• Re: How to test if your access point BSSID is in the highly insecure Apple WPS database

    From Marian@marianjones@helpfulpeople.com to misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,alt.internet.wireless on Sun Dec 7 20:27:33 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    Carlos E.R. wrote:
    There isn't, as far as I can see, an obligation to *remove* a MAC from the >> WPS db if they *never see* the nomap request.

    This is true, but they see that the SSID is hidden. This should be a
    hint no not list the BSSID either. This can be a bug, not malice.


    I'm in direct communications with the wonderfully responsive Mozilla team
    and what Carlos just said is EXACTLY how they see the situation themselves.

    <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mozilla_Location_Service>
    "Mozilla's client applications do not collect information
    about WiFi access points whose SSID is hidden or ends with
    the string '_nomap' (e.g. 'Simpson-family-wifi_nomap')."
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Marian@marianjones@helpfulpeople.com to misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,alt.internet.wireless on Sun Dec 7 20:37:29 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    Chris wrote:
    Firstly, the _nomap is on your user-defined SSID. Secondly, what is
    collected is the BSSID/MAC which in most cases cannot be edited.

    You can choose to hide your SSID. So if you've hidden your SSID the nomap option is superfluous as it won't show up anyway.

    There isn't, as far as I can see, an obligation to *remove* a MAC from the WPS db if they *never see* the nomap request.

    I've noticed you lack the kind of imagination that I have, so I may need to explain for the thousandth time that there is a REASON for the hidden SSID.

    Think about it.

    1. If you HIDE the SSID, the goal is for passive scanners to get the hint.
    A hidden SSID means you don't want to be in any of the databases.
    It's very clear. And the Mozilla security team agrees with me.
    <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mozilla_Location_Service>
    "Mozilla's client applications do not collect information
    about WiFi access points whose SSID is hidden or ends with
    the string '_nomap' (e.g. 'Simpson-family-wifi_nomap')."

    2. If you add "_nomap", then that means you want it to be scrubbed.
    But that's a completely DIFFERENT concept than being uploaded.

    Hiding it was intended to prevent the upload.
    Adding _nomap was intended to have it scrubbed if it was ever uploaded.

    You don't appear to own the imagination to figure out they're different.

    the real issue is that our
    rights are being undermined by systems designed without meaningful consent.

    A MAC like an IP or a physical address is public information. There's no requirement for consent.

    You appear to fundamentally lack imagination which is required to
    understand why the Apple WPS system is particularly egregious to personal privacy given there are no controls whatsoever on scraping its content.

    Your unimaginative argument that 'MAC addresses are public' completely
    ignores the fact that when aggregated at scale, they become a powerful
    tracking tool. A single MAC address is just a hardware identifier; but a database of millions of them tied to GPS coordinates is essentially a map
    of people's movements and residences.

    Imagine this scenario:
    1. A company collects BSSIDs (MACs) from Wi-Fi routers in a city.
    2. Over time, they build a database:
    a. MAC A -> seen at 123 Elm Street in 2022
    b. MAC A -> seen at 456 Oak Avenue in 2023
    3. From this, they infer the household at 123 Elm Street likely
    moved to 456 Oak Avenue.

    Now scale that up: Track migration patterns of entire neighborhoods.
    Correlate MACs with census data, property records, or advertising IDs.

    What was just public information becomes a de facto surveillance system, without meaningful consent from the people being tracked.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Chris@ithinkiam@gmail.com to misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,alt.internet.wireless on Mon Dec 8 08:13:37 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    Andy Burns <usenet@andyburns.uk> wrote:
    Carlos E.R. wrote:

    Marian wrote:

    -a <https://wifidb.net/wifidb/opt/search.php>

    Doesn't find mine.

    Nor mine, by SSID name (not hidden or _nomap suffix)

    I wouldn't really expect anyone to have wardriven around here with a
    laptop running Vistumbler, but you never know ...

    Mine is and I would it expect it to be as it's not hidden nor nomapped.

    This isn't about wardriving. It is routine collection by Apple (and google) devices that are nearby.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Andy Burns@usenet@andyburns.uk to misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,alt.internet.wireless on Mon Dec 8 09:16:09 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    Marian wrote:

    If you HIDE the SSID, the goal is for passive scanners to get the hint.

    What if you have multiple SSIDs on your access point, but one hasn't got _nomap suffix? e.g. some providers here "piggyback" their own wifi onto customers devices for their other customers to use ...
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Frank Slootweg@this@ddress.is.invalid to alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.internet.wireless on Mon Dec 8 13:02:48 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    On December 6, I wrote:
    Carlos E.R. <robin_listas@es.invalid> wrote:
    On 2025-12-06 01:16, Marian wrote:
    It's classic for the Apple trolls to claim everything they can't understand is a "weak lie" as Jolly Roger just did, but the fact
    remains that my BSSID is in Apple's database (and the SSID is
    hidden & has "_nomap" appended).

    So all your efforts to hide yourself are for nothing. You are listed.
    You might as well not bother to hide! :-D

    Mine isn't listed and I did nothing to hide.

    I stand corrected (by myself :-)). It turns out my BSSID *is* listed
    (in <https://wavedigger.networksurvey.app/?tab=bssid>).

    Apparently my router reported (slightly) different MAC addresses than
    the MAC address (BSSID) of my SSID. When I used 'Arlen''s 'netsh wlan
    ...' method [1], I got the correct BSSID.

    The reported location is quite accurate - within some 10 metres or so
    - but useless, because I live in a city and in an appartment building,
    so there are hundreds of other Wi-Fi Access Points close by.

    As has been said before, trying to hide makes one suspect, because
    *other* factors stand out.

    [1] I think I had tried that [2] before, but it first failed saying to
    'Run as administrator', then it failed saying it needs 'Location
    services', but it still failed. Later it turned out that it also needed
    'Let apps access your location' to be switched on. (All on Windows 11.
    Settings -> Privacy & security -> Location.)

    [2] Something similar to "netsh wlan show networks mode=bssid". I think
    'Arlen' also posted a 'netsh' command which only reports the BSSID of
    the SSID you're connected to, instead of all the visible ones, but I
    didn't find that again.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Marian@marianjones@helpfulpeople.com to misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,alt.internet.wireless on Mon Dec 8 06:46:53 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    Andy Burns wrote:
    If you HIDE the SSID, the goal is for passive scanners to get the hint.

    What if you have multiple SSIDs on your access point, but one hasn't got _nomap suffix? e.g. some providers here "piggyback" their own wifi onto customers devices for their other customers to use ...

    Hi Andy,

    You're smart and imaginative, where I agree with you and I've been
    wondering how this could have happened, since it did happen.

    There must be an explanation.

    I'm wondering if repeaters and/or bridges can cause this to happen?
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Marian@marianjones@helpfulpeople.com to misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,alt.internet.wireless on Mon Dec 8 06:50:15 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    Carlos E.R. wrote:
    You would have to prove that your house BSSID being listed is a breach
    of your fundamental right to privacy, because an AP is not directly
    linked to your person.

    The simplistic argument that 'MAC addresses are not "directly" linked'
    ignores the fact that when aggregated at scale, they become a powerful
    tracking tool. A single MAC address is just a hardware identifier; but a database of millions of them tied to GPS coordinates is essentially a map
    of people's movements and residences.

    Imagine this scenario:
    1. A company collects BSSIDs (MACs) from Wi-Fi routers in a city.
    2. Over time, they build a database:
    a. MAC A -> seen at 123 Elm Street in 2022
    b. MAC A -> seen at 456 Oak Avenue in 2023
    3. From this, they infer the household at 123 Elm Street likely
    moved to 456 Oak Avenue.

    Now scale that up: Track migration patterns of entire neighborhoods.
    Correlate MACs with census data, property records, or advertising IDs.

    What was just public information becomes a de facto surveillance system, without meaningful consent from the people being tracked.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Marian@marianjones@helpfulpeople.com to alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.internet.wireless on Mon Dec 8 07:04:25 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    Carlos E.R. wrote:
    Sorry, I can't help with that. But yes, Apple should take the hint that
    if the SSID is hidden, they should not list the associated BSSID either.

    If you have a free unused/old router or access point, you could set it
    up with a hidden _nomap SSID, and without connecting any of your phones
    to it, wait to see if the BSSID appears listed after a month or two. It would be interesting to check every day with a script, to see how fast
    they update.

    Andy Burns wrote:
    Ask some friends who use iPhones to come round for a coffee, the more devices hoovering up data the better? They may only add BSSIDs to the
    DB if they've seen them via multiple devices.

    I appreciate the input from both Carlos & Andy in that both of you seem to understand the problem set, which is I didn't consent to be tracked.
    a. I hid my SSID (which is a clear non-consent active action), and,
    b. I added _nomap to all my SSIDs (which is another active non consent).
    And yet, I'm in the Apple WPS database down to the middle of the house. (Wavedigger maps are accurate to 8 digits pinpointing the exact home!)

    The fact is that I have plenty of Apple devices in the home, maybe even
    more than Android devices, so I don't need to bring in more iPhones. :)

    We're all smart people so we can see that "something" is wrong.
    But what?

    It could be Apple (e.g., a bug).
    Or, it could be me (as Andy has intimated in a prior post).

    I've met with my neighbor who is a VP at Apple who knows me extremely well
    so he takes my claims seriously, so we'll find out soon if it's a bug.

    Or, it could be "something that I did"; but what?

    I'm thinking that I need to look more deeply at how repeaters and bridges
    pass BSSIDs. I'm not really all that familiar with how BSSIDs propagate.

    I'll dig a bit to see if maybe a repeater/bridge threw me under the bus.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Marian@marianjones@helpfulpeople.com to alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.internet.wireless on Mon Dec 8 09:04:30 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    Frank Slootweg wrote:
    On December 6, I wrote:
    Carlos E.R. <robin_listas@es.invalid> wrote:
    On 2025-12-06 01:16, Marian wrote:
    It's classic for the Apple trolls to claim everything they can't
    understand is a "weak lie" as Jolly Roger just did, but the fact
    remains that my BSSID is in Apple's database (and the SSID is
    hidden & has "_nomap" appended).

    So all your efforts to hide yourself are for nothing. You are listed.
    You might as well not bother to hide! :-D

    Mine isn't listed and I did nothing to hide.

    I stand corrected (by myself :-)). It turns out my BSSID *is* listed
    (in <https://wavedigger.networksurvey.app/?tab=bssid>).

    Apparently my router reported (slightly) different MAC addresses than
    the MAC address (BSSID) of my SSID. When I used 'Arlen''s 'netsh wlan
    ...' method [1], I got the correct BSSID.

    The reported location is quite accurate - within some 10 metres or so
    - but useless, because I live in a city and in an appartment building,
    so there are hundreds of other Wi-Fi Access Points close by.

    As has been said before, trying to hide makes one suspect, because
    *other* factors stand out.

    [1] I think I had tried that [2] before, but it first failed saying to
    'Run as administrator', then it failed saying it needs 'Location
    services', but it still failed. Later it turned out that it also needed
    'Let apps access your location' to be switched on. (All on Windows 11. Settings -> Privacy & security -> Location.)

    [2] Something similar to "netsh wlan show networks mode=bssid". I think 'Arlen' also posted a 'netsh' command which only reports the BSSID of
    the SSID you're connected to, instead of all the visible ones, but I
    didn't find that again.

    I'll agree with and/or commend anyone who makes logically defensible
    sentient statements, where I applaud Frank for reporting two facts:

    1. His BSSID was listed in the Apple WPS database, and,
    2. The "reported location is quite accurate - within 10 meters"

    My experience is almost exactly the same as Frank's in that:
    1. My BSSID is listed (even as it's HIDDEN & contains "_nomap")
    2. The locations is virtually exact (from 6 to 8 decimal places)

    Notice something interesting:
    a. When you search using the URL, you get only six decimal places
    b. When you search using python, you get up to eight decimal places

    Here is a redacted set of images showing the decimal place issue:
    <https://i.postimg.cc/C5Pcb6RQ/decimal.jpg>

    Maybe those last two decimal places are why Frank sees an inaccuracy in location that is absolutely absent from my results, although everyone knows
    I live in the boonies so even as much as 10 meters off is still exactly me.

    UPDATE: I just checked my actual numbers.
    6 decimal places: ~11 cm resolution.
    8 decimal places: ~1 mm resolution.
    The specific difference between them is only about 4cm.

