The other day one of the mechanical inference outfits resulted a
largish dump of abstract, theorems, and lemmas, with a claim that
it said something.
So I started to look at some of these abstracts, and noticed
quite a common thread, noting that mostly they are tautologies
of the rather trivial sort, not much saying more than "our
rational approximation in domain A and rational approximation
in domain B have a rational approximation of their continuations
and completions and that's all".
They're basically all subject to the "almost-quite", meaning
the almost-all, the almost-everywhere, the almost-periodic,
the almost-analytic, the "almost-quite", the "not-quite".
Since Erdos and the notion of "The Giant Monsters of Mathematical Independence", and that ordinary or standard accounts have _counter-examples_, have that these all have _counter-examples_,
readily given.
For example, the other days' "non-sofic groups exist" break
most these basically with their "non-sofic groups don't exist".
This is where "non-standard analysis" with though the "real
analytical character" is more than the "merely conservative",
which a brief scan of these abstracts suggest they are, then
that in the _claims_ the associations to already the "almost-quite"
means they're "almost-quite", too.
So, mostly it's an amplied echo-chamber of the problems mathematics
already has.
On 10/07/2026 10:25 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
The other day one of the mechanical inference outfits resulted a
largish dump of abstract, theorems, and lemmas, with a claim that
it said something.
So I started to look at some of these abstracts, and noticed
quite a common thread, noting that mostly they are tautologies
of the rather trivial sort, not much saying more than "our
rational approximation in domain A and rational approximation
in domain B have a rational approximation of their continuations
and completions and that's all".
They're basically all subject to the "almost-quite", meaning
the almost-all, the almost-everywhere, the almost-periodic,
the almost-analytic, the "almost-quite", the "not-quite".
Since Erdos and the notion of "The Giant Monsters of Mathematical
Independence", and that ordinary or standard accounts have
_counter-examples_, have that these all have _counter-examples_,
readily given.
For example, the other days' "non-sofic groups exist" break
most these basically with their "non-sofic groups don't exist".
This is where "non-standard analysis" with though the "real
analytical character" is more than the "merely conservative",
which a brief scan of these abstracts suggest they are, then
that in the _claims_ the associations to already the "almost-quite"
means they're "almost-quite", too.
So, mostly it's an amplied echo-chamber of the problems mathematics
already has.
Basically the Institute for Advanced Study which is the
National Security Administration doesn't want people to
go looking into elliptic fields their rational algebras
and radical magmas since elliptic-curve cryptography
then would be broken.
That's the gist.
Op 7-10-2026 om 19:27 schreef Ross Finlayson:
On 10/07/2026 10:25 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
The other day one of the mechanical inference outfits resulted a
largish dump of abstract, theorems, and lemmas, with a claim that
it said something.
So I started to look at some of these abstracts, and noticed
quite a common thread, noting that mostly they are tautologies
of the rather trivial sort, not much saying more than "our
rational approximation in domain A and rational approximation
in domain B have a rational approximation of their continuations
and completions and that's all".
They're basically all subject to the "almost-quite", meaning
the almost-all, the almost-everywhere, the almost-periodic,
the almost-analytic, the "almost-quite", the "not-quite".
Since Erdos and the notion of "The Giant Monsters of Mathematical
Independence", and that ordinary or standard accounts have
_counter-examples_, have that these all have _counter-examples_,
readily given.
For example, the other days' "non-sofic groups exist" break
most these basically with their "non-sofic groups don't exist".
This is where "non-standard analysis" with though the "real
analytical character" is more than the "merely conservative",
which a brief scan of these abstracts suggest they are, then
that in the _claims_ the associations to already the "almost-quite"
means they're "almost-quite", too.
So, mostly it's an amplied echo-chamber of the problems mathematics
already has.
Basically the Institute for Advanced Study which is the
National Security Administration doesn't want people to
go looking into elliptic fields their rational algebras
and radical magmas since elliptic-curve cryptography
then would be broken.
That's the gist.
Do you think AI will have solved all the remaining Millennium-prize
problems by the end of next year?
It seems they pretty rapidly went from being able to solve high-school
level Math Olympiad problems to research level math problems.
On 10/07/2026 07:20 PM, sobriquet wrote:
[..]
Do you think AI will have solved all the remaining Millennium-prize
problems by the end of next year?
It seems they pretty rapidly went from being able to solve high-school
level Math Olympiad problems to research level math problems.
No, I think that a variety of Hilbert or Clay problems
are _independent_ "standard" or "ordinary" number theory
after "standard" and "ordinary" set theory the usual
descriptive set theory's account, then that solvers like HOL/Isabelle/Coq/Lean and so on where the primitives are
classes for relation suffer all the aspects of class/set
distinction, then furthermore, primitives of "total functions"
suffer from that there exists non-Cartesian functions,
like "sweep", the natural/unit equivalency function.
I think a variety of what's considered in the extrapolation
is that what's been "solved" isn't really considered "solved",
either. I.e., people are reading too much into the results,
as about the "almost-quite", here.
Thanks for writing, good luck in your endeavors.
Op 8-10-2026 om 05:21 schreef Ross Finlayson:
On 10/07/2026 07:20 PM, sobriquet wrote:
[..]
Do you think AI will have solved all the remaining Millennium-prize
problems by the end of next year?
It seems they pretty rapidly went from being able to solve high-school
level Math Olympiad problems to research level math problems.
No, I think that a variety of Hilbert or Clay problems
are _independent_ "standard" or "ordinary" number theory
after "standard" and "ordinary" set theory the usual
descriptive set theory's account, then that solvers like
HOL/Isabelle/Coq/Lean and so on where the primitives are
classes for relation suffer all the aspects of class/set
distinction, then furthermore, primitives of "total functions"
suffer from that there exists non-Cartesian functions,
like "sweep", the natural/unit equivalency function.
I think a variety of what's considered in the extrapolation
is that what's been "solved" isn't really considered "solved",
either. I.e., people are reading too much into the results,
as about the "almost-quite", here.
Thanks for writing, good luck in your endeavors.
For now it seems like it will be like Euclid, gathering all existing
math and formalizing it into a comprehensive framework (Lean).
It will be really interesting when it starts coming up with new math concepts, but I reckon that would still require some sort of
breakthrough, since it seems it can't even come up with concepts from
scratch for toy problems like the game of go.
On 10/08/2026 06:24 AM, sobriquet wrote:
Op 8-10-2026 om 05:21 schreef Ross Finlayson:
On 10/07/2026 07:20 PM, sobriquet wrote:
[..]
Do you think AI will have solved all the remaining Millennium-prize
problems by the end of next year?
It seems they pretty rapidly went from being able to solve high-school >>>> level Math Olympiad problems to research level math problems.
No, I think that a variety of Hilbert or Clay problems
are _independent_ "standard" or "ordinary" number theory
after "standard" and "ordinary" set theory the usual
descriptive set theory's account, then that solvers like
HOL/Isabelle/Coq/Lean and so on where the primitives are
classes for relation suffer all the aspects of class/set
distinction, then furthermore, primitives of "total functions"
suffer from that there exists non-Cartesian functions,
like "sweep", the natural/unit equivalency function.
