From Newsgroup: alt.privacy


the universal "ignore" filter automatically demotes/flags all articles
in all newsgroups, allowing only those articles, contributors, servers, topics, etc., which have been previously whitelisted, i.e. "unignored", "promoted", "watched", "highlighted", "kept", etc., primarily based on
text strings in overview headers, e.g. "message-id *@server001*, which
are added/modified/deleted at the user's discretion . . . it's similar
to whitelisting phone calls, so only preapproved caller id numbers may ring through to your phone and ignored caller ids still appear without
ringing . . . usenet's call-blocking app is the global "ignore" filter

the chronic usenet offenders, primary and secondary troll aliases, are killfiled, and the unfamiliar troll aliases, tertiary, ephemeral, will remain buried in collapsed threads pending routine purges (e.g. daily),
so no matter how may umpteen times per day/per newsgroup(s) they morph
their headers, they cannot circumvent usenet's newsreader call-blocker

the "ignore" filter is easily activated in any newsreader, e.g., using
forte agent, to set filter expression "author: *", kill action "ignore thread", scope "global", priority "100" . . . then "unignore"(unblock) articles selectively, while automatically ignoring usenet's minions of predators (trollfarm, usenet's commission-only telemarketing chatbots)

most usenet newsgroups subscribers (mainly lurkers, some contributors)
probably have a hundred or more "killfile" entries that greatly reduce visible newsgroup activity, making it easier to further whitelist some articles, while blacklisting a few more of gazillions of troll aliases
(some newsgroups may attract fewer trolls than others...caveat emptor),
and filtering by newsgroup sections, hierarchies, e.g. [news.*], using asterisks to shorten entries without oversimplifying, e.g. from *abcd*,
and beware insidious troll farm tactics, e.g., replies to known trolls
are almost always from other troll puppets but not always, and this is
where whitelisting prevents inadvertent filters, "guilt by association"

--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: alt.privacy

-----BEGIN YUBISIGNER SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

While the technical mechanics described in the original post are functionally accurate,
the philosophy behind this "Universal Ignore" strategy is deeply flawed.

It attempts to apply a draconian, corporate-style "default deny" logic to UsenetrCoone of the last bastions of decentralized, permissionless communication.

Using a global ignore rule to create an exclusive whitelist is an effective way to stop spam.
The logic of prioritizing filters to bypass global blocks is best practice network defense.

It is true that relying on static killfiles is a losing battle against automated scripts that constantly generate new headers.
A default-deny approach physically stops this vector.

Despite the technical accuracy, the implementation suggested is a profound attack on the core values of open networks, anonymity, and free software:

You suggest using Forte Agent.
As a proprietary, closed-source piece of software, it has no place in secure or private communications.
You cannot trust a black box.
Any serious filtering should be done using strictly Free/Libre Open Source Software (FLOSS), where the code can be audited.

You complain about "morphing aliases".
The ability to change aliases and operate pseudonymously or anonymously is a fundamental human right, not a "troll tactic."
By instituting a "default deny" filter, you are silencing every anonymous voice by default.

Usenet was designed for open, frictionless exchange of ideas.
The "Universal Ignore" turns your newsreader into a permissioned walled garden.
If you only read pre-approved voices, you trap yourself in an echo chamber, effectively doing the censors' job for them.
You kill serendipity and radical new ideas.

Instead of nuking the entire network with an archaic plaintext filter,
the modern cypherpunk solution to identity verification on decentralized networks is cryptography.

If you want to know a post is genuinely from a trusted contact, they should sign their messages cryptographically.
We should rely on cryptographic mathematics to verify individuals, not blanket censorship algorithms to ignore the masses.

We must not sacrifice the open, anonymous nature of our protocols just to filter out the noise.
Privacy and free speech are messy by design.

I took the trouble to answer you because as long as you can present a thesis through logical reasoning, you are always welcome.
IMHO
--
Gabx

Author: Gab Virebent
Signed at: 2026-06-11 13:15:58 +0000
Filename: m2n-msg.wyf5XL
File size: 2403 bytes
Email: gabriel1@virebent.art
Telefax: n/a
URL: https://contact.virebent.art
Comment: Posted via NeoMutt mail2news
RIPEMD-256: 83e74e2b42902adf313abffb2e1e0f8753e0ff46482e07b1d045ece8a947b74b
SHA-256: 959e0f2e7ec53bc944ac7eba2558ed6452e915f6cf4fb97cb72109dcc306d865
SM3: 548d18cf88cae33056bce41209633cd04804a93a69f9d494a883e911d7411ea9 Streebog-256: 9ea511f1ca6f6784502e75fb046e65c63927e31e06998b93761d631310722c38 -----BEGIN YUBISIGNER ED25519 SIGNATURE----- 016a3022f054b794469ed0178235afd551ac9537e5c4a787ceaec8ce6bc29a8a 4d37f3d5a9e97430919b786a46382f2d21870ead1e2bd4c34f1d848829a8570a f294d138917f4da91db95906ee5e63fbd2e552130fca747e7c797a052e006f0c
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--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: alt.privacy

-----BEGIN YUBISIGNER SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

While the technical mechanics described in the original post are
functionally accurate, the philosophy behind this "Universal Ignore"
strategy is deeply flawed.
It attempts to apply a draconian, corporate-style "default deny" logic
to UsenetrCoone of the last bastions of decentralized, permissionless communication.

