Changing the foundational basis to Proof Theoretic Semantics
Tarski Undefinability is overcome
x ree Provable rco x ree True // proof theoretic semantics
Changing the foundation to proof theoretic semantics where
truth is well-founded provability blocks TarskirCOs diagonal
step most clearly seen on line (3)
Here is the Tarski Undefinability Theorem proof
(1) x ree Provable if and only if p
(2) x ree True if and only if p
(3) x ree Provable if and only if x ree True. // (1) and (2) combined
(4) either x ree True or x|a ree True;-a-a-a-a // axiom: ~True(x) re? ~True(~x)
(5) if x ree Provable, then x ree True;-a // axiom: Provable(x) raA True(x) (6) if x|a ree Provable, then x|a ree True;-a // axiom: Provable(~x) raA True(~x)
(7) x ree True
(8) x ree Provable
(9) x|a ree Provable
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
A proof theoretic prover rejects expressions that
do not have "a well-founded justification tree within
Proof theoretic semantics".
The same way that Prolog does
% This sentence is not true.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Changing the foundational basis to Proof Theoretic Semantics
Tarski Undefinability is overcome
x ree Provable rco x ree True // proof theoretic semantics
Changing the foundation to proof theoretic semantics where
truth is well-founded provability blocks TarskirCOs diagonal
step most clearly seen on line (3)
Here is the Tarski Undefinability Theorem proof
(1) x ree Provable if and only if p
(2) x ree True if and only if p
(3) x ree Provable if and only if x ree True. // (1) and (2) combined
(4) either x ree True or x|a ree True;-a-a-a-a // axiom: ~True(x) re? ~True(~x)
(5) if x ree Provable, then x ree True;-a // axiom: Provable(x) raA True(x) (6) if x|a ree Provable, then x|a ree True;-a // axiom: Provable(~x) raA True(~x)
(7) x ree True
(8) x ree Provable
(9) x|a ree Provable
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
A proof theoretic prover rejects expressions that
do not have "a well-founded justification tree within
Proof theoretic semantics".
The same way that Prolog does
% This sentence is not true.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
On 2/5/2026 10:55 AM, olcott wrote:
Changing the foundational basis to Proof Theoretic Semantics
Tarski Undefinability is overcome
x ree Provable rco x ree True // proof theoretic semantics
Changing the foundation to proof theoretic semantics where
truth is well-founded provability blocks TarskirCOs diagonal
step most clearly seen on line (3)
Here is the Tarski Undefinability Theorem proof
(1) x ree Provable if and only if p
(2) x ree True if and only if p
(3) x ree Provable if and only if x ree True. // (1) and (2) combined
(4) either x ree True or x|a ree True;-a-a-a-a // axiom: ~True(x) re? ~True(~x)
(5) if x ree Provable, then x ree True;-a // axiom: Provable(x) raA True(x) >> (6) if x|a ree Provable, then x|a ree True;-a // axiom: Provable(~x) raA True(~x)
(7) x ree True
(8) x ree Provable
(9) x|a ree Provable
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
A proof theoretic prover rejects expressions that
do not have "a well-founded justification tree within
Proof theoretic semantics".
The same way that Prolog does
% This sentence is not true.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
With actual competent human review
x ree Provable rco x ree True // proof theoretic semantics
is changed to
x ree Provable rcA x ree True // proof theoretic semantics
This is Tarski's line (5)
This overrules anything that contradicts it because
it has now attained axiom status.
Below I show how this overrules Tarski line (3)
thus overcoming Tarski Undefinability when we
change its foundation from truth conditional semantics
to proof theoretic semantics. PTS was not available
at the time That he wrote
"The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages"
(3) x ree Provable if and only if x ree True.
can be divided into
(3)(a) if x ree Provable, then x ree True
(3)(b) if x ree True, then x ree Provable
(5) if x ree Provable, then x ree True
(5) combined with (3)(b) becomes
if x ree ProvablerCarCethen rCex ree Provable
Changing the foundational basis to Proof Theoretic Semantics
Tarski Undefinability is overcome
x ree Provable rco x ree True // proof theoretic semantics
On 05/02/2026 18:55, olcott wrote:
Changing the foundational basis to Proof Theoretic Semantics
Tarski Undefinability is overcome
x ree Provable rco x ree True // proof theoretic semantics
A definition in terms of an undefined symbol does not really define.