I think a variety of what's considered in the extrapolation
is that what's been "solved" isn't really considered "solved",
either. I.e., people are reading too much into the results,
as about the "almost-quite", here.
Thanks for writing, good luck in your endeavors.
For now it seems like it will be like Euclid, gathering all existing
math and formalizing it into a comprehensive framework (Lean).
It will be really interesting when it starts coming up with new math
concepts, but I reckon that would still require some sort of
breakthrough, since it seems it can't even come up with concepts from
scratch for toy problems like the game of go.
There's the Cantorian Continuum Hypothesis, which supposedly
contributed to Cantor's madness that he couldn't prove it,
then that Goedel showed it consistent (shown) one way,
von Neumann the other way which is usually excluded,
then Cohen added more baggage and an axiom of forcing
to result it "independent" instead of "inconsistent",
while yet various inductive arguments contradict each
other and thus in the weaker sort of account of induction,
have it "inconsistent".
It's so that mathematics has accounts of independence after
each of its accounts of openings/perestroikas/catastrophes,
since ancient times like for accounts of magnitudes or the
Pythagorean and so on, up to the 1900's account about whether
the reals and complex numbers are isomorphism then their _uniqueness_
up to isomorphism, when for examples there is readily contrived
other structures that fit the field axioms and are analytic,
besides that division in complex numbers is another opening,
helping show that mathematics the usual account of functional
analysis is full of holes.
"Openings", then, like openings in games, where chess is a
set-piece while go is a blank slate, with a lattice, about chess
or go or tong qi or the like, there is that "singularities in
a singularity theory are branches in a multiplicity theory".
Then, about the usual order of description of operations,
like those of arithmetic, then for example about whether
convolution is first or last or eventual, and it varies,
makes for accounts of the equi-interpretability of model theories.
So, the Cantorian with almost-all transcendental and the
Pythagorean with almost-all rational plainly don't agree,
yet either on its own account, then for what meets in the
middle "the middle of nowhere" that accounts of weak induction
will always fail to conclude concomitantly exist, yet that
the super-classical account of motion always concludes does.
We already have one.
On 10/08/2026 06:54 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 10/08/2026 06:24 AM, sobriquet wrote:
Op 8-10-2026 om 05:21 schreef Ross Finlayson:
On 10/07/2026 07:20 PM, sobriquet wrote:
[..]
Do you think AI will have solved all the remaining Millennium-prize
problems by the end of next year?
It seems they pretty rapidly went from being able to solve high-school >>>>> level Math Olympiad problems to research level math problems.
No, I think that a variety of Hilbert or Clay problems
are _independent_ "standard" or "ordinary" number theory
after "standard" and "ordinary" set theory the usual
descriptive set theory's account, then that solvers like
HOL/Isabelle/Coq/Lean and so on where the primitives are
classes for relation suffer all the aspects of class/set
distinction, then furthermore, primitives of "total functions"
suffer from that there exists non-Cartesian functions,
like "sweep", the natural/unit equivalency function.
I think a variety of what's considered in the extrapolation
is that what's been "solved" isn't really considered "solved",
either. I.e., people are reading too much into the results,
as about the "almost-quite", here.
Thanks for writing, good luck in your endeavors.
For now it seems like it will be like Euclid, gathering all existing
math and formalizing it into a comprehensive framework (Lean).
It will be really interesting when it starts coming up with new math
concepts, but I reckon that would still require some sort of
breakthrough, since it seems it can't even come up with concepts from
scratch for toy problems like the game of go.
There's the Cantorian Continuum Hypothesis, which supposedly
contributed to Cantor's madness that he couldn't prove it,
then that Goedel showed it consistent (shown) one way,
von Neumann the other way which is usually excluded,
then Cohen added more baggage and an axiom of forcing
to result it "independent" instead of "inconsistent",
while yet various inductive arguments contradict each
other and thus in the weaker sort of account of induction,
have it "inconsistent".
It's so that mathematics has accounts of independence after
each of its accounts of openings/perestroikas/catastrophes,
since ancient times like for accounts of magnitudes or the
Pythagorean and so on, up to the 1900's account about whether
the reals and complex numbers are isomorphism then their _uniqueness_
up to isomorphism, when for examples there is readily contrived
other structures that fit the field axioms and are analytic,
besides that division in complex numbers is another opening,
helping show that mathematics the usual account of functional
analysis is full of holes.
"Openings", then, like openings in games, where chess is a
set-piece while go is a blank slate, with a lattice, about chess
or go or tong qi or the like, there is that "singularities in
a singularity theory are branches in a multiplicity theory".
Then, about the usual order of description of operations,
like those of arithmetic, then for example about whether
convolution is first or last or eventual, and it varies,
makes for accounts of the equi-interpretability of model theories.
So, the Cantorian with almost-all transcendental and the
Pythagorean with almost-all rational plainly don't agree,
yet either on its own account, then for what meets in the
middle "the middle of nowhere" that accounts of weak induction
will always fail to conclude concomitantly exist, yet that
the super-classical account of motion always concludes does.
We already have one.
Well I started taking a look at these or taking in "CONTENTS.md"
and a variety of lines emerge as a common thread, basically about
rational rational algebras and rational radical magmas, then as with
regards to various accounts of claimed completions and closures,
that combined reductions result weakened reductions and as of
overall mostly simple things, then as with regards to outlying
definition like "complete modularity", "de Rham", "semi-simple Galois extensions", "monodromy" as after "holonomy", and otherwise the usual
idea that differential-geometry is partial-differential-geometry, and
doesn't have claims for wider classes of functions or stricter
definitions of topologies than partial-differential-geometries.
Accounts like "Zariski dense", for example, are qualified to reduce
their attachments to "analyticity", helping give that the results aren't
so surprising, and indeed about the "finer" or "sharper" points, the
claims variously either are conservative extensions, or in some cases, indefensible claims about completions that can't be claimed or have
immediate direct counterexamples.
Looking for contradictions, basically is about irrationals, and accounts
of Erdos and about Hecke, about things like Apery's constant and the infinitary series in rationals being irrational, that there are various
what can be made conflicting conclusions among the claimed theorems.
Accounts about Hecke about the theory of Ramsey furthermore encounter
results of independence known since Erdos that various of the claims
have counterexamples.
About the emphasis to rational fields and elliptic fields, and Selmer,
is basically to introduce "braids" about singular conditions, noting
that the various ranks or orders suggested have openings both above
(the infinite) _and below_ (the zero), making it so that some of the
claims are weaker than they might otherwise suggest, then, that among interacting terms and implicits, and systems of the relevant mappings as
most accounts are simply enough of analyticity among "continuous
functions" of "rational domains", those "anti-inductive" results about
the infinitary or zero-eth order can combine and broadcast to result counterexamples, even in otherwise the qualified account.
Examples like "complete modularity" include "Campana orbifold Iitaka hypothesis", when various conjectures are conditioned by others.
