upon picking apart the abject nonsense that is recursive undecidability,
so that i can discuss what undecidability _actually_ looks like within computing,
i find myself stumbling into a proof that turing machines as a model are
not capable of computing everything that can be computed mechanically
i guess we'll see where the paper ultimately leads for sure, but things
are cooking rLiN+A
dart200 <user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:
upon picking apart the abject nonsense that is recursive undecidability,
so that i can discuss what undecidability _actually_ looks like within
computing,
i find myself stumbling into a proof that turing machines as a model are
not capable of computing everything that can be computed mechanically
You can't do much advanced computing on an Apple laptop operating from your kitchen table.
i guess we'll see where the paper ultimately leads for sure, but things
are cooking rLiN+A
As an IT professional, I can say without the least hesitation, there's not many machines that can compare with a Cray.
Cray Computers are optimized for massive mathematical arrays rather than standard scalar math. Crays are heavily utilized in nuclear research, aerospace design, codebreaking, and global satellite weather prediction.
On 06/08/2026 5:29 AM, Dude wrote:
dart200 <user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:
upon picking apart the abject nonsense that is recursive undecidability, >>> so that i can discuss what undecidability _actually_ looks like within
computing,
i find myself stumbling into a proof that turing machines as a model are >>> not capable of computing everything that can be computed mechanically
Have you considered how to model the /Antikythera Mechanism/ on a Turing machine, as a subject for your thesis? I believe that's been done, so
the question is, what exactly is it about mechanical computing that
cannot be done on Turing machines?
You can't do much advanced computing on an Apple laptop operating from
i guess we'll see where the paper ultimately leads for sure, but things
are cooking rLiN+A
your
kitchen table.
That is a matter of perspective. The fruit laptop on the kitchen table
can be thought of as a terminal, or even just a typewriter, for the
Cray.
As an IT professional, I can say without the least hesitation, there's
not
many machines that can compare with a Cray.
I'm an I.T. professional who's never used a Cray, so I can't comment on
that.
Cray Computers are optimized for massive mathematical arrays rather than
standard scalar math. Crays are heavily utilized in nuclear research,
aerospace design, codebreaking, and global satellite weather prediction.
So if I understand Finseth's book about how to code an Emacs correctly,
a Cray supercomputer would be massively hampered were you to implement a
text editor on one.
So, which text editor do yo prefer, when coding a Cray?
On 08/07/2026 10:18 AM, Johann 'Myrkraverk' Oskarsson wrote:
On 06/08/2026 5:29 AM, Dude wrote:
dart200 <user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:
upon picking apart the abject nonsense that is recursive
undecidability,
so that i can discuss what undecidability _actually_ looks like within >>>> computing,
i find myself stumbling into a proof that turing machines as a model
are
not capable of computing everything that can be computed mechanically
Have you considered how to model the /Antikythera Mechanism/ on a Turing
machine, as a subject for your thesis?-a I believe that's been done, so
the question is, what exactly is it about mechanical computing that
cannot be done on Turing machines?
You can't do much advanced computing on an Apple laptop operating from
i guess we'll see where the paper ultimately leads for sure, but things >>>> are cooking rLiN+A
your
kitchen table.
That is a matter of perspective.-a The fruit laptop on the kitchen table
can be thought of as a terminal, or even just a typewriter, for the
Cray.
As an IT professional, I can say without the least hesitation, there's
not
many machines that can compare with a Cray.
I'm an I.T. professional who's never used a Cray, so I can't comment on
that.
Cray Computers are optimized for massive mathematical arrays rather than >>> standard scalar math. Crays are heavily utilized in nuclear research,
aerospace design, codebreaking, and global satellite weather prediction.
So if I understand Finseth's book about how to code an Emacs correctly,
a Cray supercomputer would be massively hampered were you to implement a
text editor on one.
So, which text editor do yo prefer, when coding a Cray?
Maybe if you read Finsler and Boffa then it would be more clear
why Church-Turing thesis is in a model of computation that simply
doesn't necessarily include "Zeno machines" and the like, while
it's so for the finite and bounded, in the unbounded.
Finsler and Boffa make some various accounts of "infinity"
and the "extra-ordinary" that numbers naturally have that
are usually ignored or plain banned in "ordinary" models.
On 8/12/26 7:34 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/07/2026 10:18 AM, Johann 'Myrkraverk' Oskarsson wrote:
On 06/08/2026 5:29 AM, Dude wrote:
dart200 <user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:
upon picking apart the abject nonsense that is recursive
undecidability,
so that i can discuss what undecidability _actually_ looks like within >>>>> computing,
i find myself stumbling into a proof that turing machines as a
model are
not capable of computing everything that can be computed mechanically
Have you considered how to model the /Antikythera Mechanism/ on a Turing >>> machine, as a subject for your thesis? I believe that's been done, so
the question is, what exactly is it about mechanical computing that
cannot be done on Turing machines?
You can't do much advanced computing on an Apple laptop operating from >>>> your
i guess we'll see where the paper ultimately leads for sure, but
things
are cooking rLiN+A
kitchen table.
That is a matter of perspective. The fruit laptop on the kitchen table
can be thought of as a terminal, or even just a typewriter, for the
Cray.
As an IT professional, I can say without the least hesitation, there's >>>> not
many machines that can compare with a Cray.
I'm an I.T. professional who's never used a Cray, so I can't comment on
that.
Cray Computers are optimized for massive mathematical arrays rather
than
standard scalar math. Crays are heavily utilized in nuclear research,
aerospace design, codebreaking, and global satellite weather
prediction.
So if I understand Finseth's book about how to code an Emacs correctly,
a Cray supercomputer would be massively hampered were you to implement a >>> text editor on one.
So, which text editor do yo prefer, when coding a Cray?
Maybe if you read Finsler and Boffa then it would be more clear
why Church-Turing thesis is in a model of computation that simply
doesn't necessarily include "Zeno machines" and the like, while
it's so for the finite and bounded, in the unbounded.
Finsler and Boffa make some various accounts of "infinity"
and the "extra-ordinary" that numbers naturally have that
are usually ignored or plain banned in "ordinary" models.
theoretical mathematician do have a tendency to try wacky shit when it
comes infinite ...
turing for example tried to extend logical systems into transfinite
ordinals in an attempt to get around incompleteness. no idea what kind
of axiom would realistically come past an infinite amount of them, but
this unfortunately didn't work so it doesn't really matter eh?
i plan to propose a limit to the incompleteness within computing, which
in turn may in fact make it complete. or at least trivialize
incompleteness to the point of irrelevancy
On 08/12/2026 10:15 PM, dart200 wrote:
On 8/12/26 7:34 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/07/2026 10:18 AM, Johann 'Myrkraverk' Oskarsson wrote:
On 06/08/2026 5:29 AM, Dude wrote:
dart200 <user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:
upon picking apart the abject nonsense that is recursive
undecidability,
so that i can discuss what undecidability _actually_ looks like
within
computing,
i find myself stumbling into a proof that turing machines as a
model are
not capable of computing everything that can be computed mechanically >>>>
Have you considered how to model the /Antikythera Mechanism/ on a
Turing
machine, as a subject for your thesis?-a I believe that's been done, so >>>> the question is, what exactly is it about mechanical computing that
cannot be done on Turing machines?
You can't do much advanced computing on an Apple laptop operating from >>>>> your
i guess we'll see where the paper ultimately leads for sure, but
things
are cooking rLiN+A
kitchen table.
That is a matter of perspective.-a The fruit laptop on the kitchen table >>>> can be thought of as a terminal, or even just a typewriter, for the
Cray.
As an IT professional, I can say without the least hesitation, there's >>>>> not
many machines that can compare with a Cray.
I'm an I.T. professional who's never used a Cray, so I can't comment on >>>> that.
Cray Computers are optimized for massive mathematical arrays rather
than
standard scalar math. Crays are heavily utilized in nuclear research, >>>>> aerospace design, codebreaking, and global satellite weather
prediction.
So if I understand Finseth's book about how to code an Emacs correctly, >>>> a Cray supercomputer would be massively hampered were you to
implement a
text editor on one.
So, which text editor do yo prefer, when coding a Cray?
Maybe if you read Finsler and Boffa then it would be more clear
why Church-Turing thesis is in a model of computation that simply
doesn't necessarily include "Zeno machines" and the like, while
it's so for the finite and bounded, in the unbounded.
Finsler and Boffa make some various accounts of "infinity"
and the "extra-ordinary" that numbers naturally have that
are usually ignored or plain banned in "ordinary" models.
theoretical mathematician do have a tendency to try wacky shit when it
comes infinite ...
turing for example tried to extend logical systems into transfinite
ordinals in an attempt to get around incompleteness. no idea what kind
of axiom would realistically come past an infinite amount of them, but
this unfortunately didn't work so it doesn't really matter eh?
i plan to propose a limit to the incompleteness within computing, which
in turn may in fact make it complete. or at least trivialize
incompleteness to the point of irrelevancy
Why would you do that?
It's kind of like driving a car, and knowing the limits,
since one never knows the limits, yet is always finding the limits, incompleteness is simply beyond a limit, and not being cognizant
of it, if not quite sure where it is, risks hitting its wall,
or driving over its cliff.
It's like the very notion of analysis, making
restriction-of-comprehension keeps some things simple, other things un-available to reason. Somebody else needn't adopt that restriction,
and then it's like a rooster locking itself in the coop.
Mirimanoff points out that a model of finite ordinals is extra-ordinary, Russell wishes it away, the "Russell-ian retro-thesis",
it's natural that infinity is "in", and that models of ordinals
or integers start as both bounded-fragments and
extraordinary-extensions, the "standard" model not even existing except as
a limit of those.
The classical expositions of the super-classical, usually considered
to start with Zeno's account of infinite-divisbility and summability
and motion in time, and the geometric series, gives reasons why that
for infinitary-analysis, that's about the only place to start that
isn't wacky, and it makes of itself accounts of why induction fails
where deduction succeeds, and about complementary duals, and the
great account of structure and geometry and arithmetic, and continuity
and infinity, up-front.
Then, that there are more models of laws of large numbers, and
that naive induction is basically finitistic and only knows a
law of small numbers, or "weak" induction, compared to the "strong"
induction which is given an account by the existence of a space
and its structure, that the "a priori" of "strong induction" is
due classical-expositions of super-classical results after the double-reductio and the ad-infinitum instead of the ad-absurdam,
about the "ab-absurdam", that numbers and forms always have those.
Then, retro-finitism or ultra-finitism is naive, and incomplete.--
On 8/13/26 10:12 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/12/2026 10:15 PM, dart200 wrote:
On 8/12/26 7:34 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/07/2026 10:18 AM, Johann 'Myrkraverk' Oskarsson wrote:
On 06/08/2026 5:29 AM, Dude wrote:
dart200 <user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:
upon picking apart the abject nonsense that is recursive
undecidability,
so that i can discuss what undecidability _actually_ looks like
within
computing,
i find myself stumbling into a proof that turing machines as a
model are
not capable of computing everything that can be computed
mechanically
Have you considered how to model the /Antikythera Mechanism/ on a
Turing
machine, as a subject for your thesis? I believe that's been done, so >>>>> the question is, what exactly is it about mechanical computing that
cannot be done on Turing machines?
You can't do much advanced computing on an Apple laptop operating
i guess we'll see where the paper ultimately leads for sure, but >>>>>>> things
are cooking rLiN+A
from
your
kitchen table.
That is a matter of perspective. The fruit laptop on the kitchen
table
can be thought of as a terminal, or even just a typewriter, for the
Cray.
As an IT professional, I can say without the least hesitation,
there's
not
many machines that can compare with a Cray.
I'm an I.T. professional who's never used a Cray, so I can't
comment on
that.
Cray Computers are optimized for massive mathematical arrays rather >>>>>> than
standard scalar math. Crays are heavily utilized in nuclear research, >>>>>> aerospace design, codebreaking, and global satellite weather
prediction.
So if I understand Finseth's book about how to code an Emacs
correctly,
a Cray supercomputer would be massively hampered were you to
implement a
text editor on one.
So, which text editor do yo prefer, when coding a Cray?
Maybe if you read Finsler and Boffa then it would be more clear
why Church-Turing thesis is in a model of computation that simply
doesn't necessarily include "Zeno machines" and the like, while
it's so for the finite and bounded, in the unbounded.
Finsler and Boffa make some various accounts of "infinity"
and the "extra-ordinary" that numbers naturally have that
are usually ignored or plain banned in "ordinary" models.
theoretical mathematician do have a tendency to try wacky shit when it
comes infinite ...
turing for example tried to extend logical systems into transfinite
ordinals in an attempt to get around incompleteness. no idea what kind
of axiom would realistically come past an infinite amount of them, but
this unfortunately didn't work so it doesn't really matter eh?
i plan to propose a limit to the incompleteness within computing, which
in turn may in fact make it complete. or at least trivialize
incompleteness to the point of irrelevancy
Why would you do that?
because erroneously proving a limit that does not actually exist will artificially limit our potential to wield computing as an applied technique
like specifically when it comes to our practical application of
computing, we do not prove what our computations do. we might test
various inputs/outputs combos, but this is quite a bit inferior to
proving semantics across their entire input possibility space (and not
just brute forcing that proof)
It's kind of like driving a car, and knowing the limits,
since one never knows the limits, yet is always finding the limits,
incompleteness is simply beyond a limit, and not being cognizant
of it, if not quite sure where it is, risks hitting its wall,
or driving over its cliff.
i'm not sure how framing currently intractable problems as actually
tractable (without limiting the domain!) risks driving over some kind of existential cliff in this case
undecidability within computing is entirely founded in the problems of computing the semantic properties of computations, unlocking those kinds
of problems as actually tractable seems like possibly a huge boon to the advancement of computing
It's like the very notion of analysis, making
restriction-of-comprehension keeps some things simple, other things
un-available to reason. Somebody else needn't adopt that restriction,
and then it's like a rooster locking itself in the coop.
i'm not proposing a reduction in power to computing, if anything this
would be an expansion in descriptive power
Mirimanoff points out that a model of finite ordinals is extra-ordinary,
Russell wishes it away, the "Russell-ian retro-thesis",
it's natural that infinity is "in", and that models of ordinals
or integers start as both bounded-fragments and
extraordinary-extensions, the "standard" model not even existing
except as
a limit of those.
The classical expositions of the super-classical, usually considered
to start with Zeno's account of infinite-divisbility and summability
and motion in time, and the geometric series, gives reasons why that
for infinitary-analysis, that's about the only place to start that
isn't wacky, and it makes of itself accounts of why induction fails
where deduction succeeds, and about complementary duals, and the
great account of structure and geometry and arithmetic, and continuity
and infinity, up-front.
i have a hard time parsing what u mean even with gemenigpts help, but
please do remember the /theory of computing/ is inherently limited to
the cardinality of natural numbers, as mechanical computations must be
mapped to the finite machine description which compute them
Then, that there are more models of laws of large numbers, and
that naive induction is basically finitistic and only knows a
law of small numbers, or "weak" induction, compared to the "strong"
induction which is given an account by the existence of a space
and its structure, that the "a priori" of "strong induction" is
due classical-expositions of super-classical results after the
double-reductio and the ad-infinitum instead of the ad-absurdam,
about the "ab-absurdam", that numbers and forms always have those.
Then, retro-finitism or ultra-finitism is naive, and incomplete.
On 08/13/2026 06:29 PM, dart200 wrote:
On 8/13/26 10:12 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/12/2026 10:15 PM, dart200 wrote:
On 8/12/26 7:34 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/07/2026 10:18 AM, Johann 'Myrkraverk' Oskarsson wrote:
On 06/08/2026 5:29 AM, Dude wrote:
dart200 <user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:
upon picking apart the abject nonsense that is recursive
undecidability,
so that i can discuss what undecidability _actually_ looks like >>>>>>>> within
computing,
i find myself stumbling into a proof that turing machines as a >>>>>>>> model are
not capable of computing everything that can be computed
mechanically
Have you considered how to model the /Antikythera Mechanism/ on a
Turing
machine, as a subject for your thesis?-a I believe that's been
done, so
the question is, what exactly is it about mechanical computing that >>>>>> cannot be done on Turing machines?
You can't do much advanced computing on an Apple laptop operating >>>>>>> from
i guess we'll see where the paper ultimately leads for sure, but >>>>>>>> things
are cooking rLiN+A
your
kitchen table.
That is a matter of perspective.-a The fruit laptop on the kitchen >>>>>> table
can be thought of as a terminal, or even just a typewriter, for the >>>>>> Cray.
As an IT professional, I can say without the least hesitation,
there's
not
many machines that can compare with a Cray.
I'm an I.T. professional who's never used a Cray, so I can't
comment on
that.
Cray Computers are optimized for massive mathematical arrays rather >>>>>>> than
standard scalar math. Crays are heavily utilized in nuclear
research,
aerospace design, codebreaking, and global satellite weather
prediction.
So if I understand Finseth's book about how to code an Emacs
correctly,
a Cray supercomputer would be massively hampered were you to
implement a
text editor on one.
So, which text editor do yo prefer, when coding a Cray?
Maybe if you read Finsler and Boffa then it would be more clear
why Church-Turing thesis is in a model of computation that simply
doesn't necessarily include "Zeno machines" and the like, while
it's so for the finite and bounded, in the unbounded.