On 2/6/2026 3:01 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 05/02/2026 18:55, olcott wrote:
Changing the foundational basis to Proof Theoretic Semantics
Tarski Undefinability is overcome
x ree Provable rco x ree True // proof theoretic semantics
A definition in terms of an undefined symbol does not really define.
It is an axiom: reCx (Provable(x) rcA True(x))
There are dozens of papers needed to verify this.
It will take me quite a while to form proper citations
of these papers. It is anchored in proof theoretic semantics.
Generic PTS states that ~Provable(x) rco Meaningless(x).
Model theory and truth conditional semantics are rejected.
On 2/6/26 10:30 AM, olcott wrote:
On 2/6/2026 3:01 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 05/02/2026 18:55, olcott wrote:
Changing the foundational basis to Proof Theoretic Semantics
Tarski Undefinability is overcome
x ree Provable rco x ree True // proof theoretic semantics
A definition in terms of an undefined symbol does not really define.
It is an axiom: reCx (Provable(x) rcA True(x))
But the axiom uses rcA which goes in just one direction, while you statements used rco which attempts to go both ways.
There are dozens of papers needed to verify this.
It will take me quite a while to form proper citations
of these papers. It is anchored in proof theoretic semantics.
Generic PTS states that ~Provable(x) rco Meaningless(x).
Model theory and truth conditional semantics are rejected.
And, I think your problem is you don't actually understand what you are reading. This shows in that you have been making the claim for years,
but you are now admitting you can't ACTUALLY show why it is (yet).
Your problem is it seems you fundamentally don't understand how
semantics work, and why it is important to put things into context.
This shows in part because you keep on trying to apply principles for general Philosophy to Formal Logic, where they do not apply.
Sorry, you are just showing your fundamental ignorance of what you are talking about.--
On 2/6/2026 12:15 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/6/26 10:30 AM, olcott wrote:
On 2/6/2026 3:01 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 05/02/2026 18:55, olcott wrote:
Changing the foundational basis to Proof Theoretic Semantics
Tarski Undefinability is overcome
x ree Provable rco x ree True // proof theoretic semantics
A definition in terms of an undefined symbol does not really define.
It is an axiom: reCx (Provable(x) rcA True(x))
But the axiom uses rcA which goes in just one direction, while you
statements used rco which attempts to go both ways.
This was corrected by an expert that seems
to really know these things.
This same expert agrees that with within PTS:
"if x is provable, then it is true."
There are dozens of papers needed to verify this.
It will take me quite a while to form proper citations
of these papers. It is anchored in proof theoretic semantics.
Generic PTS states that ~Provable(x) rco Meaningless(x).
Model theory and truth conditional semantics are rejected.
And, I think your problem is you don't actually understand what you
are reading. This shows in that you have been making the claim for
years, but you are now admitting you can't ACTUALLY show why it is (yet).
reCx-a (~Provable(x) rco Meaningless(x))
Seems to be exactly and precisely what Proof Theoretic
Semantics actually says. Since the SEP article was
written by the guy that coined the term:
"Proof Theoretic Semantics"
It should be pretty definitive.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/
Your problem is it seems you fundamentally don't understand how
semantics work, and why it is important to put things into context.
Not at all. It all in "Proof Theoretic Semantics"
This shows in part because you keep on trying to apply principles for
general Philosophy to Formal Logic, where they do not apply.
Try saying that after you spend three hours carefully studying
the linked article. That article is not the end-all be-all
of "Proof Theoretic Semantics", yet it does seem to be the
most definitive single source.