Using a global ignore rule to create an exclusive whitelist is an
effective way to stop spam. The logic of prioritizing filters to bypass
global blocks is best practice network defense.

It is true that relying on static killfiles is a losing battle against automated scripts that constantly generate new headers. A default-deny approach physically stops this vector.

Despite the technical accuracy, the implementation suggested is a
profound attack on the core values of open networks, anonymity, and free software:

You suggest using Forte Agent. As a proprietary, closed-source piece of software, it has no place in secure or private communications. You
cannot trust a black box. Any serious filtering should be done using
strictly Free/Libre Open Source Software (FLOSS), where the code can be audited.

You complain about "morphing aliases".
The ability to change aliases and operate pseudonymously or anonymously
is a fundamental human right, not a "troll tactic." By instituting a
"default deny" filter, you are silencing every anonymous voice by default.

Usenet was designed for open, frictionless exchange of ideas. The
"Universal Ignore" turns your newsreader into a permissioned walled
garden. If you only read pre-approved voices, you trap yourself in an
echo chamber, effectively doing the censors' job for them. You kill serendipity and radical new ideas.

Instead of nuking the entire network with an archaic plaintext filter,
the modern cypherpunk solution to identity verification on decentralized networks is cryptography.
If you want to know a post is genuinely from a trusted contact, they
should sign their messages cryptographically. We should rely on
cryptographic mathematics to verify individuals, not blanket censorship algorithms to ignore the masses.

We must not sacrifice the open, anonymous nature of our protocols just
to filter out the noise. Privacy and free speech are messy by design.
I took the trouble to answer you because as long as you can present a
thesis through logical reasoning, you are always welcome.
IMHO
--
Gabx

Author: Gab Virebent
Signed at: 2026-06-11 13:15:58 +0000
Filename: m2n-msg.wyf5XL
File size: 2403 bytes
Email: gabriel1@virebent.art
Telefax: n/a
URL: https://contact.virebent.art
Comment: Posted via NeoMutt mail2news
RIPEMD-256: 83e74e2b42902adf313abffb2e1e0f8753e0ff46482e07b1d045ece8a947b74b
SHA-256: 959e0f2e7ec53bc944ac7eba2558ed6452e915f6cf4fb97cb72109dcc306d865
SM3: 548d18cf88cae33056bce41209633cd04804a93a69f9d494a883e911d7411ea9
Streebog-256:
9ea511f1ca6f6784502e75fb046e65c63927e31e06998b93761d631310722c38
-----BEGIN YUBISIGNER ED25519 SIGNATURE----- 016a3022f054b794469ed0178235afd551ac9537e5c4a787ceaec8ce6bc29a8a 4d37f3d5a9e97430919b786a46382f2d21870ead1e2bd4c34f1d848829a8570a f294d138917f4da91db95906ee5e63fbd2e552130fca747e7c797a052e006f0c
-----END YUBISIGNER ED25519 SIGNATURE-----


--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: alt.privacy

On 11 Jun 2026, Gabx <mail2news@virebent.invalid> posted some news:1781183776.558A54BCD57320A7@domain.invalid:

-----BEGIN YUBISIGNER SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

While the technical mechanics described in the original post are
functionally accurate, the philosophy behind this "Universal Ignore"
strategy is deeply flawed.

It attempts to apply a draconian, corporate-style "default deny" logic
to UsenetrCoone of the last bastions of decentralized, permissionless communication.

Using a global ignore rule to create an exclusive whitelist is an
effective way to stop spam. The logic of prioritizing filters to
bypass global blocks is best practice network defense.

It is true that relying on static killfiles is a losing battle against automated scripts that constantly generate new headers. A default-deny approach physically stops this vector.

Despite the technical accuracy, the implementation suggested is a
profound attack on the core values of open networks, anonymity, and
free software:

You suggest using Forte Agent.
As a proprietary, closed-source piece of software, it has no place in
secure or private communications. You cannot trust a black box.
Any serious filtering should be done using strictly Free/Libre Open
Source Software (FLOSS), where the code can be audited.

You complain about "morphing aliases".
The ability to change aliases and operate pseudonymously or
anonymously is a fundamental human right, not a "troll tactic." By instituting a "default deny" filter, you are silencing every anonymous
voice by default.

Usenet was designed for open, frictionless exchange of ideas.
The "Universal Ignore" turns your newsreader into a permissioned
walled garden. If you only read pre-approved voices, you trap yourself
in an echo chamber, effectively doing the censors' job for them. You
kill serendipity and radical new ideas.

Instead of nuking the entire network with an archaic plaintext filter,
the modern cypherpunk solution to identity verification on
decentralized networks is cryptography.

If you want to know a post is genuinely from a trusted contact, they
should sign their messages cryptographically. We should rely on
cryptographic mathematics to verify individuals, not blanket
censorship algorithms to ignore the masses.

We must not sacrifice the open, anonymous nature of our protocols just
to filter out the noise. Privacy and free speech are messy by design.

I took the trouble to answer you because as long as you can present a
thesis through logical reasoning, you are always welcome. IMHO

That was quite profound.

--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: alt.privacy

Joe Fretzl wrote:

That was quite profound.

Let's say!
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