• Proof Theoretic Semantics Blocks Pathological Self-Reference

    From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy,comp.lang.prolog on Fri Jan 16 11:47:53 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.lang.prolog

    The system uses proof-theoretic semantics, where the
    meaning of a statement is determined entirely by its
    inferential role within a theory. A theory T consists
    of a finite set of basic statements together with
    everything that can be derived from them using the
    inference rules. The statements derivable in this
    way are the theorems of T. A statement is true in
    T exactly when T proves it. A statement is false
    in T exactly when T proves its negation. Some
    statements are neither true nor false in T. These
    are the non-well-founded statements: statements
    whose inferential justification cannot be grounded
    in a finite, well-founded proof structure. This includes
    self-referential constructions such as G||del-type sentences.

    *Proof Theoretic Semantics Blocks Pathological Self-Reference* https://philpapers.org/archive/OLCPTS.pdf
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy,comp.lang.prolog on Fri Jan 16 13:52:34 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.lang.prolog

    On 1/16/26 12:47 PM, olcott wrote:
    The system uses proof-theoretic semantics, where the
    meaning of a statement is determined entirely by its
    inferential role within a theory. A theory T consists
    of a finite set of basic statements together with
    everything that can be derived from them using the
    inference rules. The statements derivable in this
    way are the theorems of T. A statement is true in
    T exactly when T proves it. A statement is false
    in T exactly when T proves its negation. Some
    statements are neither true nor false in T. These
    are the non-well-founded statements: statements
    whose inferential justification cannot be grounded
    in a finite, well-founded proof structure. This includes
    self-referential constructions such as G||del-type sentences.

    *Proof Theoretic Semantics Blocks Pathological Self-Reference* https://philpapers.org/archive/OLCPTS.pdf


    WHAT system?

    WHAT can you do in it?

    Can you actually prove that, or is it just more of your lies.

    Your problem is that you system is based on a criteria that matches your
    own definition of non-well-founded.

    It seems that for many of the system you want to talk about, it is non-well-founded if statements are in fact non-well-founded because you
    can't KNOW if a proof exists (but isn't known yet) of the statement or
    its negation.

    This collapse your whole system into a ball of meaningless unless you
    restrict it to "toy" level where you can prove if a proof can exist.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy,comp.lang.prolog on Fri Jan 16 13:16:00 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.lang.prolog

    On 1/16/2026 12:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 12:47 PM, olcott wrote:
    The system uses proof-theoretic semantics, where the
    meaning of a statement is determined entirely by its
    inferential role within a theory. A theory T consists
    of a finite set of basic statements together with
    everything that can be derived from them using the
    inference rules. The statements derivable in this
    way are the theorems of T. A statement is true in
    T exactly when T proves it. A statement is false
    in T exactly when T proves its negation. Some
    statements are neither true nor false in T. These
    are the non-well-founded statements: statements
    whose inferential justification cannot be grounded
    in a finite, well-founded proof structure. This includes
    self-referential constructions such as G||del-type sentences.

    *Proof Theoretic Semantics Blocks Pathological Self-Reference*
    https://philpapers.org/archive/OLCPTS.pdf


    WHAT system?

    WHAT can you do in it?

    Can you actually prove that, or is it just more of your lies.


    You have to actually read the paper.

    Your problem is that you system is based on a criteria that matches your
    own definition of non-well-founded.


    What does not well-founded mean in proof-theoretic semantics?

    In proofrCatheoretic semantics, a statement is not wellrCafounded when its justification cannot be grounded in a finite, wellrCastructured chain of inferential steps. It lacks a terminating, wellrCaordered proof tree that would normally establish its truth or falsity. This often happens with selfrCareferential or circular statements whose rCLproofsrCY loop back on themselves rather than bottoming out in basic axioms or introduction
    rules. // Copilot

    In proof-theoretic semantics, saying that something is rCLnot
    well-foundedrCY means that the structure used to define or justify
    meanings does not rest on a base case that is independent of itself.
    Instead, it involves circular or infinitely descending dependencies
    among rules or proofs. // ChatGPT

    In proof-theoretic semantics, not well-founded typically refers to
    derivations or proof structures that contain infinite descending chains
    or circular dependencies, violating the well-foundedness property.
    In classical proof theory, well-founded derivations have a clear
    hierarchical structure where every inference rule application depends
    only on "smaller" or "simpler" premises, eventually bottoming out in
    axioms or basic rules. This ensures that proofs are finitely
    constructible and verifiable. // Claude AI

    A set of introduction rules (definitional clauses) for an atom P is
    called well-founded if every chain of successive "definitions"
    (unfoldings) eventually terminates rCo i.e., there is no infinite
    descending chain of definitional dependencies.
    Intuitively:
    The meaning of P is ultimately grounded in basic facts or in logical
    structure after finitely many unfoldings. // Grok



    It seems that for many of the system you want to talk about, it is non- well-founded if statements are in fact non-well-founded because you
    can't KNOW if a proof exists (but isn't known yet) of the statement or
    its negation.

    This collapse your whole system into a ball of meaningless unless you restrict it to "toy" level where you can prove if a proof can exist.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy,comp.lang.prolog on Fri Jan 16 14:34:22 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.lang.prolog

    On 1/16/26 2:16 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 12:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 12:47 PM, olcott wrote:
    The system uses proof-theoretic semantics, where the
    meaning of a statement is determined entirely by its
    inferential role within a theory. A theory T consists
    of a finite set of basic statements together with
    everything that can be derived from them using the
    inference rules. The statements derivable in this
    way are the theorems of T. A statement is true in
    T exactly when T proves it. A statement is false
    in T exactly when T proves its negation. Some
    statements are neither true nor false in T. These
    are the non-well-founded statements: statements
    whose inferential justification cannot be grounded
    in a finite, well-founded proof structure. This includes
    self-referential constructions such as G||del-type sentences.

    *Proof Theoretic Semantics Blocks Pathological Self-Reference*
    https://philpapers.org/archive/OLCPTS.pdf


    WHAT system?

    WHAT can you do in it?

    Can you actually prove that, or is it just more of your lies.


    You have to actually read the paper.

    I did. Where do you actually define the initial axioms of your syste,/


    Your problem is that you system is based on a criteria that matches
    your own definition of non-well-founded.


    What does not well-founded mean in proof-theoretic semantics?

    So. how is your definition of the criteria to be non-well-founded not non-well-founded for some questions?

    Note, asking LLMs for a definition doesn't define it in your system.


    In proofrCatheoretic semantics, a statement is not wellrCafounded when its justification cannot be grounded in a finite, wellrCastructured chain of inferential steps. It lacks a terminating, wellrCaordered proof tree that would normally establish its truth or falsity. This often happens with selfrCareferential or circular statements whose rCLproofsrCY loop back on themselves rather than bottoming out in basic axioms or introduction
    rules. // Copilot

    In proof-theoretic semantics, saying that something is rCLnot well- foundedrCY means that the structure used to define or justify meanings
    does not rest on a base case that is independent of itself. Instead, it involves circular or infinitely descending dependencies among rules or proofs. // ChatGPT

    In proof-theoretic semantics, not well-founded typically refers to derivations or proof structures that contain infinite descending chains
    or circular dependencies, violating the well-foundedness property.
    In classical proof theory, well-founded derivations have a clear hierarchical structure where every inference rule application depends
    only on "smaller" or "simpler" premises, eventually bottoming out in
    axioms or basic rules. This ensures that proofs are finitely
    constructible and verifiable. // Claude AI

    A set of introduction rules (definitional clauses) for an atom P is
    called well-founded if every chain of successive
    "definitions" (unfoldings) eventually terminates rCo i.e., there is no infinite descending chain of definitional dependencies.
    Intuitively:
    The meaning of P is ultimately grounded in basic facts or in logical structure after finitely many unfoldings. // Grok



    And, thus, your "definition" of non-well-founded is non-well-founded in
    any system with even marginal complexity, if there can be a unbounded
    number of proofs that can be formed.

    Thus, your whole system is just non-well-founded, because it is based on
    a non-well-founded statement.


    It seems that for many of the system you want to talk about, it is
    non- well-founded if statements are in fact non-well-founded because
    you can't KNOW if a proof exists (but isn't known yet) of the
    statement or its negation.

    This collapse your whole system into a ball of meaningless unless you
    restrict it to "toy" level where you can prove if a proof can exist.



    As a simple example, is the Goldbach's conjecture a well-founded statement?

    To claim it is not-well-founded means, by the rules of proof-theoretic semantics, you are asserting that there is a proof of this claim. That
    proof says there must not be a proof of its negation, and thus there can
    not be a counter example of it, and thus it must be true. After all, all
    that is needed to prove the negation of the Goldbach's conjecture is to
    find one even number not representable as the sum of two primes. If you
    prove that there can't be one, then you have proven the statement.

    Your problem is you can't apply your system to anything that can do
    actual math, as mathematics is not compatible with your criteria.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy,comp.lang.prolog on Fri Jan 16 14:24:29 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.lang.prolog

    On 1/16/2026 1:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 2:16 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 12:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 12:47 PM, olcott wrote:
    The system uses proof-theoretic semantics, where the
    meaning of a statement is determined entirely by its
    inferential role within a theory. A theory T consists
    of a finite set of basic statements together with
    everything that can be derived from them using the
    inference rules. The statements derivable in this
    way are the theorems of T. A statement is true in
    T exactly when T proves it. A statement is false
    in T exactly when T proves its negation. Some
    statements are neither true nor false in T. These
    are the non-well-founded statements: statements
    whose inferential justification cannot be grounded
    in a finite, well-founded proof structure. This includes
    self-referential constructions such as G||del-type sentences.

    *Proof Theoretic Semantics Blocks Pathological Self-Reference*
    https://philpapers.org/archive/OLCPTS.pdf


    WHAT system?

    WHAT can you do in it?

    Can you actually prove that, or is it just more of your lies.


    You have to actually read the paper.

    I did. Where do you actually define the initial axioms of your syste,/


    Your problem is that you system is based on a criteria that matches
    your own definition of non-well-founded.


    What does not well-founded mean in proof-theoretic semantics?

    So. how is your definition of the criteria to be non-well-founded not non-well-founded for some questions?

    Note, asking LLMs for a definition doesn't define it in your system.


    In proofrCatheoretic semantics, a statement is not wellrCafounded when its >> justification cannot be grounded in a finite, wellrCastructured chain of
    inferential steps. It lacks a terminating, wellrCaordered proof tree
    that would normally establish its truth or falsity. This often happens
    with selfrCareferential or circular statements whose rCLproofsrCY loop back >> on themselves rather than bottoming out in basic axioms or
    introduction rules. // Copilot

    In proof-theoretic semantics, saying that something is rCLnot well-
    foundedrCY means that the structure used to define or justify meanings
    does not rest on a base case that is independent of itself. Instead,
    it involves circular or infinitely descending dependencies among rules
    or proofs. // ChatGPT

    In proof-theoretic semantics, not well-founded typically refers to
    derivations or proof structures that contain infinite descending
    chains or circular dependencies, violating the well-foundedness property.
    In classical proof theory, well-founded derivations have a clear
    hierarchical structure where every inference rule application depends
    only on "smaller" or "simpler" premises, eventually bottoming out in
    axioms or basic rules. This ensures that proofs are finitely
    constructible and verifiable. // Claude AI

    A set of introduction rules (definitional clauses) for an atom P is
    called well-founded if every chain of successive "definitions"
    (unfoldings) eventually terminates rCo i.e., there is no infinite
    descending chain of definitional dependencies.
    Intuitively:
    The meaning of P is ultimately grounded in basic facts or in logical
    structure after finitely many unfoldings. // Grok



    And, thus, your "definition" of non-well-founded

    Is the standard definition in truth theoretic semantics making
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.

    This includes expressing all of PA in a complete system.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy,comp.lang.prolog on Fri Jan 16 15:34:59 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.lang.prolog

    On 1/16/26 3:24 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 1:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 2:16 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 12:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 12:47 PM, olcott wrote:
    The system uses proof-theoretic semantics, where the
    meaning of a statement is determined entirely by its
    inferential role within a theory. A theory T consists
    of a finite set of basic statements together with
    everything that can be derived from them using the
    inference rules. The statements derivable in this
    way are the theorems of T. A statement is true in
    T exactly when T proves it. A statement is false
    in T exactly when T proves its negation. Some
    statements are neither true nor false in T. These
    are the non-well-founded statements: statements
    whose inferential justification cannot be grounded
    in a finite, well-founded proof structure. This includes
    self-referential constructions such as G||del-type sentences.

    *Proof Theoretic Semantics Blocks Pathological Self-Reference*
    https://philpapers.org/archive/OLCPTS.pdf


    WHAT system?

    WHAT can you do in it?

    Can you actually prove that, or is it just more of your lies.


    You have to actually read the paper.

    I did. Where do you actually define the initial axioms of your syste,/


    Your problem is that you system is based on a criteria that matches
    your own definition of non-well-founded.


    What does not well-founded mean in proof-theoretic semantics?

    So. how is your definition of the criteria to be non-well-founded not
    non-well-founded for some questions?

    Note, asking LLMs for a definition doesn't define it in your system.


    In proofrCatheoretic semantics, a statement is not wellrCafounded when
    its justification cannot be grounded in a finite, wellrCastructured
    chain of inferential steps. It lacks a terminating, wellrCaordered
    proof tree that would normally establish its truth or falsity. This
    often happens with selfrCareferential or circular statements whose
    rCLproofsrCY loop back on themselves rather than bottoming out in basic >>> axioms or introduction rules. // Copilot

    In proof-theoretic semantics, saying that something is rCLnot well-
    foundedrCY means that the structure used to define or justify meanings
    does not rest on a base case that is independent of itself. Instead,
    it involves circular or infinitely descending dependencies among
    rules or proofs. // ChatGPT

    In proof-theoretic semantics, not well-founded typically refers to
    derivations or proof structures that contain infinite descending
    chains or circular dependencies, violating the well-foundedness
    property.
    In classical proof theory, well-founded derivations have a clear
    hierarchical structure where every inference rule application depends
    only on "smaller" or "simpler" premises, eventually bottoming out in
    axioms or basic rules. This ensures that proofs are finitely
    constructible and verifiable. // Claude AI

    A set of introduction rules (definitional clauses) for an atom P is
    called well-founded if every chain of successive
    "definitions" (unfoldings) eventually terminates rCo i.e., there is no
    infinite descending chain of definitional dependencies.
    Intuitively:
    The meaning of P is ultimately grounded in basic facts or in logical
    structure after finitely many unfoldings. // Grok



    And, thus, your "definition" of non-well-founded

    Is the standard definition in truth theoretic semantics making
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.

