• Re: have we been misusing incompleteness???

    From dart200@user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid to comp.theory on Sun Dec 28 23:17:50 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/28/25 3:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/28/25 5:30 PM, dart200 wrote:
    the halting problem is generally held up as an example of
    incompleteness in action, and that machines can halt/not without it
    being provable/ knowable.


    First, The Halting Problem more directly shows "Uncomputability" instead
    of "Incompleteness". Note, "Uncomputability" is a property of a
    "Problem", that there are mappings that exist that can not be generated
    by a computation.

    "Incompleteness" is a property of a Logical System, indicating that
    there are true statements in the system that can not be proven.

    but the only one demonstrated can be proven true outside the system. it
    did not show a total unprovable truth, there still was a proof to prove
    it, it just existed outside the system that said truth was in respect to.



    but i'm not really sure how that could be related to incompleteness:

    incompleteness demonstrated a *know* and *provable* truth that existed
    outside a particular system of proof,

    it did not demonstrate an *unknowable* and *unprovable* truth existing
    outside *any* system of proof ...

    Because the move from it being "Uncomputable" to showing the field is "Incomplete" needs some additional arguements (which has been done).

    You seem to have rejected thinking about it, because it goes into
    talking about the "ghost" machines that are individually not computable
    in their behavior, and in fact, we can't even know if they are such a machine.

    actually i'm now thinking about using incompleteness against the halting problem



    like what proponents of the halting problem continually assert, eh???


    Which, since the step from Halting showing that there is an
    "Uncomptable" problem allows us to show that Computation Theory exhibits
    the property of Incompleteness, is a valid thing to talk about.

    right but like i said: incompleteness did not show a truth that could
    not be proven at all, just that it couldn't be proven within some system.


    Now, until you accept that Halting is, in fact, uncomputable, going the
    next step won't be possible.
    --
    a burnt out swe investigating into why our tooling doesn't involve
    basic semantic proofs like halting analysis

    please excuse my pseudo-pyscript,

    ~ nick
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  • From dart200@user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid to comp.theory on Sun Dec 28 23:41:41 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/28/25 3:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/28/25 5:30 PM, dart200 wrote:
    the halting problem is generally held up as an example of
    incompleteness in action, and that machines can halt/not without it
    being provable/ knowable.


    First, The Halting Problem more directly shows "Uncomputability" instead
    of "Incompleteness". Note, "Uncomputability" is a property of a
    "Problem", that there are mappings that exist that can not be generated
    by a computation.

    but it's always demonstrated by a specific machine, and unless you're
    gunna say all machines of a certain property cannot be decided to have
    that property (which is ridiculous), then ofc it involves specific input
    being undecidable.


    "Incompleteness" is a property of a Logical System, indicating that
    there are true statements in the system that can not be proven.


    the truth that backs incompleteness is still proven, just not within the system as it stands.

    what it doesn't say is that unprovable truths exists



    but i'm not really sure how that could be related to incompleteness:

    incompleteness demonstrated a *know* and *provable* truth that existed
    outside a particular system of proof,

    it did not demonstrate an *unknowable* and *unprovable* truth existing
    outside *any* system of proof ...

    Because the move from it being "Uncomputable" to showing the field is "Incomplete" needs some additional arguements (which has been done).

    You seem to have rejected thinking about it, because it goes into
    talking about the "ghost" machines that are individually not computable
    in their behavior, and in fact, we can't even know if they are such a machine.


    like what proponents of the halting problem continually assert, eh???


    Which, since the step from Halting showing that there is an
    "Uncomptable" problem allows us to show that Computation Theory exhibits
    the property of Incompleteness, is a valid thing to talk about.

    Now, until you accept that Halting is, in fact, uncomputable, going the
    next step won't be possible.

    the problem with halting is that your claims truths that exist which
    cannot be proven by any means, which is not the same thing as
    incompleteness. the truth godel demonstrated was still provable, else
    how would we know it's "true"?
    --
    a burnt out swe investigating into why our tooling doesn't involve
    basic semantic proofs like halting analysis

    please excuse my pseudo-pyscript,

    ~ nick
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory on Mon Dec 29 08:37:20 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/29/25 2:17 AM, dart200 wrote:
    On 12/28/25 3:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/28/25 5:30 PM, dart200 wrote:
    the halting problem is generally held up as an example of
    incompleteness in action, and that machines can halt/not without it
    being provable/ knowable.


    First, The Halting Problem more directly shows "Uncomputability"
    instead of "Incompleteness". Note, "Uncomputability" is a property of
    a "Problem", that there are mappings that exist that can not be
    generated by a computation.

    "Incompleteness" is a property of a Logical System, indicating that
    there are true statements in the system that can not be proven.

    but the only one demonstrated can be proven true outside the system. it
    did not show a total unprovable truth, there still was a proof to prove
    it, it just existed outside the system that said truth was in respect to.

    You don't understand the proof. There is not just ONE input program.
    There is one for every different decider, as it doesn't call some
    idealized decider, but that actual machine claimed to be a decider.

    After showing we can make such an input that makes any given decider
    wrong, we can show that therefore there is no decider that gets all right.

    I believe there is then another proof that shows that because there is
    no decider that gets all inputs correctly, you can show that there must
    be some program that no known to be corret partial decider gets right,
    in other words, a program that we can not know its halting status, as we
    can not prove it will not halt.




    but i'm not really sure how that could be related to incompleteness:

    incompleteness demonstrated a *know* and *provable* truth that
    existed outside a particular system of proof,

    it did not demonstrate an *unknowable* and *unprovable* truth
    existing outside *any* system of proof ...

    Because the move from it being "Uncomputable" to showing the field is
    "Incomplete" needs some additional arguements (which has been done).

    You seem to have rejected thinking about it, because it goes into
    talking about the "ghost" machines that are individually not
    computable in their behavior, and in fact, we can't even know if they
    are such a machine.

    actually i'm now thinking about using incompleteness against the halting problem

    How?




    like what proponents of the halting problem continually assert, eh???


    Which, since the step from Halting showing that there is an
    "Uncomptable" problem allows us to show that Computation Theory
    exhibits the property of Incompleteness, is a valid thing to talk about.

    right but like i said: incompleteness did not show a truth that could
    not be proven at all, just that it couldn't be proven within some system.

    Which is what Incompleteness is about. It says that THE SYSTEM has a
    true statement that THE SYSTEM can not prove. Doesn't matter that some meta-system can prove it.

    There is an additional proof that shows that while some of these
    statements can be proved is some meta-system of the system, there will
    always be some that can't be proved at any finite level of meta-system.



    Now, until you accept that Halting is, in fact, uncomputable, going
    the next step won't be possible.



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  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory on Mon Dec 29 08:37:23 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/29/25 2:41 AM, dart200 wrote:
    On 12/28/25 3:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/28/25 5:30 PM, dart200 wrote:
    the halting problem is generally held up as an example of
    incompleteness in action, and that machines can halt/not without it
    being provable/ knowable.


    First, The Halting Problem more directly shows "Uncomputability"
    instead of "Incompleteness". Note, "Uncomputability" is a property of
    a "Problem", that there are mappings that exist that can not be
    generated by a computation.

    but it's always demonstrated by a specific machine, and unless you're
    gunna say all machines of a certain property cannot be decided to have
    that property (which is ridiculous), then ofc it involves specific input being undecidable.

    Which means you don't understand the proof.

    The proof didn't show there was one uncomputable machine, but that there
    was at least one machine (different for every decider) that the decider
    got wrong, and thus we could show that there was no decider that got
    every machine correct, and thus the basic halting problem was uncomputable.

    I beleive there is another proof that shows that because of this, there
    will exist a class of machines that no, known to be correct, partial
    decider will decide on. We don't know how to construct such a machine,
    only that they exist, since an interesting property of this class is we
    can not determine that a machine IS in this class, since determining it
    is in the class means we have resolved that the machine is non-halting,
    as all halting machines are decidable.



    "Incompleteness" is a property of a Logical System, indicating that
    there are true statements in the system that can not be proven.


    the truth that backs incompleteness is still proven, just not within the system as it stands.

    what it doesn't say is that unprovable truths exists

    But, I beleive it was Tarski, was able to extend Godel's proof to show
    that while a given meta-system can prove some of the statements not
    proven in the base system, there WILL exist some statements not provable
    in ANY system.




    but i'm not really sure how that could be related to incompleteness:

    incompleteness demonstrated a *know* and *provable* truth that
    existed outside a particular system of proof,

    it did not demonstrate an *unknowable* and *unprovable* truth
    existing outside *any* system of proof ...

    Because the move from it being "Uncomputable" to showing the field is
    "Incomplete" needs some additional arguements (which has been done).

    You seem to have rejected thinking about it, because it goes into
    talking about the "ghost" machines that are individually not
    computable in their behavior, and in fact, we can't even know if they
    are such a machine.


    like what proponents of the halting problem continually assert, eh???


    Which, since the step from Halting showing that there is an
    "Uncomptable" problem allows us to show that Computation Theory
    exhibits the property of Incompleteness, is a valid thing to talk about.

    Now, until you accept that Halting is, in fact, uncomputable, going
    the next step won't be possible.

    the problem with halting is that your claims truths that exist which
    cannot be proven by any means, which is not the same thing as incompleteness. the truth godel demonstrated was still provable, else
    how would we know it's "true"?


    Which just shows you don't understand the meaning of the term.

    Incompleteness is a property of a given Formal System, it says that
    there exist a statement that is true in that system, but can not be
    proven in that system.

    Godel's proof build a meta-system that constructs a statement that
    exists in the base system, and which is true in that base system, but
    can not be proven in the base system, only the meta-system.

    That shows that the base system must have been incomplete.

    Since we could do that same operation again in the meta-system, by
    making a meta-meta-system, that meta-system must also be incomplete.
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  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory on Mon Dec 29 17:18:34 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 29/12/2025 07:41, dart200 wrote:
    On 12/28/25 3:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/28/25 5:30 PM, dart200 wrote:
    the halting problem is generally held up as an example of
    incompleteness in action, and that machines can halt/not without it
    being provable/ knowable.


    First, The Halting Problem more directly shows "Uncomputability"
    instead of "Incompleteness". Note, "Uncomputability" is a property of
    a "Problem", that there are mappings that exist that can not be
    generated by a computation.

    but it's always demonstrated by a specific machine, and unless you're
    gunna say all machines of a certain property cannot be decided to have
    that property (which is ridiculous), then ofc it involves specific input being undecidable.


    "Incompleteness" is a property of a Logical System, indicating that
    there are true statements in the system that can not be proven.


    the truth that backs incompleteness is still proven, just not within the system as it stands.

    what it doesn't say is that unprovable truths exists



    but i'm not really sure how that could be related to incompleteness:

    incompleteness demonstrated a *know* and *provable* truth that
    existed outside a particular system of proof,

    it did not demonstrate an *unknowable* and *unprovable* truth
    existing outside *any* system of proof ...

    Because the move from it being "Uncomputable" to showing the field is
    "Incomplete" needs some additional arguements (which has been done).

    You seem to have rejected thinking about it, because it goes into
    talking about the "ghost" machines that are individually not
    computable in their behavior, and in fact, we can't even know if they
    are such a machine.


    like what proponents of the halting problem continually assert, eh???


    Which, since the step from Halting showing that there is an
    "Uncomptable" problem allows us to show that Computation Theory
    exhibits the property of Incompleteness, is a valid thing to talk about.

    Now, until you accept that Halting is, in fact, uncomputable, going
    the next step won't be possible.

    the problem with halting is that your claims truths that exist which
    cannot be proven by any means, which is not the same thing as
    incompleteness. the truth godel demonstrated was still provable, else
    how would we know it's "true"?

    You're using the informal, everyday, meaning of provable. That is, that
    there is anything I could experience that could actually happen that
    would make me produce from a propositionally structured sentence for a
    while should I actually experience it.

    Also using a vague notion of "to know" that's notorious for semantic
    ambiguity not backtracked.

    Also referentially ambiguous "we".

    and referentially ambiguous "truth" (informal internal general synergy
    vs member of the theorems of a formal system which is a very specific
    synergy).

    You deftly convey little to no meaning.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

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  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic on Mon Dec 29 18:42:35 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 29/12/2025 13:37, Richard Damon wrote:

    Incompleteness is a property of a given Formal System, it says that
    there exist a statement that is true in that system, but can not be
    proven in that system.

    Godel's proof build a meta-system that constructs a statement that
    exists in the base system, and which is true in that base system, but
    can not be proven in the base system, only the meta-system.

    What do you mean by "proven" here. Do you mean "derived" ? Normally we
    say a proposition is true in a system when we mean the proposition is a
    theorem of the system; it has a derivation in the system: a finite
    sequence of statements that each is derivable from the axioms and
    earlier statements in the sequence by application of a deductive rule of
    the system--where the deductive rules are transitive so that's also
    application of /some/ deductive rules--and which ends with the
    proposition that's being derived.

    If there is a derivation then it is provable in the base system, if
    there /isn't/ a derivation then it is /not/ true in that base system
    (which is different from saying its contrapositive is true in that base system).
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic on Mon Dec 29 12:52:34 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/29/2025 12:42 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 29/12/2025 13:37, Richard Damon wrote:

    Incompleteness is a property of a given Formal System, it says that
    there exist a statement that is true in that system, but can not be
    proven in that system.

    Godel's proof build a meta-system that constructs a statement that
    exists in the base system, and which is true in that base system, but
    can not be proven in the base system, only the meta-system.

    What do you mean by "proven" here. Do you mean "derived" ? Normally we
    say a proposition is true in a system when we mean the proposition is a theorem of the system; it has a derivation in the system: a finite
    sequence of statements that each is derivable from the axioms and
    earlier statements in the sequence by application of a deductive rule of
    the system--where the deductive rules are transitive so that's also application of /some/ deductive rules--and which ends with the
    proposition that's being derived.

    If there is a derivation then it is provable in the base system, if
    there /isn't/ a derivation then it is /not/ true in that base system
    (which is different from saying its contrapositive is true in that base system).



    Yes you are correct here. Even though it is dead-obvious
    that you are correct everyone indoctrinated with Godel
    1931 Incompleteness will disagree.
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
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  • From pa@pa@see.signature.invalid (Pierre Asselin) to comp.theory,sci.logic on Mon Dec 29 19:21:08 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    In sci.logic Tristan Wibberley <tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk> wrote:
    On 29/12/2025 13:37, Richard Damon wrote:

    Incompleteness is a property of a given Formal System, it says that
    there exist a statement that is true in that system, but can not be
    proven in that system.

