• Market forces not governing

    From Gordon@Gordon@leaf.net.nz to nz.general on Fri Oct 3 02:35:54 2025
    From Newsgroup: nz.general

    https://www.interest.co.nz/public-policy/135502/energy-companies-don%E2%80%99t-see-sufficient-profit-preparing-dry-year-risks-and-are

    This is worth a read. Market forces can not govern under the existing structure.

    "rCLThis is because competitors, and industrial customers, can free-ride on the
    investment made by someone else that has the effect of suppressing prices.rCY

    Added on-demand capacity reduces risk of scarcity and therefore prices for all energy users across the board. Those who do not make the investment benefit alongside those who do.

    rCLThis creates an underinvestment problem, as private entities have little incentive to build assets that may be rarely used, and so have limited
    revenue opportunities, but are essential during periods of high supply risk,rCY
    Frontier said.

    So the Government is going to have to build the dry year generation. The
    market forces are not governing and this partial public ownership model
    looks like a case of unintended concequences. The temptation to sell the
    "dry" supply in "wet" years will become a habbit. Pushing the limit and
    ending up with no "dry" generation.

    There are similarities with the solar and wind generation as they have "dry" periods of generation both on a daily and longer term. It results in the need for a large amount of energy storage.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Crash@nogood@dontbother.invalid to nz.general on Sat Oct 4 14:37:55 2025
    From Newsgroup: nz.general

    On 3 Oct 2025 02:35:54 GMT, Gordon <Gordon@leaf.net.nz> wrote:

    https://www.interest.co.nz/public-policy/135502/energy-companies-don%E2%80%99t-see-sufficient-profit-preparing-dry-year-risks-and-are

    This is worth a read. Market forces can not govern under the existing >structure.

    "oThis is because competitors, and industrial customers, can free-ride on the >investment made by someone else that has the effect of suppressing prices.o

    Added on-demand capacity reduces risk of scarcity and therefore prices for all
    energy users across the board. Those who do not make the investment benefit >alongside those who do.

    oThis creates an underinvestment problem, as private entities have little >incentive to build assets that may be rarely used, and so have limited >revenue opportunities, but are essential during periods of high supply risk,o >Frontier said.

    So the Government is going to have to build the dry year generation. The >market forces are not governing and this partial public ownership model
    looks like a case of unintended concequences. The temptation to sell the >"dry" supply in "wet" years will become a habbit. Pushing the limit and >ending up with no "dry" generation.

    There are similarities with the solar and wind generation as they have "dry" >periods of generation both on a daily and longer term. It results in the need >for a large amount of energy storage.

    To some extent, this is all true. What is not mentioned though is
    that the Government owns a majority interest in 3 or the 4 big
    generators. It is also true that the owners of minority interests in
    all 3 bought into this - what was in it for them was dividends, even
    if they all banded together they could still not over-ride the
    Government of the day on anything.

    There is no financial incentive to invest in generating capacity that
    is normally not needed. When it is needed, they get windfall pricing
    from existing capacity, and if they have greater capacity at any time
    the windfall revenues from capacity shortfall disappears.

    The answer so far is that the Government have offered the 3 generators
    access to low-cost capital to fund extra generating capacity - but
    this does not solve the problem that the financial situation rewards
    shortages.

    My suggestion is that the Government empower Transpower (an SOE) to
    build its own generating capacity for use when the 4 generators cannot
    meet Transpower' projected demand (ie usually referred to as 'peaker' generators, and usually fossil fueled to enable short startup times).
    This not only gives the electricity grid security of supply but
    ensures the 4 generators are not the only generating resource
    Transpower has access to.
    --
    Crash McBash
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2