• One way that the Halting Theorem is incoherent

    From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Nov 5 20:53:26 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    [an input that does the opposite of
    what one particular decider outputs]
    is inherently incoherent.

    If it gets a return value to do the opposite of
    then it is the caller of the decider and not
    the input to this same decider. If it is the
    input to a decider then it is not the caller
    of this same decider. One can be a father or
    a son one can fill both roles for the same person.
    One cannot be onerCOs own father.

    https://www.liarparadox.org/Peter_Linz_HP_317-320.pdf
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    Computation(Olcott)
    Paraphrase of Emil Post definition of computation
    All computations are equivalent to the application of finite
    string transformation rules to finite string inputs to derive
    any and all outputs.

    Because Post canonical systems are Turing-equivalent, anything
    that cannot be derived by applying finite string transformations
    to finite strings is outside the scope of ChurchrCoTuring computation.

    Decider(Olcott)
    Correcting the misnomer term-of-the-art: decider
    Every Decider(Olcott) must apply finite string transformation
    inference steps to their finite string inputs that are relevant
    to the decision criteria. It must make its decision on this basis.

    Halt Decider(Olcott)
    Decider(Olcott) entails that Halt Decider(Olcott) H(D) must apply
    finite-string inference steps according to the operational semantics
    of the source-code computation language of D. The only way to determine
    the halting property of a finite string input is to examine the same
    behavior as the behavior of D simulated by H.

    *Succinct refutation of the Halting Theorem* https://github.com/plolcott/x86utm/blob/master/README.md

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of general knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dart200@user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Nov 5 23:18:12 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 11/5/26 6:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    [an input that does the opposite of
    -awhat one particular decider outputs]
    -ais inherently incoherent.

    If it gets a return value to do the opposite of
    then it is the caller of the decider and not
    the input to this same decider. If it is the

    the paradoxical machine constructs an in memory copy of it's own
    definition using a quine, and then submits that copy to the decider for analysis

    input to a decider then it is not the caller
    of this same decider. One can be a father or
    a son one can fill both roles for the same person.
    One cannot be onerCOs own father.

    it's more akin to cloning itself polcott. and yes machines can do this,
    the technique isn't that complicated


    https://www.liarparadox.org/Peter_Linz_HP_317-320.pdf

    --
    arising us out of the computing dark ages,
    please excuse my pseudo-pyscript,
    ~ the lil crank that could
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dart200@user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,alt.messianic,alt.buddha.short.fat.guy on Fri Nov 6 00:35:05 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 11/5/26 11:18 PM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/5/26 6:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    [an input that does the opposite of
    -a-awhat one particular decider outputs]
    -a-ais inherently incoherent.

    If it gets a return value to do the opposite of
    then it is the caller of the decider and not
    the input to this same decider. If it is the

    the paradoxical machine constructs an in memory copy of it's own
    definition using a quine, and then submits that copy to the decider for analysis

    the thing u don't understand polcott is that paradoxical machines do not
    exist by anyone's choice, not even a god could do fuck all about them

    if giving a set of finite string transformations that attempts to
    compute the halting function, totally, partially, or otherwise...

    some paradoxical machine is simply a logical possibility (and more so
    infinite variations of which) that can be written as a series of finite
    string transformations. its existence in the total enumeration of finite string transformations, is necessarily implied by any existence of any
    finite string transformation, that attempts to compute the halting
    function, totally, partially, or otherwise

    HHH does exist, u wrote it. therefore must DD does exist, which u also
    wrote, so theory aligns with evidence

    for any HHH_N, of which there are infinite variations of, that compute difference infinite slices of the total halting function, however
    accurate, there will necessarily be some DD1 analogy for it that is necessarily not in that slice.

    that just is the nature of undecidability within computing, whatcha
    gunna do about it polcott?

    in my opinion the real question we should be asking is which infinite
    slice we're truly interested in, which honestly we've answered quite
    poorly thus far


    input to a decider then it is not the caller
    of this same decider. One can be a father or
    a son one can fill both roles for the same person.
    One cannot be onerCOs own father.

    it's more akin to cloning itself polcott. and yes machines can do this,
    the technique isn't that complicated


    https://www.liarparadox.org/Peter_Linz_HP_317-320.pdf



    --
    arising us out of the computing dark ages,
    please excuse my pseudo-pyscript,
    ~ the lil crank that could

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Fri Nov 6 08:25:06 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 11/6/2026 1:18 AM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/5/26 6:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    [an input that does the opposite of
    -a-awhat one particular decider outputs]
    -a-ais inherently incoherent.

    If it gets a return value to do the opposite of
    then it is the caller of the decider and not
    the input to this same decider. If it is the

    the paradoxical machine constructs an in memory copy of it's own
    definition using a quine, and then submits that copy to the decider for analysis


    If has never been possible to construct an input that
    does the opposite of what its halt decider reports
    because this do the opposite code is always unreachable.
    The DD that does the opposite of what HHH(DD) reports
    is the caller of HHH(DD) thus not its actual input.

    input to a decider then it is not the caller
    of this same decider. One can be a father or
    a son one can fill both roles for the same person.
    One cannot be onerCOs own father.

    it's more akin to cloning itself polcott. and yes machines can do this,
    the technique isn't that complicated


    https://www.liarparadox.org/Peter_Linz_HP_317-320.pdf



    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    Computation(Olcott)
    Paraphrase of Emil Post definition of computation
    All computations are equivalent to the application of finite
    string transformation rules to finite string inputs to derive
    any and all outputs.

    Because Post canonical systems are Turing-equivalent, anything
    that cannot be derived by applying finite string transformations
    to finite strings is outside the scope of ChurchrCoTuring computation.

    Decider(Olcott)
    Correcting the misnomer term-of-the-art: decider
    Every Decider(Olcott) must apply finite string transformation
    inference steps to their finite string inputs that are relevant
    to the decision criteria. It must make its decision on this basis.

    Halt Decider(Olcott)
    Decider(Olcott) entails that Halt Decider(Olcott) H(D) must apply
    finite-string inference steps according to the operational semantics
    of the source-code computation language of D. The only way to determine
    the halting property of a finite string input is to examine the same
    behavior as the behavior of D simulated by H.

    *Succinct refutation of the Halting Theorem* https://github.com/plolcott/x86utm/blob/master/README.md

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of general knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dart200@user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Fri Nov 6 08:38:11 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 11/6/26 6:25 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 11/6/2026 1:18 AM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/5/26 6:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    [an input that does the opposite of
    -a-awhat one particular decider outputs]
    -a-ais inherently incoherent.

    If it gets a return value to do the opposite of
    then it is the caller of the decider and not
    the input to this same decider. If it is the

    the paradoxical machine constructs an in memory copy of it's own
    definition using a quine, and then submits that copy to the decider
    for analysis


    If has never been possible to construct an input that
    does the opposite of what its halt decider reports
    because this do the opposite code is always unreachable.
    The DD that does the opposite of what HHH(DD) reports
    is the caller of HHH(DD) thus not its actual input.

    the DD simulated by HHH is stopped by HHH polcott,

    it does not reach it's natural end state


    input to a decider then it is not the caller
    of this same decider. One can be a father or
    a son one can fill both roles for the same person.
    One cannot be onerCOs own father.

    it's more akin to cloning itself polcott. and yes machines can do
    this, the technique isn't that complicated


    https://www.liarparadox.org/Peter_Linz_HP_317-320.pdf





    --
    arising us out of the computing dark ages,
    please excuse my pseudo-pyscript,
    ~ the lil crank that could
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Fri Nov 6 11:05:05 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 11/6/2026 10:38 AM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/6/26 6:25 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 11/6/2026 1:18 AM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/5/26 6:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    [an input that does the opposite of
    -a-awhat one particular decider outputs]
    -a-ais inherently incoherent.

    If it gets a return value to do the opposite of
    then it is the caller of the decider and not
    the input to this same decider. If it is the

    the paradoxical machine constructs an in memory copy of it's own
    definition using a quine, and then submits that copy to the decider
    for analysis


    If has never been possible to construct an input that
    does the opposite of what its halt decider reports
    because this do the opposite code is always unreachable.
    The DD that does the opposite of what HHH(DD) reports
    is the caller of HHH(DD) thus not its actual input.

    the DD simulated by HHH is stopped by HHH polcott,

    it does not reach it's natural end state


    Maybe this stuff is just over your head?

    There does not exist any implementation of C function HHH
    that simulates C function DD according to the operational
    semantics of C such that the simulated C function DD reaches
    its own simulated return statement in any N finite number of
    steps.


    input to a decider then it is not the caller
    of this same decider. One can be a father or
    a son one can fill both roles for the same person.
    One cannot be onerCOs own father.

    it's more akin to cloning itself polcott. and yes machines can do
    this, the technique isn't that complicated


    https://www.liarparadox.org/Peter_Linz_HP_317-320.pdf






    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    Computation(Olcott)
    Paraphrase of Emil Post definition of computation
    All computations are equivalent to the application of finite
    string transformation rules to finite string inputs to derive
    any and all outputs.

    Because Post canonical systems are Turing-equivalent, anything
    that cannot be derived by applying finite string transformations
    to finite strings is outside the scope of ChurchrCoTuring computation.

    Decider(Olcott)
    Correcting the misnomer term-of-the-art: decider
    Every Decider(Olcott) must apply finite string transformation
    inference steps to their finite string inputs that are relevant
    to the decision criteria. It must make its decision on this basis.

    Halt Decider(Olcott)
    Decider(Olcott) entails that Halt Decider(Olcott) H(D) must apply
    finite-string inference steps according to the operational semantics
    of the source-code computation language of D. The only way to determine
    the halting property of a finite string input is to examine the same
    behavior as the behavior of D simulated by H.

    *Succinct refutation of the Halting Theorem* https://github.com/plolcott/x86utm/blob/master/README.md

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of general knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dart200@user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Fri Nov 6 09:12:49 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 11/6/26 9:05 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 11/6/2026 10:38 AM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/6/26 6:25 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 11/6/2026 1:18 AM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/5/26 6:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    [an input that does the opposite of
    -a-awhat one particular decider outputs]
    -a-ais inherently incoherent.

    If it gets a return value to do the opposite of
    then it is the caller of the decider and not
    the input to this same decider. If it is the

    the paradoxical machine constructs an in memory copy of it's own
    definition using a quine, and then submits that copy to the decider
    for analysis


    If has never been possible to construct an input that
    does the opposite of what its halt decider reports
    because this do the opposite code is always unreachable.
    The DD that does the opposite of what HHH(DD) reports
    is the caller of HHH(DD) thus not its actual input.

    the DD simulated by HHH is stopped by HHH polcott,

    it does not reach it's natural end state


    Maybe this stuff is just over your head?

    gaslighting me ain't a good look polcott

    HHH as implemented is what causes the DD simulated by HHH to not reach
    it's natural end state


    There does not exist any implementation of C function HHH
    that simulates C function DD according to the operational
    semantics of C such that the simulated C function DD reaches
    its own simulated return statement in any N finite number of
    steps.

    correct, there are other simulators that do reach DDs natural end state, however

    for example: any implementation of EYon as defined by turing in /on
    computable numbers/



    input to a decider then it is not the caller
    of this same decider. One can be a father or
    a son one can fill both roles for the same person.
    One cannot be onerCOs own father.

    it's more akin to cloning itself polcott. and yes machines can do
    this, the technique isn't that complicated


    https://www.liarparadox.org/Peter_Linz_HP_317-320.pdf








    --
    arising us out of the computing dark ages,
    please excuse my pseudo-pyscript,
    ~ the lil crank that could
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Fri Nov 6 11:19:16 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 11/6/2026 11:12 AM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/6/26 9:05 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 11/6/2026 10:38 AM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/6/26 6:25 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 11/6/2026 1:18 AM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/5/26 6:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    [an input that does the opposite of
    -a-awhat one particular decider outputs]
    -a-ais inherently incoherent.

    If it gets a return value to do the opposite of
    then it is the caller of the decider and not
    the input to this same decider. If it is the

    the paradoxical machine constructs an in memory copy of it's own
    definition using a quine, and then submits that copy to the decider >>>>> for analysis


    If has never been possible to construct an input that
    does the opposite of what its halt decider reports
    because this do the opposite code is always unreachable.
    The DD that does the opposite of what HHH(DD) reports
    is the caller of HHH(DD) thus not its actual input.

    the DD simulated by HHH is stopped by HHH polcott,

    it does not reach it's natural end state


    Maybe this stuff is just over your head?

    gaslighting me ain't a good look polcott

    HHH as implemented is what causes the DD simulated by HHH to not reach
    it's natural end state


    There does not exist any implementation of C function HHH
    that simulates C function DD according to the operational
    semantics of C such that the simulated C function DD reaches
    its own simulated return statement in any N finite number of
    steps.

    correct, there are other simulators that do reach DDs natural end state, however

    for example: any implementation of EYon as defined by turing in /on computable numbers/


    Not when DD calls this same EYon



    input to a decider then it is not the caller
    of this same decider. One can be a father or
    a son one can fill both roles for the same person.
    One cannot be onerCOs own father.

    it's more akin to cloning itself polcott. and yes machines can do
    this, the technique isn't that complicated


    https://www.liarparadox.org/Peter_Linz_HP_317-320.pdf









    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    Computation(Olcott)
    Paraphrase of Emil Post definition of computation
    All computations are equivalent to the application of finite
    string transformation rules to finite string inputs to derive
    any and all outputs.

    Because Post canonical systems are Turing-equivalent, anything
    that cannot be derived by applying finite string transformations
    to finite strings is outside the scope of ChurchrCoTuring computation.

    Decider(Olcott)
    Correcting the misnomer term-of-the-art: decider
    Every Decider(Olcott) must apply finite string transformation
    inference steps to their finite string inputs that are relevant
    to the decision criteria. It must make its decision on this basis.

    Halt Decider(Olcott)
    Decider(Olcott) entails that Halt Decider(Olcott) H(D) must apply
    finite-string inference steps according to the operational semantics
    of the source-code computation language of D. The only way to determine
    the halting property of a finite string input is to examine the same
    behavior as the behavior of D simulated by H.

    *Succinct refutation of the Halting Theorem* https://github.com/plolcott/x86utm/blob/master/README.md

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of general knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dart200@user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Fri Nov 6 10:02:28 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 11/6/26 9:19 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 11/6/2026 11:12 AM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/6/26 9:05 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 11/6/2026 10:38 AM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/6/26 6:25 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 11/6/2026 1:18 AM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/5/26 6:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    [an input that does the opposite of
    -a-awhat one particular decider outputs]
    -a-ais inherently incoherent.

    If it gets a return value to do the opposite of
    then it is the caller of the decider and not
    the input to this same decider. If it is the

    the paradoxical machine constructs an in memory copy of it's own
    definition using a quine, and then submits that copy to the
    decider for analysis


    If has never been possible to construct an input that
    does the opposite of what its halt decider reports
    because this do the opposite code is always unreachable.
    The DD that does the opposite of what HHH(DD) reports
    is the caller of HHH(DD) thus not its actual input.

    the DD simulated by HHH is stopped by HHH polcott,

    it does not reach it's natural end state


    Maybe this stuff is just over your head?

    gaslighting me ain't a good look polcott

    HHH as implemented is what causes the DD simulated by HHH to not reach
    it's natural end state


    There does not exist any implementation of C function HHH
    that simulates C function DD according to the operational
    semantics of C such that the simulated C function DD reaches
    its own simulated return statement in any N finite number of
    steps.

    correct, there are other simulators that do reach DDs natural end
    state, however

    for example: any implementation of EYon as defined by turing in /on
    computable numbers/


    Not when DD calls this same EYon

    if DD called EYon(DD) instead of HHH(DD)-- lets call this variation DD_EYon,
    then DD_EYon would be an infinite recursion

    neither the top level DD_EYon, nor any recursively simulated EYon(DD_EYon) would halt

    but if EYon calls the original DD that calls HHH, then EYon(DD) halts...




    input to a decider then it is not the caller
    of this same decider. One can be a father or
    a son one can fill both roles for the same person.
    One cannot be onerCOs own father.

    it's more akin to cloning itself polcott. and yes machines can do >>>>>> this, the technique isn't that complicated


    https://www.liarparadox.org/Peter_Linz_HP_317-320.pdf











    --
    arising us out of the computing dark ages,
    please excuse my pseudo-pyscript,
    ~ the lil crank that could
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Fri Nov 6 12:11:01 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 11/6/2026 12:02 PM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/6/26 9:19 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 11/6/2026 11:12 AM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/6/26 9:05 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 11/6/2026 10:38 AM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/6/26 6:25 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 11/6/2026 1:18 AM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/5/26 6:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    [an input that does the opposite of
    -a-awhat one particular decider outputs]
    -a-ais inherently incoherent.

    If it gets a return value to do the opposite of
    then it is the caller of the decider and not
    the input to this same decider. If it is the

    the paradoxical machine constructs an in memory copy of it's own >>>>>>> definition using a quine, and then submits that copy to the
    decider for analysis


    If has never been possible to construct an input that
    does the opposite of what its halt decider reports
    because this do the opposite code is always unreachable.
    The DD that does the opposite of what HHH(DD) reports
    is the caller of HHH(DD) thus not its actual input.

    the DD simulated by HHH is stopped by HHH polcott,

    it does not reach it's natural end state


    Maybe this stuff is just over your head?

    gaslighting me ain't a good look polcott

    HHH as implemented is what causes the DD simulated by HHH to not
    reach it's natural end state


    There does not exist any implementation of C function HHH
    that simulates C function DD according to the operational
    semantics of C such that the simulated C function DD reaches
    its own simulated return statement in any N finite number of
    steps.

    correct, there are other simulators that do reach DDs natural end
    state, however

    for example: any implementation of EYon as defined by turing in /on
    computable numbers/


    Not when DD calls this same EYon

    if DD called EYon(DD) instead of HHH(DD)-- lets call this variation DD_EYon,
    -athen DD_EYon would be an infinite recursion

    neither the top level DD_EYon, nor any recursively simulated EYon(DD_EYon) would
    halt

    but if EYon calls the original DD that calls HHH, then EYon(DD) halts...