    What's really different is if you live in the boonies, the BSSID is you.
    If you're in the city, the BSSID might be you and people close to you.

    Note: It also matters how "close to your BSSID" the Apple devices are.
    In my case, they're right here, next to me, so they're close to the router.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Marian@marianjones@helpfulpeople.com to alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.internet.wireless on Mon Dec 8 21:19:00 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    Carlos E.R. wrote:
    As has been said before, trying to hide makes one suspect, because
    *other* factors stand out.

    I am curious, though, about why some people are listed and some are not. What's the criteria? Maybe just chance. A passerby having the proper non intentional software working properly, I'd guess.

    I will disagree with anyone who makes an illogical statement such as that
    which Frank made above, but I'll help answer any valid question such as
    what Carlos asked.

    Regarding Frank's assessment that hiding the SSID and putting _nomap on the SSID "makes one suspect"... Suggesting that opting out makes you 'suspect' flips the logic. In a system where consent is assumed unless you opt out, taking the opt-out step is the rational, privacy-protective choice.

    In a system where the user must opt out, what I'm doing is establishing
    clear instructions to the WPS databases that I do not consent to tracking.
    a. I hid my SSID (which is a clear non-consent active action), and,
    b. I added _nomap to all my SSIDs (which is another active non consent).
    And yet, Apple ignored *both* those messages of clear opt-out intent!

    Mozilla, for example, says they'll honor the hidden SSID or the _nomap.
    <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mozilla_Location_Service>
    "Mozilla's client applications do not collect information
    about WiFi access points whose SSID is hidden or ends with
    the string '_nomap' (e.g. 'Simpson-family-wifi_nomap')."

    But not Apple.
    Clearly Apple ignored all my requests to opt out of their WPS database.

    That's a problem.
    A big problem.

    What makes Apple *different* from Google is there are zero controls.
    Anyone can download millions of tracking datapoints with Apple's WPS setup. (That's what the security researchers were warning us about after all.)

    Scenario:
    1. The Johnson family lives in Denver, Colorado.
    Their home router has a unique BSSID 44:55:66:77:88:99

    2. The Johnsons move to Atlanta, Georgia, and bring their router
    with them. As soon as they plug it in, the same BSSID is detected.

    3. A data broker can infer that the Johnsons moved across the country.
    Advertisers could target them with "new homeowner" services ads.
    A stalker or abusive ex could quickly discover their new address

    The BSSID is persistent across locations.
    That persistence means your router acts like a digital homing beacon.
    It follows you wherever you go.

    Now run that kind of tracking on millions of BSSIDs en masse, which is what security researched showed the insecure Apple WPS database can be used for.

    As for Carlos' question of why some people are in the highly insecure Apple
    WPS database, A router's BSSID is only logged if an Apple device (like an iPhone, iPad, or Mac) scans it and reports it back to Apple's servers. If
    no device running Apple's WPS software has ever passed near your router, it won't be listed.

    In my case, I have plenty of Apple mobile devices inside my home.
    So they threw me under the bus even if nobody else did it for Apple.

    The paper by Erik Rye & Dave Levin tracked BSSIDs over a year, where they mention that Apple doesn't seem to be scrubbing old BSSIDs out of the db.
    "we were able to track BSSIDs longitudinally over the course of a year"
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Carlos E.R.@robin_listas@es.invalid to alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.internet.wireless on Wed Dec 10 00:19:14 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    On 2025-12-08 15:04, Marian wrote:
    Carlos E.R. wrote:
    Sorry, I can't help with that. But yes, Apple should take the hint
    that if the SSID is hidden, they should not list the associated BSSID
    either.

    If you have a free unused/old router or access point, you could set it
    up with a hidden _nomap SSID, and without connecting any of your
    phones to it, wait to see if the BSSID appears listed after a month or
    two. It would be interesting to check every day with a script, to see
    how fast they update.

    Andy Burns wrote:
    Ask some friends who use iPhones to come round for a coffee, the more
    devices hoovering up data the better?-a They may only add BSSIDs to the
    DB if they've seen them via multiple devices.

    I appreciate the input from both Carlos & Andy in that both of you seem to understand the problem set, which is I didn't consent to be tracked.
    a. I hid my SSID (which is a clear non-consent active action), and, b. I added _nomap to all my SSIDs (which is another active non consent).
    And yet, I'm in the Apple WPS database down to the middle of the house. (Wavedigger maps are accurate to 8 digits pinpointing the exact home!)

    The fact is that I have plenty of Apple devices in the home, maybe even
    more than Android devices, so I don't need to bring in more iPhones. :)

    We're all smart people so we can see that "something" is wrong. But what?

    It could be Apple (e.g., a bug).
    Or, it could be me (as Andy has intimated in a prior post).

    I've met with my neighbor who is a VP at Apple who knows me extremely well
    so he takes my claims seriously, so we'll find out soon if it's a bug.

    Or, it could be "something that I did"; but what?

    I'm thinking that I need to look more deeply at how repeaters and bridges pass BSSIDs. I'm not really all that familiar with how BSSIDs propagate.

    I'll dig a bit to see if maybe a repeater/bridge threw me under the bus.

    Doubtful.

    The SSID is the same, so would have the _nomap, but I'm unsure about the
    BSSID keeping or not.

    In any case, you can find out if the SSID is published or hidden by any
    of those repeaters/bridges. Just move near to each one of them, and
    query the laptop information. Make sure it is connected to it by
    comparing the strength of the signal.
    --
    Cheers, Carlos.
    ESEfc-Efc+, EUEfc-Efc|;
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Carlos E.R.@robin_listas@es.invalid to alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.internet.wireless on Wed Dec 10 00:26:15 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    On 2025-12-09 05:19, Marian wrote:
    Carlos E.R. wrote:
    -a-a As has been said before, trying to hide makes one suspect, because
    *other* factors stand out.

    I am curious, though, about why some people are listed and some are
    not. What's the criteria? Maybe just chance. A passerby having the
    proper non intentional software working properly, I'd guess.

    I will disagree with anyone who makes an illogical statement such as that which Frank made above, but I'll help answer any valid question such as
    what Carlos asked.

    Regarding Frank's assessment that hiding the SSID and putting _nomap on the SSID "makes one suspect"... Suggesting that opting out makes you 'suspect' flips the logic. In a system where consent is assumed unless you opt out, taking the opt-out step is the rational, privacy-protective choice.

    Yes, but it also signals "I have something to hide!". It makes you "interesting".


    ...

    3. A data broker can infer that the Johnsons moved across the country.
    -a-a Advertisers could target them with "new homeowner" services ads.
    -a-a A stalker or abusive ex could quickly discover their new address

    Yes, but there are other information avenues that give away that
    information to the public. Starting with the Johnsons talking on
    twitter. The mobile phone will also notice and register this information (gps), and it will be at least available in aggregate form.


    The BSSID is persistent across locations.
    That persistence means your router acts like a digital homing beacon.
    It follows you wherever you go.

    Now run that kind of tracking on millions of BSSIDs en masse, which is what security researched showed the insecure Apple WPS database can be used for.

    As for Carlos' question of why some people are in the highly insecure Apple WPS database, A router's BSSID is only logged if an Apple device (like an iPhone, iPad, or Mac) scans it and reports it back to Apple's servers. If
    no device running Apple's WPS software has ever passed near your router, it won't be listed.
    In my case, I have plenty of Apple mobile devices inside my home.
    So they threw me under the bus even if nobody else did it for Apple.

    The paper by Erik Rye & Dave Levin tracked BSSIDs over a year, where they mention that Apple doesn't seem to be scrubbing old BSSIDs out of the db.
    "we were able to track BSSIDs longitudinally over the course of a year"

    Ok.
    --
    Cheers, Carlos.
    ESEfc-Efc+, EUEfc-Efc|;
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Carlos E.R.@robin_listas@es.invalid to alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.internet.wireless on Wed Dec 10 00:31:35 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    On 2025-12-08 17:04, Marian wrote:
    Frank Slootweg wrote:
    On December 6, I wrote:
    Carlos E.R. <robin_listas@es.invalid> wrote:

    ...

    Notice something interesting:
    a. When you search using the URL, you get only six decimal places
    b. When you search using python, you get up to eight decimal places

    Here is a redacted set of images showing the decimal place issue: <https://i.postimg.cc/C5Pcb6RQ/decimal.jpg>

    Maybe those last two decimal places are why Frank sees an inaccuracy in location that is absolutely absent from my results, although everyone knows
    I live in the boonies so even as much as 10 meters off is still exactly me.

    But you said yourself you own Apple phones. Those will have reported you
    from inside the house, so very accurate. In my case, they report the
    location at the pavement where they see the signal, not the actual location.


    UPDATE: I just checked my actual numbers. 6 decimal places: ~11 cm resolution.
    8 decimal places: ~1 mm resolution.
    The specific difference between them is only about 4cm.

    What's really different is if you live in the boonies, the BSSID is you.

    No, it is still your home.

    If you're in the city, the BSSID might be you and people close to you.

    Note: It also matters how "close to your BSSID" the Apple devices are.
    In my case, they're right here, next to me, so they're close to the router.

    --
    Cheers, Carlos.
    ESEfc-Efc+, EUEfc-Efc|;
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Carlos E.R.@robin_listas@es.invalid to misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,alt.internet.wireless on Wed Dec 10 00:37:24 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    On 2025-12-08 14:50, Marian wrote:
    Carlos E.R. wrote:
    You would have to prove that your house BSSID being listed is a breach
    of your fundamental right to privacy, because an AP is not directly
    linked to your person.

    The simplistic argument that 'MAC addresses are not "directly" linked' ignores the fact that when aggregated at scale, they become a powerful tracking tool. A single MAC address is just a hardware identifier; but a database of millions of them tied to GPS coordinates is essentially a map
    of people's movements and residences.

    Imagine this scenario:
    1. A company collects BSSIDs (MACs) from Wi-Fi routers in a city. 2.
    Over time, they build a database: -a a. MAC A -> seen at 123 Elm Street
    in 2022 -a b. MAC A -> seen at 456 Oak Avenue in 2023
    3. From this, they infer the household at 123 Elm Street likely
    -a moved to 456 Oak Avenue.

    Now scale that up: Track migration patterns of entire neighborhoods. Correlate MACs with census data, property records, or advertising IDs.
    What was just public information becomes a de facto surveillance system, without meaningful consent from the people being tracked.

    Yes, this is true.
    --
    Cheers, Carlos.
    ESEfc-Efc+, EUEfc-Efc|;
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Marian@marianjones@helpfulpeople.com to misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,alt.internet.wireless on Tue Dec 9 19:24:18 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    Carlos E.R. wrote:
    Now scale that up: Track migration patterns of entire neighborhoods.
    Correlate MACs with census data, property records, or advertising IDs.
    What was just public information becomes a de facto surveillance system,
    without meaningful consent from the people being tracked.

    Yes, this is true.

    Hi Carlos,

    Thank you for understanding the problem set.

    I'd like to make a critical point about your understanding of the issues.
    a. The security researchers are the ones flagging this serious issue
    b. It's only with the Apple WPS database (not with the Google WPS db)
    c. That's because Apple allows millions of BSSIDs to be collected in days

    Another point I'd like to make is that the Apple trolls do not UNDERSTAND
    what you and the security researchers (and I) understand (see above).

    The Apple trolls are spending all our valuable time with lame excuses attempting to defend Apple's insecure WPS database to the death, no matter what.

    Chris, for example, just claimed I'd never write the code to track people.
    And yet, I already wrote it. I posted it on the weekend. So it's there.

    From: Marian <marianjones@helpfulpeople.com>
    Newsgroups: alt.comp.os.windows-10,alt.internet.wireless,alt.comp.microsoft.windows,alt.comp.os.windows-11
    Subject: Tutorial: Query the Apple database with Python for your access point BSSID
    Date: Sat, 6 Dec 2025 10:55:40 -0700
    Message-ID: <10h1qmr$2alo$1@nnrp.usenet.blueworldhosting.com>

    If you feed any number of BSSIDs to that python script, it
    feeds back the GPS locations to 8 decimal places of the BSSID.

    If I can write that code in seconds, imagine what a nefarious malevolent
    team could do who cares to track millions upon millions of people by BSSIDs. --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Marian@marianjones@helpfulpeople.com to alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.internet.wireless on Tue Dec 9 19:54:09 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    Carlos E.R. wrote:
    Regarding Frank's assessment that hiding the SSID and putting _nomap on the >> SSID "makes one suspect"... Suggesting that opting out makes you 'suspect' >> flips the logic. In a system where consent is assumed unless you opt out,
    taking the opt-out step is the rational, privacy-protective choice.

