ABB Automation Builder Gateway for Windows

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Summary
ABB became aware of severe vulnerability in the products versions listed as affected in the advisory. The Windows gateway is accessible remotely by default. Unauthenticated attackers can therefore search for PLCs, but the user management of the PLCs prevents the actual access to the PLCs ? unless it is disabled
The following versions of ABB Automation Builder Gateway for Windows are affected:

Automation Builder <2.9.0, 2.9.0





CVSS
Vendor
Equipment
Vulnerabilities




v3 5.3
ABB
ABB Automation Builder Gateway for Windows
Initialization of a Resource with an Insecure Default




Background

Critical Infrastructure Sectors: Chemical, Critical Manufacturing, Energy, Water and Wastewater
Countries/Areas Deployed: Worldwide
Company Headquarters Location: Switzerland


Vulnerabilities

Expand All +

CVE-2024-41975

The gateway serves as a communication channel for various clients to AC500 PLCs. By default, the gateway listens on all available network adapters on port 1217 and can therefore be accessed remotely. How-ever, remote access to the gateway is only required in certain network configurations. Since the gateway is usually accessed locally, many users are unaware of this remote access option, which can enable scan-ning of and access to restricted PLC networks. Unauthenticated attackers can therefore search for PLCs, but the user management of the PLCs prevents the actual access to the PLCs ? unless it is disabled. Please note that the gateway for Windows can be installed as a separate setup or as part of other setups such as the CODESYS Development System V3 setup or the CODESYS OPC DA Server setup.
View CVE Details

Affected Products
ABB Automation Builder Gateway for Windows

Vendor:ABB
Product Version:ABB Automation Builder <2.9.0
Product Status:fixed, known_affected


Remediations
Vendor fixIf remote access is not required, check the "LocalAddress" setting in the [CmpGwCommDrvTcp] section of the Gateway's configuration file as follows (restart of gateway required in case of changes): [CmpGwCommDrvTcp] LocalAddress=127.0.0.1 ; allow access only from the local computer The gateway configuration file can be located at (example for Automation Builder 2.8): %ProgramFiles%\ABB\AB2.8\AutomationBuilder\GatewayPLC\Gateway.cfg Starting with Automation Builder version 2.9.0 the vulnerability is closed by setting the default for the gateway to local access. Automation Builder 2.9.0 is available for download from the related download site. https://www.abb.com/global/en/areas/motion/digital-tools/automation-builder/software-download
WorkaroundWorkarounds are specific measures that a user can take to help block an attack, for example, temporarily disabling the vulnerable feature may remove the exposure with well-known impact on functionality. ABB has tested the following workarounds. Although these workarounds will not correct the underlying vulnerability, they can help block known attack vectors. When a workaround reduces functionality, this is identified below as ?Impact of workaround?. The vulnerability can be closed by enabling local access only. See chapter ?Recommended immediate actions? for details.

Relevant CWE: CWE-1188 Initialization of a Resource with an Insecure Default

Metrics




CVSS Version
Base Score
Base Severity
Vector String




3.1
5.3
MEDIUM
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N/E:F/RL:O/RC:C








Acknowledgments

ABB PSIRT reported this vulnerability to CISA.


Notice
The information in this document is subject to change without notice, and should not be construed as a commitment by ABB. ABB provides no warranty, express or implied, including warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, for the information contained in this document, and assumes no responsibility for any errors that may appear in this document. In no event shall ABB or any of its suppliers be liable for direct, indirect, special, incidental or consequential damages of any nature or kind arising from the use of this document, or from the use of any hardware or software described in this document, even if ABB or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. This document and parts hereof must not be reproduced or copied without written permission from ABB, and the contents hereof must not be imparted to a third party nor used for any unauthorized purpose. All rights to registrations and trademarks reside with their respective owners.

Frequently Asked Questions
What causes the vulnerability? - Refer to section ?Vulnerability severity and details?. What is the ABB Automation Builder? - The ABB Automation Builder is the programming and commissioning tool mainly for the ABB PLC AC500 and the operator panels CP600. What might an attacker use the vulnerability to do? - An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could scan for connected PLCs. Could the vulnerability be exploited remotely? - Yes, an attacker who has network access to an affected system node could exploit this vulnerability. Recommended practices include that process control systems are physically protected, have no direct connections to the Internet, and are separated from other networks by means of a firewall system that has a minimal number of ports exposed. What does the update do? - The update removes the vulnerability by setting the defaults of the gateway to local access. When this security advisory was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed? - Yes, this vulnerability has been publicly disclosed. When this security advisory was issued, had ABB received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited? - No, ABB had not received any information indicating that this vulnerability had been exploited when this security advisory was originally issued.

Legal Notice and Terms of Use
This product is provided subject to this Notification (https://www.cisa.gov/notification) and this Privacy & Use policy (https://www.cisa.gov/privacy-policy).

Recommended Practices
CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the exploitation risk of these vulnerabilities.
Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, and ensure they are not accessible from the internet.
Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolate them from business networks.
When remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most recent version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as its connected devices.
CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
CISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.
CISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets. Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.
Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.

Advisory Conversion Disclaimer
This ICSA is a verbatim republication of ABB PSIRT 3ADR011525 from a direct conversion of the vendor's Common Security Advisory Framework (CSAF) advisory. This is republished to CISA's website as a means of increasing visibility and is provided "as-is" for informational purposes only. CISA is not responsible for the editorial or technical accuracy of republished advisories and provides no warranties of any kind regarding any information contained within this advisory. Further, CISA does not endorse any commercial product or service. Please contact ABB PSIRT directly for any questions regarding this advisory.
Revision History

Initial Release Date: 2026-02-24




Date
Revision
Summary




2026-02-24
1
Initial version.


2026-05-12
2
Initial CISA Republication of ABB PSIRT 3ADR011525 advisory




Legal Notice and Terms of Use

https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-132-04

2026-05-12 12:00 UTC
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