    Proving that the call to EYon(DD) or HHH(DD) cannot be
    ignored and must form the basis for a correct halt
    decision when applying finite stings transformation
    rules to input static finite strings.




    input to a decider then it is not the caller
    of this same decider. One can be a father or
    a son one can fill both roles for the same person.
    One cannot be onerCOs own father.

    it's more akin to cloning itself polcott. and yes machines can do >>>>>>> this, the technique isn't that complicated


    https://www.liarparadox.org/Peter_Linz_HP_317-320.pdf













    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    Computation(Olcott)
    Paraphrase of Emil Post definition of computation
    All computations are equivalent to the application of finite
    string transformation rules to finite string inputs to derive
    any and all outputs.

    Because Post canonical systems are Turing-equivalent, anything
    that cannot be derived by applying finite string transformations
    to finite strings is outside the scope of ChurchrCoTuring computation.

    Decider(Olcott)
    Correcting the misnomer term-of-the-art: decider
    Every Decider(Olcott) must apply finite string transformation
    inference steps to their finite string inputs that are relevant
    to the decision criteria. It must make its decision on this basis.

    Halt Decider(Olcott)
    Decider(Olcott) entails that Halt Decider(Olcott) H(D) must apply
    finite-string inference steps according to the operational semantics
    of the source-code computation language of D. The only way to determine
    the halting property of a finite string input is to examine the same
    behavior as the behavior of D simulated by H.

    *Succinct refutation of the Halting Theorem* https://github.com/plolcott/x86utm/blob/master/README.md

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of general knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dart200@user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Fri Nov 6 10:30:13 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 11/6/26 10:11 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 11/6/2026 12:02 PM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/6/26 9:19 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 11/6/2026 11:12 AM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/6/26 9:05 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 11/6/2026 10:38 AM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/6/26 6:25 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 11/6/2026 1:18 AM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/5/26 6:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    [an input that does the opposite of
    -a-awhat one particular decider outputs]
    -a-ais inherently incoherent.

    If it gets a return value to do the opposite of
    then it is the caller of the decider and not
    the input to this same decider. If it is the

    the paradoxical machine constructs an in memory copy of it's own >>>>>>>> definition using a quine, and then submits that copy to the
    decider for analysis


    If has never been possible to construct an input that
    does the opposite of what its halt decider reports
    because this do the opposite code is always unreachable.
    The DD that does the opposite of what HHH(DD) reports
    is the caller of HHH(DD) thus not its actual input.

    the DD simulated by HHH is stopped by HHH polcott,

    it does not reach it's natural end state


    Maybe this stuff is just over your head?

    gaslighting me ain't a good look polcott

    HHH as implemented is what causes the DD simulated by HHH to not
    reach it's natural end state


    There does not exist any implementation of C function HHH
    that simulates C function DD according to the operational
    semantics of C such that the simulated C function DD reaches
    its own simulated return statement in any N finite number of
    steps.

    correct, there are other simulators that do reach DDs natural end
    state, however

    for example: any implementation of EYon as defined by turing in /on
    computable numbers/


    Not when DD calls this same EYon

    if DD called EYon(DD) instead of HHH(DD)-- lets call this variation DD_EYon,
    -a-athen DD_EYon would be an infinite recursion

    neither the top level DD_EYon, nor any recursively simulated EYon(DD_EYon) >> would halt

    but if EYon calls the original DD that calls HHH, then EYon(DD) halts...


    Proving that the call to EYon(DD) or HHH(DD) cannot be
    ignored and must form the basis for a correct halt
    decision when applying finite stings transformation
    rules to input static finite strings.

    i apologize, i don't understand the comment





    input to a decider then it is not the caller
    of this same decider. One can be a father or
    a son one can fill both roles for the same person.
    One cannot be onerCOs own father.

    it's more akin to cloning itself polcott. and yes machines can >>>>>>>> do this, the technique isn't that complicated


    https://www.liarparadox.org/Peter_Linz_HP_317-320.pdf















    --
    arising us out of the computing dark ages,
    please excuse my pseudo-pyscript,
    ~ the lil crank that could
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Fri Nov 6 12:45:16 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 11/6/2026 12:30 PM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/6/26 10:11 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 11/6/2026 12:02 PM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/6/26 9:19 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 11/6/2026 11:12 AM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/6/26 9:05 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 11/6/2026 10:38 AM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/6/26 6:25 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 11/6/2026 1:18 AM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/5/26 6:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    [an input that does the opposite of
    -a-awhat one particular decider outputs]
    -a-ais inherently incoherent.

    If it gets a return value to do the opposite of
    then it is the caller of the decider and not
    the input to this same decider. If it is the

    the paradoxical machine constructs an in memory copy of it's >>>>>>>>> own definition using a quine, and then submits that copy to the >>>>>>>>> decider for analysis


    If has never been possible to construct an input that
    does the opposite of what its halt decider reports
    because this do the opposite code is always unreachable.
    The DD that does the opposite of what HHH(DD) reports
    is the caller of HHH(DD) thus not its actual input.

    the DD simulated by HHH is stopped by HHH polcott,

    it does not reach it's natural end state


    Maybe this stuff is just over your head?

    gaslighting me ain't a good look polcott

    HHH as implemented is what causes the DD simulated by HHH to not
    reach it's natural end state


    There does not exist any implementation of C function HHH
    that simulates C function DD according to the operational
    semantics of C such that the simulated C function DD reaches
    its own simulated return statement in any N finite number of
    steps.

    correct, there are other simulators that do reach DDs natural end
    state, however

    for example: any implementation of EYon as defined by turing in /on >>>>> computable numbers/


    Not when DD calls this same EYon

    if DD called EYon(DD) instead of HHH(DD)-- lets call this variation
    DD_EYon, -a-athen DD_EYon would be an infinite recursion

    neither the top level DD_EYon, nor any recursively simulated EYon(DD_EYon) >>> would halt

    but if EYon calls the original DD that calls HHH, then EYon(DD) halts... >>>

    Proving that the call to EYon(DD) or HHH(DD) cannot be
    ignored and must form the basis for a correct halt
    decision when applying finite stings transformation
    rules to input static finite strings.

    i apologize, i don't understand the comment


    Computation defined
    Paraphrase of Emil Post definition of computation
    All computations are equivalent applying finite string
    transformation rules to finite string inputs to derive
    any and all outputs.

    Because Post canonical systems are Turing-equivalent,
    anything that cannot be derived by applying finite string
    transformations to finite strings inputs is outside of
    the domain of ChurchrCoTuring computable functions.

    Its this theory of computation definition.





    input to a decider then it is not the caller
    of this same decider. One can be a father or
    a son one can fill both roles for the same person.
    One cannot be onerCOs own father.

    it's more akin to cloning itself polcott. and yes machines can >>>>>>>>> do this, the technique isn't that complicated


    https://www.liarparadox.org/Peter_Linz_HP_317-320.pdf

















    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    Computation(Olcott)
    Paraphrase of Emil Post definition of computation
    All computations are equivalent to the application of finite
    string transformation rules to finite string inputs to derive
    any and all outputs.

    Because Post canonical systems are Turing-equivalent, anything
    that cannot be derived by applying finite string transformations
    to finite strings is outside the scope of ChurchrCoTuring computation.

    Decider(Olcott)
    Correcting the misnomer term-of-the-art: decider
    Every Decider(Olcott) must apply finite string transformation
    inference steps to their finite string inputs that are relevant
    to the decision criteria. It must make its decision on this basis.

    Halt Decider(Olcott)
    Decider(Olcott) entails that Halt Decider(Olcott) H(D) must apply
    finite-string inference steps according to the operational semantics
    of the source-code computation language of D. The only way to determine
    the halting property of a finite string input is to examine the same
    behavior as the behavior of D simulated by H.

    *Succinct refutation of the Halting Theorem* https://github.com/plolcott/x86utm/blob/master/README.md

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of general knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Dude@punditster@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,alt.messianic,alt.buddha.short.fat.guy on Fri Nov 6 11:45:19 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 11/6/2026 12:35 AM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/5/26 11:18 PM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/5/26 6:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    [an input that does the opposite of
    -a-awhat one particular decider outputs]
    -a-ais inherently incoherent.

    If it gets a return value to do the opposite of
    then it is the caller of the decider and not
    the input to this same decider. If it is the

    the paradoxical machine constructs an in memory copy of it's own
    definition using a quine, and then submits that copy to the decider
    for analysis

    the thing u don't understand polcott is that paradoxical machines do not exist by anyone's choice, not even a god could do fuck all about them

    if giving a set of finite string transformations that attempts to
    compute the halting function, totally, partially, or otherwise...

    some paradoxical machine is simply a logical possibility (and more so infinite variations of which) that can be written as a series of finite string transformations. its existence in the total enumeration of finite string transformations, is necessarily implied by any existence of any finite string transformation, that attempts to compute the halting
    function, totally, partially, or otherwise

    HHH does exist, u wrote it. therefore must DD does exist, which u also wrote, so theory aligns with evidence

    for any HHH_N, of which there are infinite variations of, that compute difference infinite slices of the total halting function, however
    accurate, there will necessarily be some DD1 analogy for it that is necessarily not in that slice.

    that just is the nature of undecidability within computing, whatcha
    gunna do about it polcott?

    in my opinion the real question we should be asking is which infinite
    slice we're truly interested in, which honestly we've answered quite
    poorly thus far

    Call me skeptical. It just doesn't compute. YMMV.

    Alright, I'm at C:\



    input to a decider then it is not the caller
    of this same decider. One can be a father or
    a son one can fill both roles for the same person.
    One cannot be onerCOs own father.

    it's more akin to cloning itself polcott. and yes machines can do
    this, the technique isn't that complicated


    https://www.liarparadox.org/Peter_Linz_HP_317-320.pdf





    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dart200@user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Fri Nov 6 13:41:21 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 11/6/26 10:45 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 11/6/2026 12:30 PM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/6/26 10:11 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 11/6/2026 12:02 PM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/6/26 9:19 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 11/6/2026 11:12 AM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/6/26 9:05 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 11/6/2026 10:38 AM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/6/26 6:25 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 11/6/2026 1:18 AM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/5/26 6:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    [an input that does the opposite of
    -a-awhat one particular decider outputs]
    -a-ais inherently incoherent.

    If it gets a return value to do the opposite of
    then it is the caller of the decider and not
    the input to this same decider. If it is the

    the paradoxical machine constructs an in memory copy of it's >>>>>>>>>> own definition using a quine, and then submits that copy to >>>>>>>>>> the decider for analysis


    If has never been possible to construct an input that
    does the opposite of what its halt decider reports
    because this do the opposite code is always unreachable.
    The DD that does the opposite of what HHH(DD) reports
    is the caller of HHH(DD) thus not its actual input.

    the DD simulated by HHH is stopped by HHH polcott,

    it does not reach it's natural end state


    Maybe this stuff is just over your head?

    gaslighting me ain't a good look polcott

    HHH as implemented is what causes the DD simulated by HHH to not
    reach it's natural end state


    There does not exist any implementation of C function HHH
    that simulates C function DD according to the operational
    semantics of C such that the simulated C function DD reaches
    its own simulated return statement in any N finite number of
    steps.

    correct, there are other simulators that do reach DDs natural end >>>>>> state, however

    for example: any implementation of EYon as defined by turing in /on >>>>>> computable numbers/


    Not when DD calls this same EYon

    if DD called EYon(DD) instead of HHH(DD)-- lets call this variation
    DD_EYon, -a-athen DD_EYon would be an infinite recursion

    neither the top level DD_EYon, nor any recursively simulated EYon(DD_EYon)
    would halt

    but if EYon calls the original DD that calls HHH, then EYon(DD) halts... >>>>

    Proving that the call to EYon(DD) or HHH(DD) cannot be
    ignored and must form the basis for a correct halt
    decision when applying finite stings transformation
    rules to input static finite strings.

    i apologize, i don't understand the comment


    Computation defined
    Paraphrase of Emil Post definition of computation
    All computations are equivalent applying finite string
    transformation rules to finite string inputs to derive
    any and all outputs.

    Because Post canonical systems are Turing-equivalent,
    anything that cannot be derived by applying finite string
    transformations to finite strings inputs is outside of
    the domain of ChurchrCoTuring computable functions.

    which the total halting function is, and that is the halting theorem in
    a nutshell


    Its this theory of computation definition.





    input to a decider then it is not the caller
    of this same decider. One can be a father or
    a son one can fill both roles for the same person.
    One cannot be onerCOs own father.

    it's more akin to cloning itself polcott. and yes machines can >>>>>>>>>> do this, the technique isn't that complicated


    https://www.liarparadox.org/Peter_Linz_HP_317-320.pdf



















    --
    arising us out of the computing dark ages,
    please excuse my pseudo-pyscript,
    ~ the lil crank that could
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Fri Nov 6 15:50:24 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 11/6/2026 3:41 PM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/6/26 10:45 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 11/6/2026 12:30 PM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/6/26 10:11 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 11/6/2026 12:02 PM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/6/26 9:19 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 11/6/2026 11:12 AM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/6/26 9:05 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 11/6/2026 10:38 AM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/6/26 6:25 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 11/6/2026 1:18 AM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/5/26 6:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    [an input that does the opposite of
    -a-awhat one particular decider outputs]
    -a-ais inherently incoherent.

    If it gets a return value to do the opposite of
    then it is the caller of the decider and not
    the input to this same decider. If it is the

    the paradoxical machine constructs an in memory copy of it's >>>>>>>>>>> own definition using a quine, and then submits that copy to >>>>>>>>>>> the decider for analysis


    If has never been possible to construct an input that
    does the opposite of what its halt decider reports
    because this do the opposite code is always unreachable.
    The DD that does the opposite of what HHH(DD) reports
    is the caller of HHH(DD) thus not its actual input.

    the DD simulated by HHH is stopped by HHH polcott,

    it does not reach it's natural end state


    Maybe this stuff is just over your head?

    gaslighting me ain't a good look polcott

    HHH as implemented is what causes the DD simulated by HHH to not >>>>>>> reach it's natural end state


    There does not exist any implementation of C function HHH
    that simulates C function DD according to the operational
    semantics of C such that the simulated C function DD reaches
    its own simulated return statement in any N finite number of
    steps.

    correct, there are other simulators that do reach DDs natural end >>>>>>> state, however

    for example: any implementation of EYon as defined by turing in /on >>>>>>> computable numbers/


    Not when DD calls this same EYon

    if DD called EYon(DD) instead of HHH(DD)-- lets call this variation >>>>> DD_EYon, -a-athen DD_EYon would be an infinite recursion

    neither the top level DD_EYon, nor any recursively simulated EYon(DD_EYon)
    would halt

    but if EYon calls the original DD that calls HHH, then EYon(DD) halts... >>>>>

    Proving that the call to EYon(DD) or HHH(DD) cannot be
    ignored and must form the basis for a correct halt
    decision when applying finite stings transformation
    rules to input static finite strings.

    i apologize, i don't understand the comment


    Computation defined
    Paraphrase of Emil Post definition of computation
    All computations are equivalent applying finite string
    transformation rules to finite string inputs to derive
    any and all outputs.

    Because Post canonical systems are Turing-equivalent,
    anything that cannot be derived by applying finite string
    transformations to finite strings inputs is outside of
    the domain of ChurchrCoTuring computable functions.

    which the total halting function is, and that is the halting theorem in
    a nutshell


    We are TOTALLY WRONG to start with what math
    wants computations to achieve. We must only
    begin with what finite string transformations
    applied to input finite strings can achieve.


    Its this theory of computation definition.





    input to a decider then it is not the caller
    of this same decider. One can be a father or
    a son one can fill both roles for the same person.
    One cannot be onerCOs own father.

    it's more akin to cloning itself polcott. and yes machines >>>>>>>>>>> can do this, the technique isn't that complicated


    https://www.liarparadox.org/Peter_Linz_HP_317-320.pdf





















    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    Computation(Olcott)
    Paraphrase of Emil Post definition of computation
    All computations are equivalent to the application of finite
    string transformation rules to finite string inputs to derive
    any and all outputs.

    Because Post canonical systems are Turing-equivalent, anything
    that cannot be derived by applying finite string transformations
    to finite strings is outside the scope of ChurchrCoTuring computation.

    Decider(Olcott)
    Correcting the misnomer term-of-the-art: decider
    Every Decider(Olcott) must apply finite string transformation
    inference steps to their finite string inputs that are relevant
    to the decision criteria. It must make its decision on this basis.

    Halt Decider(Olcott)
    Decider(Olcott) entails that Halt Decider(Olcott) H(D) must apply
    finite-string inference steps according to the operational semantics
    of the source-code computation language of D. The only way to determine
    the halting property of a finite string input is to examine the same
    behavior as the behavior of D simulated by H.

    *Succinct refutation of the Halting Theorem* https://github.com/plolcott/x86utm/blob/master/README.md

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of general knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dart200@user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Fri Nov 6 14:39:40 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 11/6/26 1:50 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 11/6/2026 3:41 PM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/6/26 10:45 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 11/6/2026 12:30 PM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/6/26 10:11 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 11/6/2026 12:02 PM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/6/26 9:19 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 11/6/2026 11:12 AM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/6/26 9:05 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 11/6/2026 10:38 AM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/6/26 6:25 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 11/6/2026 1:18 AM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/5/26 6:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    [an input that does the opposite of
    -a-awhat one particular decider outputs]
    -a-ais inherently incoherent.