    This includes expressing all of PA in a complete system.


    I think not.

    One problem you are going to run into is that this "entire body of
    knowledge" is itself not built on those semantics,

    It is a problem trying to process "knowledge" based on a different logic
    than the logic you are trying to process it.

    Also, part of our knowledge is about mathematics, which, for instance
    will assert that the Goldbach Conjecture is one of the great puzzles of mathematics, and must either be true or false, but that FACT is
    incompatible with proof-theoretic semantics, as mathematics can show
    that some true statements do not have proofs in the system.

    Thus, your system colapses in a contradiction that the statement might
    be not-well-founded, but that classification might be not-well-founded,
    and that determination may be not-well-founded, and so on, so your
    attempt to define you system runs into a possibly infinite loop of
    asking if we can even talk about the statement.

    If you disagree, it falls upon YOU to figure out how to handle that
    issue, you can't just assume it can be done.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy,comp.lang.prolog on Fri Jan 16 14:51:14 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.lang.prolog

    On 1/16/2026 2:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 3:24 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 1:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 2:16 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 12:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 12:47 PM, olcott wrote:
    The system uses proof-theoretic semantics, where the
    meaning of a statement is determined entirely by its
    inferential role within a theory. A theory T consists
    of a finite set of basic statements together with
    everything that can be derived from them using the
    inference rules. The statements derivable in this
    way are the theorems of T. A statement is true in
    T exactly when T proves it. A statement is false
    in T exactly when T proves its negation. Some
    statements are neither true nor false in T. These
    are the non-well-founded statements: statements
    whose inferential justification cannot be grounded
    in a finite, well-founded proof structure. This includes
    self-referential constructions such as G||del-type sentences.

    *Proof Theoretic Semantics Blocks Pathological Self-Reference*
    https://philpapers.org/archive/OLCPTS.pdf


    WHAT system?

    WHAT can you do in it?

    Can you actually prove that, or is it just more of your lies.


    You have to actually read the paper.

    I did. Where do you actually define the initial axioms of your syste,/


    Your problem is that you system is based on a criteria that matches >>>>> your own definition of non-well-founded.


    What does not well-founded mean in proof-theoretic semantics?

    So. how is your definition of the criteria to be non-well-founded not
    non-well-founded for some questions?

    Note, asking LLMs for a definition doesn't define it in your system.


    In proofrCatheoretic semantics, a statement is not wellrCafounded when >>>> its justification cannot be grounded in a finite, wellrCastructured
    chain of inferential steps. It lacks a terminating, wellrCaordered
    proof tree that would normally establish its truth or falsity. This
    often happens with selfrCareferential or circular statements whose
    rCLproofsrCY loop back on themselves rather than bottoming out in basic >>>> axioms or introduction rules. // Copilot

    In proof-theoretic semantics, saying that something is rCLnot well-
    foundedrCY means that the structure used to define or justify meanings >>>> does not rest on a base case that is independent of itself. Instead,
    it involves circular or infinitely descending dependencies among
    rules or proofs. // ChatGPT

    In proof-theoretic semantics, not well-founded typically refers to
    derivations or proof structures that contain infinite descending
    chains or circular dependencies, violating the well-foundedness
    property.
    In classical proof theory, well-founded derivations have a clear
    hierarchical structure where every inference rule application
    depends only on "smaller" or "simpler" premises, eventually
    bottoming out in axioms or basic rules. This ensures that proofs are
    finitely constructible and verifiable. // Claude AI

    A set of introduction rules (definitional clauses) for an atom P is
    called well-founded if every chain of successive "definitions"
    (unfoldings) eventually terminates rCo i.e., there is no infinite
    descending chain of definitional dependencies.
    Intuitively:
    The meaning of P is ultimately grounded in basic facts or in logical
    structure after finitely many unfoldings. // Grok



    And, thus, your "definition" of non-well-founded

    Is the standard definition in truth theoretic semantics making
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.

    This includes expressing all of PA in a complete system.


    I think not.

    One problem you are going to run into is that this "entire body of knowledge" is itself not built on those semantics,


    I knew that this would be philosophically too deep
    for you so I am using PA to build a bridge.

    It is a problem trying to process "knowledge" based on a different logic than the logic you are trying to process it.

    Also, part of our knowledge is about mathematics, which, for instance
    will assert that the Goldbach Conjecture is one of the great puzzles of mathematics, and must either be true or false, but that FACT is
    incompatible with proof-theoretic semantics, as mathematics can show
    that some true statements do not have proofs in the system.


    You seem to keep forgetting the specified domain
    is the body of knowledge that is
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"

    Thus, your system colapses in a contradiction that the statement might
    be not-well-founded, but that classification might be not-well-founded,
    and that determination may be not-well-founded, and so on, so your
    attempt to define you system runs into a possibly infinite loop of
    asking if we can even talk about the statement.


    My paper already explains all of the details of that.

    Proof Theoretic Semantics Blocks Pathological Self-Reference https://philpapers.org/archive/OLCPTS.pdf

    If you disagree, it falls upon YOU to figure out how to handle that
    issue, you can't just assume it can be done.

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy,comp.lang.prolog on Fri Jan 16 16:54:37 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.lang.prolog

    On 1/16/26 3:51 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 2:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 3:24 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 1:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 2:16 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 12:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 12:47 PM, olcott wrote:
    The system uses proof-theoretic semantics, where the
    meaning of a statement is determined entirely by its
    inferential role within a theory. A theory T consists
    of a finite set of basic statements together with
    everything that can be derived from them using the
    inference rules. The statements derivable in this
    way are the theorems of T. A statement is true in
    T exactly when T proves it. A statement is false
    in T exactly when T proves its negation. Some
    statements are neither true nor false in T. These
    are the non-well-founded statements: statements
    whose inferential justification cannot be grounded
    in a finite, well-founded proof structure. This includes
    self-referential constructions such as G||del-type sentences.

    *Proof Theoretic Semantics Blocks Pathological Self-Reference*
    https://philpapers.org/archive/OLCPTS.pdf


    WHAT system?

    WHAT can you do in it?

    Can you actually prove that, or is it just more of your lies.


    You have to actually read the paper.

    I did. Where do you actually define the initial axioms of your syste,/ >>>>

    Your problem is that you system is based on a criteria that
    matches your own definition of non-well-founded.


    What does not well-founded mean in proof-theoretic semantics?

    So. how is your definition of the criteria to be non-well-founded
    not non-well-founded for some questions?

    Note, asking LLMs for a definition doesn't define it in your system.


    In proofrCatheoretic semantics, a statement is not wellrCafounded when >>>>> its justification cannot be grounded in a finite, wellrCastructured >>>>> chain of inferential steps. It lacks a terminating, wellrCaordered
    proof tree that would normally establish its truth or falsity. This >>>>> often happens with selfrCareferential or circular statements whose
    rCLproofsrCY loop back on themselves rather than bottoming out in basic >>>>> axioms or introduction rules. // Copilot

    In proof-theoretic semantics, saying that something is rCLnot well- >>>>> foundedrCY means that the structure used to define or justify
    meanings does not rest on a base case that is independent of
    itself. Instead, it involves circular or infinitely descending
    dependencies among rules or proofs. // ChatGPT

    In proof-theoretic semantics, not well-founded typically refers to
    derivations or proof structures that contain infinite descending
    chains or circular dependencies, violating the well-foundedness
    property.
    In classical proof theory, well-founded derivations have a clear
    hierarchical structure where every inference rule application
    depends only on "smaller" or "simpler" premises, eventually
    bottoming out in axioms or basic rules. This ensures that proofs
    are finitely constructible and verifiable. // Claude AI

    A set of introduction rules (definitional clauses) for an atom P is >>>>> called well-founded if every chain of successive
    "definitions" (unfoldings) eventually terminates rCo i.e., there is >>>>> no infinite descending chain of definitional dependencies.
    Intuitively:
    The meaning of P is ultimately grounded in basic facts or in
    logical structure after finitely many unfoldings. // Grok



    And, thus, your "definition" of non-well-founded

    Is the standard definition in truth theoretic semantics making
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.

    This includes expressing all of PA in a complete system.


    I think not.

    One problem you are going to run into is that this "entire body of
    knowledge" is itself not built on those semantics,


    I knew that this would be philosophically too deep
    for you so I am using PA to build a bridge.

    It is a problem trying to process "knowledge" based on a different
    logic than the logic you are trying to process it.

    Also, part of our knowledge is about mathematics, which, for instance
    will assert that the Goldbach Conjecture is one of the great puzzles
    of mathematics, and must either be true or false, but that FACT is
    incompatible with proof-theoretic semantics, as mathematics can show
    that some true statements do not have proofs in the system.


    You seem to keep forgetting the specified domain
    is the body of knowledge that is
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"

    Which means NOTHING about the real world, only man's own classification
    of things.

    So, it can't talk about things like Global Warming, or f the Earth is Round.


    Thus, your system colapses in a contradiction that the statement might
    be not-well-founded, but that classification might be not-well-
    founded, and that determination may be not-well-founded, and so on, so
    your attempt to define you system runs into a possibly infinite loop
    of asking if we can even talk about the statement.


    My paper already explains all of the details of that.

    Proof Theoretic Semantics Blocks Pathological Self-Reference https://philpapers.org/archive/OLCPTS.pdf

    WHERE???

    You have a less than one page prompt that defines what you are thinking of.

    Everything after that is LLM garbage making comments of what you said.

    I guess you are building a theory of nothing.

    You are trying to define what is "true", but not a system that it works
    in, which means you haven't actually shown it can do anything.

    You are talking Philosophy, not Formal Logic.



    If you disagree, it falls upon YOU to figure out how to handle that
    issue, you can't just assume it can be done.




    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy,comp.lang.prolog on Fri Jan 16 16:09:54 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.lang.prolog

    On 1/16/2026 3:54 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 3:51 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 2:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 3:24 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 1:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 2:16 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 12:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 12:47 PM, olcott wrote:
    The system uses proof-theoretic semantics, where the
    meaning of a statement is determined entirely by its
    inferential role within a theory. A theory T consists
    of a finite set of basic statements together with
    everything that can be derived from them using the
    inference rules. The statements derivable in this
    way are the theorems of T. A statement is true in
    T exactly when T proves it. A statement is false
    in T exactly when T proves its negation. Some
    statements are neither true nor false in T. These
    are the non-well-founded statements: statements
    whose inferential justification cannot be grounded
    in a finite, well-founded proof structure. This includes
    self-referential constructions such as G||del-type sentences.

    *Proof Theoretic Semantics Blocks Pathological Self-Reference* >>>>>>>> https://philpapers.org/archive/OLCPTS.pdf


    WHAT system?

    WHAT can you do in it?

    Can you actually prove that, or is it just more of your lies.


    You have to actually read the paper.

    I did. Where do you actually define the initial axioms of your syste,/ >>>>>

    Your problem is that you system is based on a criteria that
    matches your own definition of non-well-founded.


    What does not well-founded mean in proof-theoretic semantics?

    So. how is your definition of the criteria to be non-well-founded
    not non-well-founded for some questions?

    Note, asking LLMs for a definition doesn't define it in your system. >>>>>

    In proofrCatheoretic semantics, a statement is not wellrCafounded when >>>>>> its justification cannot be grounded in a finite, wellrCastructured >>>>>> chain of inferential steps. It lacks a terminating, wellrCaordered >>>>>> proof tree that would normally establish its truth or falsity.
    This often happens with selfrCareferential or circular statements >>>>>> whose rCLproofsrCY loop back on themselves rather than bottoming out >>>>>> in basic axioms or introduction rules. // Copilot

    In proof-theoretic semantics, saying that something is rCLnot well- >>>>>> foundedrCY means that the structure used to define or justify
    meanings does not rest on a base case that is independent of
    itself. Instead, it involves circular or infinitely descending
    dependencies among rules or proofs. // ChatGPT

    In proof-theoretic semantics, not well-founded typically refers to >>>>>> derivations or proof structures that contain infinite descending
    chains or circular dependencies, violating the well-foundedness
    property.
    In classical proof theory, well-founded derivations have a clear
    hierarchical structure where every inference rule application
    depends only on "smaller" or "simpler" premises, eventually
    bottoming out in axioms or basic rules. This ensures that proofs
    are finitely constructible and verifiable. // Claude AI

    A set of introduction rules (definitional clauses) for an atom P
    is called well-founded if every chain of successive "definitions" >>>>>> (unfoldings) eventually terminates rCo i.e., there is no infinite >>>>>> descending chain of definitional dependencies.
    Intuitively:
    The meaning of P is ultimately grounded in basic facts or in
    logical structure after finitely many unfoldings. // Grok



    And, thus, your "definition" of non-well-founded

    Is the standard definition in truth theoretic semantics making
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.

    This includes expressing all of PA in a complete system.


    I think not.

    One problem you are going to run into is that this "entire body of
    knowledge" is itself not built on those semantics,


    I knew that this would be philosophically too deep
    for you so I am using PA to build a bridge.

    It is a problem trying to process "knowledge" based on a different
    logic than the logic you are trying to process it.

    Also, part of our knowledge is about mathematics, which, for instance
    will assert that the Goldbach Conjecture is one of the great puzzles
    of mathematics, and must either be true or false, but that FACT is
    incompatible with proof-theoretic semantics, as mathematics can show
    that some true statements do not have proofs in the system.


