On 1/2/2026 2:15 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 02/01/2026 03:26, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2026 8:38 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2026 8:25 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/26 9:07 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2026 4:12 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 31/12/2025 23:27, Richard Damon wrote:
So, how do you think you can prove it in F?
What does "F" refer to?
F reo G_F rao -4Prov_F(riLG_FriY)
F proves that: G_F is equivalent to G_F is not provable in F
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel-incompleteness/#FirIncTheCom >>>>>>
reaG ree WFF(F) (G rao (F re4 G))
There exists a G in F that is logically
equivalent to its own unprovability in F
reaG ree WFF(F) (G := (F re4 G))
There exists a G in F that asserts its own unprovability in F
The proof of G in F would seem to require a sequence
of inference steps in F that prove that they themselves
do not exist.
But that isn't what G is in the proof, so you are just using a bad
reference.
That you do not know exactly how semantics works in
linguistics (making sure to ignore all context) is
not my mistake. The reason that Ludwig Wittgenstein
was never understood is that none of his detractors
understood how language itself really works. Not
knowing how language really works results in
undetected muddled thinking.
...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)
G asserts its own unprovability.
Is what the above means semantically.
The proof of G does semantically entail a sequence
of inference steps that prove that they themselves
do not exist.
Ludwig Wittgenstein
8. I imagine someone asking my advice; he says:
"I have constructed a proposition (1 will use
'P' to designate it) in Russell's symbolism,
and by means of certain definitions and
transformations it can be so interpreted that
it says: 'P is not provable in Russell's system'.
False. He did not do that; he tried to do so then hallucinated that he
succeeded. A contradiction follows from the negation of my
characterisation of his actions and so from the truth of the proposition
that he defined P so. That definitional proposition follows from the
axioms of inconsistent systems and not from those of useful consistent
ones. Typically it /is/ an axiom of inconsistent systems and not of
consistent ones.
His paper is a convoluted mess hiding this simple fact
...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)
G||del, Kurt 1931.
On Formally Undecidable Propositions of
Principia Mathematica And Related Systems
When we combine that with this:
Let {T} be such a theory. Then the elementary
statements which belong to {T} we shall call the
elementary theorems of {T}; we also say that
these elementary statements are true for {T}.
Thus, given {T}, an elementary theorem is an
elementary statement which is true.
https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
Foundations of Mathematical Logic 1977
Then G||del simply made a very convoluted analog
to the Liar Paradox.
Le 02/01/2026 |a 15:47, olcott a |-crit :
On 1/2/2026 2:15 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 02/01/2026 03:26, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2026 8:38 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2026 8:25 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/26 9:07 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2026 4:12 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 31/12/2025 23:27, Richard Damon wrote:
So, how do you think you can prove it in F?
What does "F" refer to?
F reo G_F rao -4Prov_F(riLG_FriY)
F proves that: G_F is equivalent to G_F is not provable in F
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel-incompleteness/
#FirIncTheCom
reaG ree WFF(F) (G rao (F re4 G))
There exists a G in F that is logically
equivalent to its own unprovability in F
reaG ree WFF(F) (G := (F re4 G))
There exists a G in F that asserts its own unprovability in F
The proof of G in F would seem to require a sequence
of inference steps in F that prove that they themselves
do not exist.
But that isn't what G is in the proof, so you are just using a bad >>>>>> reference.
That you do not know exactly how semantics works in
linguistics (making sure to ignore all context) is
not my mistake. The reason that Ludwig Wittgenstein
was never understood is that none of his detractors
understood how language itself really works. Not
knowing how language really works results in
undetected muddled thinking.
...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)
G asserts its own unprovability.
Is what the above means semantically.
The proof of G does semantically entail a sequence
of inference steps that prove that they themselves
do not exist.
Ludwig Wittgenstein
8. I imagine someone asking my advice; he says:
"I have constructed a proposition (1 will use
'P' to designate it) in Russell's symbolism,
and by means of certain definitions and
transformations it can be so interpreted that
it says: 'P is not provable in Russell's system'.
False. He did not do that; he tried to do so then hallucinated that he
succeeded. A contradiction follows from the negation of my
characterisation of his actions and so from the truth of the proposition >>> that he defined P so. That definitional proposition follows from the
axioms of inconsistent systems and not from those of useful consistent
ones. Typically it /is/ an axiom of inconsistent systems and not of
consistent ones.
His paper is a convoluted mess hiding this simple fact
...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)
G||del, Kurt 1931.