    If it gets a return value to do the opposite of
    then it is the caller of the decider and not
    the input to this same decider. If it is the

    the paradoxical machine constructs an in memory copy of it's >>>>>>>>>>>> own definition using a quine, and then submits that copy to >>>>>>>>>>>> the decider for analysis


    If has never been possible to construct an input that
    does the opposite of what its halt decider reports
    because this do the opposite code is always unreachable. >>>>>>>>>>> The DD that does the opposite of what HHH(DD) reports
    is the caller of HHH(DD) thus not its actual input.

    the DD simulated by HHH is stopped by HHH polcott,

    it does not reach it's natural end state


    Maybe this stuff is just over your head?

    gaslighting me ain't a good look polcott

    HHH as implemented is what causes the DD simulated by HHH to not >>>>>>>> reach it's natural end state


    There does not exist any implementation of C function HHH
    that simulates C function DD according to the operational
    semantics of C such that the simulated C function DD reaches >>>>>>>>> its own simulated return statement in any N finite number of >>>>>>>>> steps.

    correct, there are other simulators that do reach DDs natural >>>>>>>> end state, however

    for example: any implementation of EYon as defined by turing in /on >>>>>>>> computable numbers/


    Not when DD calls this same EYon

    if DD called EYon(DD) instead of HHH(DD)-- lets call this variation >>>>>> DD_EYon, -a-athen DD_EYon would be an infinite recursion

    neither the top level DD_EYon, nor any recursively simulated EYon(DD_EYon)
    would halt

    but if EYon calls the original DD that calls HHH, then EYon(DD) halts... >>>>>>

    Proving that the call to EYon(DD) or HHH(DD) cannot be
    ignored and must form the basis for a correct halt
    decision when applying finite stings transformation
    rules to input static finite strings.

    i apologize, i don't understand the comment


    Computation defined
    Paraphrase of Emil Post definition of computation
    All computations are equivalent applying finite string
    transformation rules to finite string inputs to derive
    any and all outputs.

    Because Post canonical systems are Turing-equivalent,
    anything that cannot be derived by applying finite string
    transformations to finite strings inputs is outside of
    the domain of ChurchrCoTuring computable functions.

    which the total halting function is, and that is the halting theorem
    in a nutshell


    We are TOTALLY WRONG to start with what math
    wants computations to achieve. We must only
    begin with what finite string transformations
    applied to input finite strings can achieve.

    math is not limited to describing what is computable...

    and i cannot agree that desiring a computable mapping from
    machine->semantics is a unreasonable desire polcott



    Its this theory of computation definition.





    input to a decider then it is not the caller
    of this same decider. One can be a father or
    a son one can fill both roles for the same person.
    One cannot be onerCOs own father.

    it's more akin to cloning itself polcott. and yes machines >>>>>>>>>>>> can do this, the technique isn't that complicated


    https://www.liarparadox.org/Peter_Linz_HP_317-320.pdf >>>>>>>>>>>>>






















    --
    arising us out of the computing dark ages,
    please excuse my pseudo-pyscript,
    ~ the lil crank that could
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Lawrence =?iso-8859-13?q?D=FFOliveiro?=@ldo@nz.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Nov 9 02:43:39 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On Thu, 5 Nov 2026 20:53:26 -0600, olcott wrote:

    [an input that does the opposite of what one particular decider
    outputs] is inherently incoherent.

    You mean rCLlogical contradictionrCY? Of course -- thatrCOs how the proof works: if the starting assumption leads to a nonsensical conclusion,
    and no other fault in the logic can be found, then the assumption (in
    this case, that you *can* create a decision procedure for the halting
    problem) must be wrong.

    This is the essence of a rCLreductio ad absurdumrCY proof.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Sun Nov 8 20:46:19 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 11/8/2026 8:43 PM, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:
    On Thu, 5 Nov 2026 20:53:26 -0600, olcott wrote:

    [an input that does the opposite of what one particular decider
    outputs] is inherently incoherent.

    You mean rCLlogical contradictionrCY?

    An INPUT to a function instance
    that CALLS this same function instance
    is like a guy that is his own father.

    Of course -- thatrCOs how the proof
    works: if the starting assumption leads to a nonsensical conclusion,
    and no other fault in the logic can be found, then the assumption (in
    this case, that you *can* create a decision procedure for the halting problem) must be wrong.

    This is the essence of a rCLreductio ad absurdumrCY proof.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    Computation(Olcott)
    Paraphrase of Emil Post definition of computation
    All computations are equivalent to the application of finite
    string transformation rules to finite string inputs to derive
    any and all outputs.

    Because Post canonical systems are Turing-equivalent, anything
    that cannot be derived by applying finite string transformations
    to finite strings is outside the scope of ChurchrCoTuring computation.

    Decider(Olcott)
    Correcting the misnomer term-of-the-art: decider
    Every Decider(Olcott) must apply finite string transformation
    inference steps to their finite string inputs that are relevant
    to the decision criteria. It must make its decision on this basis.

    Halt Decider(Olcott)
    Decider(Olcott) entails that Halt Decider(Olcott) H(D) must apply
    finite-string inference steps according to the operational semantics
    of the source-code computation language of D. The only way to determine
    the halting property of a finite string input is to examine the same
    behavior as the behavior of D simulated by H.

    *Succinct refutation of the Halting Theorem* https://github.com/plolcott/x86utm/blob/master/README.md

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of general knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Nov 9 08:54:11 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 09/11/2026 02:43, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:
    On Thu, 5 Nov 2026 20:53:26 -0600, olcott wrote:

    [an input that does the opposite of what one particular decider
    outputs] is inherently incoherent.

    You mean rCLlogical contradictionrCY? Of course -- thatrCOs how the proof works: if the starting assumption leads to a nonsensical conclusion,
    and no other fault in the logic can be found, then the assumption (in
    this case, that you *can* create a decision procedure for the halting problem) must be wrong.

    This is the essence of a rCLreductio ad absurdumrCY proof.

    If the starting assumption is not nonsensical already, perhaps, but you
    have an ontology in there:

    1. my meaning
    2. my formalisation attempt of my meaning
    3. (2) is nonsensical
    * 4. my meaning is nonsensical

    The step 3 to 4 is inadmissible, broadly.

    I have realised that ontologies are not monotonic wrt system extensions,
    unlike what we require of theories and morphologies.

    Intuitively I felt that for some time but it previously only appeared as
    an unwillingness to trust what were pushy demands for belief.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2026 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Nov 9 11:00:02 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 06/11/2026 04:53, olcott wrote:
    [an input that does the opposite of
    -awhat one particular decider outputs]
    -ais inherently incoherent.

    If it gets a return value to do the opposite of
    then it is the caller of the decider and not
    the input to this same decider. If it is the
    input to a decider then it is not the caller
    of this same decider. One can be a father or
    a son one can fill both roles for the same person.
    One cannot be onerCOs own father.

    https://www.liarparadox.org/Peter_Linz_HP_317-320.pdf

    That is a straw man deception. What you are talking about is not
    the halting theorem. In particular, the identified incoherence
    is not in the halting theorem.

    Would you honestly want to show an incoherence in the halting
    theorem you would first present the theorem you are going to
    talk about and then identifiy the first sentence that is not
    coherent in the context of the sentences before it. The rest
    of the theorem is irrelevant to the existence of the incoherence
    but are needed because they specify what you are talking about.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Nov 9 09:10:56 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 06/11/2026 02:53, olcott wrote:
    [an input that does the opposite of
    -awhat one particular decider outputs]
    -ais inherently incoherent.

    I continue to reject your acceptance of the explication of "incoherent"
    that you're relying on. It should be rejected and an alternative
    pedagogy that uses a different word should be sought.

    "incoherent" normally describes something like this:

    I went for a short vigourous dream in a cave
    all conditionals wield a hope
    the sun is the yeti's willy and it smells of rancid newt vomit. qed

    The steps do not "stick together": they do not cohere regardless of the
    the yeti's actual degree of access to sexual health services.

    I can't accept that having one /end/ of the chain flapping loose in the infinite tundra of unbounded recursion qualifies as incoherency because
    the end doesn't even exist to fail to stick to something!


    If it gets a return value to do the opposite of
    ^^^^^^^^^^^^
    stateful imperative stack-based programming or message-passing
    emulations of the same is the context?
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2026 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to sci.logic,comp.theory on Mon Nov 9 09:17:34 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 06/11/2026 08:35, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/5/26 11:18 PM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/5/26 6:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    [an input that does the opposite of
    -a-awhat one particular decider outputs]
    -a-ais inherently incoherent.

    If it gets a return value to do the opposite of
    then it is the caller of the decider and not
    the input to this same decider. If it is the

    the paradoxical machine constructs an in memory copy of it's own
    definition using a quine, and then submits that copy to the decider
    for analysis

    the thing u don't understand polcott is that paradoxical machines do not exist by anyone's choice

    They don't exist, in the everyday meaning of the word exist. In the
    sense of being objects of a formal system we never make one. We rely on
    a nontology to fool ourselves.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2026 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic on Mon Nov 9 07:45:06 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 11/9/2026 3:00 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 06/11/2026 04:53, olcott wrote:
    [an input that does the opposite of
    -a-awhat one particular decider outputs]
    -a-ais inherently incoherent.

    If it gets a return value to do the opposite of
    then it is the caller of the decider and not
    the input to this same decider. If it is the
    input to a decider then it is not the caller
    of this same decider. One can be a father or
    a son one can fill both roles for the same person.
    One cannot be onerCOs own father.

    https://www.liarparadox.org/Peter_Linz_HP_317-320.pdf

    That is a straw man deception. What you are talking about is not
    the halting theorem. In particular, the identified incoherence
    is not in the halting theorem.


    An INPUT to a function instance
    that CALLS this same function instance
    is like a guy that is his own father.

    If you think otherwise then write a
    C function that calls a function instance
    and this same C function instance is the
    input to this same called function instance.

    Would you honestly want to show an incoherence in the halting
    theorem you would first present the theorem you are going to
    talk about and then identifiy the first sentence that is not
    coherent in the context of the sentences before it. The rest
    of the theorem is irrelevant to the existence of the incoherence
    but are needed because they specify what you are talking about.


    In order for any function D to do the opposite
    of what another function H reports D must call
    H. This same D instance cannot possibly be the
    actual input to this same called function H instance.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    Computation(Olcott)
    Paraphrase of Emil Post definition of computation
    All computations are equivalent to the application of finite
    string transformation rules to finite string inputs to derive
    any and all outputs.

    Because Post canonical systems are Turing-equivalent, anything
    that cannot be derived by applying finite string transformations
    to finite strings is outside the scope of ChurchrCoTuring computation.

    Decider(Olcott)
    Correcting the misnomer term-of-the-art: decider
    Every Decider(Olcott) must apply finite string transformation
    inference steps to their finite string inputs that are relevant
    to the decision criteria. It must make its decision on this basis.

    Halt Decider(Olcott)
    Decider(Olcott) entails that Halt Decider(Olcott) H(D) must apply
    finite-string inference steps according to the operational semantics
    of the source-code computation language of D. The only way to determine
    the halting property of a finite string input is to examine the same
    behavior as the behavior of D simulated by H.

    *Succinct refutation of the Halting Theorem* https://github.com/plolcott/x86utm/blob/master/README.md

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of general knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Nov 9 07:54:33 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 11/9/2026 3:10 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 06/11/2026 02:53, olcott wrote:
    [an input that does the opposite of
    -awhat one particular decider outputs]
    -ais inherently incoherent.

    I continue to reject your acceptance of the explication of "incoherent"
    that you're relying on. It should be rejected and an alternative
    pedagogy that uses a different word should be sought.

    "incoherent" normally describes something like this:


    An INPUT to a function instance
    that CALLS this same function instance
    is like a guy that is his own father.

    I went for a short vigourous dream in a cave
    all conditionals wield a hope
    the sun is the yeti's willy and it smells of rancid newt vomit. qed

    The steps do not "stick together": they do not cohere regardless of the
    the yeti's actual degree of access to sexual health services.

    I can't accept that having one /end/ of the chain flapping loose in the infinite tundra of unbounded recursion qualifies as incoherency because
    the end doesn't even exist to fail to stick to something!


    If it gets a return value to do the opposite of
    ^^^^^^^^^^^^
    stateful imperative stack-based programming or message-passing
    emulations of the same is the context?



    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    Computation(Olcott)
    Paraphrase of Emil Post definition of computation
    All computations are equivalent to the application of finite
    string transformation rules to finite string inputs to derive
    any and all outputs.

    Because Post canonical systems are Turing-equivalent, anything
    that cannot be derived by applying finite string transformations
    to finite strings is outside the scope of ChurchrCoTuring computation.

    Decider(Olcott)
    Correcting the misnomer term-of-the-art: decider
    Every Decider(Olcott) must apply finite string transformation
    inference steps to their finite string inputs that are relevant
    to the decision criteria. It must make its decision on this basis.

    Halt Decider(Olcott)
    Decider(Olcott) entails that Halt Decider(Olcott) H(D) must apply
    finite-string inference steps according to the operational semantics
    of the source-code computation language of D. The only way to determine
    the halting property of a finite string input is to examine the same
    behavior as the behavior of D simulated by H.

    *Succinct refutation of the Halting Theorem* https://github.com/plolcott/x86utm/blob/master/README.md

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of general knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory on Mon Nov 9 07:57:07 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 11/9/2026 3:17 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 06/11/2026 08:35, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/5/26 11:18 PM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/5/26 6:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    [an input that does the opposite of
    -a-awhat one particular decider outputs]
    -a-ais inherently incoherent.

    If it gets a return value to do the opposite of
    then it is the caller of the decider and not
    the input to this same decider. If it is the

    the paradoxical machine constructs an in memory copy of it's own
    definition using a quine, and then submits that copy to the decider
    for analysis

    the thing u don't understand polcott is that paradoxical machines do not
    exist by anyone's choice

    They don't exist, in the everyday meaning of the word exist. In the
    sense of being objects of a formal system we never make one. We rely on
    a nontology to fool ourselves.



    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false. // copyright 2021 PL Olcott all rights reserved.

    The Liar Paradox exists and Prolog proves that
    it is not grounded in any truth value.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    Computation(Olcott)
    Paraphrase of Emil Post definition of computation
    All computations are equivalent to the application of finite
    string transformation rules to finite string inputs to derive
    any and all outputs.

    Because Post canonical systems are Turing-equivalent, anything
    that cannot be derived by applying finite string transformations
    to finite strings is outside the scope of ChurchrCoTuring computation.

    Decider(Olcott)
    Correcting the misnomer term-of-the-art: decider
    Every Decider(Olcott) must apply finite string transformation
    inference steps to their finite string inputs that are relevant
    to the decision criteria. It must make its decision on this basis.

    Halt Decider(Olcott)
    Decider(Olcott) entails that Halt Decider(Olcott) H(D) must apply
    finite-string inference steps according to the operational semantics
    of the source-code computation language of D. The only way to determine
    the halting property of a finite string input is to examine the same
    behavior as the behavior of D simulated by H.

    *Succinct refutation of the Halting Theorem* https://github.com/plolcott/x86utm/blob/master/README.md

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of general knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dart200@user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory on Mon Nov 9 09:05:42 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 11/9/26 1:17 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 06/11/2026 08:35, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/5/26 11:18 PM, dart200 wrote:
    On 11/5/26 6:53 PM, olcott wrote:
    [an input that does the opposite of
    -a-awhat one particular decider outputs]
    -a-ais inherently incoherent.

    If it gets a return value to do the opposite of
    then it is the caller of the decider and not
    the input to this same decider. If it is the

    the paradoxical machine constructs an in memory copy of it's own
    definition using a quine, and then submits that copy to the decider
    for analysis

    the thing u don't understand polcott is that paradoxical machines do not
    exist by anyone's choice

    They don't exist, in the everyday meaning of the word exist. In the
    sense of being objects of a formal system we never make one. We rely on
    a nontology to fool ourselves.


    yes they do, they exists in the sense of being objects of a formal
    system. DD is an example of one in respect to HHH, both those are real machines polcott implemented.
    --
    arising us out of the computing dark ages,
    please excuse my pseudo-pyscript,
    ~ the lil crank that could
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Lawrence =?iso-8859-13?q?D=FFOliveiro?=@ldo@nz.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Nov 9 22:55:37 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On Mon, 9 Nov 2026 08:54:11 +0000, Tristan Wibberley wrote:

    On 09/11/2026 02:43, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:

    On Thu, 5 Nov 2026 20:53:26 -0600, olcott wrote:

    [an input that does the opposite of what one particular decider
    outputs] is inherently incoherent.

    You mean rCLlogical contradictionrCY? Of course -- thatrCOs how the proof
    works: if the starting assumption leads to a nonsensical
    conclusion, and no other fault in the logic can be found, then the
    assumption (in this case, that you *can* create a decision
    procedure for the halting problem) must be wrong.

    This is the essence of a rCLreductio ad absurdumrCY proof.

    If the starting assumption is not nonsensical already ...

    rCLNonsensicalrCY is not a concept that enters into formal logical
    arguments.

    For example, the square root of 2 can be proven to not be
    representable as a ratio of two integers. The term coined for this new
    sort of number was rCLirrationalrCY. It could just have easily been rCLnonsensicalrCY. But calling them rCLnonsensical numbersrCY doesnrCOt make them any less real.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Lawrence =?iso-8859-13?q?D=FFOliveiro?=@ldo@nz.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory on Mon Nov 9 23:01:36 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On Sun, 8 Nov 2026 20:46:19 -0600, olcott wrote:

    On 11/8/2026 8:43 PM, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:

    On Thu, 5 Nov 2026 20:53:26 -0600, olcott wrote:

    [an input that does the opposite of what one particular decider
    outputs] is inherently incoherent.

    You mean rCLlogical contradictionrCY?

    An INPUT to a function instance that CALLS this same function
    instance is like a guy that is his own father.

    So what? In many common programming languages, functions are indeed rCLfirst-class objectsrCY, which means they can be passed to functions as arguments, and returned as results. There is a whole mathematical
    theory (++-calculus) that makes heavy use of this sort of thing. Which
    is of course computationally equivalent to Turing machines anyway.

