boot Attacks on NTRU-Based Hash-and-Sign Signatures
    * Authors: Hiroto Kaihara, Mehdi Tibouchi, Masayuki Abe
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/582)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/582.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Cold boot attacks, first introduced by Halderman et al. (USENIX'08), are a class of attacks that aim at recovering cryptographic secrets stored in volatile memory after a computer is powered off, using the fact that DRAM modules retain their contents to a large extent for some time, especially at low temperatures. Cold boot attackers can recover the original contents of memory with some flipped bits, with bit flip probabilities of <10% for one-to-zero and much lower (<0.1%) for zero-to-one shown to be easily achievable. The cryptanalytic goal is then to recover full secret keys based on this noisy data. Successful key recoveries from cold boot attacks have been shown to be feasible for various symmetric and public-key schemes, including AES, RSA, and more recently some lattice-based encryption schemes with secret keys stored in the number-theoretic transform (NTT) domain.
    In this paper, we investigate cold boot attacks against NTRU-based signature scheme Falcon and its ancestor, the signature scheme of DucasrCoLyubashevskyrCoPrest (DLP). Those schemes significantly differ from other schemes previously considered for cold boot attacks, since, in particular, the memory representation of secret signing keys mostly consists of floating point values. As a result, the various relations existing between key coefficients only hold up to floating point errors, which makes key recovery more complex. Nevertheless, at the typical bit flip probabilities achievable with cold boot attacks, we manage to fully recover Falcon and DLP keys with good probability across all parameters in simulations carried out in a simple bit flip model. Furthermore, we validate our techniques using concrete cold boot experiments againt Falcon on a Raspberry Pi single board computer.
    Finally, we propose countermeasures with negligible computational cost that significantly reduce the memory footprint of signing keys for Falcon and DLP, and at the same time make cold boot attacks considerably harder.
    ## 2026/583
    * Title: SoK: Updatable Public-Key Encryption
    * Authors: Mark Manulis, Daniel Slamanig, Federico Valbusa
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/583)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/583.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Updatable (public-key) encryption is a broad concept covering (public-key) encryption schemes whose keys can evolve over time to support secure key rotation and limit the impact of key compromise. The essential feature is that the encryption keys (and possibly also ciphertexts) can be updated from one epoch to the next via so called update tokens. This concept is useful in various applications, among them secure outsourced storage, secure messaging or low-latency forward-secret key-exchange protocols.
    The term, however, is used with varying meanings across the literature. Some works define key-updatable schemes, where only the public and secret keys evolve. Others extend this idea by also allowing ciphertexts to be updated during key evolution. Variants further differ in how evolution is triggered: in some schemes, the receiver performs key updates locally, while in others, the sender initiates the evolution by embedding update information in ciphertexts. Beyond achieving forward secrecy, many formulations also aim for post-compromise security, ensuring that once a compromised key is updated, future ciphertexts regain confidentiality under the new key.
    In this paper, we systematize this field with a focus on updatable public-key encryption schemes. Our aim is to first provide a taxonomy that sheds light into the currently fragmented terminology. It then compares their formal definition, syntaxes and formal security models found in the literature, clarifies their interrelations, and identifies common design patterns underlying current schemes. Beyond mapping the definitional landscape we provide a comparative analysis of existing instantiations, focusing on their properties and efficiency, and highlighting their main trade-offs. The paper concludes with open challenges outlining directions for advancing the field.
    ## 2026/584
    * Title: Analyzing the WebRTC Ecosystem and Breaking Authentication in DTLS-SRTP
    * Authors: Martin Bach, Vuka+iin Karad++i-c, Lukas Knittel, Robert Merget, Jean Paul Degabriele
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/584)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/584.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    DTLS-SRTP was designed to secure real-time media communication and is found in prominent audio and video call platforms, including Zoom, Teams, and Google Meet. Notably, it is part of Web Real-Time Communication (Web-RTC), a web standard enabling real-time communication in the browser. To this end, WebRTC uses multiple technologies, including HTTP, TLS, SDP, ICE, STUN, TURN, UDP, TCP, DTLS, (S)RTP, (S)RTCP, and SCTP. This amalgamation of technologies results in an overly complex system that is very challenging to audit systematically and automatically. As a result, the security of deployments of this core modern communication technology remains largely unexplored.
    In this work, we aim to close this gap by developing an automated MitM testing framework (DTLS-MitM-Scanner (DMS)) to test the DTLS channel of a DTLS-SRTP connection. We use our framework to study the current state of the ecosystem in a case study spanning 24 service providers across their browser and mobile applications. Our analysis puts special emphasis on the authentication mechanism in DTLS-SRTP, where we test for 19 potential vulnerabilities that could lead to authentication bypasses for both the client and server. We find that among the 33 tested media server implementations, 19 contained vulnerabilities allowing an attacker to break authentication at the DTLS layer. For 9 of the affected systems, which serve hundreds of millions of users, we could also demonstrate that they could be exploited by an attacker to retrieve media data, assuming only Man-in-the-Middle capabilities. We highlight the impact of these vulnerabilities by building a Proof-of-Concept exploit to listen to Webex video conference calls.
    ## 2026/585
    * Title: Format-Preserving Compression-Tolerating Authenticated Encryption for Images
    * Authors: Alexandra Boldyreva, Kaishuo Cheng, Jehad Hussein
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/585)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/585.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    We study the problem of provably-secure format-preserving authenticated encryption scheme for images, where decryption is successful even when ciphertexts undergo compression. This novel primitive offers users more control and privacy when sharing and storing images on social media and other photo-centric, compressing platforms like Facebook and Google Photos. Since compression is usually lossy, we cannot expect the decrypted image to be identical to the original. But we want the decrypted image to be visually as close to the original image as possible.