    Yes, but it also signals "I have something to hide!". It makes you "interesting".

    I never disagree with any sensibly valid point of view, so people never
    waste their time when they bring up a counterpoint with me, as I do
    understand what your're saying but we have to look at the scale of consent.

    There must be millions upon millions of people who do not consent to
    tracking, even as there must be billions who consent to tracking their AP.

    So I understand your point of view which is that every person who hides
    their SSID is more interesting, to some people, than those who do not hide their SSID. Likewise with everyone who opts out of tracking with the
    "_nomap".

    Yet, both are well known to be the classic way to not consent to tracking.
    <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mozilla_Location_Service>
    "Mozilla's client applications do not collect information
    about WiFi access points whose SSID is hidden or ends with
    the string '_nomap' (e.g. 'Simpson-family-wifi_nomap')."

    So if I'm "interesting" for opting out of consent for tracking, then there
    must be a gazillion other ways I opt out from browser cookies to the TSA.

    To wit, I recently traveled to Germany where TSA in the USA wanted to take
    my photo at the beginning of the security check. I refused.

    They looked at me. They said "fine". They compared my face to my ID.
    That was it.

    I guess my face isn't all that interesting. :)

    3. A data broker can infer that the Johnsons moved across the country.
    aa Advertisers could target them with "new homeowner" services ads.
    aa A stalker or abusive ex could quickly discover their new address

    Yes, but there are other information avenues that give away that
    information to the public. Starting with the Johnsons talking on
    twitter. The mobile phone will also notice and register this information (gps), and it will be at least available in aggregate form.

    Sure. There's a reason, for example, that I turn off bluetooth on my phone
    when I enter a store. People are tracked by ways they don't even know.

    The paper by Erik Rye & Dave Levin tracked BSSIDs over a year, where they
    mention that Apple doesn't seem to be scrubbing old BSSIDs out of the db.
    "we were able to track BSSIDs longitudinally over the course of a year"

    Ok

    I think the problem here that the security researchers outlined, is that Apple's WPS is far more dangerous than the other WPS implementations.

    The main reason is Apple allows anyone to make any number of queries.
    And, Apple allows anyone to obtain millions of BSSIDs in a few days.

    NOTE: I am aware the Apple trolls will claim that "I" must prove what the researchers said by writing those scripts, but I don't want to track people
    and I'm not a security researcher who gets paid to do it.

    I just ask the Apple trolls to come up with a single security researcher
    who agrees with their point of view that Apple's WPS is perfectly designed.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Marian@marianjones@helpfulpeople.com to alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.internet.wireless on Tue Dec 9 20:05:25 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    Carlos E.R. wrote:
    Maybe those last two decimal places are why Frank sees an inaccuracy in
    location that is absolutely absent from my results, although everyone knows >> I live in the boonies so even as much as 10 meters off is still exactly me.

    But you said yourself you own Apple phones. Those will have reported you from inside the house, so very accurate. In my case, they report the location at the pavement where they see the signal, not the actual location.

    Hi Carlos,

    As always, I agree with anyone who opines a sensibly logical position, so I agree with you that the "closer" the Apple device is to the access point,
    the more accurate the GPS location will be (given to 8 decimal places).

    Not only do I have plenty of Apple devices, but I have plenty of routers.
    <https://i.postimg.cc/qMhQRkJN/linksys-wrt-54g.jpg>

    Since we're all on WISP, we have radios galore which repurpose as APs.
    <https://i.postimg.cc/5t4Nhkwx/transceiver01.jpg>

    So if anyone wanted to query the database every five minutes, for example,
    if I carried an iPhone or iPad with me around the house, they could track
    me from one side of the house to the other, to the barn, to the stables, to
    the pool, to the end of the driveway, etc. The accuracy is that close.

    Of course, that's only as good as how frequently the WPS database is
    updated when a new GPS location is received that is different from the old.

    UPDATE: I just checked my actual numbers. 6 decimal places: ~11 cm
    resolution.
    8 decimal places: ~1 mm resolution.
    The specific difference between them is only about 4cm.

    What's really different is if you live in the boonies, the BSSID is you.

    No, it is still your home.

    Actually, it's the location of the access point, which may not even be
    inside the home since it can be at the poolhouse or in the stables.
    <https://i.postimg.cc/RZXNZBCQ/transceiver02.jpg>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Frank Slootweg@this@ddress.is.invalid to misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,alt.internet.wireless on Wed Dec 10 19:10:49 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    Carlos E.R. <robin_listas@es.invalid> wrote:
    On 2025-12-08 14:50, Marian wrote:
    [...]
    Imagine this scenario:
    1. A company collects BSSIDs (MACs) from Wi-Fi routers in a city. 2.
    Over time, they build a database: a a. MAC A -> seen at 123 Elm Street
    in 2022 a b. MAC A -> seen at 456 Oak Avenue in 2023
    3. From this, they infer the household at 123 Elm Street likely
    a moved to 456 Oak Avenue.

    Now scale that up: Track migration patterns of entire neighborhoods. Correlate MACs with census data, property records, or advertising IDs.
    What was just public information becomes a de facto surveillance system, without meaningful consent from the people being tracked.

    Yes, this is true.

    No, it's not. As you said, it's not people, but households and, as
    others have said, it's not even households, but *devices* (Access
    Points).

    The *Access Point* has moved and that could be for all kinds of
    reasons. The AP might be re-used by someone else. The household may have
    been split up (someone(s) moved out), so the household did not move.
    Etc., etc..

    Devices are not people, at least not yet.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Chris@ithinkiam@gmail.com to misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,alt.internet.wireless on Wed Dec 10 19:30:39 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    Frank Slootweg <this@ddress.is.invalid> wrote:
    Carlos E.R. <robin_listas@es.invalid> wrote:
    On 2025-12-08 14:50, Marian wrote:
    [...]
    Imagine this scenario:
    1. A company collects BSSIDs (MACs) from Wi-Fi routers in a city. 2.
    Over time, they build a database: -a a. MAC A -> seen at 123 Elm Street >>> in 2022 -a b. MAC A -> seen at 456 Oak Avenue in 2023
    3. From this, they infer the household at 123 Elm Street likely
    -a moved to 456 Oak Avenue.

    Now scale that up: Track migration patterns of entire neighborhoods.
    Correlate MACs with census data, property records, or advertising IDs.
    What was just public information becomes a de facto surveillance system, >>> without meaningful consent from the people being tracked.

    Yes, this is true.

    No, it's not. As you said, it's not people, but households and, as
    others have said, it's not even households, but *devices* (Access
    Points).

    The *Access Point* has moved and that could be for all kinds of
    reasons. The AP might be re-used by someone else. The household may have
    been split up (someone(s) moved out), so the household did not move.
    Etc., etc..

    Devices are not people, at least not yet.

    Correct.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Andy Burns@usenet@andyburns.uk to misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,alt.internet.wireless on Wed Dec 10 19:37:15 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    Frank Slootweg wrote:

    The Access Point has moved and that could be for all kinds of
    reasons.

    Some access points are inside trains/buses/planes/ships/cars

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Marian@marianjones@helpfulpeople.com to misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,alt.internet.wireless on Wed Dec 10 14:30:00 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    Chris wrote:
    Devices are not people, at least not yet.

    Correct.

    If I had a pill in my pocket, you'd say it's a pill. It's not a cure. It's
    a pill. You can't see that if it's penicillin, it can cure you of strep
    throat.

    You and Frank never were accepted into a college for a reason, Chris.
    You don't own the IQ to understand a pill in my pocket is more than just a pill.

    To you (and Frank), all pills are the same.
    Who is that strange?

    Only you are when making absurd defenses for Apple decisions.
    Nobody on the planet who is a security professional agrees with you two.

    Nobody.

    If they did, you'd find them.
    And you can't.

    Because your assessment that penicillin can't cure step throat because it's "just a pill" is absurd.

    Note: The "pill" is the analogy for the "bssid", which is more powerful
    than the item appears to be to people who don't understand what it does.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Marian@marianjones@helpfulpeople.com to misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,alt.internet.wireless on Wed Dec 10 14:31:06 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    Frank Slootweg wrote:
    As you said, it's not people,

    If I had a pill in my pocket, you'd say it's a pill. It's not a cure. It's
    a pill. To you, every pill is the same. It's just a pill, to you.

    You can't see that if it's penicillin, it can cure you of strep throat.


    Nobody on the planet who is a security professional agrees with you two.
    If they did, you'd find them.
    And you can't.

    Because your assessment that a pill can't cure step throat because it's
    "just a pill" is patently absurd.

    Note: The "pill" is the analogy for the "bssid", which is more powerful
    than the item appears to be to people who don't understand what it does.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Marian@marianjones@helpfulpeople.com to misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,alt.internet.wireless on Wed Dec 10 14:35:10 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    Andy Burns wrote:
    The Access Point has moved and that could be for all kinds of
    reasons.

    Some access points are inside trains/buses/planes/ships/cars

    Hi Andy,

    Some access points are mobile hotspots (hell, some phones are set up as a mobile hotspot), but the main claim the security professionals are making
    is that Apple's WPS does two things that nobody else's WPS seems to do.
    a. It makes *billions* of BSSID:location pairs available to all, and,
    b. It makes the query of those billions of locations available to all.

    It's hard for me to understand the "logic" from Chris & Frank that a BSSID
    is "just a number", just as they would claim that a "white pill" is just a pill.

    What they can't comprehend is that the pill that is penicillin, is more
    than just a pill as if you understood the combination, it does something.

    To them, a BSSID paired with a location is the same everywhere in the
    world. They can't fathom that it's more than just a simple white pill.

    Is there ANYONE out there on this newsgroup who understand this concept?
    Do you?
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Carlos E.R.@robin_listas@es.invalid to alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.internet.wireless on Thu Dec 11 22:37:07 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    On 2025-12-10 03:54, Marian wrote:
    Carlos E.R. wrote:
    Regarding Frank's assessment that hiding the SSID and putting _nomap
    on the
    SSID "makes one suspect"... Suggesting that opting out makes you
    'suspect'
    flips the logic. In a system where consent is assumed unless you opt
    out,
    taking the opt-out step is the rational, privacy-protective choice.

    Yes, but it also signals "I have something to hide!". It makes you
    "interesting".

    I never disagree with any sensibly valid point of view, so people never
    waste their time when they bring up a counterpoint with me, as I do understand what your're saying but we have to look at the scale of consent.

    There must be millions upon millions of people who do not consent to tracking, even as there must be billions who consent to tracking their AP.

    Huh, no. Maybe 80% of users do not even know they have that option.
    Their ISP gives them a router, they just plug it in, done.

    Only geeks and technical people know.

    ... trimming

    Ok
    --
    Cheers, Carlos.
    ESEfc-Efc+, EUEfc-Efc|;
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Carlos E.R.@robin_listas@es.invalid to misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,alt.internet.wireless on Thu Dec 11 22:45:17 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    On 2025-12-10 20:10, Frank Slootweg wrote:
    Carlos E.R. <robin_listas@es.invalid> wrote:
    On 2025-12-08 14:50, Marian wrote:
    [...]
    Imagine this scenario:
    1. A company collects BSSIDs (MACs) from Wi-Fi routers in a city. 2.
    Over time, they build a database: -a a. MAC A -> seen at 123 Elm Street
    in 2022 -a b. MAC A -> seen at 456 Oak Avenue in 2023
    3. From this, they infer the household at 123 Elm Street likely
    -a moved to 456 Oak Avenue.

    Now scale that up: Track migration patterns of entire neighborhoods.
    Correlate MACs with census data, property records, or advertising IDs.
    What was just public information becomes a de facto surveillance system, >>> without meaningful consent from the people being tracked.

    Yes, this is true.

    No, it's not. As you said, it's not people, but households and, as
    others have said, it's not even households, but *devices* (Access
    Points).

    The *Access Point* has moved and that could be for all kinds of
    reasons. The AP might be re-used by someone else. The household may have
    been split up (someone(s) moved out), so the household did not move.
    Etc., etc..

    Devices are not people, at least not yet.

    Ok, yes, we know that a device moved. We know that it could be a
    household, or it could be a car with a wifi hot spot. More data would be needed to make certain it is a household, like for example, the SSID was static for years, then moved. Still, it can be that the AP was recycled.