    You seem to be obsessed with expressing everything in C that compiles
    to x86 code. If you take a step back from that and consider other,
    higher-level languages, you might discover other interesting concepts,
    like the Y-combinator
    <https://www.playfulpython.com/y-combinator-in-python/>.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory on Mon Nov 9 17:18:45 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 11/9/2026 5:01 PM, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:
    On Sun, 8 Nov 2026 20:46:19 -0600, olcott wrote:

    On 11/8/2026 8:43 PM, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:

    On Thu, 5 Nov 2026 20:53:26 -0600, olcott wrote:

    [an input that does the opposite of what one particular decider
    outputs] is inherently incoherent.

    You mean rCLlogical contradictionrCY?

    An INPUT to a function instance that CALLS this same function
    instance is like a guy that is his own father.

    So what?
    The specified counter-example that the HP proof depends on

    an INPUT to a function that CALLS this same function
    cannot coherently exist even as an abstract object.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    Computation(Olcott)
    Paraphrase of Emil Post definition of computation
    All computations are equivalent to the application of finite
    string transformation rules to finite string inputs to derive
    any and all outputs.

    Because Post canonical systems are Turing-equivalent, anything
    that cannot be derived by applying finite string transformations
    to finite strings is outside the scope of ChurchrCoTuring computation.

    Decider(Olcott)
    Correcting the misnomer term-of-the-art: decider
    Every Decider(Olcott) must apply finite string transformation
    inference steps to their finite string inputs that are relevant
    to the decision criteria. It must make its decision on this basis.

    Halt Decider(Olcott)
    Decider(Olcott) entails that Halt Decider(Olcott) H(D) must apply
    finite-string inference steps according to the operational semantics
    of the source-code computation language of D. The only way to determine
    the halting property of a finite string input is to examine the same
    behavior as the behavior of D simulated by H.

    *Succinct refutation of the Halting Theorem* https://github.com/plolcott/x86utm/blob/master/README.md

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of general knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Chris M. Thomasson@chris.m.thomasson.1@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Nov 9 15:19:05 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 11/9/2026 2:55 PM, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:
    On Mon, 9 Nov 2026 08:54:11 +0000, Tristan Wibberley wrote:

    On 09/11/2026 02:43, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:

    On Thu, 5 Nov 2026 20:53:26 -0600, olcott wrote:

    [an input that does the opposite of what one particular decider
    outputs] is inherently incoherent.

    You mean rCLlogical contradictionrCY? Of course -- thatrCOs how the proof >>> works: if the starting assumption leads to a nonsensical
    conclusion, and no other fault in the logic can be found, then the
    assumption (in this case, that you *can* create a decision
    procedure for the halting problem) must be wrong.

    This is the essence of a rCLreductio ad absurdumrCY proof.

    If the starting assumption is not nonsensical already ...

    rCLNonsensicalrCY is not a concept that enters into formal logical
    arguments.

    For example, the square root of 2 can be proven to not be
    representable as a ratio of two integers.

    Infinite convergents of continued fractions are pretty fun.



    The term coined for this new
    sort of number was rCLirrationalrCY. It could just have easily been rCLnonsensicalrCY. But calling them rCLnonsensical numbersrCY doesnrCOt make them any less real.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Chris M. Thomasson@chris.m.thomasson.1@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Nov 9 15:20:54 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 11/9/2026 3:19 PM, Chris M. Thomasson wrote:
    On 11/9/2026 2:55 PM, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:
    On Mon, 9 Nov 2026 08:54:11 +0000, Tristan Wibberley wrote:

    On 09/11/2026 02:43, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:

    On Thu, 5 Nov 2026 20:53:26 -0600, olcott wrote:

    [an input that does the opposite of what one particular decider
    outputs] is inherently incoherent.

    You mean rCLlogical contradictionrCY? Of course -- thatrCOs how the proof >>>> works: if the starting assumption leads to a nonsensical
    conclusion, and no other fault in the logic can be found, then the
    assumption (in this case, that you *can* create a decision
    procedure for the halting problem) must be wrong.

    This is the essence of a rCLreductio ad absurdumrCY proof.

    If the starting assumption is not nonsensical already ...

    rCLNonsensicalrCY is not a concept that enters into formal logical
    arguments.

    For example, the square root of 2 can be proven to not be
    representable as a ratio of two integers.

    Infinite convergents of continued fractions are pretty fun.

    There is no single rational for sqrt(2), but there are infinite
    rationals that can take ever better finite views of it...





    The term coined for this new
    sort of number was rCLirrationalrCY. It could just have easily been
    rCLnonsensicalrCY. But calling them rCLnonsensical numbersrCY doesnrCOt make >> them any less real.


    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Lawrence =?iso-8859-13?q?D=FFOliveiro?=@ldo@nz.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory on Tue Nov 10 00:17:55 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On Mon, 9 Nov 2026 17:18:45 -0600, olcott wrote:

    On 11/9/2026 5:01 PM, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:

    On Sun, 8 Nov 2026 20:46:19 -0600, olcott wrote:

    On 11/8/2026 8:43 PM, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:

    On Thu, 5 Nov 2026 20:53:26 -0600, olcott wrote:

    [an input that does the opposite of what one particular decider
    outputs] is inherently incoherent.

    You mean rCLlogical contradictionrCY?

    An INPUT to a function instance that CALLS this same function
    instance is like a guy that is his own father.

    So what?

    The specified counter-example that the HP proof depends on an INPUT
    to a function that CALLS this same function cannot coherently exist
    even as an abstract object.

    Trivial example in Python:

    def f(f) :
    return f

    print(f(f))

    It exists as a concrete object. Try it on your own computer if you
    donrCOt believe me.

    Actual run:

    Python 3.14.9 (main, Oct 23 2026, 16:12:59) [GCC 16.2.0] on linux
    Type "help", "copyright", "credits" or "license" for more information.
    >>> def f(f) :
    ... return f
    ...
    >>> print(f(f) is f)
    True
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Python@jpierre.messager@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory on Tue Nov 10 00:24:58 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    Le 10/11/2026 |a 01:17, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro a |-crit :
    On Mon, 9 Nov 2026 17:18:45 -0600, olcott wrote:

    On 11/9/2026 5:01 PM, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:

    On Sun, 8 Nov 2026 20:46:19 -0600, olcott wrote:

    On 11/8/2026 8:43 PM, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:

    On Thu, 5 Nov 2026 20:53:26 -0600, olcott wrote:

    [an input that does the opposite of what one particular decider
    outputs] is inherently incoherent.

    You mean rCLlogical contradictionrCY?

    An INPUT to a function instance that CALLS this same function
    instance is like a guy that is his own father.

    So what?

    The specified counter-example that the HP proof depends on an INPUT
    to a function that CALLS this same function cannot coherently exist
    even as an abstract object.

    Trivial example in Python:

    def f(f) :
    return f

    print(f(f))

    It exists as a concrete object. Try it on your own computer if you
    donrCOt believe me.

    Actual run:

    Python 3.14.9 (main, Oct 23 2026, 16:12:59) [GCC 16.2.0] on linux
    Type "help", "copyright", "credits" or "license" for more information.
    >>> def f(f) :
    ... return f
    ...
    >>> print(f(f) is f)
    True

    Case in point.


    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to comp.theory,sci.logic on Tue Nov 10 09:51:27 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 09/11/2026 15:45, olcott wrote:
    On 11/9/2026 3:00 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 06/11/2026 04:53, olcott wrote:
    [an input that does the opposite of
    -a-awhat one particular decider outputs]
    -a-ais inherently incoherent.

    If it gets a return value to do the opposite of
    then it is the caller of the decider and not
    the input to this same decider. If it is the
    input to a decider then it is not the caller
    of this same decider. One can be a father or
    a son one can fill both roles for the same person.
    One cannot be onerCOs own father.

    https://www.liarparadox.org/Peter_Linz_HP_317-320.pdf

    That is a straw man deception. What you are talking about is not
    the halting theorem. In particular, the identified incoherence
    is not in the halting theorem.

    An INPUT to a function instance
    that CALLS this same function instance
    is like a guy that is his own father.

    Irrelevant. There is nothing obout calls and instances in the
    halting theorem.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory on Tue Nov 10 09:02:20 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 11/10/2026 1:51 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 09/11/2026 15:45, olcott wrote:
    On 11/9/2026 3:00 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 06/11/2026 04:53, olcott wrote:
    [an input that does the opposite of
    -a-awhat one particular decider outputs]
    -a-ais inherently incoherent.

    If it gets a return value to do the opposite of
    then it is the caller of the decider and not
    the input to this same decider. If it is the
    input to a decider then it is not the caller
    of this same decider. One can be a father or
    a son one can fill both roles for the same person.
    One cannot be onerCOs own father.

    https://www.liarparadox.org/Peter_Linz_HP_317-320.pdf

    That is a straw man deception. What you are talking about is not
    the halting theorem. In particular, the identified incoherence
    is not in the halting theorem.

    An INPUT to a function instance
    that CALLS this same function instance
    is like a guy that is his own father.

    Irrelevant. There is nothing obout calls and instances in the
    halting theorem.


    The impossible INPUT does the opposite of its own decider.
    The only way to do that is the INPUT must also the the CALLER.
    That IS the same as being one's own father.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    Computation(Olcott)
    Paraphrase of Emil Post definition of computation
    All computations are equivalent to the application of finite
    string transformation rules to finite string inputs to derive
    any and all outputs.

    Because Post canonical systems are Turing-equivalent, anything
    that cannot be derived by applying finite string transformations
    to finite strings is outside the scope of ChurchrCoTuring computation.

    Decider(Olcott)
    Correcting the misnomer term-of-the-art: decider
    Every Decider(Olcott) must apply finite string transformation
    inference steps to their finite string inputs that are relevant
    to the decision criteria. It must make its decision on this basis.

    Halt Decider(Olcott)
    Decider(Olcott) entails that Halt Decider(Olcott) H(D) must apply
    finite-string inference steps according to the operational semantics
    of the source-code computation language of D. The only way to determine
    the halting property of a finite string input is to examine the same
    behavior as the behavior of D simulated by H.

    *Succinct refutation of the Halting Theorem* https://github.com/plolcott/x86utm/blob/master/README.md

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of general knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to comp.theory on Wed Nov 11 10:52:09 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/11/2026 17:02, olcott wrote:
    On 11/10/2026 1:51 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 09/11/2026 15:45, olcott wrote:
    On 11/9/2026 3:00 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 06/11/2026 04:53, olcott wrote:
    [an input that does the opposite of
    -a-awhat one particular decider outputs]
    -a-ais inherently incoherent.

    If it gets a return value to do the opposite of
    then it is the caller of the decider and not
    the input to this same decider. If it is the
    input to a decider then it is not the caller
    of this same decider. One can be a father or
    a son one can fill both roles for the same person.
    One cannot be onerCOs own father.

    https://www.liarparadox.org/Peter_Linz_HP_317-320.pdf

    That is a straw man deception. What you are talking about is not
    the halting theorem. In particular, the identified incoherence
    is not in the halting theorem.

    An INPUT to a function instance
    that CALLS this same function instance
    is like a guy that is his own father.

    Irrelevant. There is nothing obout calls and instances in the
    halting theorem.

    The impossible INPUT does the opposite of its own decider.

    Irrelevant. The halting theorem says nothing about any impossible
    imput or doing the opposite. It doesn't even say anyting about any
    "own" decider but only generally about all halting deciders.
    --
    Mikko

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Ross Finlayson@ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Nov 11 07:27:41 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 11/08/2026 06:43 PM, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:
    On Thu, 5 Nov 2026 20:53:26 -0600, olcott wrote:

    [an input that does the opposite of what one particular decider
    outputs] is inherently incoherent.

    You mean rCLlogical contradictionrCY? Of course -- thatrCOs how the proof works: if the starting assumption leads to a nonsensical conclusion,
    and no other fault in the logic can be found, then the assumption (in
    this case, that you *can* create a decision procedure for the halting problem) must be wrong.

    This is the essence of a rCLreductio ad absurdumrCY proof.


    Some care must be taken in reasoning about "tertium non datur",
    that any statement is only true or false and no third ground,
    and, "ex falso quodlibet", out of fallacy anything, with
    regards "tertium datur", there is a third ground, and "ex falso
    nihilum", a fallacy was already not true, about logical contradiction,
    and various accounts of _inductive_ inference, as for monotonicity
    and entailment what follows, about the "riddles" or "fallacies" or
    "paradoxes" of inductive inference, and the "invincible ignorance
    of inductive inference", when it's _deductive_ inference that provides
    grounds for the account, and when that's the only way, that
    "super-classical reasoning is involved". Then, "classical logic", isn't necessarily the 20'th century account with "quasi-modal logic"
    and "material implication", like after Russell since Philo and
    Plotinus, since "classical logic" is modal or since Aristotle then
    Chrysippus the "moods" the "mood-al", making a modal, and thusly
    temporal, then "relevance" logic, about reasons why then:
    some "constructivists", in mathematics or logic, they don't
    accept "proof by contradiction", since, it's just less wrong.


    About "reductio ad absurdam" then "reduction ad infinitum", are
    two different accounts about the same thing, one "away" and the
    other "to" somewhere, away from zero or to infinity. Then, the
    "double reductio" is an account of mutual and complementary
    considerations, since induction by itself is "weak induction",
    what must be so to make "strong induction", which reasoners about
    reason over time often give to the "a priori", yet that often enough
    since "Zeno's classical expositions of the super-classical", start
    with things like the geometric series.


    So, it's not just that "no other flaw in the logic may be found",
    it's also that the stipulations also can't be wrong, then that's
    a chicken-and-egg scenario of "ad absurdam", then for the "ab absurdam".

    Surds are forms. So, reasoning is its own forms or surds, then
    the "ab-surd" usually means that there's a real true absolute
    world of objective forms, then reasoning is subjective or relative
    while on its own account objective to the individual, thus that
    the "ab-surd" is as "from the forms", then that usually enough
    the "ad absurdam" is "to-the out-of (the forms)", while "ab absurdam"
    is rather sort of what accounts "arriving-from (the forms)".


    Then the Halting Problem or Branching Problem, those being considered equivalent in lots of ways, besides that somebody like Turing says
    "well, you've heard of Turing tapes, yet in the real world nothing
    is finitistic it's continuous", then about Boolos & Jeffreys or the
    usual account of ordinary theory's approach to the _infinite_ since
    the problems about these are what happens in _the infinite_, well,
    it's sad since they have "non-classical logic", which if you bother
    to go looking sees murmured "well, there's contradictions, ...",
    instead of the "extra-ordinary", since _infinity_ isn't _ordinary_
    besides that it's "axiomatized" or _stipulated_ so, that infinity
    is _extra_ ordinary and thusly lives under _super-classical_ reasoning.



    Anyways the polcott is kind of like a howler-troll, where a mathematical "howler" is some broken thing like "1 + 1 = 11",
    though that could be in unary, then being a troll and being
    inconstant, and not keeping definitions, then one can point out
    that the usual "classical logic" of the 20'th century is also,
    since it claims "entailment" and "monotonicity" as maintaining
    reason, yet, quasi-modal logic has "see rule 1" and "last wins",
    like for example the proof-by-contradiction bit there.


    The problems with proof-by-contradiction after the problems of
    induction, then then for the reduction and double-reductio about
    them, still has that the contrapositive is always so, i.e. that
    "(A -> B) -> (not B -> not A)", that _direct_ implication with
    causality is always so, there's that "material implication" with
    "false antecedent" or "false consequent", it's false.


    So, anyways, for Halting Theorem to be consistent, then models of
    arithmetic need to be coherent, and when there's not a standard
    model of arithmetic at all, only fragments or extensions, then
    about at least three "laws of large numbers", it's super-classical
    logic not non-classical logic that needs make it reasonable, and so.


    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Ross Finlayson@ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Nov 11 07:34:27 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 11/09/2026 02:55 PM, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:
    On Mon, 9 Nov 2026 08:54:11 +0000, Tristan Wibberley wrote:

    On 09/11/2026 02:43, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:

    On Thu, 5 Nov 2026 20:53:26 -0600, olcott wrote:

    [an input that does the opposite of what one particular decider
    outputs] is inherently incoherent.

    You mean rCLlogical contradictionrCY? Of course -- thatrCOs how the proof >>> works: if the starting assumption leads to a nonsensical
    conclusion, and no other fault in the logic can be found, then the
    assumption (in this case, that you *can* create a decision
    procedure for the halting problem) must be wrong.

    This is the essence of a rCLreductio ad absurdumrCY proof.

    If the starting assumption is not nonsensical already ...

    rCLNonsensicalrCY is not a concept that enters into formal logical
    arguments.

    For example, the square root of 2 can be proven to not be
    representable as a ratio of two integers. The term coined for this new
    sort of number was rCLirrationalrCY. It could just have easily been rCLnonsensicalrCY. But calling them rCLnonsensical numbersrCY doesnrCOt make them any less real.



    The term "ir-rational" as "not rational, like a rational number a
    number yet not a ratio", like the term "ab-surd", "from the forms",
    and whether that means formless or fleeting in a world of form,
    "imaginary" isn't much better, since it's as much "a branch of
    the operations of even roots to the negative numbers", just like
    "negative" numbers are "a branch of the operations of subtraction
    to the non-negative numbers", here there's that for the "reductio",
    then there's the "double-reductio", and what's made for usually
    the projection into the branches and what isn't necessarily not so,
    then for "checking" that it's real again the solutions and so on.


    About perfect circles and straight lines and right angles,
    most people agree those are ideals, then as about whether
    that mathematical ideals exist, will accept rational arithmetic,
    about ratios, mostly though only sums.

    Yet, arithmetic is via "increment", or "partition", or as
    "Sumerian or Egyptian", most people know they can start either
    way then that the odds are off, arithmetic.