    There is a vast number of works on image encryption, mostly in the signal processing community, but they do not provide formal security analyses. We formally define security, covering the goals of image confidentiality and integrity. While we first treat the problem generically, we are particularly interested in the construction for the most common compression format, JPEG. We design a scheme for JPEG compression using the standard symmetric cryptographic tools and special pre- and post-processing. We formally assess the security guarantees provided by the construction, discuss how to select the parameters using empirical experiments, and study performance of our scheme in terms of computational efficiency and decryption quality. We also build a browser plug-in that helps users store and share photos privately.
    ## 2026/586
    * Title: Bulletproofs*: Verifier-Efficient Arithmetic Circuit Proofs via Folding
    * Authors: Emanuele Scala, Daniele Bartoli
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/586)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/586.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    We present Bulletproofs* (BP*, BulletproofsStar), a folding scheme for arithmetic circuit proofs under standard assumptions and without preprocessing, i.e., for the arithmetic circuit satisfiability language of Bulletproofs (S&P 18), following the recipe of ProtoStar (ePrint 2023/620). To this end, we first adapt the algebraic verifiers of the arithmetic circuit proof of Bulletproofs to the algebraic form required by ProtoStar, and prove that the modified protocol remains secure. Then, we design the Bulletproofs* folding scheme that is complete and knowledge-sound. Finally, we analyze the resulting verifier cost after the folding-to-IVC transformation. The result shows an asymptotic linear gain compared to repeated invocations of the monolithic Bulletproofs verifier.
    ## 2026/587
    * Title: Speeding Up Sum-Check Proving (Extended Version)
    * Authors: Quang Dao, Zachary DeStefano, Suyash Bagad, Yuval Domb, Justin Thaler
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/587)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/587.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    The sum-check protocol is a foundational primitive in modern cryptographic proof systems, but its prover-side cost has emerged as a concrete bottleneck. This paper introduces three complementary techniques that significantly reduce sum-check proving time and memory, especially in the context of zero-knowledge virtual machines (zkVMs).
    First, for applications involving products of many multilinear polynomials, we develop a new algorithm that significantly reduces the number of field multiplications required for proving. Second, we develop a "small-value sum-check prover" algorithm. This significantly speeds up the prover in the common setting where the polynomials being summed evaluate to 64 or 32-bit integers, or to elements of a small sub-field within a larger extension field. Even outside of the small-value setting, this algorithm yields a faster "streaming prover", by which we mean a small-space algorithm that applies whenever the terms being summed can be enumerated in small space (as arises, for example, in zkVM applications). Third, we nearly eliminate prover overhead in the ubiquitous case where one factor is an equality polynomial by exploiting its decomposable tensor structure.
    We implement these techniques in Jolt, a state-of-the-art zkVM, and evaluate their performance. In Jolt, we observe over an order of magnitude runtime speedup and memory reduction on the Spartan sub-protocol, and $1.7\times$ to $2.2\times$ speedups for a key high-degree sum-check sub-protocol in the Shout batch-evaluation argument.
    ## 2026/588
    * Title: Tailored Limb Counts, Faster Arithmetic: Improved TMVP Decompositions for Curve5453 and Curve6071
    * Authors: Murat Cenk, N. Gamze Orhon K-#l-#|o, Halil Kemal Ta+fk-#n, O-fuz Yayla
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/588)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/588.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Curve5453 and Curve6071 are Montgomery curves over the primes $2^{545}-3$ and $2^{607}-1$, providing 271- and 302-bit classical security, respectively.
    Their TMVP-based field multiplication in 10-limb representation costs 77 multiplications.
    We reduce this to 60 for Curve5453 ($22\%$ fewer) using a 9-limb radix-$2^{61}$ representation, and to 54 for Curve6071 ($30\%$ fewer) using a 12-limb radix-$2^{51}$ representation with hierarchical block-level TMVP.
    Choosing the limb count to produce $3 \times 3$ Toeplitz blocks aligns the structure with the size-3 TMVP formula, computing each block product in 6 multiplications rather than 9.
    Portable C implementations benchmarked on ARM64 and x86-64 confirm speedups of up to $16\%$ in field multiplication and $13\%$ in scalar multiplication.
    On ARM64, Curve5453 reaches $90.6\%$ of OpenSSL's assembly-optimized NIST P-521 ECDH throughput with 12 additional bits of classical security, and Curve6071 delivers 302-bit classical security at $80.8\%$ of P-521's throughput.
    ## 2026/589
    * Title: FROSTLASS: Flexible Ring-Oriented Schnorr-like Thresholdized Linkably Anonymous Signature Scheme
    * Authors: Joshua Babb, Brandon Goodell, Rigo Salazar, Freeman Slaughter, Luke Szramowski
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/589)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/589.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    FROST is a pragmatic method of thresholdizing Schnorr signatures, permitting a threshold quorum of $t$ signers out of $n$ total individuals to sign for a message. This scheme improved on the state of the art, resulting in an efficient protocol that aborts in the presence of up to $t-1$ malicious users with strong resilience against chosen-message attacks, assuming the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem. In this work, we build upon the foundation introduced in FROST by presenting FROSTLASS, which additionally enjoys novel linkability criteria and anonymity guarantees under the general one-more discrete logarithm problem, utilizing a "Schnorr-shaped hole'' technique to prove desirable security results. This scheme is highly practical, tailor-made for use on-chain in the Monero cryptocurrency; indeed, we also showcase a Rust implementation for this protocol, demonstrating its real-world application to improve the security and usability of Monero.