    What do you mean by "proven" here. Do you mean "derived" ?

    I think Richard misspoke slightly. The undecidable statement is
    true *in the intended interpretation* of the formal system
    (In Goedel's case, the natural numbers with addition and multiplication).

    Truth "in the formal system" isn't really defined. You need an
    interpretation.
    --
    pa at panix dot com
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  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Dec 29 13:32:01 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/29/2025 1:21 PM, Pierre Asselin wrote:
    In sci.logic Tristan Wibberley <tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk> wrote:
    On 29/12/2025 13:37, Richard Damon wrote:

    Incompleteness is a property of a given Formal System, it says that
    there exist a statement that is true in that system, but can not be
    proven in that system.

    What do you mean by "proven" here. Do you mean "derived" ?

    I think Richard misspoke slightly. The undecidable statement is
    true *in the intended interpretation* of the formal system
    (In Goedel's case, the natural numbers with addition and multiplication).

    Truth "in the formal system" isn't really defined. You need an interpretation.


    Unless (as I have been saying for at least a decade)
    the formal language directly encodes all of its
    semantics directly in its syntax. The Montague
    Grammar of natural language semantics is the best
    known example of this.
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic on Mon Dec 29 14:42:12 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/29/25 1:42 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 29/12/2025 13:37, Richard Damon wrote:

    Incompleteness is a property of a given Formal System, it says that
    there exist a statement that is true in that system, but can not be
    proven in that system.

    Godel's proof build a meta-system that constructs a statement that
    exists in the base system, and which is true in that base system, but
    can not be proven in the base system, only the meta-system.

    What do you mean by "proven" here. Do you mean "derived" ? Normally we
    say a proposition is true in a system when we mean the proposition is a theorem of the system; it has a derivation in the system: a finite
    sequence of statements that each is derivable from the axioms and
    earlier statements in the sequence by application of a deductive rule of
    the system--where the deductive rules are transitive so that's also application of /some/ deductive rules--and which ends with the
    proposition that's being derived.

    If there is a derivation then it is provable in the base system, if
    there /isn't/ a derivation then it is /not/ true in that base system
    (which is different from saying its contrapositive is true in that base system).



    Yes, Godel derives a finite set of logical steps that show this fact,
    that the statement G, making a statement about the non-existance of a
    number that satisfies a particular relationship, that was built in the meta-system out of operation in the base system (so it is valid in the
    base system).

    In the meta-system, a proof is constructed (by the method of
    construction of the relationship) that under the interpreation of
    numbers in the meta-system, that relationship is a proof checker of the statement G. If the number represents a proof of that statement
    expressed in the base system, the number will satisfy the relationship,
    and if not, it will not.

    He shows that ANY proof in the base system can be so represented.

    And thus, since G asserts that no number satisfies the relationship it
    will be true if and only if, their is no proof. Since the existance of a
    proof will show that the statement is true, but also make it false,
    since that proof will thus be represented by a number that satisfies the relationship, making the statement false, that case can not be true.

    Since either such a number exist or it doesn't, since by its
    construction, the relationship is finitely computable for ANY natural
    number, and we just showed that it is impossible by the nature of the relatonship for one to exist, it must not.

    Note also, the construction of the meta system was done with care so
    that it has an important property, that the truth value of any statement
    in the base system must equal that same statement in the meta-system, we
    can show that G must be true in the base system.

    We can also look at the base system, and see how it is actually
    established in the base system, we can see that in the base system, we
    can evaluate the relationship for any number (which doesn't have
    "meaning" in the base system) and because of the equivalence of the computation of the relationship in the two systems, we know that no
    number CAN satisfy it. Since we can test every possible number (which is
    a countably infinite operation) we can see that its truth *IS*
    established in the base system, just by a method that can't be reduced
    to a finite proof.
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  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic on Mon Dec 29 14:51:09 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/29/25 2:21 PM, Pierre Asselin wrote:
    In sci.logic Tristan Wibberley <tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk> wrote:
    On 29/12/2025 13:37, Richard Damon wrote:

    Incompleteness is a property of a given Formal System, it says that
    there exist a statement that is true in that system, but can not be
    proven in that system.

    What do you mean by "proven" here. Do you mean "derived" ?

    I think Richard misspoke slightly. The undecidable statement is
    true *in the intended interpretation* of the formal system
    (In Goedel's case, the natural numbers with addition and multiplication).

    Truth "in the formal system" isn't really defined. You need an interpretation.


    No, statements in a formal system are DEFINED to be true, if that
    statement, referencing object defined in the system model, and related
    by relationships defined in the system can be established starting with
    the initial "facts" (axioms) of the system, and following the allowed
    logical operations of the system.

    THus in the formal system of addition of Natural Numbers, the statement
    2 + 3 = 5 is a true statement, as it can be derived from the operations
    in the system. Some Formal System include a "model" that define interpreations, though another layer above can be added (as Godel did).
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  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Dec 29 14:53:55 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/29/25 2:32 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 1:21 PM, Pierre Asselin wrote:
    In sci.logic Tristan Wibberley
    <tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk> wrote:
    On 29/12/2025 13:37, Richard Damon wrote:

    Incompleteness is a property of a given Formal System, it says that
    there exist a statement that is true in that system, but can not be
    proven in that system.

    What do you mean by "proven" here. Do you mean "derived" ?

    I think Richard misspoke slightly. The undecidable statement is
    true *in the intended interpretation* of the formal system
    (In Goedel's case, the natural numbers with addition and multiplication).

    Truth "in the formal system" isn't really defined. You need an
    interpretation.


    Unless (as I have been saying for at least a decade)
    the formal language directly encodes all of its
    semantics directly in its syntax. The Montague
    Grammar of natural language semantics is the best
    known example of this.


    But it can't, as any system that defines symbols, can have something
    outside it assign additional meaning to those symbols.

    There may be SOME meaning within the system, but, with a sufficiently expressive system, additional meaning can be imposed.

    An Montague grammer is out of scope here, as we are talking FORMAL
    langauges and system, not Natural Language,

    Something which seems beyound your ability to understand, since you brainwashed youself to not understand the basics of this.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Dec 29 20:20:11 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 29/12/2025 19:53, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 2:32 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 1:21 PM, Pierre Asselin wrote:
    In sci.logic Tristan Wibberley
    <tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk> wrote:
    On 29/12/2025 13:37, Richard Damon wrote:

    Incompleteness is a property of a given Formal System, it says that
    there exist a statement that is true in that system, but can not be
    proven in that system.

    What do you mean by "proven" here. Do you mean "derived" ?

    I think Richard misspoke slightly. The undecidable statement is
    true *in the intended interpretation* of the formal system
    (In Goedel's case, the natural numbers with addition and
    multiplication).

    Truth "in the formal system" isn't really defined. You need an
    interpretation.


    Unless (as I have been saying for at least a decade)
    the formal language directly encodes all of its
    semantics directly in its syntax. The Montague
    Grammar of natural language semantics is the best
    known example of this.


    But it can't, as any system that defines symbols, can have something
    outside it assign additional meaning to those symbols.

    Ontology suggests ways to *apply* a system. The system itself works
    without additional meaning just as it does with. That's the point of
    formal systems.

    There may be SOME meaning within the system, but, with a sufficiently expressive system, additional meaning can be imposed.

    additional meaning is given to an embedding or extension (which is
    pretty-much a special-case of embedding) of a system, not to the system
    itself.

    In the case of G||del's preamble, he defines an extension of PM (I should suppose he was using 2nd ed. in 1931 from his untruths about PM if
    applied to 1st. ed.) That extension is inconsistent (or, better, I
    think, indiscriminate). his referent there for PM slides between PM and
    the derived system as he writes and he gets muddled taking a half-formed conclusion about one, assuming and completing it for the other.

    Then he defines a new system "P" which he uses to get even more muddled,
    leaves out the crucial elements of his proof because it's too easy to
    get wrong, and Stephen Meyer says he does get it wrong; he seems to be
    the only person in the world that ever checked.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic on Mon Dec 29 20:36:21 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 29/12/2025 19:51, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 2:21 PM, Pierre Asselin wrote:
    In sci.logic Tristan Wibberley
    <tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk> wrote:
    On 29/12/2025 13:37, Richard Damon wrote:

    Incompleteness is a property of a given Formal System, it says that
    there exist a statement that is true in that system, but can not be
    proven in that system.

    What do you mean by "proven" here. Do you mean "derived" ?

    I think Richard misspoke slightly. The undecidable statement is
    true *in the intended interpretation* of the formal system
    (In Goedel's case, the natural numbers with addition and multiplication).

    Truth "in the formal system" isn't really defined. You need an
    interpretation.


    No, statements in a formal system are DEFINED to be true

    Best to keep pushing the lingufranca toward "to be theorems".

    ps, I note that the use of "defined to be" here is technically wrong but
    the use of "true" is so much more problematic.

    if that> statement, referencing object defined in the system model,
    and related
    by relationships defined in the system-a can be established starting with
    the initial "facts" (axioms) of the system, and following the allowed
    logical operations of the system.
    ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
    ||||||||||||||||||
    ``````````````````~~~<~~~<~~~< Deduction Rules


    A statement in a formal system is included among its theorems exactly
    when it is derivable from the axioms of the system--which are those of
    its theorems that are merely supposed--and the derivation is done by the deduction rules of the system.

    We must prepare ourselves mentally for mathematicians to say "in a
    system" when they mean "in some axiom extension of a system" and to say
    "is true" when they mean "has a derivable embedding in at least one
    episystem embedding the system".
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Dec 29 15:38:44 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/29/2025 1:53 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 2:32 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 1:21 PM, Pierre Asselin wrote:
    In sci.logic Tristan Wibberley
    <tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk> wrote:
    On 29/12/2025 13:37, Richard Damon wrote:

    Incompleteness is a property of a given Formal System, it says that
    there exist a statement that is true in that system, but can not be
    proven in that system.

    What do you mean by "proven" here. Do you mean "derived" ?

    I think Richard misspoke slightly. The undecidable statement is
    true *in the intended interpretation* of the formal system
    (In Goedel's case, the natural numbers with addition and
    multiplication).

    Truth "in the formal system" isn't really defined. You need an
    interpretation.


    Unless (as I have been saying for at least a decade)
    the formal language directly encodes all of its
    semantics directly in its syntax. The Montague
    Grammar of natural language semantics is the best
    known example of this.


    But it can't, as any system that defines symbols, can have something
    outside it assign additional meaning to those symbols.


    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    can be expressed as relations between finite strings.

    There may be SOME meaning within the system, but, with a sufficiently expressive system, additional meaning can be imposed.

    An Montague grammer is out of scope here, as we are talking FORMAL
    langauges and system, not Natural Language,


    "We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability." (G||del 1931:39-41)

    By using an enormously convoluted process with
    G||del numbers hiding his actual claim:

    There exists a sequence of inference steps from
    the axioms of a formal system that prove that
    they themselves do not exist.

    readers are simply conned into believing that
    G||del Incompleteness is coherent and true.

    Something which seems beyound your ability to understand, since you brainwashed youself to not understand the basics of this.
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Dec 29 18:06:03 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/29/25 4:38 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 1:53 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 2:32 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 1:21 PM, Pierre Asselin wrote:
    In sci.logic Tristan Wibberley
    <tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk> wrote:
    On 29/12/2025 13:37, Richard Damon wrote:

    Incompleteness is a property of a given Formal System, it says that >>>>>> there exist a statement that is true in that system, but can not be >>>>>> proven in that system.

    What do you mean by "proven" here. Do you mean "derived" ?

    I think Richard misspoke slightly. The undecidable statement is
    true *in the intended interpretation* of the formal system
    (In Goedel's case, the natural numbers with addition and
    multiplication).

    Truth "in the formal system" isn't really defined. You need an
    interpretation.


    Unless (as I have been saying for at least a decade)
    the formal language directly encodes all of its
    semantics directly in its syntax. The Montague
    Grammar of natural language semantics is the best
    known example of this.


    But it can't, as any system that defines symbols, can have something
    outside it assign additional meaning to those symbols.


    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    can be expressed as relations between finite strings.

    Try to do that.



    There may be SOME meaning within the system, but, with a sufficiently
    expressive system, additional meaning can be imposed.

    An Montague grammer is out of scope here, as we are talking FORMAL
    langauges and system, not Natural Language,


    "We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability." (G||del 1931:39-41)


    Right, it is a statement in the meta-theory, commenting on it
    unprovabiilty in the base theory.

    Context seems to elude you, because it requires understand.


    By using an enormously convoluted process with
    G||del numbers hiding his actual claim:



    There exists a sequence of inference steps from
    the axioms of a formal system that prove that
    they themselves do not exist.

    Right, there is an INFININTE string of inference steps in the base
    theory that shows that no FINITE string of inference steps to show it.


    readers are simply conned into believing that
    G||del Incompleteness is coherent and true.

    Not conned, proven.

    You are just proving your inabilityh to understand the difference
    between Truth and Knowledge, because you can't understand about infinity,


    Something which seems beyound your ability to understand, since you
    brainwashed youself to not understand the basics of this.



    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Dec 29 17:28:26 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/29/2025 5:06 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 4:38 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 1:53 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 2:32 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 1:21 PM, Pierre Asselin wrote:
    In sci.logic Tristan Wibberley
    <tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk> wrote:
    On 29/12/2025 13:37, Richard Damon wrote:

    Incompleteness is a property of a given Formal System, it says that >>>>>>> there exist a statement that is true in that system, but can not be >>>>>>> proven in that system.

    What do you mean by "proven" here. Do you mean "derived" ?

    I think Richard misspoke slightly. The undecidable statement is
    true *in the intended interpretation* of the formal system
    (In Goedel's case, the natural numbers with addition and
    multiplication).

    Truth "in the formal system" isn't really defined. You need an
    interpretation.


    Unless (as I have been saying for at least a decade)
    the formal language directly encodes all of its
    semantics directly in its syntax. The Montague
    Grammar of natural language semantics is the best
    known example of this.


    But it can't, as any system that defines symbols, can have something
    outside it assign additional meaning to those symbols.