Accounts like the existence of roots for polynomials with integer coefficients, have counterexamples "for-each" if not "for-all", that for example being a usual claim about universal solvers when yet polynomials
are not power series and are finite and each is solvable.
Accounts like the LeLong numbers vis-a-vis Riemann zeros help illustrate
that again the breakdown of analyticity makes for counterexamples as
above about the elliptic fields.
Mentions of the "semi-simple" basically break otherwise usual
attachments to Galois theory, that for example declarations inside and outside a related theorem would be indeterminate or otherwise undefined
with regards to the claimed sorts of algebras.
Further accounts about the Iitaka function field with regards to Kodaira
(and Zariski and so on) are among their own terms about "monodromy" and "holonomy", _incompatible_ with "partial-differential-geometry's"
accounts of reduced functions and expanded topologies.
It kind of seems they went looking for a bunch of kinds of conjectures
any at all related to elliptic fields and made at least a weak result
about, then though that openinings and counterexamples make for that
accounts after immersions and submersions for sheaves and differential-topology can be part of total-differential-geometry's and
not necessarily partial-differential-geometry's, point being that's the general milieu of the line of the reasoning.
Accounts like for Bloch and Albanese have for example that the
isomorphism of the complete-ordered-field has that here, for example,
[-1, 1] is equipped with field operations (as in the limit) that makes
for that R and C are no longer unique instead distinct.
The account about Lagrange and Kahler is loose (that's otherwise about distinctions among partial and total the accounts of continuity for
geometry, with de Rham, and modularity for integers, and "complete modularity").
Hikita and Nakijima are similarly addressed as Lagrange and Kahler and
Bloch and Albanese, i,.e., that there are counterexamples in the open
(or less-partial), and stronger required conditions in the less-partial.
Accounts of quaternions (or complex numbers) and their division rings
ignore that division on complex numbers (or otherwise in terms in imaginaries) has multiple possible definitions, just like there exist negative integers or complex numbers.
I'd be looking into the claimed counterexample to Lipman-Zariski,
associating it with variously stronger acounts monodromy and holonomy,
and about the basic inversion of integral analysis and differential
analysis, then as well about claims about plane curves from "partial-differential geometry".
Some of the accounts of the rank-lowering after things like Ruffini-Abel
then for as noted about Calabi-Yau as for something like Clebsch-Gordon,
an account of reductionism, then have for something like for that by "disproving Abhyanker-Sathaye" they also disprove themselves, on
accounts like these as of the above.
They basically have "ampleness" and "lowering" as contradicting
each other (as they contradict each other).
"053. A counterexample to Pixton completeness in Chow.
** Constructs a tautological relation on a moduli space of stable
pointed curves that vanishes in rational Chow, hence in rational
cohomology, but lies outside Pixton's original relation span. This
disproves the Chow and rational-cohomological forms of his original completeness conjecture."
I'd suggest that's not so, though it would then be for getting into the reasoning, while yet that it's also among its own settings of the "almost-quite" which is the "not-quite".
There's a lot of commonality among the suggested claims, with regards
to dimensionality and 3 and 4, that with regards to various notions of
the existence of products like the cross product and so on, and about
for example the mention of Maxwell and 4-D, vis-a-vis "threefolds",
that it's be expected that the formalism would be modular itself and
composed of very similar reasoning, though it's not surprising if it's
just copy-smeared-pasted, point being that a lot of these claims are
very similar.
Something like 059 about Zariski multiplicity would be in contradiction
to claims of closures and completions about related results in the
rational rational algebras and rational radical magmas.
Accounts of Fano about distributions generally would exclude
non-standard probability distributions, for example well-known
examples like Dirac delta. This is a usual account of "masked"
or "censored" or "removable" singularities after discontinuities.
The 064 for example or -
"**064. Topological triviality of <i>++</i>-constant
surface singularities.** Proves topological right-triviality for every holomorphic one-parameter family of isolated hypersurface singularities
in rae<sup>3</sup> with constant Milnor number, resolving the surface
case of the <i>++</i>-constant problem. After shrinking the parameter
disk and representatives, ambient homeomorphisms vary jointly
continuously, fix the origin section and preserve the defining functions."
- has that that all lives under "continuous functions" and reuses the definition of the qualitative number, i.e., confounding itself.
So, looking through the first few, it's mostly "rational plus rational
equals rational" and "continuous functions are continuous functions",
yet, it's well known since Pythagoras that not all numbers are rational,
then furthermore various infinite series in rationals (have limits that)
are ir-rational.
Then, the various contradictory accounts for example as mentioned
above, either contradicting each other, having implicit counterexamples, having non-standard or extend counter-examples, or being under-defined
or ambiguous, makes for ready theorem (or, "claim") generation, making
for a thorough sort of deconstructive factoring of the claims.
That and trivials, ....
"**068. Anticanonical nonvanishing in every dimension.** If <i>X</i> is
a smooth connected complex projective variety and $`-K_X`$ admits a
smooth Hermitian metric with nonnegative curvature, then
$`H^0(X,-mK_X)\ne0`$ for some <i>m</i> > 0. Thus smooth
semipositivity forces a nonzero section of a positive tensor power of
the anticanonical bundle in every dimension."
See, for example, 068 and 053 aren't getting along.
So, for things like "which are the elementary functions and which
are the special functions", like for Lambert's W, then as well for
already "what are functions and what are topologies" with regards
to _partial_ differential-geometry and the inversions of definition
of "monodromy" and "holonomy" in _partial_ differential-geometry,
the non-standard (super-standard) in probability and so, then about
Ramsey theory and counter-examples in the infinitary, then besides,
some of the claims are attacking one branch of the bibliography
and promoting another, while under dis-ambiguation they say the same
thing, which is capricious.
On 10/12/2026 09:43 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 10/08/2026 06:54 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 10/08/2026 06:24 AM, sobriquet wrote:
Op 8-10-2026 om 05:21 schreef Ross Finlayson:
On 10/07/2026 07:20 PM, sobriquet wrote:
[..]
Do you think AI will have solved all the remaining Millennium-prize >>>>>> problems by the end of next year?
It seems they pretty rapidly went from being able to solve
high-school
level Math Olympiad problems to research level math problems.
No, I think that a variety of Hilbert or Clay problems
are _independent_ "standard" or "ordinary" number theory
after "standard" and "ordinary" set theory the usual
descriptive set theory's account, then that solvers like
HOL/Isabelle/Coq/Lean and so on where the primitives are
classes for relation suffer all the aspects of class/set
distinction, then furthermore, primitives of "total functions"
suffer from that there exists non-Cartesian functions,
like "sweep", the natural/unit equivalency function.
I think a variety of what's considered in the extrapolation
is that what's been "solved" isn't really considered "solved",
either. I.e., people are reading too much into the results,
as about the "almost-quite", here.
Thanks for writing, good luck in your endeavors.
For now it seems like it will be like Euclid, gathering all existing
math and formalizing it into a comprehensive framework (Lean).
It will be really interesting when it starts coming up with new math
concepts, but I reckon that would still require some sort of
breakthrough, since it seems it can't even come up with concepts from
scratch for toy problems like the game of go.