    ## 2026/590
    * Title: On the Security of Constraint-Friendly Map-to-Curve Relations
    * Authors: Youssef El Housni, Benedikt B|+nz
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/590)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/590.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Groth, Malvai, Miller and Zhang (Asiacrypt 2025) introduced constraint-friendly map-to-elliptic-curve-group relations that bypass the inner cryptographic hash when hashing to elliptic curve groups inside constraint systems, achieving substantial reductions in circuit size. Their security proof works in the Elliptic Curve Generic Group Model (EC-GGM).
    We identify three gaps. First, the security bound is not explicitly analyzed, and the bounds stated for the concrete instantiations are loose. Second, the EC-GGM does not capture the algebraic structure of most deployed curves; we exhibit a concrete signature forgery using the parameters claimed secure. Third, the construction requires a congruence condition on the field that is not satisfied by all deployed curves; we extend it to any field.
    As a countermeasure we propose a y-increment variant that neutralises the algebraic attack, removes the field restriction, and preserves a comparable constraint count. We implement and benchmark both constructions in the open-source gnark (Go) library; the attack is additionally demonstrated via a self-contained SageMath simulation and confirmed at the circuit level against the authorsrCO own Noir (Rust) implementation.
    ## 2026/591
    * Title: A Note on HCTR++
    * Authors: Mustafa Khairallah
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/591)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/591.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    A recent Accordion mode has been proposed by |uzt|+rk et al.: HCTR++ construction proposed in [OKY26, Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2026/383]. I identify a fundamental correctness flaw in the design. Specifically, I demon- strate that the decryption algorithm (Algorithm 2) does not correctly invert the encryption algorithm (Algorithm 1), rendering the scheme undecryptable as specified.
    The authors have acknowledged the use of AI to refine the conclusion section of their paper. I have discovered this vulnerability completely independently of any AI tools. However, as an exercise, I have provided the algorithm to both ChatGPT and Claude (free versions) in retrospect, to see if they can identify the flaw, and I report my comments/observations. I wish to emphasis that the authors have made no claims or acknowledgment of using AI tools beyond drafting and refining the introduction and conclusion sections, and I make no such claims either. The purpose of this note is point out the vulnerability (mistake) in the design, and to look into how free AI models approach finding it.
    I would like to also point out that the authors have since updated their design, and this note only refers to the original version. I have not studied the updated design and make no claims about it.
    Any comments made in this note are my own and do not reflect on the opinions of any affiliations or funding agencies.
    ## 2026/592
    * Title: Performance Analysis of Parameterizable HQC Hardware Architecture
    * Authors: Nishant Pandey, Sanjay Deshpande, Dixit Dutt Bohra, Debapriya Basu Roy, Dip Sankar Banerjee, Jakub Szefer
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/592)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/592.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    This work presents a constant-time hardware design for HQC (Hamming Quasi-Cyclic), a code-based key encapsulation mechanism selected for standardization by NIST's Post-Quantum Cryptography process. While existing hardware implementations of HQC have achieved limited performance due to area constraints, our work demonstrates that high performance can be attained with minimal hardware overhead using higher datawidth. We present a fully parameterizable, flexible data width, hardware design, configurable for both performance targets and security levels, implementing HQC key generation, encapsulation, and decapsulation in Verilog for FPGA deployment. The three operational modules share a common SHAKE256 hash core to minimize area overhead while maintaining throughput. Our design significantly outperforms existing HQC hardware implementations in terms of latency, while achieving a similar or smaller value of the area-time (AT) product compared to existing implementations. The improved performance results from the optimizations introduced in the sparse polynomial multiplier and fixed weight vector generator modules. We achieve upto 35% improvement in the AT product when compared to other most efficient unified HQC hardware designs in the literature. For our fastest configuration targeting HQC-1 (the L1 security level), key generation completes in 0.020 ms, encapsulation in 0.040 ms, and decapsulation in 0.081 ms when implemented on a Xilinx Artix 7 FPGA, showcasing a 40% improvement in latency when compared against the fastest design, while maintaining a competitive area footprint.
    ## 2026/593
    * Title: Three-Move Blind Signatures in Pairing-Free Groups
    * Authors: Yanbo Chen
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/593)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/593.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    We propose the first blind signature scheme that simultaneously achieves the following properties:
    - It uses a pairing-free group and random oracles in a black-box manner;
    - It provably achieves concurrent security based on standard assumptions (DDH) without the algebraic group model (AGM);
    - It requires only three moves.
    Moreover, the public key, signature, and communication of our scheme all consist of only a constant number of group/field elements.
    Prior to our work, black-box, three-move pairing-free schemes were only known in the AGM. A recent line of work proposed and optimized schemes without the AGM, but they all require at least four moves.
    ## 2026/594
    * Title: Efficient Compilers for Verifiable Dynamic Searchable Symmetric Encryption
    * Authors: Chaya Ganesh, Sikhar Patranabis, Raja Rakshit Varanasi
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/594)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/594.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    We construct compilers to generically transform any dynamic Searchable Symmetric Encryption (DSSE) scheme that is secure against a semi-honest server into one that is secure against a malicious servers, thus yielding a Verifiable dynamic SSE (VDSSE). Our compilers achieve optimal overheads while preserving forward and backward privacy, which are the standard and widely accepted security notions for DSSE.