Sorry, you are just showing your fundamental ignorance of what you are
talking about.
On 2/6/26 3:00 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/6/2026 12:15 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/6/26 10:30 AM, olcott wrote:
On 2/6/2026 3:01 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 05/02/2026 18:55, olcott wrote:
Changing the foundational basis to Proof Theoretic Semantics
Tarski Undefinability is overcome
x ree Provable rco x ree True // proof theoretic semantics
A definition in terms of an undefined symbol does not really define. >>>>>
It is an axiom: reCx (Provable(x) rcA True(x))
But the axiom uses rcA which goes in just one direction, while you
statements used rco which attempts to go both ways.
This was corrected by an expert that seems
to really know these things.
This same expert agrees that with within PTS:
"if x is provable, then it is true."
Right, Provable leads to Truth. But Not Provable does not mean not true,
or Truth require provability by the axiom.
I gues you are just admitting that you are just a pathetic liar.
There are dozens of papers needed to verify this.
It will take me quite a while to form proper citations
of these papers. It is anchored in proof theoretic semantics.
Generic PTS states that ~Provable(x) rco Meaningless(x).
Model theory and truth conditional semantics are rejected.
And, I think your problem is you don't actually understand what you
are reading. This shows in that you have been making the claim for
years, but you are now admitting you can't ACTUALLY show why it is
(yet).
reCx-a (~Provable(x) rco Meaningless(x))
Seems to be exactly and precisely what Proof Theoretic
Semantics actually says. Since the SEP article was
written by the guy that coined the term:
"Proof Theoretic Semantics"
It should be pretty definitive.
No, which is part of your problem. Proof-Theoretic Semantics say we
can't talk about the truth of a statement we can not prove, NOT that the statement can't be true without the proof, just we can't talk about it.
Proof-Theoretic Semantics limits our way of looking at things to what
can be proven, and things outside of what can be proven are just outside
the domain of discussion.
The problem of using this Philosophical view in Formal Logic systems
that have the power to create the Natural Number system is that we
suddenly find we can't know if we can talk about a given statement until
we solve it.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/
Your problem is it seems you fundamentally don't understand how
semantics work, and why it is important to put things into context.
Not at all. It all in "Proof Theoretic Semantics"
Which you don't understand, as that is all discussion in PHILOSOPHY, not FORMAL LOGIC, particularly those systems that can create infinite
domains of reguard.
This shows in part because you keep on trying to apply principles for
general Philosophy to Formal Logic, where they do not apply.
Try saying that after you spend three hours carefully studying
the linked article. That article is not the end-all be-all
of "Proof Theoretic Semantics", yet it does seem to be the
most definitive single source.
Maybe you should notice how many times they talk about removing things
like in standard logic. Since Formal Logic system include in there definitions, the mode of interpreation of the logic, you aren't allowed
to change that and keep the system being "the same".
In other words, if you want to change to your "Proof-Theoretic
Semantics", you FIRST need to show how much of the system services the change of rules.
Since the definition of arithmatic of Natural Numbers falls apart if you
try to force this on it, all you are doing is saying that you logic
can't handle mathematics.
On 2/6/2026 5:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/6/26 3:00 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/6/2026 12:15 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/6/26 10:30 AM, olcott wrote:
On 2/6/2026 3:01 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 05/02/2026 18:55, olcott wrote:
Changing the foundational basis to Proof Theoretic Semantics
Tarski Undefinability is overcome
x ree Provable rco x ree True // proof theoretic semantics
A definition in terms of an undefined symbol does not really define. >>>>>>
It is an axiom: reCx (Provable(x) rcA True(x))
But the axiom uses rcA which goes in just one direction, while you
statements used rco which attempts to go both ways.
This was corrected by an expert that seems
to really know these things.
This same expert agrees that with within PTS:
"if x is provable, then it is true."
Right, Provable leads to Truth. But Not Provable does not mean not
true, or Truth require provability by the axiom.