    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    can be expressed as relations between finite strings.

    Try to do that.



    There may be SOME meaning within the system, but, with a sufficiently
    expressive system, additional meaning can be imposed.

    An Montague grammer is out of scope here, as we are talking FORMAL
    langauges and system, not Natural Language,


    "We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability." (G||del 1931:39-41)


    Right, it is a statement in the meta-theory, commenting on it
    unprovabiilty in the base theory.

    Context seems to elude you, because it requires understand.


    By using an enormously convoluted process with
    G||del numbers hiding his actual claim:



    There exists a sequence of inference steps from
    the axioms of a formal system that prove that
    they themselves do not exist.

    Right, there is an INFININTE string of inference steps in the base
    theory that shows that no FINITE string of inference steps to show it.


    Rene Descartes said: "I think therefore I never existed".

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Dec 29 22:51:42 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/29/25 6:28 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 5:06 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 4:38 PM, olcott wrote:


    There exists a sequence of inference steps from
    the axioms of a formal system that prove that
    they themselves do not exist.

    Right, there is an INFININTE string of inference steps in the base
    theory that shows that no FINITE string of inference steps to show it.


    Rene Descartes said: "I think therefore I never existed".

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.



    In other words, you are just showing that you don't know what you are
    talking about and thus going into non-sense,

    As I said, and you were too stupid to understand, there is a finite
    sequence of steps in the META systen that show that there is an INFINITE sequence of steps in the system that show there is not a FINITE sequence
    of steps in the system to prove it.

    It seems to you, infinity is finite, and thus your mind is just ZERO.

    Of course, you never let facts get in the way of your stupidity.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Dec 29 22:35:44 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/29/2025 9:51 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 6:28 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 5:06 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 4:38 PM, olcott wrote:


    There exists a sequence of inference steps from
    the axioms of a formal system that prove that
    they themselves do not exist.

    Right, there is an INFININTE string of inference steps in the base
    theory that shows that no FINITE string of inference steps to show it.


    Rene Descartes said: "I think therefore I never existed".

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.



    In other words, you are just showing that you don't know what you are talking about and thus going into non-sense,


    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition
    which asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    Correctly paraphrased as:
    a sequence of inference steps from axioms
    that assert that they themselves do not exist.

    G||del, Kurt 1931.
    On Formally Undecidable Propositions of
    Principia Mathematica And Related Systems

    As I said, and you were too stupid to understand, there is a finite
    sequence of steps in the META systen that show that there is an INFINITE sequence of steps in the system that show there is not a FINITE sequence
    of steps in the system to prove it.

    It seems to you, infinity is finite, and thus your mind is just ZERO.

    Of course, you never let facts get in the way of your stupidity.

    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Dec 29 23:50:52 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/29/25 11:35 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 9:51 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 6:28 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 5:06 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 4:38 PM, olcott wrote:


    There exists a sequence of inference steps from
    the axioms of a formal system that prove that
    they themselves do not exist.

    Right, there is an INFININTE string of inference steps in the base
    theory that shows that no FINITE string of inference steps to show it. >>>>

    Rene Descartes said: "I think therefore I never existed".

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.



    In other words, you are just showing that you don't know what you are
    talking about and thus going into non-sense,


    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition
    which asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    Yes, you have said this before, and I have explained it, but apparently
    you can't read.


    Correctly paraphrased as:
    a sequence of inference steps from axioms
    that assert that they themselves do not exist.

    Nope, as I have pointed out, you have missed the context, because you
    are so stupid.

    The statement, when looked at under the meaning that only exists in the meta-system, shows that in the meta-system there is a proof, a finite
    series of steps, that shows that in the system, the statement in the
    system does not have a proof, which is a finite series of steps IN THE
    SYSTEM (not the meta-system) but there is a infinite series of steps in
    the system that make it true.

    Thus, you show you can't tell the difference between an infinite series
    of steps from a finitee series of step, thus you IQ must be 0 by that scale.

    And, you can't tell the difference between the Meta-system and the
    system, which is like thinking your pet cat is a dog.

    The fact you keep on repeating this, and never try to answer the error
    pointed out just means that you can't understand what an error is,
    because to you truth, knowledge, fact, rules, don't mean anything
    because you chose to make your self just stupid and ignorant.


    G||del, Kurt 1931.
    On Formally Undecidable Propositions of
    Principia Mathematica And Related Systems

    As I said, and you were too stupid to understand, there is a finite
    sequence of steps in the META systen that show that there is an
    INFINITE sequence of steps in the system that show there is not a
    FINITE sequence of steps in the system to prove it.

    It seems to you, infinity is finite, and thus your mind is just ZERO.

    Of course, you never let facts get in the way of your stupidity.




    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Mon Dec 29 23:33:25 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/29/2025 10:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 11:35 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 9:51 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 6:28 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 5:06 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 4:38 PM, olcott wrote:


    There exists a sequence of inference steps from
    the axioms of a formal system that prove that
    they themselves do not exist.

    Right, there is an INFININTE string of inference steps in the base
    theory that shows that no FINITE string of inference steps to show it. >>>>>

    Rene Descartes said: "I think therefore I never existed".

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.



    In other words, you are just showing that you don't know what you are
    talking about and thus going into non-sense,


    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition
    which asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    Yes, you have said this before, and I have explained it, but apparently
    you can't read.


    Correctly paraphrased as:
    a sequence of inference steps from axioms
    that assert that they themselves do not exist.

    Nope, as I have pointed out, you have missed the context, because you
    are so stupid.


    a proposition which asserts its own unprovability.

    The proof of such an propostion within the same
    formal system would require a sequence of inference
    steps that prove that they themselves do not exist.

    The statement, when looked at under the meaning that only exists in the meta-system, shows that in the meta-system there is a proof, a finite
    series of steps, that shows that in the system, the statement in the
    system does not have a proof, which is a finite series of steps IN THE SYSTEM (not the meta-system) but there is a infinite series of steps in
    the system that make it true.

    Thus, you show you can't tell the difference between an infinite series
    of steps from a finitee series of step, thus you IQ must be 0 by that
    scale.

    And, you can't tell the difference between the Meta-system and the
    system, which is like thinking your pet cat is a dog.

    The fact you keep on repeating this, and never try to answer the error pointed out just means that you can't understand what an error is,
    because to you truth, knowledge, fact, rules, don't mean anything
    because you chose to make your self just stupid and ignorant.


    G||del, Kurt 1931.
    On Formally Undecidable Propositions of
    Principia Mathematica And Related Systems

    As I said, and you were too stupid to understand, there is a finite
    sequence of steps in the META systen that show that there is an
    INFINITE sequence of steps in the system that show there is not a
    FINITE sequence of steps in the system to prove it.

    It seems to you, infinity is finite, and thus your mind is just ZERO.

    Of course, you never let facts get in the way of your stupidity.




    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Dec 30 05:49:34 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 30/12/2025 04:35, olcott wrote:

    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition
    which asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    Correctly paraphrased as:
    a sequence of inference steps from axioms
    that assert that they themselves do not exist.

    No they don't. That's an interpretation outside the system. The axioms
    merely force you to conclude that some symbol or other is not negation
    and/or another one is not a reference to the system itself when fools
    think they both /are/ those things.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dart200@user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid to comp.theory on Mon Dec 29 23:26:15 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/29/25 5:37 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 2:17 AM, dart200 wrote:
    On 12/28/25 3:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/28/25 5:30 PM, dart200 wrote:
    the halting problem is generally held up as an example of
    incompleteness in action, and that machines can halt/not without it
    being provable/ knowable.


    First, The Halting Problem more directly shows "Uncomputability"
    instead of "Incompleteness". Note, "Uncomputability" is a property of
    a "Problem", that there are mappings that exist that can not be
    generated by a computation.

    "Incompleteness" is a property of a Logical System, indicating that
    there are true statements in the system that can not be proven.

    but the only one demonstrated can be proven true outside the system.
    it did not show a total unprovable truth, there still was a proof to
    prove it, it just existed outside the system that said truth was in
    respect to.

    You don't understand the proof. There is not just ONE input program.
    There is one for every different decider, as it doesn't call some
    idealized decider, but that actual machine claimed to be a decider.

    After showing we can make such an input that makes any given decider
    wrong, we can show that therefore there is no decider that gets all right.

    I believe there is then another proof that shows that because there is
    no decider that gets all inputs correctly, you can show that there must
    be some program that no known to be corret partial decider gets right,
    in other words, a program that we can not know its halting status, as we
    can not prove it will not halt.




    but i'm not really sure how that could be related to incompleteness:

    incompleteness demonstrated a *know* and *provable* truth that
    existed outside a particular system of proof,

    it did not demonstrate an *unknowable* and *unprovable* truth
    existing outside *any* system of proof ...

    Because the move from it being "Uncomputable" to showing the field is
    "Incomplete" needs some additional arguements (which has been done).

    You seem to have rejected thinking about it, because it goes into
    talking about the "ghost" machines that are individually not
    computable in their behavior, and in fact, we can't even know if they
    are such a machine.

    actually i'm now thinking about using incompleteness against the
    halting problem

    How?




    like what proponents of the halting problem continually assert, eh???


    Which, since the step from Halting showing that there is an
    "Uncomptable" problem allows us to show that Computation Theory
    exhibits the property of Incompleteness, is a valid thing to talk about.

    right but like i said: incompleteness did not show a truth that could
    not be proven at all, just that it couldn't be proven within some system.

    Which is what Incompleteness is about. It says that THE SYSTEM has a
    true statement that THE SYSTEM can not prove. Doesn't matter that some meta-system can prove it.

    lol bruh, if there wasn't a meta system to prove it, how would godel
    have proven it true outside the system???

    at the very least godel's proof counts as a proof that exists outside
    the system


    There is an additional proof that shows that while some of these
    statements can be proved is some meta-system of the system, there will always be some that can't be proved at any finite level of meta-system.



    Now, until you accept that Halting is, in fact, uncomputable, going
    the next step won't be possible.



    --
    a burnt out swe investigating into why our tooling doesn't involve
    basic semantic proofs like halting analysis

    please excuse my pseudo-pyscript,

    ~ nick
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From joes@noreply@example.org to comp.theory,sci.logic on Tue Dec 30 09:47:48 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    Am Mon, 29 Dec 2025 23:26:15 -0800 schrieb dart200:
    On 12/29/25 5:37 AM, Richard Damon wrote:

    I believe there is then another proof that shows that because there is
    no decider that gets all inputs correctly, you can show that there must
    be some program that no known to be corret partial decider gets right,
    in other words, a program that we can not know its halting status, as
    we can not prove it will not halt.
    I believe not, but I would be delighted to see.

    actually i'm now thinking about using incompleteness against the
    halting problem
    How?

    Which is what Incompleteness is about. It says that THE SYSTEM has a
    true statement that THE SYSTEM can not prove. Doesn't matter that some
    meta-system can prove it.

    lol bruh, if there wasn't a meta system to prove it, how would godel
    have proven it true outside the system???
    at the very least godel's proof counts as a proof that exists outside
    the system

    G||del's proof is in the system of ZFC or whatever. It says something
    about another formal system and its metasystem. Those may all be
    different.

    There is an additional proof that shows that while some of these
    statements can be proved is some meta-system of the system, there will
    always be some that can't be proved at any finite level of meta-system.
    --
    Am Sat, 20 Jul 2024 12:35:31 +0000 schrieb WM in sci.math:
    It is not guaranteed that n+1 exists for every n.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Dec 30 08:32:34 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/29/2025 11:49 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 30/12/2025 04:35, olcott wrote:

    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition
    which asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    Correctly paraphrased as:
    a sequence of inference steps from axioms
    that assert that they themselves do not exist.

    No they don't. That's an interpretation outside the system. The axioms
    merely force you to conclude that some symbol or other is not negation
    and/or another one is not a reference to the system itself when fools
    think they both /are/ those things.



    G := (F re4 G)
    a sequence of inference steps in F from the axioms
    of F that assert that they themselves do not exist in F.
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Dec 30 09:32:38 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/30/25 12:33 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 10:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 11:35 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 9:51 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 6:28 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 5:06 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 4:38 PM, olcott wrote:


    There exists a sequence of inference steps from
    the axioms of a formal system that prove that
    they themselves do not exist.

    Right, there is an INFININTE string of inference steps in the base >>>>>> theory that shows that no FINITE string of inference steps to show >>>>>> it.


    Rene Descartes said: "I think therefore I never existed".

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.



    In other words, you are just showing that you don't know what you
    are talking about and thus going into non-sense,


    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition
    which asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    Yes, you have said this before, and I have explained it, but
    apparently you can't read.


    Correctly paraphrased as:
    a sequence of inference steps from axioms
    that assert that they themselves do not exist.

    Nope, as I have pointed out, you have missed the context, because you
    are so stupid.


    a proposition which asserts its own unprovability.

    a proposition who has a meaning in the meta-system talking about its provability in the base system.

    You just ignore context as that is just to complicated for you.


    The proof of such an propostion within the same
    formal system would require a sequence of inference
    steps that prove that they themselves do not exist.

    Which just shows you don't understand the concept of Formal Systems, and
    their meta-systems.

    The proof was NOT in the same system, but in a meta-system built from
    that system.

    It shows, via a finite proof in the meta-system, that there does exist a sequence of infinite length in the system to show the statement is true,
    but their can not be a finite length sequence in the system.

    All you are doing is proving you are to stupid to understand this, as
    you don't understand that two different systems ARE different systems,
    but meta-system can know details of their base system, and that there is
    a difference between infinite and finite. THis shows your intelegence to
    be near zero.


    The statement, when looked at under the meaning that only exists in
    the meta-system, shows that in the meta-system there is a proof, a
    finite series of steps, that shows that in the system, the statement
    in the system does not have a proof, which is a finite series of steps
    IN THE SYSTEM (not the meta-system) but there is a infinite series of
    steps in the system that make it true.

    Thus, you show you can't tell the difference between an infinite
    series of steps from a finitee series of step, thus you IQ must be 0
    by that scale.

    And, you can't tell the difference between the Meta-system and the
    system, which is like thinking your pet cat is a dog.

    The fact you keep on repeating this, and never try to answer the error
    pointed out just means that you can't understand what an error is,
    because to you truth, knowledge, fact, rules, don't mean anything
    because you chose to make your self just stupid and ignorant.