    We focus on optimizing communication overheads and client storage requirements. Our first compiler $\mathsf{FLASH}$ incurs $O(1)$ communication overhead between the client and the server, which is optimal, while incurring mild storage overhead at the client. Our second compiler $\mathsf{BOLT}$ incurs $O(1)$ storage overhead at the client while incurring mild communication overhead. Towards this, we define a new authenticated data structure called a set commitment and we provide an efficient instantiation of this primitive.
    We prototype implement our compilers and report on their performance over real-world databases. Our experiments validate that our compilers incur concretely low overheads on top of existing semi-honest DSSE schemes, and yield practically efficient VDSSE schemes that scale to very large databases.
    ## 2026/595
    * Title: Registration-Optimized Dynamic Group Time-based One-time Passwords for Mobile Access
    * Authors: Jiaqing Guo, Xuelian Cao, Zengpeng Li, Yong Zhou, Zheng Yang, Jianying Zhou
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/595)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/595.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Mobile access within public finance and enterprise environments often requires lightweight anonymous authentication, allowing users to prove authorization without disclosing their identities. Group Time-based One-Time Passwords (GTOTP) has recently been proposed as a lightweight primitive meeting this need with post-quantum security. To address dynamic group membership, Cao et al. introduced DGTOne, the first dynamic GTOTP construction. It employs chameleon hashes to precompute a fixed set of Merkle-tree leaves (mount points), into which conventional TOTP verification points (VPs) contributed by group members are adaptively inserted. However, DGTOne partitions mount points by time epochs, so they can expire and become unusable, causing capacity waste due to unpredictable join times. Moreover, its outsourced proof generation requires verifiers to be online each epoch to fetch refreshed credentials from Registration Authority (RA), defeating offline verification needed in mobile access. We address these limitations with two new schemes. First, we propose NWDGT, a no-wastage DGTOTP design that constructs Merkle trees of members' verification points (VP-trees) on demand, eliminating expired mount points at the cost of added handling latency. To mitigate this latency, we introduce LWDGT, which instantiates multiple small one-time signature (OTS) trees whose leaves (OTS public keys) serve as mount points. New members' VPs are signed immediately using unused leaves, achieving low wastage. We formally prove that the wastage rate of LWDGT is, with overwhelming probability, lower than that of DGTOne. By modeling the registration process and optimizing OTS-tree size, for deployments with up to 500 members (209 initially, 20 added monthly), LWDGT reduces mount point wastage rate by 10.2% over one year compared to DGTOne.
    ## 2026/596
    * Title: Gryphes: Hybrid Proofs for Modular SNARKs with Applications to zkRollups
    * Authors: Jiajun Xin, Samuel Cheung On Tin, Christodoulos Pappas, Yongjin Huang, Dimitrios Papadopoulos
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/596)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/596.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    We address the challenge of constructing a proof system capable of handling multiple computations that involve diverse types of tasks, such as scalable zkRollup applications. A central dilemma in this design is the trade-off between generality and efficiency: while arithmetic circuit-based SNARKs offer fast proofs but limited flexibility, zkVMs provide general-purpose programmability at the cost of considerable overhead for circuit translation. We observe that typical workloads for such applications can be naturally divided into two parts: (1) diverse, task and data-dependent application logic, and (2) computationally intensive cryptographic operations, e.g., hashes, that are common and repetitive. To optimize for both efficiency and adaptability, we propose Gryphes, a hybrid framework that composes matrix lookup, a generalization of lookup arguments, together with SNARK solutions tailored for cryptographic operations. At the heart of Gryphes is a novel and efficient linking protocol, enabling seamless, efficient composition of matrix lookup + Plonk with general commit-and-prove SNARKs.
    By integrating Gryphes with Groth16 for signatures and RSA accumulators for membership proofs, we build a zkRollup prototype that achieves efficient proving, constant-size proofs, and dynamic support for thousands of transaction types. This includes our matrix lookup implementation incorporated with Plonk, as well as practical optimizations, comprehensive benchmarks, and open-sourced code. Our results demonstrate that Gryphes strikes a very good balance between functionality and efficiency, offering highly expressive and practical zkRollup systems.
    ## 2026/597
    * Title: Efficiency Improvement of Deniable FHE: Tighter Deniability Analysis and TFHE-based Construction
    * Authors: Towa Toyooka, Yohei Watanabe, Mitsugu Iwamoto
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/597)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/597.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) is a cryptographic scheme that can take ciphertexts as inputs and compute a new ciphertext of a function of the underlying messages without decryption. FHE has been attracting attention along with the growing interest in privacy-preserving technologies. In terms of privacy-preserving technology, deniable encryption is also important. Deniable encryption enables a user, who may be forced to reveal the messages corresponding to the user's public ciphertexts, to lie about which messages the user encrypted. Agrawal et al. (CRYPTO 2021) introduced deniable FHE (DFHE) that combines FHE with deniable encryption, and proposed a transformation from an FHE scheme that satisfies specific special requirements, called special FHE, to a DFHE scheme. They also showed a construction of a special FHE scheme based on the BGV (Brakerski--Gentry--Vaikuntanathan) scheme. However, in the construction by Agrawal et al., one must store all the extensive randomness used for encryption in order to lie, and a bootstrapping operation, which takes a long time to execute, is a bottleneck in execution speed. In this paper, we show that by providing a tighter upper bound on deniability, we can reduce the size of the stored randomness and the required number of bootstrapping in the construction by Agrawal et al. In addition, we show that TFHE (Chillotti et al., J. Cryptol., 2020; Joye, CT-RSA 2024), which is known as a FHE scheme with fast bootstrapping, satisfies the requirements of special FHE, and thus can realize a faster DFHE scheme than the BGV-based construction.