Finsler and Boffa make some various accounts of "infinity"
and the "extra-ordinary" that numbers naturally have that
are usually ignored or plain banned in "ordinary" models.
theoretical mathematician do have a tendency to try wacky shit when it >>>> comes infinite ...
turing for example tried to extend logical systems into transfinite
ordinals in an attempt to get around incompleteness. no idea what kind >>>> of axiom would realistically come past an infinite amount of them, but >>>> this unfortunately didn't work so it doesn't really matter eh?
i plan to propose a limit to the incompleteness within computing, which >>>> in turn may in fact make it complete. or at least trivialize
incompleteness to the point of irrelevancy
Why would you do that?
because erroneously proving a limit that does not actually exist will
artificially limit our potential to wield computing as an applied
technique
like specifically when it comes to our practical application of
computing, we do not prove what our computations do. we might test
various inputs/outputs combos, but this is quite a bit inferior to
proving semantics across their entire input possibility space (and not
just brute forcing that proof)
It's kind of like driving a car, and knowing the limits,
since one never knows the limits, yet is always finding the limits,
incompleteness is simply beyond a limit, and not being cognizant
of it, if not quite sure where it is, risks hitting its wall,
or driving over its cliff.
i'm not sure how framing currently intractable problems as actually
tractable (without limiting the domain!) risks driving over some kind of
existential cliff in this case
undecidability within computing is entirely founded in the problems of
computing the semantic properties of computations, unlocking those kinds
of problems as actually tractable seems like possibly a huge boon to the
advancement of computing
It's like the very notion of analysis, making
restriction-of-comprehension keeps some things simple, other things
un-available to reason. Somebody else needn't adopt that restriction,
and then it's like a rooster locking itself in the coop.
i'm not proposing a reduction in power to computing, if anything this
would be an expansion in descriptive power
Mirimanoff points out that a model of finite ordinals is extra-ordinary, >>> Russell wishes it away, the "Russell-ian retro-thesis",
it's natural that infinity is "in", and that models of ordinals
or integers start as both bounded-fragments and
extraordinary-extensions, the "standard" model not even existing
except as
a limit of those.
The classical expositions of the super-classical, usually considered
to start with Zeno's account of infinite-divisbility and summability
and motion in time, and the geometric series, gives reasons why that
for infinitary-analysis, that's about the only place to start that
isn't wacky, and it makes of itself accounts of why induction fails
where deduction succeeds, and about complementary duals, and the
great account of structure and geometry and arithmetic, and continuity
and infinity, up-front.
i have a hard time parsing what u mean even with gemenigpts help, but
please do remember the /theory of computing/ is inherently limited to
the cardinality of natural numbers, as mechanical computations must be
mapped to the finite machine description which compute them
Then, that there are more models of laws of large numbers, and
that naive induction is basically finitistic and only knows a
law of small numbers, or "weak" induction, compared to the "strong"
induction which is given an account by the existence of a space
and its structure, that the "a priori" of "strong induction" is
due classical-expositions of super-classical results after the
double-reductio and the ad-infinitum instead of the ad-absurdam,
about the "ab-absurdam", that numbers and forms always have those.
Then, retro-finitism or ultra-finitism is naive, and incomplete.
Hm. Thanks for writing.
Agreeably, accounts of the _unbounded_, of the _finite_, keep
things "sensible, fungible, and tractable", and that accounts
of _completions_, in the _infinite_, are due descriptions by
super-classical results like what give the geometric series,
or Zeno's arguments either way _both existing_ when induction
either way makes a counter-development/counter-example to the other,
this is about "weak and strong induction", that induction and infinite induction it's usual given account of the base case then inductive case,
is "weak", since it's _completion_, doesn't have an "actual
infinite".
For the theory of computation, a usual idea is that there are
"Turing machines" and then "Zeno machines", then, that like
there are the "digital" and "analog", the "discrete" and "continuous",
that it's independent number theory which of large, larger, and largest
laws of large numbers apply, for inductive, infinite, and continuum limits.
There are at least three kinds of limits, then that if infinite limits
and continuum limits require the "strong induction", i.e., weak
induction plus also another reason why the completion occurs,
then makes for "completeness" and "measure" after "density".
The unbounded readily gives density, it's agreeable.
I suppose it's been called "non-standard", like "non-standard models
of integers" or "non-standard models of probability", yet, that's
because the entire linear curriculum mostly doesn't have an account
of deductive analysis at all, since, trivially enough, it's provides
a direct and immediate counter-development and counter-example to
any plain course of the naive (or weak) induction at all, which has
been known since antiquity about why the ancients said truth was
"discovered" instead of "invented".
Approximation algorithms abound, to be sure, and approximations
always have a nominally non-zero error term, and modeling the error term
or modeling the error bounds of approximations, include for
where the error term gets away from the approximation itself.
Then, the "as-if" or "almost", like the "almost-all",
"almost-everywhere", "almost-periodic", "almost-analytic", the sorts
of "almost-approximate", that's naturally enough more of a
"what-if" than an "as-if".
So, "modeling the error bounds" is usually what's involved in
analysis since here the study of things is called "dynamical
modeling" not "chaos theory", since math is not indeterministic,
then about singularity theory that singularities in a singularity
theory are branches in a multiplicity theory, just taking the extra-book-keeping when there's enough scratch-space to write
out the numerical method or approximative algorithm, or making
an account of how mathematics does that in actual numerical resources,
or for the usual accounts of incompleteness (or, inconsistency if
you'd rather not have incompleteness) of the ordinary, and somehow
the completeness and the consistency in the extra-ordinary,
of the infinite and continuous.
So, Church-Turing thesis is prolly not fritzed, though that
it is though merely a "fragment" or the "ordinary", and,
in the extra-ordinary then thusly, it's _independent_, the ordinary.
(The "standard" in one sense of the ordinary is "non-standard"
the other, like "standard infinitesimals" or "standard integers",
one giving a clock-arithmetic the other a field-arithmetic,
and only agreeing about the measure of [0,1].)
On 8/14/26 7:27 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/13/2026 06:29 PM, dart200 wrote:
On 8/13/26 10:12 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/12/2026 10:15 PM, dart200 wrote:
On 8/12/26 7:34 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/07/2026 10:18 AM, Johann 'Myrkraverk' Oskarsson wrote:
On 06/08/2026 5:29 AM, Dude wrote:
dart200 <user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:
upon picking apart the abject nonsense that is recursive
undecidability,
so that i can discuss what undecidability _actually_ looks like >>>>>>>>> within
computing,
i find myself stumbling into a proof that turing machines as a >>>>>>>>> model are
not capable of computing everything that can be computed
mechanically
Have you considered how to model the /Antikythera Mechanism/ on a >>>>>>> Turing
machine, as a subject for your thesis?-a I believe that's been
done, so
the question is, what exactly is it about mechanical computing that >>>>>>> cannot be done on Turing machines?
You can't do much advanced computing on an Apple laptop operating >>>>>>>> from
i guess we'll see where the paper ultimately leads for sure, but >>>>>>>>> things
are cooking rLiN+A
your
kitchen table.
That is a matter of perspective.-a The fruit laptop on the kitchen >>>>>>> table
can be thought of as a terminal, or even just a typewriter, for the >>>>>>> Cray.
As an IT professional, I can say without the least hesitation, >>>>>>>> there's
not
many machines that can compare with a Cray.
I'm an I.T. professional who's never used a Cray, so I can't
comment on
that.
Cray Computers are optimized for massive mathematical arrays rather >>>>>>>> than
standard scalar math. Crays are heavily utilized in nuclear
research,
aerospace design, codebreaking, and global satellite weather
prediction.
So if I understand Finseth's book about how to code an Emacs
correctly,
a Cray supercomputer would be massively hampered were you to
implement a
text editor on one.
So, which text editor do yo prefer, when coding a Cray?
Maybe if you read Finsler and Boffa then it would be more clear
why Church-Turing thesis is in a model of computation that simply
doesn't necessarily include "Zeno machines" and the like, while
it's so for the finite and bounded, in the unbounded.
Finsler and Boffa make some various accounts of "infinity"
and the "extra-ordinary" that numbers naturally have that
are usually ignored or plain banned in "ordinary" models.
theoretical mathematician do have a tendency to try wacky shit when it >>>>> comes infinite ...
turing for example tried to extend logical systems into transfinite
ordinals in an attempt to get around incompleteness. no idea what kind >>>>> of axiom would realistically come past an infinite amount of them, but >>>>> this unfortunately didn't work so it doesn't really matter eh?
i plan to propose a limit to the incompleteness within computing,
which
in turn may in fact make it complete. or at least trivialize
incompleteness to the point of irrelevancy
Why would you do that?
because erroneously proving a limit that does not actually exist will
artificially limit our potential to wield computing as an applied
technique
like specifically when it comes to our practical application of
computing, we do not prove what our computations do. we might test
various inputs/outputs combos, but this is quite a bit inferior to
proving semantics across their entire input possibility space (and not
just brute forcing that proof)
It's kind of like driving a car, and knowing the limits,
since one never knows the limits, yet is always finding the limits,
incompleteness is simply beyond a limit, and not being cognizant
of it, if not quite sure where it is, risks hitting its wall,
or driving over its cliff.
i'm not sure how framing currently intractable problems as actually
tractable (without limiting the domain!) risks driving over some kind of >>> existential cliff in this case
undecidability within computing is entirely founded in the problems of
computing the semantic properties of computations, unlocking those kinds >>> of problems as actually tractable seems like possibly a huge boon to the >>> advancement of computing
It's like the very notion of analysis, making
restriction-of-comprehension keeps some things simple, other things
un-available to reason. Somebody else needn't adopt that restriction,
and then it's like a rooster locking itself in the coop.
i'm not proposing a reduction in power to computing, if anything this
would be an expansion in descriptive power
Mirimanoff points out that a model of finite ordinals is extra-
ordinary,
Russell wishes it away, the "Russell-ian retro-thesis",
it's natural that infinity is "in", and that models of ordinals
or integers start as both bounded-fragments and
extraordinary-extensions, the "standard" model not even existing
except as
a limit of those.
The classical expositions of the super-classical, usually considered
to start with Zeno's account of infinite-divisbility and summability
and motion in time, and the geometric series, gives reasons why that
for infinitary-analysis, that's about the only place to start that
isn't wacky, and it makes of itself accounts of why induction fails
where deduction succeeds, and about complementary duals, and the
great account of structure and geometry and arithmetic, and continuity >>>> and infinity, up-front.
i have a hard time parsing what u mean even with gemenigpts help, but
please do remember the /theory of computing/ is inherently limited to
the cardinality of natural numbers, as mechanical computations must be
mapped to the finite machine description which compute them
Then, that there are more models of laws of large numbers, and
that naive induction is basically finitistic and only knows a
law of small numbers, or "weak" induction, compared to the "strong"
induction which is given an account by the existence of a space
and its structure, that the "a priori" of "strong induction" is
due classical-expositions of super-classical results after the
double-reductio and the ad-infinitum instead of the ad-absurdam,
about the "ab-absurdam", that numbers and forms always have those.
Then, retro-finitism or ultra-finitism is naive, and incomplete.
Hm. Thanks for writing.
Agreeably, accounts of the _unbounded_, of the _finite_, keep
things "sensible, fungible, and tractable", and that accounts
of _completions_, in the _infinite_, are due descriptions by
super-classical results like what give the geometric series,
or Zeno's arguments either way _both existing_ when induction
either way makes a counter-development/counter-example to the other,
this is about "weak and strong induction", that induction and infinite
induction it's usual given account of the base case then inductive case,
is "weak", since it's _completion_, doesn't have an "actual
infinite".
For the theory of computation, a usual idea is that there are
"Turing machines" and then "Zeno machines", then, that like
there are the "digital" and "analog", the "discrete" and "continuous",
that it's independent number theory which of large, larger, and largest
laws of large numbers apply, for inductive, infinite, and continuum
limits.
There are at least three kinds of limits, then that if infinite limits
and continuum limits require the "strong induction", i.e., weak
induction plus also another reason why the completion occurs,
then makes for "completeness" and "measure" after "density".
The unbounded readily gives density, it's agreeable.
I suppose it's been called "non-standard", like "non-standard models
of integers" or "non-standard models of probability", yet, that's
because the entire linear curriculum mostly doesn't have an account
of deductive analysis at all, since, trivially enough, it's provides
a direct and immediate counter-development and counter-example to
any plain course of the naive (or weak) induction at all, which has
been known since antiquity about why the ancients said truth was
"discovered" instead of "invented".
Approximation algorithms abound, to be sure, and approximations
always have a nominally non-zero error term, and modeling the error term
or modeling the error bounds of approximations, include for
where the error term gets away from the approximation itself.
Then, the "as-if" or "almost", like the "almost-all",
"almost-everywhere", "almost-periodic", "almost-analytic", the sorts
of "almost-approximate", that's naturally enough more of a
"what-if" than an "as-if".
So, "modeling the error bounds" is usually what's involved in
analysis since here the study of things is called "dynamical
modeling" not "chaos theory", since math is not indeterministic,
then about singularity theory that singularities in a singularity
theory are branches in a multiplicity theory, just taking the
extra-book-keeping when there's enough scratch-space to write
out the numerical method or approximative algorithm, or making
an account of how mathematics does that in actual numerical resources,
or for the usual accounts of incompleteness (or, inconsistency if
you'd rather not have incompleteness) of the ordinary, and somehow
the completeness and the consistency in the extra-ordinary,
of the infinite and continuous.
So, Church-Turing thesis is prolly not fritzed, though that
it is though merely a "fragment" or the "ordinary", and,
ross, i'm not using a model of hypercomputation to usurp the ct thesis.
as we don't actually know how to mechanically implement those, they
cannot be used by a human to compute something a turing machine cannot,
and therefore do not refute it.
recall that the ct thesis is thus:
-a| A function is effectively calculable by a human being
-a| _iff_ it can be computed by a turing machine.
the ct thesis claims actual mechanical computation that a human can do
is limited to what can be expressed within the turing machine model. refuting the ct thesis involves demonstrating a mechanical process that utilizes an idealized human agent to compute something which a turing machine simply cannot express.
the refutation is not algorithmically novel or hard, it's more due to
the fact that the human operation exists outside what can be directly referenced by the turing machine model. yes, we can simulate the human operation within the turing machine model, and that simulation will be limited by what turing machines can express, but a human agent
mechanically doing that same thing just is not. i'm sure u won't be convinced by my paragraphs here, the full argument will be in a paper
i'm finishing up.
the refutation is again, not algorithmically hard, it's moreso tied to
the same self-referential paradox which stumped turing into establishing limits to turing machine computation in the first place, back on the
1936 paper /on computable numbers/
in the extra-ordinary then thusly, it's _independent_, the ordinary.
(The "standard" in one sense of the ordinary is "non-standard"
the other, like "standard infinitesimals" or "standard integers",
one giving a clock-arithmetic the other a field-arithmetic,
and only agreeing about the measure of [0,1].)
On 16/08/2026 5:38 AM, dart200 wrote:
On 8/14/26 7:27 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/13/2026 06:29 PM, dart200 wrote:
On 8/13/26 10:12 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/12/2026 10:15 PM, dart200 wrote:
On 8/12/26 7:34 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/07/2026 10:18 AM, Johann 'Myrkraverk' Oskarsson wrote:
On 06/08/2026 5:29 AM, Dude wrote:
dart200 <user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:
upon picking apart the abject nonsense that is recursive
undecidability,
so that i can discuss what undecidability _actually_ looks like >>>>>>>>>> within
computing,
i find myself stumbling into a proof that turing machines as a >>>>>>>>>> model are
not capable of computing everything that can be computed
mechanically
Have you considered how to model the /Antikythera Mechanism/ on a >>>>>>>> Turing
machine, as a subject for your thesis? I believe that's been
done, so
the question is, what exactly is it about mechanical computing that >>>>>>>> cannot be done on Turing machines?
You can't do much advanced computing on an Apple laptop operating >>>>>>>>> from
i guess we'll see where the paper ultimately leads for sure, but >>>>>>>>>> things
are cooking rLiN+A
your
kitchen table.
That is a matter of perspective. The fruit laptop on the kitchen >>>>>>>> table
can be thought of as a terminal, or even just a typewriter, for the >>>>>>>> Cray.
As an IT professional, I can say without the least hesitation, >>>>>>>>> there's
not
many machines that can compare with a Cray.
I'm an I.T. professional who's never used a Cray, so I can't
comment on
that.
Cray Computers are optimized for massive mathematical arrays >>>>>>>>> rather
than
standard scalar math. Crays are heavily utilized in nuclear
research,
aerospace design, codebreaking, and global satellite weather >>>>>>>>> prediction.
So if I understand Finseth's book about how to code an Emacs
correctly,
a Cray supercomputer would be massively hampered were you to
implement a
text editor on one.
So, which text editor do yo prefer, when coding a Cray?
Maybe if you read Finsler and Boffa then it would be more clear
why Church-Turing thesis is in a model of computation that simply >>>>>>> doesn't necessarily include "Zeno machines" and the like, while
it's so for the finite and bounded, in the unbounded.
Finsler and Boffa make some various accounts of "infinity"
and the "extra-ordinary" that numbers naturally have that
are usually ignored or plain banned in "ordinary" models.
theoretical mathematician do have a tendency to try wacky shit
when it
comes infinite ...
turing for example tried to extend logical systems into transfinite >>>>>> ordinals in an attempt to get around incompleteness. no idea what
kind
of axiom would realistically come past an infinite amount of them, >>>>>> but
this unfortunately didn't work so it doesn't really matter eh?
i plan to propose a limit to the incompleteness within computing,
which
in turn may in fact make it complete. or at least trivialize
incompleteness to the point of irrelevancy
Why would you do that?
because erroneously proving a limit that does not actually exist will
artificially limit our potential to wield computing as an applied
technique
like specifically when it comes to our practical application of
computing, we do not prove what our computations do. we might test
various inputs/outputs combos, but this is quite a bit inferior to
proving semantics across their entire input possibility space (and not >>>> just brute forcing that proof)
It's kind of like driving a car, and knowing the limits,
since one never knows the limits, yet is always finding the limits,
incompleteness is simply beyond a limit, and not being cognizant
of it, if not quite sure where it is, risks hitting its wall,
or driving over its cliff.
i'm not sure how framing currently intractable problems as actually
tractable (without limiting the domain!) risks driving over some
kind of
existential cliff in this case
undecidability within computing is entirely founded in the problems of >>>> computing the semantic properties of computations, unlocking those
kinds
of problems as actually tractable seems like possibly a huge boon to
the
advancement of computing
It's like the very notion of analysis, making
restriction-of-comprehension keeps some things simple, other things
un-available to reason. Somebody else needn't adopt that restriction, >>>>> and then it's like a rooster locking itself in the coop.
i'm not proposing a reduction in power to computing, if anything this
would be an expansion in descriptive power
Mirimanoff points out that a model of finite ordinals is extra-
ordinary,
Russell wishes it away, the "Russell-ian retro-thesis",
it's natural that infinity is "in", and that models of ordinals
or integers start as both bounded-fragments and
extraordinary-extensions, the "standard" model not even existing
except as
a limit of those.
