• =?UTF-8?Q?Re:_Within_Proof_Theoretic_Semantics_G=c3=b6del's_G_has_n?= =?UTF-8?Q?o_meaning_in_PA?=

    From Ross Finlayson@ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com to sci.logic,sci.math,sci.math.symbolic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Sun Jul 5 12:56:13 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.ai.philosophy

    On 07/05/2026 09:33 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/5/2026 9:52 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 16:31, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 06/05/2026 20:37, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
    On 02/05/2026 20:47, Scott Hoge wrote:

    In Cantor's theorem, we do not actually construct a diagonal.
    Rather, we presuppose that we can enumerate a set, and then,
    /purely on the grounds of possibility/, conceive a diagonalized
    non-element.

    Nope, as explained and re-explained ad nauseam around here:
    just the resident trolls won't get it.

    Cantor's diagonal argument, the one with the binary sequences,
    is indeed constructive: a definition of anti-diagonal of *any*
    (infinite) list is provided, and the proof that the anti-diagonal
    cannot be in the list is quite constructive.

    "quite" but not "completely".

    A constructive operation is defined, but a diagonal number is
    constructed just when that constructive operation is applied to a
    constructible list.

    I should note for the less knowledgable readers of course it's less
    often than that, it is only that often for systems such as the one Julio
    and Phoenix are using which allows dequantification of universally
    quantified statements into the system proper which then have derivable
    statements containing actual constructions of the constructible objects
    they apply to by virtue of their original quantification. Of course,
    dequantification of fantastically quantified statements doesn't make a
    statement about nonconstructible objects because there aren't any
    outside of the fantastical quantification.

    By which I don't mean to argue the countability of the set of reals as
    defined in what we call Cantor's Proof of the Uncountability of the
    Reals to include objects quantified over by fantatstical quantification
    but not by universal quantification, but it does make some meaning
    clearer.

    While some of the sets might have objects in the system proper, some of
    the members of some of the sets clearly do not.


    % This sentence is not true.
    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    Olcott's Minimal Type Theory
    G rao -4Prov_PA(riLGriY)
    Directed Graph of evaluation sequence
    00 rao 01 02
    01 G
    02 -4 03
    03 Prov_PA 04
    04 G||del_Number_of 01 // cycle indicates no well-founded justification
    tree exists.

    The absence of
    (a) finite sequence of inference steps to an atomic base,
    (b) canonical proof
    (c) well-founded justification tree
    makes the above to PTS invalid.


    Yeah, come up with something new, or stuff a sock in it.


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  • From Ross Finlayson@ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com to sci.logic,sci.math,sci.math.symbolic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Sun Jul 5 14:30:02 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.ai.philosophy

    On 07/05/2026 01:25 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/5/2026 2:56 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
    On 07/05/2026 09:33 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/5/2026 9:52 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 16:31, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 06/05/2026 20:37, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
    On 02/05/2026 20:47, Scott Hoge wrote:

    In Cantor's theorem, we do not actually construct a diagonal.
    Rather, we presuppose that we can enumerate a set, and then,
    /purely on the grounds of possibility/, conceive a diagonalized
    non-element.

    Nope, as explained and re-explained ad nauseam around here:
    just the resident trolls won't get it.

    Cantor's diagonal argument, the one with the binary sequences,
    is indeed constructive: a definition of anti-diagonal of *any*
    (infinite) list is provided, and the proof that the anti-diagonal
    cannot be in the list is quite constructive.

    "quite" but not "completely".

    A constructive operation is defined, but a diagonal number is
    constructed just when that constructive operation is applied to a
    constructible list.

    I should note for the less knowledgable readers of course it's less
    often than that, it is only that often for systems such as the one
    Julio
    and Phoenix are using which allows dequantification of universally
    quantified statements into the system proper which then have derivable >>>> statements containing actual constructions of the constructible objects >>>> they apply to by virtue of their original quantification. Of course,
    dequantification of fantastically quantified statements doesn't make a >>>> statement about nonconstructible objects because there aren't any
    outside of the fantastical quantification.

    By which I don't mean to argue the countability of the set of reals as >>>> defined in what we call Cantor's Proof of the Uncountability of the
    Reals to include objects quantified over by fantatstical quantification >>>> but not by universal quantification, but it does make some meaning
    clearer.

    While some of the sets might have objects in the system proper, some of >>>> the members of some of the sets clearly do not.