    There is no certainty, but a possibility.
    --
    Cheers, Carlos.
    ESEfc-Efc+, EUEfc-Efc|;
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Marian@marianjones@helpfulpeople.com to alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.internet.wireless on Thu Dec 11 19:13:07 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    Carlos E.R. wrote:
    There must be millions upon millions of people who do not consent to
    tracking, even as there must be billions who consent to tracking their AP.

    Huh, no. Maybe 80% of users do not even know they have that option.
    Their ISP gives them a router, they just plug it in, done.

    Only geeks and technical people know.

    I always agree with any sensibly stated viewpoint, where I must also agree
    with you that most people probably have no idea they can opt out of
    tracking.

    Worse, even we geeky people don't necessarily realize there are different
    ways to opt out of each database, even as most use "_nomap" but not all.

    For example, Microsoft & Qualcomm force us to give them our BSSID just to
    opt out!
    <https://account.microsoft.com/privacy/location-services-opt-out>
    <https://www.qualcomm.com/site/privacy/qualcommtpsoptout>

    The horrid thing is nobody but Mozilla (whom I'm in contact with
    separately) tells us what their policy is for hidden SSID optouts.
    <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mozilla_Location_Service>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Marian@marianjones@helpfulpeople.com to misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,alt.internet.wireless on Thu Dec 11 19:21:11 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    Chris wrote:
    You don't own the IQ to understand a pill in my pocket is more than just a >> pill.

    What is it with you and these weird analogies?? Who cares if you have a
    pill in your pocket...?

    The point is a pill in my pocket is more than just a pill once you have
    some context such that it is a penicillin pill, just as a bssid is more
    than just a bssid when you have context such as the exact location of it.

    Neither you nor Frank own the IQ to understand there is context involved.

    Since you can't understand the power of the context, neither of you
    understands that a bssid is you just as penicillin can cure strep throat.

    Because your assessment that penicillin can't cure step throat because it's >> "just a pill" is absurd.

    I mean, it really can't. Penicillin is largely ineffectual following over-prescription. Plus, a single pill wouldn't cure anything; you need a course of at least a week of something like methicillin or phenoxicilin.

    You are aware my undergrad degree is in microbiology, Chris, are you not? (Hell, you joked about my textbooks many times so I know you know this.)

    Note: Penicillin does not kill bacteria; it prevents them from growing.
    It does that by interfering with their peptidoglycan cell wall structure.

    Note: The "pill" is the analogy for the "bssid", which is more powerful
    than the item appears to be to people who don't understand what it does.

    So what is the penicillin in your analogy...??

    Oh Jesus. My main point is you and Frank have such a low IQ that you can't fathom that a bssid attached to your exact location is more than a bssid.

    Your substandard IQ doesn't allow you to comprehend the contextual power.

    The analogy with the pill was simply that you and Frank own such a low IQ
    that you can't comprehend that not every pill does the same thing, Chris.

    Not every pill will prevent strep bacteria from growing.
    You and Frank don't own the necessary IQ to understand contextual power.

    That's why you say a BSSID with your GPS location is "just a number".
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Chris@ithinkiam@gmail.com to misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,alt.internet.wireless on Fri Dec 12 10:24:17 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    Carlos E.R. <robin_listas@es.invalid> wrote:
    On 2025-12-10 03:54, Marian wrote:
    Carlos E.R. wrote:
    Regarding Frank's assessment that hiding the SSID and putting _nomap
    on the
    SSID "makes one suspect"... Suggesting that opting out makes you
    'suspect'
    flips the logic. In a system where consent is assumed unless you opt
    out,
    taking the opt-out step is the rational, privacy-protective choice.

    Yes, but it also signals "I have something to hide!". It makes you
    "interesting".

    I never disagree with any sensibly valid point of view, so people never
    waste their time when they bring up a counterpoint with me, as I do
    understand what your're saying but we have to look at the scale of consent. >>
    There must be millions upon millions of people who do not consent to
    tracking, even as there must be billions who consent to tracking their AP.

    Huh, no. Maybe 80% of users do not even know they have that option.
    Their ISP gives them a router, they just plug it in, done.

    Only geeks and technical people know.

    I agree, although I'd say the number is nearer 99%. I have never ever seen
    a "_nomap" SSID and I have been aware of it for easily over 5 years.

    And when querying wifi networks almost none are changed from the ISP
    default.


    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Marian@marianjones@helpfulpeople.com to misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,alt.internet.wireless on Fri Dec 12 10:24:45 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    Chris wrote:
    Only geeks and technical people know.

    I agree, although I'd say the number is nearer 99%. I have never ever seen
    a "_nomap" SSID and I have been aware of it for easily over 5 years.

    And when querying wifi networks almost none are changed from the ISP
    default.

    What's disconcerting is that I agree with both Carlos & Chris in that
    almost nobody appears to even "know" about the opting out mechanism.

    Yet, it seems every single day of my life, I see more news about it.
    *Apple Tracks EVERYONE Through WiFi*
    *How to Opt OUT of Apple WiFi Tracking*
    <https://somegadgetguy.com/2024/05/24/apple-tracks-everyone-through-wifi-how-to-opt-out-of-apple-wifi-tracking/>

    The "good" news is you can opt out of most (but not all) these services.

    Microsoft: https://account.microsoft.com/privacy/location-services-opt-out
    Qualcomm-Skyhook: https://www.qualcomm.com/site/privacy/qualcommtpsoptout
    Apple: _nomap > https://support.apple.com/en-us/102515
    Google: _nomap > https://support.google.com/maps/answer/1725632
    WiGLE: _nomap or _optout > https://wigle.net/phpbb/viewtopic.php?t=2330
    OpenWLANMap: _nomap > https://github.com/openwifi-su/OpenWLANMap-App
    Mozilla: _nomap,hide > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mozilla_Location_Service
    Unwired Labs: https://unwiredlabs.com/optout
    Milnikov: https://www.milnikov.ru/geo/ (opt out seems to be dead)

    There must be more than those though.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Carlos E.R.@robin_listas@es.invalid to misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,alt.internet.wireless on Sun Dec 14 21:00:29 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    On 2025-12-12 11:24, Chris wrote:
    Carlos E.R. <robin_listas@es.invalid> wrote:
    On 2025-12-10 03:54, Marian wrote:
    Carlos E.R. wrote:
    Regarding Frank's assessment that hiding the SSID and putting _nomap >>>>> on the
    SSID "makes one suspect"... Suggesting that opting out makes you
    'suspect'
    flips the logic. In a system where consent is assumed unless you opt >>>>> out,
    taking the opt-out step is the rational, privacy-protective choice.

    Yes, but it also signals "I have something to hide!". It makes you
    "interesting".

    I never disagree with any sensibly valid point of view, so people never
    waste their time when they bring up a counterpoint with me, as I do
    understand what your're saying but we have to look at the scale of consent. >>>
    There must be millions upon millions of people who do not consent to
    tracking, even as there must be billions who consent to tracking their AP. >>
    Huh, no. Maybe 80% of users do not even know they have that option.
    Their ISP gives them a router, they just plug it in, done.

    Only geeks and technical people know.

    I agree, although I'd say the number is nearer 99%. I have never ever seen
    a "_nomap" SSID and I have been aware of it for easily over 5 years.

    Right, but I meant the percent of people that know how to customize
    their rooter.

    Similarly, I don't recall ever seeing it.


    And when querying wifi networks almost none are changed from the ISP
    default.

    Around my house I see three customized of mine, one random (computer
    generated long random string), 3 "TP-Link..." one "ARRIS". So everybody
    else except the random one is using factory defaults. Or provider defaults.

    Using WiFi Analizer (Android) upstairs I see a few more, also generated
    by the ISP.
    --
    Cheers, Carlos.
    ESEfc-Efc+, EUEfc-Efc|;
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Marian@marianjones@helpfulpeople.com to misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,alt.internet.wireless on Sun Dec 14 16:44:51 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    Carlos E.R. wrote:
    And when querying wifi networks almost none are changed from the ISP
    default.

    Around my house I see three customized of mine, one random (computer generated long random string), 3 "TP-Link..." one "ARRIS". So everybody
    else except the random one is using factory defaults. Or provider defaults.

    Using WiFi Analizer (Android) upstairs I see a few more, also generated
    by the ISP.


    Hi Carlos,

    If you want, you can give me a BSSID of one of the homes near you, and
    thanks to Chris who asked me to do it, I can output the nearest 400
    BSSID:GPS pairs in that area.

    If desired, I can "snowball" it even further, to get the nearest 400 to the outside ring, which will instantly extend to thousands within seconds.

    If you're OK with that, I'll post those thousands so that Chris (and others
    who may not have understood what the researchers reported) will see that.

    All I need to do is run the now-modified Apple BSSID locator code:
    <https://github.com/darkosancanin/apple_bssid_locator>
    where the main change I made to the apple_bssid_locator.py was
    FROM: apple_wloc.return_single_result = 1 (which means return only one)
    TO: apple_wloc.return_single_result = 0 (which means unlimited returns)

    In practice, "unlimited" really means Apple throttles returns at 400.
    All this I learned from reading the research that was posted about this.

    With the changes I documented, anyone in the world can reproduce what the security researchers said could be done, which I thank Chris for making me
    do it (because it took about a half hour for me to figure out that change).

    Now when I run this command using the modified apple_bssid_locator.py code
    python apple_bssid_locator.py 11:22:33:AA:BB:CC --all
    I get up to 400 BSSID:GPS pairs per query.

    If ANYONE wants to give me a BSSID of their neighbor, just post it.
    I will run the query for them and report the results here for all to see.

    As the researchers stated, it's trivial to "snowball" that query with automation to the point in two weeks the researchers had billions of
    GPS:BSSID pairs, which then they could use to track "households".

    It's so easy to do, it's scary.
    Just have someone give me a BSSID and I'll prove it to all right now.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Carlos E.R.@robin_listas@es.invalid to misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,alt.internet.wireless on Tue Dec 16 23:16:04 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    On 2025-12-15 00:44, Marian wrote:
    Carlos E.R. wrote:
    And when querying wifi networks almost none are changed from the ISP
    default.

    Around my house I see three customized of mine, one random (computer
    generated long random string), 3 "TP-Link..." one "ARRIS". So
    everybody else except the random one is using factory defaults. Or
    provider defaults.

    Using WiFi Analizer (Android) upstairs I see a few more, also
    generated by the ISP.


    Hi Carlos,

    If you want, you can give me a BSSID of one of the homes near you, and
    thanks to Chris who asked me to do it, I can output the nearest 400
    BSSID:GPS pairs in that area.

    That would reveal my location to the world :-)

    If desired, I can "snowball" it even further, to get the nearest 400 to the outside ring, which will instantly extend to thousands within seconds.

    If you're OK with that, I'll post those thousands so that Chris (and others who may not have understood what the researchers reported) will see that.

    All I need to do is run the now-modified Apple BSSID locator code: <https://github.com/darkosancanin/apple_bssid_locator>
    where the main change I made to the apple_bssid_locator.py was
    FROM: apple_wloc.return_single_result = 1 (which means return only one) TO:-a-a apple_wloc.return_single_result = 0 (which means unlimited returns)

    In practice, "unlimited" really means Apple throttles returns at 400.
    All this I learned from reading the research that was posted about this.

    With the changes I documented, anyone in the world can reproduce what the security researchers said could be done, which I thank Chris for making me
    do it (because it took about a half hour for me to figure out that change).

    Now when I run this command using the modified apple_bssid_locator.py code python apple_bssid_locator.py 11:22:33:AA:BB:CC --all
    I get up to 400 BSSID:GPS pairs per query.

    If ANYONE wants to give me a BSSID of their neighbor, just post it.
    I will run the query for them and report the results here for all to see.

    As the researchers stated, it's trivial to "snowball" that query with automation to the point in two weeks the researchers had billions of GPS:BSSID pairs, which then they could use to track "households".

    It's so easy to do, it's scary.
    Just have someone give me a BSSID and I'll prove it to all right now.

    I don't doubt it.
    --
    Cheers, Carlos.
    ESEfc-Efc+, EUEfc-Efc|;
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Marian@marianjones@helpfulpeople.com to misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,alt.internet.wireless on Wed Dec 17 00:29:14 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    Carlos E.R. wrote:
    If you want, you can give me a BSSID of one of the homes near you, and
    thanks to Chris who asked me to do it, I can output the nearest 400
    BSSID:GPS pairs in that area.

