From Newsgroup: aus.rail

I made a request for information under the GIPA Act. (NSW equivalent of Freedom of Information). Amongst other things I asked for details of the training given to control centre operators regarding the emergency door release system.

In the response, it says,

"Information has been identified as falling within the scope of your application. However, Northwest Project Delivery has advised that the
control centre operators are trained to respond to the activation of an emergency door release, but Sydney Metro does not hold any records
containing the training details."

What kind of training are they being given then? How can there be any consistency if there are no records? How can an operator refresh their
memory as to the correct procedure?

Of course, they may just be lying. They seem to be using every means at
their disposal to avoid providing useful information. For example, the emergency door release does not operate while the train is moving, so I
asked how the train speed is determined by the system.

In the response it says

"The train speed is not a relevant determination as emergency door
release cannot occur until the train is stationary."

Sylvia.

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From Newsgroup: aus.rail

On 4/08/2019 11:36 am, Sylvia Else wrote:

I made a request for information under the GIPA Act. (NSW equivalent of Freedom of Information). Amongst other things I asked for details of the training given to control centre operators regarding the emergency door release system.

Why?

snip
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From Newsgroup: aus.rail

On 4/08/2019 3:50 pm, Dechucka wrote:

On 4/08/2019 11:36 am, Sylvia Else wrote:

I made a request for information under the GIPA Act. (NSW equivalent
of Freedom of Information). Amongst other things I asked for details
of the training given to control centre operators regarding the
emergency door release system.

Why?

snip

When you pull the emergency door release handle it does not, contrary to
what you'd expect, immediately release the doors. Rather, there is a
built in delay, during which time it sends a signal to the control
centre. The operator there can override the door release, so that the
doors will not open, even after the delay time has expired.

Inquiries into past accidents have repeatedly shown that train operators
do not handle real emergencies at all well. My concern is that the Metro centre operators will always respond to a emergency door release signal
by overriding it, and only after that seeking to determine whether there
is an emergency. That is not what they're meant to do, which is to use
the delay time to decide whether to apply the override.

If their immediate response is to override the release, then in a real emergency such as a fire, that extends the time before the passengers
can escape. It isn't even clear that the operators can release the doors themselves once they have applied the override. The passengers may have
to try to operate the emergency release again, and wait for the delay
time to expire again.

The emergency release mechanism has been made very complicated, all in
the name of preventing passengers from operating it and getting out of
the train when they don't need to. There's every chance that in a real emergency with a damaged train, it won't operate in the way it should,
and passengers will die as a result.

NSW seems to be the only place where this approach is taken.

Sylvia.
--- Synchronet 3.21d-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: aus.rail

On 4/08/2019 4:08 pm, Sylvia Else wrote:

On 4/08/2019 3:50 pm, Dechucka wrote:

On 4/08/2019 11:36 am, Sylvia Else wrote:

I made a request for information under the GIPA Act. (NSW equivalent
of Freedom of Information). Amongst other things I asked for details
of the training given to control centre operators regarding the
emergency door release system.

Why?

snip

When you pull the emergency door release handle it does not, contrary to what you'd expect, immediately release the doors. Rather, there is a
built in delay, during which time it sends a signal to the control
centre. The operator there can override the door release, so that the
doors will not open, even after the delay time has expired.

Inquiries into past accidents have repeatedly shown that train operators
do not handle real emergencies at all well. My concern is that the Metro centre operators will always respond to a emergency door release signal
by overriding it, and only after that seeking to determine whether there
is an emergency. That is not what they're meant to do, which is to use
the delay time to decide whether to apply the override.

If their immediate response is to override the release, then in a real emergency such as a fire, that extends the time before the passengers
can escape. It isn't even clear that the operators can release the doors themselves once they have applied the override. The passengers may have
to try to operate the emergency release again, and wait for the delay
time to expire again.

The emergency release mechanism has been made very complicated, all in
the name of preventing passengers from operating it and getting out of
the train when they don't need to. There's every chance that in a real emergency with a damaged train, it won't operate in the way it should,
and passengers will die as a result.

NSW seems to be the only place where this approach is taken.

Sylvia.

I now realize why people don't answer your e-mails
--- Synchronet 3.21d-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: aus.rail

On 4/08/2019 6:52 pm, Dechucka wrote:

On 4/08/2019 4:08 pm, Sylvia Else wrote:

On 4/08/2019 3:50 pm, Dechucka wrote:

On 4/08/2019 11:36 am, Sylvia Else wrote:

I made a request for information under the GIPA Act. (NSW equivalent
of Freedom of Information). Amongst other things I asked for details
of the training given to control centre operators regarding the
emergency door release system.

Why?

snip

When you pull the emergency door release handle it does not, contrary
to what you'd expect, immediately release the doors. Rather, there is
a built in delay, during which time it sends a signal to the control
centre. The operator there can override the door release, so that the
doors will not open, even after the delay time has expired.

Inquiries into past accidents have repeatedly shown that train
operators do not handle real emergencies at all well. My concern is
that the Metro centre operators will always respond to a emergency
door release signal by overriding it, and only after that seeking to
determine whether there is an emergency. That is not what they're
meant to do, which is to use the delay time to decide whether to apply
the override.

If their immediate response is to override the release, then in a real
emergency such as a fire, that extends the time before the passengers
can escape. It isn't even clear that the operators can release the
doors themselves once they have applied the override. The passengers
may have to try to operate the emergency release again, and wait for
the delay time to expire again.

The emergency release mechanism has been made very complicated, all in
the name of preventing passengers from operating it and getting out of
the train when they don't need to. There's every chance that in a real
emergency with a damaged train, it won't operate in the way it should,
and passengers will die as a result.

NSW seems to be the only place where this approach is taken.

Sylvia.

I now realize why people don't answer your e-mails

And why is that?

Sylvia.
--- Synchronet 3.21d-Linux NewsLink 1.2