On Formally Undecidable Propositions of
Principia Mathematica And Related Systems
When we combine that with this:
-a-a-a Let {T} be such a theory. Then the elementary
-a-a-a statements which belong to {T} we shall call the
-a-a-a elementary theorems of {T}; we also say that
-a-a-a these elementary statements are true for {T}.
-a-a-a Thus, given {T}, an elementary theorem is an
-a-a-a elementary statement which is true.
-a-a-a https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
Foundations of Mathematical Logic 1977
Then G||del simply made a very convoluted analog
to the Liar Paradox.
This is delusional wishful thinking on your part.
Your whole "work" is a defense of your ego you've forged from the fact
that you misunderstand G||del's articles (and many others).
The real mess is you, Peter.
On 1/2/2026 9:11 AM, Python wrote:
Le 02/01/2026 |a 15:47, olcott a |-crit :
On 1/2/2026 2:15 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 02/01/2026 03:26, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2026 8:38 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2026 8:25 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/26 9:07 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2026 4:12 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 31/12/2025 23:27, Richard Damon wrote:
So, how do you think you can prove it in F?
What does "F" refer to?
F reo G_F rao -4Prov_F(riLG_FriY)
F proves that: G_F is equivalent to G_F is not provable in F
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel-incompleteness/
#FirIncTheCom
reaG ree WFF(F) (G rao (F re4 G))
There exists a G in F that is logically
equivalent to its own unprovability in F
reaG ree WFF(F) (G := (F re4 G))
There exists a G in F that asserts its own unprovability in F
The proof of G in F would seem to require a sequence
of inference steps in F that prove that they themselves
do not exist.
But that isn't what G is in the proof, so you are just using a bad >>>>>>> reference.
That you do not know exactly how semantics works in
linguistics (making sure to ignore all context) is
not my mistake. The reason that Ludwig Wittgenstein
was never understood is that none of his detractors
understood how language itself really works. Not
knowing how language really works results in
undetected muddled thinking.
...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)
G asserts its own unprovability.
Is what the above means semantically.
The proof of G does semantically entail a sequence
of inference steps that prove that they themselves
do not exist.
Ludwig Wittgenstein
8. I imagine someone asking my advice; he says:
"I have constructed a proposition (1 will use
'P' to designate it) in Russell's symbolism,
and by means of certain definitions and
transformations it can be so interpreted that
it says: 'P is not provable in Russell's system'.
False. He did not do that; he tried to do so then hallucinated that he >>>> succeeded. A contradiction follows from the negation of my
characterisation of his actions and so from the truth of the
proposition
that he defined P so. That definitional proposition follows from the
axioms of inconsistent systems and not from those of useful consistent >>>> ones. Typically it /is/ an axiom of inconsistent systems and not of
consistent ones.
His paper is a convoluted mess hiding this simple fact
...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)
G||del, Kurt 1931.
On Formally Undecidable Propositions of
Principia Mathematica And Related Systems
When we combine that with this:
-a-a-a Let {T} be such a theory. Then the elementary
-a-a-a statements which belong to {T} we shall call the
-a-a-a elementary theorems of {T}; we also say that
-a-a-a these elementary statements are true for {T}.
-a-a-a Thus, given {T}, an elementary theorem is an
-a-a-a elementary statement which is true.
-a-a-a https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
Foundations of Mathematical Logic 1977
Then G||del simply made a very convoluted analog
to the Liar Paradox.
This is delusional wishful thinking on your part.
Your whole "work" is a defense of your ego you've forged from the fact
that you misunderstand G||del's articles (and many others).
The real mess is you, Peter.
LLM systems initially said this too.
They give me lots and lots of push-back.
When they finally understand my whole
system they always totally agree, 50 times now.
Two big advantages of LLM systems
(1) The have no egoic attachment to conventional wisdom
(2) They have deep knowledge across
(a) theory of computation
(b) foundations of mathematics
(c) foundations of logic
(d) Linguistic semantics
(e) Philosophy of all of the above.
With (1) and without (2)(d) and (2)(e) people
lack a sufficient basis to understand me.
This was the exact same issue for Ludwig Wittgenstein.
On 1/2/2026 9:11 AM, Python wrote:
Le 02/01/2026 |a 15:47, olcott a |-crit :
On 1/2/2026 2:15 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 02/01/2026 03:26, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2026 8:38 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2026 8:25 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/26 9:07 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2026 4:12 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 31/12/2025 23:27, Richard Damon wrote:
So, how do you think you can prove it in F?