    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Ross Finlayson@ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Nov 11 07:47:22 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 11/11/2026 07:27 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
    On 11/08/2026 06:43 PM, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:
    On Thu, 5 Nov 2026 20:53:26 -0600, olcott wrote:

    [an input that does the opposite of what one particular decider
    outputs] is inherently incoherent.

    You mean rCLlogical contradictionrCY? Of course -- thatrCOs how the proof
    works: if the starting assumption leads to a nonsensical conclusion,
    and no other fault in the logic can be found, then the assumption (in
    this case, that you *can* create a decision procedure for the halting
    problem) must be wrong.

    This is the essence of a rCLreductio ad absurdumrCY proof.


    Some care must be taken in reasoning about "tertium non datur",
    that any statement is only true or false and no third ground,
    and, "ex falso quodlibet", out of fallacy anything, with
    regards "tertium datur", there is a third ground, and "ex falso
    nihilum", a fallacy was already not true, about logical contradiction,
    and various accounts of _inductive_ inference, as for monotonicity
    and entailment what follows, about the "riddles" or "fallacies" or "paradoxes" of inductive inference, and the "invincible ignorance
    of inductive inference", when it's _deductive_ inference that provides grounds for the account, and when that's the only way, that
    "super-classical reasoning is involved". Then, "classical logic", isn't necessarily the 20'th century account with "quasi-modal logic"
    and "material implication", like after Russell since Philo and
    Plotinus, since "classical logic" is modal or since Aristotle then
    Chrysippus the "moods" the "mood-al", making a modal, and thusly
    temporal, then "relevance" logic, about reasons why then:
    some "constructivists", in mathematics or logic, they don't
    accept "proof by contradiction", since, it's just less wrong.


    About "reductio ad absurdam" then "reduction ad infinitum", are
    two different accounts about the same thing, one "away" and the
    other "to" somewhere, away from zero or to infinity. Then, the
    "double reductio" is an account of mutual and complementary
    considerations, since induction by itself is "weak induction",
    what must be so to make "strong induction", which reasoners about
    reason over time often give to the "a priori", yet that often enough
    since "Zeno's classical expositions of the super-classical", start
    with things like the geometric series.


    So, it's not just that "no other flaw in the logic may be found",
    it's also that the stipulations also can't be wrong, then that's
    a chicken-and-egg scenario of "ad absurdam", then for the "ab absurdam".

    Surds are forms. So, reasoning is its own forms or surds, then
    the "ab-surd" usually means that there's a real true absolute
    world of objective forms, then reasoning is subjective or relative
    while on its own account objective to the individual, thus that
    the "ab-surd" is as "from the forms", then that usually enough
    the "ad absurdam" is "to-the out-of (the forms)", while "ab absurdam"
    is rather sort of what accounts "arriving-from (the forms)".


    Then the Halting Problem or Branching Problem, those being considered equivalent in lots of ways, besides that somebody like Turing says
    "well, you've heard of Turing tapes, yet in the real world nothing
    is finitistic it's continuous", then about Boolos & Jeffreys or the
    usual account of ordinary theory's approach to the _infinite_ since
    the problems about these are what happens in _the infinite_, well,
    it's sad since they have "non-classical logic", which if you bother
    to go looking sees murmured "well, there's contradictions, ...",
    instead of the "extra-ordinary", since _infinity_ isn't _ordinary_
    besides that it's "axiomatized" or _stipulated_ so, that infinity
    is _extra_ ordinary and thusly lives under _super-classical_ reasoning.



    Anyways the polcott is kind of like a howler-troll, where a mathematical "howler" is some broken thing like "1 + 1 = 11",
    though that could be in unary, then being a troll and being
    inconstant, and not keeping definitions, then one can point out
    that the usual "classical logic" of the 20'th century is also,
    since it claims "entailment" and "monotonicity" as maintaining
    reason, yet, quasi-modal logic has "see rule 1" and "last wins",
    like for example the proof-by-contradiction bit there.


    The problems with proof-by-contradiction after the problems of
    induction, then then for the reduction and double-reductio about
    them, still has that the contrapositive is always so, i.e. that
    "(A -> B) -> (not B -> not A)", that _direct_ implication with
    causality is always so, there's that "material implication" with
    "false antecedent" or "false consequent", it's false.


    So, anyways, for Halting Theorem to be consistent, then models of
    arithmetic need to be coherent, and when there's not a standard
    model of arithmetic at all, only fragments or extensions, then
    about at least three "laws of large numbers", it's super-classical
    logic not non-classical logic that needs make it reasonable, and so.



    The "ad absurdam" done properly is "meeting the forms", not,
    "decimating the forms", some forms as "a priori" exist,
    "ad infinitum".


    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Nov 12 14:56:35 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 09/11/2026 22:55, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:
    On Mon, 9 Nov 2026 08:54:11 +0000, Tristan Wibberley wrote:

    On 09/11/2026 02:43, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:

    On Thu, 5 Nov 2026 20:53:26 -0600, olcott wrote:

    [an input that does the opposite of what one particular decider
    outputs] is inherently incoherent.

    You mean rCLlogical contradictionrCY? Of course -- thatrCOs how the proof >>> works: if the starting assumption leads to a nonsensical
    conclusion, and no other fault in the logic can be found, then the
    assumption (in this case, that you *can* create a decision
    procedure for the halting problem) must be wrong.

    This is the essence of a rCLreductio ad absurdumrCY proof.

    If the starting assumption is not nonsensical already ...

    rCLNonsensicalrCY is not a concept that enters into formal logical
    arguments.


    It's one that enters into your arguments (from above):

    On 09/11/2026 02:43, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:
    ...
    ... if the starting assumption leads to a nonsensical
    conclusion ...
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2026 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to sci.logic,comp.theory on Thu Nov 12 15:38:46 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 09/11/2026 23:01, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:
    On Sun, 8 Nov 2026 20:46:19 -0600, olcott wrote:

    On 11/8/2026 8:43 PM, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:

    On Thu, 5 Nov 2026 20:53:26 -0600, olcott wrote:

    [an input that does the opposite of what one particular decider
    outputs] is inherently incoherent.

    You mean rCLlogical contradictionrCY?

    An INPUT to a function instance that CALLS this same function
    instance is like a guy that is his own father.

    So what? In many common programming languages, functions are indeed rCLfirst-class objectsrCY, which means they can be passed to functions as arguments, and returned as results.

    the lambda expressions of Church's lambda calculus are not functions,
    and they're definitely not procedures neither with nor without special
    "out" parameters to approximate the notion of valuation but there /are/
    useful and popular correspondences that are poorly expositioned on the interwebs.



    There is a whole mathematical
    theory (++-calculus) that makes heavy use of this sort of thing. Which
    is of course computationally equivalent to Turing machines anyway.

    ah, well... specially, perhaps, but not exactly. That's like saying the internet is just a series of tubes.



    You seem to be obsessed with expressing everything in C that compiles
    to x86 code. If you take a step back from that and consider other, higher-level languages, you might discover other interesting concepts,
    like the Y-combinator <https://www.playfulpython.com/y-combinator-in-python/>.

    I wouldn't want to pretend I was using the y-combinator in python: I'd
    probably be covertly using wikipedia's x-combinator instead and get
    myself a whole load of accidental strictness that makes everything nonnormalising.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2026 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Lawrence =?iso-8859-13?q?D=FFOliveiro?=@ldo@nz.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Sat Nov 14 03:25:19 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On Wed, 11 Nov 2026 07:27:41 -0800, Ross Finlayson wrote:

    On 11/08/2026 06:43 PM, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:

    On Thu, 5 Nov 2026 20:53:26 -0600, olcott wrote:

    [an input that does the opposite of what one particular decider
    outputs] is inherently incoherent.

    You mean rCLlogical contradictionrCY? Of course -- thatrCOs how the proof
    works: if the starting assumption leads to a nonsensical
    conclusion, and no other fault in the logic can be found, then the
    assumption (in this case, that you *can* create a decision
    procedure for the halting problem) must be wrong.

    This is the essence of a rCLreductio ad absurdumrCY proof.

    Some care must be taken in reasoning about "tertium non datur", that
    any statement is only true or false and no third ground ...

    Even if that were not true, it would not logically follow that there
    *was* a third ground ...
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Fri Nov 13 21:50:57 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 11/13/2026 9:25 PM, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:
    On Wed, 11 Nov 2026 07:27:41 -0800, Ross Finlayson wrote:

    On 11/08/2026 06:43 PM, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:

    On Thu, 5 Nov 2026 20:53:26 -0600, olcott wrote:

    [an input that does the opposite of what one particular decider
    outputs] is inherently incoherent.

    You mean rCLlogical contradictionrCY? Of course -- thatrCOs how the proof >>> works: if the starting assumption leads to a nonsensical
    conclusion, and no other fault in the logic can be found, then the
    assumption (in this case, that you *can* create a decision
    procedure for the halting problem) must be wrong.

    This is the essence of a rCLreductio ad absurdumrCY proof.

    Some care must be taken in reasoning about "tertium non datur", that
    any statement is only true or false and no third ground ...

    Even if that were not true, it would not logically follow that there
    *was* a third ground ...

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    What truth value does that Prolog code determine
    that its formalized Liar Paradox is grounded it?
    (Quick answer Kripke 1975 ungrounded)
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    Computation(Olcott)
    Paraphrase of Emil Post definition of computation
    All computations are equivalent to the application of finite
    string transformation rules to finite string inputs to derive
    any and all outputs.

    Because Post canonical systems are Turing-equivalent, anything
    that cannot be derived by applying finite string transformations
    to finite strings is outside the scope of ChurchrCoTuring computation.

    Decider(Olcott)
    Correcting the misnomer term-of-the-art: decider
    Every Decider(Olcott) must apply finite string transformation
    inference steps to their finite string inputs that are relevant
    to the decision criteria. It must make its decision on this basis.

    Halt Decider(Olcott)
    Decider(Olcott) entails that Halt Decider(Olcott) H(D) must apply
    finite-string inference steps according to the operational semantics
    of the source-code computation language of D. The only way to determine
    the halting property of a finite string input is to examine the same
    behavior as the behavior of D simulated by H.

    *Succinct refutation of the Halting Theorem* https://github.com/plolcott/x86utm/blob/master/README.md

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of general knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Sat Nov 14 11:09:17 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 14/11/2026 05:50, olcott wrote:
    On 11/13/2026 9:25 PM, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:
    On Wed, 11 Nov 2026 07:27:41 -0800, Ross Finlayson wrote:

    On 11/08/2026 06:43 PM, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:

    On Thu, 5 Nov 2026 20:53:26 -0600, olcott wrote:

    [an input that does the opposite of what one particular decider
    outputs] is inherently incoherent.

    You mean rCLlogical contradictionrCY? Of course -- thatrCOs how the proof >>>> works: if the starting assumption leads to a nonsensical
    conclusion, and no other fault in the logic can be found, then the
    assumption (in this case, that you *can* create a decision
    procedure for the halting problem) must be wrong.

    This is the essence of a rCLreductio ad absurdumrCY proof.

    Some care must be taken in reasoning about "tertium non datur", that
    any statement is only true or false and no third ground ...

    Even if that were not true, it would not logically follow that there
    *was* a third ground ...

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    What truth value does that Prolog code determine
    that its formalized Liar Paradox is grounded it?
    (Quick answer Kripke 1975 ungrounded)

    Prolog does not know or care about Liar's Paradox. The truth that unify_with_occurs_check/2 detects but =/2 may fail to detect is
    that the unification of LP with not(true(LP)) creates a cyclic
    data structure.
    --
    Mikko

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory on Sat Nov 14 08:16:05 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 11/14/2026 3:09 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 14/11/2026 05:50, olcott wrote:
    On 11/13/2026 9:25 PM, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:
    On Wed, 11 Nov 2026 07:27:41 -0800, Ross Finlayson wrote:

    On 11/08/2026 06:43 PM, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:

    On Thu, 5 Nov 2026 20:53:26 -0600, olcott wrote:

    [an input that does the opposite of what one particular decider
    outputs] is inherently incoherent.

    You mean rCLlogical contradictionrCY? Of course -- thatrCOs how the proof >>>>> works: if the starting assumption leads to a nonsensical
    conclusion, and no other fault in the logic can be found, then the
    assumption (in this case, that you *can* create a decision
    procedure for the halting problem) must be wrong.

    This is the essence of a rCLreductio ad absurdumrCY proof.

    Some care must be taken in reasoning about "tertium non datur", that
    any statement is only true or false and no third ground ...

    Even if that were not true, it would not logically follow that there
    *was* a third ground ...

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    What truth value does that Prolog code determine
    that its formalized Liar Paradox is grounded it?
    (Quick answer Kripke 1975 ungrounded)

    Prolog does not know or care about Liar's Paradox. The truth that unify_with_occurs_check/2 detects but =/2 may fail to detect is
    that the unification of LP with not(true(LP)) creates a cyclic
    data structure.


    BZZZT Wrong Answer.
    The the directed graphs of the evaluation sequence
    of the formalized Liar Paradox in Prolog has a cycle
    thus is stuck in infinite recursion.

    Outline of a Theory of Truth
    Saul Kripke
    The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 72, No. 19,
    Seventy-Second Annual Meeting American
    Philosophical Association, Eastern Division.
    (Nov. 6, 1975), pp. 690-716

    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf
    Kripke comes up with the exact same truth value
    of "undefined" as my above Prolog code.

    Proof Theoretic Semantics also derives this
    same result.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    Computation(Olcott)
    Paraphrase of Emil Post definition of computation
    All computations are equivalent to the application of finite
    string transformation rules to finite string inputs to derive
    any and all outputs.

    Because Post canonical systems are Turing-equivalent, anything
    that cannot be derived by applying finite string transformations
    to finite strings is outside the scope of ChurchrCoTuring computation.

    Decider(Olcott)
    Correcting the misnomer term-of-the-art: decider
    Every Decider(Olcott) must apply finite string transformation
    inference steps to their finite string inputs that are relevant
    to the decision criteria. It must make its decision on this basis.

    Halt Decider(Olcott)
    Decider(Olcott) entails that Halt Decider(Olcott) H(D) must apply
    finite-string inference steps according to the operational semantics
    of the source-code computation language of D. The only way to determine
    the halting property of a finite string input is to examine the same
    behavior as the behavior of D simulated by H.

    *Succinct refutation of the Halting Theorem* https://github.com/plolcott/x86utm/blob/master/README.md

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of general knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Python@jpierre.messager@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory on Sat Nov 14 14:26:08 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    Le 14/11/2026 |a 15:16, olcott a |-crit :
    On 11/14/2026 3:09 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 14/11/2026 05:50, olcott wrote:
    On 11/13/2026 9:25 PM, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:
    On Wed, 11 Nov 2026 07:27:41 -0800, Ross Finlayson wrote:

    On 11/08/2026 06:43 PM, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:

    On Thu, 5 Nov 2026 20:53:26 -0600, olcott wrote:

    [an input that does the opposite of what one particular decider
    outputs] is inherently incoherent.

    You mean rCLlogical contradictionrCY? Of course -- thatrCOs how the proof
    works: if the starting assumption leads to a nonsensical
    conclusion, and no other fault in the logic can be found, then the >>>>>> assumption (in this case, that you *can* create a decision
    procedure for the halting problem) must be wrong.

    This is the essence of a rCLreductio ad absurdumrCY proof.

    Some care must be taken in reasoning about "tertium non datur", that >>>>> any statement is only true or false and no third ground ...

    Even if that were not true, it would not logically follow that there
    *was* a third ground ...

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    What truth value does that Prolog code determine
    that its formalized Liar Paradox is grounded it?
    (Quick answer Kripke 1975 ungrounded)

    Prolog does not know or care about Liar's Paradox. The truth that
    unify_with_occurs_check/2 detects but =/2 may fail to detect is
    that the unification of LP with not(true(LP)) creates a cyclic
    data structure.


    BZZZT Wrong Answer.
    The the directed graphs of the evaluation sequence
    of the formalized Liar Paradox in Prolog has a cycle
    thus is stuck in infinite recursion.

    Outline of a Theory of Truth
    Saul Kripke
    The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 72, No. 19,
    Seventy-Second Annual Meeting American
    Philosophical Association, Eastern Division.
    (Nov. 6, 1975), pp. 690-716


    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf
    Kripke comes up with the exact same truth value
    of "undefined" as my above Prolog code.

    Proof Theoretic Semantics also derives this
    same result.

    Peter,

    "BZZZT Wrong Answer."

    No, Peter. Mikko's answer is EXACTLY correct.

    "?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false."

    This does NOT assign the truth value "undefined" to the Liar Paradox.

    It means that the UNIFICATION FAILED.

    Specifically, the occurs check prevents a variable from being unified with
    a term containing that same variable.

    THAT IS A PROPERTY OF TERM UNIFICATION.

    NOT A THEORY OF TRUTH.

    Your first query:

    LP = not(true(LP)).

    may construct a cyclic term in Prolog implementations supporting rational trees.

    Your second query rejects that cyclic construction.

    NEITHER QUERY EVALUATES THE TRUTH OF THE LIAR SENTENCE.

    And neither establishes that a recursive computation must run forever.

    "Kripke comes up with the exact same truth value
    of 'undefined' as my above Prolog code."

    NO.

    Kripke's 1975 theory constructs partial interpretations of a truth
    predicate. In the relevant fixed-point semantics, the Liar sentence is ungrounded and receives no classical truth value.

    That is a SEMANTIC result.

    Prolog's `false` is a COMPUTATIONAL result: a particular unification goal failed.

    THE TWO ARE NOT THE SAME.

    You have confused:

    1. Failure of unification.
    2. Nontermination of recursive evaluation.
    3. Undefinedness in a partial truth semantics.

    These are THREE DIFFERENT CONCEPTS.

    And even if you correctly implemented Kripke's theory in Prolog, that
    would tell us NOTHING about the existence of a universal halting decider.

    The diagonal program is a perfectly legitimate computation.

    It does not become an invalid program merely because its behavior
    contradicts the prediction of a hypothetical total halting decider.