    % This sentence is not true.
    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    Olcott's Minimal Type Theory
    G rao -4Prov_PA(riLGriY)
    Directed Graph of evaluation sequence
    00 rao 01 02
    01 G
    02 -4 03
    03 Prov_PA 04
    04 G||del_Number_of 01 // cycle indicates no well-founded justification >>> tree exists.

    The absence of
    (a) finite sequence of inference steps to an atomic base,
    (b) canonical proof
    (c) well-founded justification tree
    makes the above to PTS invalid.


    Yeah, come up with something new, or stuff a sock in it.



    The above proves that the notion of undecidable
    is incorrect if you understood rather than ignored
    what it says.

    It also is the final resolution to the Liar Paradox
    and you would know this if you understood it.


    Like I said,
    "understanding" is for suckers,
    "comprehension" is for knowledge.


    Your axiomatization otherwise is false.


    It's like they say,
    "It just don't mean a thing."


    WM <- retro-finitist crankety-troll
    JG <- retro-finitist crankety-troll
    PO <- retro-finitist crankety-troll
    "Polluter(s) of sci.math"


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  • From Ross Finlayson@ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com to sci.logic,sci.math,sci.math.symbolic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Sun Jul 5 15:15:37 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.ai.philosophy

    On 07/05/2026 02:45 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/5/2026 4:30 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
    On 07/05/2026 01:25 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/5/2026 2:56 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
    On 07/05/2026 09:33 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/5/2026 9:52 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 16:31, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 06/05/2026 20:37, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
    On 02/05/2026 20:47, Scott Hoge wrote:

    In Cantor's theorem, we do not actually construct a diagonal. >>>>>>>>> Rather, we presuppose that we can enumerate a set, and then, >>>>>>>>> /purely on the grounds of possibility/, conceive a diagonalized >>>>>>>>> non-element.

    Nope, as explained and re-explained ad nauseam around here:
    just the resident trolls won't get it.

    Cantor's diagonal argument, the one with the binary sequences, >>>>>>>> is indeed constructive: a definition of anti-diagonal of *any* >>>>>>>> (infinite) list is provided, and the proof that the anti-diagonal >>>>>>>> cannot be in the list is quite constructive.

    "quite" but not "completely".

    A constructive operation is defined, but a diagonal number is
    constructed just when that constructive operation is applied to a >>>>>>> constructible list.

    I should note for the less knowledgable readers of course it's less >>>>>> often than that, it is only that often for systems such as the one >>>>>> Julio
    and Phoenix are using which allows dequantification of universally >>>>>> quantified statements into the system proper which then have
    derivable
    statements containing actual constructions of the constructible
    objects
    they apply to by virtue of their original quantification. Of course, >>>>>> dequantification of fantastically quantified statements doesn't
    make a
    statement about nonconstructible objects because there aren't any
    outside of the fantastical quantification.

    By which I don't mean to argue the countability of the set of
    reals as
    defined in what we call Cantor's Proof of the Uncountability of the >>>>>> Reals to include objects quantified over by fantatstical
    quantification
    but not by universal quantification, but it does make some meaning >>>>>> clearer.

    While some of the sets might have objects in the system proper,
    some of
    the members of some of the sets clearly do not.


    % This sentence is not true.
    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    Olcott's Minimal Type Theory
    G rao -4Prov_PA(riLGriY)
    Directed Graph of evaluation sequence
    00 rao 01 02
    01 G
    02 -4 03
    03 Prov_PA 04
    04 G||del_Number_of 01 // cycle indicates no well-founded
    justification
    tree exists.

    The absence of
    (a) finite sequence of inference steps to an atomic base,
    (b) canonical proof
    (c) well-founded justification tree
    makes the above to PTS invalid.


    Yeah, come up with something new, or stuff a sock in it.



    The above proves that the notion of undecidable
    is incorrect if you understood rather than ignored
    what it says.

    It also is the final resolution to the Liar Paradox
    and you would know this if you understood it.


    Like I said,
    "understanding" is for suckers,
    "comprehension" is for knowledge.


    Gemini agrees with me and I only gave it the Prolog. https://share.gemini.google/1dJnMwOZ2k5F


    Your axiomatization otherwise is false.


    It's like they say,
    "It just don't mean a thing."


    WM <- retro-finitist crankety-troll
    JG <- retro-finitist crankety-troll
    PO <- retro-finitist crankety-troll
    "Polluter(s) of sci.math"





    Gemini agrees with not-you.