The classical expositions of the super-classical, usually considered >>>>> to start with Zeno's account of infinite-divisbility and summability >>>>> and motion in time, and the geometric series, gives reasons why that >>>>> for infinitary-analysis, that's about the only place to start that
isn't wacky, and it makes of itself accounts of why induction fails
where deduction succeeds, and about complementary duals, and the
great account of structure and geometry and arithmetic, and continuity >>>>> and infinity, up-front.
i have a hard time parsing what u mean even with gemenigpts help, but
please do remember the /theory of computing/ is inherently limited to
the cardinality of natural numbers, as mechanical computations must be >>>> mapped to the finite machine description which compute them
Then, that there are more models of laws of large numbers, and
that naive induction is basically finitistic and only knows a
law of small numbers, or "weak" induction, compared to the "strong"
induction which is given an account by the existence of a space
and its structure, that the "a priori" of "strong induction" is
due classical-expositions of super-classical results after the
double-reductio and the ad-infinitum instead of the ad-absurdam,
about the "ab-absurdam", that numbers and forms always have those.
Then, retro-finitism or ultra-finitism is naive, and incomplete.
Hm. Thanks for writing.
Agreeably, accounts of the _unbounded_, of the _finite_, keep
things "sensible, fungible, and tractable", and that accounts
of _completions_, in the _infinite_, are due descriptions by
super-classical results like what give the geometric series,
or Zeno's arguments either way _both existing_ when induction
either way makes a counter-development/counter-example to the other,
this is about "weak and strong induction", that induction and infinite
induction it's usual given account of the base case then inductive case, >>> is "weak", since it's _completion_, doesn't have an "actual
infinite".
For the theory of computation, a usual idea is that there are
"Turing machines" and then "Zeno machines", then, that like
there are the "digital" and "analog", the "discrete" and "continuous",
that it's independent number theory which of large, larger, and largest
laws of large numbers apply, for inductive, infinite, and continuum
limits.
There are at least three kinds of limits, then that if infinite limits
and continuum limits require the "strong induction", i.e., weak
induction plus also another reason why the completion occurs,
then makes for "completeness" and "measure" after "density".
The unbounded readily gives density, it's agreeable.
I suppose it's been called "non-standard", like "non-standard models
of integers" or "non-standard models of probability", yet, that's
because the entire linear curriculum mostly doesn't have an account
of deductive analysis at all, since, trivially enough, it's provides
a direct and immediate counter-development and counter-example to
any plain course of the naive (or weak) induction at all, which has
been known since antiquity about why the ancients said truth was
"discovered" instead of "invented".
Approximation algorithms abound, to be sure, and approximations
always have a nominally non-zero error term, and modeling the error term >>> or modeling the error bounds of approximations, include for
where the error term gets away from the approximation itself.
Then, the "as-if" or "almost", like the "almost-all",
"almost-everywhere", "almost-periodic", "almost-analytic", the sorts
of "almost-approximate", that's naturally enough more of a
"what-if" than an "as-if".
So, "modeling the error bounds" is usually what's involved in
analysis since here the study of things is called "dynamical
modeling" not "chaos theory", since math is not indeterministic,
then about singularity theory that singularities in a singularity
theory are branches in a multiplicity theory, just taking the
extra-book-keeping when there's enough scratch-space to write
out the numerical method or approximative algorithm, or making
an account of how mathematics does that in actual numerical resources,
or for the usual accounts of incompleteness (or, inconsistency if
you'd rather not have incompleteness) of the ordinary, and somehow
the completeness and the consistency in the extra-ordinary,
of the infinite and continuous.
So, Church-Turing thesis is prolly not fritzed, though that
it is though merely a "fragment" or the "ordinary", and,
ross, i'm not using a model of hypercomputation to usurp the ct
thesis. as we don't actually know how to mechanically implement those,
they cannot be used by a human to compute something a turing machine
cannot, and therefore do not refute it.
recall that the ct thesis is thus:
| A function is effectively calculable by a human being
| _iff_ it can be computed by a turing machine.
the ct thesis claims actual mechanical computation that a human can do
is limited to what can be expressed within the turing machine model.
refuting the ct thesis involves demonstrating a mechanical process
that utilizes an idealized human agent to compute something which a
turing machine simply cannot express.
So, why not use my earlier example of the /Antikythera mechanism/ as a counter example. If I get it right, it's an actual mechanical calcula-
tor, and as such, cannot be implemented in a /turing machine/ except as
a simulation of such.
Now, simulation isn't reality. /The map is not the territory/. I know mathematical types have a hard time with this concept, so bear with me
for now if you're confused.
I'm also confused about the theoretical argument about what is and isn't calculable by a turing machine. I live in the real world, and I use
real machines.
Basically, what I'm getting at, a human operating the /Antikythera
mechanism/ is indeed calculating something that /cannot/ be done by
a turing machine, and therefore refutes the /ct thesis/ above.
Now, I know proof by counter example is not pleasant to experience, so
I don't begrudge you being upset, but please find another topic for a
thesis, or just present the /Antikypthera mechanism/ as a counter ex-
ample, and be done with it.
the refutation is not algorithmically novel or hard, it's more due to
the fact that the human operation exists outside what can be directly
referenced by the turing machine model. yes, we can simulate the human
operation within the turing machine model, and that simulation will be
limited by what turing machines can express, but a human agent
mechanically doing that same thing just is not. i'm sure u won't be
convinced by my paragraphs here, the full argument will be in a paper
i'm finishing up.
the refutation is again, not algorithmically hard, it's moreso tied to
the same self-referential paradox which stumped turing into
establishing limits to turing machine computation in the first place,
back on the 1936 paper /on computable numbers/
in the extra-ordinary then thusly, it's _independent_, the ordinary.
(The "standard" in one sense of the ordinary is "non-standard"
the other, like "standard infinitesimals" or "standard integers",
one giving a clock-arithmetic the other a field-arithmetic,
and only agreeing about the measure of [0,1].)
I didn't graduate as a /math major/ so I don't move in the infinite
social circles.
Have a nice day!
Somebody like Maugin has something like the "acoustic wave transducer",
an electronic circuit that makes for solving what would be digital
problems more like analog problems.
These days they call that a "D-Wave quantum simulator computer",
about that there are then also many models of computation that
were about planar circuits, with vias and all, in the "three-dimensional integrated circuit" or "3-D IC", that make some
what were fundamentally serial algorithms into general parallel.
The use of optical junctions and optical traces instead of electronic junctions and electronic traces, offers an entirely different model
of propagation, basically for 1-to-many or many-to-1.
It's agreeable that a usual model of computation as a calculus
is limited to an abacus (if a rather large abacus): yet accounts
like the integral or infinitesimal analysis or Fourier-style analysis
or about doubling-measures and quasi-invariant measure theory, these
are "super-classical results" then though that a "computer algebra
system" can be given the rules to work on them like perfect numbers
in their symbolic forms.
Then, figuring whether finite, if large, approximations are "close
enough" that the differences would be lost, the "negligeable",
also they're formally "not quite", about what's called "weak induction",
and that the definition of "strong induction" is
that some super-classical example that's somehow geometric and
infinitary already exists, ..., there may be many practical and
successful "polynomial-time approximations to NP-hard problems",
and in fact there's a great book with that title, yet otherwise
the "Turing-complete" as the same as "induction-complete" isn't so.
Mathematics is kind of like physics, the popular accounts:I have noticed that a lot of mathematicians don't care how the real
rife with incompleteness, and inconsistencies, "independence",
that various successful and practical accounts choose to ignore
(and others just don't even know, nor, as long as they're "close
enough", care).
On 17/08/2026 8:43 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
Somebody like Maugin has something like the "acoustic wave transducer",
an electronic circuit that makes for solving what would be digital
problems more like analog problems.
Wouldn't that be the /analogue computers of yore/?
These days they call that a "D-Wave quantum simulator computer",
about that there are then also many models of computation that
were about planar circuits, with vias and all, in the "three-dimensional
integrated circuit" or "3-D IC", that make some
what were fundamentally serial algorithms into general parallel.
Are you telling me quantum computers don't exist, and it's all /simu-
lated/ with regular off the shelf hardware? Is it all a scam?
The use of optical junctions and optical traces instead of electronic
junctions and electronic traces, offers an entirely different model
of propagation, basically for 1-to-many or many-to-1.
Huh, isn't that the same as the analogue computers of yore, only using
light instead of electric forces to do the calculations? How do they
move the gauges?
It's agreeable that a usual model of computation as a calculus
is limited to an abacus (if a rather large abacus): yet accounts
like the integral or infinitesimal analysis or Fourier-style analysis
or about doubling-measures and quasi-invariant measure theory, these
are "super-classical results" then though that a "computer algebra
system" can be given the rules to work on them like perfect numbers
in their symbolic forms.
Do you mean computer algebra systems like FriCAS are now sentient, and therefore perfect? Or do I completely misunderstand your paragraph?
Then, figuring whether finite, if large, approximations are "close
enough" that the differences would be lost, the "negligeable",
also they're formally "not quite", about what's called "weak induction",
and that the definition of "strong induction" is
that some super-classical example that's somehow geometric and
infinitary already exists, ..., there may be many practical and
successful "polynomial-time approximations to NP-hard problems",
and in fact there's a great book with that title, yet otherwise
the "Turing-complete" as the same as "induction-complete" isn't so.
I thought induction was something we use in basic electricity. Some-
thing about making magnetic fields with electric currents? How exactly
does that work? Do you know?
I have noticed that a lot of mathematicians don't care how the real
Mathematics is kind of like physics, the popular accounts:
rife with incompleteness, and inconsistencies, "independence",
that various successful and practical accounts choose to ignore
(and others just don't even know, nor, as long as they're "close
enough", care).
world works, and stick to the math. I currently believe Sabine Hoss- enfelder (?) wrote a book about it, /Lost in Math/. Which is totally different from the TV series /Lost in Space/ or /Lost in Time/.
Now that I think about it, do you think Sabine would be willing to
starr in her own adaption of /Lost in Math/, set in a scientific
fictional environment? How would the /Math/ even look like? Do we
have a clue what math looks like, if made into science fiction?
I'm cross posting to alt.fantasy, because I don't offhand know the
name of the science fiction group.
On 08/17/2026 05:04 PM, Johann 'Myrkraverk' Oskarsson wrote:
On 17/08/2026 8:43 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
Somebody like Maugin has something like the "acoustic wave transducer",
an electronic circuit that makes for solving what would be digital
problems more like analog problems.
Wouldn't that be the /analogue computers of yore/?
These days they call that a "D-Wave quantum simulator computer",
about that there are then also many models of computation that
were about planar circuits, with vias and all, in the "three-dimensional >>> integrated circuit" or "3-D IC", that make some
what were fundamentally serial algorithms into general parallel.
Are you telling me quantum computers don't exist, and it's all /simu-
lated/ with regular off the shelf hardware? Is it all a scam?
The use of optical junctions and optical traces instead of electronic
junctions and electronic traces, offers an entirely different model
of propagation, basically for 1-to-many or many-to-1.
Huh, isn't that the same as the analogue computers of yore, only using
light instead of electric forces to do the calculations? How do they
move the gauges?
It's agreeable that a usual model of computation as a calculus
is limited to an abacus (if a rather large abacus): yet accounts
like the integral or infinitesimal analysis or Fourier-style analysis
or about doubling-measures and quasi-invariant measure theory, these
are "super-classical results" then though that a "computer algebra
system" can be given the rules to work on them like perfect numbers
in their symbolic forms.
Do you mean computer algebra systems like FriCAS are now sentient, and
therefore perfect? Or do I completely misunderstand your paragraph?
Then, figuring whether finite, if large, approximations are "close
enough" that the differences would be lost, the "negligeable",
also they're formally "not quite", about what's called "weak induction", >>> and that the definition of "strong induction" is
that some super-classical example that's somehow geometric and
infinitary already exists, ..., there may be many practical and
successful "polynomial-time approximations to NP-hard problems",
and in fact there's a great book with that title, yet otherwise
the "Turing-complete" as the same as "induction-complete" isn't so.
I thought induction was something we use in basic electricity. Some-
thing about making magnetic fields with electric currents? How exactly
does that work? Do you know?
I have noticed that a lot of mathematicians don't care how the real
Mathematics is kind of like physics, the popular accounts:
rife with incompleteness, and inconsistencies, "independence",
that various successful and practical accounts choose to ignore
(and others just don't even know, nor, as long as they're "close
enough", care).
world works, and stick to the math. I currently believe Sabine Hoss-
enfelder (?) wrote a book about it, /Lost in Math/. Which is totally
different from the TV series /Lost in Space/ or /Lost in Time/.
Now that I think about it, do you think Sabine would be willing to
starr in her own adaption of /Lost in Math/, set in a scientific
fictional environment? How would the /Math/ even look like? Do we
have a clue what math looks like, if made into science fiction?
I'm cross posting to alt.fantasy, because I don't offhand know the
name of the science fiction group.
Hm. Well, all computers employ sorts of what are called "quantum
effects", though that's just "the logic the NAND gates" usually enough,
it is though fair to say that most anything that's been called "quantum computing", with the idea of solving for a superposition of states all possible solutions at once, is "simulated quantum computing", yes.
The usual idea is that it results one solution then that's alike
accounts of "simulated annealing", "simulated quantum annealing",
and so on, what are numerical methods and approximations with their
error terms.
Then, "induction" was about "inductive inference", so it's in accounts
of inference, that there are basically "inductive inference" and
"deductive inference", and some will make for "abductive inference"
though here that's under "deductive inference" that induction is
about the point and deduction is about the space, then about that
"weak induction" is distinguished from "strong induction" that
"strong induction" has an "a priori" or "super-classical" reason
after deduction/abduction that gives a place for a limit to reach.
Words like "structural realists", vis-a-vis, "nominalist fictionalists",
have that most mathematicaians at least once
are "structural realists" and "mathematical platonists", and
at least once (or, on demand) "nominalist fictionalists" or
"logicist positivists", then that the only way to be a "strong
mathematical platonist" or "strong logicist positivist" is to
be both all the time.
A sort of paleo-classical post-modern study of the account
of reason's account over the ages and for today has both
the ideological tradition and the analytical tradition with
which to contend, about a teleology and an ontology, for a
theory that results that it's Truth's theory.
On 08/18/2026 09:37 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/17/2026 05:04 PM, Johann 'Myrkraverk' Oskarsson wrote:
On 17/08/2026 8:43 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
Somebody like Maugin has something like the "acoustic wave transducer", >>>> an electronic circuit that makes for solving what would be digital
problems more like analog problems.
Wouldn't that be the /analogue computers of yore/?
These days they call that a "D-Wave quantum simulator computer",
about that there are then also many models of computation that
were about planar circuits, with vias and all, in the "three-
dimensional
integrated circuit" or "3-D IC", that make some
what were fundamentally serial algorithms into general parallel.
Are you telling me quantum computers don't exist, and it's all /simu-
lated/ with regular off the shelf hardware?-a Is it all a scam?
The use of optical junctions and optical traces instead of electronic
junctions and electronic traces, offers an entirely different model
of propagation, basically for 1-to-many or many-to-1.
Huh, isn't that the same as the analogue computers of yore, only using
light instead of electric forces to do the calculations?-a How do they
move the gauges?
It's agreeable that a usual model of computation as a calculus
is limited to an abacus (if a rather large abacus): yet accounts
like the integral or infinitesimal analysis or Fourier-style analysis
or about doubling-measures and quasi-invariant measure theory, these
are "super-classical results" then though that a "computer algebra
system" can be given the rules to work on them like perfect numbers
in their symbolic forms.
Do you mean computer algebra systems like FriCAS are now sentient, and
therefore perfect?-a Or do I completely misunderstand your paragraph?
Then, figuring whether finite, if large, approximations are "close
enough" that the differences would be lost, the "negligeable",
also they're formally "not quite", about what's called "weak
induction",
and that the definition of "strong induction" is
that some super-classical example that's somehow geometric and
infinitary already exists, ..., there may be many practical and
successful "polynomial-time approximations to NP-hard problems",
and in fact there's a great book with that title, yet otherwise
the "Turing-complete" as the same as "induction-complete" isn't so.
I thought induction was something we use in basic electricity.-a Some-
thing about making magnetic fields with electric currents?-a How exactly >>> does that work?-a Do you know?
I have noticed that a lot of mathematicians don't care how the real
Mathematics is kind of like physics, the popular accounts:
rife with incompleteness, and inconsistencies, "independence",
that various successful and practical accounts choose to ignore
(and others just don't even know, nor, as long as they're "close
enough", care).
world works, and stick to the math.-a I currently believe Sabine Hoss-
enfelder (?) wrote a book about it, /Lost in Math/.-a Which is totally
different from the TV series /Lost in Space/ or /Lost in Time/.
Now that I think about it, do you think Sabine would be willing to
starr in her own adaption of /Lost in Math/, set in a scientific
fictional environment?-a How would the /Math/ even look like?-a Do we
have a clue what math looks like, if made into science fiction?
I'm cross posting to alt.fantasy, because I don't offhand know the
name of the science fiction group.
Hm. Well, all computers employ sorts of what are called "quantum
effects", though that's just "the logic the NAND gates" usually enough,
it is though fair to say that most anything that's been called "quantum
computing", with the idea of solving for a superposition of states all
possible solutions at once, is "simulated quantum computing", yes.
The usual idea is that it results one solution then that's alike
accounts of "simulated annealing", "simulated quantum annealing",
and so on, what are numerical methods and approximations with their
error terms.
Then, "induction" was about "inductive inference", so it's in accounts
of inference, that there are basically "inductive inference" and
"deductive inference", and some will make for "abductive inference"
though here that's under "deductive inference" that induction is
about the point and deduction is about the space, then about that
"weak induction" is distinguished from "strong induction" that
"strong induction" has an "a priori" or "super-classical" reason
after deduction/abduction that gives a place for a limit to reach.