    You seem to keep forgetting the specified domain
    is the body of knowledge that is
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"

    Which means NOTHING about the real world, only man's own classification
    of things.


    When viewed within proof theoretic semantics it
    specifies a precisely defined and coherent set
    that shows all of the details of exactly how
    conventional logic diverges from correct reasoning.

    We do not get the psychotic nonsense that
    (A & ~A) Proves that Donald Trump is Jesus the Christ.

    the principle of explosion is the law according to
    which any statement can be proven from a contradiction.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion

    *Proof Theoretic Semantics Blocks Pathological Self-Reference* https://philpapers.org/archive/OLCPTS.pdf
    Furthermore all undecidability and incompleteness is blocked.

    So, it can't talk about things like Global Warming, or f the Earth is
    Round.


    Thus, your system colapses in a contradiction that the statement
    might be not-well-founded, but that classification might be not-well-
    founded, and that determination may be not-well-founded, and so on,
    so your attempt to define you system runs into a possibly infinite
    loop of asking if we can even talk about the statement.


    My paper already explains all of the details of that.

    Proof Theoretic Semantics Blocks Pathological Self-Reference
    https://philpapers.org/archive/OLCPTS.pdf

    WHERE???

    You have a less than one page prompt that defines what you are thinking of.

    Everything after that is LLM garbage making comments of what you said.

    I guess you are building a theory of nothing.

    You are trying to define what is "true", but not a system that it works
    in, which means you haven't actually shown it can do anything.

    You are talking Philosophy, not Formal Logic.



    If you disagree, it falls upon YOU to figure out how to handle that
    issue, you can't just assume it can be done.




    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy,comp.lang.prolog on Fri Jan 16 18:21:07 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.lang.prolog

    On 1/16/26 5:09 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 3:54 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 3:51 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 2:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 3:24 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 1:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 2:16 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 12:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 12:47 PM, olcott wrote:
    The system uses proof-theoretic semantics, where the
    meaning of a statement is determined entirely by its
    inferential role within a theory. A theory T consists
    of a finite set of basic statements together with
    everything that can be derived from them using the
    inference rules. The statements derivable in this
    way are the theorems of T. A statement is true in
    T exactly when T proves it. A statement is false
    in T exactly when T proves its negation. Some
    statements are neither true nor false in T. These
    are the non-well-founded statements: statements
    whose inferential justification cannot be grounded
    in a finite, well-founded proof structure. This includes
    self-referential constructions such as G||del-type sentences. >>>>>>>>>
    *Proof Theoretic Semantics Blocks Pathological Self-Reference* >>>>>>>>> https://philpapers.org/archive/OLCPTS.pdf


    WHAT system?

    WHAT can you do in it?

    Can you actually prove that, or is it just more of your lies.


    You have to actually read the paper.

    I did. Where do you actually define the initial axioms of your
    syste,/


    Your problem is that you system is based on a criteria that
    matches your own definition of non-well-founded.


    What does not well-founded mean in proof-theoretic semantics?

    So. how is your definition of the criteria to be non-well-founded >>>>>> not non-well-founded for some questions?

    Note, asking LLMs for a definition doesn't define it in your system. >>>>>>

    In proofrCatheoretic semantics, a statement is not wellrCafounded >>>>>>> when its justification cannot be grounded in a finite,
    wellrCastructured chain of inferential steps. It lacks a
    terminating, wellrCaordered proof tree that would normally
    establish its truth or falsity. This often happens with
    selfrCareferential or circular statements whose rCLproofsrCY loop back >>>>>>> on themselves rather than bottoming out in basic axioms or
    introduction rules. // Copilot

    In proof-theoretic semantics, saying that something is rCLnot well- >>>>>>> foundedrCY means that the structure used to define or justify
    meanings does not rest on a base case that is independent of
    itself. Instead, it involves circular or infinitely descending
    dependencies among rules or proofs. // ChatGPT

    In proof-theoretic semantics, not well-founded typically refers >>>>>>> to derivations or proof structures that contain infinite
    descending chains or circular dependencies, violating the well- >>>>>>> foundedness property.
    In classical proof theory, well-founded derivations have a clear >>>>>>> hierarchical structure where every inference rule application
    depends only on "smaller" or "simpler" premises, eventually
    bottoming out in axioms or basic rules. This ensures that proofs >>>>>>> are finitely constructible and verifiable. // Claude AI

    A set of introduction rules (definitional clauses) for an atom P >>>>>>> is called well-founded if every chain of successive
    "definitions" (unfoldings) eventually terminates rCo i.e., there is >>>>>>> no infinite descending chain of definitional dependencies.
    Intuitively:
    The meaning of P is ultimately grounded in basic facts or in
    logical structure after finitely many unfoldings. // Grok



    And, thus, your "definition" of non-well-founded

    Is the standard definition in truth theoretic semantics making
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.

    This includes expressing all of PA in a complete system.


    I think not.

    One problem you are going to run into is that this "entire body of
    knowledge" is itself not built on those semantics,


    I knew that this would be philosophically too deep
    for you so I am using PA to build a bridge.

    It is a problem trying to process "knowledge" based on a different
    logic than the logic you are trying to process it.

    Also, part of our knowledge is about mathematics, which, for
    instance will assert that the Goldbach Conjecture is one of the
    great puzzles of mathematics, and must either be true or false, but
    that FACT is incompatible with proof-theoretic semantics, as
    mathematics can show that some true statements do not have proofs in
    the system.


    You seem to keep forgetting the specified domain
    is the body of knowledge that is
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"

    Which means NOTHING about the real world, only man's own
    classification of things.


    When viewed within proof theoretic semantics it
    specifies a precisely defined and coherent set
    that shows all of the details of exactly how
    conventional logic diverges from correct reasoning.

    No, it shows how your concept of "correct reasoning" is just defective.


    We do not get the psychotic nonsense that
    (A & ~A) Proves that Donald Trump is Jesus the Christ.

    Which only happens in incoherent systems like yours.


    the principle of explosion is the law according to
    which any statement can be proven from a contradiction.

    No, it says that if a systems says that a contradiction can be proven
    true, then you can prove anything you want in the system.

    Remember, a PROOF must be based on true statements. Thus to prove
    something from a contradiction means the contradiction must have first
    been proven to be true (in the system).


    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion

    *Proof Theoretic Semantics Blocks Pathological Self-Reference* https://philpapers.org/archive/OLCPTS.pdf
    Furthermore all undecidability and incompleteness is blocked.

    Nope, A Proof Theoretic Semantic system will still explode if it can
    prove a contradiction.

    The proof of the law of the principle of explosion works in
    Proof-Theoretic Semantics.


    So, it can't talk about things like Global Warming, or f the Earth is
    Round.


    Thus, your system colapses in a contradiction that the statement
    might be not-well-founded, but that classification might be not-
    well- founded, and that determination may be not-well-founded, and
    so on, so your attempt to define you system runs into a possibly
    infinite loop of asking if we can even talk about the statement.


    My paper already explains all of the details of that.

    Proof Theoretic Semantics Blocks Pathological Self-Reference
    https://philpapers.org/archive/OLCPTS.pdf

    WHERE???

    You have a less than one page prompt that defines what you are
    thinking of.

    Everything after that is LLM garbage making comments of what you said.

    I guess you are building a theory of nothing.

    You are trying to define what is "true", but not a system that it
    works in, which means you haven't actually shown it can do anything.

    You are talking Philosophy, not Formal Logic.



    If you disagree, it falls upon YOU to figure out how to handle that
    issue, you can't just assume it can be done.







    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy,comp.lang.prolog on Fri Jan 16 19:23:29 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.lang.prolog

    On 1/16/2026 5:21 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 5:09 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 3:54 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 3:51 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 2:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 3:24 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 1:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 2:16 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 12:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 12:47 PM, olcott wrote:
    The system uses proof-theoretic semantics, where the
    meaning of a statement is determined entirely by its
    inferential role within a theory. A theory T consists
    of a finite set of basic statements together with
    everything that can be derived from them using the
    inference rules. The statements derivable in this
    way are the theorems of T. A statement is true in
    T exactly when T proves it. A statement is false
    in T exactly when T proves its negation. Some
    statements are neither true nor false in T. These
    are the non-well-founded statements: statements
    whose inferential justification cannot be grounded
    in a finite, well-founded proof structure. This includes
    self-referential constructions such as G||del-type sentences. >>>>>>>>>>
    *Proof Theoretic Semantics Blocks Pathological Self-Reference* >>>>>>>>>> https://philpapers.org/archive/OLCPTS.pdf


    WHAT system?

    WHAT can you do in it?

    Can you actually prove that, or is it just more of your lies. >>>>>>>>>

    You have to actually read the paper.

    I did. Where do you actually define the initial axioms of your
    syste,/


    Your problem is that you system is based on a criteria that >>>>>>>>> matches your own definition of non-well-founded.


    What does not well-founded mean in proof-theoretic semantics?

    So. how is your definition of the criteria to be non-well-founded >>>>>>> not non-well-founded for some questions?

    Note, asking LLMs for a definition doesn't define it in your system. >>>>>>>

    In proofrCatheoretic semantics, a statement is not wellrCafounded >>>>>>>> when its justification cannot be grounded in a finite,
    wellrCastructured chain of inferential steps. It lacks a
    terminating, wellrCaordered proof tree that would normally
    establish its truth or falsity. This often happens with
    selfrCareferential or circular statements whose rCLproofsrCY loop back
    on themselves rather than bottoming out in basic axioms or
    introduction rules. // Copilot

    In proof-theoretic semantics, saying that something is rCLnot >>>>>>>> well- foundedrCY means that the structure used to define or
    justify meanings does not rest on a base case that is
    independent of itself. Instead, it involves circular or
    infinitely descending dependencies among rules or proofs. //
    ChatGPT

    In proof-theoretic semantics, not well-founded typically refers >>>>>>>> to derivations or proof structures that contain infinite
    descending chains or circular dependencies, violating the well- >>>>>>>> foundedness property.
    In classical proof theory, well-founded derivations have a clear >>>>>>>> hierarchical structure where every inference rule application >>>>>>>> depends only on "smaller" or "simpler" premises, eventually
    bottoming out in axioms or basic rules. This ensures that proofs >>>>>>>> are finitely constructible and verifiable. // Claude AI

    A set of introduction rules (definitional clauses) for an atom P >>>>>>>> is called well-founded if every chain of successive
    "definitions" (unfoldings) eventually terminates rCo i.e., there >>>>>>>> is no infinite descending chain of definitional dependencies.
    Intuitively:
    The meaning of P is ultimately grounded in basic facts or in
    logical structure after finitely many unfoldings. // Grok



    And, thus, your "definition" of non-well-founded

    Is the standard definition in truth theoretic semantics making
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.

    This includes expressing all of PA in a complete system.


    I think not.

    One problem you are going to run into is that this "entire body of
    knowledge" is itself not built on those semantics,


    I knew that this would be philosophically too deep
    for you so I am using PA to build a bridge.

    It is a problem trying to process "knowledge" based on a different
    logic than the logic you are trying to process it.

    Also, part of our knowledge is about mathematics, which, for
    instance will assert that the Goldbach Conjecture is one of the
    great puzzles of mathematics, and must either be true or false, but >>>>> that FACT is incompatible with proof-theoretic semantics, as
    mathematics can show that some true statements do not have proofs
    in the system.


    You seem to keep forgetting the specified domain
    is the body of knowledge that is
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"

    Which means NOTHING about the real world, only man's own
    classification of things.


    When viewed within proof theoretic semantics it
    specifies a precisely defined and coherent set
    that shows all of the details of exactly how
    conventional logic diverges from correct reasoning.

    No, it shows how your concept of "correct reasoning" is just defective.


    We do not get the psychotic nonsense that
    (A & ~A) Proves that Donald Trump is Jesus the Christ.

    Which only happens in incoherent systems like yours.


    the principle of explosion is the law according to
    which any statement can be proven from a contradiction.

    No, it says that if a systems says that a contradiction can be proven
    true, then you can prove anything you want in the system.


    I quoted the words that it said sheep dip !!!

    Remember, a PROOF must be based on true statements. Thus to prove
    something from a contradiction means the contradiction must have first
    been proven to be true (in the system).


    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion

    *Proof Theoretic Semantics Blocks Pathological Self-Reference*
    https://philpapers.org/archive/OLCPTS.pdf
    Furthermore all undecidability and incompleteness is blocked.

    Nope, A Proof Theoretic Semantic system will still explode if it can
    prove a contradiction.

    The proof of the law of the principle of explosion works in Proof-
    Theoretic Semantics.


    No sheep dip it does not.

    When we merely assume the axioms of a proof-theoretic
    formal system are PA then incompleteness goes away
    for PA.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy,comp.lang.prolog on Fri Jan 16 19:27:55 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.lang.prolog

    On 1/16/2026 5:21 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 5:09 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 3:54 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 3:51 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 2:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 3:24 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 1:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 2:16 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 12:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 12:47 PM, olcott wrote:
    The system uses proof-theoretic semantics, where the
    meaning of a statement is determined entirely by its
    inferential role within a theory. A theory T consists
    of a finite set of basic statements together with
    everything that can be derived from them using the
    inference rules. The statements derivable in this
    way are the theorems of T. A statement is true in
    T exactly when T proves it. A statement is false
    in T exactly when T proves its negation. Some
    statements are neither true nor false in T. These
    are the non-well-founded statements: statements
    whose inferential justification cannot be grounded
    in a finite, well-founded proof structure. This includes
    self-referential constructions such as G||del-type sentences. >>>>>>>>>>
    *Proof Theoretic Semantics Blocks Pathological Self-Reference* >>>>>>>>>> https://philpapers.org/archive/OLCPTS.pdf


    WHAT system?

    WHAT can you do in it?

    Can you actually prove that, or is it just more of your lies. >>>>>>>>>

    You have to actually read the paper.