    That would reveal my location to the world :-)

    Yes. I know. That's why I picked an arbitrary Netgear BSSID to query:
    python.exe apple_bssid_locator.py 00:22:3f:a5:7b:33

    The location of that BSSID, and a few around it, happens to be:
    1 00:22:3f:a5:7b:33 35.29422378 126.77641296
    2 10:62:e5:b1:8f:12 35.29444885 126.77671051
    3 12:09:a5:53:df:13 35.29491043 126.77599334
    4 28:6d:97:4f:be:d0 35.29439163 126.77655029
    5 28:6d:97:b9:89:96 35.29463195 126.77554321000001
    6 42:09:a5:53:df:13 35.294940940000004 126.7760086
    7 04:09:a5:53:df:13 35.29491043 126.77601623
    8 50:46:ae:f2:9b:15 35.29492568 126.77648162
    9 58:86:94:51:6b:0e 35.2944374 126.77667999
    10 88:36:6c:06:65:38 35.29442214 126.77668762

    Here's a map of the 400 access points nearest to that initial AP:
    <https://i.postimg.cc/43ysV3Mr/fermium.jpg>

    It's so easy to do, it's scary.
    Just have someone give me a BSSID and I'll prove it to all right now.

    I don't doubt it.

    Thank you for not disputing what is obvious, as the Apple trolls (Chris for
    the most part, but also Frank seems to have joined in) dispute the obvious.

    All this I did with scripts that took me only a few hours to write.
    They only take seconds to run. Think about how scary that is to privacy.

    If each line is 60 bytes, then about 60MB would store a million, and about
    60GB would store about a billion of these GPS:BSSID access point pairs.

    If I can amass these in seconds, do you think people who sell the data can?

    If people take their router with them to new locations, I can track them.
    It's so trivial, it's scary.

    What I don't understand is the Apple trolls said many times it wasn't going
    to be trivial, but if I can do it, and I'm not even a coder, anyone can.

    If one of my neighbors moves, and I want to know where they moved to,
    it would be trivial for me to track them if they re-used their router.

    Worse, I could run zillions of different searches of the highly insecure
    Apple WPS database to track movements of anything that is in the database.

    Just like the researchers said I could.
    <https://www.theregister.com/2024/05/23/apple_wifi_positioning_system/>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Marian@marianjones@helpfulpeople.com to misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,alt.internet.wireless on Wed Dec 17 02:41:14 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    Carlos E.R. wrote:
    Ok, yes, we know that a device moved. We know that it could be a
    household, or it could be a car with a wifi hot spot. More data would be needed to make certain it is a household, like for example, the SSID was static for years, then moved. Still, it can be that the AP was recycled.

    There is no certainty, but a possibility.

    Hi Carlos, and others who are interested in the progress we've had.

    In order to start snowballing using Apple's highly insecure WPS database,
    to prove the point of how dangerous it is to people like Chris who can't
    fathom that Apple would build something this easily compromised...

    Here is code that generates random (or sequential) BSSIDs to place into a
    file which can later be checked against Apple's highly insecure WPS DB.

    bssidgenerate.bat

    Select an OUI from the menu or press Enter to type your own:
    1) TP-Link F4:F2:6D
    2) Netgear 44:94:FC
    3) Arris 60:31:97
    4) Ubiquiti 24:A4:3C
    5) Technicolor 10:13:31
    6) Cisco/Linksys 00:25:9C
    7) ASUS AC:9E:17
    8) Google/Nest F4:F5:D8
    9) Amazon/Eero 74:83:C2
    10) Hitron C8:3A:35

    Enter menu number (1iV10) or press Enter to type your own: 3
    How many BSSIDs do you want to generate?: 100
    Random or Sequential? (R/S): r
    Generating BSSIDs...
    60:31:97:CF:01:AB
    60:31:97:21:8A:8B
    60:31:97:A2:3D:B5
    60:31:97:E3:F7:5F
    60:31:97:62:E4:8A
    60:31:97:7F:45:6D
    60:31:97:77:C3:76
    60:31:97:63:9E:DB
    60:31:97:5C:33:91
    60:31:97:76:B9:71
    60:31:97:1D:0B:F0
    60:31:97:9C:17:21
    60:31:97:25:F7:F5
    60:31:97:4D:67:FA
    60:31:97:94:88:D0
    60:31:97:E7:73:04
    etc.
    Output file saved to: bssidinput.txt

    Here is the batch file.
    @echo off
    :: C:\app\os\python\apple_bssid_locator\bssidgenerate.bat
    :: Runs bssidgenerate.ps1 to generate random/sequential realistic BSSIDs
    set "SCRIPT=%~dp0bssidgenerate.ps1"

    echo Running PowerShell script:
    echo %SCRIPT%
    echo.

    Here is the powershell script.

    powershell -NoLogo -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File "%SCRIPT%"

    # C:\app\os\python\apple_bssid_locator\bssidgenerate.ps1
    # Usemodel: bssidgenerate.bat (runs this powershell script)
    # v1p0 20251217
    # Generates BSSIDs based on user input.
    # Prompts for:
    # 1. OUI (first half), e.g., F4:F2:6D (TP-Link)
    # 2. Number of BSSIDs to generate (e.g., 100)
    # 3. Mode: R = random, S = sequential
    # v1p1 20251217
    # Saves results to bssidinput.txt
    # Forces an OUI in case enter is hit prematurely
    # v1p2 20251217
    # Added menu of the ten most common USA OUI's
    # v1p3 20251217
    # Added sequential-mode starting block
    # v1p4 20251217
    # Added wraparound protection (at FF:FF:FF)

    # --- BEGIN OUI MENU BLOCK ---
    Write-Host ""
    Write-Host "Select an OUI from the menu or press Enter to type your own:"
    Write-Host " 1) TP-Link F4:F2:6D"
    Write-Host " 2) Netgear 44:94:FC"
    Write-Host " 3) Arris 60:31:97"
    Write-Host " 4) Ubiquiti 24:A4:3C"
    Write-Host " 5) Technicolor 10:13:31"
    Write-Host " 6) Cisco/Linksys 00:25:9C"
    Write-Host " 7) ASUS AC:9E:17"
    Write-Host " 8) Google/Nest F4:F5:D8"
    Write-Host " 9) Amazon/Eero 74:83:C2"
    Write-Host " 10) Hitron C8:3A:35"
    Write-Host ""

    $choice = Read-Host "Enter menu number (1iV10) or press Enter to type your own"

    switch ($choice) {
    "1" { $oui = "F4:F2:6D" }
    "2" { $oui = "44:94:FC" }
    "3" { $oui = "60:31:97" }
    "4" { $oui = "24:A4:3C" }
    "5" { $oui = "10:13:31" }
    "6" { $oui = "00:25:9C" }
    "7" { $oui = "AC:9E:17" }
    "8" { $oui = "F4:F5:D8" }
    "9" { $oui = "74:83:C2" }
    "10" { $oui = "C8:3A:35" }
    default { $oui = $null }
    }
    # --- END OUI MENU BLOCK ---

    # Ask for the first half (OUI)
    if (-not $oui) {
    $oui = Read-Host "Enter the first half (e.g., F4:F2:6D)"
    }
    $oui = $oui.ToUpper().Replace("-",":").Trim()

    # Prevent empty OUI
    if (-not $oui) {
    Write-Host "You must enter an OUI such as F4:F2:6D."
    exit
    }

    # Ask how many BSSIDs to generate
    $count = Read-Host "How many BSSIDs do you want to generate?"
    $count = [int]$count

    # Ask for mode: random or sequential
    $mode = Read-Host "Random or Sequential? (R/S)"
    $mode = $mode.ToUpper()

    Write-Host ""
    Write-Host "Generating BSSIDs..."
    Write-Host ""

    # Output file
    $outfile = "bssidinput.txt"
    Clear-Content -Path $outfile -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

    # Function to format a number 0iV255 as two hex digits
    function To-Hex([int]$n) {
    return "{0:X2}" -f $n
    }

    # Sequential mode
    if ($mode -eq "S") {

    # Ask for starting second-half (e.g., AB:CD:EF)
    $startHex = Read-Host "Enter starting second-half (e.g., AB:CD:EF) or press Enter for 00:00:00"
    if (-not $startHex) { $startHex = "00:00:00" }

    # Normalize
    $startHex = $startHex.ToUpper().Replace("-",":").Trim()

    # Convert to integer
    $parts = $startHex.Split(":")
    if ($parts.Count -ne 3) {
    Write-Host "Invalid starting value. Must be three bytes like AB:CD:EF."
    exit
    }

    $startVal = ([Convert]::ToInt32($parts[0],16) -shl 16) `
    + ([Convert]::ToInt32($parts[1],16) -shl 8) `
    + [Convert]::ToInt32($parts[2],16)

    $maxVal = 0xFFFFFF

    for ($i = 0; $i -lt $count; $i++) {

    $val = $startVal + $i

    if ($val -gt $maxVal) {
    Write-Host "Reached maximum value FF:FF:FF. Stopping."
    break
    }

    $b1 = ($val -shr 16) -band 0xFF
    $b2 = ($val -shr 8) -band 0xFF
    $b3 = $val -band 0xFF

    $bssid = "${oui}:{0}:{1}:{2}" -f (To-Hex $b1), (To-Hex $b2), (To-Hex $b3)
    Write-Host $bssid
    Add-Content -Path $outfile -Value $bssid
    }
    }

    # Random mode
    elseif ($mode -eq "R") {
    $rand = New-Object System.Random
    for ($i = 0; $i -lt $count; $i++) {
    $b1 = $rand.Next(0,256)
    $b2 = $rand.Next(0,256)
    $b3 = $rand.Next(0,256)

    $bssid = "${oui}:{0}:{1}:{2}" -f (To-Hex $b1), (To-Hex $b2), (To-Hex $b3)
    Write-Host $bssid
    Add-Content -Path $outfile -Value $bssid
    }
    }

    else {
    Write-Host "Invalid choice. Please enter R or S."
    }

    Write-Host ""
    Write-Host "Output file saved to: $(Resolve-Path $outfile)"

    # end of C:\app\os\python\apple_bssid_locator\bssidgenerate.ps1
    --
    Helping others & learning from them is what this Usenet ng is all about.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Marian@marianjones@helpfulpeople.com to misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,alt.internet.wireless on Wed Dec 17 02:50:31 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    Marian wrote:
    Here is code that generates random (or sequential) BSSIDs to place into a file which can later be checked against Apple's highly insecure WPS DB.

    Hi Carlos,

    Note that I'm constantly adding value to the topic, unlike the Apple trolls (who seem to be defending Apple to the death, no matter what, using the
    first inane excuse that they can think of, instead of helping us all).

    My claim is that it's trivial to gather valid access points to check
    against Apple's highly insecure WPS database, where below is that check.

    Once we have tens of thousands of random (or sequential) BSSIDs (which we
    can start at any start point but I stop at the FF:FF:FF wrap around), we
    can then check each of them against Apple's highly insecure WPS database.