There's the Cantorian Continuum Hypothesis, which supposedly
contributed to Cantor's madness that he couldn't prove it,
then that Goedel showed it consistent (shown) one way,
von Neumann the other way which is usually excluded,
then Cohen added more baggage and an axiom of forcing
to result it "independent" instead of "inconsistent",
while yet various inductive arguments contradict each
other and thus in the weaker sort of account of induction,
have it "inconsistent".
It's so that mathematics has accounts of independence after
each of its accounts of openings/perestroikas/catastrophes,
since ancient times like for accounts of magnitudes or the
Pythagorean and so on, up to the 1900's account about whether
the reals and complex numbers are isomorphism then their _uniqueness_
up to isomorphism, when for examples there is readily contrived
other structures that fit the field axioms and are analytic,
besides that division in complex numbers is another opening,
helping show that mathematics the usual account of functional
analysis is full of holes.
"Openings", then, like openings in games, where chess is a
set-piece while go is a blank slate, with a lattice, about chess
or go or tong qi or the like, there is that "singularities in
a singularity theory are branches in a multiplicity theory".
Then, about the usual order of description of operations,
like those of arithmetic, then for example about whether
convolution is first or last or eventual, and it varies,
makes for accounts of the equi-interpretability of model theories.
So, the Cantorian with almost-all transcendental and the
Pythagorean with almost-all rational plainly don't agree,
yet either on its own account, then for what meets in the
middle "the middle of nowhere" that accounts of weak induction
will always fail to conclude concomitantly exist, yet that
the super-classical account of motion always concludes does.
We already have one.
Well I started taking a look at these or taking in "CONTENTS.md"
and a variety of lines emerge as a common thread, basically about
rational rational algebras and rational radical magmas, then as with
regards to various accounts of claimed completions and closures,
that combined reductions result weakened reductions and as of
overall mostly simple things, then as with regards to outlying
definition like "complete modularity", "de Rham", "semi-simple Galois
extensions", "monodromy" as after "holonomy", and otherwise the usual
idea that differential-geometry is partial-differential-geometry, and
doesn't have claims for wider classes of functions or stricter
definitions of topologies than partial-differential-geometries.
Accounts like "Zariski dense", for example, are qualified to reduce
their attachments to "analyticity", helping give that the results aren't
so surprising, and indeed about the "finer" or "sharper" points, the
claims variously either are conservative extensions, or in some cases,
indefensible claims about completions that can't be claimed or have
immediate direct counterexamples.
Looking for contradictions, basically is about irrationals, and accounts
of Erdos and about Hecke, about things like Apery's constant and the
infinitary series in rationals being irrational, that there are various
what can be made conflicting conclusions among the claimed theorems.
Accounts about Hecke about the theory of Ramsey furthermore encounter
results of independence known since Erdos that various of the claims
have counterexamples.
About the emphasis to rational fields and elliptic fields, and Selmer,
is basically to introduce "braids" about singular conditions, noting
that the various ranks or orders suggested have openings both above
(the infinite) _and below_ (the zero), making it so that some of the
claims are weaker than they might otherwise suggest, then, that among
interacting terms and implicits, and systems of the relevant mappings as
most accounts are simply enough of analyticity among "continuous
functions" of "rational domains", those "anti-inductive" results about
the infinitary or zero-eth order can combine and broadcast to result
counterexamples, even in otherwise the qualified account.
Examples like "complete modularity" include "Campana orbifold Iitaka
hypothesis", when various conjectures are conditioned by others.
Accounts like the existence of roots for polynomials with integer
coefficients, have counterexamples "for-each" if not "for-all", that for
example being a usual claim about universal solvers when yet polynomials
are not power series and are finite and each is solvable.
Accounts like the LeLong numbers vis-a-vis Riemann zeros help illustrate
that again the breakdown of analyticity makes for counterexamples as
above about the elliptic fields.
Mentions of the "semi-simple" basically break otherwise usual
attachments to Galois theory, that for example declarations inside and
outside a related theorem would be indeterminate or otherwise undefined
with regards to the claimed sorts of algebras.
Further accounts about the Iitaka function field with regards to Kodaira
(and Zariski and so on) are among their own terms about "monodromy" and
"holonomy", _incompatible_ with "partial-differential-geometry's"
accounts of reduced functions and expanded topologies.
It kind of seems they went looking for a bunch of kinds of conjectures
any at all related to elliptic fields and made at least a weak result
about, then though that openinings and counterexamples make for that
accounts after immersions and submersions for sheaves and
differential-topology can be part of total-differential-geometry's and
not necessarily partial-differential-geometry's, point being that's the
general milieu of the line of the reasoning.
Accounts like for Bloch and Albanese have for example that the
isomorphism of the complete-ordered-field has that here, for example,
[-1, 1] is equipped with field operations (as in the limit) that makes
for that R and C are no longer unique instead distinct.
The account about Lagrange and Kahler is loose (that's otherwise about
distinctions among partial and total the accounts of continuity for
geometry, with de Rham, and modularity for integers, and "complete
modularity").
Hikita and Nakijima are similarly addressed as Lagrange and Kahler and
Bloch and Albanese, i,.e., that there are counterexamples in the open
(or less-partial), and stronger required conditions in the less-partial.
Accounts of quaternions (or complex numbers) and their division rings
ignore that division on complex numbers (or otherwise in terms in
imaginaries) has multiple possible definitions, just like there exist
negative integers or complex numbers.
I'd be looking into the claimed counterexample to Lipman-Zariski,
associating it with variously stronger acounts monodromy and holonomy,
and about the basic inversion of integral analysis and differential
analysis, then as well about claims about plane curves from
"partial-differential geometry".
Some of the accounts of the rank-lowering after things like Ruffini-Abel
then for as noted about Calabi-Yau as for something like Clebsch-Gordon,
an account of reductionism, then have for something like for that by
"disproving Abhyanker-Sathaye" they also disprove themselves, on
accounts like these as of the above.
They basically have "ampleness" and "lowering" as contradicting
each other (as they contradict each other).
"053. A counterexample to Pixton completeness in Chow.
** Constructs a tautological relation on a moduli space of stable
pointed curves that vanishes in rational Chow, hence in rational
cohomology, but lies outside Pixton's original relation span. This
disproves the Chow and rational-cohomological forms of his original
completeness conjecture."
I'd suggest that's not so, though it would then be for getting into the
reasoning, while yet that it's also among its own settings of the
"almost-quite" which is the "not-quite".
There's a lot of commonality among the suggested claims, with regards
to dimensionality and 3 and 4, that with regards to various notions of
the existence of products like the cross product and so on, and about
for example the mention of Maxwell and 4-D, vis-a-vis "threefolds",
that it's be expected that the formalism would be modular itself and
composed of very similar reasoning, though it's not surprising if it's
just copy-smeared-pasted, point being that a lot of these claims are
very similar.
Something like 059 about Zariski multiplicity would be in contradiction
to claims of closures and completions about related results in the
rational rational algebras and rational radical magmas.