    I did. Where do you actually define the initial axioms of your
    syste,/


    Your problem is that you system is based on a criteria that >>>>>>>>> matches your own definition of non-well-founded.


    What does not well-founded mean in proof-theoretic semantics?

    So. how is your definition of the criteria to be non-well-founded >>>>>>> not non-well-founded for some questions?

    Note, asking LLMs for a definition doesn't define it in your system. >>>>>>>

    In proofrCatheoretic semantics, a statement is not wellrCafounded >>>>>>>> when its justification cannot be grounded in a finite,
    wellrCastructured chain of inferential steps. It lacks a
    terminating, wellrCaordered proof tree that would normally
    establish its truth or falsity. This often happens with
    selfrCareferential or circular statements whose rCLproofsrCY loop back
    on themselves rather than bottoming out in basic axioms or
    introduction rules. // Copilot

    In proof-theoretic semantics, saying that something is rCLnot >>>>>>>> well- foundedrCY means that the structure used to define or
    justify meanings does not rest on a base case that is
    independent of itself. Instead, it involves circular or
    infinitely descending dependencies among rules or proofs. //
    ChatGPT

    In proof-theoretic semantics, not well-founded typically refers >>>>>>>> to derivations or proof structures that contain infinite
    descending chains or circular dependencies, violating the well- >>>>>>>> foundedness property.
    In classical proof theory, well-founded derivations have a clear >>>>>>>> hierarchical structure where every inference rule application >>>>>>>> depends only on "smaller" or "simpler" premises, eventually
    bottoming out in axioms or basic rules. This ensures that proofs >>>>>>>> are finitely constructible and verifiable. // Claude AI

    A set of introduction rules (definitional clauses) for an atom P >>>>>>>> is called well-founded if every chain of successive
    "definitions" (unfoldings) eventually terminates rCo i.e., there >>>>>>>> is no infinite descending chain of definitional dependencies.
    Intuitively:
    The meaning of P is ultimately grounded in basic facts or in
    logical structure after finitely many unfoldings. // Grok



    And, thus, your "definition" of non-well-founded

    Is the standard definition in truth theoretic semantics making
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.

    This includes expressing all of PA in a complete system.


    I think not.

    One problem you are going to run into is that this "entire body of
    knowledge" is itself not built on those semantics,


    I knew that this would be philosophically too deep
    for you so I am using PA to build a bridge.

    It is a problem trying to process "knowledge" based on a different
    logic than the logic you are trying to process it.

    Also, part of our knowledge is about mathematics, which, for
    instance will assert that the Goldbach Conjecture is one of the
    great puzzles of mathematics, and must either be true or false, but >>>>> that FACT is incompatible with proof-theoretic semantics, as
    mathematics can show that some true statements do not have proofs
    in the system.


    You seem to keep forgetting the specified domain
    is the body of knowledge that is
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"

    Which means NOTHING about the real world, only man's own
    classification of things.


    When viewed within proof theoretic semantics it
    specifies a precisely defined and coherent set
    that shows all of the details of exactly how
    conventional logic diverges from correct reasoning.

    No, it shows how your concept of "correct reasoning" is just defective.


    A sentence is meaningful only if its justification graph
    is wellrCafounded. A wellrCafounded graph always has a terminating
    evaluation. Truth is defined as the result of that terminating
    evaluation. Any sentence whose justification graph is
    nonrCawellrCafounded has no terminating evaluation, so it is
    not meaningful and not truthrCaapt. Therefore truth is total
    and computable over the meaningful fragment.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy,comp.lang.prolog on Fri Jan 16 22:24:17 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.lang.prolog

    On 1/16/26 8:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 5:21 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 5:09 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 3:54 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 3:51 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 2:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 3:24 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 1:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 2:16 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 12:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 12:47 PM, olcott wrote:
    The system uses proof-theoretic semantics, where the
    meaning of a statement is determined entirely by its
    inferential role within a theory. A theory T consists
    of a finite set of basic statements together with
    everything that can be derived from them using the
    inference rules. The statements derivable in this
    way are the theorems of T. A statement is true in
    T exactly when T proves it. A statement is false
    in T exactly when T proves its negation. Some
    statements are neither true nor false in T. These
    are the non-well-founded statements: statements
    whose inferential justification cannot be grounded
    in a finite, well-founded proof structure. This includes >>>>>>>>>>> self-referential constructions such as G||del-type sentences. >>>>>>>>>>>
    *Proof Theoretic Semantics Blocks Pathological Self-Reference* >>>>>>>>>>> https://philpapers.org/archive/OLCPTS.pdf


    WHAT system?

    WHAT can you do in it?

    Can you actually prove that, or is it just more of your lies. >>>>>>>>>>

    You have to actually read the paper.

    I did. Where do you actually define the initial axioms of your >>>>>>>> syste,/


    Your problem is that you system is based on a criteria that >>>>>>>>>> matches your own definition of non-well-founded.


    What does not well-founded mean in proof-theoretic semantics? >>>>>>>>
    So. how is your definition of the criteria to be non-well-
    founded not non-well-founded for some questions?

    Note, asking LLMs for a definition doesn't define it in your
    system.


    In proofrCatheoretic semantics, a statement is not wellrCafounded >>>>>>>>> when its justification cannot be grounded in a finite,
    wellrCastructured chain of inferential steps. It lacks a
    terminating, wellrCaordered proof tree that would normally
    establish its truth or falsity. This often happens with
    selfrCareferential or circular statements whose rCLproofsrCY loop >>>>>>>>> back on themselves rather than bottoming out in basic axioms or >>>>>>>>> introduction rules. // Copilot

    In proof-theoretic semantics, saying that something is rCLnot >>>>>>>>> well- foundedrCY means that the structure used to define or >>>>>>>>> justify meanings does not rest on a base case that is
    independent of itself. Instead, it involves circular or
    infinitely descending dependencies among rules or proofs. // >>>>>>>>> ChatGPT

    In proof-theoretic semantics, not well-founded typically refers >>>>>>>>> to derivations or proof structures that contain infinite
    descending chains or circular dependencies, violating the well- >>>>>>>>> foundedness property.
    In classical proof theory, well-founded derivations have a
    clear hierarchical structure where every inference rule
    application depends only on "smaller" or "simpler" premises, >>>>>>>>> eventually bottoming out in axioms or basic rules. This ensures >>>>>>>>> that proofs are finitely constructible and verifiable. //
    Claude AI

    A set of introduction rules (definitional clauses) for an atom >>>>>>>>> P is called well-founded if every chain of successive
    "definitions" (unfoldings) eventually terminates rCo i.e., there >>>>>>>>> is no infinite descending chain of definitional dependencies. >>>>>>>>> Intuitively:
    The meaning of P is ultimately grounded in basic facts or in >>>>>>>>> logical structure after finitely many unfoldings. // Grok



    And, thus, your "definition" of non-well-founded

    Is the standard definition in truth theoretic semantics making
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.

    This includes expressing all of PA in a complete system.


    I think not.

    One problem you are going to run into is that this "entire body of >>>>>> knowledge" is itself not built on those semantics,


    I knew that this would be philosophically too deep
    for you so I am using PA to build a bridge.

    It is a problem trying to process "knowledge" based on a different >>>>>> logic than the logic you are trying to process it.

    Also, part of our knowledge is about mathematics, which, for
    instance will assert that the Goldbach Conjecture is one of the
    great puzzles of mathematics, and must either be true or false,
    but that FACT is incompatible with proof-theoretic semantics, as
    mathematics can show that some true statements do not have proofs >>>>>> in the system.


    You seem to keep forgetting the specified domain
    is the body of knowledge that is
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"

    Which means NOTHING about the real world, only man's own
    classification of things.


    When viewed within proof theoretic semantics it
    specifies a precisely defined and coherent set
    that shows all of the details of exactly how
    conventional logic diverges from correct reasoning.

    No, it shows how your concept of "correct reasoning" is just defective.


    We do not get the psychotic nonsense that
    (A & ~A) Proves that Donald Trump is Jesus the Christ.

    Which only happens in incoherent systems like yours.


    the principle of explosion is the law according to
    which any statement can be proven from a contradiction.

    No, it says that if a systems says that a contradiction can be proven
    true, then you can prove anything you want in the system.


    I quoted the words that it said sheep dip !!!

    No, you misinterpreted the words. You forget that to PROVE something,
    you need to start from KNOWN TRUTHS.

    So, if we KNOW in the system that the contradction is true, then we can
    do what you claim.

    Otherwise, it is just unsound logic.

    After all, if 1 + 2 = 20 then you are a genius.

    But, since 1 + 2 isn't 20, then you are not shown to be a genius.


    Remember, a PROOF must be based on true statements. Thus to prove
    something from a contradiction means the contradiction must have first
    been proven to be true (in the system).


    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion

    *Proof Theoretic Semantics Blocks Pathological Self-Reference*
    https://philpapers.org/archive/OLCPTS.pdf
    Furthermore all undecidability and incompleteness is blocked.

    Nope, A Proof Theoretic Semantic system will still explode if it can
    prove a contradiction.

    The proof of the law of the principle of explosion works in Proof-
    Theoretic Semantics.


    No sheep dip it does not.

    When we merely assume the axioms of a proof-theoretic
    formal system are PA then incompleteness goes away
    for PA.


    Nope, Your system becomes inconsistant, and incompleteness is only
    defined for consistent systems.

    You logic is like assuming the moon is made of green cheese, and then
    showing that we could just go there to live, as we have the food
    supplies we need to live.

    Your problem is that in logic, you aren't allowed to just "assume"
    things. The fact that you keep on talking that way shows that you just
    lve in a fantasy world that doesn't connect to reality.

    Your "Logic" is just built on lying and being inconsistant.

    Thus, nothing you claim means anything, as you have shown you don't knwo
    what things actually mean.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy,comp.lang.prolog on Fri Jan 16 22:24:19 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.lang.prolog

    On 1/16/26 8:27 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 5:21 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 5:09 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 3:54 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 3:51 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 2:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 3:24 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 1:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 2:16 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 12:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 12:47 PM, olcott wrote:
    The system uses proof-theoretic semantics, where the
    meaning of a statement is determined entirely by its
    inferential role within a theory. A theory T consists
    of a finite set of basic statements together with
    everything that can be derived from them using the
    inference rules. The statements derivable in this
    way are the theorems of T. A statement is true in
    T exactly when T proves it. A statement is false
    in T exactly when T proves its negation. Some
    statements are neither true nor false in T. These
    are the non-well-founded statements: statements
    whose inferential justification cannot be grounded
    in a finite, well-founded proof structure. This includes >>>>>>>>>>> self-referential constructions such as G||del-type sentences. >>>>>>>>>>>
    *Proof Theoretic Semantics Blocks Pathological Self-Reference* >>>>>>>>>>> https://philpapers.org/archive/OLCPTS.pdf


    WHAT system?

    WHAT can you do in it?

    Can you actually prove that, or is it just more of your lies. >>>>>>>>>>

    You have to actually read the paper.

    I did. Where do you actually define the initial axioms of your >>>>>>>> syste,/


    Your problem is that you system is based on a criteria that >>>>>>>>>> matches your own definition of non-well-founded.


    What does not well-founded mean in proof-theoretic semantics? >>>>>>>>
    So. how is your definition of the criteria to be non-well-
    founded not non-well-founded for some questions?

    Note, asking LLMs for a definition doesn't define it in your
    system.


    In proofrCatheoretic semantics, a statement is not wellrCafounded >>>>>>>>> when its justification cannot be grounded in a finite,
    wellrCastructured chain of inferential steps. It lacks a
    terminating, wellrCaordered proof tree that would normally
    establish its truth or falsity. This often happens with
    selfrCareferential or circular statements whose rCLproofsrCY loop >>>>>>>>> back on themselves rather than bottoming out in basic axioms or >>>>>>>>> introduction rules. // Copilot

    In proof-theoretic semantics, saying that something is rCLnot >>>>>>>>> well- foundedrCY means that the structure used to define or >>>>>>>>> justify meanings does not rest on a base case that is
    independent of itself. Instead, it involves circular or
    infinitely descending dependencies among rules or proofs. // >>>>>>>>> ChatGPT

    In proof-theoretic semantics, not well-founded typically refers >>>>>>>>> to derivations or proof structures that contain infinite
    descending chains or circular dependencies, violating the well- >>>>>>>>> foundedness property.
    In classical proof theory, well-founded derivations have a
    clear hierarchical structure where every inference rule
    application depends only on "smaller" or "simpler" premises, >>>>>>>>> eventually bottoming out in axioms or basic rules. This ensures >>>>>>>>> that proofs are finitely constructible and verifiable. //
    Claude AI

    A set of introduction rules (definitional clauses) for an atom >>>>>>>>> P is called well-founded if every chain of successive
    "definitions" (unfoldings) eventually terminates rCo i.e., there >>>>>>>>> is no infinite descending chain of definitional dependencies. >>>>>>>>> Intuitively:
    The meaning of P is ultimately grounded in basic facts or in >>>>>>>>> logical structure after finitely many unfoldings. // Grok



    And, thus, your "definition" of non-well-founded

    Is the standard definition in truth theoretic semantics making
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.

    This includes expressing all of PA in a complete system.


    I think not.

    One problem you are going to run into is that this "entire body of >>>>>> knowledge" is itself not built on those semantics,


    I knew that this would be philosophically too deep
    for you so I am using PA to build a bridge.

    It is a problem trying to process "knowledge" based on a different >>>>>> logic than the logic you are trying to process it.

    Also, part of our knowledge is about mathematics, which, for
    instance will assert that the Goldbach Conjecture is one of the
    great puzzles of mathematics, and must either be true or false,
    but that FACT is incompatible with proof-theoretic semantics, as
    mathematics can show that some true statements do not have proofs >>>>>> in the system.


    You seem to keep forgetting the specified domain
    is the body of knowledge that is
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"

    Which means NOTHING about the real world, only man's own
    classification of things.