    @echo off
    :: This is C:\app\os\python\apple_bssid_locator\bssidcheck.bat
    :: v1p0 20251217
    :: checks a list of BSSIDs from bssidcheck.txt in Apple's WPS db
    :: outputs to the console and into a timestamped log file
    :: v1p1 20251217
    :: added fullpath to output files in the console output
    :: v1p2 20251217
    :: only log when a lookup is successful
    :: v1p3 20251217
    :: added summary section of bssid's that were found

    :: Begin Log setup
    set LOGDIR=%~dp0log
    if not exist "%LOGDIR%" mkdir "%LOGDIR%"

    for /f %%A in ('wmic os get localdatetime ^| find "."') do set dt0=%%A
    set "session_ts=%dt0:~0,8%_%dt0:~8,6%"
    set "session_log=%LOGDIR%\session_%session_ts%.log"
    :: End Log setup

    :: --- begin Success list setup ---
    set "FOUND_LIST="
    :: --- end Success list setup ---

    echo === New BSSID lookup session started at %date% %time% === >> "%session_log%"
    echo Session log: %session_log%

    :: Begin FILE MODE
    if exist "%~dp0bssidcheck.txt" (
    echo Processing BSSIDs from bssidcheck.txt...
    for /f "usebackq tokens=*" %%X in ("%~dp0bssidcheck.txt") do (
    set "BSSID=%%X"
    call :process_bssid
    )
    goto end
    )
    :: End FILE MODE

    :: Begin INTERACTIVE MODE
    :loop
    echo.
    set /p BSSID=Enter the BSSID (or q to quit):
    if /I "%BSSID%"=="q" goto end

    call :process_bssid
    goto loop

    :: End INTERACTIVE MODE

    :: Begin PROCESS ONE BSSID
    :process_bssid
    :: --- Clean up input ---
    set "BSSID=%BSSID:"=%"
    set "BSSID=%BSSID: =%"

    :: --- begin Make filename-safe version ---
    set "safeBSSID=%BSSID::=-%"
    :: --- end Make filename-safe version ---

    :: --- begin Generate timestamp for THIS lookup ---
    for /f %%A in ('wmic os get localdatetime ^| find "."') do set dt=%%A
    set "ts=%dt:~0,8%_%dt:~8,6%"
    :: --- end Generate timestamp for THIS lookup ---

    :: --- begin Timestamped output file ---
    set "outfile=%LOGDIR%\bssidlookup_%ts%_%safeBSSID%.log"
    :: --- end Timestamped output file ---

    :: --- begin Clear previous coordinates ---
    set LAT=
    set LON=
    :: --- end Clear previous coordinates ---

    :: --- begin Run Python lookup ---
    echo === Lookup started at %date% %time% === > "%outfile%"
    echo BSSID: %BSSID% >> "%outfile%"
    echo. >> "%outfile%"

    python.exe apple_bssid_locator.py %BSSID% --all >> "%outfile%"
    :: --- end Run Python lookup ---

    :: --- begin Display results ---
    echo -----------------------------------------------
    type "%outfile%"
    echo -----------------------------------------------
    if defined LAT if defined LON echo Log written to: %outfile%
    :: --- end Display results ---

    :: --- begin Extract coordinates ---
    for /f "tokens=2 delims=: " %%A in ('findstr /i "Latitude" "%outfile%"')
    do set LAT=%%A
    for /f "tokens=2 delims=: " %%B in ('findstr /i "Longitude" "%outfile%"')
    do set LON=%%B

    echo === Lookup finished at %date% %time% === >> "%outfile%"
    echo. >> "%outfile%"
    :: --- end Extract coordinates ---

    :: --- begin Append to session log ---
    if defined LAT if defined LON (
    echo [%date% %time%] BSSID: %BSSID% >> "%session_log%"
    echo Latitude: %LAT% >> "%session_log%"
    echo Longitude: %LON% >> "%session_log%"
    echo. >> "%session_log%"

    :: Add to success list
    set "FOUND_LIST=%FOUND_LIST% %BSSID%"
    )
    :: --- end Append to session log ---

    :: --- begin Append to master log ---
    if defined LAT if defined LON (
    echo [%date% %time%] BSSID: %BSSID% >> "%LOGDIR%\bssidcheck_%session_ts%.log"
    echo Latitude: %LAT% >> "%LOGDIR%\bssidcheck_%session_ts%.log"
    echo Longitude: %LON% >> "%LOGDIR%\bssidcheck_%session_ts%.log"
    echo. >> "%LOGDIR%\bssidcheck_%session_ts%.log"
    )
    :: --- end Append to master log ---

    :: --- begin Open in Google Maps ---
    if defined LAT if defined LON start msedge "https://www.google.com/maps/search/?api=1&query=%LAT%,%LON%"
    :: --- end Open in Google Maps ---

    goto :eof
    :: End PROCESS ONE BSSID


    :end

    :: --- begin Summary of successful lookups ---
    echo.
    echo ===== Summary of Successful BSSID Lookups =====
    if defined FOUND_LIST (
    echo %FOUND_LIST%
    ) else (
    echo No BSSIDs were successfully located.
    )
    echo ===============================================
    echo.
    :: --- end Summary of successful lookups ---

    echo Exiting. Goodbye!
    :: end of C:\app\os\python\apple_bssid_locator\bssidcheck.bat
    --
    Never make the mistake of thinking I'm anything like the Apple trolls are.
    I am not here for my ego; nor for my amusement; but to teach & learn.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Marian@marianjones@helpfulpeople.com to misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,alt.internet.wireless on Wed Dec 17 03:27:48 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    Marian wrote:
    My claim is that it's trivial to gather valid access points to check
    against Apple's highly insecure WPS database, where below is that check.

    Anyone interested in running these TP-Link BSSIDs through Apple's
    highly insecure WPS lookup database & reporting results to the team?
    <https://wavedigger.networksurvey.app/?tab=bssid>

    ===== Summary of Successful BSSID Lookups =====
    F4:F2:6D:B6:A6:97
    F4:F2:6D:38:43:72
    F4:F2:6D:8E:DE:DC
    F4:F2:6D:87:0A:CE
    etc.
    ===============================================

    Click on these links and let the team know what you find out from them:
    <https://wavedigger.networksurvey.app/?tab=bssid&bssid=F4-F2-6D-B6-A6-97>
    <https://wavedigger.networksurvey.app/?tab=bssid&bssid=F4-F2-6D-38-43-72>
    <https://wavedigger.networksurvey.app/?tab=bssid&bssid=F4-F2-6D-8E-DE-DC>
    <https://wavedigger.networksurvey.app/?tab=bssid&bssid=F4-F2-6D-87-0A-CE>
    etc.

    Here's a report of the nearest 400 APs to the Shreveport Louisiana BSSID:
    <https://www.google.com/maps/place/32#27'32.07"N+93#48'53.84"W/>
    (4302 Josey Cir, Shreveport, LA 71109)

    Enter the BSSID (or q to quit): F4:F2:6D:B6:A6:97
    -----------------------------------------------
    === Lookup started at Wed 12/17/2025 3:15:21.02 ===
    BSSID: F4:F2:6D:B6:A6:97

    Searching for location of bssid: F4:F2:6D:B6:A6:97
    Saved 309 entries to results.txt
    BSSID: f4:f2:6d:b6:a6:97
    Latitude: 32.45974349
    Longitude: -93.81695556

    BSSID: 18:de:50:5b:14:6c
    Latitude: 32.45925521
    Longitude: -93.81757354

    BSSID: 1a:1e:19:0d:c9:a9
    Latitude: 32.45926666
    Longitude: -93.8175888

    BSSID: 1e:9e:cc:d6:cb:71
    Latitude: 32.45985031
    Longitude: -93.81725311

    BSSID: 1e:9e:cc:d6:cb:76
    Latitude: 32.45985031
    Longitude: -93.81725311

    BSSID: 02:aa:a0:ba:26:e0
    Latitude: 32.45988464
    Longitude: -93.81759643000001

    BSSID: 50:95:51:b5:b6:ae
    Latitude: 32.4591217
    Longitude: -93.81761169

    BSSID: 54:b2:03:2f:1b:60
    Latitude: 32.45988082
    Longitude: -93.81723022

    BSSID: 62:b2:03:2f:1b:60
    Latitude: 32.45986175
    Longitude: -93.81723785

    BSSID: 06:aa:a0:ba:26:e0
    Latitude: 32.45986938
    Longitude: -93.81759643000001

    BSSID: 6a:b2:03:2f:1b:60
    Latitude: 32.45987701
    Longitude: -93.81723022

    BSSID: 6e:b2:03:2f:1b:60
    Latitude: 32.459846490000004
    Longitude: -93.81730651000001

    BSSID: 84:eb:3e:f8:36:d3
    Latitude: 32.45880508
    Longitude: -93.81717681

    BSSID: 84:eb:3e:fa:b2:63
    Latitude: 32.4595375
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    Longitude: -93.81859588

    BSSID: 54:a6:5c:b0:58:b4
    Latitude: 32.45838546
    Longitude: -93.81859588

    BSSID: 72:13:01:fd:d6:19
    Latitude: 32.458404540000004
    Longitude: -93.81896972

    BSSID: 86:ef:16:b0:c3:44
    Latitude: 32.4580307
    Longitude: -93.81842803

    BSSID: 88:ef:16:b0:c3:44
    Latitude: 32.45802688
    Longitude: -93.81842041

    BSSID: 08:65:f0:85:af:46
    Latitude: 32.458133690000004
    Longitude: -93.81807708000001

    BSSID: 9c:34:26:24:02:fe
    Latitude: 32.45853042
    Longitude: -93.81868743

    BSSID: 9e:ad:43:e2:72:58
    Latitude: 32.45835494
    Longitude: -93.81844329

    BSSID: a6:36:c7:93:a6:e3
    Latitude: 32.45809555
    Longitude: -93.81831359

    BSSID: ac:91:9b:d4:bd:30
    Latitude: 32.45775222
    Longitude: -93.81910705

    BSSID: ae:61:a3:82:38:31
    Latitude: 32.45793151
    Longitude: -93.81826782

    BSSID: ae:97:cd:1d:65:1d
    Latitude: 32.45816421
    Longitude: -93.81831359

    BSSID: ae:ae:19:be:75:b9
    Latitude: 32.45865631
    Longitude: -93.81803894000001

    BSSID: be:34:26:24:02:fe
    Latitude: 32.45854187
    Longitude: -93.81868743

    BSSID: be:d7:d4:c9:42:98
    Latitude: 32.4582901
    Longitude: -93.81867218000001

    BSSID: c6:50:9c:9d:03:92
    Latitude: 32.45809555
    Longitude: -93.81854248

    BSSID: dc:eb:69:59:75:17
    Latitude: 32.45872497
    Longitude: -93.81905364

    BSSID: dc:eb:69:59:75:1a
    Latitude: 32.45876693
    Longitude: -93.81905364

    BSSID: dc:eb:69:59:75:1c
    Latitude: 32.458740230000004
    Longitude: -93.81904602

    BSSID: dc:eb:69:59:75:1d
    Latitude: 32.45874404
    Longitude: -93.81906127

    BSSID: de:34:26:24:02:fe
    Latitude: 32.45853424
    Longitude: -93.8186798

    BSSID: e2:db:d1:ca:98:99
    Latitude: 32.45833587
    Longitude: -93.8184967

    BSSID: f6:79:0a:5a:0e:aa
    Latitude: 32.45858383
    Longitude: -93.81819915

    BSSID: f8:79:0a:5a:0e:aa
    Latitude: 32.45858001
    Longitude: -93.81817626

    BSSID: 3c:b7:4b:a2:12:6f
    Latitude: 32.45782089
    Longitude: -93.81845855

    BSSID: 3c:b7:4b:a2:12:72
    Latitude: 32.45783233
    Longitude: -93.81846618

    BSSID: 4a:ea:62:bb:12:84
    Latitude: 32.45869445
    Longitude: -93.81802368

    BSSID: 08:65:f0:84:e3:7e
    Latitude: 32.45810699
    Longitude: -93.81805419

    BSSID: 08:65:f0:85:ab:f6
    Latitude: 32.45824813
    Longitude: -93.81806182

    BSSID: 9e:b3:f7:e9:12:d2
    Latitude: 32.45869445
    Longitude: -93.81893157

    BSSID: a6:6a:44:d3:d3:fb
    Latitude: 32.45800399
    Longitude: -93.81819915

    BSSID: b6:53:d2:96:a3:a6
    Latitude: 32.45809936
    Longitude: -93.81781768

    BSSID: be:d7:d4:d1:6d:a5
    Latitude: 32.4582138
    Longitude: -93.81854248

    BSSID: de:cd:2f:94:a1:f3
    Latitude: 32.45821762
    Longitude: -93.81860351

    BSSID: bc:64:4b:13:e5:b4
    Latitude: 32.45775985
    Longitude: -93.81871795

    BSSID: 0e:64:4b:13:e5:b4
    Latitude: 32.4577713
    Longitude: -93.81870269

    BSSID: 6e:29:90:48:48:f8
    Latitude: 32.45824813
    Longitude: -93.81910705

    BSSID: 6e:29:90:44:df:e4
    Latitude: 32.45845794
    Longitude: -93.81904602

    BSSID: 6e:29:90:48:5c:92
    Latitude: 32.45841598
    Longitude: -93.81911468

    BSSID: 10:9a:dd:89:81:75
    Latitude: 32.46053314
    Longitude: -93.81541442

    BSSID: 16:93:7c:21:d8:cd
    Latitude: 32.460472100000004
    Longitude: -93.81539154000001

    BSSID: 1c:93:7c:21:d8:cd
    Latitude: 32.46047592
    Longitude: -93.81538391000001