    That contradiction refutes the hypothetical decider.

    NOT THE PROGRAM.


    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory on Sat Nov 14 08:47:28 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 11/14/2026 8:26 AM, Python wrote:
    Le 14/11/2026 |a 15:16, olcott a |-crit :
    On 11/14/2026 3:09 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 14/11/2026 05:50, olcott wrote:
    On 11/13/2026 9:25 PM, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:
    On Wed, 11 Nov 2026 07:27:41 -0800, Ross Finlayson wrote:

    On 11/08/2026 06:43 PM, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:

    On Thu, 5 Nov 2026 20:53:26 -0600, olcott wrote:

    [an input that does the opposite of what one particular decider >>>>>>>> outputs] is inherently incoherent.

    You mean rCLlogical contradictionrCY? Of course -- thatrCOs how the proof
    works: if the starting assumption leads to a nonsensical
    conclusion, and no other fault in the logic can be found, then the >>>>>>> assumption (in this case, that you *can* create a decision
    procedure for the halting problem) must be wrong.

    This is the essence of a rCLreductio ad absurdumrCY proof.

    Some care must be taken in reasoning about "tertium non datur", that >>>>>> any statement is only true or false and no third ground ...

    Even if that were not true, it would not logically follow that there >>>>> *was* a third ground ...

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    What truth value does that Prolog code determine
    that its formalized Liar Paradox is grounded it?
    (Quick answer Kripke 1975 ungrounded)

    Prolog does not know or care about Liar's Paradox. The truth that
    unify_with_occurs_check/2 detects but =/2 may fail to detect is
    that the unification of LP with not(true(LP)) creates a cyclic
    data structure.


    BZZZT Wrong Answer.
    The the directed graphs of the evaluation sequence
    of the formalized Liar Paradox in Prolog has a cycle
    thus is stuck in infinite recursion.

    Outline of a Theory of Truth
    Saul Kripke
    The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 72, No. 19,
    Seventy-Second Annual Meeting American
    Philosophical Association, Eastern Division.
    (Nov. 6, 1975), pp. 690-716


    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/
    files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf
    Kripke comes up with the exact same truth value
    of "undefined" as my above Prolog code.

    Proof Theoretic Semantics also derives this
    same result.

    Peter,

    -a-a "BZZZT Wrong Answer."

    No, Peter. Mikko's answer is EXACTLY correct.

    -a-a "?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    -a-a-a false."

    This does NOT assign the truth value "undefined" to the Liar Paradox.

    It means that the UNIFICATION FAILED.


    because assigning a truth value to LP is impossible
    because the directed graph of the evaluation sequence
    of LP contains a cycle.

    At a shallow depth of understanding you would seem to
    be correct. When we go deeper then non-so-much.

    Specifically, the occurs check prevents a variable from being unified
    with a term containing that same variable.

    THAT IS A PROPERTY OF TERM UNIFICATION.

    NOT A THEORY OF TRUTH.

    Your first query:

    -a-a LP = not(true(LP)).


    Minimal Type Theory does this same thing. https://philarchive.org/archive/PETMTT-4v2

    LP := ~True(LP)
    resolves to ~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(...))))))

    may construct a cyclic term in Prolog implementations supporting
    rational trees.

    Your second query rejects that cyclic construction.

    NEITHER QUERY EVALUATES THE TRUTH OF THE LIAR SENTENCE.


    and likewise the square root of a dead cat is never found.

    And neither establishes that a recursive computation must run forever.

    -a-a "Kripke comes up with the exact same truth value
    -a-a-a of 'undefined' as my above Prolog code."

    NO.

    Kripke's 1975 theory constructs partial interpretations of a truth predicate. In the relevant fixed-point semantics, the Liar sentence is ungrounded and receives no classical truth value.

    That is a SEMANTIC result.


    The same way the Proof Theoretic Semantics works.
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    requires semantic inference steps specified syntactically.

    Prolog's `false` is a COMPUTATIONAL result: a particular unification
    goal failed.


    and is a Semantic result within Proof Theoretic Semantics.

    THE TWO ARE NOT THE SAME.

    You have confused:

    1. Failure of unification.
    2. Nontermination of recursive evaluation.
    3. Undefinedness in a partial truth semantics.

    These are THREE DIFFERENT CONCEPTS.

    And even if you correctly implemented Kripke's theory in Prolog, that
    would tell us NOTHING about the existence of a universal halting decider.

    The diagonal program is a perfectly legitimate computation.

    It does not become an invalid program merely because its behavior contradicts the prediction of a hypothetical total halting decider.

    That contradiction refutes the hypothetical decider.

    NOT THE PROGRAM.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    Computation(Olcott)
    Paraphrase of Emil Post definition of computation
    All computations are equivalent to the application of finite
    string transformation rules to finite string inputs to derive
    any and all outputs.

    Because Post canonical systems are Turing-equivalent, anything
    that cannot be derived by applying finite string transformations
    to finite strings is outside the scope of ChurchrCoTuring computation.

    Decider(Olcott)
    Correcting the misnomer term-of-the-art: decider
    Every Decider(Olcott) must apply finite string transformation
    inference steps to their finite string inputs that are relevant
    to the decision criteria. It must make its decision on this basis.

    Halt Decider(Olcott)
    Decider(Olcott) entails that Halt Decider(Olcott) H(D) must apply
    finite-string inference steps according to the operational semantics
    of the source-code computation language of D. The only way to determine
    the halting property of a finite string input is to examine the same
    behavior as the behavior of D simulated by H.

    *Succinct refutation of the Halting Theorem* https://github.com/plolcott/x86utm/blob/master/README.md

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of general knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Python@jpierre.messager@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory on Sat Nov 14 14:58:42 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    Le 14/11/2026 |a 15:47, olcott a |-crit :
    On 11/14/2026 8:26 AM, Python wrote:
    Le 14/11/2026 |a 15:16, olcott a |-crit :
    On 11/14/2026 3:09 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 14/11/2026 05:50, olcott wrote:
    On 11/13/2026 9:25 PM, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:
    On Wed, 11 Nov 2026 07:27:41 -0800, Ross Finlayson wrote:

    On 11/08/2026 06:43 PM, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:

    On Thu, 5 Nov 2026 20:53:26 -0600, olcott wrote:

    [an input that does the opposite of what one particular decider >>>>>>>>> outputs] is inherently incoherent.

    You mean rCLlogical contradictionrCY? Of course -- thatrCOs how the proof
    works: if the starting assumption leads to a nonsensical
    conclusion, and no other fault in the logic can be found, then the >>>>>>>> assumption (in this case, that you *can* create a decision
    procedure for the halting problem) must be wrong.

    This is the essence of a rCLreductio ad absurdumrCY proof.

    Some care must be taken in reasoning about "tertium non datur", that >>>>>>> any statement is only true or false and no third ground ...

    Even if that were not true, it would not logically follow that there >>>>>> *was* a third ground ...

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    What truth value does that Prolog code determine
    that its formalized Liar Paradox is grounded it?
    (Quick answer Kripke 1975 ungrounded)

    Prolog does not know or care about Liar's Paradox. The truth that
    unify_with_occurs_check/2 detects but =/2 may fail to detect is
    that the unification of LP with not(true(LP)) creates a cyclic
    data structure.


    BZZZT Wrong Answer.
    The the directed graphs of the evaluation sequence
    of the formalized Liar Paradox in Prolog has a cycle
    thus is stuck in infinite recursion.

    Outline of a Theory of Truth
    Saul Kripke
    The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 72, No. 19,
    Seventy-Second Annual Meeting American
    Philosophical Association, Eastern Division.
    (Nov. 6, 1975), pp. 690-716


    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/
    files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf
    Kripke comes up with the exact same truth value
    of "undefined" as my above Prolog code.

    Proof Theoretic Semantics also derives this
    same result.

    Peter,

    -a-a "BZZZT Wrong Answer."

    No, Peter. Mikko's answer is EXACTLY correct.

    -a-a "?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    -a-a-a false."

    This does NOT assign the truth value "undefined" to the Liar Paradox.

    It means that the UNIFICATION FAILED.


    because assigning a truth value to LP is impossible
    because the directed graph of the evaluation sequence
    of LP contains a cycle.

    At a shallow depth of understanding you would seem to
    be correct. When we go deeper then non-so-much.

    Specifically, the occurs check prevents a variable from being unified
    with a term containing that same variable.

    THAT IS A PROPERTY OF TERM UNIFICATION.

    NOT A THEORY OF TRUTH.

    Your first query:

    -a-a LP = not(true(LP)).


    Minimal Type Theory does this same thing. https://philarchive.org/archive/PETMTT-4v2

    LP := ~True(LP)
    resolves to ~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(...))))))

    may construct a cyclic term in Prolog implementations supporting
    rational trees.

    Your second query rejects that cyclic construction.

    NEITHER QUERY EVALUATES THE TRUTH OF THE LIAR SENTENCE.


    and likewise the square root of a dead cat is never found.

    And neither establishes that a recursive computation must run forever.

    -a-a "Kripke comes up with the exact same truth value
    -a-a-a of 'undefined' as my above Prolog code."

    NO.

    Kripke's 1975 theory constructs partial interpretations of a truth
    predicate. In the relevant fixed-point semantics, the Liar sentence is
    ungrounded and receives no classical truth value.

    That is a SEMANTIC result.


    The same way the Proof Theoretic Semantics works.
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    requires semantic inference steps specified syntactically.

    Prolog's `false` is a COMPUTATIONAL result: a particular unification
    goal failed.


    and is a Semantic result within Proof Theoretic Semantics.

    THE TWO ARE NOT THE SAME.

    You have confused:

    1. Failure of unification.
    2. Nontermination of recursive evaluation.
    3. Undefinedness in a partial truth semantics.

    These are THREE DIFFERENT CONCEPTS.

    And even if you correctly implemented Kripke's theory in Prolog, that
    would tell us NOTHING about the existence of a universal halting decider.

    The diagonal program is a perfectly legitimate computation.

    It does not become an invalid program merely because its behavior
    contradicts the prediction of a hypothetical total halting decider.

    That contradiction refutes the hypothetical decider.

    NOT THE PROGRAM.

    Peter,

    "because assigning a truth value to LP is impossible
    because the directed graph of the evaluation sequence
    of LP contains a cycle."

    NO.

    You are STILL confusing a cyclic term with a semantic paradox.

    Try this:

    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(X, f(X)).
    false.

    WHERE IS THE LIAR PARADOX?

    WHERE IS THE TRUTH PREDICATE?

    WHERE IS THE SEMANTIC CONTRADICTION?

    NOWHERE.

    The unification fails because X occurs inside f(X).

    THAT IS ALL.

    Your occurs check does not know whether `f` means truth, negation,
    addition, or a dead cat.

    It simply checks the structure of a term.

    "LP := ~True(LP)
    resolves to ~True(~True(~True(...)))"

    Writing an infinite expansion does not establish a semantic
    interpretation.

    Kripke's construction involves a truth predicate, a partial valuation, and
    a fixed-point construction.

    It does not consist of detecting cycles in arbitrary Prolog terms.

    Indeed, cyclic dependencies are not automatically semantic contradictions.

    For example, a positive self-referential truth sentence can remain
    ungrounded without asserting its own falsity.

    THE STRUCTURE OF THE DEPENDENCY ALONE DOES NOT DETERMINE ITS TRUTH VALUE.

    "and is a Semantic result within Proof Theoretic Semantics."

    THEN SHOW THE SEMANTICS.

    Define your interpretation function.

    Define your consequence relation.

    Show the inference rule that turns the failure of:

    unify_with_occurs_check(X, f(X))

    into a statement about truth.

    You cannot simply label an operational failure "semantic" and pretend that
    you have proved something about Kripke's theory.

    And none of this rescues your attack on the Halting Theorem.

    The diagonal argument does not ask a halting decider to assign a truth
    value to the Liar Paradox.

    It assumes a total computable function H that correctly decides whether programs halt.

    It then constructs a program D that behaves contrary to H's prediction.

    If H says D halts, D loops.

    If H says D does not halt, D halts.

    If H refuses to answer, H IS NOT TOTAL.

    THOSE ARE THE POSSIBILITIES YOU KEEP REFUSING TO ADDRESS.

    A Prolog occurs check cannot make the diagonal program disappear.

    And citing Kripke does not turn a failed unification into a refutation of Turing.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory on Sat Nov 14 10:26:55 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 11/14/2026 8:58 AM, Python wrote:
    Le 14/11/2026 |a 15:47, olcott a |-crit :
    On 11/14/2026 8:26 AM, Python wrote:
    Le 14/11/2026 |a 15:16, olcott a |-crit :
    On 11/14/2026 3:09 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 14/11/2026 05:50, olcott wrote:
    On 11/13/2026 9:25 PM, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:
    On Wed, 11 Nov 2026 07:27:41 -0800, Ross Finlayson wrote:

    On 11/08/2026 06:43 PM, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:

    On Thu, 5 Nov 2026 20:53:26 -0600, olcott wrote:

    [an input that does the opposite of what one particular decider >>>>>>>>>> outputs] is inherently incoherent.

    You mean rCLlogical contradictionrCY? Of course -- thatrCOs how the >>>>>>>>> proof
    works: if the starting assumption leads to a nonsensical
    conclusion, and no other fault in the logic can be found, then the >>>>>>>>> assumption (in this case, that you *can* create a decision
    procedure for the halting problem) must be wrong.

    This is the essence of a rCLreductio ad absurdumrCY proof.

    Some care must be taken in reasoning about "tertium non datur", >>>>>>>> that
    any statement is only true or false and no third ground ...

    Even if that were not true, it would not logically follow that there >>>>>>> *was* a third ground ...

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    What truth value does that Prolog code determine
    that its formalized Liar Paradox is grounded it?
    (Quick answer Kripke 1975 ungrounded)

    Prolog does not know or care about Liar's Paradox. The truth that
    unify_with_occurs_check/2 detects but =/2 may fail to detect is
    that the unification of LP with not(true(LP)) creates a cyclic
    data structure.


    BZZZT Wrong Answer.
    The the directed graphs of the evaluation sequence
    of the formalized Liar Paradox in Prolog has a cycle
    thus is stuck in infinite recursion.

    Outline of a Theory of Truth
    Saul Kripke
    The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 72, No. 19,
    Seventy-Second Annual Meeting American
    Philosophical Association, Eastern Division.
    (Nov. 6, 1975), pp. 690-716


    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/
    files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf
    Kripke comes up with the exact same truth value
    of "undefined" as my above Prolog code.

    Proof Theoretic Semantics also derives this
    same result.

    Peter,

    -a-a-a "BZZZT Wrong Answer."

    No, Peter. Mikko's answer is EXACTLY correct.

    -a-a-a "?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    -a-a-a-a false."

    This does NOT assign the truth value "undefined" to the Liar Paradox.

    It means that the UNIFICATION FAILED.


    because assigning a truth value to LP is impossible
    because the directed graph of the evaluation sequence
    of LP contains a cycle.

    At a shallow depth of understanding you would seem to
    be correct. When we go deeper then non-so-much.

    Specifically, the occurs check prevents a variable from being unified
    with a term containing that same variable.

    THAT IS A PROPERTY OF TERM UNIFICATION.

    NOT A THEORY OF TRUTH.

    Your first query:

    -a-a-a LP = not(true(LP)).


    Minimal Type Theory does this same thing.
    https://philarchive.org/archive/PETMTT-4v2

    LP := ~True(LP)
    resolves to ~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(...))))))

    may construct a cyclic term in Prolog implementations supporting
    rational trees.

    Your second query rejects that cyclic construction.

    NEITHER QUERY EVALUATES THE TRUTH OF THE LIAR SENTENCE.


    and likewise the square root of a dead cat is never found.

    And neither establishes that a recursive computation must run forever.

    -a-a-a "Kripke comes up with the exact same truth value
    -a-a-a-a of 'undefined' as my above Prolog code."

    NO.

    Kripke's 1975 theory constructs partial interpretations of a truth
    predicate. In the relevant fixed-point semantics, the Liar sentence
    is ungrounded and receives no classical truth value.

    That is a SEMANTIC result.


    The same way the Proof Theoretic Semantics works.
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    requires semantic inference steps specified syntactically.

    Prolog's `false` is a COMPUTATIONAL result: a particular unification
    goal failed.


    and is a Semantic result within Proof Theoretic Semantics.

    THE TWO ARE NOT THE SAME.

    You have confused:

    1. Failure of unification.
    2. Nontermination of recursive evaluation.
    3. Undefinedness in a partial truth semantics.

    These are THREE DIFFERENT CONCEPTS.

    And even if you correctly implemented Kripke's theory in Prolog, that
    would tell us NOTHING about the existence of a universal halting
    decider.

    The diagonal program is a perfectly legitimate computation.

    It does not become an invalid program merely because its behavior
    contradicts the prediction of a hypothetical total halting decider.

    That contradiction refutes the hypothetical decider.

    NOT THE PROGRAM.

    Peter,

    -a-a "because assigning a truth value to LP is impossible
    -a-a-a because the directed graph of the evaluation sequence
    -a-a-a of LP contains a cycle."

    NO.

    You are STILL confusing a cyclic term with a semantic paradox.


    It never reaches the paradoxical code.

    Try this:

    -a-a ?- unify_with_occurs_check(X, f(X)).
    -a-a false.

    WHERE IS THE LIAR PARADOX?

    WHERE IS THE TRUTH PREDICATE?

    WHERE IS THE SEMANTIC CONTRADICTION?

    NOWHERE.

    The unification fails because X occurs inside f(X).

    THAT IS ALL.

    Your occurs check does not know whether `f` means truth, negation,
    addition, or a dead cat.

    It simply checks the structure of a term.

    -a-a "LP := ~True(LP)
    -a-a-a resolves to ~True(~True(~True(...)))"

    Writing an infinite expansion does not establish a semantic interpretation.