I gues you are just admitting that you are just a pathetic liar.
There are dozens of papers needed to verify this.
It will take me quite a while to form proper citations
of these papers. It is anchored in proof theoretic semantics.
Generic PTS states that ~Provable(x) rco Meaningless(x).
Model theory and truth conditional semantics are rejected.
And, I think your problem is you don't actually understand what you
are reading. This shows in that you have been making the claim for
years, but you are now admitting you can't ACTUALLY show why it is
(yet).
reCx-a (~Provable(x) rco Meaningless(x))
Seems to be exactly and precisely what Proof Theoretic
Semantics actually says. Since the SEP article was
written by the guy that coined the term:
"Proof Theoretic Semantics"
It should be pretty definitive.
No, which is part of your problem. Proof-Theoretic Semantics say we
can't talk about the truth of a statement we can not prove, NOT that
the statement can't be true without the proof, just we can't talk
about it.
Lets try to say this exactly accurately.
In PTS expressions that are unprovable are
ungrounded in semantic meaning.
When I refer to a formal system I am referring to
Russell's atomic facts written down and placed in
a simple Type Hierarchy.
-a atomic facts, which consist either of a simple
-a particular exhibiting a quality, or multiple
-a simple particulars standing in a relation. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-atomism/
Proof-Theoretic Semantics limits our way of looking at things to what
can be proven, and things outside of what can be proven are just
outside the domain of discussion.
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
necessarily includes the entire body of knowledge
expressed in language.
The problem of using this Philosophical view in Formal Logic systems
that have the power to create the Natural Number system is that we
suddenly find we can't know if we can talk about a given statement
until we solve it.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/
Your problem is it seems you fundamentally don't understand how
semantics work, and why it is important to put things into context.
Not at all. It all in "Proof Theoretic Semantics"
Which you don't understand, as that is all discussion in PHILOSOPHY,
not FORMAL LOGIC, particularly those systems that can create infinite
domains of reguard.
This shows in part because you keep on trying to apply principles
for general Philosophy to Formal Logic, where they do not apply.
Try saying that after you spend three hours carefully studying
the linked article. That article is not the end-all be-all
of "Proof Theoretic Semantics", yet it does seem to be the
most definitive single source.
Maybe you should notice how many times they talk about removing things
like in standard logic. Since Formal Logic system include in there
definitions, the mode of interpreation of the logic, you aren't
allowed to change that and keep the system being "the same".
In other words, if you want to change to your "Proof-Theoretic
Semantics", you FIRST need to show how much of the system services the
change of rules.
Since the definition of arithmatic of Natural Numbers falls apart if
you try to force this on it, all you are doing is saying that you
logic can't handle mathematics.
reCx (Provable(PA, x)-a rcA True(PA, x))
reCx (Provable(PA, ~x) rcA False(PA, x))
reCx (~True(PA, x) reo ~False(PA, x) rco ~Truth_Apt(PA, x))
On 2/6/26 7:10 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/6/2026 5:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/6/26 3:00 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/6/2026 12:15 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/6/26 10:30 AM, olcott wrote:
On 2/6/2026 3:01 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 05/02/2026 18:55, olcott wrote:
Changing the foundational basis to Proof Theoretic Semantics
Tarski Undefinability is overcome
x ree Provable rco x ree True // proof theoretic semantics
A definition in terms of an undefined symbol does not really define. >>>>>>>
It is an axiom: reCx (Provable(x) rcA True(x))
But the axiom uses rcA which goes in just one direction, while you
statements used rco which attempts to go both ways.
This was corrected by an expert that seems
to really know these things.
This same expert agrees that with within PTS:
"if x is provable, then it is true."
Right, Provable leads to Truth. But Not Provable does not mean not
true, or Truth require provability by the axiom.
I gues you are just admitting that you are just a pathetic liar.
There are dozens of papers needed to verify this.
It will take me quite a while to form proper citations
of these papers. It is anchored in proof theoretic semantics.