    BSSID: 1e:51:a4:d5:ad:2e
    Latitude: 32.46110534
    Longitude: -93.81504821

    BSSID: 22:76:13:0c:4a:e6
    Latitude: 32.46063232
    Longitude: -93.81548309

    BSSID: 02:71:47:b8:8e:45
    Latitude: 32.46051788
    Longitude: -93.81537628

    BSSID: 02:a0:0d:cf:38:92
    Latitude: 32.46069717
    Longitude: -93.81577301

    BSSID: 2a:c5:c8:13:e4:09
    Latitude: 32.46052169
    Longitude: -93.81542205

    BSSID: 3a:a0:97:ae:25:b0
    Latitude: 32.46107101
    Longitude: -93.81588745

    BSSID: 42:75:c3:38:ad:5d
    Latitude: 32.45996475
    Longitude: -93.81601715000001

    BSSID: 48:ea:62:19:c1:37
    Latitude: 32.46043395
    Longitude: -93.81559753

    BSSID: 58:07:f8:2c:e9:f4
    Latitude: 32.46059417
    Longitude: -93.81523895000001

    BSSID: 84:eb:3f:39:d3:36
    Latitude: 32.460472100000004
    Longitude: -93.81536102

    BSSID: c0:a0:0d:cf:38:92
    Latitude: 32.46071243
    Longitude: -93.81578826

    BSSID: c2:38:96:68:ab:18
    Latitude: 32.46050643
    Longitude: -93.81540679

    BSSID: e2:a0:0d:cf:38:92
    Latitude: 32.46071243
    Longitude: -93.81578063

    BSSID: e8:97:b8:8e:f4:99
    Latitude: 32.4604988
    Longitude: -93.81613159

    BSSID: 0e:93:7c:21:d8:cd
    Latitude: 32.46048355
    Longitude: -93.81538391000001

    BSSID: f8:a0:97:ae:25:b0
    Latitude: 32.46107482
    Longitude: -93.8159027

    BSSID: 28:6b:b4:e6:5a:6a
    Latitude: 32.46052169
    Longitude: -93.81571197

    BSSID: 42:75:c3:38:ad:59
    Latitude: 32.46013259
    Longitude: -93.81605529000001

    BSSID: 42:75:c3:38:ad:5a
    Latitude: 32.46012878
    Longitude: -93.81604766

    BSSID: 42:75:c3:38:ad:5e
    Latitude: 32.46014404
    Longitude: -93.81604766

    BSSID: 42:75:c3:38:ad:5f
    Latitude: 32.46013259
    Longitude: -93.81605529000001

    BSSID: 54:21:60:82:37:08
    Latitude: 32.46048736
    Longitude: -93.81610107

    BSSID: 8c:61:a3:83:5c:19
    Latitude: 32.4610939
    Longitude: -93.81595611

    BSSID: 8c:85:80:e4:91:ab
    Latitude: 32.46012115
    Longitude: -93.81610107

    BSSID: 90:d0:92:56:be:64
    Latitude: 32.46058654
    Longitude: -93.81621551

    BSSID: a2:ff:70:fe:7b:e8
    Latitude: 32.46064376
    Longitude: -93.81583404

    BSSID: a2:ff:70:fe:7b:ed
    Latitude: 32.46063995
    Longitude: -93.81584167

    BSSID: 0a:05:81:2b:bb:4d
    Latitude: 32.4604988
    Longitude: -93.81541442

    BSSID: ae:61:a3:83:5c:19
    Latitude: 32.4610939
    Longitude: -93.81596374

    BSSID: c2:e5:da:6e:1b:48
    Latitude: 32.46081161
    Longitude: -93.81608581

    BSSID: ce:61:a3:83:5c:19
    Latitude: 32.46108627
    Longitude: -93.81595611

    BSSID: 86:ea:ed:40:1b:57
    Latitude: 32.4599533
    Longitude: -93.81594848

    BSSID: da:a0:11:b9:d5:51
    Latitude: 32.46051788
    Longitude: -93.81621551

    BSSID: 72:13:01:e1:d9:21
    Latitude: 32.4601593
    Longitude: -93.81848907

    BSSID: 72:13:01:e1:d9:22
    Latitude: 32.46015167
    Longitude: -93.81848907

    BSSID: 72:13:01:e1:d9:26
    Latitude: 32.46016311
    Longitude: -93.81850433

    BSSID: 84:eb:3f:39:cb:07
    Latitude: 32.46070098
    Longitude: -93.81808471000001

    BSSID: 84:eb:3f:07:10:ef
    Latitude: 32.46009826
    Longitude: -93.81835174

    BSSID: 8c:61:a3:a1:11:01
    Latitude: 32.46061325
    Longitude: -93.8179779

    BSSID: 8c:76:3f:51:c7:f7
    Latitude: 32.46059036
    Longitude: -93.81776428

    BSSID: 8c:0f:6f:1b:1a:60
    Latitude: 32.46043014
    Longitude: -93.81858062

    BSSID: 8e:49:62:6e:f4:8a
    Latitude: 32.46063995
    Longitude: -93.81803131

    BSSID: 8e:76:3f:51:c7:f7
    Latitude: 32.46057891
    Longitude: -93.81777954

    BSSID: 96:76:3f:51:c7:f7
    Latitude: 32.46059417
    Longitude: -93.81775665

    BSSID: 9a:0f:6f:1b:1a:60
    Latitude: 32.46042251
    Longitude: -93.81858825

    BSSID: a0:68:7e:90:9d:50
    Latitude: 32.46071243
    Longitude: -93.81809997

    BSSID: a2:0f:6f:1b:1a:60
    Latitude: 32.460426330000004
    Longitude: -93.81858825

    BSSID: a6:0f:6f:1b:1a:60
    Latitude: 32.46038436
    Longitude: -93.81861877

    BSSID: cc:58:30:61:e8:27
    Latitude: 32.46091461
    Longitude: -93.81833648

    BSSID: d4:5d:df:e4:38:10
    Latitude: 32.46094512
    Longitude: -93.81808471000001

    BSSID: 18:60:24:d6:92:0f
    Latitude: 32.46081161
    Longitude: -93.81790161

    BSSID: 2a:c5:c8:04:a7:dd
    Latitude: 32.46001434
    Longitude: -93.81880187

    BSSID: 4a:4b:d4:6a:36:fd
    Latitude: 32.46064376
    Longitude: -93.81900787000001

    BSSID: 8e:49:62:f2:22:22
    Latitude: 32.460762020000004
    Longitude: -93.81889343

    BSSID: ae:61:a3:a1:11:01
    Latitude: 32.46060943
    Longitude: -93.8179779

    BSSID: ce:61:a3:a1:11:01
    Latitude: 32.46060943
    Longitude: -93.8179779

    BSSID: d4:5d:df:e8:5b:90
    Latitude: 32.46016311
    Longitude: -93.81820678

    BSSID: e2:5d:df:e8:5b:90
    Latitude: 32.46017837
    Longitude: -93.81820678

    BSSID: ea:01:c7:48:27:3c
    Latitude: 32.46076965
    Longitude: -93.81806945

    BSSID: ea:5d:df:e4:38:10
    Latitude: 32.46091842
    Longitude: -93.81809234

    BSSID: ea:5d:df:e8:5b:90
    Latitude: 32.46017074
    Longitude: -93.81820678

    BSSID: ee:5d:df:e8:5b:90
    Latitude: 32.46022033
    Longitude: -93.81821441

    BSSID: fa:d2:ac:08:fd:ed
    Latitude: 32.46027374
    Longitude: -93.81826782

    BSSID: fc:51:a4:ae:a5:50
    Latitude: 32.46082305
    Longitude: -93.81792449

    BSSID: fe:51:a4:ae:a5:50
    Latitude: 32.46081542
    Longitude: -93.81790924

    BSSID: e2:3e:cb:98:c8:2c
    Latitude: 32.46010589
    Longitude: -93.81864929

    BSSID: 00:18:f8:c1:4a:65
    Latitude: 32.45991134
    Longitude: -93.81384277000001

    BSSID: 02:aa:a0:e3:5f:38
    Latitude: 32.458904260000004
    Longitude: -93.81495666

    BSSID: 06:aa:a0:e3:5f:38
    Latitude: 32.45891189
    Longitude: -93.81496429

    BSSID: 72:13:01:01:99:9a
    Latitude: 32.45918273
    Longitude: -93.81450653

    BSSID: 72:13:01:01:99:9d
    Latitude: 32.45917892
    Longitude: -93.81450653

    BSSID: ec:aa:a0:e3:5f:38
    Latitude: 32.45891189
    Longitude: -93.81495666

    BSSID: fa:aa:a0:e3:5f:38
    Latitude: 32.45890808
    Longitude: -93.81495666
    -----------------------------------------------
    --
    The point being made is not that I wish to track movement (I don't!);
    but that it's trivial to do using the insecure Apple WPS database.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Marian@marianjones@helpfulpeople.com to alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.internet.wireless on Thu Dec 18 14:37:54 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    Carlos E.R. wrote:
    I'll dig a bit to see if maybe a repeater/bridge threw me under the bus.

    Doubtful.

    The SSID is the same, so would have the _nomap, but I'm unsure about the BSSID keeping or not.

    In any case, you can find out if the SSID is published or hidden by any
    of those repeaters/bridges. Just move near to each one of them, and
    query the laptop information. Make sure it is connected to it by
    comparing the strength of the signal.

    I found out, directly from Apple, what the problem was.

    I'm not at liberty to provide the details, but my neighbor, who is very
    high in the Apple hierarchy, filed a RADAR internal bug report for me.

    After a week of discussing the problem, and even with my high-level access, Apple pulled the typical stalling & denial (can't reproduce) tactic, I
    stood my ground and asked Apple to answer one question to my satisfaction.

    Q: Why, when I followed all Apple's published rules, am I in their WPS db?
    A: The answer came back that they don't respect the fact my SSID is hidden.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Marian@marianjones@helpfulpeople.com to alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.internet.wireless on Sun Dec 28 10:54:17 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    Andy Burns wrote:
    If you have a free unused/old router or access point, you could set it
    up with a hidden _nomap SSID, and without connecting any of your phones
    to it, wait to see if the BSSID appears listed after a month or two. It
    would be interesting to check every day with a script, to see how fast
    they update.

    Ask some friends who use iPhones to come round for a coffee, the more devices hoovering up data the better? They may only add BSSIDs to the
    DB if they've seen them via multiple devices.

    Hi Andy,

    I respect you so I am explaining that I'm taking your suggestion to heart.
    Yet we don't need any Apple devices to run this test, it's that easy to do.

    Jan 1st I'm putting 3 old routers (which you may recognize) in Palo Alto.
    <https://i.postimg.cc/44WKMKpJ/apple-wps-testing.jpg>

    1. Normal SSID
    2. _nomap SSID
    3. _nomap SSID + hidden broadcast frames

    I have a friend in Palo Alto who is willing to host these three routers for about a month, starting on January 1st, 2026. Then we will move the three routers to Cupertino on February 1st to simulate moving to a new flat.
    From: Marian <marianjones@helpfulpeople.com>
    Newsgroups: alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,alt.internet.wireless
    Subject: Help! How do we get Apple to care about privacy for entities who own access points?
    Date: Tue, 23 Dec 2025 23:42:17 -0700
    Organization: BWH Usenet Archive (https://usenet.blueworldhosting.com)
    Message-ID: <10ig209$29kr$1@nnrp.usenet.blueworldhosting.com>

    I already know EXACTLY what will happen, but this is simply the test
    results that I will show to Apple when the time comes to show it to them.

    Given virtually every router in the world has the HIDDEN broadcast frame feature, we can assume hundreds of millions of people use that feature.

    Apple does not intend to honor their own published privacy policy, so the routers with that feature will be included in the public Apple WPS
    database, which is expressly against the wishes of the people who do that.

    What Apple "is doing" is the antithesis of what Apple "says" they will do.

    To me, that's morally, ethically & legally reprehensible for Apple to do
    that, and Apple can't say they're unaware because I know they're aware.
    --
    It used to be Apple only told the truth in court, but with Judge Gonzalez' case with Apple execs, it may be Apple doen't even tell the truth in court.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Marian@marianjones@helpfulpeople.com to alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.internet.wireless on Sun Dec 28 17:14:10 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    Andy Burns wrote:
    Nor mine, by SSID name (not hidden or _nomap suffix)

    I wouldn't really expect anyone to have wardriven around here with a
    laptop running Vistumbler, but you never know ...