    ## 2026/598
    * Title: Triangulating Meet-in-the-Middle Attack
    * Authors: Boxin Zhao, Qingliang Hou, Lingyue Qin, Xiaoyang Dong
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/598)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/598.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    To penetrate more rounds with Meet-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack, the neutral words are usually subject to some linear constraints, e.g., Sasaki and Aoki's initial structure technique. At CRYPTO 2021, Dong et al. found the neutral words can be nonlinearly constrained. They introduced a table-based method to precompute and store the solution space of the neutral words, which led to a huge memory complexity. In this paper, we find some nonlinearly constrained neutral words can be solved efficiently by Khovratovich et al.'s triangulation algorithm (TA). Furthermore, motivated by the structured Gaussian elimination paradigm developed by LaMacchia et al. and Bender et al., we improve the TA to deal with the case when there are still many unprocessed equations, but no variable exists in only one equation (the original TA will terminate). Then, we introduce the new MitM attack based on our improved TA, called triangulating MitM attack.
    As applications, the memory complexities of the single-plaintext key-recovery attacks on 4-/5-round AES-128 are significantly reduced from $2^{80}$ to the practical $2^{24}$ or from $2^{96}$ to $2^{40}$. Besides, a series of new one/two-plaintext attacks are proposed for reduced AES-192/-256 and Rijndael-EM, which are the basic primitives of NIST PQC candidate FAEST. A partial key-recovery experiment is conducted on 4-round AES-128 to verify the correctness of our technique. For AES-256-DM, the memory complexity of the 10-round preimage attack is reduced from $2^{56}$ to $2^{8}$, thus an experiment is also implemented. Without our technique, the impractical memories $2^{80}$ or $2^{56}$ of previous attacks in the precomputation phase will always prevent any kind of (partial) experimental simulations.
    In the full version, we extend our techniques to sponge functions.
    ## 2026/599
    * Title: Proving modern code-based dual attacks with second-order techniques
    * Authors: Charles Meyer-Hilfiger
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/599)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/599.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    In code-based cryptography, dual attacks for solving the decoding problem have recently been improved. They are now competitive and beat information set decoders for a significant regime. These recent dual attacks, starting from Carrier et al. (Asiacrypt 2022), work by reducing decoding to an LPN problem where the secret and the noise involve parts of the error vector coming from the decoding problem. However, currently, the analysis of all these dual attacks is heuristic. In the original Asiacrypt 2022 work, a simple LPN modeling was used to carry out the analysis but Meyer-Hilfiger and Tillich (TCC 2023) showed that this assumption could not be used. Consequently, they proposed an alternative analysis based on Fourier theory and on heuristically modeling the weight enumerator of a random linear code as a Poisson variable. The analysis of the newest and most efficient dual attack, doubleRLPN, introduced by Carrier et al. (Eurocrypt 2024) also relies on this technique and on this model.
    Our main contribution is to devise a variant of doubleRLPN that we can fully prove without using any model. We show that our variant has the same performance, up to polynomial factors, as the original doubleRLPN algorithm. The final algorithm and its analysis are also simpler. Our technique involves flipping the coordinates of the noisy codeword and observing the fine changes in the amount of noise in the related LPN problem to reconstruct the entire error. The analysis is based on the second-order behavior of the bias of the noise which was already used in the original analysis.
    Secondly, the performance of our algorithm, as it was the case for doubleRLPN, heavily depends on having access to a good code along with an efficient decoder. We instantiate this code by choosing a Cartesian product of a constant (instead of sublinear in the original proposal by Carrier et al.) number of random linear codes. We use a decoder based on blockwise error enumeration that was already used by Guo et al. (Asiacrypt 2014). We show that our approach is optimal up to polynomial (instead of superpolynomial) factors.
    ## 2026/600
    * Title: Hadal: Centralized Label DP Training without a Trusted Party
    * Authors: James Choncholas, Stanislav Peceny, Amit Agarwal, Mariana Raykova, Baiyu Li, Karn Seth
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/600)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/600.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    We explore distributed training in a setting where features are held by one party and labels are held by another. In this context, we focus on label Differential Privacy (DP), where the labels require privacy protection from the other party who learns the trained model. Previous approaches struggle to train accurate models in high-privacy settings (i.e. when $\epsilon \leq 1$), or typically require a trusted third party. To eliminate this trusted party while preserving model utility, we present PostScale, a novel Homomorphic Encryption (HE)-based protocol suited for high-privacy regimes with ciphertext multiplicative depth of two. Our protocol is suitable for a wide variety of models in the semi-honest setting and avoids leaking the model architecture as well as costly ciphertext operations like bootstrapping and rotations. We also present a multi-party sampling protocol for generating DP noise, and Hadal, a general-purpose dataflow-based framework for encrypted computation implementing our protocols. Hadal repurposes existing tools for use with HE, including comprehensive performance profiling capabilities, dual execution modes (eager and deferred), graph compiler-based optimization, and hyperparameter tuning. Our techniques achieve model utility similar to centralized DP while reducing communication by over 90% (from 1 TB to 8 GB per batch) and training time by 99% (from 54 minutes to 33 seconds) compared to related work that protects both features and labels. These improvements unlock larger models; we train Bert-tiny of Devlin et al. (2019), with 6.5 MB of parameters, in 20 ms per example in a LAN setting.