Generic PTS states that ~Provable(x) rco Meaningless(x).
Model theory and truth conditional semantics are rejected.
And, I think your problem is you don't actually understand what you >>>>> are reading. This shows in that you have been making the claim for
years, but you are now admitting you can't ACTUALLY show why it is
(yet).
reCx-a (~Provable(x) rco Meaningless(x))
Seems to be exactly and precisely what Proof Theoretic
Semantics actually says. Since the SEP article was
written by the guy that coined the term:
"Proof Theoretic Semantics"
It should be pretty definitive.
No, which is part of your problem. Proof-Theoretic Semantics say we
can't talk about the truth of a statement we can not prove, NOT that
the statement can't be true without the proof, just we can't talk
about it.
Lets try to say this exactly accurately.
In PTS expressions that are unprovable are
ungrounded in semantic meaning.
Right, which means you can't talk about them.
When I refer to a formal system I am referring to
Russell's atomic facts written down and placed in
a simple Type Hierarchy.
Then you aren't talking about a real Formal System.
This is your problem, You don't understand what a Formal system actually
is.
You keep on thinking it is just a form of Philosophy, which it really
isn't.
-a-a atomic facts, which consist either of a simple
-a-a particular exhibiting a quality, or multiple
-a-a simple particulars standing in a relation.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-atomism/
So, how do you fit Peano Arithmatic into that system?
Proof-Theoretic Semantics limits our way of looking at things to what
can be proven, and things outside of what can be proven are just
outside the domain of discussion.
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
necessarily includes the entire body of knowledge
expressed in language.
Try to do it.
Since that body of knowledge expresses facts about mathematics and such system, it include things like the Pythagorean Theorem, which is *NOT*
true just on the meaning of its words,
Since the definition of arithmatic of Natural Numbers falls apart if
you try to force this on it, all you are doing is saying that you
logic can't handle mathematics.
reCx (Provable(PA, x)-a rcA True(PA, x))
reCx (Provable(PA, ~x) rcA False(PA, x))
reCx (~True(PA, x) reo ~False(PA, x) rco ~Truth_Apt(PA, x))
Which isn't what Proof Theoretic says,
As it doesn't introduce the concept of the predicate "True".
It says if you CAN prove the statement in the system, then you can say
the statement is true.
And, if you CAN prove the converse of the statement in the system, then
you can say the statement if false,
And, if you CAN prove that the you can never do either of the above, you
can say the statement is non-well-founded.
You might not be able to do any of the above, in which case you can't
talk about the statement and it truth.
Since in mathematics, there ARE statements for which you can't do any of
the above, Proof-Theoretic Semantic fall apart for it, as you start to
run into the issue of not knowing if you can talk about the statements.
It works better in simpler systems where there are many statements for
which you can reduce it to one of the three cases you can talk about.
On 2/7/2026 8:47 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 07/02/2026 00:10, olcott wrote:
When I refer to a formal system I am referring to
Russell's atomic facts written down and placed in
a simple Type Hierarchy.
Is that, in effect, the conventional meaning of "formal system"? It is
not normally expressed so, see Curry and Feys.
It is the axiomatic foundation of this:
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
On 2/7/2026 9:49 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/7/26 8:10 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/7/2026 2:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/7/26 11:46 AM, olcott wrote:
On 2/7/2026 10:33 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/7/26 10:10 AM, olcott wrote:
On 2/7/2026 8:46 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/7/26 9:22 AM, olcott wrote:
On 2/7/2026 7:50 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/7/26 8:10 AM, olcott wrote:
On 2/7/2026 4:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 06/02/2026 17:30, olcott wrote:
On 2/6/2026 3:01 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 05/02/2026 18:55, olcott wrote:
Changing the foundational basis to Proof Theoretic Semantics >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Tarski Undefinability is overcomeA definition in terms of an undefined symbol does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>> really define.
x ree Provable rco x ree True // proof theoretic semantics >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
It is an axiom: reCx (Provable(x) rcA True(x))
There are theories where every sentence is provable but it >>>>>>>>>>>> is not
possiible to interprete any theory so that every sentence is >>>>>>>>>>>> true.