What does "F" refer to?
F reo G_F rao -4Prov_F(riLG_FriY)
F proves that: G_F is equivalent to G_F is not provable in F
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel-incompleteness/
#FirIncTheCom
reaG ree WFF(F) (G rao (F re4 G))
There exists a G in F that is logically
equivalent to its own unprovability in F
reaG ree WFF(F) (G := (F re4 G))
There exists a G in F that asserts its own unprovability in F
The proof of G in F would seem to require a sequence
of inference steps in F that prove that they themselves
do not exist.
But that isn't what G is in the proof, so you are just using a bad >>>>>>> reference.
That you do not know exactly how semantics works in
linguistics (making sure to ignore all context) is
not my mistake. The reason that Ludwig Wittgenstein
was never understood is that none of his detractors
understood how language itself really works. Not
knowing how language really works results in
undetected muddled thinking.
...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)
G asserts its own unprovability.
Is what the above means semantically.
The proof of G does semantically entail a sequence
of inference steps that prove that they themselves
do not exist.
Ludwig Wittgenstein
8. I imagine someone asking my advice; he says:
"I have constructed a proposition (1 will use
'P' to designate it) in Russell's symbolism,
and by means of certain definitions and
transformations it can be so interpreted that
it says: 'P is not provable in Russell's system'.
False. He did not do that; he tried to do so then hallucinated that he >>>> succeeded. A contradiction follows from the negation of my
characterisation of his actions and so from the truth of the proposition >>>> that he defined P so. That definitional proposition follows from the
axioms of inconsistent systems and not from those of useful consistent >>>> ones. Typically it /is/ an axiom of inconsistent systems and not of
consistent ones.
His paper is a convoluted mess hiding this simple fact
...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)
G||del, Kurt 1931.
On Formally Undecidable Propositions of
Principia Mathematica And Related Systems
When we combine that with this:
-a-a-a Let {T} be such a theory. Then the elementary
-a-a-a statements which belong to {T} we shall call the
-a-a-a elementary theorems of {T}; we also say that
-a-a-a these elementary statements are true for {T}.
-a-a-a Thus, given {T}, an elementary theorem is an
-a-a-a elementary statement which is true.
-a-a-a https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
Foundations of Mathematical Logic 1977
Then G||del simply made a very convoluted analog
to the Liar Paradox.
This is delusional wishful thinking on your part.
Your whole "work" is a defense of your ego you've forged from the fact
that you misunderstand G||del's articles (and many others).
The real mess is you, Peter.
LLM systems initially said this too.
They give me lots and lots of push-back.
When they finally understand my whole
system they always totally agree, 50 times now.
Two big advantages of LLM systems
(1) The have no egoic attachment to conventional wisdom
(2) They have deep knowledge across
(a) theory of computation
(b) foundations of mathematics
(c) foundations of logic
(d) Linguistic semantics
(e) Philosophy of all of the above.
With (1) and without (2)(d) and (2)(e) people
lack a sufficient basis to understand me.
This was the exact same issue for Ludwig Wittgenstein.
The real mess is you, Peter.
LLM systems initially said this too.
On 1/3/26 9:49 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2026 8:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/26 8:45 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2026 7:35 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/26 5:23 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2026 2:58 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 03/01/2026 17:30, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2026 10:58 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
We begin by postulating a certain non void, definite
class {E} of statements, which we call elementary
statements...
I didn't write that.
That is part of how Curry defined True(x) rei Theorem(x)
https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
But he doesn't define True(x) to be = Theorem(x)
Thus, given {T}, an elementary theorem is an elementary statement
which is true.
https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
Are you capable of ever paying complete attention?
I hyper-focus instead. This makes most everyone
else seem like they have severe attention deficit
by contrast.
Which says that Theorems are true statement, not that truth are
proven statements.
So you have no idea how true statements are derived
from other true statements ?
https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
Right, but the chain can be infinite, and thus not a proof.
On 1/3/2026 9:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/26 9:49 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2026 8:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/26 8:45 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2026 7:35 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/26 5:23 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2026 2:58 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 03/01/2026 17:30, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2026 10:58 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
We begin by postulating a certain non void, definite
class {E} of statements, which we call elementary
statements...
I didn't write that.
That is part of how Curry defined True(x) rei Theorem(x)
https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
But he doesn't define True(x) to be = Theorem(x)
Thus, given {T}, an elementary theorem is an elementary statement
which is true.
https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
Are you capable of ever paying complete attention?