    ## 2026/601
    * Title: Cryptanalysis of the Lightweight Stream Cipher RRSC
    * Authors: Shivarama K. N., Susil Kumar Bishoi
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/601)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/601.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    This paper presents a security evaluation of the RRSC lightweight stream cipher in its 64-bit and 128-bit variants. The analysis examines the key update process, internal component interactions, and diffusion behavior during initialization, supported by an avalanche study. Based on these observations, several cryptanalytic scenarios are explored, including time-memory-data trade-off attacks, full key-recovery attacks in the known-plaintext setting, and partial key-recovery attacks targeting the linear feedback shift register and nonlinear feedback shift register components. It is shown that the effective key space is reduced from \(2^{128}\) to \(2^{96}\) for the 128-bit variant and from \(2^{64}\) to \(2^{48}\) for the 64-bit variant.
    ## 2026/602
    * Title: Confidential Transfers for Multi-Purpose Tokens on the XRP Ledger
    * Authors: Murat Cenk, Aanchal Malhotra, Joseph A. Akinyele
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/602)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/602.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    We introduce Confidential Transfers for Multi-Purpose Tokens (Confidential MPTs) on the XRP Ledger, a cryptographic extension of the XLS-33 token standard that enables confidential balances and hidden transfer amounts while preserving public supply verifiability. The protocol replaces plaintext per-account balances with ECrCoElGamal ciphertexts and employs non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs to enforce transfer correctness, balance sufficiency, and the invariant OutstandingAmount ren MaxAmount without requiring decryption by validators. Confidentiality is scoped to transaction amounts and account balances; sender and receiver identities remain public, preserving XRPLrCOs account-based execution model. Our design maintains full compatibility with existing MPT semantics: public and confidential balances coexist, issuance rules remain unchanged, and theissuerrCOs designated second account is treated identically to other holders. The protocol further supports issuer-controlled operations, including freeze and clawback, without weakening supply soundness. To accommodate regulatory and institutional requirements, Confidential MPTs provide cryptographic auditability through an on-chain selective-disclosure model based on multi-ciphertext balance representations and equality proofs, while remaining compatible with simpler issuer-mediated audit models. We present a complete protocol specification, a security analysis under standard discrete-logarithm assumptions, and an open-source reference implementation (mpt-crypto) that realizes the required cryptographic primitives. Experimental evaluation demonstrates that confidential transfers can be verified within XRPL validator performance constraints, with proof sizes and verification costs suitable for production deployment.
    ## 2026/603
    * Title: Oblivious SpaceSaving: Heavy-Hitter Detection over Fully Homomorphic Encryption
    * Authors: Sohaib .., Divyakant Agrawal, Amr El Abbadi
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/603)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/603.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Heavy-hitter detection is a fundamental primitive in stream analytics, with applications in network monitoring, telemetry, and large-scale data systems. In many practical deployments, this computation must be maintained continuously on remote infrastructure that offers higher availability and centralized operational control, even when the underlying streams contain sensitive identifiers or proprietary activity patterns. Existing privacy-preserving approaches either incur substantial statistical noise or rely on multi-server trust assumptions. Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) offers an attractive alternative by enabling exact computation over encrypted data on a single untrusted server, but the high cost of encrypted comparisons has historically made stateful stream processing impractical.
    We present Oblivious SpaceSaving, a privacy-preserving reformulation of the classical Space-Saving algorithm for fully encrypted execution. Our central idea is the Moving Floor abstraction, which exploits a monotonicity invariant in the summary state to replace repeated magnitude comparisons with equality-based selection against a tracked encrypted floor. We further combine this with parallel victim selection and a hierarchical asynchronous ingestion pipeline, yielding an end-to-end encrypted heavy-hitter architecture that preserves the deterministic accuracy guarantees of the original algorithm.
    Our design reduces the cost of encrypted updates by up to $2.74\times$ over a naive oblivious baseline and sustains end-to-end encrypted ingestion throughputs of up to 4.30 items/s with sub-second amortized latency. These results show that, with the right algorithmic reformulation, classical streaming summaries can be made practically viable under fully encrypted execution, bringing privacy-preserving stream analytics significantly closer to deployment.
    ## 2026/604
    * Title: CatCrypt: From Rust to Cryptographic Security in Lean
    * Authors: Bas Spitters
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/604)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/604.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    We describe the methodology and scope of CatCrypt, a library for machine-checked cryptographic security proofs in Lean. CatCrypt provides an end-to-end pipeline from Rust reference implementations to security proofs in the computational model in Lean.
    The translation from Rust to Lean is done using the Hax tool.
    CatCrypt covers 172 cryptographic protocols and constructions with machine-checked security theorems in the computational model.
    Of these, 110 have the full Rust-to-Lean pipeline. All bounds have been systematically cross-referenced against their published sources (IETF RFCs, NIST standards, and academic papers). Some proofs were ported from SSProve (Rocq), EasyCrypt, ProVerif, CryptoVerif and Squirrel; most are independent formalisations with no prior machine-checked treatment. CatCrypt also includes a verified Lean implementation of a substantial part of the hax transpiler pipeline.
    This work is an experiment of what can be done by a researcher working with GenAI. Until recently, the formalization of one protocol required months of expert effort. In contrast, the whole of CatCrypt was developed in a period of two months. Because it was developed with AI, we develop a new methodology to increase confidence that the specifications are correct. Moreover, we will continue to audit the code in the coming months to gain even more confidence in the specification of the results.