Accounts of Fano about distributions generally would exclude
non-standard probability distributions, for example well-known
examples like Dirac delta. This is a usual account of "masked"
or "censored" or "removable" singularities after discontinuities.
The 064 for example or -
"**064. Topological triviality of <i>++</i>-constant
surface singularities.** Proves topological right-triviality for every
holomorphic one-parameter family of isolated hypersurface singularities
in rae<sup>3</sup> with constant Milnor number, resolving the surface
case of the <i>++</i>-constant problem. After shrinking the parameter
disk and representatives, ambient homeomorphisms vary jointly
continuously, fix the origin section and preserve the defining
functions."
- has that that all lives under "continuous functions" and reuses the
definition of the qualitative number, i.e., confounding itself.
So, looking through the first few, it's mostly "rational plus rational
equals rational" and "continuous functions are continuous functions",
yet, it's well known since Pythagoras that not all numbers are rational,
then furthermore various infinite series in rationals (have limits that)
are ir-rational.
Then, the various contradictory accounts for example as mentioned
above, either contradicting each other, having implicit counterexamples,
having non-standard or extend counter-examples, or being under-defined
or ambiguous, makes for ready theorem (or, "claim") generation, making
for a thorough sort of deconstructive factoring of the claims.
That and trivials, ....
"**068. Anticanonical nonvanishing in every dimension.** If <i>X</i> is
a smooth connected complex projective variety and $`-K_X`$ admits a
smooth Hermitian metric with nonnegative curvature, then
$`H^0(X,-mK_X)\ne0`$ for some <i>m</i> > 0. Thus smooth
semipositivity forces a nonzero section of a positive tensor power of
the anticanonical bundle in every dimension."
See, for example, 068 and 053 aren't getting along.
So, for things like "which are the elementary functions and which
are the special functions", like for Lambert's W, then as well for
already "what are functions and what are topologies" with regards
to _partial_ differential-geometry and the inversions of definition
of "monodromy" and "holonomy" in _partial_ differential-geometry,
the non-standard (super-standard) in probability and so, then about
Ramsey theory and counter-examples in the infinitary, then besides,
some of the claims are attacking one branch of the bibliography
and promoting another, while under dis-ambiguation they say the same
thing, which is capricious.
About the Navier-Stokes bit from a few weeks ago,
it was already mentioned here that the "hairy ball theorem"
already gives an account then that the account given
is yet a _finite_ blowup, since "an arbitrarily large
finite constant" is yet not _infinite_.
Then also there was the "non-sofic groups exist" which
basically all those inductive arguments would see as
a counter-example.
On 10/12/2026 09:53 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 10/12/2026 09:43 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 10/08/2026 06:54 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 10/08/2026 06:24 AM, sobriquet wrote:
Op 8-10-2026 om 05:21 schreef Ross Finlayson:
On 10/07/2026 07:20 PM, sobriquet wrote:
[..]
Do you think AI will have solved all the remaining Millennium-prize >>>>>>> problems by the end of next year?
It seems they pretty rapidly went from being able to solve
high-school
level Math Olympiad problems to research level math problems.
No, I think that a variety of Hilbert or Clay problems
are _independent_ "standard" or "ordinary" number theory
after "standard" and "ordinary" set theory the usual
descriptive set theory's account, then that solvers like
HOL/Isabelle/Coq/Lean and so on where the primitives are
classes for relation suffer all the aspects of class/set
distinction, then furthermore, primitives of "total functions"
suffer from that there exists non-Cartesian functions,
like "sweep", the natural/unit equivalency function.
I think a variety of what's considered in the extrapolation
is that what's been "solved" isn't really considered "solved",
either. I.e., people are reading too much into the results,
as about the "almost-quite", here.
Thanks for writing, good luck in your endeavors.
For now it seems like it will be like Euclid, gathering all existing >>>>> math and formalizing it into a comprehensive framework (Lean).
It will be really interesting when it starts coming up with new math >>>>> concepts, but I reckon that would still require some sort of
breakthrough, since it seems it can't even come up with concepts from >>>>> scratch for toy problems like the game of go.
There's the Cantorian Continuum Hypothesis, which supposedly
contributed to Cantor's madness that he couldn't prove it,
then that Goedel showed it consistent (shown) one way,
von Neumann the other way which is usually excluded,
then Cohen added more baggage and an axiom of forcing
to result it "independent" instead of "inconsistent",
while yet various inductive arguments contradict each
other and thus in the weaker sort of account of induction,
have it "inconsistent".
It's so that mathematics has accounts of independence after
each of its accounts of openings/perestroikas/catastrophes,
since ancient times like for accounts of magnitudes or the
Pythagorean and so on, up to the 1900's account about whether
the reals and complex numbers are isomorphism then their _uniqueness_
up to isomorphism, when for examples there is readily contrived
other structures that fit the field axioms and are analytic,
besides that division in complex numbers is another opening,
helping show that mathematics the usual account of functional
analysis is full of holes.
"Openings", then, like openings in games, where chess is a
set-piece while go is a blank slate, with a lattice, about chess
or go or tong qi or the like, there is that "singularities in
a singularity theory are branches in a multiplicity theory".
Then, about the usual order of description of operations,
like those of arithmetic, then for example about whether
convolution is first or last or eventual, and it varies,
makes for accounts of the equi-interpretability of model theories.
So, the Cantorian with almost-all transcendental and the
Pythagorean with almost-all rational plainly don't agree,
yet either on its own account, then for what meets in the
middle "the middle of nowhere" that accounts of weak induction
will always fail to conclude concomitantly exist, yet that
the super-classical account of motion always concludes does.
We already have one.
Well I started taking a look at these or taking in "CONTENTS.md"
and a variety of lines emerge as a common thread, basically about
rational rational algebras and rational radical magmas, then as with
regards to various accounts of claimed completions and closures,
that combined reductions result weakened reductions and as of
overall mostly simple things, then as with regards to outlying
definition like "complete modularity", "de Rham", "semi-simple Galois
extensions", "monodromy" as after "holonomy", and otherwise the usual
idea that differential-geometry is partial-differential-geometry, and
doesn't have claims for wider classes of functions or stricter
definitions of topologies than partial-differential-geometries.
Accounts like "Zariski dense", for example, are qualified to reduce
their attachments to "analyticity", helping give that the results aren't >>> so surprising, and indeed about the "finer" or "sharper" points, the
claims variously either are conservative extensions, or in some cases,
indefensible claims about completions that can't be claimed or have
immediate direct counterexamples.
Looking for contradictions, basically is about irrationals, and accounts >>> of Erdos and about Hecke, about things like Apery's constant and the
infinitary series in rationals being irrational, that there are various
what can be made conflicting conclusions among the claimed theorems.
Accounts about Hecke about the theory of Ramsey furthermore encounter
results of independence known since Erdos that various of the claims
have counterexamples.
About the emphasis to rational fields and elliptic fields, and Selmer,
is basically to introduce "braids" about singular conditions, noting
that the various ranks or orders suggested have openings both above
(the infinite) _and below_ (the zero), making it so that some of the
claims are weaker than they might otherwise suggest, then, that among
interacting terms and implicits, and systems of the relevant mappings as >>> most accounts are simply enough of analyticity among "continuous
functions" of "rational domains", those "anti-inductive" results about
the infinitary or zero-eth order can combine and broadcast to result
counterexamples, even in otherwise the qualified account.