Words like "structural realists", vis-a-vis, "nominalist fictionalists",
have that most mathematicaians at least once
are "structural realists" and "mathematical platonists", and
at least once (or, on demand) "nominalist fictionalists" or
"logicist positivists", then that the only way to be a "strong
mathematical platonist" or "strong logicist positivist" is to
be both all the time.
A sort of paleo-classical post-modern study of the account
of reason's account over the ages and for today has both
the ideological tradition and the analytical tradition with
which to contend, about a teleology and an ontology, for a
theory that results that it's Truth's theory.
The Sufis and since antiquity have an account of "The Seeker",Do these /Sufis/ guys also believe the Cambrian era needs re evaluation?
the "Truth-Seeker".
On 19/08/2026 12:44 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/18/2026 09:37 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/17/2026 05:04 PM, Johann 'Myrkraverk' Oskarsson wrote:
On 17/08/2026 8:43 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
Somebody like Maugin has something like the "acoustic wave
transducer",
an electronic circuit that makes for solving what would be digital
problems more like analog problems.
Wouldn't that be the /analogue computers of yore/?
These days they call that a "D-Wave quantum simulator computer",
about that there are then also many models of computation that
were about planar circuits, with vias and all, in the "three-
dimensional
integrated circuit" or "3-D IC", that make some
what were fundamentally serial algorithms into general parallel.
Are you telling me quantum computers don't exist, and it's all /simu-
lated/ with regular off the shelf hardware? Is it all a scam?
The use of optical junctions and optical traces instead of electronic >>>>> junctions and electronic traces, offers an entirely different model
of propagation, basically for 1-to-many or many-to-1.
Huh, isn't that the same as the analogue computers of yore, only using >>>> light instead of electric forces to do the calculations? How do they
move the gauges?
It's agreeable that a usual model of computation as a calculus
is limited to an abacus (if a rather large abacus): yet accounts
like the integral or infinitesimal analysis or Fourier-style analysis >>>>> or about doubling-measures and quasi-invariant measure theory, these >>>>> are "super-classical results" then though that a "computer algebra
system" can be given the rules to work on them like perfect numbers
in their symbolic forms.
Do you mean computer algebra systems like FriCAS are now sentient, and >>>> therefore perfect? Or do I completely misunderstand your paragraph?
Then, figuring whether finite, if large, approximations are "close
enough" that the differences would be lost, the "negligeable",
also they're formally "not quite", about what's called "weak
induction",
and that the definition of "strong induction" is
that some super-classical example that's somehow geometric and
infinitary already exists, ..., there may be many practical and
successful "polynomial-time approximations to NP-hard problems",
and in fact there's a great book with that title, yet otherwise
the "Turing-complete" as the same as "induction-complete" isn't so.
I thought induction was something we use in basic electricity. Some-
thing about making magnetic fields with electric currents? How exactly >>>> does that work? Do you know?
I have noticed that a lot of mathematicians don't care how the real
Mathematics is kind of like physics, the popular accounts:
rife with incompleteness, and inconsistencies, "independence",
that various successful and practical accounts choose to ignore
(and others just don't even know, nor, as long as they're "close
enough", care).
world works, and stick to the math. I currently believe Sabine Hoss-
enfelder (?) wrote a book about it, /Lost in Math/. Which is totally
different from the TV series /Lost in Space/ or /Lost in Time/.
Now that I think about it, do you think Sabine would be willing to
starr in her own adaption of /Lost in Math/, set in a scientific
fictional environment? How would the /Math/ even look like? Do we
have a clue what math looks like, if made into science fiction?
I'm cross posting to alt.fantasy, because I don't offhand know the
name of the science fiction group.
Hm. Well, all computers employ sorts of what are called "quantum
effects", though that's just "the logic the NAND gates" usually enough,
it is though fair to say that most anything that's been called "quantum
computing", with the idea of solving for a superposition of states all
possible solutions at once, is "simulated quantum computing", yes.
So, all we need to protect ourselves against this /simulated quantum computing/, is to have /simulated cryptography/? Does the N.S.A. know
about it?
The usual idea is that it results one solution then that's alike
accounts of "simulated annealing", "simulated quantum annealing",
and so on, what are numerical methods and approximations with their
error terms.
Then, "induction" was about "inductive inference", so it's in accounts
of inference, that there are basically "inductive inference" and
"deductive inference", and some will make for "abductive inference"
though here that's under "deductive inference" that induction is
about the point and deduction is about the space, then about that
"weak induction" is distinguished from "strong induction" that
"strong induction" has an "a priori" or "super-classical" reason
after deduction/abduction that gives a place for a limit to reach.
So, we simply approximate the limit of of the induction with numerical calculations? Have you considered any of the methods in the book /MATH Toolkit for REAL-TIME Programming/ by Crenshaw for this task?
I know the trolls in comp.lang.c don't believe I can type in these
titles, but the book is on my shelf, and I can just look at it, and
the name of the author. They really have a problem with the distinction between fantasy and reality. Something we don't do here in alt.fantasy.
Words like "structural realists", vis-a-vis, "nominalist fictionalists", >>> have that most mathematicaians at least once
are "structural realists" and "mathematical platonists", and
at least once (or, on demand) "nominalist fictionalists" or
"logicist positivists", then that the only way to be a "strong
mathematical platonist" or "strong logicist positivist" is to
be both all the time.
Do you think mathematicians ever write better structural platonic
fiction than Lewis Carrol, who is mostly famous for writing Alice in Wonderland, but was also a great mathematician?
A sort of paleo-classical post-modern study of the account
of reason's account over the ages and for today has both
the ideological tradition and the analytical tradition with
which to contend, about a teleology and an ontology, for a
theory that results that it's Truth's theory.
Have you considered cambrian-pre-classical avant-modern study of
fossils? I believe the /cambrian explosion/ is a misnomer, and a
new analytical tradition of reintrepreting the fossils is needed
to discover the truth.
The Sufis and since antiquity have an account of "The Seeker",Do these /Sufis/ guys also believe the Cambrian era needs re evaluation?
the "Truth-Seeker".
Do they even care that modern "archaeologists" may be greatly misunder- standing the life forms of our own planetary pre-extinction-event bio-
logy? By that I mean before all five usual /extinction level events/.
Thank you, and happy marine biology!
On 08/18/2026 12:35 PM, Johann 'Myrkraverk' Oskarsson wrote:
On 19/08/2026 12:44 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/18/2026 09:37 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/17/2026 05:04 PM, Johann 'Myrkraverk' Oskarsson wrote:
On 17/08/2026 8:43 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
Somebody like Maugin has something like the "acoustic wave
transducer",
an electronic circuit that makes for solving what would be digital >>>>>> problems more like analog problems.
Wouldn't that be the /analogue computers of yore/?
These days they call that a "D-Wave quantum simulator computer",
about that there are then also many models of computation that
were about planar circuits, with vias and all, in the "three-
dimensional
integrated circuit" or "3-D IC", that make some
what were fundamentally serial algorithms into general parallel.
Are you telling me quantum computers don't exist, and it's all /simu- >>>>> lated/ with regular off the shelf hardware?-a Is it all a scam?
The use of optical junctions and optical traces instead of electronic >>>>>> junctions and electronic traces, offers an entirely different model >>>>>> of propagation, basically for 1-to-many or many-to-1.
Huh, isn't that the same as the analogue computers of yore, only using >>>>> light instead of electric forces to do the calculations?-a How do they >>>>> move the gauges?
It's agreeable that a usual model of computation as a calculus
is limited to an abacus (if a rather large abacus): yet accounts
like the integral or infinitesimal analysis or Fourier-style analysis >>>>>> or about doubling-measures and quasi-invariant measure theory, these >>>>>> are "super-classical results" then though that a "computer algebra >>>>>> system" can be given the rules to work on them like perfect numbers >>>>>> in their symbolic forms.
Do you mean computer algebra systems like FriCAS are now sentient, and >>>>> therefore perfect?-a Or do I completely misunderstand your paragraph? >>>>>>
Then, figuring whether finite, if large, approximations are "close >>>>>> enough" that the differences would be lost, the "negligeable",
also they're formally "not quite", about what's called "weak
induction",
and that the definition of "strong induction" is
that some super-classical example that's somehow geometric and
infinitary already exists, ..., there may be many practical and
successful "polynomial-time approximations to NP-hard problems",
and in fact there's a great book with that title, yet otherwise
the "Turing-complete" as the same as "induction-complete" isn't so. >>>>>>
I thought induction was something we use in basic electricity.-a Some- >>>>> thing about making magnetic fields with electric currents?-a How
exactly
does that work?-a Do you know?
I have noticed that a lot of mathematicians don't care how the real
Mathematics is kind of like physics, the popular accounts:
rife with incompleteness, and inconsistencies, "independence",
that various successful and practical accounts choose to ignore
(and others just don't even know, nor, as long as they're "close
enough", care).
world works, and stick to the math.-a I currently believe Sabine Hoss- >>>>> enfelder (?) wrote a book about it, /Lost in Math/.-a Which is totally >>>>> different from the TV series /Lost in Space/ or /Lost in Time/.
Now that I think about it, do you think Sabine would be willing to
starr in her own adaption of /Lost in Math/, set in a scientific
fictional environment?-a How would the /Math/ even look like?-a Do we >>>>> have a clue what math looks like, if made into science fiction?
I'm cross posting to alt.fantasy, because I don't offhand know the
name of the science fiction group.
Hm. Well, all computers employ sorts of what are called "quantum
effects", though that's just "the logic the NAND gates" usually enough, >>>> it is though fair to say that most anything that's been called "quantum >>>> computing", with the idea of solving for a superposition of states all >>>> possible solutions at once, is "simulated quantum computing", yes.
So, all we need to protect ourselves against this /simulated quantum
computing/, is to have /simulated cryptography/?-a Does the N.S.A. know
about it?
The usual idea is that it results one solution then that's alike
accounts of "simulated annealing", "simulated quantum annealing",
and so on, what are numerical methods and approximations with their
error terms.
Then, "induction" was about "inductive inference", so it's in accounts >>>> of inference, that there are basically "inductive inference" and
"deductive inference", and some will make for "abductive inference"
though here that's under "deductive inference" that induction is
about the point and deduction is about the space, then about that
"weak induction" is distinguished from "strong induction" that
"strong induction" has an "a priori" or "super-classical" reason
after deduction/abduction that gives a place for a limit to reach.
So, we simply approximate the limit of of the induction with numerical
calculations?-a Have you considered any of the methods in the book /MATH
Toolkit for REAL-TIME Programming/ by Crenshaw for this task?
I know the trolls in comp.lang.c don't believe I can type in these
titles, but the book is on my shelf, and I can just look at it, and
the name of the author.-a They really have a problem with the distinction
between fantasy and reality.-a Something we don't do here in alt.fantasy.
Words like "structural realists", vis-a-vis, "nominalist
fictionalists",
have that most mathematicaians at least once
are "structural realists" and "mathematical platonists", and
at least once (or, on demand) "nominalist fictionalists" or
"logicist positivists", then that the only way to be a "strong
mathematical platonist" or "strong logicist positivist" is to
be both all the time.
Do you think mathematicians ever write better structural platonic
fiction than Lewis Carrol, who is mostly famous for writing Alice in
Wonderland, but was also a great mathematician?
A sort of paleo-classical post-modern study of the account
of reason's account over the ages and for today has both
the ideological tradition and the analytical tradition with
which to contend, about a teleology and an ontology, for a
theory that results that it's Truth's theory.
Have you considered cambrian-pre-classical avant-modern study of
fossils?-a I believe the /cambrian explosion/ is a misnomer, and a
new analytical tradition of reintrepreting the fossils is needed
to discover the truth.
The Sufis and since antiquity have an account of "The Seeker",Do these /Sufis/ guys also believe the Cambrian era needs re evaluation?
the "Truth-Seeker".
Do they even care that modern "archaeologists" may be greatly misunder-
standing the life forms of our own planetary pre-extinction-event bio-
logy?-a By that I mean before all five usual /extinction level events/.
Thank you, and happy marine biology!
In high school I wrote a paper on Carroll (or Dodgson) about
"The Raven and the Writing Desk", the old "why is the raven
like the writing desk?", and the answer is it's not, except
that all questions have all answers (even the non-sensical).
Dodgson wasn't a particularly "great" mathematician, yet
though, for example, he entertained notions of the non-Archimedean
and infinitesimals, yet, many people also don't know that
Peano of integer fame also constructs infinitesimals a century
before John Conway and the like the sur-real numbers, where
the Robinson's hyper-real numbers really don't say much at all,
then there were Veronese and Stolz centuries after Cavalieri
and indivisibles, then there's Bishop and Cheng in the 20'th
century with "partially ordered ring with rather restricted
transfer principle", and things like Vicker's alternative topologies,
Bell's "smooth" numbers (or, rather, in the language of continuous
functions, which don't say much about continuous domains), Leibniz
with the differential and Newton's fluxions, Maclaurin the great formalization of standard analysis presaging Cauchy and Weierstrass,
about duBois-Reymond the long-line and all its crossing of the
linear continuum, Cantor didn't say much about infinitesimals
except they made him sick, Eudoxus the usual account of the
rational field an extension to completion more or less is the
same as Cauchy, that Dedekind later broke, then that Democritus
has atomism since antiquity, and Grosseteste with aliquot-parts
after Duns Scotus and "infinity is in", has that Xenocrates had
standard infinitesimals before Aristotle even got published.
Then Dodgson was a mathematician on his own account.
The greater risk to the security of cryptography is that
the usual account of modular forms and things like "Fermat's
Last Theorem was proved by Andrew Wiles" are bull-shit,
since there are accounts of real numbers and laws of large
numbers, more than the usual law of large numbers the law
of small numbers, making what are called "Giant Monsters of
Mathematical Independence" after Erdos who provides plentiful
contradictions in open conjectures in number theory, that
relatively simple under-explored mathematics simply fill
out the corners in many cases of "weak seeds or predictable salts"
and the like, that it wasn't really secure to begin, then
that "AI" from its looking around for a meal-ticket finds
actually the weaknesses of modern standard cryptographic algorithms,
their backdoors that clever mathematicians, maybe too clever,
thought in their superiority nobody else would ever figure out.
Pride goeth before the fall, ....
A usual Atlantean Bronze Age hypothesis has much evidence
from the similarities of the scripts of the meso-American
and medi-Terranean on basically either side of the Atlas
mountains the Atlantic.
The name "America" itself may even simply predate "Amerigo Vespucci".
On 19/08/2026 4:47 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/18/2026 12:35 PM, Johann 'Myrkraverk' Oskarsson wrote:
On 19/08/2026 12:44 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/18/2026 09:37 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/17/2026 05:04 PM, Johann 'Myrkraverk' Oskarsson wrote:
On 17/08/2026 8:43 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
Somebody like Maugin has something like the "acoustic wave
transducer",
an electronic circuit that makes for solving what would be digital >>>>>>> problems more like analog problems.
Wouldn't that be the /analogue computers of yore/?
These days they call that a "D-Wave quantum simulator computer", >>>>>>> about that there are then also many models of computation that
were about planar circuits, with vias and all, in the "three-
dimensional
integrated circuit" or "3-D IC", that make some
what were fundamentally serial algorithms into general parallel.
Are you telling me quantum computers don't exist, and it's all /simu- >>>>>> lated/ with regular off the shelf hardware? Is it all a scam?
The use of optical junctions and optical traces instead of
electronic
junctions and electronic traces, offers an entirely different model >>>>>>> of propagation, basically for 1-to-many or many-to-1.
Huh, isn't that the same as the analogue computers of yore, only
using
light instead of electric forces to do the calculations? How do they >>>>>> move the gauges?
It's agreeable that a usual model of computation as a calculus
is limited to an abacus (if a rather large abacus): yet accounts >>>>>>> like the integral or infinitesimal analysis or Fourier-style
analysis
or about doubling-measures and quasi-invariant measure theory, these >>>>>>> are "super-classical results" then though that a "computer algebra >>>>>>> system" can be given the rules to work on them like perfect numbers >>>>>>> in their symbolic forms.
Do you mean computer algebra systems like FriCAS are now sentient, >>>>>> and
therefore perfect? Or do I completely misunderstand your paragraph? >>>>>>>
Then, figuring whether finite, if large, approximations are "close >>>>>>> enough" that the differences would be lost, the "negligeable",
also they're formally "not quite", about what's called "weak
induction",
and that the definition of "strong induction" is
that some super-classical example that's somehow geometric and
infinitary already exists, ..., there may be many practical and
successful "polynomial-time approximations to NP-hard problems", >>>>>>> and in fact there's a great book with that title, yet otherwise
the "Turing-complete" as the same as "induction-complete" isn't so. >>>>>>>
I thought induction was something we use in basic electricity. Some- >>>>>> thing about making magnetic fields with electric currents? How
exactly
does that work? Do you know?
I have noticed that a lot of mathematicians don't care how the real >>>>>> world works, and stick to the math. I currently believe Sabine Hoss- >>>>>> enfelder (?) wrote a book about it, /Lost in Math/. Which is totally >>>>>> different from the TV series /Lost in Space/ or /Lost in Time/.
Mathematics is kind of like physics, the popular accounts:
rife with incompleteness, and inconsistencies, "independence",
that various successful and practical accounts choose to ignore
(and others just don't even know, nor, as long as they're "close >>>>>>> enough", care).
Now that I think about it, do you think Sabine would be willing to >>>>>> starr in her own adaption of /Lost in Math/, set in a scientific
fictional environment? How would the /Math/ even look like? Do we >>>>>> have a clue what math looks like, if made into science fiction?
I'm cross posting to alt.fantasy, because I don't offhand know the >>>>>> name of the science fiction group.
Hm. Well, all computers employ sorts of what are called "quantum
effects", though that's just "the logic the NAND gates" usually
enough,
it is though fair to say that most anything that's been called
"quantum
computing", with the idea of solving for a superposition of states all >>>>> possible solutions at once, is "simulated quantum computing", yes.
So, all we need to protect ourselves against this /simulated quantum
computing/, is to have /simulated cryptography/? Does the N.S.A. know
about it?