    G||del, Kurt 1931.
    On Formally Undecidable Propositions of
    Principia Mathematica And Related Systems

    As I said, and you were too stupid to understand, there is a finite
    sequence of steps in the META systen that show that there is an
    INFINITE sequence of steps in the system that show there is not a
    FINITE sequence of steps in the system to prove it.

    It seems to you, infinity is finite, and thus your mind is just ZERO.

    Of course, you never let facts get in the way of your stupidity.







    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Dec 30 09:38:08 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/30/25 9:32 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 11:49 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 30/12/2025 04:35, olcott wrote:

    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition
    which asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    Correctly paraphrased as:
    a sequence of inference steps from axioms
    that assert that they themselves do not exist.

    No they don't. That's an interpretation outside the system. The axioms
    merely force you to conclude that some symbol or other is not negation
    and/or another one is not a reference to the system itself when fools
    think they both /are/ those things.



    G := (F re4 G)

    That isn't the statement of G, so you start with a lie.


    a sequence of inference steps in F from the axioms
    of F that assert that they themselves do not exist in F.


    But that statement you are trying to start with isn't a statement in F,
    but an interpretation of the statement in F as understood in MF.

    All you are doing is showing you stupidity of not understanding context.

    And thus you show you can't understand meaning, as meaning is based on context.


    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Dec 30 08:52:11 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/30/2025 8:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/30/25 12:33 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 10:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 11:35 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 9:51 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 6:28 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 5:06 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 4:38 PM, olcott wrote:


    There exists a sequence of inference steps from
    the axioms of a formal system that prove that
    they themselves do not exist.

    Right, there is an INFININTE string of inference steps in the
    base theory that shows that no FINITE string of inference steps >>>>>>> to show it.


    Rene Descartes said: "I think therefore I never existed".

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.



    In other words, you are just showing that you don't know what you
    are talking about and thus going into non-sense,


    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition
    which asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    Yes, you have said this before, and I have explained it, but
    apparently you can't read.


    Correctly paraphrased as:
    a sequence of inference steps from axioms
    that assert that they themselves do not exist.

    Nope, as I have pointed out, you have missed the context, because you
    are so stupid.


    a proposition which asserts its own unprovability.

    a proposition who has a meaning in the meta-system talking about its provability in the base system.


    This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"
    the outer sentence is true because the inner sentence
    is semantically incoherent.


    You just ignore context as that is just to complicated for you.


    I focus on the details that everyone else has been
    indoctrinated to ignore.


    The proof of such an propostion within the same
    formal system would require a sequence of inference
    steps that prove that they themselves do not exist.

    Which just shows you don't understand the concept of Formal Systems, and their meta-systems.


    This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"
    the outer sentence is true because the inner sentence
    is semantically incoherent.

    Sentences that are semantically incoherent are not true.
    This is ignored because a meta level version of the same
    sentence can be made true on the basis of this incoherence.

    G := (F re4 G)
    a sequence of inference steps in F from the axioms
    of F that assert that they themselves do not exist in F.

    The proof was NOT in the same system, but in a meta-system built from
    that system.


    To hide the fact of the incoherence as was shown above.

    It shows, via a finite proof in the meta-system, that there does exist a sequence of infinite length in the system to show the statement is true,
    but their can not be a finite length sequence in the system.

    All you are doing is proving you are to stupid to understand this, as

    The actual stupidity is how mathematicians believe that
    the foundations of math are inherently infallible as if
    they themselves are the actual mind of God.

    you don't understand that two different systems ARE different systems,
    but meta-system can know details of their base system, and that there is
    a difference between infinite and finite. THis shows your intelegence to
    be near zero.


    The statement, when looked at under the meaning that only exists in
    the meta-system, shows that in the meta-system there is a proof, a
    finite series of steps, that shows that in the system, the statement
    in the system does not have a proof, which is a finite series of
    steps IN THE SYSTEM (not the meta-system) but there is a infinite
    series of steps in the system that make it true.

    Thus, you show you can't tell the difference between an infinite
    series of steps from a finitee series of step, thus you IQ must be 0
    by that scale.

    And, you can't tell the difference between the Meta-system and the
    system, which is like thinking your pet cat is a dog.

    The fact you keep on repeating this, and never try to answer the
    error pointed out just means that you can't understand what an error
    is, because to you truth, knowledge, fact, rules, don't mean anything
    because you chose to make your self just stupid and ignorant.


    G||del, Kurt 1931.
    On Formally Undecidable Propositions of
    Principia Mathematica And Related Systems

    As I said, and you were too stupid to understand, there is a finite >>>>> sequence of steps in the META systen that show that there is an
    INFINITE sequence of steps in the system that show there is not a
    FINITE sequence of steps in the system to prove it.

    It seems to you, infinity is finite, and thus your mind is just ZERO. >>>>>
    Of course, you never let facts get in the way of your stupidity.







    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Dec 30 09:10:11 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/30/2025 8:38 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/30/25 9:32 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 11:49 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 30/12/2025 04:35, olcott wrote:

    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition
    which asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    Correctly paraphrased as:
    a sequence of inference steps from axioms
    that assert that they themselves do not exist.

    No they don't. That's an interpretation outside the system. The axioms
    merely force you to conclude that some symbol or other is not negation
    and/or another one is not a reference to the system itself when fools
    think they both /are/ those things.



    G := (F re4 G)

    That isn't the statement of G, so you start with a lie.


    a sequence of inference steps in F from the axioms
    of F that assert that they themselves do not exist in F.



    (F re4 G)
    "re4" means that a sequence of inference steps from
    F to G do not exist.

    But that statement you are trying to start with isn't a statement in F,

    Since is begins with F it is in F.
    That people do not usually look at this degree
    of detail do not mean that I am incorrect.

    but an interpretation of the statement in F as understood in MF.

    All you are doing is showing you stupidity of not understanding context.


    All the I am doing is looking at these things at
    the deeper level beyond indoctrination. I am directly
    examining the foundations of logic and math.

    Everyone else takes these as "given" as if from
    the mind of God.

    And thus you show you can't understand meaning, as meaning is based on context.


    I understand meaning better then anyone else.
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    for this entire body is one giant semantic tautology.
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Dec 30 10:14:34 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/30/25 9:52 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/30/2025 8:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/30/25 12:33 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 10:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 11:35 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 9:51 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 6:28 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 5:06 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 4:38 PM, olcott wrote:


    There exists a sequence of inference steps from
    the axioms of a formal system that prove that
    they themselves do not exist.

    Right, there is an INFININTE string of inference steps in the >>>>>>>> base theory that shows that no FINITE string of inference steps >>>>>>>> to show it.


    Rene Descartes said: "I think therefore I never existed".

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.



    In other words, you are just showing that you don't know what you >>>>>> are talking about and thus going into non-sense,


    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition
    which asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    Yes, you have said this before, and I have explained it, but
    apparently you can't read.


    Correctly paraphrased as:
    a sequence of inference steps from axioms
    that assert that they themselves do not exist.

    Nope, as I have pointed out, you have missed the context, because
    you are so stupid.


    a proposition which asserts its own unprovability.

    a proposition who has a meaning in the meta-system talking about its
    provability in the base system.


    This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"
    the outer sentence is true because the inner sentence
    is semantically incoherent.


    You just ignore context as that is just to complicated for you.


    I focus on the details that everyone else has been
    indoctrinated to ignore.


    The proof of such an propostion within the same
    formal system would require a sequence of inference
    steps that prove that they themselves do not exist.

    Which just shows you don't understand the concept of Formal Systems,
    and their meta-systems.


    This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"
    the outer sentence is true because the inner sentence
    is semantically incoherent.

    In other words, you can't talk about the sentence you want to talk
    about, so you do to soething irrelevent.


    Sentences that are semantically incoherent are not true.
    This is ignored because a meta level version of the same
    sentence can be made true on the basis of this incoherence.

    But that isn't the case for G, unless you think arithmatic is
    semantically incoherent.

    But then, I think that *IS* the case for you.


    G := (F re4 G)

    Which isn't G in F, so your arguement fails.

    a sequence of inference steps in F from the axioms
    of F that assert that they themselves do not exist in F.

    The proof was NOT in the same system, but in a meta-system built from
    that system.


    To hide the fact of the incoherence as was shown above.

    Which says you don't know what that means.

    All you have done is prove that to you, LOGIC is just incoherent because
    you don't understand it.


    It shows, via a finite proof in the meta-system, that there does exist
    a sequence of infinite length in the system to show the statement is
    true, but their can not be a finite length sequence in the system.

    All you are doing is proving you are to stupid to understand this, as

    The actual stupidity is how mathematicians believe that
    the foundations of math are inherently infallible as if
    they themselves are the actual mind of God.

    So, you think mathematics DOESN'T work?

    Can you show an actual FLAW in mathematics, or it is just that anything
    too complicated for you must be wrong because YOU think YOU are God?

    Note, that in a formal system, the axiomatic base and the logical
    deductions it allows IS sort of like "God" to the system, as it is what creates it and controls it, and that is a key feature of God, he is the Creater and Controller of the system.

    Since you have shown you can not actually create a working system, or
    control one with coherent thoughts, you show you are not actually very
    much in the image of God, but have lost that as you turned to your lies.

    All you are doing is showing your stupidity, and that you whole basis is
    a rejection of that which you don't understand instead of seeking to understand it, as you are stuck in your lies.


    you don't understand that two different systems ARE different systems,
    but meta-system can know details of their base system, and that there
    is a difference between infinite and finite. THis shows your
    intelegence to be near zero.


    The statement, when looked at under the meaning that only exists in
    the meta-system, shows that in the meta-system there is a proof, a
    finite series of steps, that shows that in the system, the statement
    in the system does not have a proof, which is a finite series of
    steps IN THE SYSTEM (not the meta-system) but there is a infinite
    series of steps in the system that make it true.

    Thus, you show you can't tell the difference between an infinite
    series of steps from a finitee series of step, thus you IQ must be 0
    by that scale.

    And, you can't tell the difference between the Meta-system and the
    system, which is like thinking your pet cat is a dog.

    The fact you keep on repeating this, and never try to answer the
    error pointed out just means that you can't understand what an error
    is, because to you truth, knowledge, fact, rules, don't mean
    anything because you chose to make your self just stupid and ignorant. >>>>

    G||del, Kurt 1931.
    On Formally Undecidable Propositions of
    Principia Mathematica And Related Systems

    As I said, and you were too stupid to understand, there is a
    finite sequence of steps in the META systen that show that there
    is an INFINITE sequence of steps in the system that show there is >>>>>> not a FINITE sequence of steps in the system to prove it.

    It seems to you, infinity is finite, and thus your mind is just ZERO. >>>>>>
    Of course, you never let facts get in the way of your stupidity.










    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Dec 30 10:15:55 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/30/2025 9:14 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/30/25 9:52 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/30/2025 8:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/30/25 12:33 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 10:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 11:35 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 9:51 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 6:28 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 5:06 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 4:38 PM, olcott wrote:


    There exists a sequence of inference steps from
    the axioms of a formal system that prove that
    they themselves do not exist.

    Right, there is an INFININTE string of inference steps in the >>>>>>>>> base theory that shows that no FINITE string of inference steps >>>>>>>>> to show it.


    Rene Descartes said: "I think therefore I never existed".

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.



    In other words, you are just showing that you don't know what you >>>>>>> are talking about and thus going into non-sense,


    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition
    which asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    Yes, you have said this before, and I have explained it, but
    apparently you can't read.


    Correctly paraphrased as:
    a sequence of inference steps from axioms
    that assert that they themselves do not exist.

    Nope, as I have pointed out, you have missed the context, because
    you are so stupid.


    a proposition which asserts its own unprovability.

    a proposition who has a meaning in the meta-system talking about its
    provability in the base system.


    This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"
    the outer sentence is true because the inner sentence
    is semantically incoherent.


    You just ignore context as that is just to complicated for you.


    I focus on the details that everyone else has been
    indoctrinated to ignore.


    The proof of such an propostion within the same
    formal system would require a sequence of inference
    steps that prove that they themselves do not exist.

    Which just shows you don't understand the concept of Formal Systems,
    and their meta-systems.


    This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"
    the outer sentence is true because the inner sentence
    is semantically incoherent.

    In other words, you can't talk about the sentence you want to talk
    about, so you do to soething irrelevent.


    Exactly the opposite Incompleteness and Undefinability
    dishonestly dodge the fact the their actual sentences
    are incoherent by using the meta-level.

    This meta-level is correct to state that these sentences
    are not provable and not true.

    The meta-level never looks at why they are unprovable
    and untrue. They are unprovable and untrue BECAUSE they
    are semantically incoherent.

    The proper treatment is to toss these sentences out as
    incoherent. The proper treatment is not to create a
    meta-level that simply ignores this incoherence.

    Tarski's metatheory Tarski's theory
    This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true" is true

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    In meta-F In F
    This sentence cannot be proven: "This sentence cannot be proven" is true

    ?- G = not(provable(F, G)).
    G = not(provable(F, G)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(G, not(provable(F, G))).
    false.
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Dec 30 13:57:52 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/30/25 11:15 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/30/2025 9:14 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/30/25 9:52 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/30/2025 8:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/30/25 12:33 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 10:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 11:35 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 9:51 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 6:28 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 5:06 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 4:38 PM, olcott wrote:


    There exists a sequence of inference steps from
    the axioms of a formal system that prove that
    they themselves do not exist.

    Right, there is an INFININTE string of inference steps in the >>>>>>>>>> base theory that shows that no FINITE string of inference >>>>>>>>>> steps to show it.


    Rene Descartes said: "I think therefore I never existed".

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.



    In other words, you are just showing that you don't know what >>>>>>>> you are talking about and thus going into non-sense,


    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition
    which asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    Yes, you have said this before, and I have explained it, but
    apparently you can't read.


    Correctly paraphrased as:
    a sequence of inference steps from axioms
    that assert that they themselves do not exist.

    Nope, as I have pointed out, you have missed the context, because >>>>>> you are so stupid.


    a proposition which asserts its own unprovability.

    a proposition who has a meaning in the meta-system talking about its
    provability in the base system.


    This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"
    the outer sentence is true because the inner sentence
    is semantically incoherent.


    You just ignore context as that is just to complicated for you.


    I focus on the details that everyone else has been
    indoctrinated to ignore.