Proof Theoretic Semantics enables
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
to be reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge. >>>>>>>>>>>
No it doesn't, but then you never understood what truth is, or >>>>>>>>>> really what knowledge is.
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
expressions of language are defined in terms of other
expressions of language thus truth is computed on the
basis of relations between finite strings.
In other words, you admit your definition is self-referenetial, >>>>>>>> and by your own claims, not a basis for logic.
It is an acyclic directed graph.
So, what part of language has meaning without reference to
anything else?
You just said that your expressions are defined in terms of other >>>>>> expressions. Which ones are definable without reference to
anything else?
It is all a huge semantic tautology, even the
stipulated "atomic facts" specify relations
between finite strings.
In other words, NO, you can't explain what you mean and need to keep
changing it because you don't understand what you are talking about.
A system that is one bing semantic tautology means it is basically
worthless as everything is just redundently true
When we understand that every expression that is "true on the basis
of meaning expressed in language" derives all of its meaning by its
relation to other expressions of language then we can see that the
expressions PTS rejects really are semantically meaningless. We can
anchor this even more by stipulating that these relations are
semantic entailment specified syntactically.
But the problem is too many true statements are NOT "True on the basis
of meaning expressed in language", like the Pythagorean Theorem.
Those ate atomic facts in the system, stipulated to be true.
Russell's atomic facts are complete.
Thus, your system based on just things that are, is woefully
underpowered.
The complete body of all knowledge that can be written
down is not underpowered.
Until you can show how you can show the Pythogorean Theorem fits into
you system, you are just showing that you are just an idiotic liar.
You you are going to be disrespectful I will stop talking to you.
On 2/7/26 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/7/2026 8:47 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 07/02/2026 00:10, olcott wrote:
When I refer to a formal system I am referring to
Russell's atomic facts written down and placed in
a simple Type Hierarchy.
Is that, in effect, the conventional meaning of "formal system"? It is
not normally expressed so, see Curry and Feys.
It is the axiomatic foundation of this:
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
No, because that doesn't exist.
The problem is "True" can't be computable in a system that handles all knowledge, as you have been shown.
Your problem is you just don't understand what you are talking about, as truth is a concept you, as a pathological liar, can't understand.
On 2/9/2026 6:51 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/7/26 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/7/2026 8:47 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 07/02/2026 00:10, olcott wrote:
When I refer to a formal system I am referring to
Russell's atomic facts written down and placed in
a simple Type Hierarchy.
Is that, in effect, the conventional meaning of "formal system"? It is >>>> not normally expressed so, see Curry and Feys.
It is the axiomatic foundation of this:
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
No, because that doesn't exist.
The problem is "True" can't be computable in a system that handles all
knowledge, as you have been shown.
Your problem is you just don't understand what you are talking about, as
truth is a concept you, as a pathological liar, can't understand.
I warned you about disrespect
On 2/9/2026 6:51 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/7/26 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/7/2026 8:47 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 07/02/2026 00:10, olcott wrote:
When I refer to a formal system I am referring to
Russell's atomic facts written down and placed in
a simple Type Hierarchy.
Is that, in effect, the conventional meaning of "formal system"? It is >>>> not normally expressed so, see Curry and Feys.
It is the axiomatic foundation of this:
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
No, because that doesn't exist.
The problem is "True" can't be computable in a system that handles all
knowledge, as you have been shown.
Your problem is you just don't understand what you are talking about,
as truth is a concept you, as a pathological liar, can't understand.
I warned you about disrespect
| Sysop: | Amessyroom |
|---|---|
| Location: | Fayetteville, NC |
| Users: | 59 |
| Nodes: | 6 (0 / 6) |
| Uptime: | 00:02:57 |
| Calls: | 810 |
| Files: | 1,287 |
| Messages: | 196,153 |