The usual idea is that it results one solution then that's alike
accounts of "simulated annealing", "simulated quantum annealing",
and so on, what are numerical methods and approximations with their
error terms.
Then, "induction" was about "inductive inference", so it's in accounts >>>>> of inference, that there are basically "inductive inference" and
"deductive inference", and some will make for "abductive inference"
though here that's under "deductive inference" that induction is
about the point and deduction is about the space, then about that
"weak induction" is distinguished from "strong induction" that
"strong induction" has an "a priori" or "super-classical" reason
after deduction/abduction that gives a place for a limit to reach.
So, we simply approximate the limit of of the induction with numerical
calculations? Have you considered any of the methods in the book /MATH
Toolkit for REAL-TIME Programming/ by Crenshaw for this task?
I know the trolls in comp.lang.c don't believe I can type in these
titles, but the book is on my shelf, and I can just look at it, and
the name of the author. They really have a problem with the distinction >>> between fantasy and reality. Something we don't do here in alt.fantasy. >>>
Words like "structural realists", vis-a-vis, "nominalist
fictionalists",
have that most mathematicaians at least once
are "structural realists" and "mathematical platonists", and
at least once (or, on demand) "nominalist fictionalists" or
"logicist positivists", then that the only way to be a "strong
mathematical platonist" or "strong logicist positivist" is to
be both all the time.
Do you think mathematicians ever write better structural platonic
fiction than Lewis Carrol, who is mostly famous for writing Alice in
Wonderland, but was also a great mathematician?
A sort of paleo-classical post-modern study of the account
of reason's account over the ages and for today has both
the ideological tradition and the analytical tradition with
which to contend, about a teleology and an ontology, for a
theory that results that it's Truth's theory.
Have you considered cambrian-pre-classical avant-modern study of
fossils? I believe the /cambrian explosion/ is a misnomer, and a
new analytical tradition of reintrepreting the fossils is needed
to discover the truth.
The Sufis and since antiquity have an account of "The Seeker",Do these /Sufis/ guys also believe the Cambrian era needs re evaluation? >>>
the "Truth-Seeker".
Do they even care that modern "archaeologists" may be greatly misunder-
standing the life forms of our own planetary pre-extinction-event bio-
logy? By that I mean before all five usual /extinction level events/.
Thank you, and happy marine biology!
In high school I wrote a paper on Carroll (or Dodgson) about
"The Raven and the Writing Desk", the old "why is the raven
like the writing desk?", and the answer is it's not, except
that all questions have all answers (even the non-sensical).
Dodgson wasn't a particularly "great" mathematician, yet
though, for example, he entertained notions of the non-Archimedean
and infinitesimals, yet, many people also don't know that
Peano of integer fame also constructs infinitesimals a century
before John Conway and the like the sur-real numbers, where
the Robinson's hyper-real numbers really don't say much at all,
then there were Veronese and Stolz centuries after Cavalieri
and indivisibles, then there's Bishop and Cheng in the 20'th
century with "partially ordered ring with rather restricted
transfer principle", and things like Vicker's alternative topologies,
Bell's "smooth" numbers (or, rather, in the language of continuous
functions, which don't say much about continuous domains), Leibniz
with the differential and Newton's fluxions, Maclaurin the great
formalization of standard analysis presaging Cauchy and Weierstrass,
about duBois-Reymond the long-line and all its crossing of the
linear continuum, Cantor didn't say much about infinitesimals
except they made him sick, Eudoxus the usual account of the
rational field an extension to completion more or less is the
same as Cauchy, that Dedekind later broke, then that Democritus
has atomism since antiquity, and Grosseteste with aliquot-parts
after Duns Scotus and "infinity is in", has that Xenocrates had
standard infinitesimals before Aristotle even got published.
Then Dodgson was a mathematician on his own account.
I'm coming at this from here and there, having only passing knowledge of calculus, and undergraduate linear algebra. And then having read the
scraps of quotations we have of the earliest Greek philosophers we know.
Wasn't Xenocrates just repeating the wisdom and knowledge of Thales of Miletus?
In any case, it'll be a while until I start adding the history of the mathematics to my ever growing pile of reading material, having all
kinds of things, including stuff to implement my own cryptographic pri- mitives.
The greater risk to the security of cryptography is that
the usual account of modular forms and things like "Fermat's
Last Theorem was proved by Andrew Wiles" are bull-shit,
since there are accounts of real numbers and laws of large
numbers, more than the usual law of large numbers the law
of small numbers, making what are called "Giant Monsters of
Mathematical Independence" after Erdos who provides plentiful
contradictions in open conjectures in number theory, that
relatively simple under-explored mathematics simply fill
out the corners in many cases of "weak seeds or predictable salts"
and the like, that it wasn't really secure to begin, then
that "AI" from its looking around for a meal-ticket finds
actually the weaknesses of modern standard cryptographic algorithms,
their backdoors that clever mathematicians, maybe too clever,
thought in their superiority nobody else would ever figure out.
Well, on weak salts, I try to just make do with Fortuna, and hope for
the best.
Pride goeth before the fall, ....
Indeed, but this is known in cryptographic circles. They're well aware
that at any time a new mathematician -- or should I say, mathemagickian
-- can invent something that invalidates all of prior cryptography.
Still, we do what we can with the available knowledge, and code our cry- ptography in C despite all the howling about Rust and memory safety.
I'm now adding sci.crypt to the discussion.
A usual Atlantean Bronze Age hypothesis has much evidence
from the similarities of the scripts of the meso-American
and medi-Terranean on basically either side of the Atlas
mountains the Atlantic.
I'm not sure I believe in an /Atlantian Bronze Age/, as in, that
/Atlantis/ was -- or was in -- America, and that what we now call /The Atlantic Ocean/ but back then was the /Ethiopian Ocean/ was navigable
during what we call the /Bronze Age/.
On the scripts, have you read Bernal's /Cadmean Letters/? It's a fashi- nating book.
I think it's much more likely that the Atlantis we know and love was an empire known before the last ice age. I'm also unsure about when it was supposed to have sunk. If I remember my Randall Carlsson correctly,
there is doubt and interpretation on exactly how long ago it was supp-
osed to have happened, and I'm basing my own theories on it was longer
ago than /currently accepted/ among the hystorians who don't even belie-
ve it existed in the first place.
So now I'm adding alt.magick, and alt.magic.history to the discussion.
I cannot stress this enough, but I do not believe in ancient aliens, nor little green men. So I'm not adding any science fiction groups to this discussion!
If you have any input on when exactly Atlantis is supposed to have sunk,
I'd greatly like to hear it.
The name "America" itself may even simply predate "Amerigo Vespucci".
That sort of interesting. Do you have a better source than yourself on
it? I have no idea what bronze age people would have called America, if
they even knew about it as anything but /the unknown west/.
On 08/18/2026 02:35 PM, Johann 'Myrkraverk' Oskarsson wrote:[]
On 19/08/2026 4:47 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/18/2026 12:35 PM, Johann 'Myrkraverk' Oskarsson wrote:
On 19/08/2026 12:44 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/18/2026 09:37 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/17/2026 05:04 PM, Johann 'Myrkraverk' Oskarsson wrote:
On 17/08/2026 8:43 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
A usual Atlantean Bronze Age hypothesis has much evidence
from the similarities of the scripts of the meso-American
and medi-Terranean on basically either side of the Atlas
mountains the Atlantic.
I'm not sure I believe in an /Atlantian Bronze Age/, as in, that
/Atlantis/ was -- or was in -- America, and that what we now call /The Atlantic Ocean/ but back then was the /Ethiopian Ocean/ was navigable during what we call the /Bronze Age/.
That sort of interesting. Do you have a better source than yourself on
it? I have no idea what bronze age people would have called America, if they even knew about it as anything but /the unknown west/.
The Atlantean theory of Bronze-Age transmigration and world-wide
peopling circa 12000 BCE and up to the Noachic or ante-Deluvian, was thoroughly debunked and replaced with the "Alaskan lang bridge" concept
since it entirely infuriated those with the Hamite/Shemite/Japhethite
view of racial discrimination and the impossibility of sea-faring
and ocean-faring of primitive peoples, vis-a-vis the Kon-Tiki
or the accounts of Bronze Age bronze mines all up the Missouri
and that the seat of the civilization was from Peru, and that
the scripts besides the architecture of pyramids on both sides
of the Atlantic, have that it does take a bit of squinting to
consider the ancient Mayan and Phoenician scripts side-by-side,
which are about the same count and assigned to the same phonemes,
and have the same ideogram. Then, there's a book from about
120 years ago with much the considered evidence for this sort
of account, which most would discard, though is quite readable
and archaeologically principled.
There are of course a variety of considered influences of humanity's
origins, basically from the heart, the south, and the north.
That said homo sapiens has many possible mutations.
About Amerigo Vespucci the famed cartographer, has that there
were already maps predating Vespucci's several hundred years,
and, he might've simply inherited a copy.
broOn Tue, 18 Aug 2026 16:06:50 -0700
Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> wrote:
On 08/18/2026 02:35 PM, Johann 'Myrkraverk' Oskarsson wrote:[]
On 19/08/2026 4:47 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/18/2026 12:35 PM, Johann 'Myrkraverk' Oskarsson wrote:
On 19/08/2026 12:44 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/18/2026 09:37 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/17/2026 05:04 PM, Johann 'Myrkraverk' Oskarsson wrote:
On 17/08/2026 8:43 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
[]A usual Atlantean Bronze Age hypothesis has much evidence
from the similarities of the scripts of the meso-American
and medi-Terranean on basically either side of the Atlas
mountains the Atlantic.
I'm not sure I believe in an /Atlantian Bronze Age/, as in, that
/Atlantis/ was -- or was in -- America, and that what we now call /The
Atlantic Ocean/ but back then was the /Ethiopian Ocean/ was navigable
during what we call the /Bronze Age/.
[]
That sort of interesting. Do you have a better source than yourself on
it? I have no idea what bronze age people would have called America, if >>> they even knew about it as anything but /the unknown west/.
The Atlantean theory of Bronze-Age transmigration and world-wide
peopling circa 12000 BCE and up to the Noachic or ante-Deluvian, was
thoroughly debunked and replaced with the "Alaskan lang bridge" concept
since it entirely infuriated those with the Hamite/Shemite/Japhethite
view of racial discrimination and the impossibility of sea-faring
and ocean-faring of primitive peoples, vis-a-vis the Kon-Tiki
or the accounts of Bronze Age bronze mines all up the Missouri
. As of 1999, "no one has found evidence that points to the use of
melting, smelting and casting in prehistoric eastern North America."[3] (prC>136)
and that the seat of the civilization was from Peru, and that
the scripts besides the architecture of pyramids on both sides
of the Atlantic, have that it does take a bit of squinting to
consider the ancient Mayan and Phoenician scripts side-by-side,
which are about the same count and assigned to the same phonemes,
and have the same ideogram. Then, there's a book from about
120 years ago with much the considered evidence for this sort
of account, which most would discard, though is quite readable
and archaeologically principled.
Now, I forgot if I mentioned this before, but Graham Hancock has
There are of course a variety of considered influences of humanity's
origins, basically from the heart, the south, and the north.
That said homo sapiens has many possible mutations.
About Amerigo Vespucci the famed cartographer, has that there
were already maps predating Vespucci's several hundred years,
and, he might've simply inherited a copy.
On 19/08/2026 11:55 PM, Kerr-Mudd, John wrote:
broOn Tue, 18 Aug 2026 16:06:50 -0700
Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> wrote:
On 08/18/2026 02:35 PM, Johann 'Myrkraverk' Oskarsson wrote:[]
On 19/08/2026 4:47 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/18/2026 12:35 PM, Johann 'Myrkraverk' Oskarsson wrote:
On 19/08/2026 12:44 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/18/2026 09:37 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/17/2026 05:04 PM, Johann 'Myrkraverk' Oskarsson wrote:
On 17/08/2026 8:43 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
[]A usual Atlantean Bronze Age hypothesis has much evidence
from the similarities of the scripts of the meso-American
and medi-Terranean on basically either side of the Atlas
mountains the Atlantic.
I'm not sure I believe in an /Atlantian Bronze Age/, as in, that
/Atlantis/ was -- or was in -- America, and that what we now call /The >>>> Atlantic Ocean/ but back then was the /Ethiopian Ocean/ was navigable
during what we call the /Bronze Age/.
[]
That sort of interesting. Do you have a better source than yourself on >>>> it? I have no idea what bronze age people would have called
America, if
they even knew about it as anything but /the unknown west/.
The Atlantean theory of Bronze-Age transmigration and world-wide
peopling circa 12000 BCE and up to the Noachic or ante-Deluvian, was
thoroughly debunked and replaced with the "Alaskan lang bridge" concept
since it entirely infuriated those with the Hamite/Shemite/Japhethite
view of racial discrimination and the impossibility of sea-faring
and ocean-faring of primitive peoples, vis-a-vis the Kon-Tiki
or the accounts of Bronze Age bronze mines all up the Missouri
. As of 1999, "no one has found evidence that points to the use of
melting, smelting and casting in prehistoric eastern North America."[3]
(prC>136)
I'm not sure that's relevant. Looking at a map of ocean currents, they
land in meso-america. I believe /meso-america/ is the term we use to
refer to the now /Gulf of Trump/, or was it /Gulf of America/, or /Gulf
of Mexico/? I'm getting confused due to the constant name changes.
So, if indeed any ships arriving from the shore of northern africa, or southern europe -- this is the same place -- land in the americas,
wouldn't they have to land in meso-america, and the gulf?
And on that subject, how was the melting, smelting, and general use of
metals in meso-america before Columbus?
and that the seat of the civilization was from Peru, and that
the scripts besides the architecture of pyramids on both sides
of the Atlantic, have that it does take a bit of squinting to
consider the ancient Mayan and Phoenician scripts side-by-side,
which are about the same count and assigned to the same phonemes,
and have the same ideogram. Then, there's a book from about
120 years ago with much the considered evidence for this sort
of account, which most would discard, though is quite readable
and archaeologically principled.
Hmm, which book is that? There were a /lot/ of books published ca. 120
years ago, and I'm not inclined to read them all in the near future!
Now, I forgot if I mentioned this before, but Graham Hancock has
There are of course a variety of considered influences of humanity's
origins, basically from the heart, the south, and the north.
That said homo sapiens has many possible mutations.
About Amerigo Vespucci the famed cartographer, has that there
were already maps predating Vespucci's several hundred years,
and, he might've simply inherited a copy.
written interesting theories on this subject, and has also starred
his own T.V. show, for those who can't be bothered to read.
Happy sailing across the /atlantic ocean/!
On 8/13/26 10:12 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/12/2026 10:15 PM, dart200 wrote:
On 8/12/26 7:34 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/07/2026 10:18 AM, Johann 'Myrkraverk' Oskarsson wrote:
On 06/08/2026 5:29 AM, Dude wrote:
dart200 <user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:
upon picking apart the abject nonsense that is recursive
undecidability,
so that i can discuss what undecidability _actually_ looks like >>>>>>> within
computing,
i find myself stumbling into a proof that turing machines as a
model are
not capable of computing everything that can be computed mechanically >>>>>
Have you considered how to model the /Antikythera Mechanism/ on a
Turing
machine, as a subject for your thesis?-a I believe that's been done, so >>>>> the question is, what exactly is it about mechanical computing that
cannot be done on Turing machines?
You can't do much advanced computing on an Apple laptop operating from >>>>>> your
i guess we'll see where the paper ultimately leads for sure, but >>>>>>> things
are cooking rLiN+A
kitchen table.
That is a matter of perspective.-a The fruit laptop on the kitchen table >>>>> can be thought of as a terminal, or even just a typewriter, for the
Cray.
As an IT professional, I can say without the least hesitation, there's >>>>>> not
many machines that can compare with a Cray.
I'm an I.T. professional who's never used a Cray, so I can't comment on >>>>> that.
Cray Computers are optimized for massive mathematical arrays rather >>>>>> than
standard scalar math. Crays are heavily utilized in nuclear research, >>>>>> aerospace design, codebreaking, and global satellite weather
prediction.
So if I understand Finseth's book about how to code an Emacs correctly, >>>>> a Cray supercomputer would be massively hampered were you to
implement a
text editor on one.
So, which text editor do yo prefer, when coding a Cray?
Maybe if you read Finsler and Boffa then it would be more clear
why Church-Turing thesis is in a model of computation that simply
doesn't necessarily include "Zeno machines" and the like, while
it's so for the finite and bounded, in the unbounded.
Finsler and Boffa make some various accounts of "infinity"
and the "extra-ordinary" that numbers naturally have that
are usually ignored or plain banned in "ordinary" models.
theoretical mathematician do have a tendency to try wacky shit when it
comes infinite ...
turing for example tried to extend logical systems into transfinite
ordinals in an attempt to get around incompleteness. no idea what kind
of axiom would realistically come past an infinite amount of them, but
this unfortunately didn't work so it doesn't really matter eh?
i plan to propose a limit to the incompleteness within computing, which
in turn may in fact make it complete. or at least trivialize
incompleteness to the point of irrelevancy
Why would you do that?
because erroneously proving a limit that does not actually exist will artificially limit our potential to wield computing as an applied technique
like specifically when it comes to our practical application of
computing, we do not prove what our computations do. we might test
various inputs/outputs combos, but this is quite a bit inferior to
proving semantics across their entire input possibility space (and not
just brute forcing that proof)
It's kind of like driving a car, and knowing the limits,
since one never knows the limits, yet is always finding the limits,
incompleteness is simply beyond a limit, and not being cognizant
of it, if not quite sure where it is, risks hitting its wall,
or driving over its cliff.
i'm not sure how framing currently intractable problems as actually tractable (without limiting the domain!) risks driving over some kind of existential cliff in this case
undecidability within computing is entirely founded in the problems of computing the semantic properties of computations, unlocking those kinds
of problems as actually tractable seems like possibly a huge boon to the advancement of computing
It's like the very notion of analysis, making
restriction-of-comprehension keeps some things simple, other things
un-available to reason. Somebody else needn't adopt that restriction,
and then it's like a rooster locking itself in the coop.
i'm not proposing a reduction in power to computing, if anything this
would be an expansion in descriptive power
Mirimanoff points out that a model of finite ordinals is extra-ordinary,
Russell wishes it away, the "Russell-ian retro-thesis",
it's natural that infinity is "in", and that models of ordinals
or integers start as both bounded-fragments and
extraordinary-extensions, the "standard" model not even existing except as >> a limit of those.