    The proof of such an propostion within the same
    formal system would require a sequence of inference
    steps that prove that they themselves do not exist.

    Which just shows you don't understand the concept of Formal Systems,
    and their meta-systems.


    This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"
    the outer sentence is true because the inner sentence
    is semantically incoherent.

    In other words, you can't talk about the sentence you want to talk
    about, so you do to soething irrelevent.


    Exactly the opposite Incompleteness and Undefinability
    dishonestly dodge the fact the their actual sentences
    are incoherent by using the meta-level.

    And what is incoherent about using a meta-level.

    All a mete-level is, is to build a new Formal System, based on the base
    system that knows the basic properties of the base system.

    For instance, the Rational Numbers can be considers a "meta" of the
    Integeres.


    This meta-level is correct to state that these sentences
    are not provable and not true.

    The meta-level never looks at why they are unprovable
    and untrue. They are unprovable and untrue BECAUSE they
    are semantically incoherent.

    No, the sentence of G was specifically constructed to have a coherent
    meaning in the base system, but you just are too stupid to understand that.

    THe statment G, in the base system, as well as in the meta system is the
    claim that there exists no natural number g that satisifies a particular mathematical property expresses as a primative recursive relationship.

    The mathematics of that is fully coherent in the base system, and WILL
    have an answer of either yes or no, even if that system might not be
    able to compute that answer.

    In the meta-system, because of how the relationship was created, we see
    that in adds meaning from the base system into numbers that inherently
    only mean themselves. Just like we can form words with meaning from
    letters that have no inherent meaning.

    It seems you don't even understand how "meaning" works, so your core is
    based on a fundamental misunderstanding of what you talk about.


    The proper treatment is to toss these sentences out as
    incoherent. The proper treatment is not to create a
    meta-level that simply ignores this incoherence.

    But they aren't.

    I guess to you, mathematics is just incoherent, and logic has to be kept primative.

    In other words, you are just too stupid to be in the field.


    Tarski's metatheory-a-a-a-a-a-a-a Tarski's theory
    This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true" is true

    You just don't understand what Tarski is saying, as his proof build on
    the concept that Godel uses, and Tarski shows that if we assume the
    existance of a predicate "True" that will return True if its input
    sentance is actually True, but False otherwise (either the contradiction
    of the sentence is true, so it is false, or the sentence doesn't have a
    truth value) then by the same "math" Godel uses, we can prove that the
    liar must have a truth value.


    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    Right, so by the proof, "True" as a predicate can't exist.



    In meta-F-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a In F
    This sentence cannot be proven: "This sentence cannot be proven" is true

    ?- G = not(provable(F, G)).
    G = not(provable(F, G)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(G, not(provable(F, G))).
    false.



    And all you are doing is proving your ignornce of how logic works, since
    none of the system you are talking about can be modeled by Prolog.

    Of course, YOU can't handle systems that can't be handled by Prolog as
    you are just too stupid.


    I will note again, the fact that you just refuse to even try to address
    any of the points, but just keep repeating your wrong opinion that it
    can't be right shows that inside, you understand you have no grounds for
    your claims, and accept that you argument is baseless, but you still
    just repeat it.

    If you wanted to try to actually show an error in what I say, you would actually address my words and try to show an error, but that would
    require you showing an understand of the field that you just don't have,
    and would force you to reveal that you really have nothing to base your
    claims on.

    I note that everything you say is based on your own (ignorant)
    understanding of how logic works and you can't actually get to the meet
    of any source to back you up.

    At best, you look at minor offhand high level explainations that you mis-interprete.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Dec 30 13:01:19 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/30/2025 12:57 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/30/25 11:15 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/30/2025 9:14 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/30/25 9:52 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/30/2025 8:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/30/25 12:33 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 10:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 11:35 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 9:51 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 6:28 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 5:06 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 4:38 PM, olcott wrote:


    There exists a sequence of inference steps from
    the axioms of a formal system that prove that
    they themselves do not exist.

    Right, there is an INFININTE string of inference steps in the >>>>>>>>>>> base theory that shows that no FINITE string of inference >>>>>>>>>>> steps to show it.


    Rene Descartes said: "I think therefore I never existed".

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.



    In other words, you are just showing that you don't know what >>>>>>>>> you are talking about and thus going into non-sense,


    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition
    which asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41) >>>>>>>
    Yes, you have said this before, and I have explained it, but
    apparently you can't read.


    Correctly paraphrased as:
    a sequence of inference steps from axioms
    that assert that they themselves do not exist.

    Nope, as I have pointed out, you have missed the context, because >>>>>>> you are so stupid.


    a proposition which asserts its own unprovability.

    a proposition who has a meaning in the meta-system talking about
    its provability in the base system.


    This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"
    the outer sentence is true because the inner sentence
    is semantically incoherent.


    You just ignore context as that is just to complicated for you.


    I focus on the details that everyone else has been
    indoctrinated to ignore.


    The proof of such an propostion within the same
    formal system would require a sequence of inference
    steps that prove that they themselves do not exist.

    Which just shows you don't understand the concept of Formal
    Systems, and their meta-systems.


    This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"
    the outer sentence is true because the inner sentence
    is semantically incoherent.

    In other words, you can't talk about the sentence you want to talk
    about, so you do to soething irrelevent.


    Exactly the opposite Incompleteness and Undefinability
    dishonestly dodge the fact the their actual sentences
    are incoherent by using the meta-level.

    And what is incoherent about using a meta-level.

    All a mete-level is, is to build a new Formal System, based on the base system that knows the basic properties of the base system.

    For instance, the Rational Numbers can be considers a "meta" of the Integeres.


    This meta-level is correct to state that these sentences
    are not provable and not true.

    The meta-level never looks at why they are unprovable
    and untrue. They are unprovable and untrue BECAUSE they
    are semantically incoherent.

    No, the sentence of G was specifically constructed to have a coherent meaning in the base system, but you just are too stupid to understand that.


    Why do you lie about this? Does lying give you cheap thrill?

    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    G||del, Kurt 1931.
    On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica And
    Related Systems


    THe statment G, in the base system, as well as in the meta system is the claim that there exists no natural number g that satisifies a particular mathematical property expresses as a primative recursive relationship.

    The mathematics of that is fully coherent in the base system, and WILL
    have an answer of either yes or no, even if that system might not be
    able to compute that answer.

    In the meta-system, because of how the relationship was created, we see
    that in adds meaning from the base system into numbers that inherently
    only mean themselves. Just like we can form words with meaning from
    letters that have no inherent meaning.

    It seems you don't even understand how "meaning" works, so your core is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of what you talk about.


    The proper treatment is to toss these sentences out as
    incoherent. The proper treatment is not to create a
    meta-level that simply ignores this incoherence.

    But they aren't.

    I guess to you, mathematics is just incoherent, and logic has to be kept primative.

    In other words, you are just too stupid to be in the field.


    Tarski's metatheory-a-a-a-a-a-a-a Tarski's theory
    This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true" is true

    You just don't understand what Tarski is saying, as his proof build on
    the concept that Godel uses, and Tarski shows that if we assume the existance of a predicate "True" that will return True if its input
    sentance is actually True, but False otherwise (either the contradiction
    of the sentence is true, so it is false, or the sentence doesn't have a truth value) then by the same "math" Godel uses, we can prove that the
    liar must have a truth value.


    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    Right, so by the proof, "True" as a predicate can't exist.



    In meta-F-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a In F
    This sentence cannot be proven: "This sentence cannot be proven" is true

    ?- G = not(provable(F, G)).
    G = not(provable(F, G)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(G, not(provable(F, G))).
    false.



    And all you are doing is proving your ignornce of how logic works, since none of the system you are talking about can be modeled by Prolog.

    Of course, YOU can't handle systems that can't be handled by Prolog as
    you are just too stupid.


    I will note again, the fact that you just refuse to even try to address
    any of the points, but just keep repeating your wrong opinion that it
    can't be right shows that inside, you understand you have no grounds for your claims, and accept that you argument is baseless, but you still
    just repeat it.

    If you wanted to try to actually show an error in what I say, you would actually address my words and try to show an error, but that would
    require you showing an understand of the field that you just don't have,
    and would force you to reveal that you really have nothing to base your claims on.

    I note that everything you say is based on your own (ignorant)
    understanding of how logic works and you can't actually get to the meet
    of any source to back you up.

    At best, you look at minor offhand high level explainations that you mis-interprete.
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Dec 30 14:04:05 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/30/25 10:10 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/30/2025 8:38 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/30/25 9:32 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 11:49 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 30/12/2025 04:35, olcott wrote:

    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition
    which asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    Correctly paraphrased as:
    a sequence of inference steps from axioms
    that assert that they themselves do not exist.

    No they don't. That's an interpretation outside the system. The axioms >>>> merely force you to conclude that some symbol or other is not negation >>>> and/or another one is not a reference to the system itself when fools
    think they both /are/ those things.



    G := (F re4 G)

    That isn't the statement of G, so you start with a lie.


    a sequence of inference steps in F from the axioms
    of F that assert that they themselves do not exist in F.



    (F re4 G)
    "re4" means that a sequence of inference steps from
    F to G do not exist.

    Right, and there is, it is just an infinite sequence of steps.

    Your problem (which you seem to be too stupid to understand by words) is
    that this is NOT the definition of G, but an INTERPRETATION of that G
    under the light of new definitions established in the Meta System.


    But that statement you are trying to start with isn't a statement in F,

    Since is begins with F it is in F.
    That people do not usually look at this degree
    of detail do not mean that I am incorrect.

    Nope, I guess you don't think that one system can talk of other systems.

    I guess you don't understand how logic works at all.


    but an interpretation of the statement in F as understood in MF.

    All you are doing is showing you stupidity of not understanding context.


    All the I am doing is looking at these things at
    the deeper level beyond indoctrination. I am directly
    examining the foundations of logic and math.

    MNo, you are looking at things through a broken lens of lies.


    Everyone else takes these as "given" as if from
    the mind of God.

    But in a sense, they are.

    "God" is the creater and control of things.

    In a Formal System, the Axioms and rules FORM that system, and
    everything in it comes out of that.

    Thus, the system, in a very real sense, has a Creator, and thus a "God"


    And thus you show you can't understand meaning, as meaning is based on
    context.


    I understand meaning better then anyone else.
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    for this entire body is one giant semantic tautology.


    Nope, the problem is yout THINK you do, and thus have made yourself
    stupid and incapable of learning. Becoming the perfect example of Dunning-Kruger.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Dec 30 13:08:51 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/30/2025 1:04 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/30/25 10:10 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/30/2025 8:38 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/30/25 9:32 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 11:49 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 30/12/2025 04:35, olcott wrote:

    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition
    which asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    Correctly paraphrased as:
    a sequence of inference steps from axioms
    that assert that they themselves do not exist.

    No they don't. That's an interpretation outside the system. The axioms >>>>> merely force you to conclude that some symbol or other is not negation >>>>> and/or another one is not a reference to the system itself when fools >>>>> think they both /are/ those things.



    G := (F re4 G)

    That isn't the statement of G, so you start with a lie.


    a sequence of inference steps in F from the axioms
    of F that assert that they themselves do not exist in F.



    (F re4 G)
    "re4" means that a sequence of inference steps from
    F to G do not exist.

    Right, and there is, it is just an infinite sequence of steps.


    You are stupidly saying that something that does not exist
    at all infinitely exists.
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Dec 30 14:10:34 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/30/25 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/30/2025 12:57 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/30/25 11:15 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/30/2025 9:14 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/30/25 9:52 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/30/2025 8:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/30/25 12:33 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 10:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 11:35 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 9:51 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 6:28 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 5:06 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 4:38 PM, olcott wrote:


    There exists a sequence of inference steps from
    the axioms of a formal system that prove that
    they themselves do not exist.

    Right, there is an INFININTE string of inference steps in >>>>>>>>>>>> the base theory that shows that no FINITE string of
    inference steps to show it.


    Rene Descartes said: "I think therefore I never existed". >>>>>>>>>>>
    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.



    In other words, you are just showing that you don't know what >>>>>>>>>> you are talking about and thus going into non-sense,


    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition
    which asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41) >>>>>>>>
    Yes, you have said this before, and I have explained it, but
    apparently you can't read.


    Correctly paraphrased as:
    a sequence of inference steps from axioms
    that assert that they themselves do not exist.

    Nope, as I have pointed out, you have missed the context,
    because you are so stupid.


    a proposition which asserts its own unprovability.

    a proposition who has a meaning in the meta-system talking about
    its provability in the base system.


    This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"
    the outer sentence is true because the inner sentence
    is semantically incoherent.


    You just ignore context as that is just to complicated for you.


    I focus on the details that everyone else has been
    indoctrinated to ignore.


    The proof of such an propostion within the same
    formal system would require a sequence of inference
    steps that prove that they themselves do not exist.

    Which just shows you don't understand the concept of Formal
    Systems, and their meta-systems.


    This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"
    the outer sentence is true because the inner sentence
    is semantically incoherent.

    In other words, you can't talk about the sentence you want to talk
    about, so you do to soething irrelevent.


    Exactly the opposite Incompleteness and Undefinability
    dishonestly dodge the fact the their actual sentences
    are incoherent by using the meta-level.

    And what is incoherent about using a meta-level.

    All a mete-level is, is to build a new Formal System, based on the
    base system that knows the basic properties of the base system.

    For instance, the Rational Numbers can be considers a "meta" of the
    Integeres.


    This meta-level is correct to state that these sentences
    are not provable and not true.

    The meta-level never looks at why they are unprovable
    and untrue. They are unprovable and untrue BECAUSE they
    are semantically incoherent.

    No, the sentence of G was specifically constructed to have a coherent
    meaning in the base system, but you just are too stupid to understand
    that.


    Why do you lie about this? Does lying give you cheap thrill?

    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    And where does this say that is what the sentence is in the base system?

    Why do YOU LIE? BECAUSE YOU ARE JUST STUPID.

    Read the paper, see what the statement ACTUALLY IS.

    It is a mathematical expression you probably have no idea what it means,
    so you just skip over it. That is the power of stupidity.

    Note, this sentence talks about the INTERPRETAION of the original
    sentence (in the base language) when seen in the light of the additional meaning added by the meta system.

    It seems you don't know what you are talking about, and just refuse to
    learn.