I hyper-focus instead. This makes most everyone
else seem like they have severe attention deficit
by contrast.
Which says that Theorems are true statement, not that truth are
proven statements.
So you have no idea how true statements are derived
from other true statements ?
https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
Right, but the chain can be infinite, and thus not a proof.
Right so we may never know if the Goldbach conjecture is true.
We do now that all paradoxes resolve to nonsense.
This means that True(L, x) can be defined for the
entire body of knowledge expressed in language.
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
Eliminates a key issue that has plagued epistemology since 1951
https://www.theologie.uzh.ch/dam/jcr:ffffffff- fbd6-1538-0000-000070cf64bc/Quine51.pdf
On 1/3/26 10:36 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2026 9:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/26 9:49 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2026 8:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/26 8:45 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2026 7:35 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/26 5:23 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2026 2:58 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 03/01/2026 17:30, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2026 10:58 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
We begin by postulating a certain non void, definite
class {E} of statements, which we call elementary
statements...
I didn't write that.
That is part of how Curry defined True(x) rei Theorem(x)
https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
But he doesn't define True(x) to be = Theorem(x)
Thus, given {T}, an elementary theorem is an elementary statement
which is true.
https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
Are you capable of ever paying complete attention?
I hyper-focus instead. This makes most everyone
else seem like they have severe attention deficit
by contrast.
Which says that Theorems are true statement, not that truth are
proven statements.
So you have no idea how true statements are derived
from other true statements ?
https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
Right, but the chain can be infinite, and thus not a proof.
Right so we may never know if the Goldbach conjecture is true.
But it must be either True or False.
Your system can't handle that.
Unknown is a value of Knowledge, not Truth.
All you are doing is showing that you own system must be incomplete
becuase it can't even HANDLE some statements that we know must have a
truth value.
We do now that all paradoxes resolve to nonsense.
No, because the word "Paradox" just means an APPARENT contradiction.
For example, Zeno's paradox that seems to show that Achilies can't pass
the Tortoise is resolved by noting that while you went through an
infinite number of steps of logic, those only encompassed a finite
amount of time, and after that Achilies does pass the Tortoise.
The Liar's Paradox gets resolved by seeing that the statement just
doesn't have a Truth Value (Not all syntacticly valid statemente do) and thus isn't a Semantically valid statement, and the "Not" operator is
being given an invalid value (or Not(not-a-truth-value) is just not-a- truth-value).
This means that True(L, x) can be defined for the
*entire body of knowledge expressed in language*
No, because we can still express in that language statements that we can
not know if they are true, like the Goldbach conjecture.
Note, the True predicate has a domain of all syntactially valid
expressions, and returns false for any that are semantically invalid.
Thus True(L, "The Goldbach Conjecture") needs to resolve that actual
truth of that conjecture.
All you are showing is your inability to understand the rules of the
game you got in.
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
Eliminates a key issue that has plagued epistemology since 1951
No, because it just admits its own limitation, and put forward a mis- defintion of Truth.
https://www.theologie.uzh.ch/dam/jcr:ffffffff-
fbd6-1538-0000-000070cf64bc/Quine51.pdf
Which is about Philosophy, not Logic, which is part of your problem, you don't understand the difference.
On 1/4/2026 6:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/26 10:36 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2026 9:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/26 9:49 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2026 8:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/26 8:45 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2026 7:35 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/26 5:23 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2026 2:58 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 03/01/2026 17:30, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2026 10:58 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
We begin by postulating a certain non void, definite
class {E} of statements, which we call elementary
statements...
I didn't write that.
That is part of how Curry defined True(x) rei Theorem(x)
https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
But he doesn't define True(x) to be = Theorem(x)
Thus, given {T}, an elementary theorem is an elementary statement >>>>>>> which is true.
https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
Are you capable of ever paying complete attention?
I hyper-focus instead. This makes most everyone
else seem like they have severe attention deficit
by contrast.
Which says that Theorems are true statement, not that truth are
proven statements.
So you have no idea how true statements are derived
from other true statements ?
https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
Right, but the chain can be infinite, and thus not a proof.
Right so we may never know if the Goldbach conjecture is true.
But it must be either True or False.
Your system can't handle that.
Unknown is a value of Knowledge, not Truth.
All you are doing is showing that you own system must be incomplete
becuase it can't even HANDLE some statements that we know must have a
truth value.
It is not incomplete in the G||del sense.
We do now that all paradoxes resolve to nonsense.
No, because the word "Paradox" just means an APPARENT contradiction.