    When viewed within proof theoretic semantics it
    specifies a precisely defined and coherent set
    that shows all of the details of exactly how
    conventional logic diverges from correct reasoning.

    No, it shows how your concept of "correct reasoning" is just defective.


    A sentence is meaningful only if its justification graph
    is wellrCafounded. A wellrCafounded graph always has a terminating evaluation. Truth is defined as the result of that terminating
    evaluation. Any sentence whose justification graph is
    nonrCawellrCafounded has no terminating evaluation, so it is
    not meaningful and not truthrCaapt. Therefore truth is total
    and computable over the meaningful fragment.



    And thus your criteria for well-foundedness isn't itself well founded.

    This is the problem of trying to redefine "truth" to be something other
    than what it is.

    The problem is, there are statements you can't show that they ARE not-well-founded, and thus you can't talk about them.

    We can't tell of the Golfbach conjecture is well-founded or not, so your system ends up having many unkownable holes in it.

    And because when you first want to pose the question, you likely don't
    know if the answer will be available, or if it is in the realm of
    unprovable. This means your "logic" is mostly restrictred to talking
    about what is already known, and is worthless for producing new knowledge.

    It even has problem with much of the existing knowledge, as that is
    based on truth-conditional logic, so isn't even true anymore in your system. --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy,comp.lang.prolog on Fri Jan 16 21:42:30 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.lang.prolog

    On 1/16/2026 9:24 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 8:27 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 5:21 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 5:09 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 3:54 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 3:51 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 2:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 3:24 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 1:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 2:16 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 12:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 12:47 PM, olcott wrote:
    The system uses proof-theoretic semantics, where the
    meaning of a statement is determined entirely by its
    inferential role within a theory. A theory T consists
    of a finite set of basic statements together with
    everything that can be derived from them using the
    inference rules. The statements derivable in this
    way are the theorems of T. A statement is true in
    T exactly when T proves it. A statement is false
    in T exactly when T proves its negation. Some
    statements are neither true nor false in T. These
    are the non-well-founded statements: statements
    whose inferential justification cannot be grounded
    in a finite, well-founded proof structure. This includes >>>>>>>>>>>> self-referential constructions such as G||del-type sentences. >>>>>>>>>>>>
    *Proof Theoretic Semantics Blocks Pathological Self-Reference* >>>>>>>>>>>> https://philpapers.org/archive/OLCPTS.pdf


    WHAT system?

    WHAT can you do in it?

    Can you actually prove that, or is it just more of your lies. >>>>>>>>>>>

    You have to actually read the paper.

    I did. Where do you actually define the initial axioms of your >>>>>>>>> syste,/


    Your problem is that you system is based on a criteria that >>>>>>>>>>> matches your own definition of non-well-founded.


    What does not well-founded mean in proof-theoretic semantics? >>>>>>>>>
    So. how is your definition of the criteria to be non-well-
    founded not non-well-founded for some questions?

    Note, asking LLMs for a definition doesn't define it in your >>>>>>>>> system.


    In proofrCatheoretic semantics, a statement is not wellrCafounded >>>>>>>>>> when its justification cannot be grounded in a finite,
    wellrCastructured chain of inferential steps. It lacks a
    terminating, wellrCaordered proof tree that would normally >>>>>>>>>> establish its truth or falsity. This often happens with
    selfrCareferential or circular statements whose rCLproofsrCY loop >>>>>>>>>> back on themselves rather than bottoming out in basic axioms >>>>>>>>>> or introduction rules. // Copilot

    In proof-theoretic semantics, saying that something is rCLnot >>>>>>>>>> well- foundedrCY means that the structure used to define or >>>>>>>>>> justify meanings does not rest on a base case that is
    independent of itself. Instead, it involves circular or
    infinitely descending dependencies among rules or proofs. // >>>>>>>>>> ChatGPT

    In proof-theoretic semantics, not well-founded typically
    refers to derivations or proof structures that contain
    infinite descending chains or circular dependencies, violating >>>>>>>>>> the well- foundedness property.
    In classical proof theory, well-founded derivations have a >>>>>>>>>> clear hierarchical structure where every inference rule
    application depends only on "smaller" or "simpler" premises, >>>>>>>>>> eventually bottoming out in axioms or basic rules. This
    ensures that proofs are finitely constructible and
    verifiable. // Claude AI

    A set of introduction rules (definitional clauses) for an atom >>>>>>>>>> P is called well-founded if every chain of successive
    "definitions" (unfoldings) eventually terminates rCo i.e., there >>>>>>>>>> is no infinite descending chain of definitional dependencies. >>>>>>>>>> Intuitively:
    The meaning of P is ultimately grounded in basic facts or in >>>>>>>>>> logical structure after finitely many unfoldings. // Grok



    And, thus, your "definition" of non-well-founded

    Is the standard definition in truth theoretic semantics making >>>>>>>> "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.

    This includes expressing all of PA in a complete system.


    I think not.

    One problem you are going to run into is that this "entire body >>>>>>> of knowledge" is itself not built on those semantics,


    I knew that this would be philosophically too deep
    for you so I am using PA to build a bridge.

    It is a problem trying to process "knowledge" based on a
    different logic than the logic you are trying to process it.

    Also, part of our knowledge is about mathematics, which, for
    instance will assert that the Goldbach Conjecture is one of the >>>>>>> great puzzles of mathematics, and must either be true or false, >>>>>>> but that FACT is incompatible with proof-theoretic semantics, as >>>>>>> mathematics can show that some true statements do not have proofs >>>>>>> in the system.


    You seem to keep forgetting the specified domain
    is the body of knowledge that is
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"

    Which means NOTHING about the real world, only man's own
    classification of things.


    When viewed within proof theoretic semantics it
    specifies a precisely defined and coherent set
    that shows all of the details of exactly how
    conventional logic diverges from correct reasoning.

    No, it shows how your concept of "correct reasoning" is just defective.


    A sentence is meaningful only if its justification graph
    is wellrCafounded. A wellrCafounded graph always has a terminating
    evaluation. Truth is defined as the result of that terminating
    evaluation. Any sentence whose justification graph is
    nonrCawellrCafounded has no terminating evaluation, so it is
    not meaningful and not truthrCaapt. Therefore truth is total
    and computable over the meaningful fragment.



    And thus your criteria for well-foundedness isn't itself well founded.

    This is the problem of trying to redefine "truth" to be something other
    than what it is.

    The problem is, there are statements you can't show that they ARE not- well-founded, and thus you can't talk about them.

    We can't tell of the Golfbach conjecture is well-founded or not, so your system ends up having many unkownable holes in it.


    Within the set of knowledge that is
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    the truth value of Goldbach is outside of the domain.

    And because when you first want to pose the question, you likely don't
    know if the answer will be available, or if it is in the realm of unprovable. This means your "logic" is mostly restrictred to talking
    about what is already known, and is worthless for producing new knowledge.


    It can catch all dangerous liars 100 million times a day.

    It even has problem with much of the existing knowledge, as that is
    based on truth-conditional logic, so isn't even true anymore in your
    system.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy,comp.lang.prolog on Fri Jan 16 21:44:28 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.lang.prolog

    On 1/16/2026 9:24 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 8:27 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 5:21 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 5:09 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 3:54 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 3:51 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 2:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 3:24 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 1:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 2:16 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 12:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 12:47 PM, olcott wrote:
    The system uses proof-theoretic semantics, where the
    meaning of a statement is determined entirely by its
    inferential role within a theory. A theory T consists
    of a finite set of basic statements together with
    everything that can be derived from them using the
    inference rules. The statements derivable in this
    way are the theorems of T. A statement is true in
    T exactly when T proves it. A statement is false
    in T exactly when T proves its negation. Some
    statements are neither true nor false in T. These
    are the non-well-founded statements: statements
    whose inferential justification cannot be grounded
    in a finite, well-founded proof structure. This includes >>>>>>>>>>>> self-referential constructions such as G||del-type sentences. >>>>>>>>>>>>
    *Proof Theoretic Semantics Blocks Pathological Self-Reference* >>>>>>>>>>>> https://philpapers.org/archive/OLCPTS.pdf


    WHAT system?

    WHAT can you do in it?

    Can you actually prove that, or is it just more of your lies. >>>>>>>>>>>

    You have to actually read the paper.

    I did. Where do you actually define the initial axioms of your >>>>>>>>> syste,/


    Your problem is that you system is based on a criteria that >>>>>>>>>>> matches your own definition of non-well-founded.


    What does not well-founded mean in proof-theoretic semantics? >>>>>>>>>
    So. how is your definition of the criteria to be non-well-
    founded not non-well-founded for some questions?

    Note, asking LLMs for a definition doesn't define it in your >>>>>>>>> system.


    In proofrCatheoretic semantics, a statement is not wellrCafounded >>>>>>>>>> when its justification cannot be grounded in a finite,
    wellrCastructured chain of inferential steps. It lacks a
    terminating, wellrCaordered proof tree that would normally >>>>>>>>>> establish its truth or falsity. This often happens with
    selfrCareferential or circular statements whose rCLproofsrCY loop >>>>>>>>>> back on themselves rather than bottoming out in basic axioms >>>>>>>>>> or introduction rules. // Copilot

    In proof-theoretic semantics, saying that something is rCLnot >>>>>>>>>> well- foundedrCY means that the structure used to define or >>>>>>>>>> justify meanings does not rest on a base case that is
    independent of itself. Instead, it involves circular or
    infinitely descending dependencies among rules or proofs. // >>>>>>>>>> ChatGPT

    In proof-theoretic semantics, not well-founded typically
    refers to derivations or proof structures that contain
    infinite descending chains or circular dependencies, violating >>>>>>>>>> the well- foundedness property.
    In classical proof theory, well-founded derivations have a >>>>>>>>>> clear hierarchical structure where every inference rule
    application depends only on "smaller" or "simpler" premises, >>>>>>>>>> eventually bottoming out in axioms or basic rules. This
    ensures that proofs are finitely constructible and
    verifiable. // Claude AI

    A set of introduction rules (definitional clauses) for an atom >>>>>>>>>> P is called well-founded if every chain of successive
    "definitions" (unfoldings) eventually terminates rCo i.e., there >>>>>>>>>> is no infinite descending chain of definitional dependencies. >>>>>>>>>> Intuitively:
    The meaning of P is ultimately grounded in basic facts or in >>>>>>>>>> logical structure after finitely many unfoldings. // Grok



    And, thus, your "definition" of non-well-founded

    Is the standard definition in truth theoretic semantics making >>>>>>>> "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.

    This includes expressing all of PA in a complete system.


    I think not.

    One problem you are going to run into is that this "entire body >>>>>>> of knowledge" is itself not built on those semantics,


    I knew that this would be philosophically too deep
    for you so I am using PA to build a bridge.

    It is a problem trying to process "knowledge" based on a
    different logic than the logic you are trying to process it.

    Also, part of our knowledge is about mathematics, which, for
    instance will assert that the Goldbach Conjecture is one of the >>>>>>> great puzzles of mathematics, and must either be true or false, >>>>>>> but that FACT is incompatible with proof-theoretic semantics, as >>>>>>> mathematics can show that some true statements do not have proofs >>>>>>> in the system.


    You seem to keep forgetting the specified domain
    is the body of knowledge that is
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"

    Which means NOTHING about the real world, only man's own
    classification of things.


    When viewed within proof theoretic semantics it
    specifies a precisely defined and coherent set
    that shows all of the details of exactly how
    conventional logic diverges from correct reasoning.

    No, it shows how your concept of "correct reasoning" is just defective.


    A sentence is meaningful only if its justification graph
    is wellrCafounded. A wellrCafounded graph always has a terminating
    evaluation. Truth is defined as the result of that terminating
    evaluation. Any sentence whose justification graph is
    nonrCawellrCafounded has no terminating evaluation, so it is
    not meaningful and not truthrCaapt. Therefore truth is total
    and computable over the meaningful fragment.



    And thus your criteria for well-foundedness isn't itself well founded.


    You cannot possibly show that.
    It is actually the same semantic tautology
    that I have been saying for years.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy,comp.lang.prolog on Sat Jan 17 11:22:40 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.lang.prolog

    On 16/01/2026 19:47, olcott wrote:

    The system uses proof-theoretic semantics, where the
    meaning of a statement is determined entirely by its
    inferential role within a theory. A theory T consists
    of a finite set of basic statements together with
    everything that can be derived from them using the
    inference rules. The statements derivable in this
    way are the theorems of T. A statement is true in
    T exactly when T proves it.

    Usually the expression "is a theorem of T" is used instead of "is true
    in T". THe words "true" and "false" are usually reserved for truth in
    a particular interpretation.
    A statement is false
    in T exactly when T proves its negation. Some
    statements are neither true nor false in T.

    Usually the expression "undecidable in T" is used instead of
    "neither true nor false in T".

    A theory where some statements that are neither provable or disprovable
    is said to be incomplere.

    These are the non-well-founded statements: statements
    whose inferential justification cannot be grounded
    in a finite, well-founded proof structure. This includes
    self-referential constructions such as G||del-type sentences.

    G||del's sentence is a sentence of Peano arithmetic. When inpterpreted according to the arithmentic semantics it is not self-referential.
    Peano's postulates just are insufficient for the proof of G||del's
    sentence. The simlest fis is to simply add G||del's sentence to the
    postulates. This addition does not create any inconsistency. However,
    the new theory is still incomlete.

    One should also note that for some theories there is no way to determine whether a claim is provable. A simple example is the group theory.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy,comp.lang.prolog on Sat Jan 17 07:03:44 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.lang.prolog

    On 1/16/26 10:42 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 9:24 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 8:27 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 5:21 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 5:09 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 3:54 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 3:51 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 2:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 3:24 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 1:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 2:16 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 12:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 12:47 PM, olcott wrote:
    The system uses proof-theoretic semantics, where the >>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning of a statement is determined entirely by its >>>>>>>>>>>>> inferential role within a theory. A theory T consists >>>>>>>>>>>>> of a finite set of basic statements together with
    everything that can be derived from them using the
    inference rules. The statements derivable in this
    way are the theorems of T. A statement is true in
    T exactly when T proves it. A statement is false
    in T exactly when T proves its negation. Some
    statements are neither true nor false in T. These
    are the non-well-founded statements: statements
    whose inferential justification cannot be grounded
    in a finite, well-founded proof structure. This includes >>>>>>>>>>>>> self-referential constructions such as G||del-type sentences. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
    *Proof Theoretic Semantics Blocks Pathological Self-Reference* >>>>>>>>>>>>> https://philpapers.org/archive/OLCPTS.pdf


    WHAT system?