    G||del, Kurt 1931.
    On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica And
    Related Systems

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Dec 30 13:13:10 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/30/2025 1:10 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/30/25 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/30/2025 12:57 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/30/25 11:15 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/30/2025 9:14 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/30/25 9:52 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/30/2025 8:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/30/25 12:33 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 10:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 11:35 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 9:51 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 6:28 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 5:06 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 4:38 PM, olcott wrote:


    There exists a sequence of inference steps from
    the axioms of a formal system that prove that
    they themselves do not exist.

    Right, there is an INFININTE string of inference steps in >>>>>>>>>>>>> the base theory that shows that no FINITE string of >>>>>>>>>>>>> inference steps to show it.


    Rene Descartes said: "I think therefore I never existed". >>>>>>>>>>>>
    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.



    In other words, you are just showing that you don't know what >>>>>>>>>>> you are talking about and thus going into non-sense,


    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition
    which asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41) >>>>>>>>>
    Yes, you have said this before, and I have explained it, but >>>>>>>>> apparently you can't read.


    Correctly paraphrased as:
    a sequence of inference steps from axioms
    that assert that they themselves do not exist.

    Nope, as I have pointed out, you have missed the context,
    because you are so stupid.


    a proposition which asserts its own unprovability.

    a proposition who has a meaning in the meta-system talking about >>>>>>> its provability in the base system.


    This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"
    the outer sentence is true because the inner sentence
    is semantically incoherent.


    You just ignore context as that is just to complicated for you.


    I focus on the details that everyone else has been
    indoctrinated to ignore.


    The proof of such an propostion within the same
    formal system would require a sequence of inference
    steps that prove that they themselves do not exist.

    Which just shows you don't understand the concept of Formal
    Systems, and their meta-systems.


    This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"
    the outer sentence is true because the inner sentence
    is semantically incoherent.

    In other words, you can't talk about the sentence you want to talk
    about, so you do to soething irrelevent.


    Exactly the opposite Incompleteness and Undefinability
    dishonestly dodge the fact the their actual sentences
    are incoherent by using the meta-level.

    And what is incoherent about using a meta-level.

    All a mete-level is, is to build a new Formal System, based on the
    base system that knows the basic properties of the base system.

    For instance, the Rational Numbers can be considers a "meta" of the
    Integeres.


    This meta-level is correct to state that these sentences
    are not provable and not true.

    The meta-level never looks at why they are unprovable
    and untrue. They are unprovable and untrue BECAUSE they
    are semantically incoherent.

    No, the sentence of G was specifically constructed to have a coherent
    meaning in the base system, but you just are too stupid to understand
    that.


    Why do you lie about this? Does lying give you cheap thrill?

    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which asserts its
    own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    And where does this say that is what the sentence is in the base system?


    That <is> the summation of his whole proof dip shit.
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Dec 30 14:14:08 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/30/25 2:08 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/30/2025 1:04 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/30/25 10:10 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/30/2025 8:38 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/30/25 9:32 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 11:49 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 30/12/2025 04:35, olcott wrote:

    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition
    which asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    Correctly paraphrased as:
    a sequence of inference steps from axioms
    that assert that they themselves do not exist.

    No they don't. That's an interpretation outside the system. The
    axioms
    merely force you to conclude that some symbol or other is not
    negation
    and/or another one is not a reference to the system itself when fools >>>>>> think they both /are/ those things.



    G := (F re4 G)

    That isn't the statement of G, so you start with a lie.


    a sequence of inference steps in F from the axioms
    of F that assert that they themselves do not exist in F.



    (F re4 G)
    "re4" means that a sequence of inference steps from
    F to G do not exist.

    Right, and there is, it is just an infinite sequence of steps.


    You are stupidly saying that something that does not exist
    at all infinitely exists.


    ????

    What doesn't exist:
    A finite sequence in F

    What does exist:
    An infinite sequence if F, and
    A finite sequence in Meta

    Thus, your claim LIES by comparing the finite sequence to the infinte sequence, or sequences in different systems with different rules.

    So, either finite == infinite or F == M by your logic,

    Both are LIES, so you are just a LIAR.

    And a stupid one at that as I have lost track of how many times it has
    been explained to you, and you have shown an inability to learn it.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Dec 30 14:26:26 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/30/25 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/30/2025 1:10 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/30/25 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/30/2025 12:57 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/30/25 11:15 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/30/2025 9:14 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/30/25 9:52 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/30/2025 8:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/30/25 12:33 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 10:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 11:35 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 9:51 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 6:28 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 5:06 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 4:38 PM, olcott wrote:


    There exists a sequence of inference steps from
    the axioms of a formal system that prove that
    they themselves do not exist.

    Right, there is an INFININTE string of inference steps in >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the base theory that shows that no FINITE string of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> inference steps to show it.


    Rene Descartes said: "I think therefore I never existed". >>>>>>>>>>>>>
    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    There is no sequence of inference steps that
    prove they themselves do not exist.

    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.
    That is all that G||del ever proved.



    In other words, you are just showing that you don't know >>>>>>>>>>>> what you are talking about and thus going into non-sense, >>>>>>>>>>>>

    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition
    which asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41) >>>>>>>>>>
    Yes, you have said this before, and I have explained it, but >>>>>>>>>> apparently you can't read.


    Correctly paraphrased as:
    a sequence of inference steps from axioms
    that assert that they themselves do not exist.

    Nope, as I have pointed out, you have missed the context, >>>>>>>>>> because you are so stupid.


    a proposition which asserts its own unprovability.

    a proposition who has a meaning in the meta-system talking about >>>>>>>> its provability in the base system.


    This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"
    the outer sentence is true because the inner sentence
    is semantically incoherent.


    You just ignore context as that is just to complicated for you. >>>>>>>>

    I focus on the details that everyone else has been
    indoctrinated to ignore.


    The proof of such an propostion within the same
    formal system would require a sequence of inference
    steps that prove that they themselves do not exist.

    Which just shows you don't understand the concept of Formal
    Systems, and their meta-systems.


    This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"
    the outer sentence is true because the inner sentence
    is semantically incoherent.

    In other words, you can't talk about the sentence you want to talk >>>>>> about, so you do to soething irrelevent.


    Exactly the opposite Incompleteness and Undefinability
    dishonestly dodge the fact the their actual sentences
    are incoherent by using the meta-level.

    And what is incoherent about using a meta-level.

    All a mete-level is, is to build a new Formal System, based on the
    base system that knows the basic properties of the base system.

    For instance, the Rational Numbers can be considers a "meta" of the
    Integeres.


    This meta-level is correct to state that these sentences
    are not provable and not true.

    The meta-level never looks at why they are unprovable
    and untrue. They are unprovable and untrue BECAUSE they
    are semantically incoherent.

    No, the sentence of G was specifically constructed to have a
    coherent meaning in the base system, but you just are too stupid to
    understand that.


    Why do you lie about this? Does lying give you cheap thrill?

    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which asserts its
    own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    And where does this say that is what the sentence is in the base system?


    That <is> the summation of his whole proof dip shit.




    In may be a "summation", but doesn't show an error.

    Your problem is you just don't understand what you are talking about
    since you chose to make yourself ignorant.

    You are just as bad as the flat-earthers, but at least they TRY to use
    real logic,
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Dec 30 20:22:02 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 30/12/2025 14:32, olcott wrote:

    G := (F re4 G)
    a sequence of inference steps in F from the axioms
    of F that assert that they themselves do not exist in F.

    You suppose that's what the symbols mean. Yet you know that supposition
    is inadmissible per-Se. Cognitive dissonance in action.

    You rely on the delusion that the internal sensation of defining a
    symbol actually has that effect on your mindspace and also on the
    continued hallucination that the symbol is then stably so defined when
    you later introspect your mind-space.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Dec 30 14:35:29 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/30/2025 2:22 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 30/12/2025 14:32, olcott wrote:

    G := (F re4 G)
    a sequence of inference steps in F from the axioms
    of F that assert that they themselves do not exist in F.

    You suppose that's what the symbols mean. Yet you know that supposition
    is inadmissible per-Se. Cognitive dissonance in action.


    The symbols *mean* a self-contradictory expression of language
    the same sort of thing as: "this sentence is not true".

    You rely on the delusion that the internal sensation of defining a
    symbol actually has that effect on your mindspace and also on the
    continued hallucination that the symbol is then stably so defined when
    you later introspect your mind-space.

    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Dec 30 15:59:09 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/30/25 3:35 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/30/2025 2:22 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 30/12/2025 14:32, olcott wrote:

    G := (F re4 G)
    a sequence of inference steps in F from the axioms
    of F that assert that they themselves do not exist in F.

    You suppose that's what the symbols mean. Yet you know that supposition
    is inadmissible per-Se. Cognitive dissonance in action.


    The symbols *mean* a self-contradictory expression of language
    the same sort of thing as: "this sentence is not true".

    But it doesn't, as it is satisfiable by a statement that is true but unprovable, which just mean the statement is established true by an
    infinite chain of infernce, but there is no finite chain of inference
    that establishes it.

    Yes, it can also be satisfied by making the statement not have a truth
    value, so we have two options.

    Your problem is that since that WASN'T the actual statement of G, but
    just an interpreation of it, and the ACTUAL statement for G must have a
    truth value, as it is asking about the existance of a number with a
    computable property, we can show that the non-truth-bearing option must
    be incorrect.

    Of course, when you only think things half way, you can try to argue otherwise, but that just shows your ignornace.

    You only reject the fact that it can be statisifed by a true statement
    that can't be proven, because you don't want such a thing to exist. But
    they do, at least if you allow mathematics to exist.

    So, unless you want to insist that civilization regress back to
    primative times without higher logic, you are just living a lie.

    Your "world" is built on the lie that we can know all truths, when the
    world is actually more complicated than that, which just breaks you ideas.


    You rely on the delusion that the internal sensation of defining a
    symbol actually has that effect on your mindspace and also on the
    continued hallucination that the symbol is then stably so defined when
    you later introspect your mind-space.




    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Dec 30 21:26:50 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 30/12/2025 20:35, olcott wrote:

    The symbols *mean* a self-contradictory expression of language
    the same sort of thing as: "this sentence is not true".

    Not per-Se. Formally, it depends on the full nature of the system
    they're in.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Dec 30 21:34:18 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 30/12/2025 20:59, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/30/25 3:35 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/30/2025 2:22 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 30/12/2025 14:32, olcott wrote:

    G := (F re4 G)
    a sequence of inference steps in F from the axioms
    of F that assert that they themselves do not exist in F.

    You suppose that's what the symbols mean. Yet you know that supposition
    is inadmissible per-Se. Cognitive dissonance in action.


    The symbols *mean* a self-contradictory expression of language
    the same sort of thing as: "this sentence is not true".

    But it doesn't, as it is satisfiable by a statement that is true but unprovable, which just mean the statement is established true by an
    infinite chain of infernce

    Are you using a finite derivation in the meta-system of the limit of a converging sequence of finite derivations of increasing length (whose
    terminals may or may not be the statement being proved but the limit of
    whose terminals /is/)?

    And thus you say the statement is true thereby exemplifying a point from
    which we may inductively infer a meaning for "true"? Is that "true of
    the system in the meta-system" ?
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Dec 30 15:39:36 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/30/2025 3:26 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 30/12/2025 20:35, olcott wrote:

    The symbols *mean* a self-contradictory expression of language
    the same sort of thing as: "this sentence is not true".

    Not per-Se. Formally, it depends on the full nature of the system
    they're in.


    Sure and we could define a "black cat" as a
    {fifteen story office building eating a sandwich}

    Within the pure semantics of the actual underlying
    meanings any expression of language that means:

    {a sequence of inference steps in F from the axioms
    of F that assert that they themselves do not exist in F}

    is semantically incoherent.
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Dec 30 15:41:57 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/30/2025 3:34 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 30/12/2025 20:59, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/30/25 3:35 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/30/2025 2:22 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 30/12/2025 14:32, olcott wrote:

    G := (F re4 G)
    a sequence of inference steps in F from the axioms
    of F that assert that they themselves do not exist in F.

    You suppose that's what the symbols mean. Yet you know that supposition >>>> is inadmissible per-Se. Cognitive dissonance in action.


    The symbols *mean* a self-contradictory expression of language
    the same sort of thing as: "this sentence is not true".

    But it doesn't, as it is satisfiable by a statement that is true but
    unprovable, which just mean the statement is established true by an
    infinite chain of infernce

    Are you using a finite derivation in the meta-system of the limit of a converging sequence of finite derivations of increasing length (whose terminals may or may not be the statement being proved but the limit of
    whose terminals /is/)?

    And thus you say the statement is true thereby exemplifying a point from which we may inductively infer a meaning for "true"? Is that "true of
    the system in the meta-system" ?


    True in the system can only really mean provable
    from the axioms of this same system any other
    meaning is nonsense.
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Dec 30 16:47:28 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/30/25 4:41 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/30/2025 3:34 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 30/12/2025 20:59, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/30/25 3:35 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/30/2025 2:22 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 30/12/2025 14:32, olcott wrote:

    G := (F re4 G)
    a sequence of inference steps in F from the axioms
    of F that assert that they themselves do not exist in F.

    You suppose that's what the symbols mean. Yet you know that
    supposition
    is inadmissible per-Se. Cognitive dissonance in action.


    The symbols *mean* a self-contradictory expression of language
    the same sort of thing as: "this sentence is not true".

    But it doesn't, as it is satisfiable by a statement that is true but
    unprovable, which just mean the statement is established true by an
    infinite chain of infernce

    Are you using a finite derivation in the meta-system of the limit of a
    converging sequence of finite derivations of increasing length (whose
    terminals may or may not be the statement being proved but the limit of
    whose terminals /is/)?

    And thus you say the statement is true thereby exemplifying a point from
    which we may inductively infer a meaning for "true"? Is that "true of
    the system in the meta-system" ?


    True in the system can only really mean provable
    from the axioms of this same system any other
    meaning is nonsense.


    True doesn't need to be PROVEN, only ESTABLISHED

    True in the system F *IS* established as it is just a fact that no
    number will satisfy the relationship, which can be established by
    testing all of that countably infinite set.