    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Ross Finlayson@ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com to sci.logic,sci.math,sci.math.symbolic,comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Jul 6 09:16:29 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.ai.philosophy

    On 07/05/2026 03:55 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/5/2026 5:15 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
    On 07/05/2026 02:45 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/5/2026 4:30 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
    On 07/05/2026 01:25 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/5/2026 2:56 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
    On 07/05/2026 09:33 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 7/5/2026 9:52 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 04/07/2026 16:31, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 06/05/2026 20:37, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
    On 02/05/2026 20:47, Scott Hoge wrote:

    In Cantor's theorem, we do not actually construct a diagonal. >>>>>>>>>>> Rather, we presuppose that we can enumerate a set, and then, >>>>>>>>>>> /purely on the grounds of possibility/, conceive a diagonalized >>>>>>>>>>> non-element.

    Nope, as explained and re-explained ad nauseam around here: >>>>>>>>>> just the resident trolls won't get it.

    Cantor's diagonal argument, the one with the binary sequences, >>>>>>>>>> is indeed constructive: a definition of anti-diagonal of *any* >>>>>>>>>> (infinite) list is provided, and the proof that the anti-diagonal >>>>>>>>>> cannot be in the list is quite constructive.

    "quite" but not "completely".

    A constructive operation is defined, but a diagonal number is >>>>>>>>> constructed just when that constructive operation is applied to a >>>>>>>>> constructible list.

    I should note for the less knowledgable readers of course it's less >>>>>>>> often than that, it is only that often for systems such as the one >>>>>>>> Julio
    and Phoenix are using which allows dequantification of universally >>>>>>>> quantified statements into the system proper which then have
    derivable
    statements containing actual constructions of the constructible >>>>>>>> objects
    they apply to by virtue of their original quantification. Of
    course,
    dequantification of fantastically quantified statements doesn't >>>>>>>> make a
    statement about nonconstructible objects because there aren't any >>>>>>>> outside of the fantastical quantification.

    By which I don't mean to argue the countability of the set of
    reals as
    defined in what we call Cantor's Proof of the Uncountability of the >>>>>>>> Reals to include objects quantified over by fantatstical
    quantification
    but not by universal quantification, but it does make some meaning >>>>>>>> clearer.

    While some of the sets might have objects in the system proper, >>>>>>>> some of
    the members of some of the sets clearly do not.


    % This sentence is not true.
    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.



    Gemini agrees with not-you.



    OK then the point that I was trying to make is
    exactly what Gemini said right here:
    https://share.gemini.google/1dJnMwOZ2k5F





    I tend not to follow links like that, post the transcript.


    Point being though that "Prawitz' PTS" has _recovery_ and
    the outer products not just inner products, since complementary
    duals, and that accounts of inductive ignorance and _elimination_
    are not full accounts of logic.


    About what's "agreeably arguable" and "arguably agreeable",
    try Claude instead, or Kimi, either less "automatically agreeable"
    then Gemini or Grok, where ChatGPT is about in the middle, then
    though that they're all quite alike as model reasoners.


    Anyways language includes its own account within itself,
    so there are first-class models of cycles, and then that
    the resolution of mathematical paradox ends-with there
    not being any, not starts-with there not being any.


    Then, novelty has that simply repeating the argument
    does not strengthen it, indeed, it weakens it,
    then the fact that "LP" its assignment trivially
    short-circuits to not-true-LP resulting false
    then is nothing. I.e., that implementation just balks
    since its type system has no context, not having
    context first-class itself.




    About the un-countability of the complete-ordered-field
    or "field-reals" yet countability of a continuous domain
    like "line-reals", basically has that "non-Cartesian functions"
    exist in accounts of the continuous and for geometry,
    which simply has that primitive-recursive-arithmetic
    and its usual account of Cartesian functions (elements re-move-able,
    mappings re-order-able) doesn't suffice to describe geometric relation.


    So, it's a theorem in any account of descriptive set theory
    "strong enough for geometry" that the existence of non-Cartesian
    functions is a theorem, then that there are models of continuous
    domains (extent, density, completeness, measure) that are countable
    like the line-reals, un-countable like the field-reals, and variously
    countable and un-countable and even of greater cardinality like
    the signal-reals, since there exist non-Cartesian functions so
    it's entirely consistent their existence together, that since
    they have constructive demonstractions each, otherwise would
    simply, and always, contradict each other.



    So, any account of theory intending to describe mathematics
    results having line-reals, field-reals, and signal-reals,
    about the nature of the continuous and discrete after
    the nature of the infinite and finite.



    Then, "Russell's retro-thesis" is similarly a retro-finitist's,
    wishing what's so, here it's called "hypocritical".






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