• PuTTY 0.84 is released

    From Simon Tatham@anakin@pobox.com to comp.security.ssh on Fri May 22 11:48:05 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.security.ssh

    PuTTY version 0.84 is released
    ------------------------------

    All the pre-built binaries, and the source code, are now available
    from the PuTTY website at

    https://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/

    0.84 fixes the following security vulnerabilities:

    - Previous versions of PuTTY can be made to crash during SSH
    connection startup, by a malicious server or a MITM attacker
    substituting malicious data in the initial SSH key exchange. Two
    different bugs allow the server to cause an assertion failure or a
    double-free crash.

    - If you use an old insecure connection protocol like Telnet, and
    connect through a proxy server that requires you to enter a
    password, then the whole Telnet connection was accidentally marked
    with the 'trust sigil' that distinguishes prompts from PuTTY itself
    from prompts sent by the server. This could conceivably have fooled
    a user into believing a malicious server's phony request for your
    proxy password.

    0.84 has some new features:

    - PuTTY now has the option to run a user-specified command before
    making its main network connection. You could use this, for
    example, to perform a port knock or other network operation that
    temporarily opens the port you want to connect to.

    - On Unix, PuTTY's terminal now supports displaying 'pre-edit text',
    showing what you have typed so far while you're entering a
    multi-key sequence that generates a single Unicode character.

    0.84 also has various bug fixes:

    - In the Unix version, you couldn't configure a certificate authority
    for certified host keys using the GUI, unless you had first
    manually created the directory where PuTTY stores the configuration.

    - Fixed spurious error "Network error: Socket is not connected" when
    connecting via an HTTP proxy that requires authentication.

    - On Windows, if you disable cursor blinking systemwide in Control
    Panel but have it turned on in PuTTY, PuTTY would blink the cursor
    frantically.

    - Improved support for running the Unix version on Wayland: pterm
    won't crash when trying to stamp utmp, and a sensible default font
    will be selected instead of complaining about trad X11 'fixed'
    being missing.
    --
    import hashlib; print((lambda p,q,g,y,r,s,m: (lambda w:(pow(g,int(hashlib.sha1( m.encode('ascii')).hexdigest(),16)*w%q,p)*pow(y,r*w%q,p)%p)%q)(pow(s,q-2,q))==r and s%q!=0 and m)(12342649995480866419, 2278082317364501, 1670428356600652640, 5398151833726432125, 645223105888478, 1916678356240619, "<anakin@pobox.com>")) --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Simon Tatham@anakin@pobox.com to comp.security.ssh on Sun Aug 16 14:13:18 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.security.ssh

    PuTTY version 0.85 is released
    ------------------------------

    This is a SECURITY UPDATE, fixing five recently reported
    vulnerabilities. None of them is _known_ to be severe, but at least
    one _potentially_ is. Apart from these updates and very minor bug
    fixes, 0.85 is the same as 0.84. We urge users to upgrade.

    All the pre-built binaries, and the source code, are now available
    from the PuTTY website at

    https://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/

    0.85 fixes the following security vulnerabilities:

    - A crash (potentially exploitable) in Pageant, if you loaded a key
    still encrypted, and then tried to use it (causing Pageant to
    prompt for the passphrase), and then another client of Pageant
    deleted the key before you answered the passphrase prompt.

    - A buffer overflow in the OpenSSH encrypt-then-MAC cipher modes
    (although PuTTY doesn't use those by default), triggered by a
    server sending the largest permitted size of packet.

    - A buffer overflow in decrypting a private key, if the private key
    was provided to you by a third party who was malicious. (If you
    always generate your own keys, you're safe.)

    - Two denials of service: a malicious SSH server could send PuTTY
    into a tight loop, and a legitimate server or a MITM could cause
    PuTTY to consume unlimited memory at the start of an SSH
    connection.

    Enjoy using PuTTY!
    --
    import hashlib; print((lambda p,q,g,y,r,s,m: (lambda w:(pow(g,int(hashlib.sha1( m.encode('ascii')).hexdigest(),16)*w%q,p)*pow(y,r*w%q,p)%p)%q)(pow(s,q-2,q))==r and s%q!=0 and m)(12342649995480866419, 2278082317364501, 1670428356600652640, 5398151833726432125, 645223105888478, 1916678356240619, "<anakin@pobox.com>")) --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2