For example, Zeno's paradox that seems to show that Achilies can't
pass the Tortoise is resolved by noting that while you went through an
infinite number of steps of logic, those only encompassed a finite
amount of time, and after that Achilies does pass the Tortoise.
paradoxes resolve to nonsense.
The Liar's Paradox gets resolved by seeing that the statement just
doesn't have a Truth Value (Not all syntacticly valid statemente do)
and thus isn't a Semantically valid statement, and the "Not" operator
is being given an invalid value (or Not(not-a-truth-value) is just
not-a- truth-value).
Yes
This means that True(L, x) can be defined for the
*entire body of knowledge expressed in language*
No, because we can still express in that language statements that we
can not know if they are true, like the Goldbach conjecture.
Did you notice that those are not in the body of knowledge?
*entire body of knowledge expressed in language*
Note, the True predicate has a domain of all syntactially valid
expressions, and returns false for any that are semantically invalid.
If X is unknown or
semantically incoherent or
simply not encoded then True(X)==FALSE and True(~X)==FALSE
Thus True(L, "The Goldbach Conjecture") needs to resolve that actual
truth of that conjecture.
This is the domain
*entire body of knowledge expressed in language*
The Goldbach Conjecture's truth value is not in that domain
All you are showing is your inability to understand the rules of the
game you got in.
After 28 years I have finally got it.
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
Eliminates a key issue that has plagued epistemology since 1951
No, because it just admits its own limitation, and put forward a mis-
defintion of Truth.
The analytic/synthetic distinction was broken by Quine
since 1951. I reframed it as the Analytic(Olcott) / Empirical
distinction.
https://www.theologie.uzh.ch/dam/jcr:ffffffff-
fbd6-1538-0000-000070cf64bc/Quine51.pdf
Which is about Philosophy, not Logic, which is part of your problem,
you don't understand the difference.
I defined the computable subset of knowledge.
On 1/4/26 9:48 AM, olcott wrote:
On 1/4/2026 6:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/26 10:36 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2026 9:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/26 9:49 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2026 8:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/26 8:45 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2026 7:35 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/26 5:23 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2026 2:58 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 03/01/2026 17:30, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2026 10:58 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
We begin by postulating a certain non void, definite
class {E} of statements, which we call elementary
statements...
I didn't write that.
That is part of how Curry defined True(x) rei Theorem(x)
https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
But he doesn't define True(x) to be = Theorem(x)
Thus, given {T}, an elementary theorem is an elementary statement >>>>>>>> which is true.
https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
Are you capable of ever paying complete attention?
I hyper-focus instead. This makes most everyone
else seem like they have severe attention deficit
by contrast.
Which says that Theorems are true statement, not that truth are >>>>>>> proven statements.
So you have no idea how true statements are derived
from other true statements ?
https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
Right, but the chain can be infinite, and thus not a proof.
Right so we may never know if the Goldbach conjecture is true.
But it must be either True or False.
Your system can't handle that.
Unknown is a value of Knowledge, not Truth.
All you are doing is showing that you own system must be incomplete
becuase it can't even HANDLE some statements that we know must have a
truth value.
It is not incomplete in the G||del sense.
Then it is just inconsistant, and incomplete in the more general sense.
You CAN'T have you goal of "all general knowledge" and Truth is Provable
at the same time without having a broken system.
We do now that all paradoxes resolve to nonsense.
No, because the word "Paradox" just means an APPARENT contradiction.
For example, Zeno's paradox that seems to show that Achilies can't
pass the Tortoise is resolved by noting that while you went through
an infinite number of steps of logic, those only encompassed a finite
amount of time, and after that Achilies does pass the Tortoise.
paradoxes resolve to nonsense.
So, the sum of the number 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + 1/16 ... is nonsense?
The Liar's Paradox gets resolved by seeing that the statement just
doesn't have a Truth Value (Not all syntacticly valid statemente do)
and thus isn't a Semantically valid statement, and the "Not" operator
is being given an invalid value (or Not(not-a-truth-value) is just
not-a- truth-value).
Yes
So (as the PREDICATE) True(LP) is false, and True(~LP) is also false.
But if X = ~True(X) can't use this excape, as the "True" preidcate is
ALWAYS a truth value, and thus ~True(X) is also ALWAYS a truth value.
This is the problem with a truth predicate, it looses the escape valve
of just using the not operator.
This means that True(L, x) can be defined for the
*entire body of knowledge expressed in language*
No, because we can still express in that language statements that we
can not know if they are true, like the Goldbach conjecture.