    We happen to be able to prove in the meta-system that all numbers will
    fail to meet the relationship. In the system we just need to test that
    whole infinite set, so the testing arguemnt isn't a proof, but does
    establish the fact.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Dec 30 16:53:44 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/30/25 4:34 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 30/12/2025 20:59, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/30/25 3:35 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/30/2025 2:22 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 30/12/2025 14:32, olcott wrote:

    G := (F re4 G)
    a sequence of inference steps in F from the axioms
    of F that assert that they themselves do not exist in F.

    You suppose that's what the symbols mean. Yet you know that supposition >>>> is inadmissible per-Se. Cognitive dissonance in action.


    The symbols *mean* a self-contradictory expression of language
    the same sort of thing as: "this sentence is not true".

    But it doesn't, as it is satisfiable by a statement that is true but
    unprovable, which just mean the statement is established true by an
    infinite chain of infernce

    Are you using a finite derivation in the meta-system of the limit of a converging sequence of finite derivations of increasing length (whose terminals may or may not be the statement being proved but the limit of
    whose terminals /is/)?

    And thus you say the statement is true thereby exemplifying a point from which we may inductively infer a meaning for "true"? Is that "true of
    the system in the meta-system" ?


    The fact that it is true in the meta system comes out of the interpretation

    We KNOW, from the basic nature of the statement G, that it is asseeting
    the non-existance of a number meeting a computable relationship that it
    must have a truth value, as either such a number exists or not.

    From the interpretation in the meta, we know that if a number exists
    that stisfies the relationship, from such a number we can create a proof
    that no number can exist that satisfies that relationship, there by
    given the comment he makes that we have a statement that asserts its one unprobability. That is the "meaning" of any number that statisfies the relationship, and thus such a number can not exist.

    Since such a number can not exist, that proves (in the meta system) that
    the original statement was true.

    It also allows us to look into the base system, and thus say that in the
    base system, we can show that every number will just fail the
    relationship, and thus we can show an (infinite) sequence of steps in
    the base system that establishes the truth of the statement in the system.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Tue Dec 30 16:56:19 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/30/25 4:39 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/30/2025 3:26 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 30/12/2025 20:35, olcott wrote:

    The symbols *mean* a self-contradictory expression of language
    the same sort of thing as: "this sentence is not true".

    Not per-Se. Formally, it depends on the full nature of the system
    they're in.


    Sure and we could define a "black cat" as a
    {fifteen story office building eating a sandwich}

    Sure, just can't do that in a system that already defines those other
    terms differently.

    It may be that is such a system, you just can't have black cats.


    Within the pure semantics of the actual underlying
    meanings any expression of language that means:

    {a sequence of inference steps in F from the axioms
    -aof F that assert that they themselves do not exist in F}

    is semantically incoherent.


    But that isn't what the statement means, as you lost the context of
    where each sequence is in, and what steps are allowed in the sequence.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From pa@pa@see.signature.invalid (Pierre Asselin) to comp.theory,sci.logic on Tue Dec 30 23:14:40 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    In sci.logic Richard Damon <Richard@damon-family.org> wrote:
    On 12/29/25 2:21 PM, Pierre Asselin wrote:
    In sci.logic Tristan Wibberley <tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk> wrote:
    On 29/12/2025 13:37, Richard Damon wrote:

    Incompleteness is a property of a given Formal System, it says that
    there exist a statement that is true in that system, but can not be
    proven in that system.

    What do you mean by "proven" here. Do you mean "derived" ?

    I think Richard misspoke slightly. The undecidable statement is
    true *in the intended interpretation* of the formal system
    (In Goedel's case, the natural numbers with addition and multiplication).

    Truth "in the formal system" isn't really defined. You need an interpretation.


    By the way when I wrote "Richard misspoke slightly" I should have
    added "but that doesn't invalidate his argument". Sorry about that.

    No, statements in a formal system are DEFINED to be true, if that
    statement, referencing object defined in the system model, and related
    by relationships defined in the system can be established starting with
    the initial "facts" (axioms) of the system, and following the allowed logical operations of the system.

    That's provability, not truth.

    THus in the formal system of addition of Natural Numbers, the statement
    2 + 3 = 5 is a true statement, as it can be derived from the operations
    in the system.

    A statement provable in the system, and a true statement about natural
    numbers.

    Some Formal System include a "model" that define
    interpreations, though another layer above can be added (as Godel did).

    I dunno, I always saw the models as separate from the formal system.
    (That said, an intended model often provides the motivation for the
    formal system.)
    --
    pa at panix dot com
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic on Wed Dec 31 07:36:05 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/30/25 6:14 PM, Pierre Asselin wrote:
    In sci.logic Richard Damon <Richard@damon-family.org> wrote:
    On 12/29/25 2:21 PM, Pierre Asselin wrote:
    In sci.logic Tristan Wibberley <tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk> wrote:
    On 29/12/2025 13:37, Richard Damon wrote:

    Incompleteness is a property of a given Formal System, it says that
    there exist a statement that is true in that system, but can not be
    proven in that system.

    What do you mean by "proven" here. Do you mean "derived" ?

    I think Richard misspoke slightly. The undecidable statement is
    true *in the intended interpretation* of the formal system
    (In Goedel's case, the natural numbers with addition and multiplication). >>>
    Truth "in the formal system" isn't really defined. You need an
    interpretation.


    By the way when I wrote "Richard misspoke slightly" I should have
    added "but that doesn't invalidate his argument". Sorry about that.

    No, statements in a formal system are DEFINED to be true, if that
    statement, referencing object defined in the system model, and related
    by relationships defined in the system can be established starting with
    the initial "facts" (axioms) of the system, and following the allowed
    logical operations of the system.

    That's provability, not truth.

    No, provability requires a FINITE sequence to be showable.

    Truth can be established by an INFINITE sequence.


    THus in the formal system of addition of Natural Numbers, the statement
    2 + 3 = 5 is a true statement, as it can be derived from the operations
    in the system.

    A statement provable in the system, and a true statement about natural numbers.

    And thus a true statement in a system that defines Natural Numbers.


    Some Formal System include a "model" that define
    interpreations, though another layer above can be added (as Godel did).

    I dunno, I always saw the models as separate from the formal system.
    (That said, an intended model often provides the motivation for the
    formal system.)


    Models CAN be seperate, or can be assumed part of the system.

    For instance, Geometery needs a model to be able to be used for
    anything. The basic system defines the basic truths of the system, and
    derives a lot of transforms. You need to add a model into the system to
    define what points, lines, etc you are going to be starting from, to
    actually get a result. The theories talk about points, lines, etc as
    formal parameters to the theory, but doesn't create any to work with.
    You need to add a model to it.

    Mathematics is somewhat similar. While the bases system will define the numbers that we can work with, a lot of the theories in the system
    reference values, and we can add a model to provide meaningful values to operate on. Some facts, like 2 + 3 = 5 don't need a model, but others
    are only really meaningful if we have a model to give us specific values
    to work with,
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From pa@pa@see.signature.invalid (Pierre Asselin) to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Dec 31 21:16:39 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    In sci.logic Tristan Wibberley <tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk> wrote:

    [ ... ]
    Then he defines a new system "P" which he uses to get even more muddled, leaves out the crucial elements of his proof because it's too easy to
    get wrong,

    G%del, muddled? He was the most meticulous sonovabitch that ever
    lived!


    and Stephen Meyer says he does get it wrong; he seems to be
    the only person in the world that ever checked.

    People have misunderstood G%del and proved it by their comments.
    I don't know who Stephen Meyer is; my money is on G%del.
    --
    pa at panix dot com
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From pa@pa@see.signature.invalid (Pierre Asselin) to comp.theory,sci.logic on Wed Dec 31 21:18:18 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    In sci.logic Richard Damon <Richard@damon-family.org> wrote:

    No, provability requires a FINITE sequence to be showable.

    Truth can be established by an INFINITE sequence.

    You're going off the beaten paths. Does that work
    if you quantify over real numbers? Just curious.
    --
    pa at panix dot com
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Dec 31 16:21:50 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/29/25 3:20 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 29/12/2025 19:53, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 2:32 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 1:21 PM, Pierre Asselin wrote:
    In sci.logic Tristan Wibberley
    <tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk> wrote:
    On 29/12/2025 13:37, Richard Damon wrote:

    Incompleteness is a property of a given Formal System, it says that >>>>>> there exist a statement that is true in that system, but can not be >>>>>> proven in that system.

    What do you mean by "proven" here. Do you mean "derived" ?

    I think Richard misspoke slightly. The undecidable statement is
    true *in the intended interpretation* of the formal system
    (In Goedel's case, the natural numbers with addition and
    multiplication).

    Truth "in the formal system" isn't really defined. You need an
    interpretation.


    Unless (as I have been saying for at least a decade)
    the formal language directly encodes all of its
    semantics directly in its syntax. The Montague
    Grammar of natural language semantics is the best
    known example of this.


    But it can't, as any system that defines symbols, can have something
    outside it assign additional meaning to those symbols.

    Ontology suggests ways to *apply* a system. The system itself works
    without additional meaning just as it does with. That's the point of
    formal systems.

    There may be SOME meaning within the system, but, with a sufficiently
    expressive system, additional meaning can be imposed.

    additional meaning is given to an embedding or extension (which is pretty-much a special-case of embedding) of a system, not to the system itself.

    In the case of G||del's preamble, he defines an extension of PM (I should suppose he was using 2nd ed. in 1931 from his untruths about PM if
    applied to 1st. ed.) That extension is inconsistent (or, better, I
    think, indiscriminate). his referent there for PM slides between PM and
    the derived system as he writes and he gets muddled taking a half-formed conclusion about one, assuming and completing it for the other.

    Then he defines a new system "P" which he uses to get even more muddled, leaves out the crucial elements of his proof because it's too easy to
    get wrong, and Stephen Meyer says he does get it wrong; he seems to be
    the only person in the world that ever checked.


    I would suggest, if you find an actual ERROR in what he said, that you
    can prove, you write a paper and publish it to make a name for yourself.

    Of course, if you show that your error is you don't actually understand
    what you claim to be talking about, you will make the fool of yourself.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic on Wed Dec 31 16:26:35 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/31/25 4:18 PM, Pierre Asselin wrote:
    In sci.logic Richard Damon <Richard@damon-family.org> wrote:

    No, provability requires a FINITE sequence to be showable.

    Truth can be established by an INFINITE sequence.

    You're going off the beaten paths. Does that work
    if you quantify over real numbers? Just curious.


    Why not?

    It says the steps may not be enumerable, but the inenumerable path exists.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Dec 31 15:52:46 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/31/2025 3:16 PM, Pierre Asselin wrote:
    In sci.logic Tristan Wibberley <tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk> wrote:

    [ ... ]
    Then he defines a new system "P" which he uses to get even more muddled,
    leaves out the crucial elements of his proof because it's too easy to
    get wrong,

    G||del, muddled? He was the most meticulous sonovabitch that ever
    lived!


    and Stephen Meyer says he does get it wrong; he seems to be
    the only person in the world that ever checked.

    People have misunderstood G||del and proved it by their comments.
    I don't know who Stephen Meyer is; my money is on G||del.


    G||del proved that there cannot possibly exist any
    sequence of inference steps in F prove that they
    themselves do not exist.

    He admitted this himself:
    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition
    which asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    G||del, Kurt 1931.
    On Formally Undecidable Propositions of
    Principia Mathematica And Related Systems
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Dec 31 16:56:12 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/31/25 4:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 3:16 PM, Pierre Asselin wrote:
    In sci.logic Tristan Wibberley
    <tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk> wrote:

    [ ... ]
    Then he defines a new system "P" which he uses to get even more muddled, >>> leaves out the crucial elements of his proof because it's too easy to
    get wrong,

    G||del, muddled? He was the most meticulous sonovabitch that ever
    lived!


    and Stephen Meyer says he does get it wrong; he seems to be
    the only person in the world that ever checked.

    People have misunderstood G||del and proved it by their comments.
    I don't know who Stephen Meyer is; my money is on G||del.


    G||del proved that there cannot possibly exist any
    sequence of inference steps in F prove that they
    themselves do not exist.

    No *FINITE* sequence of inference steps.

    He also proves there *IS* an infinite sequence of steps


    He admitted this himself:
    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition
    which asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    And proofs are finite.

    And that statement is made in the Meta System, and is talking about the
    base system.

    All you are doing is proving that you are an idiot, and maybe in your
    case there isn't a difference between You and a deterministic machine,
    as you are stuck in your bad programming.

    It seems you hae a broken CPU.


    G||del, Kurt 1931.
    On Formally Undecidable Propositions of
    Principia Mathematica And Related Systems



    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Dec 31 15:57:58 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/29/2025 2:20 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 29/12/2025 19:53, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 2:32 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 1:21 PM, Pierre Asselin wrote:
    In sci.logic Tristan Wibberley
    <tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk> wrote:
    On 29/12/2025 13:37, Richard Damon wrote:

    Incompleteness is a property of a given Formal System, it says that >>>>>> there exist a statement that is true in that system, but can not be >>>>>> proven in that system.

    What do you mean by "proven" here. Do you mean "derived" ?

    I think Richard misspoke slightly. The undecidable statement is
    true *in the intended interpretation* of the formal system
    (In Goedel's case, the natural numbers with addition and
    multiplication).

    Truth "in the formal system" isn't really defined. You need an
    interpretation.


    Unless (as I have been saying for at least a decade)
    the formal language directly encodes all of its
    semantics directly in its syntax. The Montague
    Grammar of natural language semantics is the best
    known example of this.


    But it can't, as any system that defines symbols, can have something
    outside it assign additional meaning to those symbols.

    Ontology suggests ways to *apply* a system. The system itself works
    without additional meaning just as it does with. That's the point of
    formal systems.

    There may be SOME meaning within the system, but, with a sufficiently
    expressive system, additional meaning can be imposed.

    additional meaning is given to an embedding or extension (which is pretty-much a special-case of embedding) of a system, not to the system itself.

    In the case of G||del's preamble, he defines an extension of PM (I should suppose he was using 2nd ed. in 1931 from his untruths about PM if
    applied to 1st. ed.) That extension is inconsistent (or, better, I
    think, indiscriminate). his referent there for PM slides between PM and
    the derived system as he writes and he gets muddled taking a half-formed conclusion about one, assuming and completing it for the other.

    Then he defines a new system "P" which he uses to get even more muddled, leaves out the crucial elements of his proof because it's too easy to
    get wrong, and Stephen Meyer says he does get it wrong; he seems to be
    the only person in the world that ever checked.


