https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/5777548/ro-2020-002_prelim.pdf
In <hengfaFac6cU1@mid.individual.net>, Sylvia Else <sylvia@email.invalid> writes:
https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/5777548/ro-2020-002_prelim.pdf
Thanks Sylvia.
The cause of the crash is buried deep in the bureaucratic obfuscation.
Top level of criminal negligence lies with the politicians who:-
1) Apparently paid for only a single standard gauge track between Albury and
Melbourne, and
2) Reduced the number and quality of public servants because they hate them.
Second level lies with the rail managers who oversaw the signalling system which
caused the crash.
Third level lies with the signalling team who switched the points without first:-
1) Ensuring that everyone had read and understood the email, and
2) Ensuring that there were warning signs on the ground to backup the email,
and
3) Ensuring that there were detonators on the track to backup the warning.
It seems that the train got through the turnout at excessive speed without derailing. Could it be that the drag of the emergency brakes ripped up the track thus derailing the train?
ATP could have saved the day but only if the speed change was correctly programmed in by a human. Business IT people get this sort of thing wrong every
day.
ATP could have saved the day but only if the speed change was correctly programmed in by a human.Ordinary signalling would have saved the day. The driver would have seen the distant showing turn out and braked. The distant signal would be placed to allow for the braking distance.
On 04-Apr-20 7:13 am, johnsuth@nospam.com.au wrote:
In <hengfaFac6cU1@mid.individual.net>, Sylvia Else <sylvia@email.invalid> writes:
https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/5777548/ro-2020-002_prelim.pdf
Thanks Sylvia.
The cause of the crash is buried deep in the bureaucratic obfuscation.
Top level of criminal negligence lies with the politicians who:-
1) Apparently paid for only a single standard gauge track between Albury and
Melbourne, and
2) Reduced the number and quality of public servants because they hate them.
Second level lies with the rail managers who oversaw the signalling system which
caused the crash.
Third level lies with the signalling team who switched the points without
first:-
1) Ensuring that everyone had read and understood the email, and
2) Ensuring that there were warning signs on the ground to backup the email,
and
3) Ensuring that there were detonators on the track to backup the warning. >>
It seems that the train got through the turnout at excessive speed without >> derailing. Could it be that the drag of the emergency brakes ripped up the >> track thus derailing the train?
ATP could have saved the day but only if the speed change was correctly
programmed in by a human. Business IT people get this sort of thing wrong every
day.
Note that a preliminary report identifies facts. There is much more work
for the ATSB to do, and they will be doing it before they issue a final >report.
Sylvia.
On Saturday, 4 April 2020 07:24:11 UTC+11, john...@nospam.com.au wrote:
=20
=20
ATP could have saved the day but only if the speed change was correctly= >=20
programmed in by a human. =20
Ordinary signalling would have saved the day. The driver would have seen th= >e distant showing turn out and braked. The distant signal would be placed t= >o allow for the braking distance.=20
The problem was the line was running without signalling as the equipment ha= >d been damaged by fire. If the line had ATP, it too would have been non-fun= >ctional on the day and the driver would have had to cut out the ATP before = >entering the 'dark' section. So ATP wouldn't have helped.
The issues are why someone decided to switch over to using the loop when th= >e loop wasn't needed. (I assume to 'clean the rails') and more importantly = >and harder to determine since the driver and observer lost their lives, why=
they hadn't read and acted on the train notice about the loop being used t=
hat day? Did they even get a copy, and if they did, why wasn't the import o= >f the notice stressed when they received it?
The actual physics of the derailment is pretty straight forward - they hit = >a low-speed turnout at near mainline speeds. Physics took over at that poin= >t.
As usual, the actual reasons are going to be a complex interplay of procedu= >res that didn't quite work as they should have.
In <heprt1FpqnhU1@mid.individual.net>, Sylvia Else <sylvia@email.invalid> writes:
On 04-Apr-20 7:13 am, johnsuth@nospam.com.au wrote:
In <hengfaFac6cU1@mid.individual.net>, Sylvia Else <sylvia@email.invalid> writes:
https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/5777548/ro-2020-002_prelim.pdf
Thanks Sylvia.
The cause of the crash is buried deep in the bureaucratic obfuscation.
Top level of criminal negligence lies with the politicians who:-
1) Apparently paid for only a single standard gauge track between Albury and
Melbourne, and
2) Reduced the number and quality of public servants because they hate them.
Second level lies with the rail managers who oversaw the signalling system which
caused the crash.
Third level lies with the signalling team who switched the points without >>> first:-
1) Ensuring that everyone had read and understood the email, and
2) Ensuring that there were warning signs on the ground to backup the email,
and
3) Ensuring that there were detonators on the track to backup the warning. >>>
It seems that the train got through the turnout at excessive speed without >>> derailing. Could it be that the drag of the emergency brakes ripped up the >>> track thus derailing the train?
ATP could have saved the day but only if the speed change was correctly
programmed in by a human. Business IT people get this sort of thing wrong every
day.
Note that a preliminary report identifies facts. There is much more work
for the ATSB to do, and they will be doing it before they issue a final
report.
Sylvia.
Death of 2 employees is criminal negligence, and no amount of semantics will reduce anyone's responsibility.
I read an ATSB report on a SPAD near Junee. It frequently used the words "almost certainly". What is 100% certain is that the normal signalling system
failed to prevent the SPAD, and the consequences flowing from it (none in that
case).
If rail travel is statisticly safer than road travel, it is probably because train drivers are more skilled at their job than car drivers, and not because of
the signalling system.
I studied the TV pictures carefully, using freeze frame. I recall that the train successfully negotiated the turnout and was colinear with the loop track
until the leading loco capsized. This is why I wonder if the track collapsed under the train.
If the train did successfully negotiate the turnout at excessive speed, that is
a tribute to all the components of wheel/rail interaction.
I studied the TV pictures carefully, using freeze frame. I recall that the train successfully negotiated the turnout and was colinear with the loop trackThis actually happens quite a lot in these sorts of things, the locomotive manages to stay on the track through the curve of the points but the subsequent forces on the track cause a rail to pull out its clips/spikes and roll or the forces on the wheel flanges get so great, an already highly stressed wheel or other suspension component fails.
until the leading loco capsized. This is why I wonder if the track collapsed
under the train.
On Monday, 6 April 2020 12:31:51 UTC+10, john...@nospam.com.au wrote:
I studied the TV pictures carefully, using freeze frame. I recall that t= >he=20
train successfully negotiated the turnout and was colinear with the loop = >track=20
until the leading loco capsized. This is why I wonder if the track colla= >psed=20
under the train.
This actually happens quite a lot in these sorts of things, the locomotive = >manages to stay on the track through the curve of the points but the subseq= >uent forces on the track cause a rail to pull out its clips/spikes and roll=
or the forces on the wheel flanges get so great, an already highly stresse=
d wheel or other suspension component fails.
This accident wasn't mechanical or track failure, it was a process failure.=
The ATSB need to work out why the process for notifying the crew that they= were to use the loop at Wallan failed and secondary, why full line speed w=
as allowed with the signalling system 'dark'.
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