    WHAT can you do in it?

    Can you actually prove that, or is it just more of your lies. >>>>>>>>>>>>

    You have to actually read the paper.

    I did. Where do you actually define the initial axioms of your >>>>>>>>>> syste,/


    Your problem is that you system is based on a criteria that >>>>>>>>>>>> matches your own definition of non-well-founded.


    What does not well-founded mean in proof-theoretic semantics? >>>>>>>>>>
    So. how is your definition of the criteria to be non-well- >>>>>>>>>> founded not non-well-founded for some questions?

    Note, asking LLMs for a definition doesn't define it in your >>>>>>>>>> system.


    In proofrCatheoretic semantics, a statement is not wellrCafounded >>>>>>>>>>> when its justification cannot be grounded in a finite,
    wellrCastructured chain of inferential steps. It lacks a >>>>>>>>>>> terminating, wellrCaordered proof tree that would normally >>>>>>>>>>> establish its truth or falsity. This often happens with >>>>>>>>>>> selfrCareferential or circular statements whose rCLproofsrCY loop >>>>>>>>>>> back on themselves rather than bottoming out in basic axioms >>>>>>>>>>> or introduction rules. // Copilot

    In proof-theoretic semantics, saying that something is rCLnot >>>>>>>>>>> well- foundedrCY means that the structure used to define or >>>>>>>>>>> justify meanings does not rest on a base case that is
    independent of itself. Instead, it involves circular or >>>>>>>>>>> infinitely descending dependencies among rules or proofs. // >>>>>>>>>>> ChatGPT

    In proof-theoretic semantics, not well-founded typically >>>>>>>>>>> refers to derivations or proof structures that contain
    infinite descending chains or circular dependencies,
    violating the well- foundedness property.
    In classical proof theory, well-founded derivations have a >>>>>>>>>>> clear hierarchical structure where every inference rule >>>>>>>>>>> application depends only on "smaller" or "simpler" premises, >>>>>>>>>>> eventually bottoming out in axioms or basic rules. This >>>>>>>>>>> ensures that proofs are finitely constructible and
    verifiable. // Claude AI

    A set of introduction rules (definitional clauses) for an >>>>>>>>>>> atom P is called well-founded if every chain of successive >>>>>>>>>>> "definitions" (unfoldings) eventually terminates rCo i.e., >>>>>>>>>>> there is no infinite descending chain of definitional
    dependencies.
    Intuitively:
    The meaning of P is ultimately grounded in basic facts or in >>>>>>>>>>> logical structure after finitely many unfoldings. // Grok >>>>>>>>>>>


    And, thus, your "definition" of non-well-founded

    Is the standard definition in truth theoretic semantics making >>>>>>>>> "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.

    This includes expressing all of PA in a complete system.


    I think not.

    One problem you are going to run into is that this "entire body >>>>>>>> of knowledge" is itself not built on those semantics,


    I knew that this would be philosophically too deep
    for you so I am using PA to build a bridge.

    It is a problem trying to process "knowledge" based on a
    different logic than the logic you are trying to process it.

    Also, part of our knowledge is about mathematics, which, for
    instance will assert that the Goldbach Conjecture is one of the >>>>>>>> great puzzles of mathematics, and must either be true or false, >>>>>>>> but that FACT is incompatible with proof-theoretic semantics, as >>>>>>>> mathematics can show that some true statements do not have
    proofs in the system.


    You seem to keep forgetting the specified domain
    is the body of knowledge that is
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"

    Which means NOTHING about the real world, only man's own
    classification of things.


    When viewed within proof theoretic semantics it
    specifies a precisely defined and coherent set
    that shows all of the details of exactly how
    conventional logic diverges from correct reasoning.

    No, it shows how your concept of "correct reasoning" is just defective. >>>>

    A sentence is meaningful only if its justification graph
    is wellrCafounded. A wellrCafounded graph always has a terminating
    evaluation. Truth is defined as the result of that terminating
    evaluation. Any sentence whose justification graph is
    nonrCawellrCafounded has no terminating evaluation, so it is
    not meaningful and not truthrCaapt. Therefore truth is total
    and computable over the meaningful fragment.



    And thus your criteria for well-foundedness isn't itself well founded.

    This is the problem of trying to redefine "truth" to be something
    other than what it is.

    The problem is, there are statements you can't show that they ARE not-
    well-founded, and thus you can't talk about them.

    We can't tell of the Golfbach conjecture is well-founded or not, so
    your system ends up having many unkownable holes in it.


    Within the set of knowledge that is
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    the truth value of Goldbach is outside of the domain.

    Then the truth value of most of mathematics is outside the domain.

    Can you prove even the Pathagorean Theorem (the sum of the squares of
    the length of the two sizes of a right triange is equal to the square of
    the length of the hypotenuse)?

    Can you prove based on the meaning expressed in langugage that the earth
    is round?

    The problem is your criteria doesn't handle most knowledge.


    And because when you first want to pose the question, you likely don't
    know if the answer will be available, or if it is in the realm of
    unprovable. This means your "logic" is mostly restrictred to talking
    about what is already known, and is worthless for producing new
    knowledge.


    It can catch all dangerous liars 100 million times a day.

    Nope, as most lies are not lies ONLY by the meaning of words, but needs
    to have other facts brought into the picture.

    Your problem is you want to exclude the things you don't like but keep
    what you want, but your definition doesn't do that.



    It even has problem with much of the existing knowledge, as that is
    based on truth-conditional logic, so isn't even true anymore in your
    system.



    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@news.x.richarddamon@xoxy.net to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy,comp.lang.prolog on Sat Jan 17 07:03:50 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.lang.prolog

    On 1/16/26 10:44 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 9:24 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 8:27 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 5:21 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 5:09 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 3:54 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 3:51 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 2:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 3:24 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 1:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 2:16 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 12:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 12:47 PM, olcott wrote:
    The system uses proof-theoretic semantics, where the >>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning of a statement is determined entirely by its >>>>>>>>>>>>> inferential role within a theory. A theory T consists >>>>>>>>>>>>> of a finite set of basic statements together with
    everything that can be derived from them using the
    inference rules. The statements derivable in this
    way are the theorems of T. A statement is true in
    T exactly when T proves it. A statement is false
    in T exactly when T proves its negation. Some
    statements are neither true nor false in T. These
    are the non-well-founded statements: statements
    whose inferential justification cannot be grounded
    in a finite, well-founded proof structure. This includes >>>>>>>>>>>>> self-referential constructions such as G||del-type sentences. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
    *Proof Theoretic Semantics Blocks Pathological Self-Reference* >>>>>>>>>>>>> https://philpapers.org/archive/OLCPTS.pdf


    WHAT system?

    WHAT can you do in it?

    Can you actually prove that, or is it just more of your lies. >>>>>>>>>>>>

    You have to actually read the paper.

    I did. Where do you actually define the initial axioms of your >>>>>>>>>> syste,/


    Your problem is that you system is based on a criteria that >>>>>>>>>>>> matches your own definition of non-well-founded.


    What does not well-founded mean in proof-theoretic semantics? >>>>>>>>>>
    So. how is your definition of the criteria to be non-well- >>>>>>>>>> founded not non-well-founded for some questions?

    Note, asking LLMs for a definition doesn't define it in your >>>>>>>>>> system.


    In proofrCatheoretic semantics, a statement is not wellrCafounded >>>>>>>>>>> when its justification cannot be grounded in a finite,
    wellrCastructured chain of inferential steps. It lacks a >>>>>>>>>>> terminating, wellrCaordered proof tree that would normally >>>>>>>>>>> establish its truth or falsity. This often happens with >>>>>>>>>>> selfrCareferential or circular statements whose rCLproofsrCY loop >>>>>>>>>>> back on themselves rather than bottoming out in basic axioms >>>>>>>>>>> or introduction rules. // Copilot

    In proof-theoretic semantics, saying that something is rCLnot >>>>>>>>>>> well- foundedrCY means that the structure used to define or >>>>>>>>>>> justify meanings does not rest on a base case that is
    independent of itself. Instead, it involves circular or >>>>>>>>>>> infinitely descending dependencies among rules or proofs. // >>>>>>>>>>> ChatGPT

    In proof-theoretic semantics, not well-founded typically >>>>>>>>>>> refers to derivations or proof structures that contain
    infinite descending chains or circular dependencies,
    violating the well- foundedness property.
    In classical proof theory, well-founded derivations have a >>>>>>>>>>> clear hierarchical structure where every inference rule >>>>>>>>>>> application depends only on "smaller" or "simpler" premises, >>>>>>>>>>> eventually bottoming out in axioms or basic rules. This >>>>>>>>>>> ensures that proofs are finitely constructible and
    verifiable. // Claude AI

    A set of introduction rules (definitional clauses) for an >>>>>>>>>>> atom P is called well-founded if every chain of successive >>>>>>>>>>> "definitions" (unfoldings) eventually terminates rCo i.e., >>>>>>>>>>> there is no infinite descending chain of definitional
    dependencies.
    Intuitively:
    The meaning of P is ultimately grounded in basic facts or in >>>>>>>>>>> logical structure after finitely many unfoldings. // Grok >>>>>>>>>>>


    And, thus, your "definition" of non-well-founded

    Is the standard definition in truth theoretic semantics making >>>>>>>>> "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.

    This includes expressing all of PA in a complete system.


    I think not.

    One problem you are going to run into is that this "entire body >>>>>>>> of knowledge" is itself not built on those semantics,


    I knew that this would be philosophically too deep
    for you so I am using PA to build a bridge.

    It is a problem trying to process "knowledge" based on a
    different logic than the logic you are trying to process it.

    Also, part of our knowledge is about mathematics, which, for
    instance will assert that the Goldbach Conjecture is one of the >>>>>>>> great puzzles of mathematics, and must either be true or false, >>>>>>>> but that FACT is incompatible with proof-theoretic semantics, as >>>>>>>> mathematics can show that some true statements do not have
    proofs in the system.


    You seem to keep forgetting the specified domain
    is the body of knowledge that is
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"

    Which means NOTHING about the real world, only man's own
    classification of things.


    When viewed within proof theoretic semantics it
    specifies a precisely defined and coherent set
    that shows all of the details of exactly how
    conventional logic diverges from correct reasoning.

    No, it shows how your concept of "correct reasoning" is just defective. >>>>

    A sentence is meaningful only if its justification graph
    is wellrCafounded. A wellrCafounded graph always has a terminating
    evaluation. Truth is defined as the result of that terminating
    evaluation. Any sentence whose justification graph is
    nonrCawellrCafounded has no terminating evaluation, so it is
    not meaningful and not truthrCaapt. Therefore truth is total
    and computable over the meaningful fragment.



    And thus your criteria for well-foundedness isn't itself well founded.


    You cannot possibly show that.
    It is actually the same semantic tautology
    that I have been saying for years.


    I did.

    How can you PROVE that a statement is not well founded in
    proof-theoretic logic, when you can not search the entire body of
    possible proofs to KNOW that one doesn't exist.

    Yes, there are SOME statements you can do this for, but your system is
    built on a criteria that isn't always well-founded.

    Goldbach's Conjecture is a good example. We don't KNOW if a proof
    exists, or doesn't exist, or it a counter example exists.

    Thus, any claim about its well-foundedness is just a lie, and is just not-well-founded.

    The Conjecture seems true, as we have tested it to a very large value.

    What is know is that we can not prove that no proof r refutation can
    exist, so we can not prove it not to be well-founded, as such a proof
    would mean that no counter example number can exist (as that is all that
    is needed to refute it) and thus it must be true.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy,comp.lang.prolog on Sat Jan 17 09:53:01 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.lang.prolog

    On 1/17/2026 3:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 16/01/2026 19:47, olcott wrote:

    The system uses proof-theoretic semantics, where the
    meaning of a statement is determined entirely by its
    inferential role within a theory. A theory T consists
    of a finite set of basic statements together with
    everything that can be derived from them using the
    inference rules. The statements derivable in this
    way are the theorems of T. A statement is true in
    T exactly when T proves it.

    Usually the expression "is a theorem of T" is used instead of "is true
    in T". THe words "true" and "false" are usually reserved for truth in
    a particular interpretation.

    That is what I changed. That is how Incompleteness arises.
    I switched truth conditional semantics that uses model
    theory for proof theoretic semantics. Then I had to add
    Haskell Curry's notion of True in {T}.

    Then the elementary statements which belong to {T} we
    shall call the elementary theorems of {T} we also say
    that these elementary statements are true for {T}
    https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf

    This is the same thing that I have been saying for years,
    the only difference now is the I can anchor my own ideas
    in standard terms of the art.

    A statement is false
    in T exactly when T proves its negation. Some
    statements are neither true nor false in T.

    Usually the expression "undecidable in T" is used instead of
    "neither true nor false in T".


    What was undecidable in truth conditional semantics
    becomes non-well-founded thus semantically illrCaformed
    in proof theoretic semantics. Non-well-founded a
    conventional term of the art from proof theoretic semantics.

    A theory where some statements that are neither provable or disprovable
    is said to be incomplere.

    These are the non-well-founded statements: statements
    whose inferential justification cannot be grounded
    in a finite, well-founded proof structure. This includes
    self-referential constructions such as G||del-type sentences.

    G||del's sentence is a sentence of Peano arithmetic. When inpterpreted according to the arithmentic semantics it is not self-referential.