The classical expositions of the super-classical, usually considered
to start with Zeno's account of infinite-divisbility and summability
and motion in time, and the geometric series, gives reasons why that
for infinitary-analysis, that's about the only place to start that
isn't wacky, and it makes of itself accounts of why induction fails
where deduction succeeds, and about complementary duals, and the
great account of structure and geometry and arithmetic, and continuity
and infinity, up-front.
i have a hard time parsing what u mean even with gemenigpts help, but
please do remember the /theory of computing/ is inherently limited to
the cardinality of natural numbers, as mechanical computations must be mapped to the finite machine description which compute them
Then, that there are more models of laws of large numbers, and
that naive induction is basically finitistic and only knows a
law of small numbers, or "weak" induction, compared to the "strong"
induction which is given an account by the existence of a space
and its structure, that the "a priori" of "strong induction" is
due classical-expositions of super-classical results after the
double-reductio and the ad-infinitum instead of the ad-absurdam,
about the "ab-absurdam", that numbers and forms always have those.
Then, retro-finitism or ultra-finitism is naive, and incomplete.
dart200 <user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid> wrote:
On 8/13/26 10:12 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/12/2026 10:15 PM, dart200 wrote:
On 8/12/26 7:34 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/07/2026 10:18 AM, Johann 'Myrkraverk' Oskarsson wrote:
On 06/08/2026 5:29 AM, Dude wrote:
dart200 <user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:
upon picking apart the abject nonsense that is recursive
undecidability,
so that i can discuss what undecidability _actually_ looks like >>>>>>>> within
computing,
i find myself stumbling into a proof that turing machines as a >>>>>>>> model are
not capable of computing everything that can be computed mechanically >>>>>>
Have you considered how to model the /Antikythera Mechanism/ on a
Turing
machine, as a subject for your thesis?-a I believe that's been done, so >>>>>> the question is, what exactly is it about mechanical computing that >>>>>> cannot be done on Turing machines?
You can't do much advanced computing on an Apple laptop operating from >>>>>>> your
i guess we'll see where the paper ultimately leads for sure, but >>>>>>>> things
are cooking rLiN+A
kitchen table.
That is a matter of perspective.-a The fruit laptop on the kitchen table >>>>>> can be thought of as a terminal, or even just a typewriter, for the >>>>>> Cray.
As an IT professional, I can say without the least hesitation, there's >>>>>>> not
many machines that can compare with a Cray.
I'm an I.T. professional who's never used a Cray, so I can't comment on >>>>>> that.
Cray Computers are optimized for massive mathematical arrays rather >>>>>>> than
standard scalar math. Crays are heavily utilized in nuclear research, >>>>>>> aerospace design, codebreaking, and global satellite weather
prediction.
So if I understand Finseth's book about how to code an Emacs correctly, >>>>>> a Cray supercomputer would be massively hampered were you to
implement a
text editor on one.
So, which text editor do yo prefer, when coding a Cray?
Maybe if you read Finsler and Boffa then it would be more clear
why Church-Turing thesis is in a model of computation that simply
doesn't necessarily include "Zeno machines" and the like, while
it's so for the finite and bounded, in the unbounded.
Finsler and Boffa make some various accounts of "infinity"
and the "extra-ordinary" that numbers naturally have that
are usually ignored or plain banned in "ordinary" models.
theoretical mathematician do have a tendency to try wacky shit when it >>>> comes infinite ...
turing for example tried to extend logical systems into transfinite
ordinals in an attempt to get around incompleteness. no idea what kind >>>> of axiom would realistically come past an infinite amount of them, but >>>> this unfortunately didn't work so it doesn't really matter eh?
i plan to propose a limit to the incompleteness within computing, which >>>> in turn may in fact make it complete. or at least trivialize
incompleteness to the point of irrelevancy
Why would you do that?
because erroneously proving a limit that does not actually exist will
artificially limit our potential to wield computing as an applied technique
But erroneously claiming that a proof is invalid makes everything you do worthless.
Since you donrCOt understand the actual basics of the field that you claim is wrong, all you are doing is proving your ignorance.
like specifically when it comes to our practical application of
computing, we do not prove what our computations do. we might test
various inputs/outputs combos, but this is quite a bit inferior to
proving semantics across their entire input possibility space (and not
just brute forcing that proof)
WasnrCOt one of your complaints that people donrCOt actually prove correctness?
Note, there is a world of difference between the rCLTheoreticalrCY discussion of the limits Theoretical computability, and the Practical investigation of what is practically computable.
Asking people to do what is actually impossible to do is the best way to destroy the productivity of a field. We rarely rCLProverCY correctness of a program in a rigorous way, because to do so requires significantly weakling the power of you computation to make its behavior actually provable.
Most practical applications can take an only 99% chance of correctness for
a 10x speed up in operation and development time (that is likely a very low factor for real applications)
It's kind of like driving a car, and knowing the limits,
since one never knows the limits, yet is always finding the limits,
incompleteness is simply beyond a limit, and not being cognizant
of it, if not quite sure where it is, risks hitting its wall,
or driving over its cliff.
i'm not sure how framing currently intractable problems as actually
tractable (without limiting the domain!) risks driving over some kind of
existential cliff in this case
ArnrCOt YOU the one trying to claim the rCLintractable problemsrCY (like halting)
are tractable?
The Cliff exists, and driving blindfolded is a good way to run off it.
undecidability within computing is entirely founded in the problems of
computing the semantic properties of computations, unlocking those kinds
of problems as actually tractable seems like possibly a huge boon to the
advancement of computing
And some of the limits of that have been found,
It's like the very notion of analysis, making
restriction-of-comprehension keeps some things simple, other things
un-available to reason. Somebody else needn't adopt that restriction,
and then it's like a rooster locking itself in the coop.
i'm not proposing a reduction in power to computing, if anything this
would be an expansion in descriptive power
Nope. As it seems every time you try to describe it, you want to prevent certain question from being asked about certain machines. You canrCOt make you deciders a class of operations not allowed to be used by the machines
to be decided on except by reducing the power of the computing you are looking at. BY DEFINITION, to be within the field you claim, the deciders need to be exactly of the same class of machines as the machines being decided on, and thus they canrCOt exclude rCLthemselvesrCY from valid input, or
let their answer be different if you do.
Mirimanoff points out that a model of finite ordinals is extra-ordinary, >>> Russell wishes it away, the "Russell-ian retro-thesis",
it's natural that infinity is "in", and that models of ordinals
or integers start as both bounded-fragments and
extraordinary-extensions, the "standard" model not even existing except as >>> a limit of those.
The classical expositions of the super-classical, usually considered
to start with Zeno's account of infinite-divisbility and summability
and motion in time, and the geometric series, gives reasons why that
for infinitary-analysis, that's about the only place to start that
isn't wacky, and it makes of itself accounts of why induction fails
where deduction succeeds, and about complementary duals, and the
great account of structure and geometry and arithmetic, and continuity
and infinity, up-front.
i have a hard time parsing what u mean even with gemenigpts help, but
please do remember the /theory of computing/ is inherently limited to
the cardinality of natural numbers, as mechanical computations must be
mapped to the finite machine description which compute them
Perhaps your problem is you donrCOt understand the limit of that finiteness, and how mathematics can express things beyond that.
The existence of trans-finite number systems allow the creation of trans-computable systems that are beyond rCLclassicalrCY computation, but such
system are by definition not actually realizable.
Then, that there are more models of laws of large numbers, and
that naive induction is basically finitistic and only knows a
law of small numbers, or "weak" induction, compared to the "strong"
induction which is given an account by the existence of a space
and its structure, that the "a priori" of "strong induction" is
due classical-expositions of super-classical results after the
double-reductio and the ad-infinitum instead of the ad-absurdam,
about the "ab-absurdam", that numbers and forms always have those.
Then, retro-finitism or ultra-finitism is naive, and incomplete.
On 9/7/26 1:44 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
dart200 <user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid> wrote:
On 8/13/26 10:12 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/12/2026 10:15 PM, dart200 wrote:
On 8/12/26 7:34 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/07/2026 10:18 AM, Johann 'Myrkraverk' Oskarsson wrote:
On 06/08/2026 5:29 AM, Dude wrote:
dart200 <user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:
upon picking apart the abject nonsense that is recursive
undecidability,
so that i can discuss what undecidability _actually_ looks like >>>>>>>>> within
computing,
i find myself stumbling into a proof that turing machines as a >>>>>>>>> model are
not capable of computing everything that can be computed
mechanically
Have you considered how to model the /Antikythera Mechanism/ on a >>>>>>> Turing
machine, as a subject for your thesis?-a I believe that's been
done, so
the question is, what exactly is it about mechanical computing that >>>>>>> cannot be done on Turing machines?
You can't do much advanced computing on an Apple laptop
i guess we'll see where the paper ultimately leads for sure, but >>>>>>>>> things
are cooking rLiN+A
operating from
your
kitchen table.
That is a matter of perspective.-a The fruit laptop on the kitchen >>>>>>> table
can be thought of as a terminal, or even just a typewriter, for the >>>>>>> Cray.
As an IT professional, I can say without the least hesitation, >>>>>>>> there's
not
many machines that can compare with a Cray.
I'm an I.T. professional who's never used a Cray, so I can't
comment on
that.
Cray Computers are optimized for massive mathematical arrays rather >>>>>>>> than
standard scalar math. Crays are heavily utilized in nuclear
research,
aerospace design, codebreaking, and global satellite weather
prediction.
So if I understand Finseth's book about how to code an Emacs
correctly,
a Cray supercomputer would be massively hampered were you to
implement a
text editor on one.
So, which text editor do yo prefer, when coding a Cray?
Maybe if you read Finsler and Boffa then it would be more clear
why Church-Turing thesis is in a model of computation that simply
doesn't necessarily include "Zeno machines" and the like, while
it's so for the finite and bounded, in the unbounded.
Finsler and Boffa make some various accounts of "infinity"
and the "extra-ordinary" that numbers naturally have that
are usually ignored or plain banned in "ordinary" models.
theoretical mathematician do have a tendency to try wacky shit when it >>>>> comes infinite ...
turing for example tried to extend logical systems into transfinite
ordinals in an attempt to get around incompleteness. no idea what kind >>>>> of axiom would realistically come past an infinite amount of them, but >>>>> this unfortunately didn't work so it doesn't really matter eh?
i plan to propose a limit to the incompleteness within computing,
which
in turn may in fact make it complete. or at least trivialize
incompleteness to the point of irrelevancy
Why would you do that?
because erroneously proving a limit that does not actually exist will
artificially limit our potential to wield computing as an applied
technique
But erroneously claiming that a proof is invalid makes everything you do
worthless.
bruh the ct-thesis is definitely fucked and there ain't nothing you can
do about it tbh rick
can't wait until you read the paper tbh, i plan to post it friday Ef2i
Since you donrCOt understand the actual basics of the field that you
claim is
wrong, all you are doing is proving your ignorance.
like specifically when it comes to our practical application of
computing, we do not prove what our computations do. we might test
various inputs/outputs combos, but this is quite a bit inferior to
proving semantics across their entire input possibility space (and not
just brute forcing that proof)
WasnrCOt one of your complaints that people donrCOt actually prove
correctness?
Note, there is a world of difference between the rCLTheoreticalrCY discussion
of the limits Theoretical computability, and the Practical
investigation of
what is practically computable.
Asking people to do what is actually impossible to do is the best way to
destroy the productivity of a field. We rarely rCLProverCY correctness of a >> program in a rigorous way, because to do so requires significantly
weakling
the power of you computation to make its behavior actually provable.
Most practical applications can take an only 99% chance of correctness
for
a 10x speed up in operation and development time (that is likely a
very low
factor for real applications)
It's kind of like driving a car, and knowing the limits,
since one never knows the limits, yet is always finding the limits,
incompleteness is simply beyond a limit, and not being cognizant
of it, if not quite sure where it is, risks hitting its wall,
or driving over its cliff.
i'm not sure how framing currently intractable problems as actually
tractable (without limiting the domain!) risks driving over some kind of >>> existential cliff in this case
ArnrCOt YOU the one trying to claim the rCLintractable problemsrCY (like
halting)
are tractable?
The Cliff exists, and driving blindfolded is a good way to run off it.
undecidability within computing is entirely founded in the problems of
computing the semantic properties of computations, unlocking those kinds >>> of problems as actually tractable seems like possibly a huge boon to the >>> advancement of computing
And some of the limits of that have been found,
It's like the very notion of analysis, making
restriction-of-comprehension keeps some things simple, other things
un-available to reason. Somebody else needn't adopt that restriction,
and then it's like a rooster locking itself in the coop.
i'm not proposing a reduction in power to computing, if anything this
would be an expansion in descriptive power
Nope. As it seems every time you try to describe it, you want to prevent
certain question from being asked about certain machines. You canrCOt make >> you deciders a class of operations not allowed to be used by the machines
to be decided on except by reducing the power of the computing you are
looking at. BY DEFINITION, to be within the field you claim, the deciders
need to be exactly of the same class of machines as the machines being
decided on, and thus they canrCOt exclude rCLthemselvesrCY from valid input, or
let their answer be different if you do.
Mirimanoff points out that a model of finite ordinals is extra-
ordinary,
Russell wishes it away, the "Russell-ian retro-thesis",
it's natural that infinity is "in", and that models of ordinals
or integers start as both bounded-fragments and
extraordinary-extensions, the "standard" model not even existing
except as
a limit of those.
The classical expositions of the super-classical, usually considered
to start with Zeno's account of infinite-divisbility and summability
and motion in time, and the geometric series, gives reasons why that
for infinitary-analysis, that's about the only place to start that
isn't wacky, and it makes of itself accounts of why induction fails
where deduction succeeds, and about complementary duals, and the
great account of structure and geometry and arithmetic, and continuity >>>> and infinity, up-front.
i have a hard time parsing what u mean even with gemenigpts help, but
please do remember the /theory of computing/ is inherently limited to
the cardinality of natural numbers, as mechanical computations must be
mapped to the finite machine description which compute them
Perhaps your problem is you donrCOt understand the limit of that
finiteness,
and how mathematics can express things beyond that.
The existence of trans-finite number systems allow the creation of
trans-computable systems that are beyond rCLclassicalrCY computation, but >> such
system are by definition not actually realizable.
Then, that there are more models of laws of large numbers, and
that naive induction is basically finitistic and only knows a
law of small numbers, or "weak" induction, compared to the "strong"
induction which is given an account by the existence of a space
and its structure, that the "a priori" of "strong induction" is
due classical-expositions of super-classical results after the
double-reductio and the ad-infinitum instead of the ad-absurdam,
about the "ab-absurdam", that numbers and forms always have those.
Then, retro-finitism or ultra-finitism is naive, and incomplete.
On 9/8/2026 1:46 AM, dart200 wrote:
On 9/7/26 1:44 PM, Richard Damon wrote:The first thing I would do, if I were you, would be to enroll in a thirty-day coding boot camp. Get up to speed programming. Maybe learn
dart200 <user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid> wrote:
On 8/13/26 10:12 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/12/2026 10:15 PM, dart200 wrote:
On 8/12/26 7:34 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/07/2026 10:18 AM, Johann 'Myrkraverk' Oskarsson wrote:
On 06/08/2026 5:29 AM, Dude wrote:
dart200 <user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:
upon picking apart the abject nonsense that is recursive
undecidability,
so that i can discuss what undecidability _actually_ looks like >>>>>>>>>> within
computing,
i find myself stumbling into a proof that turing machines as a >>>>>>>>>> model are
not capable of computing everything that can be computed
mechanically
Have you considered how to model the /Antikythera Mechanism/ on a >>>>>>>> Turing
machine, as a subject for your thesis?-a I believe that's been >>>>>>>> done, so
the question is, what exactly is it about mechanical computing that >>>>>>>> cannot be done on Turing machines?
You can't do much advanced computing on an Apple laptop
i guess we'll see where the paper ultimately leads for sure, but >>>>>>>>>> things
are cooking rLiN+A
operating from
your
kitchen table.
That is a matter of perspective.-a The fruit laptop on the
kitchen table
can be thought of as a terminal, or even just a typewriter, for the >>>>>>>> Cray.
As an IT professional, I can say without the least hesitation, >>>>>>>>> there's
not
many machines that can compare with a Cray.
I'm an I.T. professional who's never used a Cray, so I can't
comment on
that.
Cray Computers are optimized for massive mathematical arrays >>>>>>>>> rather
than
standard scalar math. Crays are heavily utilized in nuclear >>>>>>>>> research,
aerospace design, codebreaking, and global satellite weather >>>>>>>>> prediction.
So if I understand Finseth's book about how to code an Emacs
correctly,
a Cray supercomputer would be massively hampered were you to
implement a
text editor on one.
So, which text editor do yo prefer, when coding a Cray?
Maybe if you read Finsler and Boffa then it would be more clear
why Church-Turing thesis is in a model of computation that simply >>>>>>> doesn't necessarily include "Zeno machines" and the like, while
it's so for the finite and bounded, in the unbounded.
Finsler and Boffa make some various accounts of "infinity"
and the "extra-ordinary" that numbers naturally have that
are usually ignored or plain banned in "ordinary" models.
theoretical mathematician do have a tendency to try wacky shit
when it
comes infinite ...
turing for example tried to extend logical systems into transfinite >>>>>> ordinals in an attempt to get around incompleteness. no idea what >>>>>> kind
of axiom would realistically come past an infinite amount of them, >>>>>> but
this unfortunately didn't work so it doesn't really matter eh?
i plan to propose a limit to the incompleteness within computing, >>>>>> which
in turn may in fact make it complete. or at least trivialize
incompleteness to the point of irrelevancy
Why would you do that?
because erroneously proving a limit that does not actually exist will
artificially limit our potential to wield computing as an applied
technique
But erroneously claiming that a proof is invalid makes everything you do >>> worthless.
bruh the ct-thesis is definitely fucked and there ain't nothing you
can do about it tbh rick
some diagramming and BASIC, then move on to Python. YMMV.
