• Olcott's system at test

    From Fred. Zwarts@F.Zwarts@HetNet.nl to comp.theory on Mon Jul 13 16:15:30 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    Consider the sentence A: "Olcott's system is correct".
    Olcott has confirmed that he thinks that A is true.
    However, from what Olcott told us Olcott's system will reject this
    finite string A, because of a self-reference.
    According to the system, A has no truth value.
    So, Olcott and his system do not agree about the truth value of A.

    Olcott claims that his system will convince everybody about the truth.

    We now see ourselves confronted with the ultimate test of the strength
    of Olcott's system:
    Is the system strong enough to make Olcott change his opinion about A?
    Will he accept that we cannot say that A is true?

    If no.
    If even Olcott himself does accept the truth value of finite strings as
    given by his own system, why would we believe that other people will
    change their opinion because of the output of the system?

    If yes.
    If Olcott accepts that we cannot say that A is true, i.e. that his
    system is correct, why would anyone change his opinion because of the
    output of this system?
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  • From Fred. Zwarts@F.Zwarts@HetNet.nl to comp.theory on Mon Jul 13 16:18:15 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    Op 13.jul.2026 om 16:15 schreef Fred. Zwarts:
    Consider the sentence A: "Olcott's system is correct".
    Olcott has confirmed that he thinks that A is true.
    However, from what Olcott told us Olcott's system will reject this
    finite string A, because of a self-reference.
    According to the system, A has no truth value.
    So, Olcott and his system do not agree about the truth value of A.

    Olcott claims that his system will convince everybody about the truth.

    We now see ourselves confronted with the ultimate test of the strength
    of Olcott's system:
    Is the system strong enough to make Olcott change his opinion about A?
    Will he accept that we cannot say that A is true?

    If no.
    If even Olcott himself does accept the truth value of finite strings as
    does -> does not accept
    given by his own system, why would we believe that other people will
    change their opinion because of the output of the system?

    If yes.
    If Olcott accepts that we cannot say that A is true, i.e. that his
    system is correct, why would anyone change his opinion because of the
    output of this system?

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  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to comp.theory on Tue Jul 14 10:06:30 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 13/07/2026 17:15, Fred. Zwarts wrote:
    Consider the sentence A: "Olcott's system is correct".
    Olcott has confirmed that he thinks that A is true.
    However, from what Olcott told us Olcott's system will reject this
    finite string A, because of a self-reference.
    According to the system, A has no truth value.
    So, Olcott and his system do not agree about the truth value of A.

    Olcott claims that his system will convince everybody about the truth.

    Olcott would include A as a basic fact. He might forget to tell the
    system that "Olcott's system" refers to the system itself and not to
    some other system.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Fred. Zwarts@F.Zwarts@HetNet.nl to comp.theory on Tue Jul 14 10:41:11 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    Op 13.jul.2026 om 16:18 schreef Fred. Zwarts:
    Op 13.jul.2026 om 16:15 schreef Fred. Zwarts:
    Consider the sentence A: "Olcott's system is correct".
    Olcott has confirmed that he thinks that A is true.
    However, from what Olcott told us Olcott's system will reject this
    finite string A, because of a self-reference.
    According to the system, A has no truth value.
    So, Olcott and his system do not agree about the truth value of A.

    Olcott claims that his system will convince everybody about the truth.

    We now see ourselves confronted with the ultimate test of the strength
    of Olcott's system:
    Is the system strong enough to make Olcott change his opinion about A?
    Will he accept that we cannot say that A is true?

    If no.
    If even Olcott himself does accept the truth value of finite strings as
    does -> does not accept
    given by his own system, why would we believe that other people will
    change their opinion because of the output of the system?

    If yes.
    If Olcott accepts that we cannot say that A is true, i.e. that his
    system is correct, why would anyone change his opinion because of the
    output of this system?


    This means that Olcott's system is unmasked as semantic incoherence or
    outside of the body of knowledge.
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  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Tue Jul 14 13:15:41 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/14/2026 2:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 13/07/2026 17:15, Fred. Zwarts wrote:
    Consider the sentence A: "Olcott's system is correct".
    Olcott has confirmed that he thinks that A is true.
    However, from what Olcott told us Olcott's system will reject this
    finite string A, because of a self-reference.
    According to the system, A has no truth value.
    So, Olcott and his system do not agree about the truth value of A.

    Olcott claims that his system will convince everybody about the truth.

    Olcott would include A as a basic fact. He might forget to tell the
    system that "Olcott's system" refers to the system itself and not to
    some other system.