Examples like "complete modularity" include "Campana orbifold Iitaka
hypothesis", when various conjectures are conditioned by others.
Accounts like the existence of roots for polynomials with integer
coefficients, have counterexamples "for-each" if not "for-all", that for >>> example being a usual claim about universal solvers when yet polynomials >>> are not power series and are finite and each is solvable.
Accounts like the LeLong numbers vis-a-vis Riemann zeros help illustrate >>> that again the breakdown of analyticity makes for counterexamples as
above about the elliptic fields.
Mentions of the "semi-simple" basically break otherwise usual
attachments to Galois theory, that for example declarations inside and
outside a related theorem would be indeterminate or otherwise undefined
with regards to the claimed sorts of algebras.
Further accounts about the Iitaka function field with regards to Kodaira >>> (and Zariski and so on) are among their own terms about "monodromy" and
"holonomy", _incompatible_ with "partial-differential-geometry's"
accounts of reduced functions and expanded topologies.
It kind of seems they went looking for a bunch of kinds of conjectures
any at all related to elliptic fields and made at least a weak result
about, then though that openinings and counterexamples make for that
accounts after immersions and submersions for sheaves and
differential-topology can be part of total-differential-geometry's and
not necessarily partial-differential-geometry's, point being that's the
general milieu of the line of the reasoning.
Accounts like for Bloch and Albanese have for example that the
isomorphism of the complete-ordered-field has that here, for example,
[-1, 1] is equipped with field operations (as in the limit) that makes
for that R and C are no longer unique instead distinct.
The account about Lagrange and Kahler is loose (that's otherwise about
distinctions among partial and total the accounts of continuity for
geometry, with de Rham, and modularity for integers, and "complete
modularity").
Hikita and Nakijima are similarly addressed as Lagrange and Kahler and
Bloch and Albanese, i,.e., that there are counterexamples in the open
(or less-partial), and stronger required conditions in the less-partial. >>>
Accounts of quaternions (or complex numbers) and their division rings
ignore that division on complex numbers (or otherwise in terms in
imaginaries) has multiple possible definitions, just like there exist
negative integers or complex numbers.
I'd be looking into the claimed counterexample to Lipman-Zariski,
associating it with variously stronger acounts monodromy and holonomy,
and about the basic inversion of integral analysis and differential
analysis, then as well about claims about plane curves from
"partial-differential geometry".
Some of the accounts of the rank-lowering after things like Ruffini-Abel >>> then for as noted about Calabi-Yau as for something like Clebsch-Gordon, >>> an account of reductionism, then have for something like for that by
"disproving Abhyanker-Sathaye" they also disprove themselves, on
accounts like these as of the above.
They basically have "ampleness" and "lowering" as contradicting
each other (as they contradict each other).
"053. A counterexample to Pixton completeness in Chow.
** Constructs a tautological relation on a moduli space of stable
pointed curves that vanishes in rational Chow, hence in rational
cohomology, but lies outside Pixton's original relation span. This
disproves the Chow and rational-cohomological forms of his original
completeness conjecture."
I'd suggest that's not so, though it would then be for getting into the
reasoning, while yet that it's also among its own settings of the
"almost-quite" which is the "not-quite".
There's a lot of commonality among the suggested claims, with regards
to dimensionality and 3 and 4, that with regards to various notions of
the existence of products like the cross product and so on, and about
for example the mention of Maxwell and 4-D, vis-a-vis "threefolds",
that it's be expected that the formalism would be modular itself and
composed of very similar reasoning, though it's not surprising if it's
just copy-smeared-pasted, point being that a lot of these claims are
very similar.
Something like 059 about Zariski multiplicity would be in contradiction
to claims of closures and completions about related results in the
rational rational algebras and rational radical magmas.
Accounts of Fano about distributions generally would exclude
non-standard probability distributions, for example well-known
examples like Dirac delta. This is a usual account of "masked"
or "censored" or "removable" singularities after discontinuities.
The 064 for example or -
"**064. Topological triviality of <i>++</i>-constant
surface singularities.** Proves topological right-triviality for every
holomorphic one-parameter family of isolated hypersurface singularities
in rae<sup>3</sup> with constant Milnor number, resolving the surface
case of the <i>++</i>-constant problem. After shrinking the parameter
disk and representatives, ambient homeomorphisms vary jointly
continuously, fix the origin section and preserve the defining
functions."
- has that that all lives under "continuous functions" and reuses the
definition of the qualitative number, i.e., confounding itself.
So, looking through the first few, it's mostly "rational plus rational
equals rational" and "continuous functions are continuous functions",
yet, it's well known since Pythagoras that not all numbers are rational, >>> then furthermore various infinite series in rationals (have limits that) >>> are ir-rational.
Then, the various contradictory accounts for example as mentioned
above, either contradicting each other, having implicit counterexamples, >>> having non-standard or extend counter-examples, or being under-defined
or ambiguous, makes for ready theorem (or, "claim") generation, making
for a thorough sort of deconstructive factoring of the claims.
That and trivials, ....
"**068. Anticanonical nonvanishing in every dimension.** If <i>X</i> is
a smooth connected complex projective variety and $`-K_X`$ admits a
smooth Hermitian metric with nonnegative curvature, then
$`H^0(X,-mK_X)\ne0`$ for some <i>m</i> > 0. Thus smooth
semipositivity forces a nonzero section of a positive tensor power of
the anticanonical bundle in every dimension."
See, for example, 068 and 053 aren't getting along.
So, for things like "which are the elementary functions and which
are the special functions", like for Lambert's W, then as well for
already "what are functions and what are topologies" with regards
to _partial_ differential-geometry and the inversions of definition
of "monodromy" and "holonomy" in _partial_ differential-geometry,
the non-standard (super-standard) in probability and so, then about
Ramsey theory and counter-examples in the infinitary, then besides,
some of the claims are attacking one branch of the bibliography
and promoting another, while under dis-ambiguation they say the same
thing, which is capricious.
About the Navier-Stokes bit from a few weeks ago,
it was already mentioned here that the "hairy ball theorem"
already gives an account then that the account given
is yet a _finite_ blowup, since "an arbitrarily large
finite constant" is yet not _infinite_.
Then also there was the "non-sofic groups exist" which
basically all those inductive arguments would see as
a counter-example.
It's basically not much different from taking a random
sampling of abstract and theorems quite widely, though
there's a definite slant toward the partial and reductionism
and away from the singular and integral (and, "complete modularity"),
and vouching the safety of EC DSA, which is a modern standard.
Doesn't much address Erdos' "Giant Monsters of Mathematical Independence",
or for that matter the wider account of theory overall.
On 10/08/2026 06:24 AM, sobriquet wrote:
Op 8-10-2026 om 05:21 schreef Ross Finlayson:
On 10/07/2026 07:20 PM, sobriquet wrote:
[..]