On 08/09/2026 22:53, Dude wrote:
On 9/8/2026 1:46 AM, dart200 wrote:
On 9/7/26 1:44 PM, Richard Damon wrote:The first thing I would do, if I were you, would be to enroll in a
dart200 <user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid> wrote:
On 8/13/26 10:12 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/12/2026 10:15 PM, dart200 wrote:
On 8/12/26 7:34 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/07/2026 10:18 AM, Johann 'Myrkraverk' Oskarsson wrote:
On 06/08/2026 5:29 AM, Dude wrote:
dart200 <user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:
upon picking apart the abject nonsense that is recursive >>>>>>>>>>> undecidability,
so that i can discuss what undecidability _actually_ looks like >>>>>>>>>>> within
computing,
i find myself stumbling into a proof that turing machines as a >>>>>>>>>>> model are
not capable of computing everything that can be computed >>>>>>>>>>> mechanically
Have you considered how to model the /Antikythera Mechanism/ on a >>>>>>>>> Turing
machine, as a subject for your thesis?-a I believe that's been >>>>>>>>> done, so
the question is, what exactly is it about mechanical computing >>>>>>>>> that
cannot be done on Turing machines?
You can't do much advanced computing on an Apple laptop
i guess we'll see where the paper ultimately leads for sure, but >>>>>>>>>>> things
are cooking rLiN+A
operating from
your
kitchen table.
That is a matter of perspective.-a The fruit laptop on the
kitchen table
can be thought of as a terminal, or even just a typewriter, for >>>>>>>>> the
Cray.
As an IT professional, I can say without the least hesitation, >>>>>>>>>> there's
not
many machines that can compare with a Cray.
I'm an I.T. professional who's never used a Cray, so I can't >>>>>>>>> comment on
that.
Cray Computers are optimized for massive mathematical arrays >>>>>>>>>> rather
than
standard scalar math. Crays are heavily utilized in nuclear >>>>>>>>>> research,
aerospace design, codebreaking, and global satellite weather >>>>>>>>>> prediction.
So if I understand Finseth's book about how to code an Emacs >>>>>>>>> correctly,
a Cray supercomputer would be massively hampered were you to >>>>>>>>> implement a
text editor on one.
So, which text editor do yo prefer, when coding a Cray?
Maybe if you read Finsler and Boffa then it would be more clear >>>>>>>> why Church-Turing thesis is in a model of computation that simply >>>>>>>> doesn't necessarily include "Zeno machines" and the like, while >>>>>>>> it's so for the finite and bounded, in the unbounded.
Finsler and Boffa make some various accounts of "infinity"
and the "extra-ordinary" that numbers naturally have that
are usually ignored or plain banned in "ordinary" models.
theoretical mathematician do have a tendency to try wacky shit
when it
comes infinite ...
turing for example tried to extend logical systems into transfinite >>>>>>> ordinals in an attempt to get around incompleteness. no idea what >>>>>>> kind
of axiom would realistically come past an infinite amount of
them, but
this unfortunately didn't work so it doesn't really matter eh?
i plan to propose a limit to the incompleteness within computing, >>>>>>> which
in turn may in fact make it complete. or at least trivialize
incompleteness to the point of irrelevancy
Why would you do that?
because erroneously proving a limit that does not actually exist will >>>>> artificially limit our potential to wield computing as an applied
technique
But erroneously claiming that a proof is invalid makes everything
you do
worthless.
bruh the ct-thesis is definitely fucked and there ain't nothing you
can do about it tbh rick
thirty-day coding boot camp. Get up to speed programming. Maybe learn
some diagramming and BASIC, then move on to Python. YMMV.
That you say that shows that you don't know or care what you are talking about.
is isrrelevant to discussions about computation theory and mathematics
and logic.
You came here for enlightenment? The ct-thesis is definitely fucked!
So, I just want to help the kid get a job to support his baby. YMMV.
[ Followup-To: set ]
In comp.theory Dude <punditster@gmail.com> wrote:
[ .... ]
You came here for enlightenment? The ct-thesis is definitely fucked!
The Church-Turing thesis is more like a definition of what computing
means. Nobody has come up with anything that can be computed that can't
be computed by some turing machine. And that's in many, many decades of looking. You seem to be saying you've found such a counterexample. Post
it!
So, I just want to help the kid get a job to support his baby. YMMV.
The best thing you can do is develop some cynicism, recognise that the
world as it is is far from ideal (you would probably use the term
"fucked"), and make sure your son is materially and emotionally provided
for.
[ .... ]
On 9/9/26 8:42 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
[ Followup-To: set ]
In comp.theory Dude <punditster@gmail.com> wrote:
You came here for enlightenment? The ct-thesis is definitely fucked!
The Church-Turing thesis is more like a definition of what computing
means. Nobody has come up with anything that can be computed that
can't be computed by some turing machine. And that's in many, many
decades of looking. You seem to be saying you've found such a counterexample. Post it!
it shows we can produce a sequence based on the enumeration of turing machines, that is outside the bounds of turing computability
i'm going to post it this friday Sep 11
----
arising us out of the computing dark ages,
please excuse my pseudo-pyscript,
~ the lil crank that could
On 9/9/26 8:19 AM, Dude wrote:
On 9/9/2026 12:44 AM, dart200 wrote:
On 9/8/26 12:53 PM, Dude wrote:Your ct-thesis is definitely fucked!
On 9/8/2026 1:46 AM, dart200 wrote:
On 9/7/26 1:44 PM, Richard Damon wrote:The first thing I would do, if I were you, would be to enroll in a
dart200 <user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid> wrote:
On 8/13/26 10:12 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/12/2026 10:15 PM, dart200 wrote:
On 8/12/26 7:34 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/07/2026 10:18 AM, Johann 'Myrkraverk' Oskarsson wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> On 06/08/2026 5:29 AM, Dude wrote:
dart200 <user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:
upon picking apart the abject nonsense that is recursive >>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability,
so that i can discuss what undecidability _actually_ looks >>>>>>>>>>>>> like
within
computing,
i find myself stumbling into a proof that turing machines as a >>>>>>>>>>>>> model are
not capable of computing everything that can be computed >>>>>>>>>>>>> mechanically
Have you considered how to model the /Antikythera Mechanism/ >>>>>>>>>>> on a
Turing
machine, as a subject for your thesis?-a I believe that's been >>>>>>>>>>> done, so
the question is, what exactly is it about mechanical
computing that
cannot be done on Turing machines?
You can't do much advanced computing on an Apple laptop >>>>>>>>>>>> operating from
i guess we'll see where the paper ultimately leads for >>>>>>>>>>>>> sure, but
things
are cooking rLiN+A
your
kitchen table.
That is a matter of perspective.-a The fruit laptop on the >>>>>>>>>>> kitchen table
can be thought of as a terminal, or even just a typewriter, >>>>>>>>>>> for the
Cray.
As an IT professional, I can say without the least
hesitation, there's
not
many machines that can compare with a Cray.
I'm an I.T. professional who's never used a Cray, so I can't >>>>>>>>>>> comment on
that.
Cray Computers are optimized for massive mathematical arrays >>>>>>>>>>>> rather
than
standard scalar math. Crays are heavily utilized in nuclear >>>>>>>>>>>> research,
aerospace design, codebreaking, and global satellite weather >>>>>>>>>>>> prediction.
So if I understand Finseth's book about how to code an Emacs >>>>>>>>>>> correctly,
a Cray supercomputer would be massively hampered were you to >>>>>>>>>>> implement a
text editor on one.
So, which text editor do yo prefer, when coding a Cray?
Maybe if you read Finsler and Boffa then it would be more clear >>>>>>>>>> why Church-Turing thesis is in a model of computation that simply >>>>>>>>>> doesn't necessarily include "Zeno machines" and the like, while >>>>>>>>>> it's so for the finite and bounded, in the unbounded.
Finsler and Boffa make some various accounts of "infinity" >>>>>>>>>> and the "extra-ordinary" that numbers naturally have that
are usually ignored or plain banned in "ordinary" models.
theoretical mathematician do have a tendency to try wacky shit >>>>>>>>> when it
comes infinite ...
turing for example tried to extend logical systems into
transfinite
ordinals in an attempt to get around incompleteness. no idea >>>>>>>>> what kind
of axiom would realistically come past an infinite amount of >>>>>>>>> them, but
this unfortunately didn't work so it doesn't really matter eh? >>>>>>>>>
i plan to propose a limit to the incompleteness within
computing, which
in turn may in fact make it complete. or at least trivialize >>>>>>>>> incompleteness to the point of irrelevancy
Why would you do that?
because erroneously proving a limit that does not actually exist >>>>>>> will
artificially limit our potential to wield computing as an applied >>>>>>> technique
But erroneously claiming that a proof is invalid makes everything >>>>>> you do
worthless.
bruh the ct-thesis is definitely fucked and there ain't nothing you >>>>> can do about it tbh rick
thirty-day coding boot camp. Get up to speed programming. Maybe
learn some diagramming and BASIC, then move on to Python. YMMV.
Thesis? Seriously? You can't even write a complete sentence on one
can't wait until you read the paper tbh, i plan to post it friday Ef2i >>>>>
single line without adding a porn emoji.
Master of the one-liner!
this is waaay tf over ur pay grade dud, move alone now!
The paper you are referring to is entirely false and fabricated,
originating from a mashup of internet rumors and memes made up by
informants which have all been refuted and found to be spurious, crude
racist and biased - on this very board!
yes dud, shoo....
Since you donrCOt understand the actual basics of the field that you >>>>>> claim is
wrong, all you are doing is proving your ignorance.
like specifically when it comes to our practical application of
computing, we do not prove what our computations do. we might test >>>>>>> various inputs/outputs combos, but this is quite a bit inferior to >>>>>>> proving semantics across their entire input possibility space
(and not
just brute forcing that proof)
WasnrCOt one of your complaints that people donrCOt actually prove >>>>>> correctness?
Note, there is a world of difference between the rCLTheoreticalrCY >>>>>> discussion
of the limits Theoretical computability, and the Practical
investigation of
what is practically computable.
Asking people to do what is actually impossible to do is the best >>>>>> way to
destroy the productivity of a field. We rarely rCLProverCY correctness >>>>>> of a
program in a rigorous way, because to do so requires significantly >>>>>> weakling
the power of you computation to make its behavior actually provable. >>>>>>
Most practical applications can take an only 99% chance of
correctness for
a 10x speed up in operation and development time (that is likely a >>>>>> very low
factor for real applications)
It's kind of like driving a car, and knowing the limits,
since one never knows the limits, yet is always finding the limits, >>>>>>>> incompleteness is simply beyond a limit, and not being cognizant >>>>>>>> of it, if not quite sure where it is, risks hitting its wall,
or driving over its cliff.
i'm not sure how framing currently intractable problems as actually >>>>>>> tractable (without limiting the domain!) risks driving over some >>>>>>> kind of
existential cliff in this case
ArnrCOt YOU the one trying to claim the rCLintractable problemsrCY (like
halting)
are tractable?
The Cliff exists, and driving blindfolded is a good way to run off >>>>>> it.
undecidability within computing is entirely founded in the
problems of
computing the semantic properties of computations, unlocking
those kinds
of problems as actually tractable seems like possibly a huge boon >>>>>>> to the
advancement of computing
And some of the limits of that have been found,
It's like the very notion of analysis, making
restriction-of-comprehension keeps some things simple, other things >>>>>>>> un-available to reason. Somebody else needn't adopt that
restriction,
and then it's like a rooster locking itself in the coop.
i'm not proposing a reduction in power to computing, if anything >>>>>>> this
would be an expansion in descriptive power
Nope. As it seems every time you try to describe it, you want to
prevent
certain question from being asked about certain machines. You
canrCOt make
you deciders a class of operations not allowed to be used by the
machines
to be decided on except by reducing the power of the computing you >>>>>> are
looking at. BY DEFINITION, to be within the field you claim, the
deciders
need to be exactly of the same class of machines as the machines
being
decided on, and thus they canrCOt exclude rCLthemselvesrCY from valid >>>>>> input, or
let their answer be different if you do.
Mirimanoff points out that a model of finite ordinals is extra- >>>>>>>> ordinary,
Russell wishes it away, the "Russell-ian retro-thesis",
it's natural that infinity is "in", and that models of ordinals >>>>>>>> or integers start as both bounded-fragments and
extraordinary-extensions, the "standard" model not even existing >>>>>>>> except as
a limit of those.
The classical expositions of the super-classical, usually
considered
to start with Zeno's account of infinite-divisbility and
summability
and motion in time, and the geometric series, gives reasons why >>>>>>>> that
for infinitary-analysis, that's about the only place to start that >>>>>>>> isn't wacky, and it makes of itself accounts of why induction fails >>>>>>>> where deduction succeeds, and about complementary duals, and the >>>>>>>> great account of structure and geometry and arithmetic, and
continuity
and infinity, up-front.
i have a hard time parsing what u mean even with gemenigpts help, >>>>>>> but
please do remember the /theory of computing/ is inherently
limited to
the cardinality of natural numbers, as mechanical computations
must be
mapped to the finite machine description which compute them
Perhaps your problem is you donrCOt understand the limit of that
finiteness,
and how mathematics can express things beyond that.
The existence of trans-finite number systems allow the creation of >>>>>> trans-computable systems that are beyond rCLclassicalrCY computation, >>>>>> but such
system are by definition not actually realizable.
Then, that there are more models of laws of large numbers, and >>>>>>>> that naive induction is basically finitistic and only knows a
law of small numbers, or "weak" induction, compared to the "strong" >>>>>>>> induction which is given an account by the existence of a space >>>>>>>> and its structure, that the "a priori" of "strong induction" is >>>>>>>> due classical-expositions of super-classical results after the >>>>>>>> double-reductio and the ad-infinitum instead of the ad-absurdam, >>>>>>>> about the "ab-absurdam", that numbers and forms always have those. >>>>>>>>
Then, retro-finitism or ultra-finitism is naive, and incomplete. >>>>>>>
On Tue, 8 Sep 2026 12:53:54 -0700, Dude <punditster@gmail.com> wrote:
On 9/8/2026 1:46 AM, dart200 wrote:
On 9/7/26 1:44 PM, Richard Damon wrote:The first thing I would do, if I were you, would be to enroll in a
dart200 <user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid> wrote:
On 8/13/26 10:12 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/12/2026 10:15 PM, dart200 wrote:
On 8/12/26 7:34 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/07/2026 10:18 AM, Johann 'Myrkraverk' Oskarsson wrote:
On 06/08/2026 5:29 AM, Dude wrote:
dart200 <user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:
upon picking apart the abject nonsense that is recursive >>>>>>>>>>> undecidability,
so that i can discuss what undecidability _actually_ looks like >>>>>>>>>>> within
computing,
i find myself stumbling into a proof that turing machines as a >>>>>>>>>>> model are
not capable of computing everything that can be computed >>>>>>>>>>> mechanically
Have you considered how to model the /Antikythera Mechanism/ on a >>>>>>>>> Turing
machine, as a subject for your thesis?-a I believe that's been >>>>>>>>> done, so
the question is, what exactly is it about mechanical computing that >>>>>>>>> cannot be done on Turing machines?
You can't do much advanced computing on an Apple laptop
i guess we'll see where the paper ultimately leads for sure, but >>>>>>>>>>> things
are cooking ??
operating from
your
kitchen table.
That is a matter of perspective.-a The fruit laptop on the kitchen >>>>>>>>> table
can be thought of as a terminal, or even just a typewriter, for the >>>>>>>>> Cray.
As an IT professional, I can say without the least hesitation, >>>>>>>>>> there's
not
many machines that can compare with a Cray.
I'm an I.T. professional who's never used a Cray, so I can't >>>>>>>>> comment on
that.
Cray Computers are optimized for massive mathematical arrays rather >>>>>>>>>> than
standard scalar math. Crays are heavily utilized in nuclear >>>>>>>>>> research,
aerospace design, codebreaking, and global satellite weather >>>>>>>>>> prediction.
So if I understand Finseth's book about how to code an Emacs >>>>>>>>> correctly,
a Cray supercomputer would be massively hampered were you to >>>>>>>>> implement a
text editor on one.
So, which text editor do yo prefer, when coding a Cray?
Maybe if you read Finsler and Boffa then it would be more clear >>>>>>>> why Church-Turing thesis is in a model of computation that simply >>>>>>>> doesn't necessarily include "Zeno machines" and the like, while >>>>>>>> it's so for the finite and bounded, in the unbounded.
Finsler and Boffa make some various accounts of "infinity"
and the "extra-ordinary" that numbers naturally have that
are usually ignored or plain banned in "ordinary" models.
theoretical mathematician do have a tendency to try wacky shit when it >>>>>>> comes infinite ...
turing for example tried to extend logical systems into transfinite >>>>>>> ordinals in an attempt to get around incompleteness. no idea what kind >>>>>>> of axiom would realistically come past an infinite amount of them, but >>>>>>> this unfortunately didn't work so it doesn't really matter eh?
i plan to propose a limit to the incompleteness within computing, >>>>>>> which
in turn may in fact make it complete. or at least trivialize
incompleteness to the point of irrelevancy
Why would you do that?
because erroneously proving a limit that does not actually exist will >>>>> artificially limit our potential to wield computing as an applied
technique
But erroneously claiming that a proof is invalid makes everything you do >>>> worthless.
bruh the ct-thesis is definitely fucked and there ain't nothing you can
do about it tbh rick
thirty-day coding boot camp. Get up to speed programming. Maybe learn
some diagramming and BASIC, then move on to Python. YMMV.
5 miles an hour ought to be enough for anybody.
can't wait until you read the paper tbh, i plan to post it friday ?Thesis? Seriously? You can't even write a complete sentence on one
single line without adding a porn emoji.
Master of the one-liner!