Did you notice that those are not in the body of knowledge?
*entire body of knowledge expressed in language*
So, are you saying you language can only express statements already know
to be true?
In other words, it isn't a "logic" that allows discovery?
The body of knowldege certainly understand the concepts of summing two numbers, of even numbers, and primes, so, if able to be inquisative, ask about the sums of primes and even numbers.
This shows that you system just can't do what you want it to do, and you view of "semantics" is just insufficent to do what you want it to,
Note, the True predicate has a domain of all syntactially valid
expressions, and returns false for any that are semantically invalid.
If X is unknown or
semantically incoherent or
simply not encoded then True(X)==FALSE and True(~X)==FALSE
Nope.
The fact we don't KNOW the truth of X doesn't affect the value returned
by True(x)
It seems you confuse Known with True, and not even go so far as Knowable.
That means truth values in you system CHANGE over time, which is unacceptable in an actual logic system.
Thus True(L, "The Goldbach Conjecture") needs to resolve that actual
truth of that conjecture.
This is the domain
*entire body of knowledge expressed in language*
The Goldbach Conjecture's truth value is not in that domain
But is expressible in that language.
I guess you are just asserting your system is just a repository of Knowledge, and WORTHLESS in dealing with statement not in its repository.
All you are showing is your inability to understand the rules of the
game you got in.
After 28 years I have finally got it.
Nop,e just showing you have lost it.
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
Eliminates a key issue that has plagued epistemology since 1951
No, because it just admits its own limitation, and put forward a mis-
defintion of Truth.
The analytic/synthetic distinction was broken by Quine
since 1951. I reframed it as the Analytic(Olcott) / Empirical
distinction.
But that isn't part of Formal Logic, just general Philosophy.
It seems you don't even understand the scope of the field you are trying
to talk about.
https://www.theologie.uzh.ch/dam/jcr:ffffffff-
fbd6-1538-0000-000070cf64bc/Quine51.pdf
Which is about Philosophy, not Logic, which is part of your problem,
you don't understand the difference.
I defined the computable subset of knowledge.
No, you have failed to actually define anything.
You have a concept for a worthless system to record knowledge that you
can interograte to see if something was already known.
On 1/4/2026 1:21 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/4/26 9:48 AM, olcott wrote:
On 1/4/2026 6:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/26 10:36 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2026 9:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/26 9:49 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2026 8:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/26 8:45 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2026 7:35 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/26 5:23 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2026 2:58 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 03/01/2026 17:30, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2026 10:58 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
We begin by postulating a certain non void, definite >>>>>>>>>>>>> class {E} of statements, which we call elementary
statements...
I didn't write that.
That is part of how Curry defined True(x) rei Theorem(x) >>>>>>>>>>> https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
But he doesn't define True(x) to be = Theorem(x)
Thus, given {T}, an elementary theorem is an elementary statement >>>>>>>>> which is true.
https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
Are you capable of ever paying complete attention?
I hyper-focus instead. This makes most everyone
else seem like they have severe attention deficit
by contrast.
Which says that Theorems are true statement, not that truth are >>>>>>>> proven statements.
So you have no idea how true statements are derived
from other true statements ?
https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
Right, but the chain can be infinite, and thus not a proof.
Right so we may never know if the Goldbach conjecture is true.
But it must be either True or False.
Your system can't handle that.
Unknown is a value of Knowledge, not Truth.
All you are doing is showing that you own system must be incomplete
becuase it can't even HANDLE some statements that we know must have
a truth value.
It is not incomplete in the G||del sense.
Then it is just inconsistant, and incomplete in the more general sense.
You CAN'T have you goal of "all general knowledge" and Truth is
Provable at the same time without having a broken system.
It is categorically impossible to derive any element
of the body of knowledge that can be expressed in
language that is not entirely comprised of some relation
between finite strings.
We do now that all paradoxes resolve to nonsense.
No, because the word "Paradox" just means an APPARENT contradiction.
For example, Zeno's paradox that seems to show that Achilies can't
pass the Tortoise is resolved by noting that while you went through
an infinite number of steps of logic, those only encompassed a
finite amount of time, and after that Achilies does pass the Tortoise. >>>>
paradoxes resolve to nonsense.
So, the sum of the number 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + 1/16 ... is nonsense?
The Liar's Paradox gets resolved by seeing that the statement just
doesn't have a Truth Value (Not all syntacticly valid statemente do)
and thus isn't a Semantically valid statement, and the "Not"
operator is being given an invalid value (or Not(not-a-truth-value)
is just not-a- truth-value).