    Kripke's construction involves a truth predicate, a partial valuation,
    and a fixed-point construction.

    It does not consist of detecting cycles in arbitrary Prolog terms.

    Indeed, cyclic dependencies are not automatically semantic contradictions.

    For example, a positive self-referential truth sentence can remain ungrounded without asserting its own falsity.

    THE STRUCTURE OF THE DEPENDENCY ALONE DOES NOT DETERMINE ITS TRUTH VALUE.

    -a-a "and is a Semantic result within Proof Theoretic Semantics."

    THEN SHOW THE SEMANTICS.

    Define your interpretation function.

    Define your consequence relation.

    Show the inference rule that turns the failure of:

    -a-a unify_with_occurs_check(X, f(X))

    into a statement about truth.

    You cannot simply label an operational failure "semantic" and pretend
    that you have proved something about Kripke's theory.

    And none of this rescues your attack on the Halting Theorem.

    The diagonal argument does not ask a halting decider to assign a truth
    value to the Liar Paradox.

    It assumes a total computable function H that correctly decides whether programs halt.

    It then constructs a program D that behaves contrary to H's prediction.

    If H says D halts, D loops.

    If H says D does not halt, D halts.

    If H refuses to answer, H IS NOT TOTAL.

    THOSE ARE THE POSSIBILITIES YOU KEEP REFUSING TO ADDRESS.

    A Prolog occurs check cannot make the diagonal program disappear.

    And citing Kripke does not turn a failed unification into a refutation
    of Turing.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    Computation(Olcott)
    Paraphrase of Emil Post definition of computation
    All computations are equivalent to the application of finite
    string transformation rules to finite string inputs to derive
    any and all outputs.

    Because Post canonical systems are Turing-equivalent, anything
    that cannot be derived by applying finite string transformations
    to finite strings is outside the scope of ChurchrCoTuring computation.

    Decider(Olcott)
    Correcting the misnomer term-of-the-art: decider
    Every Decider(Olcott) must apply finite string transformation
    inference steps to their finite string inputs that are relevant
    to the decision criteria. It must make its decision on this basis.

    Halt Decider(Olcott)
    Decider(Olcott) entails that Halt Decider(Olcott) H(D) must apply
    finite-string inference steps according to the operational semantics
    of the source-code computation language of D. The only way to determine
    the halting property of a finite string input is to examine the same
    behavior as the behavior of D simulated by H.

    *Succinct refutation of the Halting Theorem* https://github.com/plolcott/x86utm/blob/master/README.md

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of general knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Python@jpierre.messager@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory on Sat Nov 14 17:03:27 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    Peter,

    "It never reaches the paradoxical code."

    WHAT PARADOXICAL CODE?

    Look at the actual query:

    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(X, f(X)).
    false.

    There is no paradox.

    There is no truth predicate.

    There is no recursive evaluation.

    There is no "paradoxical code" to reach.

    The unification algorithm simply detects that X occurs inside f(X) and
    fails.

    END OF STORY.

    Now replace f(X) with not(true(X)):

    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(X, not(true(X))).
    false.

    THE SAME THING HAPPENS.

    Not because Prolog has discovered the Liar Paradox.

    Not because it has computed an undefined truth value.

    Not because it has detected an infinite execution.

    But because THE OCCURS CHECK REJECTS CYCLIC UNIFICATION.

    You are assigning philosophical significance to an operation that does not even inspect the meaning of your predicate names.

    And your claim that the computation "never reaches the paradoxical code"
    is especially revealing.

    THERE IS NO SUCH CODE IN THE QUERY.

    You have constructed a term, not implemented a truth evaluator.

    If you want to demonstrate a semantic result, DEFINE THE SEMANTICS.

    If you want to demonstrate infinite recursion, SHOW THE RECURSIVE
    EVALUATION.

    If you want to refute the Halting Theorem, IDENTIFY THE INVALID STEP IN
    ITS DIAGONAL PROOF.

    So far, you have done none of these things.

    You have merely confused three different problems and declared victory
    over all of them.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory on Sat Nov 14 21:21:01 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 11/14/2026 11:03 AM, Python wrote:
    Peter,

    -a-a "It never reaches the paradoxical code."

    WHAT PARADOXICAL CODE?

    Look at the actual query:

    -a-a ?- unify_with_occurs_check(X, f(X)).
    -a-a false.

    There is no paradox.

    There is no truth predicate.

    There is no recursive evaluation.

    There is no "paradoxical code" to reach.

    The unification algorithm simply detects that X occurs inside f(X) and fails.

    END OF STORY.

    Now replace f(X) with not(true(X)):

    -a-a ?- unify_with_occurs_check(X, not(true(X))).
    -a-a false.

    THE SAME THING HAPPENS.

    Not because Prolog has discovered the Liar Paradox.

    Not because it has computed an undefined truth value.

    Not because it has detected an infinite execution.

    But because THE OCCURS CHECK REJECTS CYCLIC UNIFICATION.


    Bingo !!! Do you know the underlying details of this?

    You are assigning philosophical significance to an operation that does
    not even inspect the meaning of your predicate names.

    And your claim that the computation "never reaches the paradoxical code"
    is especially revealing.

    THERE IS NO SUCH CODE IN THE QUERY.

    You have constructed a term, not implemented a truth evaluator.

    If you want to demonstrate a semantic result, DEFINE THE SEMANTICS.

    If you want to demonstrate infinite recursion, SHOW THE RECURSIVE EVALUATION.

    If you want to refute the Halting Theorem, IDENTIFY THE INVALID STEP IN
    ITS DIAGONAL PROOF.

    So far, you have done none of these things.

    You have merely confused three different problems and declared victory
    over all of them.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    Computation(Olcott)
    Paraphrase of Emil Post definition of computation
    All computations are equivalent to the application of finite
    string transformation rules to finite string inputs to derive
    any and all outputs.

    Because Post canonical systems are Turing-equivalent, anything
    that cannot be derived by applying finite string transformations
    to finite strings is outside the scope of ChurchrCoTuring computation.

    Decider(Olcott)
    Correcting the misnomer term-of-the-art: decider
    Every Decider(Olcott) must apply finite string transformation
    inference steps to their finite string inputs that are relevant
    to the decision criteria. It must make its decision on this basis.

    Halt Decider(Olcott)
    Decider(Olcott) entails that Halt Decider(Olcott) H(D) must apply
    finite-string inference steps according to the operational semantics
    of the source-code computation language of D. The only way to determine
    the halting property of a finite string input is to examine the same
    behavior as the behavior of D simulated by H.

    *Succinct refutation of the Halting Theorem* https://github.com/plolcott/x86utm/blob/master/README.md

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of general knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Lawrence =?iso-8859-13?q?D=FFOliveiro?=@ldo@nz.invalid to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Sun Nov 15 07:37:26 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On Fri, 13 Nov 2026 21:50:57 -0600, olcott wrote:

    On 11/13/2026 9:25 PM, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:

    On Wed, 11 Nov 2026 07:27:41 -0800, Ross Finlayson wrote:

    On 11/08/2026 06:43 PM, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:

    On Thu, 5 Nov 2026 20:53:26 -0600, olcott wrote:

    [an input that does the opposite of what one particular decider
    outputs] is inherently incoherent.

    You mean rCLlogical contradictionrCY? Of course -- thatrCOs how the
    proof works: if the starting assumption leads to a nonsensical
    conclusion, and no other fault in the logic can be found, then
    the assumption (in this case, that you *can* create a decision
    procedure for the halting problem) must be wrong.

    This is the essence of a rCLreductio ad absurdumrCY proof.

    Some care must be taken in reasoning about "tertium non datur",
    that any statement is only true or false and no third ground ...

    Even if that were not true, it would not logically follow that
    there *was* a third ground ...

    [irrelevancies deleted]

    What Mr Finlayson and I were discussing might better be known as rCLthe
    Law of the Excluded MiddlerCY. He was trying to suggest that, because a rCLreductio ad absurdumrCY argument depends on that law, then if the law
    were not valid, that would invalidate the rCLreductio ad absurdumrCY
    argument.

    I was merely pointing out that that does not necessarily follow.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory on Sun Nov 15 11:55:24 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 14/11/2026 16:16, olcott wrote:
    On 11/14/2026 3:09 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 14/11/2026 05:50, olcott wrote:
    On 11/13/2026 9:25 PM, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:
    On Wed, 11 Nov 2026 07:27:41 -0800, Ross Finlayson wrote:

    On 11/08/2026 06:43 PM, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:

    On Thu, 5 Nov 2026 20:53:26 -0600, olcott wrote:

    [an input that does the opposite of what one particular decider
    outputs] is inherently incoherent.

    You mean rCLlogical contradictionrCY? Of course -- thatrCOs how the proof
    works: if the starting assumption leads to a nonsensical
    conclusion, and no other fault in the logic can be found, then the >>>>>> assumption (in this case, that you *can* create a decision
    procedure for the halting problem) must be wrong.

    This is the essence of a rCLreductio ad absurdumrCY proof.

    Some care must be taken in reasoning about "tertium non datur", that >>>>> any statement is only true or false and no third ground ...

    Even if that were not true, it would not logically follow that there
    *was* a third ground ...

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    What truth value does that Prolog code determine
    that its formalized Liar Paradox is grounded it?
    (Quick answer Kripke 1975 ungrounded)

    Prolog does not know or care about Liar's Paradox. The truth that
    unify_with_occurs_check/2 detects but =/2 may fail to detect is
    that the unification of LP with not(true(LP)) creates a cyclic
    data structure.

    BZZZT Wrong Answer.

    An answer that is wrong but true is better than an naswer that is
    right and false.

    The the directed graphs of the evaluation sequence
    of the formalized Liar Paradox in Prolog has a cycle
    thus is stuck in infinite recursion.

    Both unify_with_occurs_check/2 and =/2 are primitive operations.
    Consequently both evaluation sequences are singlet sequnces and
    therefore cannot contain cycles.
    --
    Mikko

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Sun Nov 15 12:11:09 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 15/11/2026 09:37, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:
    On Fri, 13 Nov 2026 21:50:57 -0600, olcott wrote:

    On 11/13/2026 9:25 PM, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:

    On Wed, 11 Nov 2026 07:27:41 -0800, Ross Finlayson wrote:

    On 11/08/2026 06:43 PM, Lawrence DrCOOliveiro wrote:

    On Thu, 5 Nov 2026 20:53:26 -0600, olcott wrote:

    [an input that does the opposite of what one particular decider
    outputs] is inherently incoherent.

    You mean rCLlogical contradictionrCY? Of course -- thatrCOs how the
    proof works: if the starting assumption leads to a nonsensical
    conclusion, and no other fault in the logic can be found, then
    the assumption (in this case, that you *can* create a decision
    procedure for the halting problem) must be wrong.

    This is the essence of a rCLreductio ad absurdumrCY proof.

    Some care must be taken in reasoning about "tertium non datur",
    that any statement is only true or false and no third ground ...

    Even if that were not true, it would not logically follow that
    there *was* a third ground ...

    [irrelevancies deleted]

    What Mr Finlayson and I were discussing might better be known as rCLthe
    Law of the Excluded MiddlerCY. He was trying to suggest that, because a rCLreductio ad absurdumrCY argument depends on that law, then if the law
    were not valid, that would invalidate the rCLreductio ad absurdumrCY argument.

    I was merely pointing out that that does not necessarily follow.

    For example:
    -40 = 3, -41 = 2, 1 re? 2 = 3, X re? 0 = X, X re? 3 = 3
    does not satisfy the excluded middle (or no third posssibility) but
    does satisfy all rules of the ordinary propositional logic.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Python@jpierre.messager@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory on Sun Nov 15 11:36:25 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    Le 15/11/2026 |a 04:21, olcott a |-crit :
    On 11/14/2026 11:03 AM, Python wrote:
    Peter,

    -a-a "It never reaches the paradoxical code."

    WHAT PARADOXICAL CODE?

    Look at the actual query:

    -a-a ?- unify_with_occurs_check(X, f(X)).
    -a-a false.

    There is no paradox.

    There is no truth predicate.

    There is no recursive evaluation.

    There is no "paradoxical code" to reach.

    The unification algorithm simply detects that X occurs inside f(X) and
    fails.

    END OF STORY.

    Now replace f(X) with not(true(X)):

    -a-a ?- unify_with_occurs_check(X, not(true(X))).
    -a-a false.

    THE SAME THING HAPPENS.

    Not because Prolog has discovered the Liar Paradox.

    Not because it has computed an undefined truth value.

    Not because it has detected an infinite execution.

    But because THE OCCURS CHECK REJECTS CYCLIC UNIFICATION.


    Bingo !!! Do you know the underlying details of this?

    You are assigning philosophical significance to an operation that does
    not even inspect the meaning of your predicate names.

    And your claim that the computation "never reaches the paradoxical code"
    is especially revealing.

    THERE IS NO SUCH CODE IN THE QUERY.

    You have constructed a term, not implemented a truth evaluator.

    If you want to demonstrate a semantic result, DEFINE THE SEMANTICS.

    If you want to demonstrate infinite recursion, SHOW THE RECURSIVE
    EVALUATION.

    If you want to refute the Halting Theorem, IDENTIFY THE INVALID STEP IN
    ITS DIAGONAL PROOF.

    So far, you have done none of these things.

    You have merely confused three different problems and declared victory
    over all of them.

    Peter,

    "Bingo !!! Do you know the underlying details of this?"

    YES, PETER.

    DO YOU?

    The occurs check is a standard part of first-order term unification.

    When attempting to unify a variable X with a term t, it checks whether X already occurs within t.

    If it does, the unification is rejected, because no finite first-order
    term can satisfy that substitution.

    For example:

    unify_with_occurs_check(X, f(X))

    fails.

    So does:

    unify_with_occurs_check(X, not(true(X)))

    And so does:

    unify_with_occurs_check(X, banana(X))

    SAME ALGORITHM.

    SAME RESULT.

    NO SEMANTIC INTERPRETATION REQUIRED.

    Now consider:

    unify_with_occurs_check(X, f(Y))

    This succeeds, provided X and Y are distinct unbound variables.

    The algorithm is examining TERM STRUCTURE.

    It is not deciding whether f is true, false, paradoxical, or meaningful.

    And here is the crucial distinction:

    The occurs check does not detect infinite recursion in a program.

    It prevents the construction of a cyclic substitution in finite-term unification.

    Those are NOT the same problem.

    So what exactly are you celebrating?

    That Prolog implements an occurs check?

    WE ALREADY KNEW THAT.

    That a self-referential term may be rejected by a particular unification algorithm?

    WE ALREADY KNEW THAT TOO.

    That this somehow invalidates the diagonal proof of the Halting Theorem?

    THEN PROVE THE CONNECTION.

    Because a diagonal program is not a cyclic first-order term.

    And rejecting cyclic terms does not establish that a universal halting
    decider exists.

    Your "Bingo" is not a mathematical argument.

    It's the sound of someone recognizing a familiar word without
    understanding what it proves.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory on Sun Nov 15 07:23:47 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 11/15/2026 5:36 AM, Python wrote:
    Le 15/11/2026 |a 04:21, olcott a |-crit :
    On 11/14/2026 11:03 AM, Python wrote:
    Peter,

    -a-a-a "It never reaches the paradoxical code."

    WHAT PARADOXICAL CODE?

    Look at the actual query:

    -a-a-a ?- unify_with_occurs_check(X, f(X)).
    -a-a-a false.

    There is no paradox.

    There is no truth predicate.

    There is no recursive evaluation.

    There is no "paradoxical code" to reach.

    The unification algorithm simply detects that X occurs inside f(X)
    and fails.

    END OF STORY.

    Now replace f(X) with not(true(X)):

    -a-a-a ?- unify_with_occurs_check(X, not(true(X))).
    -a-a-a false.

    THE SAME THING HAPPENS.

    Not because Prolog has discovered the Liar Paradox.

    Not because it has computed an undefined truth value.

    Not because it has detected an infinite execution.

    But because THE OCCURS CHECK REJECTS CYCLIC UNIFICATION.


    Bingo !!! Do you know the underlying details of this?

    You are assigning philosophical significance to an operation that
    does not even inspect the meaning of your predicate names.

    And your claim that the computation "never reaches the paradoxical
    code" is especially revealing.

    THERE IS NO SUCH CODE IN THE QUERY.

    You have constructed a term, not implemented a truth evaluator.

    If you want to demonstrate a semantic result, DEFINE THE SEMANTICS.

    If you want to demonstrate infinite recursion, SHOW THE RECURSIVE
    EVALUATION.

    If you want to refute the Halting Theorem, IDENTIFY THE INVALID STEP
    IN ITS DIAGONAL PROOF.

    So far, you have done none of these things.

    You have merely confused three different problems and declared
    victory over all of them.

    Peter,

    -a-a "Bingo !!! Do you know the underlying details of this?"

    YES, PETER.

    DO YOU?

    The occurs check is a standard part of first-order term unification.

    When attempting to unify a variable X with a term t, it checks whether X already occurs within t.

    If it does, the unification is rejected, because no finite first-order
    term can satisfy that substitution.

    For example:

    -a-a unify_with_occurs_check(X, f(X))

    fails.

    So does:

    -a-a unify_with_occurs_check(X, not(true(X)))

    And so does:

    -a-a unify_with_occurs_check(X, banana(X))

    SAME ALGORITHM.

    SAME RESULT.

    NO SEMANTIC INTERPRETATION REQUIRED.

    Now consider:

    -a-a unify_with_occurs_check(X, f(Y))

    This succeeds, provided X and Y are distinct unbound variables.

    The algorithm is examining TERM STRUCTURE.

    It is not deciding whether f is true, false, paradoxical, or meaningful.

    And here is the crucial distinction:

    The occurs check does not detect infinite recursion in a program.

    It prevents the construction of a cyclic substitution in finite-term unification.

    Those are NOT the same problem.

    So what exactly are you celebrating?

    That Prolog implements an occurs check?