    Hi Andy,

    In the United States, it's a public record where everyone who owns a home lives, so there's a 1:1 relationship between them and their router.

    Cybernews: *Anyone can tap into your WiFi location data to track you*
    explains how Apple's WPS can be exploited for mass surveillance. <https://cybernews.com/privacy/apple-beams-wifi-location-data-privacy-risk/>

    The researchers already showed anyone in the world is already able to use Apple's WPS db to track Loretta Anne Jameson's AP which is currently
    located at 4302 Josey Circle, Shreveport, LA 71109.

    When she moves, I'll let you know where she moves her router to.
    Likewise with any of her neighbors.

    Ronda and Alfred Beel, 4310 Josey Cir, Unit #2-A
    Benjamin and Eric Choyica 1/4 and, 4318 Josey Cir, Unit #2-A
    Jeffrey Devin, 4306 Josey Cir, Unit #2-A
    Flora Ann Jackson Gellion, 4338 Josey Cir, Unit #2-A
    Lonzie D. Groniger, 4321 Josey Cir, Unit #2-A
    Lutrisher Walton Hill, 4329 Josey Cir, Unit #2-A
    Melvin Hawthorn, Jr. 1/2 and, 4823 Josey Cir, Unit #2-A
    Mary E. Gebbs Hendy, 4816 Josey Cir, Unit #2-A
    Shane Jameson Sr., 4330 Josey Cir, Unit #2-A
    Rosemary Ellerbee Jones, 4317 Josey Cir, Unit #2-A
    Charles Nesh, 4824 Josey Cir, Unit #2-A
    James and Dollie Henson Smythe, 4314 Josey Cir, Unit #2-A
    Sherryn Marie Smythe, 4820 Josey Cir, Unit #2-A
    Terrince Steedman, 4326 Josey Cir, Unit #2-A
    Pamela Tomas, 4828 Josey Cir, Unit #2-A
    Trivia Yashica Watken, 4827 Josey Cir, Unit #2-A
    etc.

    Anyone can do this for any home in the United States.
    Which is why this is so dangerous to privacy.
    --
    I'm here to help others understand the deeper mechanics of WPS that
    most people never comprehend (& that Apple marketing never explains).
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Alan@nuh-uh@nope.com to alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.internet.wireless on Sun Dec 28 20:55:12 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    On 2025-12-28 16:14, Marian wrote:
    Andy Burns wrote:
    Nor mine, by SSID name (not hidden or _nomap suffix)

    I wouldn't really expect anyone to have wardriven around here with a
    laptop running Vistumbler, but you never know ...

    Hi Andy,
    In the United States, it's a public record where everyone who owns a home lives, so there's a 1:1 relationship between them and their router.

    Only assuming the accuracy of the database...

    ...which isn't accurate...

    ...because devices that AREN'T in the supposed location of an AP are
    reporting that one is NEAR their actual location.

    Cybernews: *Anyone can tap into your WiFi location data to track you* explains how Apple's WPS can be exploited for mass surveillance. <https://cybernews.com/privacy/apple-beams-wifi-location-data-privacy- risk/>

    The researchers already showed anyone in the world is already able to use Apple's WPS db to track Loretta Anne Jameson's AP which is currently
    located at 4302 Josey Circle, Shreveport, LA 71109.

    How do you know that?

    When she moves, I'll let you know where she moves her router to.
    Likewise with any of her neighbors.

    Ronda and Alfred Beel, 4310 Josey Cir, Unit #2-A
    Benjamin and Eric Choyica 1/4 and, 4318 Josey Cir, Unit #2-A
    Jeffrey Devin, 4306 Josey Cir, Unit #2-A
    Flora Ann Jackson Gellion, 4338 Josey Cir, Unit #2-A
    Lonzie D. Groniger, 4321 Josey Cir, Unit #2-A
    Lutrisher Walton Hill, 4329 Josey Cir, Unit #2-A
    Melvin Hawthorn, Jr. 1/2 and, 4823 Josey Cir, Unit #2-A
    Mary E. Gebbs Hendy, 4816 Josey Cir, Unit #2-A
    Shane Jameson Sr., 4330 Josey Cir, Unit #2-A
    Rosemary Ellerbee Jones, 4317 Josey Cir, Unit #2-A
    Charles Nesh, 4824 Josey Cir, Unit #2-A
    James and Dollie Henson Smythe, 4314 Josey Cir, Unit #2-A
    Sherryn Marie Smythe, 4820 Josey Cir, Unit #2-A
    Terrince Steedman, 4326 Josey Cir, Unit #2-A
    Pamela Tomas, 4828 Josey Cir, Unit #2-A
    Trivia Yashica Watken, 4827 Josey Cir, Unit #2-A
    etc.

    Anyone can do this for any home in the United States.
    Which is why this is so dangerous to privacy.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tyrone@none@none.none to alt.comp.os.windows-10,alt.internet.wireless,comp.mobile.android,misc.phone.mobile.iphone on Mon Dec 29 15:12:36 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    On Dec 28, 2025 at 11:55:12rC>PM EST, "Alan" <nuh-uh@nope.com> wrote:

    On 2025-12-28 16:14, Marian wrote:
    Andy Burns wrote:
    Nor mine, by SSID name (not hidden or _nomap suffix)

    I wouldn't really expect anyone to have wardriven around here with a
    laptop running Vistumbler, but you never know ...

    Hi Andy,
    In the United States, it's a public record where everyone who owns a home
    lives, so there's a 1:1 relationship between them and their router.

    Only assuming the accuracy of the database...

    ...which isn't accurate...

    ...because devices that AREN'T in the supposed location of an AP are reporting that one is NEAR their actual location.

    And STILL assuming that a moving router ALWAYS indicates the person moved. MUCH more likely that the router was sold/given away.

    Not to mention that since their are "public records where everyone who owns a home
    lives" then what is this router adding anyway? If you know where I live, why does the router even matter?

    The answer to that is obvious. It only matters because Arlen thinks it makes Apple "look bad".

    Which is Arlen's lifelong quest.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Marian@marianjones@helpfulpeople.com to alt.comp.os.windows-10,alt.internet.wireless,comp.mobile.android,misc.phone.mobile.iphone on Mon Dec 29 15:04:30 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    Tyrone wrote:
    it makes Apple "look bad".

    What Apple does is what "makes Apple look bad", not me.

    What's important is that Apple's WPS database implementation is insecure. That's not opinion. That's fact which was described in the research.

    Google's WPS database access is nothing like Apple's WPS database access. Anyone in the world can access Apple's entire WPS db without restriction.

    All I did was reproduce what the researchers said was easily possible.
    And it was.

    What the researchers didn't note, and which I learned, and I'm likely only
    one out of millions who knows this, was not only does Apple not respect
    their own published privacy policy on opting out, but they have no
    intention of respecting their published privacy opt-out policy.

    This is not opinion.
    This is fact.

    Only one out of millions of people know what I just said above.
    We know it because we're extremely intelligent and well informed.

    Bear in mind if Google or Mozilla did what Apple did, I would be on their
    case too, because what Apple is doing is the antithesis of what Apple
    "says" it does.

    It's legally, morally & ethically reprehensible what Apple is doing.
    If Google or Mozilla did what Apple does, I'd say the same of them.

    But they didn't.
    Only Apple does this.
    --
    I'm here to help others understand the deeper mechanics of WPS that
    most people never comprehend (& that Apple marketing never explains).
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Hank Rogers@Hank@nospam.invalid to alt.comp.os.windows-10,alt.internet.wireless,comp.mobile.android,misc.phone.mobile.iphone on Mon Dec 29 17:52:51 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    Marian wrote on 12/29/2025 4:04 PM:
    Tyrone wrote:
    it makes Apple "look bad".

    What Apple does is what "makes Apple look bad", not me.

    What's important is that Apple's WPS database implementation is
    insecure. That's not opinion. That's fact which was described in the research.

    Google's WPS database access is nothing like Apple's WPS database access. Anyone in the world can access Apple's entire WPS db without restriction.

    All I did was reproduce what the researchers said was easily possible.
    And it was.

    What the researchers didn't note, and which I learned, and I'm likely only one out of millions who knows this, was not only does Apple not respect
    their own published privacy policy on opting out, but they have no
    intention of respecting their published privacy opt-out policy.

    This is not opinion.
    This is fact.

    Only one out of millions of people know what I just said above.
    We know it because we're extremely intelligent and well informed.

    Bear in mind if Google or Mozilla did what Apple did, I would be on their case too, because what Apple is doing is the antithesis of what Apple
    "says" it does.

    It's legally, morally & ethically reprehensible what Apple is doing.
    If Google or Mozilla did what Apple does, I'd say the same of them.

    But they didn't.
    Only Apple does this.

    So, I have to ask ... WHY aren't you taking any positive action marion?

    Anonymously Posting rubbish on usenet will not help us, nor you. Apple doesn't even read it, let alone anyone that could intervene.

    I realize you are a secret agent and must maintain your privacy to top
    secret level, but surely you realize few can even read your secret stuff.

    You are pissing up a rainpipe, Marion 007.

    This message will self-destruct in 3 seconds ... sssssss.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Hank Rogers@Hank@nospam.invalid to alt.comp.os.windows-10,alt.internet.wireless,comp.mobile.android,misc.phone.mobile.iphone on Mon Dec 29 18:45:38 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    Marian wrote on 12/29/2025 4:04 PM:
    Tyrone wrote:
    it makes Apple "look bad".

    What Apple does is what "makes Apple look bad", not me.

    What's important is that Apple's WPS database implementation is
    insecure. That's not opinion. That's fact which was described in the research.

    Google's WPS database access is nothing like Apple's WPS database access. Anyone in the world can access Apple's entire WPS db without restriction.

    All I did was reproduce what the researchers said was easily possible.
    And it was.

    What the researchers didn't note, and which I learned, and I'm likely only one out of millions who knows this, was not only does Apple not respect
    their own published privacy policy on opting out, but they have no
    intention of respecting their published privacy opt-out policy.

    This is not opinion.
    This is fact.

    Only one out of millions of people know what I just said above.

    Thank goodness! If only a few people and yourself know this, the rest
    of us likely have some time left.

    We know it because we're extremely intelligent and well informed.


    Your superior intellect is well known Marion. But who are the others in
    the "We"?

    I'm sure everyone would like to thank this genius cadre for their efforts.

    No, on second thought perhaps not. I'm sure all these people are
    cloaked in secrecy, and we should do nothing to blow their cover.


    This message will self destruct in 3 seconds.



    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Chris@ithinkiam@gmail.com to misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,alt.internet.wireless on Thu Dec 11 07:20:54 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    Marian <marianjones@helpfulpeople.com> wrote:
    Chris wrote:
    Devices are not people, at least not yet.

    Correct.

    If I had a pill in my pocket, you'd say it's a pill. It's not a cure. It's
    a pill. You can't see that if it's penicillin, it can cure you of strep throat.

    You and Frank never were accepted into a college for a reason, Chris.
    You don't own the IQ to understand a pill in my pocket is more than just a pill.

    What is it with you and these weird analogies?? Who cares if you have a
    pill in your pocket...?

    To you (and Frank), all pills are the same.
    Who is that strange?

    Only you are when making absurd defenses for Apple decisions.
    Nobody on the planet who is a security professional agrees with you two.

    Nobody.

    If they did, you'd find them.
    And you can't.

    Because your assessment that penicillin can't cure step throat because it's "just a pill" is absurd.

    I mean, it really can't. Penicillin is largely ineffectual following over-prescription. Plus, a single pill wouldn't cure anything; you need a course of at least a week of something like methicillin or phenoxicilin.

    Note: The "pill" is the analogy for the "bssid", which is more powerful
    than the item appears to be to people who don't understand what it does.

    So what is the penicillin in your analogy...??

    I think you've taken too many pills, Donald.



    --- Synchronet 3.21d-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Frank Slootweg@this@ddress.is.invalid to misc.phone.mobile.iphone,alt.comp.os.windows-10,comp.mobile.android,alt.internet.wireless on Thu Dec 11 14:40:52 2025
    From Newsgroup: alt.internet.wireless

    Andy Burns <usenet@andyburns.uk> wrote:
    Frank Slootweg wrote:

    The Access Point has moved and that could be for all kinds of
    reasons.

    Some access points are inside trains/buses/planes/ships/cars

    Yes, the assumption has been that we're talking about 'fixed' access
    points.
    --- Synchronet 3.21d-Linux NewsLink 1.2