Do you think AI will have solved all the remaining Millennium-prize
problems by the end of next year?
It seems they pretty rapidly went from being able to solve high-school >>>> level Math Olympiad problems to research level math problems.
No, I think that a variety of Hilbert or Clay problems
are _independent_ "standard" or "ordinary" number theory
after "standard" and "ordinary" set theory the usual
descriptive set theory's account, then that solvers like
HOL/Isabelle/Coq/Lean and so on where the primitives are
classes for relation suffer all the aspects of class/set
distinction, then furthermore, primitives of "total functions"
suffer from that there exists non-Cartesian functions,
like "sweep", the natural/unit equivalency function.
I think a variety of what's considered in the extrapolation
is that what's been "solved" isn't really considered "solved",
either. I.e., people are reading too much into the results,
as about the "almost-quite", here.
Thanks for writing, good luck in your endeavors.
For now it seems like it will be like Euclid, gathering all existing
math and formalizing it into a comprehensive framework (Lean).
It will be really interesting when it starts coming up with new math
concepts, but I reckon that would still require some sort of
breakthrough, since it seems it can't even come up with concepts from
scratch for toy problems like the game of go.
There's the Cantorian Continuum Hypothesis, which supposedly
contributed to Cantor's madness that he couldn't prove it,
then that Goedel showed it consistent (shown) one way,
von Neumann the other way which is usually excluded,
then Cohen added more baggage and an axiom of forcing
to result it "independent" instead of "inconsistent",
while yet various inductive arguments contradict each
other and thus in the weaker sort of account of induction,
have it "inconsistent".
It's so that mathematics has accounts of independence after
each of its accounts of openings/perestroikas/catastrophes,
since ancient times like for accounts of magnitudes or the
Pythagorean and so on, up to the 1900's account about whether
the reals and complex numbers are isomorphism then their _uniqueness_
up to isomorphism, when for examples there is readily contrived
other structures that fit the field axioms and are analytic,
besides that division in complex numbers is another opening,
helping show that mathematics the usual account of functional
analysis is full of holes.
"Openings", then, like openings in games, where chess is a
set-piece while go is a blank slate, with a lattice, about chess
or go or tong qi or the like, there is that "singularities in
a singularity theory are branches in a multiplicity theory".
Then, about the usual order of description of operations,
like those of arithmetic, then for example about whether
convolution is first or last or eventual, and it varies,
makes for accounts of the equi-interpretability of model theories.
So, the Cantorian with almost-all transcendental and the
Pythagorean with almost-all rational plainly don't agree,
yet either on its own account, then for what meets in the
middle "the middle of nowhere" that accounts of weak induction
will always fail to conclude concomitantly exist, yet that
the super-classical account of motion always concludes does.
We already have one.
On 10/08/2026 06:54 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 10/08/2026 06:24 AM, sobriquet wrote:
Op 8-10-2026 om 05:21 schreef Ross Finlayson:
On 10/07/2026 07:20 PM, sobriquet wrote:
[..]
Do you think AI will have solved all the remaining Millennium-prize
problems by the end of next year?
It seems they pretty rapidly went from being able to solve high-school >>>>> level Math Olympiad problems to research level math problems.
No, I think that a variety of Hilbert or Clay problems
are _independent_ "standard" or "ordinary" number theory
after "standard" and "ordinary" set theory the usual
descriptive set theory's account, then that solvers like
HOL/Isabelle/Coq/Lean and so on where the primitives are
classes for relation suffer all the aspects of class/set
distinction, then furthermore, primitives of "total functions"
suffer from that there exists non-Cartesian functions,
like "sweep", the natural/unit equivalency function.
I think a variety of what's considered in the extrapolation
is that what's been "solved" isn't really considered "solved",
either. I.e., people are reading too much into the results,
as about the "almost-quite", here.
Thanks for writing, good luck in your endeavors.
For now it seems like it will be like Euclid, gathering all existing
math and formalizing it into a comprehensive framework (Lean).
It will be really interesting when it starts coming up with new math
concepts, but I reckon that would still require some sort of
breakthrough, since it seems it can't even come up with concepts from
scratch for toy problems like the game of go.
There's the Cantorian Continuum Hypothesis, which supposedly
contributed to Cantor's madness that he couldn't prove it,
then that Goedel showed it consistent (shown) one way,
von Neumann the other way which is usually excluded,
then Cohen added more baggage and an axiom of forcing
to result it "independent" instead of "inconsistent",
while yet various inductive arguments contradict each
other and thus in the weaker sort of account of induction,
have it "inconsistent".
It's so that mathematics has accounts of independence after
each of its accounts of openings/perestroikas/catastrophes,
since ancient times like for accounts of magnitudes or the
Pythagorean and so on, up to the 1900's account about whether
the reals and complex numbers are isomorphism then their _uniqueness_
up to isomorphism, when for examples there is readily contrived
other structures that fit the field axioms and are analytic,
besides that division in complex numbers is another opening,
helping show that mathematics the usual account of functional
analysis is full of holes.
"Openings", then, like openings in games, where chess is a
set-piece while go is a blank slate, with a lattice, about chess
or go or tong qi or the like, there is that "singularities in
a singularity theory are branches in a multiplicity theory".
Then, about the usual order of description of operations,
like those of arithmetic, then for example about whether
convolution is first or last or eventual, and it varies,
makes for accounts of the equi-interpretability of model theories.
So, the Cantorian with almost-all transcendental and the
Pythagorean with almost-all rational plainly don't agree,
yet either on its own account, then for what meets in the
middle "the middle of nowhere" that accounts of weak induction
will always fail to conclude concomitantly exist, yet that
the super-classical account of motion always concludes does.
We already have one.
That's a big "if".
"Common-sensical" is by definition a sort of reflection on
the inter-subjective and all the accounts of _reason_.
As "reflection on reason", and "structured reflection on
reason", then philosophy in a sense is about thinking beings
and feeling beings about human condition where man is animal
and man is machine, yet, man is mind, which is somehow sublime,
where for example it's an opinion that there's not a mind/body
problem, instead that a sort of holistic dual monism makes
for an account of paradox-free reason for theory primarily.
Then, sometimes "philosopher" is inclusive, and means any
thinking-being engaging in first-class reason, and sometimes
it's exclusive, meaning we're only yet attaining to be
"true philosophers", about what's "Truth" vis-a-vis
what's "true".
The notion of "philocasuy" then at least is a form of philosophy
that's yet rather more demanding its fulfillment.
Then, we might separate the "technical philosophy" from the
"analytical philosophy", or the "technical" from the "techno-analytic",
that any usual common-sensical abstraction is well enough "analytic"
or "techno-analytic", yet, in terms of a theory overall and an
overall theory to be "technical", to be subjectable to technique,
that "most philosophers" these days would consider themselves in
their "paleo-classical, post-modern" approach to be analytical,
that logic and mathematics makes quite strong requirements what's
to be properly "technical".
Then, "moral philosophy" is its own sort of account about the
human condition, basically reflecting on free-will I haven't
much spoken to it, while I maintain notions of "absolute"
ethics and morals as for and above one-self.