    WE ALREADY KNEW THAT.

    That a self-referential term may be rejected by a particular unification algorithm?

    WE ALREADY KNEW THAT TOO.

    That this somehow invalidates the diagonal proof of the Halting Theorem?

    THEN PROVE THE CONNECTION.

    Because a diagonal program is not a cyclic first-order term.

    And rejecting cyclic terms does not establish that a universal halting decider exists.

    Your "Bingo" is not a mathematical argument.

    It's the sound of someone recognizing a familiar word without
    understanding what it proves.

    Like my Minimal Type Theory unify_with_occurs_check()
    detects a cycle in the directed graph of the
    evaluation sequence.

    LP := ~True(LP) which expands into:
    ~True(~True(~True(~True(...)))) infinite recursion. https://philarchive.org/archive/PETMTT-4v8

    Cannot possibly get to a truth value is what
    Saul Kripke meant by assigning ungrounded to it.

    Outline of a Theory of Truth --- Saul Kripke
    The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 72, No. 19,
    Seventy-Second Annual Meeting American
    Philosophical Association, Eastern Division.
    (Nov. 6, 1975), pp. 690-716.

    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    Computation(Olcott)
    Paraphrase of Emil Post definition of computation
    All computations are equivalent to the application of finite
    string transformation rules to finite string inputs to derive
    any and all outputs.

    Because Post canonical systems are Turing-equivalent, anything
    that cannot be derived by applying finite string transformations
    to finite strings is outside the scope of ChurchrCoTuring computation.

    Decider(Olcott)
    Correcting the misnomer term-of-the-art: decider
    Every Decider(Olcott) must apply finite string transformation
    inference steps to their finite string inputs that are relevant
    to the decision criteria. It must make its decision on this basis.

    Halt Decider(Olcott)
    Decider(Olcott) entails that Halt Decider(Olcott) H(D) must apply
    finite-string inference steps according to the operational semantics
    of the source-code computation language of D. The only way to determine
    the halting property of a finite string input is to examine the same
    behavior as the behavior of D simulated by H.

    *Succinct refutation of the Halting Theorem* https://github.com/plolcott/x86utm/blob/master/README.md

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of general knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Python@jpierre.messager@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory on Sun Nov 15 20:13:52 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    Le 15/11/2026 |a 14:23, olcott a |-crit :
    On 11/15/2026 5:36 AM, Python wrote:
    Le 15/11/2026 |a 04:21, olcott a |-crit :
    On 11/14/2026 11:03 AM, Python wrote:
    Peter,

    -a-a-a "It never reaches the paradoxical code."

    WHAT PARADOXICAL CODE?

    Look at the actual query:

    -a-a-a ?- unify_with_occurs_check(X, f(X)).
    -a-a-a false.

    There is no paradox.

    There is no truth predicate.

    There is no recursive evaluation.

    There is no "paradoxical code" to reach.

    The unification algorithm simply detects that X occurs inside f(X)
    and fails.

    END OF STORY.

    Now replace f(X) with not(true(X)):

    -a-a-a ?- unify_with_occurs_check(X, not(true(X))).
    -a-a-a false.

    THE SAME THING HAPPENS.

    Not because Prolog has discovered the Liar Paradox.

    Not because it has computed an undefined truth value.

    Not because it has detected an infinite execution.

    But because THE OCCURS CHECK REJECTS CYCLIC UNIFICATION.


    Bingo !!! Do you know the underlying details of this?

    You are assigning philosophical significance to an operation that
    does not even inspect the meaning of your predicate names.

    And your claim that the computation "never reaches the paradoxical
    code" is especially revealing.

    THERE IS NO SUCH CODE IN THE QUERY.

    You have constructed a term, not implemented a truth evaluator.

    If you want to demonstrate a semantic result, DEFINE THE SEMANTICS.

    If you want to demonstrate infinite recursion, SHOW THE RECURSIVE
    EVALUATION.

    If you want to refute the Halting Theorem, IDENTIFY THE INVALID STEP
    IN ITS DIAGONAL PROOF.

    So far, you have done none of these things.

    You have merely confused three different problems and declared
    victory over all of them.

    Peter,

    -a-a "Bingo !!! Do you know the underlying details of this?"

    YES, PETER.

    DO YOU?

    The occurs check is a standard part of first-order term unification.

    When attempting to unify a variable X with a term t, it checks whether X
    already occurs within t.

    If it does, the unification is rejected, because no finite first-order
    term can satisfy that substitution.

    For example:

    -a-a unify_with_occurs_check(X, f(X))

    fails.

    So does:

    -a-a unify_with_occurs_check(X, not(true(X)))

    And so does:

    -a-a unify_with_occurs_check(X, banana(X))

    SAME ALGORITHM.

    SAME RESULT.

    NO SEMANTIC INTERPRETATION REQUIRED.

    Now consider:

    -a-a unify_with_occurs_check(X, f(Y))

    This succeeds, provided X and Y are distinct unbound variables.

    The algorithm is examining TERM STRUCTURE.

    It is not deciding whether f is true, false, paradoxical, or meaningful.

    And here is the crucial distinction:

    The occurs check does not detect infinite recursion in a program.

    It prevents the construction of a cyclic substitution in finite-term
    unification.

    Those are NOT the same problem.

    So what exactly are you celebrating?

    That Prolog implements an occurs check?

    WE ALREADY KNEW THAT.

    That a self-referential term may be rejected by a particular unification
    algorithm?

    WE ALREADY KNEW THAT TOO.

    That this somehow invalidates the diagonal proof of the Halting Theorem?

    THEN PROVE THE CONNECTION.

    Because a diagonal program is not a cyclic first-order term.

    And rejecting cyclic terms does not establish that a universal halting
    decider exists.

    Your "Bingo" is not a mathematical argument.

    It's the sound of someone recognizing a familiar word without
    understanding what it proves.

    Like my Minimal Type Theory unify_with_occurs_check()
    detects a cycle in the directed graph of the
    evaluation sequence.

    LP := ~True(LP) which expands into:
    ~True(~True(~True(~True(...)))) infinite recursion. https://philarchive.org/archive/PETMTT-4v8

    Cannot possibly get to a truth value is what
    Saul Kripke meant by assigning ungrounded to it.

    Outline of a Theory of Truth --- Saul Kripke
    The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 72, No. 19,
    Seventy-Second Annual Meeting American
    Philosophical Association, Eastern Division.
    (Nov. 6, 1975), pp. 690-716.


    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf


    Peter,

    "Like my Minimal Type Theory unify_with_occurs_check()
    detects a cycle in the directed graph of the
    evaluation sequence."

    YOU ARE STILL CONFUSING THREE DIFFERENT THINGS.

    1. A cyclic term.
    2. A cyclic dependency between propositions.
    3. An infinite computational evaluation.

    THEY ARE NOT EQUIVALENT.

    "LP := ~True(LP) which expands into:
    ~True(~True(~True(~True(...)))) infinite recursion."

    No.

    That is an infinite syntactic unfolding.

    It is not, by itself, an execution trace of a truth-evaluation algorithm.

    And detecting a cycle does not automatically establish nontermination.

    Consider the ordinary recursive function:

    int f(int n) {
    if (n == 0) return 0;
    return f(n - 1);
    }

    Its call graph contains a cycle.

    YET IT TERMINATES FOR EVERY NONNEGATIVE INTEGER INPUT.

    A cycle in a dependency graph does not prove that evaluation runs forever.

    Now consider the sentence:

    P <-> True("P")

    This sentence refers to its own truth, WITHOUT NEGATION.

    Its dependency graph contains exactly the same kind of self-reference as
    your Liar sentence.

    But its semantic behavior is different.

    In Kripke's least fixed-point construction, both can remain ungrounded.

    However, the positive truth-teller can receive TRUE or FALSE in suitable
    other fixed points, whereas the Liar cannot receive either classical truth value in a consistent fixed point.

    SAME SELF-REFERENCE.

    DIFFERENT SEMANTIC CONSTRAINTS.

    Therefore the existence of a cycle is NOT sufficient to determine the
    semantic status of a sentence.

    "Cannot possibly get to a truth value is what
    Saul Kripke meant by assigning ungrounded to it."

    NO.

    Kripke's notion of groundedness is defined through a semantic fixed-point construction using a partial truth predicate.

    It is not defined by whether a Prolog unification algorithm detects a
    cyclic term.

    The Liar remains undefined in the relevant fixed-point semantics because neither assigning it TRUE nor assigning it FALSE is consistent with its
    truth conditions.

    THAT IS A SEMANTIC FACT.

    Your occurs check, meanwhile, rejects:

    X = banana(X)

    just as readily as:

    X = not(true(X))

    IT HAS NO IDEA WHAT "TRUE" OR "BANANA" MEANS.

    So here is the question:

    Does your algorithm distinguish the Liar from the positive Truth-Teller?

    If so, SHOW THE SEMANTIC RULES THAT MAKE THE DISTINCTION.

    If not, you have not implemented Kripke's theory.

    You have implemented a cycle detector.

    And once again, NONE OF THIS REFUTES THE HALTING THEOREM.

    A diagonal program is a valid computation, not a malformed cyclic Prolog
    term.

    You cannot make undecidability disappear by confusing self-reference with invalid syntax.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Sun Nov 15 20:44:44 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 11/15/2026 2:13 PM, Python wrote:
    Le 15/11/2026 |a 14:23, olcott a |-crit :
    On 11/15/2026 5:36 AM, Python wrote:
    Le 15/11/2026 |a 04:21, olcott a |-crit :
    On 11/14/2026 11:03 AM, Python wrote:
    Peter,

    -a-a-a "It never reaches the paradoxical code."

    WHAT PARADOXICAL CODE?

    Look at the actual query:

    -a-a-a ?- unify_with_occurs_check(X, f(X)).
    -a-a-a false.

    There is no paradox.

    There is no truth predicate.

    There is no recursive evaluation.

    There is no "paradoxical code" to reach.

    The unification algorithm simply detects that X occurs inside f(X)
    and fails.

    END OF STORY.

    Now replace f(X) with not(true(X)):

    -a-a-a ?- unify_with_occurs_check(X, not(true(X))).
    -a-a-a false.

    THE SAME THING HAPPENS.

    Not because Prolog has discovered the Liar Paradox.

    Not because it has computed an undefined truth value.

    Not because it has detected an infinite execution.

    But because THE OCCURS CHECK REJECTS CYCLIC UNIFICATION.


    Bingo !!! Do you know the underlying details of this?

    You are assigning philosophical significance to an operation that
    does not even inspect the meaning of your predicate names.

    And your claim that the computation "never reaches the paradoxical
    code" is especially revealing.

    THERE IS NO SUCH CODE IN THE QUERY.

    You have constructed a term, not implemented a truth evaluator.

    If you want to demonstrate a semantic result, DEFINE THE SEMANTICS.

    If you want to demonstrate infinite recursion, SHOW THE RECURSIVE
    EVALUATION.

    If you want to refute the Halting Theorem, IDENTIFY THE INVALID
    STEP IN ITS DIAGONAL PROOF.

    So far, you have done none of these things.

    You have merely confused three different problems and declared
    victory over all of them.

    Peter,

    -a-a-a "Bingo !!! Do you know the underlying details of this?"

    YES, PETER.

    DO YOU?

    The occurs check is a standard part of first-order term unification.

    When attempting to unify a variable X with a term t, it checks
    whether X already occurs within t.

    If it does, the unification is rejected, because no finite first-
    order term can satisfy that substitution.

    For example:

    -a-a-a unify_with_occurs_check(X, f(X))

    fails.

    So does:

    -a-a-a unify_with_occurs_check(X, not(true(X)))

    And so does:

    -a-a-a unify_with_occurs_check(X, banana(X))

    SAME ALGORITHM.

    SAME RESULT.

    NO SEMANTIC INTERPRETATION REQUIRED.

    Now consider:

    -a-a-a unify_with_occurs_check(X, f(Y))

    This succeeds, provided X and Y are distinct unbound variables.

    The algorithm is examining TERM STRUCTURE.

    It is not deciding whether f is true, false, paradoxical, or meaningful. >>>
    And here is the crucial distinction:

    The occurs check does not detect infinite recursion in a program.

    It prevents the construction of a cyclic substitution in finite-term
    unification.

    Those are NOT the same problem.

    So what exactly are you celebrating?

    That Prolog implements an occurs check?

    WE ALREADY KNEW THAT.

    That a self-referential term may be rejected by a particular
    unification algorithm?

    WE ALREADY KNEW THAT TOO.

    That this somehow invalidates the diagonal proof of the Halting Theorem? >>>
    THEN PROVE THE CONNECTION.

    Because a diagonal program is not a cyclic first-order term.

    And rejecting cyclic terms does not establish that a universal
    halting decider exists.

    Your "Bingo" is not a mathematical argument.

    It's the sound of someone recognizing a familiar word without
    understanding what it proves.

    Like my Minimal Type Theory unify_with_occurs_check()
    detects a cycle in the directed graph of the
    evaluation sequence.

    LP := ~True(LP) which expands into:
    ~True(~True(~True(~True(...)))) infinite recursion.
    https://philarchive.org/archive/PETMTT-4v8

    Cannot possibly get to a truth value is what
    Saul Kripke meant by assigning ungrounded to it.

    Outline of a Theory of Truth --- Saul Kripke
    The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 72, No. 19,
    Seventy-Second Annual Meeting American
    Philosophical Association, Eastern Division.
    (Nov. 6, 1975), pp. 690-716.


    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/
    files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf

    Peter,

    -a-a "Like my Minimal Type Theory unify_with_occurs_check()
    -a-a-a detects a cycle in the directed graph of the
    -a-a-a evaluation sequence."

    YOU ARE STILL CONFUSING THREE DIFFERENT THINGS.

    1. A cyclic term.
    2. A cyclic dependency between propositions.
    3. An infinite computational evaluation.

    THEY ARE NOT EQUIVALENT.

    -a-a "LP := ~True(LP) which expands into:
    -a-a-a ~True(~True(~True(~True(...)))) infinite recursion."

    No.

    That is an infinite syntactic unfolding.


    Unless executed by a theorem prover without occurs_check()

    It is not, by itself, an execution trace of a truth-evaluation algorithm.

    And detecting a cycle does not automatically establish nontermination.

    Consider the ordinary recursive function:

    -a-a int f(int n) {
    -a-a-a-a-a-a if (n == 0) return 0;
    -a-a-a-a-a-a return f(n - 1);
    -a-a }

    Its call graph contains a cycle.


    It has conditional termination. The other one does not.

    YET IT TERMINATES FOR EVERY NONNEGATIVE INTEGER INPUT.

    A cycle in a dependency graph does not prove that evaluation runs forever.


    I should have said an unconditional cycle.

    Now consider the sentence:

    -a-a P <-> True("P")

    This sentence refers to its own truth, WITHOUT NEGATION.

    Its dependency graph contains exactly the same kind of self-reference as your Liar sentence.

    But its semantic behavior is different.


    Not in Prolog or Minimal Type Theory.
    It has an unconditional cycle.

    In Kripke's least fixed-point construction, both can remain ungrounded.

    However, the positive truth-teller can receive TRUE or FALSE in suitable other fixed points, whereas the Liar cannot receive either classical
    truth value in a consistent fixed point.


    Not in MTT or Prolog.
    These things ultimately anchor in Proof Theoretic Semantics.
    Which is the way that
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    actually works in actual reality.

    SAME SELF-REFERENCE.

    DIFFERENT SEMANTIC CONSTRAINTS.

    Therefore the existence of a cycle is NOT sufficient to determine the semantic status of a sentence.


    Unconditional cycle.

    -a-a "Cannot possibly get to a truth value is what
    -a-a-a Saul Kripke meant by assigning ungrounded to it."

    NO.

    Kripke's notion of groundedness is defined through a semantic fixed-
    point construction using a partial truth predicate.


    His system is much more convoluted that PTS
    through MTT / Prolog.

    It is not defined by whether a Prolog unification algorithm detects a
    cyclic term.

    The Liar remains undefined
    in the relevant fixed-point semantics because
    neither assigning it TRUE nor assigning it FALSE is consistent with its truth conditions.

    THAT IS A SEMANTIC FACT.

    Your occurs check, meanwhile, rejects:

    -a-a X = banana(X)

    just as readily as:

    -a-a X = not(true(X))

    IT HAS NO IDEA WHAT "TRUE" OR "BANANA" MEANS.

    So here is the question:

    Does your algorithm distinguish the Liar from the positive Truth-Teller?

    If so, SHOW THE SEMANTIC RULES THAT MAKE THE DISTINCTION.

    If not, you have not implemented Kripke's theory.

    You have implemented a cycle detector.


    I have implemented Kripke's result through
    an enormously simpler process.

    And once again, NONE OF THIS REFUTES THE HALTING THEOREM.

    A diagonal program is a valid computation, not a malformed cyclic Prolog term.

    You cannot make undecidability disappear by confusing self-reference
    with invalid syntax.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    Computation(Olcott)
    Paraphrase of Emil Post definition of computation
    All computations are equivalent to the application of finite
    string transformation rules to finite string inputs to derive
    any and all outputs.

    Because Post canonical systems are Turing-equivalent, anything
    that cannot be derived by applying finite string transformations
    to finite strings is outside the scope of ChurchrCoTuring computation.

    Decider(Olcott)
    Correcting the misnomer term-of-the-art: decider
    Every Decider(Olcott) must apply finite string transformation
    inference steps to their finite string inputs that are relevant
    to the decision criteria. It must make its decision on this basis.

    Halt Decider(Olcott)
    Decider(Olcott) entails that Halt Decider(Olcott) H(D) must apply
    finite-string inference steps according to the operational semantics
    of the source-code computation language of D. The only way to determine
    the halting property of a finite string input is to examine the same
    behavior as the behavior of D simulated by H.

    *Succinct refutation of the Halting Theorem* https://github.com/plolcott/x86utm/blob/master/README.md

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of general knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2