    G_F rao -4Prov_F (riLG_FriY) is self-referential https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel-incompleteness/#FirIncTheCom

    Peano's postulates just are insufficient for the proof of G||del's
    sentence. The simlest fis is to simply add G||del's sentence to the postulates. This addition does not create any inconsistency. However,
    the new theory is still incomlete.

    One should also note that for some theories there is no way to determine whether a claim is provable. A simple example is the group theory.


    Plain PA has no internal notion of truth; any truth
    talk is metarCatheoretic. To work proofrCatheoretically,
    we must add a rulerCaanchored truth predicate in the
    sense of Curry, governed by elementary theorems of T.

    If we then impose an objectrCalevel wellrCafoundedness
    constraint on truthrCorejecting any cyclic truth
    dependenciesrCoG||delrCOs fixedrCapoint sentence G becomes
    syntactically nonrCawellrCafounded and is blocked before
    any truth value is assigned. In such a system,
    G||delrCOs G is not a deep undecidable truth, but
    an illrCaformed attempt at selfrCareference.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy,comp.lang.prolog on Sat Jan 17 10:01:20 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.lang.prolog

    On 1/17/2026 6:03 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 10:42 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 9:24 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 8:27 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 5:21 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 5:09 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 3:54 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 3:51 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 2:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 3:24 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 1:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 2:16 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 12:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 12:47 PM, olcott wrote:
    The system uses proof-theoretic semantics, where the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning of a statement is determined entirely by its >>>>>>>>>>>>>> inferential role within a theory. A theory T consists >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of a finite set of basic statements together with
    everything that can be derived from them using the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> inference rules. The statements derivable in this
    way are the theorems of T. A statement is true in
    T exactly when T proves it. A statement is false
    in T exactly when T proves its negation. Some
    statements are neither true nor false in T. These
    are the non-well-founded statements: statements
    whose inferential justification cannot be grounded >>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a finite, well-founded proof structure. This includes >>>>>>>>>>>>>> self-referential constructions such as G||del-type sentences. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    *Proof Theoretic Semantics Blocks Pathological Self- >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Reference*
    https://philpapers.org/archive/OLCPTS.pdf


    WHAT system?

    WHAT can you do in it?

    Can you actually prove that, or is it just more of your lies. >>>>>>>>>>>>>

    You have to actually read the paper.

    I did. Where do you actually define the initial axioms of >>>>>>>>>>> your syste,/


    Your problem is that you system is based on a criteria that >>>>>>>>>>>>> matches your own definition of non-well-founded.


    What does not well-founded mean in proof-theoretic semantics? >>>>>>>>>>>
    So. how is your definition of the criteria to be non-well- >>>>>>>>>>> founded not non-well-founded for some questions?

    Note, asking LLMs for a definition doesn't define it in your >>>>>>>>>>> system.


    In proofrCatheoretic semantics, a statement is not
    wellrCafounded when its justification cannot be grounded in a >>>>>>>>>>>> finite, wellrCastructured chain of inferential steps. It lacks >>>>>>>>>>>> a terminating, wellrCaordered proof tree that would normally >>>>>>>>>>>> establish its truth or falsity. This often happens with >>>>>>>>>>>> selfrCareferential or circular statements whose rCLproofsrCY loop >>>>>>>>>>>> back on themselves rather than bottoming out in basic axioms >>>>>>>>>>>> or introduction rules. // Copilot

    In proof-theoretic semantics, saying that something is rCLnot >>>>>>>>>>>> well- foundedrCY means that the structure used to define or >>>>>>>>>>>> justify meanings does not rest on a base case that is >>>>>>>>>>>> independent of itself. Instead, it involves circular or >>>>>>>>>>>> infinitely descending dependencies among rules or proofs. // >>>>>>>>>>>> ChatGPT

    In proof-theoretic semantics, not well-founded typically >>>>>>>>>>>> refers to derivations or proof structures that contain >>>>>>>>>>>> infinite descending chains or circular dependencies,
    violating the well- foundedness property.
    In classical proof theory, well-founded derivations have a >>>>>>>>>>>> clear hierarchical structure where every inference rule >>>>>>>>>>>> application depends only on "smaller" or "simpler" premises, >>>>>>>>>>>> eventually bottoming out in axioms or basic rules. This >>>>>>>>>>>> ensures that proofs are finitely constructible and
    verifiable. // Claude AI

    A set of introduction rules (definitional clauses) for an >>>>>>>>>>>> atom P is called well-founded if every chain of successive >>>>>>>>>>>> "definitions" (unfoldings) eventually terminates rCo i.e., >>>>>>>>>>>> there is no infinite descending chain of definitional >>>>>>>>>>>> dependencies.
    Intuitively:
    The meaning of P is ultimately grounded in basic facts or in >>>>>>>>>>>> logical structure after finitely many unfoldings. // Grok >>>>>>>>>>>>


    And, thus, your "definition" of non-well-founded

    Is the standard definition in truth theoretic semantics making >>>>>>>>>> "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.

    This includes expressing all of PA in a complete system.


    I think not.

    One problem you are going to run into is that this "entire body >>>>>>>>> of knowledge" is itself not built on those semantics,


    I knew that this would be philosophically too deep
    for you so I am using PA to build a bridge.

    It is a problem trying to process "knowledge" based on a
    different logic than the logic you are trying to process it. >>>>>>>>>
    Also, part of our knowledge is about mathematics, which, for >>>>>>>>> instance will assert that the Goldbach Conjecture is one of the >>>>>>>>> great puzzles of mathematics, and must either be true or false, >>>>>>>>> but that FACT is incompatible with proof-theoretic semantics, >>>>>>>>> as mathematics can show that some true statements do not have >>>>>>>>> proofs in the system.


    You seem to keep forgetting the specified domain
    is the body of knowledge that is
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"

    Which means NOTHING about the real world, only man's own
    classification of things.


    When viewed within proof theoretic semantics it
    specifies a precisely defined and coherent set
    that shows all of the details of exactly how
    conventional logic diverges from correct reasoning.

    No, it shows how your concept of "correct reasoning" is just
    defective.


    A sentence is meaningful only if its justification graph
    is wellrCafounded. A wellrCafounded graph always has a terminating
    evaluation. Truth is defined as the result of that terminating
    evaluation. Any sentence whose justification graph is
    nonrCawellrCafounded has no terminating evaluation, so it is
    not meaningful and not truthrCaapt. Therefore truth is total
    and computable over the meaningful fragment.



    And thus your criteria for well-foundedness isn't itself well founded.

    This is the problem of trying to redefine "truth" to be something
    other than what it is.

    The problem is, there are statements you can't show that they ARE
    not- well-founded, and thus you can't talk about them.

    We can't tell of the Golfbach conjecture is well-founded or not, so
    your system ends up having many unkownable holes in it.


    Within the set of knowledge that is
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    the truth value of Goldbach is outside of the domain.

    Then the truth value of most of mathematics is outside the domain.


    Everything that is
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    in entire body knowledge is in the domain. Only a
    subset of this is encoded in any physically existing system.

    Can you prove even the Pathagorean Theorem (the sum of the squares of
    the length of the two sizes of a right triange is equal to the square of
    the length of the hypotenuse)?

    Can you prove based on the meaning expressed in langugage that the earth
    is round?

    The problem is your criteria doesn't handle most knowledge.


    And because when you first want to pose the question, you likely
    don't know if the answer will be available, or if it is in the realm
    of unprovable. This means your "logic" is mostly restrictred to
    talking about what is already known, and is worthless for producing
    new knowledge.


    It can catch all dangerous liars 100 million times a day.

    Nope, as most lies are not lies ONLY by the meaning of words, but needs
    to have other facts brought into the picture.

    Your problem is you want to exclude the things you don't like but keep
    what you want, but your definition doesn't do that.



    It even has problem with much of the existing knowledge, as that is
    based on truth-conditional logic, so isn't even true anymore in your
    system.



    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy,comp.lang.prolog on Sat Jan 17 10:11:19 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.lang.prolog

    On 1/17/2026 6:03 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 10:44 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 9:24 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 8:27 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 5:21 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 5:09 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 3:54 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 3:51 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 2:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 3:24 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 1:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 2:16 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 12:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 12:47 PM, olcott wrote:
    The system uses proof-theoretic semantics, where the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning of a statement is determined entirely by its >>>>>>>>>>>>>> inferential role within a theory. A theory T consists >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of a finite set of basic statements together with
    everything that can be derived from them using the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> inference rules. The statements derivable in this
    way are the theorems of T. A statement is true in
    T exactly when T proves it. A statement is false
    in T exactly when T proves its negation. Some
    statements are neither true nor false in T. These
    are the non-well-founded statements: statements
    whose inferential justification cannot be grounded >>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a finite, well-founded proof structure. This includes >>>>>>>>>>>>>> self-referential constructions such as G||del-type sentences. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    *Proof Theoretic Semantics Blocks Pathological Self- >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Reference*
    https://philpapers.org/archive/OLCPTS.pdf


    WHAT system?

    WHAT can you do in it?

    Can you actually prove that, or is it just more of your lies. >>>>>>>>>>>>>

    You have to actually read the paper.

    I did. Where do you actually define the initial axioms of >>>>>>>>>>> your syste,/


    Your problem is that you system is based on a criteria that >>>>>>>>>>>>> matches your own definition of non-well-founded.


    What does not well-founded mean in proof-theoretic semantics? >>>>>>>>>>>
    So. how is your definition of the criteria to be non-well- >>>>>>>>>>> founded not non-well-founded for some questions?

    Note, asking LLMs for a definition doesn't define it in your >>>>>>>>>>> system.


    In proofrCatheoretic semantics, a statement is not
    wellrCafounded when its justification cannot be grounded in a >>>>>>>>>>>> finite, wellrCastructured chain of inferential steps. It lacks >>>>>>>>>>>> a terminating, wellrCaordered proof tree that would normally >>>>>>>>>>>> establish its truth or falsity. This often happens with >>>>>>>>>>>> selfrCareferential or circular statements whose rCLproofsrCY loop >>>>>>>>>>>> back on themselves rather than bottoming out in basic axioms >>>>>>>>>>>> or introduction rules. // Copilot

    In proof-theoretic semantics, saying that something is rCLnot >>>>>>>>>>>> well- foundedrCY means that the structure used to define or >>>>>>>>>>>> justify meanings does not rest on a base case that is >>>>>>>>>>>> independent of itself. Instead, it involves circular or >>>>>>>>>>>> infinitely descending dependencies among rules or proofs. // >>>>>>>>>>>> ChatGPT

    In proof-theoretic semantics, not well-founded typically >>>>>>>>>>>> refers to derivations or proof structures that contain >>>>>>>>>>>> infinite descending chains or circular dependencies,
    violating the well- foundedness property.
    In classical proof theory, well-founded derivations have a >>>>>>>>>>>> clear hierarchical structure where every inference rule >>>>>>>>>>>> application depends only on "smaller" or "simpler" premises, >>>>>>>>>>>> eventually bottoming out in axioms or basic rules. This >>>>>>>>>>>> ensures that proofs are finitely constructible and
    verifiable. // Claude AI

    A set of introduction rules (definitional clauses) for an >>>>>>>>>>>> atom P is called well-founded if every chain of successive >>>>>>>>>>>> "definitions" (unfoldings) eventually terminates rCo i.e., >>>>>>>>>>>> there is no infinite descending chain of definitional >>>>>>>>>>>> dependencies.
    Intuitively:
    The meaning of P is ultimately grounded in basic facts or in >>>>>>>>>>>> logical structure after finitely many unfoldings. // Grok >>>>>>>>>>>>


    And, thus, your "definition" of non-well-founded

    Is the standard definition in truth theoretic semantics making >>>>>>>>>> "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.

    This includes expressing all of PA in a complete system.


    I think not.

    One problem you are going to run into is that this "entire body >>>>>>>>> of knowledge" is itself not built on those semantics,


    I knew that this would be philosophically too deep
    for you so I am using PA to build a bridge.

    It is a problem trying to process "knowledge" based on a
    different logic than the logic you are trying to process it. >>>>>>>>>
    Also, part of our knowledge is about mathematics, which, for >>>>>>>>> instance will assert that the Goldbach Conjecture is one of the >>>>>>>>> great puzzles of mathematics, and must either be true or false, >>>>>>>>> but that FACT is incompatible with proof-theoretic semantics, >>>>>>>>> as mathematics can show that some true statements do not have >>>>>>>>> proofs in the system.


    You seem to keep forgetting the specified domain
    is the body of knowledge that is
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"

    Which means NOTHING about the real world, only man's own
    classification of things.


    When viewed within proof theoretic semantics it
    specifies a precisely defined and coherent set
    that shows all of the details of exactly how
    conventional logic diverges from correct reasoning.

    No, it shows how your concept of "correct reasoning" is just
    defective.


    A sentence is meaningful only if its justification graph
    is wellrCafounded. A wellrCafounded graph always has a terminating
    evaluation. Truth is defined as the result of that terminating
    evaluation. Any sentence whose justification graph is
    nonrCawellrCafounded has no terminating evaluation, so it is
    not meaningful and not truthrCaapt. Therefore truth is total
    and computable over the meaningful fragment.



    And thus your criteria for well-foundedness isn't itself well founded.


    You cannot possibly show that.
    It is actually the same semantic tautology
    that I have been saying for years.


    I did.

    How can you PROVE that a statement is not well founded in proof-
    theoretic logic, when you can not search the entire body of possible
    proofs to KNOW that one doesn't exist.


    If no proof exists in the entire body of general knowledge
    that is "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    and no rebuttal exists in this body then the expression is
    non-well-founded in this body.

    In a proofrCatheoretic framework, an expression is wellrCafounded
    only if the body of knowledge contains a proof or a rebuttal
    grounded in the meaningrCagiving rules of the language. If
    neither exists, the expression lacks inferential grounding
    and is therefore nonrCawellrCafounded within that body.

    Yes, there are SOME statements you can do this for, but your system is
    built on a criteria that isn't always well-founded.