    Olcott's system is inherently correct because
    it only includes the entire body of general
    knowledge.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of general knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
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  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to comp.theory on Wed Jul 15 09:42:49 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 14/07/2026 11:41, Fred. Zwarts wrote:
    Op 13.jul.2026 om 16:18 schreef Fred. Zwarts:
    Op 13.jul.2026 om 16:15 schreef Fred. Zwarts:
    Consider the sentence A: "Olcott's system is correct".
    Olcott has confirmed that he thinks that A is true.
    However, from what Olcott told us Olcott's system will reject this
    finite string A, because of a self-reference.
    According to the system, A has no truth value.
    So, Olcott and his system do not agree about the truth value of A.

    Olcott claims that his system will convince everybody about the truth.

    We now see ourselves confronted with the ultimate test of the
    strength of Olcott's system:
    Is the system strong enough to make Olcott change his opinion about
    A? Will he accept that we cannot say that A is true?

    If no.
    If even Olcott himself does accept the truth value of finite strings as
    does -> does not accept
    given by his own system, why would we believe that other people will
    change their opinion because of the output of the system?

    If yes.
    If Olcott accepts that we cannot say that A is true, i.e. that his
    system is correct, why would anyone change his opinion because of the
    output of this system?

    This means that Olcott's system is unmasked as semantic incoherence or outside of the body of knowledge.

    The system is not but the correctness is; and probably many other
    questions about the system, too.
    --
    Mikko
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  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Wed Jul 15 09:44:59 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 14/07/2026 21:15, olcott wrote:
    On 7/14/2026 2:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 13/07/2026 17:15, Fred. Zwarts wrote:
    Consider the sentence A: "Olcott's system is correct".
    Olcott has confirmed that he thinks that A is true.
    However, from what Olcott told us Olcott's system will reject this
    finite string A, because of a self-reference.
    According to the system, A has no truth value.
    So, Olcott and his system do not agree about the truth value of A.

    Olcott claims that his system will convince everybody about the truth.

    Olcott would include A as a basic fact. He might forget to tell the
    system that "Olcott's system" refers to the system itself and not to
    some other system.

    Olcott's system is inherently correct because
    it only includes the entire body of general
    knowledge.

    Considering that most of what is usually called "known" is actually
    uncertain or approximate, how large is the body of general knowledge?
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math on Wed Jul 15 10:01:45 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 7/15/2026 1:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 14/07/2026 21:15, olcott wrote:
    On 7/14/2026 2:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 13/07/2026 17:15, Fred. Zwarts wrote:
    Consider the sentence A: "Olcott's system is correct".
    Olcott has confirmed that he thinks that A is true.
    However, from what Olcott told us Olcott's system will reject this
    finite string A, because of a self-reference.
    According to the system, A has no truth value.
    So, Olcott and his system do not agree about the truth value of A.

    Olcott claims that his system will convince everybody about the truth.

    Olcott would include A as a basic fact. He might forget to tell the
    system that "Olcott's system" refers to the system itself and not to
    some other system.

    Olcott's system is inherently correct because
    it only includes the entire body of general
    knowledge.

    Considering that most of what is usually called "known" is actually
    uncertain or approximate, how large is the body of general knowledge?


    If it is not a verified fact then it is
    no kind of knowledge.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of general knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to sci.logic,comp.theory,sci.math on Thu Jul 16 08:56:28 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 15/07/2026 18:01, olcott wrote:
    On 7/15/2026 1:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 14/07/2026 21:15, olcott wrote:
    On 7/14/2026 2:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 13/07/2026 17:15, Fred. Zwarts wrote:
    Consider the sentence A: "Olcott's system is correct".
    Olcott has confirmed that he thinks that A is true.
    However, from what Olcott told us Olcott's system will reject this
    finite string A, because of a self-reference.
    According to the system, A has no truth value.
    So, Olcott and his system do not agree about the truth value of A.

    Olcott claims that his system will convince everybody about the truth. >>>>
    Olcott would include A as a basic fact. He might forget to tell the
    system that "Olcott's system" refers to the system itself and not to
    some other system.

    Olcott's system is inherently correct because
    it only includes the entire body of general
    knowledge.

    Considering that most of what is usually called "known" is actually
    uncertain or approximate, how large is the body of general knowledge?

    If it is not a verified fact then it is
    no kind of knowledge.

    Most people would consider "When a stone is released in air it will
    fall down" knowledge btu it is not actually verified as a universal
    truth. If you exlude all real world knowledge the usefulnes of your
    system is very much restricted.
    --
    Mikko
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