Yes
So (as the PREDICATE) True(LP) is false, and True(~LP) is also false.
Indicating that LP is not a truth-bearer / proposition.
But if X = ~True(X) can't use this excape, as the "True" preidcate is
ALWAYS a truth value, and thus ~True(X) is also ALWAYS a truth value.
We just went over this:
LP is not a truth-bearer even when LP is called X.
This is the problem with a truth predicate, it looses the escape valve
of just using the not operator.
This means that True(L, x) can be defined for the
*entire body of knowledge expressed in language*
No, because we can still express in that language statements that we
can not know if they are true, like the Goldbach conjecture.
Did you notice that those are not in the body of knowledge?
*entire body of knowledge expressed in language*
So, are you saying you language can only express statements already
know to be true?
Language can express the the truth value of
the Goldbach conjecture is unknown.
In other words, it isn't a "logic" that allows discovery?
The body of knowldege certainly understand the concepts of summing two
numbers, of even numbers, and primes, so, if able to be inquisative,
ask about the sums of primes and even numbers.
No infinite proof completes in finite time.
Not even with the magic fairy dust of an
Oracle Machine.
This shows that you system just can't do what you want it to do, and
you view of "semantics" is just insufficent to do what you want it to,
I can't get my kitchen sink to bake me a birthday cake either.
Note, the True predicate has a domain of all syntactially valid
expressions, and returns false for any that are semantically invalid.
If X is unknown or
semantically incoherent or
simply not encoded then True(X)==FALSE and True(~X)==FALSE
Nope.
I stipulate that is an element of the architecture
that I am specifying. stipulated specifications
can only be incorrect when they are impossible
of incoheeent.
The fact we don't KNOW the truth of X doesn't affect the value
returned by True(x)
Unknowns are not in the domain of knowledge.
It seems you confuse Known with True, and not even go so far as Knowable.
domain of knowledge.
domain of knowledge.
domain of knowledge.
domain of knowledge.
domain of knowledge.
That means truth values in you system CHANGE over time, which is
unacceptable in an actual logic system.
Pluto being measured against updated criteria
is no longer a planet.
Thus True(L, "The Goldbach Conjecture") needs to resolve that actual
truth of that conjecture.
This is the domain
*entire body of knowledge expressed in language*
The Goldbach Conjecture's truth value is not in that domain
But is expressible in that language.
It is categorically impossible to derive any element
of the body of knowledge that can be expressed in
language that is not entirely comprised of some relation
between finite strings.
I guess you are just asserting your system is just a repository of
Knowledge, and WORTHLESS in dealing with statement not in its repository.
It is not an all knowing mind of God.
All you are showing is your inability to understand the rules of the
game you got in.
After 28 years I have finally got it.
Nop,e just showing you have lost it.
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
Eliminates a key issue that has plagued epistemology since 1951
No, because it just admits its own limitation, and put forward a
mis- defintion of Truth.
The analytic/synthetic distinction was broken by Quine
since 1951. I reframed it as the Analytic(Olcott) / Empirical
distinction.
But that isn't part of Formal Logic, just general Philosophy.
My "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
within the body of knowledge specifies the precise subset
of knowledge that can be computed on the basis of relations
between finite strings. It also reframes the analytic/synthetic
distinction with an unequivocal line-of-demarcation between
Analytic(Olcott) and Empirical(Olcott).
It seems you don't even understand the scope of the field you are
trying to talk about.
https://www.theologie.uzh.ch/dam/jcr:ffffffff-
fbd6-1538-0000-000070cf64bc/Quine51.pdf
Which is about Philosophy, not Logic, which is part of your problem,
you don't understand the difference.
I defined the computable subset of knowledge.
No, you have failed to actually define anything.
It is categorically impossible to derive any element
of the body of knowledge that can be expressed in
language that is not entirely comprised of some relation
between finite strings.
You have a concept for a worthless system to record knowledge that you
can interograte to see if something was already known.
That you require an acceptable system to be the
omniscient mind of God is a category error.
On 1/4/26 3:21 PM, olcott wrote:
It is categorically impossible to derive any element
of the body of knowledge that can be expressed in
language that is not entirely comprised of some relation
between finite strings.
So?
The problem is we want to derive things that aren't yet in the body of knowledge.
And, the relationship between finite strings is often not what you
consider the "meaning of the words", as the strings often aren't just
words.