    Goldbach's Conjecture is a good example. We don't KNOW if a proof
    exists, or doesn't exist, or it a counter example exists.

    Thus, any claim about its well-foundedness is just a lie, and is just not-well-founded.

    The Conjecture seems true, as we have tested it to a very large value.

    What is know is that we can not prove that no proof r refutation can
    exist, so we can not prove it not to be well-founded, as such a proof
    would mean that no counter example number can exist (as that is all that
    is needed to refute it) and thus it must be true.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy,comp.lang.prolog on Sat Jan 17 15:31:07 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.lang.prolog

    On 1/17/26 11:11 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/17/2026 6:03 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 10:44 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 9:24 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 8:27 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 5:21 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 5:09 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 3:54 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 3:51 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 2:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 3:24 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 1:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 2:16 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/16/2026 12:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 12:47 PM, olcott wrote:
    The system uses proof-theoretic semantics, where the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning of a statement is determined entirely by its >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inferential role within a theory. A theory T consists >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of a finite set of basic statements together with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> everything that can be derived from them using the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inference rules. The statements derivable in this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> way are the theorems of T. A statement is true in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> T exactly when T proves it. A statement is false >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in T exactly when T proves its negation. Some
    statements are neither true nor false in T. These >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are the non-well-founded statements: statements
    whose inferential justification cannot be grounded >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a finite, well-founded proof structure. This includes >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> self-referential constructions such as G||del-type sentences. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    *Proof Theoretic Semantics Blocks Pathological Self- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Reference*
    https://philpapers.org/archive/OLCPTS.pdf


    WHAT system?

    WHAT can you do in it?

    Can you actually prove that, or is it just more of your lies. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    You have to actually read the paper.

    I did. Where do you actually define the initial axioms of >>>>>>>>>>>> your syste,/


    Your problem is that you system is based on a criteria >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that matches your own definition of non-well-founded. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    What does not well-founded mean in proof-theoretic semantics? >>>>>>>>>>>>
    So. how is your definition of the criteria to be non-well- >>>>>>>>>>>> founded not non-well-founded for some questions?

    Note, asking LLMs for a definition doesn't define it in your >>>>>>>>>>>> system.


    In proofrCatheoretic semantics, a statement is not
    wellrCafounded when its justification cannot be grounded in a >>>>>>>>>>>>> finite, wellrCastructured chain of inferential steps. It >>>>>>>>>>>>> lacks a terminating, wellrCaordered proof tree that would >>>>>>>>>>>>> normally establish its truth or falsity. This often happens >>>>>>>>>>>>> with selfrCareferential or circular statements whose rCLproofsrCY
    loop back on themselves rather than bottoming out in basic >>>>>>>>>>>>> axioms or introduction rules. // Copilot

    In proof-theoretic semantics, saying that something is rCLnot >>>>>>>>>>>>> well- foundedrCY means that the structure used to define or >>>>>>>>>>>>> justify meanings does not rest on a base case that is >>>>>>>>>>>>> independent of itself. Instead, it involves circular or >>>>>>>>>>>>> infinitely descending dependencies among rules or
    proofs. // ChatGPT

    In proof-theoretic semantics, not well-founded typically >>>>>>>>>>>>> refers to derivations or proof structures that contain >>>>>>>>>>>>> infinite descending chains or circular dependencies, >>>>>>>>>>>>> violating the well- foundedness property.
    In classical proof theory, well-founded derivations have a >>>>>>>>>>>>> clear hierarchical structure where every inference rule >>>>>>>>>>>>> application depends only on "smaller" or "simpler"
    premises, eventually bottoming out in axioms or basic >>>>>>>>>>>>> rules. This ensures that proofs are finitely constructible >>>>>>>>>>>>> and verifiable. // Claude AI

    A set of introduction rules (definitional clauses) for an >>>>>>>>>>>>> atom P is called well-founded if every chain of successive >>>>>>>>>>>>> "definitions" (unfoldings) eventually terminates rCo i.e., >>>>>>>>>>>>> there is no infinite descending chain of definitional >>>>>>>>>>>>> dependencies.
    Intuitively:
    The meaning of P is ultimately grounded in basic facts or >>>>>>>>>>>>> in logical structure after finitely many unfoldings. // Grok >>>>>>>>>>>>>


    And, thus, your "definition" of non-well-founded

    Is the standard definition in truth theoretic semantics making >>>>>>>>>>> "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.

    This includes expressing all of PA in a complete system. >>>>>>>>>>>

    I think not.

    One problem you are going to run into is that this "entire >>>>>>>>>> body of knowledge" is itself not built on those semantics, >>>>>>>>>>

    I knew that this would be philosophically too deep
    for you so I am using PA to build a bridge.

    It is a problem trying to process "knowledge" based on a
    different logic than the logic you are trying to process it. >>>>>>>>>>
    Also, part of our knowledge is about mathematics, which, for >>>>>>>>>> instance will assert that the Goldbach Conjecture is one of >>>>>>>>>> the great puzzles of mathematics, and must either be true or >>>>>>>>>> false, but that FACT is incompatible with proof-theoretic >>>>>>>>>> semantics, as mathematics can show that some true statements >>>>>>>>>> do not have proofs in the system.


    You seem to keep forgetting the specified domain
    is the body of knowledge that is
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"

    Which means NOTHING about the real world, only man's own
    classification of things.


    When viewed within proof theoretic semantics it
    specifies a precisely defined and coherent set
    that shows all of the details of exactly how
    conventional logic diverges from correct reasoning.

    No, it shows how your concept of "correct reasoning" is just
    defective.


    A sentence is meaningful only if its justification graph
    is wellrCafounded. A wellrCafounded graph always has a terminating
    evaluation. Truth is defined as the result of that terminating
    evaluation. Any sentence whose justification graph is
    nonrCawellrCafounded has no terminating evaluation, so it is
    not meaningful and not truthrCaapt. Therefore truth is total
    and computable over the meaningful fragment.



    And thus your criteria for well-foundedness isn't itself well founded. >>>>

    You cannot possibly show that.
    It is actually the same semantic tautology
    that I have been saying for years.


    I did.

    How can you PROVE that a statement is not well founded in proof-
    theoretic logic, when you can not search the entire body of possible
    proofs to KNOW that one doesn't exist.


    If no proof exists in the entire body of general knowledge
    that is "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    and no rebuttal exists in this body then the expression is
    non-well-founded in this body.

    And how do you know if one exists?

    THAT is your problem, and what makes your system not-well-founded.

    You need an answer to a question you might not have.



    In a proofrCatheoretic framework, an expression is wellrCafounded
    only if the body of knowledge contains a proof or a rebuttal
    grounded in the meaningrCagiving rules of the language. If
    neither exists, the expression lacks inferential grounding
    and is therefore nonrCawellrCafounded within that body.

    And, that property might not be know, and thus is itself not-well-founded.

    "Normal" Proof-Theoretic work just allows there to be things we do not
    know. Statements can be KNOWN TRUE, KNOWN FALSE, or we don't know (yet),
    and might not be able to know.

    It is forcing an answer of "Not-Well-Founded" gets you into problem.



    Yes, there are SOME statements you can do this for, but your system is
    built on a criteria that isn't always well-founded.

    Goldbach's Conjecture is a good example. We don't KNOW if a proof
    exists, or doesn't exist, or it a counter example exists.

    Thus, any claim about its well-foundedness is just a lie, and is just
    not-well-founded.

    The Conjecture seems true, as we have tested it to a very large value.

    What is know is that we can not prove that no proof r refutation can
    exist, so we can not prove it not to be well-founded, as such a proof
    would mean that no counter example number can exist (as that is all
    that is needed to refute it) and thus it must be true.



    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy,comp.lang.prolog on Sat Jan 17 15:31:05 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.lang.prolog

    On 1/17/26 11:01 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/17/2026 6:03 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/16/26 10:42 PM, olcott wrote:

    Within the set of knowledge that is
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    the truth value of Goldbach is outside of the domain.

    Then the truth value of most of mathematics is outside the domain.


    Everything that is
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    in entire body knowledge is in the domain. Only a
    subset of this is encoded in any physically existing system.

    And, as pointed out, by you logic, this does NOT include much of the
    knowledge of Mathematics,

    See the below that you ignored


    Can you prove even the Pathagorean Theorem (the sum of the squares of
    the length of the two sizes of a right triange is equal to the square
    of the length of the hypotenuse)?

    Can you prove based on the meaning expressed in langugage that the
    earth is round?

    The problem is your criteria doesn't handle most knowledge.


    And because when you first want to pose the question, you likely
    don't know if the answer will be available, or if it is in the realm
    of unprovable. This means your "logic" is mostly restrictred to
    talking about what is already known, and is worthless for producing
    new knowledge.


    It can catch all dangerous liars 100 million times a day.

    Nope, as most lies are not lies ONLY by the meaning of words, but
    needs to have other facts brought into the picture.

    Your problem is you want to exclude the things you don't like but keep
    what you want, but your definition doesn't do that.



    It even has problem with much of the existing knowledge, as that is
    based on truth-conditional logic, so isn't even true anymore in your
    system.






    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy,comp.lang.prolog on Sat Jan 17 15:31:09 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.lang.prolog

    On 1/17/26 10:53 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/17/2026 3:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 16/01/2026 19:47, olcott wrote:

    The system uses proof-theoretic semantics, where the
    meaning of a statement is determined entirely by its
    inferential role within a theory. A theory T consists
    of a finite set of basic statements together with
    everything that can be derived from them using the
    inference rules. The statements derivable in this
    way are the theorems of T. A statement is true in
    T exactly when T proves it.

    Usually the expression "is a theorem of T" is used instead of "is true
    in T". THe words "true" and "false" are usually reserved for truth in
    a particular interpretation.

    That is what I changed. That is how Incompleteness arises.
    I switched truth conditional semantics that uses model
    theory for proof theoretic semantics. Then I had to add
    Haskell Curry's notion of True in {T}.

    No, but that is what breaks you system.


    -a Then the elementary statements which belong to {T} we
    -a shall call the elementary theorems of {T} we also say
    -a that these elementary statements are true for {T}
    -a https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf

    This is the same thing that I have been saying for years,
    the only difference now is the I can anchor my own ideas
    in standard terms of the art.

    Well, try to.

    The problem is you


    A statement is false
    in T exactly when T proves its negation. Some
    statements are neither true nor false in T.

    Usually the expression "undecidable in T" is used instead of
    "neither true nor false in T".


    What was undecidable in truth conditional semantics
    becomes non-well-founded thus semantically illrCaformed
    in proof theoretic semantics. Non-well-founded a
    conventional term of the art from proof theoretic semantics.

    And that non-well-founded property is non-well-founded for some
    quesiton, breaking your system.


    A theory where some statements that are neither provable or disprovable
    is said to be incomplere.

    These are the non-well-founded statements: statements
    whose inferential justification cannot be grounded
    in a finite, well-founded proof structure. This includes
    self-referential constructions such as G||del-type sentences.

    G||del's sentence is a sentence of Peano arithmetic. When inpterpreted
    according to the arithmentic semantics it is not self-referential.

    G_F rao -4Prov_F (riLG_FriY) is self-referential https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel-incompleteness/#FirIncTheCom

    Right, which is why that isn't Godel statement, just your incomplete interpretation of it.

    Your problem is that TRUTH doesn't matter to you, just your retoric, and
    thus you are just a pathological liar.


    Peano's postulates just are insufficient for the proof of G||del's
    sentence. The simlest fis is to simply add G||del's sentence to the
    postulates. This addition does not create any inconsistency. However,
    the new theory is still incomlete.

    One should also note that for some theories there is no way to determine
    whether a claim is provable. A simple example is the group theory.


    Plain PA has no internal notion of truth; any truth
    talk is metarCatheoretic. To work proofrCatheoretically,
    we must add a rulerCaanchored truth predicate in the
    sense of Curry, governed by elementary theorems of T.

    Sure it does.

    Does 1 + 1 = 2? Yes
    Does 1 + 2 = 4? No


    If we then impose an objectrCalevel wellrCafoundedness
    constraint on truthrCorejecting any cyclic truth
    dependenciesrCoG||delrCOs fixedrCapoint sentence G becomes
    syntactically nonrCawellrCafounded and is blocked before
    any truth value is assigned. In such a system,
    G||delrCOs G is not a deep undecidable truth, but
    an illrCaformed attempt at selfrCareference.


    Nope, not unless you say just plain mathematics is non-well-founded.

    Godels statement, when look at in PA, is just a complicated problem,
    perhaps like GoldBack's, that we can keep on testing to higher and
    higher values and never find a counter example. We can't find a proof,
    but who knows if it is hiding somewhere, and we can't find a counter
    example.

    In PA, it is just a statement that turns out to be True (as proven in
    the meta system) and can not be proven in PA (as proven in the meta system).

    There is NOTHING about G that is non-well-founded in asking, but also by
    its nature, must be a truth bearer.

    I guess all you are doing is sayng that you only accept easy problems
    that you know the answer to, and anything else will just be classified
    as non-well-founded until you find an answer.

    That doesn't make a useful logic system.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy,comp.lang.prolog on Sun Jan 18 11:51:43 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.lang.prolog

    On 17/01/2026 17:53, olcott wrote:
    On 1/17/2026 3:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 16/01/2026 19:47, olcott wrote:

    The system uses proof-theoretic semantics, where the
    meaning of a statement is determined entirely by its
    inferential role within a theory. A theory T consists
    of a finite set of basic statements together with
    everything that can be derived from them using the
    inference rules. The statements derivable in this
    way are the theorems of T. A statement is true in
    T exactly when T proves it.

    Usually the expression "is a theorem of T" is used instead of "is true
    in T". THe words "true" and "false" are usually reserved for truth in
    a particular interpretation.

    That is what I changed. That is how Incompleteness arises.

    No, it isn't. Changing words does not change the things the words
    refer to. It may be useful for deception by equivocation but does
    not serve any other useful purpose.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2