    We hope this work will facilitate the adoption of formal methods in the development of security-critical software. This is especially urgent due to AI's increased hacking capabilities, the explosion of AI generated software and the ongoing post-quantum transition, which requires the development of new cryptographic protocols and their secure implementation.
    ## 2026/605
    * Title: Adaptively-Secure Proxy Re-Encryption with Tight Security
    * Authors: Chen Qian, Shuo Chen, Shuai Han
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/605)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/605.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    (Bi-Directional) Proxy Re-Encryption ($\mathsf{PRE}$) is a public-key encryption scheme that allows a proxy, holding a re-encryption key from $i$ to $j$, to transform a ciphertext intended for $i$ into one intended for $j$. $\mathsf{PRE}$ has numerous applications, including secure data sharing and cloud computing. However, most existing $\mathsf{PRE}$ schemes experience significant security degradation when adversaries are allowed to adaptively corrupt re-encryption or secret keys. Prior to this work, only a few $\mathsf{PRE}$ schemes achieved quasi-polynomial security loss in the adaptive setting, and even those were limited to restricted re-encryption strategies.
    In this paper, we propose four distinct $\mathsf{PRE}$ schemes with tight security guarantees in the adaptive setting, based on the $\mathsf{MDDH}$ assumption:
    - $\mathsf{PRE}_0$, $\mathsf{PRE}_1$: Single- and multi-challenge $\mathsf{aHRA}$-secure $\mathsf{PRE}$ schemes with tight security focusing on efficient constructions.
    - $\mathsf{PRE}_2$, $\mathsf{PRE}_3$: Single- and multi-challenge $\mathsf{aCCA}$-secure $\mathsf{PRE}$ schemes with (almost) tight security focusing on $\mathsf{CCA}$-type security.
    To achieve tightly $\mathsf{CCA}$-secure $\mathsf{PRE}$ schemes, we introduce a novel concept called tag-based language-malleable $\mathsf{NIZK}$ with special simulation soundness. This primitive provides simulation-sound $\mathsf{NIZK}$ while preserving a restricted form of malleability. We construct both one-time and unbounded versions of this primitive under the $\mathsf{MDDH}$(Matrix Decisional Diffie-Hellman) assumption.
    ## 2026/606
    * Title: PD-Net: Learning Device-Invariant Representations for Heterogeneous Cross-Device Side-Channel Attacks
    * Authors: Dalin He, Wei Cheng, Yuejun Liu, Jingdian Ming, Yongbin Zhou
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/606)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/606.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Heterogeneous cross-device side-channel attacks remain a critical yet underexplored challenge, as models trained on one device often fail to generalize across architectures. This paper presents PD-Net, a domain generalization framework that learns device-invariant features by disentangling algorithmic content from device-specific style and aligning feature distributions using prototypical and Maximum Mean Discrepancy (MMD) losses.
    PD-Net is trained on nine heterogeneous source domains spanning ARM/AVR/FPGA and power/electromagnetic leakage modalities, including 32-bit ARM Cortex-M0/M1/M3/M4, 8-bit AVR ATmega (three series), and 128-bit Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA, and evaluated in a zero-shot setting without target-specific adaptation.
    Experimental results demonstrate robust zero-shot cross-architecture transfers between 8-bit and 32-bit devices, with consistent gains over existing generalization and transfer-learning approaches. In particular, PD-Net delivers 29 successful attacks with only 10 divergences across 70 settings, markedly outperforming the state of the art, which succeeds in only 4 cases and diverges 19 times.
    To the best of our knowledge, this is the first domain generalization (DG)-based deep learning framework to systematically demonstrate practical zero-shot heterogeneous cross-device side-channel attacks.
    ## 2026/607
    * Title: Refined Approx-SVP Rank Reduction Conditions and Adaptive Lattice Reduction for MSIS Security Estimation
    * Authors: Xiaohan Zhang, Zijian Zhou, Longjiang Qu
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/607)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/607.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    The security of lattice-based cryptography relies critically on the concrete hardness of the approximate shortest vector problem (Approx-SVP). For cryptographic-sized instances, existing Approx-SVP rank reduction conditions may be overly aggressive, as they implicitly assume access to a large number of extremely short lattice vectors. In this work, we systematize and refine Approx-SVP rank reduction conditions from a feasibility perspective. We identify that, in the context of dimension-for-free (D4f) technique, the existence of a single sufficiently short vector is the essential requirement, and we derive two refined and compact rank reduction conditions accordingly. The first condition is based on geometric properties of lattice sieving, while the second incorporates a basis-quality-dependent probabilistic bound. These results are validated through extensive experiments on high-dimensional lattices, where the compact condition outperforms prior methods by up to a factor of $60$ in dimensions $850$ and $925$. To reliably realize these conditions in high dimensions, we present APBKZ, an adaptive Pump-based lattice reduction strategy that dynamically selects the blocksize and dimension-for-free parameters according to the evolving Gram-Schmidt profile. We further introduce HeadAPBKZ, a head-focused execution mode that restricts reduction to a critical prefix once the rank reduction condition is satisfied. Combining these advances, we develop an improved concrete security estimation framework for the MSIS problem. Applied to Dilithium, our analysis indicates that when integrating compact rank reduction behavior with the D4f technique, the estimated concrete security margin of Dilithium drops by 9.50-16.63 bits compared to the conservative Core-SVP baseline, offering more accurate security benchmarks for cryptographic standardization.