Since you donrCOt understand the actual basics of the field that you
claim is
wrong, all you are doing is proving your ignorance.
like specifically when it comes to our practical application of
computing, we do not prove what our computations do. we might test
various inputs/outputs combos, but this is quite a bit inferior to
proving semantics across their entire input possibility space (and not >>>>> just brute forcing that proof)
WasnrCOt one of your complaints that people donrCOt actually prove
correctness?
Note, there is a world of difference between the rCLTheoreticalrCY discussion
of the limits Theoretical computability, and the Practical
investigation of
what is practically computable.
Asking people to do what is actually impossible to do is the best way to >>>> destroy the productivity of a field. We rarely rCLProverCY correctness of a
program in a rigorous way, because to do so requires significantly
weakling
the power of you computation to make its behavior actually provable.
Most practical applications can take an only 99% chance of correctness >>>> for
a 10x speed up in operation and development time (that is likely a
very low
factor for real applications)
It's kind of like driving a car, and knowing the limits,
since one never knows the limits, yet is always finding the limits, >>>>>> incompleteness is simply beyond a limit, and not being cognizant
of it, if not quite sure where it is, risks hitting its wall,
or driving over its cliff.
i'm not sure how framing currently intractable problems as actually
tractable (without limiting the domain!) risks driving over some kind of >>>>> existential cliff in this case
ArnrCOt YOU the one trying to claim the rCLintractable problemsrCY (like >>>> halting)
are tractable?
The Cliff exists, and driving blindfolded is a good way to run off it. >>>>
undecidability within computing is entirely founded in the problems of >>>>> computing the semantic properties of computations, unlocking those kinds >>>>> of problems as actually tractable seems like possibly a huge boon to the >>>>> advancement of computing
And some of the limits of that have been found,
It's like the very notion of analysis, making
restriction-of-comprehension keeps some things simple, other things >>>>>> un-available to reason. Somebody else needn't adopt that restriction, >>>>>> and then it's like a rooster locking itself in the coop.
i'm not proposing a reduction in power to computing, if anything this >>>>> would be an expansion in descriptive power
Nope. As it seems every time you try to describe it, you want to prevent >>>> certain question from being asked about certain machines. You canrCOt make >>>> you deciders a class of operations not allowed to be used by the machines >>>> to be decided on except by reducing the power of the computing you are >>>> looking at. BY DEFINITION, to be within the field you claim, the deciders >>>> need to be exactly of the same class of machines as the machines being >>>> decided on, and thus they canrCOt exclude rCLthemselvesrCY from valid input, or
let their answer be different if you do.
Mirimanoff points out that a model of finite ordinals is extra-
ordinary,
Russell wishes it away, the "Russell-ian retro-thesis",
it's natural that infinity is "in", and that models of ordinals
or integers start as both bounded-fragments and
extraordinary-extensions, the "standard" model not even existing
except as
a limit of those.
The classical expositions of the super-classical, usually considered >>>>>> to start with Zeno's account of infinite-divisbility and summability >>>>>> and motion in time, and the geometric series, gives reasons why that >>>>>> for infinitary-analysis, that's about the only place to start that >>>>>> isn't wacky, and it makes of itself accounts of why induction fails >>>>>> where deduction succeeds, and about complementary duals, and the
great account of structure and geometry and arithmetic, and continuity >>>>>> and infinity, up-front.
i have a hard time parsing what u mean even with gemenigpts help, but >>>>> please do remember the /theory of computing/ is inherently limited to >>>>> the cardinality of natural numbers, as mechanical computations must be >>>>> mapped to the finite machine description which compute them
Perhaps your problem is you donrCOt understand the limit of that
finiteness,
and how mathematics can express things beyond that.
The existence of trans-finite number systems allow the creation of
trans-computable systems that are beyond rCLclassicalrCY computation, but >>>> such
system are by definition not actually realizable.
Then, that there are more models of laws of large numbers, and
that naive induction is basically finitistic and only knows a
law of small numbers, or "weak" induction, compared to the "strong" >>>>>> induction which is given an account by the existence of a space
and its structure, that the "a priori" of "strong induction" is
due classical-expositions of super-classical results after the
double-reductio and the ad-infinitum instead of the ad-absurdam,
about the "ab-absurdam", that numbers and forms always have those. >>>>>>
Then, retro-finitism or ultra-finitism is naive, and incomplete.
dart200 <user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid> wrote:
On 9/9/26 8:42 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
[ Followup-To: set ]
In comp.theory Dude <punditster@gmail.com> wrote:
You came here for enlightenment? The ct-thesis is definitely fucked!
The Church-Turing thesis is more like a definition of what computing
means. Nobody has come up with anything that can be computed that
can't be computed by some turing machine. And that's in many, many
decades of looking. You seem to be saying you've found such a
counterexample. Post it!
it shows we can produce a sequence based on the enumeration of turing
machines, that is outside the bounds of turing computability
i'm going to post it this friday Sep 11
Excellent! But expect the validity of your conclusion to be challenged.
[ .... ]
--
arising us out of the computing dark ages,
please excuse my pseudo-pyscript,
~ the lil crank that could
On 9/9/26 11:15 AM, Dude wrote:
On 9/9/2026 9:47 AM, dart200 wrote:
On 9/9/26 8:19 AM, Dude wrote:You cross-posted your thesis here to get enlightened?
On 9/9/2026 12:44 AM, dart200 wrote:
On 9/8/26 12:53 PM, Dude wrote:Your ct-thesis is definitely fucked!
On 9/8/2026 1:46 AM, dart200 wrote:
On 9/7/26 1:44 PM, Richard Damon wrote:The first thing I would do, if I were you, would be to enroll in a >>>>>> thirty-day coding boot camp. Get up to speed programming. Maybe
dart200 <user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid> wrote:
On 8/13/26 10:12 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/12/2026 10:15 PM, dart200 wrote:
On 8/12/26 7:34 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/07/2026 10:18 AM, Johann 'Myrkraverk' Oskarsson wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> On 06/08/2026 5:29 AM, Dude wrote:
Maybe if you read Finsler and Boffa then it would be more clear >>>>>>>>>>>> why Church-Turing thesis is in a model of computation that >>>>>>>>>>>> simply
dart200 <user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
upon picking apart the abject nonsense that is recursive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability,
so that i can discuss what undecidability _actually_ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> looks like
within
computing,
i find myself stumbling into a proof that turing machines >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as a
model are
not capable of computing everything that can be computed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mechanically
Have you considered how to model the /Antikythera
Mechanism/ on a
Turing
machine, as a subject for your thesis?-a I believe that's >>>>>>>>>>>>> been done, so
the question is, what exactly is it about mechanical >>>>>>>>>>>>> computing that
cannot be done on Turing machines?
You can't do much advanced computing on an Apple laptop >>>>>>>>>>>>>> operating from
i guess we'll see where the paper ultimately leads for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sure, but
things
are cooking rLiN+A
your
kitchen table.
That is a matter of perspective.-a The fruit laptop on the >>>>>>>>>>>>> kitchen table
can be thought of as a terminal, or even just a typewriter, >>>>>>>>>>>>> for the
Cray.
As an IT professional, I can say without the least >>>>>>>>>>>>>> hesitation, there's
not
many machines that can compare with a Cray.
I'm an I.T. professional who's never used a Cray, so I >>>>>>>>>>>>> can't comment on
that.
Cray Computers are optimized for massive mathematical >>>>>>>>>>>>>> arrays rather
than
standard scalar math. Crays are heavily utilized in >>>>>>>>>>>>>> nuclear research,
aerospace design, codebreaking, and global satellite weather >>>>>>>>>>>>>> prediction.
So if I understand Finseth's book about how to code an >>>>>>>>>>>>> Emacs correctly,
a Cray supercomputer would be massively hampered were you to >>>>>>>>>>>>> implement a
text editor on one.
So, which text editor do yo prefer, when coding a Cray? >>>>>>>>>>>>
doesn't necessarily include "Zeno machines" and the like, while >>>>>>>>>>>> it's so for the finite and bounded, in the unbounded.
Finsler and Boffa make some various accounts of "infinity" >>>>>>>>>>>> and the "extra-ordinary" that numbers naturally have that >>>>>>>>>>>> are usually ignored or plain banned in "ordinary" models. >>>>>>>>>>>>
theoretical mathematician do have a tendency to try wacky >>>>>>>>>>> shit when it
comes infinite ...
turing for example tried to extend logical systems into >>>>>>>>>>> transfinite
ordinals in an attempt to get around incompleteness. no idea >>>>>>>>>>> what kind
of axiom would realistically come past an infinite amount of >>>>>>>>>>> them, but
this unfortunately didn't work so it doesn't really matter eh? >>>>>>>>>>>
i plan to propose a limit to the incompleteness within
computing, which
in turn may in fact make it complete. or at least trivialize >>>>>>>>>>> incompleteness to the point of irrelevancy
Why would you do that?
because erroneously proving a limit that does not actually
exist will
artificially limit our potential to wield computing as an
applied technique
But erroneously claiming that a proof is invalid makes
everything you do
worthless.
bruh the ct-thesis is definitely fucked and there ain't nothing >>>>>>> you can do about it tbh rick
learn some diagramming and BASIC, then move on to Python. YMMV.
Thesis? Seriously? You can't even write a complete sentence on one >>>>>> single line without adding a porn emoji.
can't wait until you read the paper tbh, i plan to post it friday Ef2i >>>>>>>
Master of the one-liner!
this is waaay tf over ur pay grade dud, move alone now!
The paper you are referring to is entirely false and fabricated,
originating from a mashup of internet rumors and memes made up by
informants which have all been refuted and found to be spurious,
crude racist and biased - on this very board!
yes dud, shoo....
yes dud, shoo...
Since you donrCOt understand the actual basics of the field that >>>>>>>> you claim is
wrong, all you are doing is proving your ignorance.
like specifically when it comes to our practical application of >>>>>>>>> computing, we do not prove what our computations do. we might test >>>>>>>>> various inputs/outputs combos, but this is quite a bit inferior to >>>>>>>>> proving semantics across their entire input possibility space >>>>>>>>> (and not
just brute forcing that proof)
WasnrCOt one of your complaints that people donrCOt actually prove >>>>>>>> correctness?
Note, there is a world of difference between the rCLTheoreticalrCY >>>>>>>> discussion
of the limits Theoretical computability, and the Practical
investigation of
what is practically computable.
Asking people to do what is actually impossible to do is the
best way to
destroy the productivity of a field. We rarely rCLProverCY
correctness of a
program in a rigorous way, because to do so requires
significantly weakling
the power of you computation to make its behavior actually
provable.
Most practical applications can take an only 99% chance of
correctness for
a 10x speed up in operation and development time (that is likely >>>>>>>> a very low
factor for real applications)
It's kind of like driving a car, and knowing the limits,
since one never knows the limits, yet is always finding the >>>>>>>>>> limits,
incompleteness is simply beyond a limit, and not being cognizant >>>>>>>>>> of it, if not quite sure where it is, risks hitting its wall, >>>>>>>>>> or driving over its cliff.
i'm not sure how framing currently intractable problems as
actually
tractable (without limiting the domain!) risks driving over >>>>>>>>> some kind of
existential cliff in this case
ArnrCOt YOU the one trying to claim the rCLintractable problemsrCY >>>>>>>> (like halting)
are tractable?
The Cliff exists, and driving blindfolded is a good way to run >>>>>>>> off it.
undecidability within computing is entirely founded in the
problems of
computing the semantic properties of computations, unlocking >>>>>>>>> those kinds
of problems as actually tractable seems like possibly a huge >>>>>>>>> boon to the
advancement of computing
And some of the limits of that have been found,
It's like the very notion of analysis, making
restriction-of-comprehension keeps some things simple, other >>>>>>>>>> things
un-available to reason. Somebody else needn't adopt that
restriction,
and then it's like a rooster locking itself in the coop.
i'm not proposing a reduction in power to computing, if
anything this
would be an expansion in descriptive power
Nope. As it seems every time you try to describe it, you want to >>>>>>>> prevent
certain question from being asked about certain machines. You >>>>>>>> canrCOt make
you deciders a class of operations not allowed to be used by the >>>>>>>> machines
to be decided on except by reducing the power of the computing >>>>>>>> you are
looking at. BY DEFINITION, to be within the field you claim, the >>>>>>>> deciders
need to be exactly of the same class of machines as the machines >>>>>>>> being
decided on, and thus they canrCOt exclude rCLthemselvesrCY from valid >>>>>>>> input, or
let their answer be different if you do.
Mirimanoff points out that a model of finite ordinals is
extra- ordinary,
Russell wishes it away, the "Russell-ian retro-thesis",
it's natural that infinity is "in", and that models of ordinals >>>>>>>>>> or integers start as both bounded-fragments and
extraordinary-extensions, the "standard" model not even
existing except as
a limit of those.
The classical expositions of the super-classical, usually >>>>>>>>>> considered
to start with Zeno's account of infinite-divisbility and
summability
and motion in time, and the geometric series, gives reasons >>>>>>>>>> why that
for infinitary-analysis, that's about the only place to start >>>>>>>>>> that
isn't wacky, and it makes of itself accounts of why induction >>>>>>>>>> fails
where deduction succeeds, and about complementary duals, and the >>>>>>>>>> great account of structure and geometry and arithmetic, and >>>>>>>>>> continuity
and infinity, up-front.
i have a hard time parsing what u mean even with gemenigpts >>>>>>>>> help, but
please do remember the /theory of computing/ is inherently
limited to
the cardinality of natural numbers, as mechanical computations >>>>>>>>> must be
mapped to the finite machine description which compute them
Perhaps your problem is you donrCOt understand the limit of that >>>>>>>> finiteness,
and how mathematics can express things beyond that.
The existence of trans-finite number systems allow the creation of >>>>>>>> trans-computable systems that are beyond rCLclassicalrCY
computation, but such
system are by definition not actually realizable.
Then, that there are more models of laws of large numbers, and >>>>>>>>>> that naive induction is basically finitistic and only knows a >>>>>>>>>> law of small numbers, or "weak" induction, compared to the >>>>>>>>>> "strong"
induction which is given an account by the existence of a space >>>>>>>>>> and its structure, that the "a priori" of "strong induction" is >>>>>>>>>> due classical-expositions of super-classical results after the >>>>>>>>>> double-reductio and the ad-infinitum instead of the ad-absurdam, >>>>>>>>>> about the "ab-absurdam", that numbers and forms always have >>>>>>>>>> those.
Then, retro-finitism or ultra-finitism is naive, and incomplete. >>>>>>>>>
On 9/9/2026 1:28 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 08/09/2026 22:53, Dude wrote:
On 9/8/2026 1:46 AM, dart200 wrote:
On 9/7/26 1:44 PM, Richard Damon wrote:The first thing I would do, if I were you, would be to enroll in a
dart200 <user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid> wrote:
On 8/13/26 10:12 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/12/2026 10:15 PM, dart200 wrote:
On 8/12/26 7:34 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 08/07/2026 10:18 AM, Johann 'Myrkraverk' Oskarsson wrote: >>>>>>>>>> On 06/08/2026 5:29 AM, Dude wrote:
dart200 <user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:
upon picking apart the abject nonsense that is recursive >>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability,
so that i can discuss what undecidability _actually_ looks like >>>>>>>>>>>> within
computing,
i find myself stumbling into a proof that turing machines as a >>>>>>>>>>>> model are
not capable of computing everything that can be computed >>>>>>>>>>>> mechanically
Have you considered how to model the /Antikythera Mechanism/ on a >>>>>>>>>> Turing
machine, as a subject for your thesis?-a I believe that's been >>>>>>>>>> done, so
the question is, what exactly is it about mechanical computing >>>>>>>>>> that
cannot be done on Turing machines?
You can't do much advanced computing on an Apple laptop >>>>>>>>>>> operating from
i guess we'll see where the paper ultimately leads for sure, >>>>>>>>>>>> but
things
are cooking rLiN+A
your
kitchen table.
That is a matter of perspective.-a The fruit laptop on the >>>>>>>>>> kitchen table
can be thought of as a terminal, or even just a typewriter, >>>>>>>>>> for the
Cray.
As an IT professional, I can say without the least
hesitation, there's
not
many machines that can compare with a Cray.
I'm an I.T. professional who's never used a Cray, so I can't >>>>>>>>>> comment on
that.
Cray Computers are optimized for massive mathematical arrays >>>>>>>>>>> rather
than
standard scalar math. Crays are heavily utilized in nuclear >>>>>>>>>>> research,
aerospace design, codebreaking, and global satellite weather >>>>>>>>>>> prediction.
So if I understand Finseth's book about how to code an Emacs >>>>>>>>>> correctly,
a Cray supercomputer would be massively hampered were you to >>>>>>>>>> implement a
text editor on one.
So, which text editor do yo prefer, when coding a Cray?
Maybe if you read Finsler and Boffa then it would be more clear >>>>>>>>> why Church-Turing thesis is in a model of computation that simply >>>>>>>>> doesn't necessarily include "Zeno machines" and the like, while >>>>>>>>> it's so for the finite and bounded, in the unbounded.
Finsler and Boffa make some various accounts of "infinity"
and the "extra-ordinary" that numbers naturally have that
are usually ignored or plain banned in "ordinary" models.
theoretical mathematician do have a tendency to try wacky shit >>>>>>>> when it
comes infinite ...
turing for example tried to extend logical systems into transfinite >>>>>>>> ordinals in an attempt to get around incompleteness. no idea
what kind
of axiom would realistically come past an infinite amount of
them, but
this unfortunately didn't work so it doesn't really matter eh? >>>>>>>>
i plan to propose a limit to the incompleteness within
computing, which
in turn may in fact make it complete. or at least trivialize
incompleteness to the point of irrelevancy
Why would you do that?
because erroneously proving a limit that does not actually exist will >>>>>> artificially limit our potential to wield computing as an applied >>>>>> technique
But erroneously claiming that a proof is invalid makes everything
you do
worthless.
bruh the ct-thesis is definitely fucked and there ain't nothing you
can do about it tbh rick
thirty-day coding boot camp. Get up to speed programming. Maybe learn
some diagramming and BASIC, then move on to Python. YMMV.
That you say that shows that you don't know or care what you are talking
about.
You came here for enlightenment?
The ct-thesis is definitely fucked!
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