Nobody's perfect, ..., "Truth" is, though.
How about "extreme rationalism" since "structural realism",
and then for "Foundations" and something like a "theatheory"
as a putative candidate for a Foundations a theory-of-everything,
in the technical sense for a constant, consistent, complete,
and concrete account of a paleo-classical post-modern treatment
of reason on Truth?
Reflections on reason?
That for a "technical philosophy", then,
can we ever take the "mean" out of the "meaning"?
Like I said, I don't believe in Wittgenstein,
and whether or not he basically stole the Tractatus
from Frege under his tutelage then absconded to
Cambridge to fester under Russell, of course that's
not a usually considered fact.
Like other strong mathematical platonists since antiquity,
the idea that truth exists and is discovered, and that
right angles, straight lines, and perfect circles exist
regardless our mere mortal meanderings, makes for itself
that the later account of the apriori for the axiomatics
is simple since Proclus, then that accounts of language
and the inter-subjective are well-known since Lucretius
and Aristotle and sense.
That "space exists" is usually given in the negative since Aristotle
with "nature abhors a vacuum", yet one must acknowledge that it's
simply the result of an inductive argument and sticking with "substance exists", that yet "substrate exists" is certainly part of modern
theories like physics' with Einstein's.
Half-Aristotleans and other adherents to "the invincible ignorance
of inductive inference" plainly _fail_ in the super-classical, which is.
Zero, one, and infinity are the regular singular points of the hypergeometric.
"Numbers exist" is not only a usual account of platonism the
mathematical platonism, also they say you don't exist.
There's "differential geometry", often the main of which should
be called "partial differential geometry", since similarly to
how "classical functions" won't admit vertical tangents, that
"partial differential geometry" won't admit horizontal tangents.
When learning of this, I think most people would be apalled,
since it seems they intend to re-define "function" to be of
less generality than it is, then to claim more generality for
various numerical methods, when really it should be "pdg-functions",
that "partial differential geometry" is just a little sub-field.
Basically making accounts about the total and absolute about
"holonomy" then resulting an opposite meaning and calling it same,
makes for that "partial differential geometry" is considered
what it should be, since "differential geometry" would include
the "total" and "absolute" of the "differential geometry",
not "banning zero" since "banning infinity".
So, it's f'in wrong and a lie, much like "classical quasi-modal logic".
Zero is more than just a singularity, along with infinity, since singularities in what would be singularity theories are branches
in a multiplicity theory, then for example that the "identity
dimension", including zero, is an extended singularity, and the
envelope of the linear fractional equation, Clairaut's equation,
d'Alembert's equation, and so on, the integral equations.
Quantum mechanics since Born that basically intend to include
"rest" have the failing that much like Planck being smallest
yet finite, have that thusly they have no straight lines,
right angles, perfect circles, and so on.
Zero, one, and infinity are the regular singular points of
the hypergeometric.
So, zero meters-per-second, is, infinity seconds-per-meter.
Yet, what that ignores is that rest is transient, that
zero meters-per-second, is in seconds (secondae, after minutae,
units of time), and infinity seconds-per-meter, is also in seconds, everything all parameterized by time.
So, the dimensional analysis, is a bit too weakly the dimensionless
analysis, that a wider dimensioned analysis, brings in the non-local,
and the overall potentialistic account of theory, about which the
usual account of "the classical" is a bit "the partial".
It's similar the difference between "length" and "distance", or
about "metric" and "norm": no longer do meters suffice, since,
distance is meters in time/time, about the infinitely-many higher orders
of acceleration all in time.
Further reductionist accounts result zero (by zero).
There's Hume with necessity of relevance logic and Frege with language
quite structured, about kicking Hobbes, Wittgenstein, etc.
Did Wittgenstein simply _steal_ the Tractatus from Frege, many
of whose works shortly thereafter were burned up? There are
yet posthumous Frege writings to be dug up, while it's so that
Frege already had a great account of language and that after logic.
When Frank Ramsey went to Austria to translate Wittgenstein's
copy of the Tractatus, and spent it mostly with Wittgenstein
not helping, then later back at Cambridge mostly was against
Wittgenstein, does it suggest that Wittgenstein was a fraud
and later a fraudster? Here it's a hunch, yet the stylistic
account that there's no way young hot-head Wittgenstein wrote
the Tractatus, that Ramsey was a pretty great mind.
Then there's Hume, the "problem of induction" usually enough mis-read,
that Hume demands a modal temporal relevance logic, then also makes
for accounts of the strength of the wider, fuller dialectic.
So, putting down Wittgenstein as a plagiarist in language games after
Frege, the Heidegger as a plagiarist in language games after
Parmenidies, then Nietzsche as a plagiarist in language games after
Emerson, and Russell as a plagiarist after Philo, they're weak anti-Platos.
Which make examples of object lessons, ....
Usual proof systems' reliance on "total functions" and "class
primitives" is more a failure than mere "incompleteness".
There are others, ....
The damnation as it were to "the invincible ignorance of inductive
inference" among "completing claims" and "conflicting conclusions"
of "contrasting or irresolute regularities/rulialities" makes for why
that a real modal, temporal relevance logic is necessary for sound
reasoning, in a wide account.
I'm a canonical dogmatic doctrinal researcher in
a paleo-classical post-modern account with a thorough
account of reason and super-classical reasoning,
not an ingrate.
It's hard to say what would be "original" thought, though,
for example, I introduce something like an "original" as
an "originary" analysis for mathematics like "the identity dimension".
Attaining to "Truth" is a usual account of seeking wisdom,
then that accounts of "Foundations" have very, very strong
requirements for their satisfaction of being thorough.
So, the "paleo-classical post-modern" as "super-classical
super-modern" makes for that historicity, metaphysics,
and monism are present.
Anybody has their own philosophy and psychology.
An account of a holistic dual monism, for example in the West from
Heraclitus and in the East from Zen or the Dao, is completely trivial
from accounts of "Being" and "Universe", and inverse.
Free-will is given as an account of individual freedom, including
freedom of religion, where what people bind themselves to as the lig-ous
or their ligatures their ontological commitment, may include
for example "atheism", or even "nihilism", then that free-will is
nominally un-falsifiable with regards to otherwise stimulus and
response, and randomness or stochasticity, thusly that it's "super-scientific": not necessarily un-scientific, simply super.
So, "holistic dual monism" is for an account of "dually-self-infraconsistency", for paradox-free reason, so that
reason is not wrong and you're right.
Tarski's account of model-relative non-self-contradiction
is simple, closed, and inductively-biased empirical non-affirmation.
https://www.youtube.com/@rossfinlayson
How about 200+ hours of unscripted lectures?
"Axiomless Principled Thea-theory"
I summed it up in "Axiomless Principled Thea-theory".
It's a "theory of everything" where "truth" is the quantity,
and it's conserved, always-everywhere and always-becoming.
It's a theory where as a heno-theory then various accounts
of heno-theory make for theories like logic, and mathematics
with geometry and arithmetic, and language with language
and words (and probability and physics).
There's a modal, temporal relevance logic, that's classical.
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