    ## 2026/608
    * Title: Can Adaptive Communication Graphs Lower the Bottleneck Complexity of (Secure) Multiparty Computation?
    * Authors: Lisa Kohl, Pierre Meyer, Divya Ravi, Nicolas Resch
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/608)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/608.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    The bottleneck complexity of a (secure) multiparty computation protocol is one measure of its communication-efficiency. It captures how well the communication load is balanced, and is defined as the maximum communication complexity required by any one party within the protocol execution.
    Prior works on this topic restricted attention to protocols with fixed communication graphs, i.e. whether or not a given party communicates to another only depends on the round number.
    We demonstrate the power of adaptively choosing communication graphs by developing various bottleneck-efficient protocols, both with and without security. Done na|Avely, protocols with adaptive communication graphs can exploit unnatural tricks, such as "communicating with silence." To ensure our protocols are meaningful, we additionally stipulate that they should run correctly even in asynchronous networks (where we make no assumption on the adversarial message-delays other than being finite).
    [Bottleneck complexity of arbitrary functions.] With fixed communication graphs, Boyle, Jain, Prabhakaran, and Yu (ICALP'18) established the existence of a function $f\colon\{0,1\}^n\to\{0,1\}$ requiring $\Omega(n)$-bit bottleneck complexity, which is matched by the trivial protocol of having all parties send their inputs to one party. By adaptively choosing communication graphs, we show that any function $f\colon\{0,1\}^n\to\{0,1\}$ can be computed (securely) with bottleneck $O(n/\log n)$ (which we prove is essentially optimal), even in \emph{asynchronous} networks.
    [Bottleneck complexity of symmetric functions.] Prior works have
    demonstrated that special classes of symmetric functions, such as additive [Eriguchi, Asiacrypt'23] or abelian [Keller, Orlandi, Paskin-Cherniavsky, Ravi, ITC'23] functions can be computed bottleneck-efficiently with fixed communication graphs. We both expand the class of symmetric functions achievable with low bottleneck complexity, as well as show how input-adaptive communication graphs can be leveraged to further reduce the bottleneck complexity of some of our protocols.
    ## 2026/609
    * Title: Post-Quantum Blockchains with Agility in Mind
    * Authors: Manuel B. Santos, Danno Ferrin, Ron Kahat, Michael Lodder
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/609)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/609.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    Blockchains intend to provide long-term integrity guarantees through cryptographic primitives that may become vulnerable over time due to algorithmic advances or paradigm shifts such as quantum computation. While cryptographic agility, the ability to transition between algorithms without disrupting operation, is recognized as essential, existing blockchain systems lack comprehensive support for such transitions. We address this gap by designing an Ethereum virtual machine (EVM) compatible blockchain that introduces support for cryptographic agility from genesis.

    We first propose a flexibility framework that characterizes how algorithm choice can be distributed across blockchain components. We then present two technical contributions aligned with this framework: (1) cryptographically agile transactions (CATX), a new transaction format that decouples body and signature to enable user-selected signature schemes; and (2) a consensus-layer key registration mechanism that allows validators to migrate between signature schemes as operational upgrades without hard forks. We exemplify the agility of our design with ECDSA, Falcon-512, and ML-DSA signatures by conducting experimental evaluations over 30,000 blocks and 11 million transactions, showing that the CATX format introduces no measurable overhead.
    ## 2026/610
    * Title: Concrete Estimation of Correctness and IND-CPA-D Security for FHE via Rare Event Simulation
    * Authors: Mathieu Ballandras, Jean-Baptiste Orfila, Samuel Tap
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/610)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/610.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    By construction, Fully Homomorphic Encryption schemes have probabilistic correctness due to their underlying cryptographic assumptions. The family of Learning With Errors (LWE) problems assumes that a random error term is added during encryption.
    Statistically, this error grows as homomorphic computation proceeds. While predicting the noise evolution was initially only a correctness issue, recent works have shown a direct link with the security of FHE schemes in the IND-CPA-D model.
    Here, we present a framework that provides practical guarantees that the probabilities extrapolated from theoretical models satisfy bounds as small as $2^{-128}$. We show how to obtain strong experimental guarantees that the usual Gaussian model for noise is conservative and that a refined model based on Irwin-Hall distribution is valid.
    This is realized through an algorithm called importance splitting, which we adapt here to the cryptographic setting. We provide a detailed study in the context of TFHE bootstrapping and its variants.
    We believe our framework can serve as a baseline to be extended to other schemes, thereby ensuring both correctness and security across all FHE schemes.
    ## 2026/611
    * Title: A Comparative Evaluation of DATA and Microwalk for Detecting Constant-Time Violations in Cryptographic Libraries
    * Authors: Dominik Schneider, Paul Fuchs, Kerstin Lemke-Rust
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/611)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/611.pdf)
    ### Abstract
    DATA [22] and Microwalk [23] are two advanced dynamic binary instrumentation (DBI) tools for detecting constant-time (CT) violations in software implementations.
    This paper presents a comparative evaluation of these tools' findings using a common test setup and several cryptographic implementations that are included in the libraries LibTomCrypt, OpenSSL, and liboqs.
    Our experiments yield reliable results for symmetric ciphers. For asymmetric cryptographic schemes, however, internal random numbers cause a high number of reported findings that also differ among the tools.
    In order to make the tools' results more comparable our test setup is adapted to externally inject random numbers that are otherwise generated internally by the cryptographic libraries.
    We discuss the differences of the tools' design and their impact on practical results of cryptographic implementations as well as their resource consumption in terms of memory and runtime.
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