--
You have a concept for a worthless system to record knowledge that
you can interograte to see if something was already known.
That you require an acceptable system to be the
omniscient mind of God is a category error.
That you require the system to be impotent, and not able to talk about something unknow makes it worthless.
On 1/4/2026 2:23 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/4/26 3:21 PM, olcott wrote:
It is categorically impossible to derive any element
of the body of knowledge that can be expressed in
language that is not entirely comprised of some relation
between finite strings.
So?
That is the conclusive proof that I am correct.
The problem is we want to derive things that aren't yet in the body of
knowledge.
If you want to know the name of your wife's
mother and you have not met your wife yet
then the answer is not available by any means.\
Once the body of general knowledge is fully
populated an intelligent system can derive
brand new knowledge on the basis of semantic
entailment from this basis.
And, the relationship between finite strings is often not what you
consider the "meaning of the words", as the strings often aren't just
words.
I made sure to never limit it to words.
You have a concept for a worthless system to record knowledge that
you can interograte to see if something was already known.
That you require an acceptable system to be the
omniscient mind of God is a category error.
That you require the system to be impotent, and not able to talk about
something unknow makes it worthless.
On 1/3/26 10:36 PM, olcott wrote:
We do now that all paradoxes resolve to nonsense.
No, because the word "Paradox" just means an APPARENT contradiction.
The Liar's Paradox gets resolved by seeing that the statement just
doesn't have a Truth Value (Not all syntacticly valid statemente do) and
thus isn't a Semantically valid statement, and the "Not" operator is
being given an invalid value (or Not(not-a-truth-value) is just not-a-truth-value).
So, the sum of the number 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + 1/16 ... is nonsense?
On 04/01/2026 19:21, Richard Damon wrote:You just repeat what is told, brainlessly.-aLots of rumors about infinity are there.
So, the sum of the number 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + 1/16 ... is nonsense?
It's nondeterministic because "..." has more than one meaning for the
effect it has extending the series. It's not nonsense because it's not a statement.
+ureOreireU 2->rU+
/is/ deterministic, however... it's 1.
You might be mapping time nonlinearly whereby each imagined change
occurs in its imagined reality at a constant +oreL from the previous. It's
a common affliction among classical mediterranean philosophers.
On 1/4/26 3:32 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/4/2026 2:23 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/4/26 3:21 PM, olcott wrote:
It is categorically impossible to derive any element
of the body of knowledge that can be expressed in
language that is not entirely comprised of some relation
between finite strings.
So?
That is the conclusive proof that I am correct.
No it isn't. That doesn't make Truth computable, it makes everything computable true.
The problem is we want to derive things that aren't yet in the body
of knowledge.
If you want to know the name of your wife's
mother and you have not met your wife yet
then the answer is not available by any means.\
So? She still has a name.
On 04/01/2026 19:21, Richard Damon wrote:
So, the sum of the number 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + 1/16 ... is nonsense?
It's nondeterministic because "..." has more than one meaning for the
effect it has extending the series. It's not nonsense because it's not a statement.
+ureOreireU 2->rU+
/is/ deterministic, however... it's 1.
You might be mapping time nonlinearly whereby each imagined change
occurs in its imagined reality at a constant +oreL from the previous. It's
a common affliction among classical mediterranean philosophers.
On 04/01/2026 20:45, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/4/26 3:32 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/4/2026 2:23 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/4/26 3:21 PM, olcott wrote:
It is categorically impossible to derive any element
of the body of knowledge that can be expressed in
language that is not entirely comprised of some relation
between finite strings.
So?
That is the conclusive proof that I am correct.
No it isn't. That doesn't make Truth computable, it makes everything
computable true.
The problem is we want to derive things that aren't yet in the body
of knowledge.
If you want to know the name of your wife's
mother and you have not met your wife yet
then the answer is not available by any means.\
So? She still has a name.
Is this how the church banned divorce and also remarriage after a bereavement?
They'd made an AI knowledge-base and used the same axiom that you just did?
Henry VIII made a more sophisticated one and the rest is history. It was
a system that attested reality and was written in prolog: protestant.
| Sysop: | Amessyroom |
|---|---|
| Location: | Fayetteville, NC |
| Users: | 54 |
| Nodes: | 6 (0 / 6) |
| Uptime: | 15:44:05 |
| Calls: | 742 |
| Files: | 1,218 |
| D/L today: |
3 files (2,681K bytes) |
| Messages: | 184,203 |
| Posted today: | 1 |