    G||del proved that there cannot possibly exist any
    sequence of inference steps in F prove that they
    themselves do not exist.

    He admitted this himself:
    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition
    which asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    G||del, Kurt 1931.
    On Formally Undecidable Propositions of
    Principia Mathematica And Related Systems
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Dec 31 15:59:24 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/31/2025 3:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 4:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 3:16 PM, Pierre Asselin wrote:
    In sci.logic Tristan Wibberley
    <tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk> wrote:

    [ ... ]
    Then he defines a new system "P" which he uses to get even more
    muddled,
    leaves out the crucial elements of his proof because it's too easy to
    get wrong,

    G||del, muddled? He was the most meticulous sonovabitch that ever
    lived!


    and Stephen Meyer says he does get it wrong; he seems to be
    the only person in the world that ever checked.

    People have misunderstood G||del and proved it by their comments.
    I don't know who Stephen Meyer is; my money is on G||del.


    G||del proved that there cannot possibly exist any
    sequence of inference steps in F prove that they
    themselves do not exist.

    No *FINITE* sequence of inference steps.


    Nothing can prove that itself does not
    exist because that forms proof that it
    does exist, dumbo.

    He also proves there *IS* an infinite sequence of steps


    He admitted this himself:
    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition
    which asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    And proofs are finite.

    And that statement is made in the Meta System, and is talking about the
    base system.

    All you are doing is proving that you are an idiot, and maybe in your
    case there isn't a difference between You and a deterministic machine,
    as you are stuck in your bad programming.

    It seems you hae a broken CPU.


    G||del, Kurt 1931.
    On Formally Undecidable Propositions of
    Principia Mathematica And Related Systems



    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Dec 31 17:01:57 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/31/25 4:57 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 2:20 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 29/12/2025 19:53, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/29/25 2:32 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/29/2025 1:21 PM, Pierre Asselin wrote:
    In sci.logic Tristan Wibberley
    <tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk> wrote:
    On 29/12/2025 13:37, Richard Damon wrote:

    Incompleteness is a property of a given Formal System, it says that >>>>>>> there exist a statement that is true in that system, but can not be >>>>>>> proven in that system.

    What do you mean by "proven" here. Do you mean "derived" ?

    I think Richard misspoke slightly. The undecidable statement is
    true *in the intended interpretation* of the formal system
    (In Goedel's case, the natural numbers with addition and
    multiplication).

    Truth "in the formal system" isn't really defined. You need an
    interpretation.


    Unless (as I have been saying for at least a decade)
    the formal language directly encodes all of its
    semantics directly in its syntax. The Montague
    Grammar of natural language semantics is the best
    known example of this.


    But it can't, as any system that defines symbols, can have something
    outside it assign additional meaning to those symbols.

    Ontology suggests ways to *apply* a system. The system itself works
    without additional meaning just as it does with. That's the point of
    formal systems.

    There may be SOME meaning within the system, but, with a sufficiently
    expressive system, additional meaning can be imposed.

    additional meaning is given to an embedding or extension (which is
    pretty-much a special-case of embedding) of a system, not to the system
    itself.

    In the case of G||del's preamble, he defines an extension of PM (I should
    suppose he was using 2nd ed. in 1931 from his untruths about PM if
    applied to 1st. ed.) That extension is inconsistent (or, better, I
    think, indiscriminate). his referent there for PM slides between PM and
    the derived system as he writes and he gets muddled taking a half-formed
    conclusion about one, assuming and completing it for the other.

    Then he defines a new system "P" which he uses to get even more muddled,
    leaves out the crucial elements of his proof because it's too easy to
    get wrong, and Stephen Meyer says he does get it wrong; he seems to be
    the only person in the world that ever checked.


    G||del proved that there cannot possibly exist any
    sequence of inference steps in F prove that they
    themselves do not exist.

    No *FINITE* sequence, as that is what a proof is.

    He also proved the existance of the INFINITE sequence that made the
    statement true.


    He admitted this himself:
    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition
    which asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    Which you don't understand,

    This is an interpreation of the statement in the meta system that is
    talking about its provability in the base system.

    So yes, the statement is TRUE and unprovable.

    If it was FALSE, then that says we can prove a false statement to be
    true, which is just a contradiction.

    Of course, you are just showing your stupidity and inability to
    understand things,

    It sounds like you have burnt out your CPU and lost the ability to
    think, and are stuck in a trap loop.


    G||del, Kurt 1931.
    On Formally Undecidable Propositions of
    Principia Mathematica And Related Systems



    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Dec 31 17:09:17 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/31/25 4:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 3:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 4:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 3:16 PM, Pierre Asselin wrote:
    In sci.logic Tristan Wibberley
    <tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk> wrote:

    [ ... ]
    Then he defines a new system "P" which he uses to get even more
    muddled,
    leaves out the crucial elements of his proof because it's too easy to >>>>> get wrong,

    G||del, muddled? He was the most meticulous sonovabitch that ever
    lived!


    and Stephen Meyer says he does get it wrong; he seems to be
    the only person in the world that ever checked.

    People have misunderstood G||del and proved it by their comments.
    I don't know who Stephen Meyer is; my money is on G||del.


    G||del proved that there cannot possibly exist any
    sequence of inference steps in F prove that they
    themselves do not exist.

    No *FINITE* sequence of inference steps.


    Nothing can prove that itself does not
    exist because that forms proof that it
    does exist, dumbo.

    So you are just ignoring context because you are stupid.

    The statement, with the added information of the meta-system proves (by
    a proof in the meta system) that the statment is true.

    Because, the statement is just a statement of arithmatic in the base
    system, that means it is also must be true in the base system.

    A result of the statement being true, it shows (with its interpreation
    in the meta system) that there can not be a proof in the base system for it,

    So, all you are doing is saying you can't tell the difference between different system and think they are all the same.

    That is like saying your cat can be a dog.

    You really are THAT stupid.

    So
    G + Meta proves G
    G without Meta can't prove G

    No contradiction, as Meta provides the information that allows the proof
    to be formed.


    He also proves there *IS* an infinite sequence of steps


    He admitted this himself:
    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition
    which asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    And proofs are finite.

    And that statement is made in the Meta System, and is talking about
    the base system.

    All you are doing is proving that you are an idiot, and maybe in your
    case there isn't a difference between You and a deterministic machine,
    as you are stuck in your bad programming.

    It seems you hae a broken CPU.


    G||del, Kurt 1931.
    On Formally Undecidable Propositions of
    Principia Mathematica And Related Systems






    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Dec 31 16:42:43 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/31/2025 4:09 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 4:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 3:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 4:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 3:16 PM, Pierre Asselin wrote:
    In sci.logic Tristan Wibberley
    <tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk> wrote:

    [ ... ]
    Then he defines a new system "P" which he uses to get even more
    muddled,
    leaves out the crucial elements of his proof because it's too easy to >>>>>> get wrong,

    G||del, muddled? He was the most meticulous sonovabitch that ever
    lived!


    and Stephen Meyer says he does get it wrong; he seems to be
    the only person in the world that ever checked.

    People have misunderstood G||del and proved it by their comments.
    I don't know who Stephen Meyer is; my money is on G||del.


    G||del proved that there cannot possibly exist any
    sequence of inference steps in F prove that they
    themselves do not exist.

    No *FINITE* sequence of inference steps.


    Nothing can prove that itself does not
    exist because that forms proof that it
    does exist, dumbo.

    So you are just ignoring context because you are stupid.

    The statement, with the added information of the meta-system proves (by
    a proof in the meta system) that the statment is true.


    Something else can prove that X cannot prove that
    X does not exist, AKA your meta-system.

    Nothing can directly prove that itself does not
    exist because this forms proof that it does exist.
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Dec 31 17:48:36 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/31/25 5:42 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 4:09 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 4:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 3:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 4:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 3:16 PM, Pierre Asselin wrote:
    In sci.logic Tristan Wibberley
    <tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk> wrote:

    [ ... ]
    Then he defines a new system "P" which he uses to get even more >>>>>>> muddled,
    leaves out the crucial elements of his proof because it's too
    easy to
    get wrong,

    G||del, muddled? He was the most meticulous sonovabitch that ever
    lived!


    and Stephen Meyer says he does get it wrong; he seems to be
    the only person in the world that ever checked.

    People have misunderstood G||del and proved it by their comments.
    I don't know who Stephen Meyer is; my money is on G||del.


    G||del proved that there cannot possibly exist any
    sequence of inference steps in F prove that they
    themselves do not exist.

    No *FINITE* sequence of inference steps.


    Nothing can prove that itself does not
    exist because that forms proof that it
    does exist, dumbo.

    So you are just ignoring context because you are stupid.

    The statement, with the added information of the meta-system proves
    (by a proof in the meta system) that the statment is true.


    Something else can prove that X cannot prove that
    X does not exist, AKA your meta-system.

    Nothing can directly prove that itself does not
    exist because this forms proof that it does exist.



    Nope, got a source for that?

    Why does my explanation not work?

    Can you even put my explaination imto your own words to show that you understand it.

    The statement G, under the interpreation provided by M certainly can
    prove that the system without M can't prove it.

    It seems you think that X is as big as X+1

    Sorry, you are just showing that you brain has self-distructed itself
    and left you with no ability to reason.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Dec 31 17:08:00 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/31/2025 4:48 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 5:42 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 4:09 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 4:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 3:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 4:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 3:16 PM, Pierre Asselin wrote:
    In sci.logic Tristan Wibberley
    <tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk> wrote:

    [ ... ]
    Then he defines a new system "P" which he uses to get even more >>>>>>>> muddled,
    leaves out the crucial elements of his proof because it's too >>>>>>>> easy to
    get wrong,

    G||del, muddled? He was the most meticulous sonovabitch that ever >>>>>>> lived!


    and Stephen Meyer says he does get it wrong; he seems to be
    the only person in the world that ever checked.

    People have misunderstood G||del and proved it by their comments. >>>>>>> I don't know who Stephen Meyer is; my money is on G||del.


    G||del proved that there cannot possibly exist any
    sequence of inference steps in F prove that they
    themselves do not exist.

    No *FINITE* sequence of inference steps.


    Nothing can prove that itself does not
    exist because that forms proof that it
    does exist, dumbo.

    So you are just ignoring context because you are stupid.

    The statement, with the added information of the meta-system proves
    (by a proof in the meta system) that the statment is true.


    Something else can prove that X cannot prove that
    X does not exist, AKA your meta-system.

    Nothing can directly prove that itself does not
    exist because this forms proof that it does exist.



    Nope, got a source for that?

    Why does my explanation not work?


    It is not that your explanation doesn't work.
    It is that it ignores the root cause of why
    G is unprovable in F.

    If you disagree then provide a correct
    proof that you yourself never existed.

    If you can't see how this is impossible
    you must by very dumb.

    Since you have proved that you are quite
    smart then any disagreement would most
    likely be a lie, a mere head game.

    Can you even put my explaination imto your own words to show that you understand it.

    The statement G, under the interpreation provided by M certainly can
    prove that the system without M can't prove it.

    It seems you think that X is as big as X+1

    Sorry, you are just showing that you brain has self-distructed itself
    and left you with no ability to reason.
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Dec 31 18:27:03 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/31/25 6:08 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 4:48 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 5:42 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 4:09 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 4:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 3:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 4:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 3:16 PM, Pierre Asselin wrote:
    In sci.logic Tristan Wibberley
    <tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk> wrote:

    [ ... ]
    Then he defines a new system "P" which he uses to get even more >>>>>>>>> muddled,
    leaves out the crucial elements of his proof because it's too >>>>>>>>> easy to
    get wrong,

    G||del, muddled? He was the most meticulous sonovabitch that ever >>>>>>>> lived!


    and Stephen Meyer says he does get it wrong; he seems to be
    the only person in the world that ever checked.

    People have misunderstood G||del and proved it by their comments. >>>>>>>> I don't know who Stephen Meyer is; my money is on G||del.


    G||del proved that there cannot possibly exist any
    sequence of inference steps in F prove that they
    themselves do not exist.

    No *FINITE* sequence of inference steps.


    Nothing can prove that itself does not
    exist because that forms proof that it
    does exist, dumbo.

    So you are just ignoring context because you are stupid.

    The statement, with the added information of the meta-system proves
    (by a proof in the meta system) that the statment is true.


    Something else can prove that X cannot prove that
    X does not exist, AKA your meta-system.

    Nothing can directly prove that itself does not
    exist because this forms proof that it does exist.



    Nope, got a source for that?

    Why does my explanation not work?


    It is not that your explanation doesn't work.
    It is that it ignores the root cause of why
    G is unprovable in F.

    So, how do you think you can prove it in F?


    If you disagree then provide a correct
    proof that you yourself never existed.

    Not the same.

    You are ignoring the effect of different context.

    And, since I exist, I can't prove a false statement that I don't exist.

    Also, G isn't the proof, it is the thing being proven or not.


    If you can't see how this is impossible
    you must by very dumb.

    Your arguement is just stupid, and invalid.

    Showing that likely you are both STUPID yourself, and a liar.


    Since you have proved that you are quite
    smart then any disagreement would most
    likely be a lie, a mere head game.

    Why? How is it a lie to disagree with a falsehood?

    You just continue to prove that you are nothing but a totally ignorant pathological liar that just doesn't understand logic, but doesn't care.


    Can you even put my explaination imto your own words to show that you
    understand it.

    The statement G, under the interpreation provided by M certainly can
    prove that the system without M can't prove it.

    It seems you think that X is as big as X+1

    Sorry, you are just showing that you brain has self-distructed itself
    and left you with no ability to reason.



    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Dec 31 18:23:03 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/31/2025 5:27 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 6:08 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 4:48 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 5:42 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 4:09 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 4:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 3:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 4:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 3:16 PM, Pierre Asselin wrote:
    In sci.logic Tristan Wibberley
    <tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk> wrote:

    [ ... ]
    Then he defines a new system "P" which he uses to get even >>>>>>>>>> more muddled,
    leaves out the crucial elements of his proof because it's too >>>>>>>>>> easy to
    get wrong,

    G||del, muddled? He was the most meticulous sonovabitch that ever >>>>>>>>> lived!


    and Stephen Meyer says he does get it wrong; he seems to be >>>>>>>>>> the only person in the world that ever checked.

    People have misunderstood G||del and proved it by their comments. >>>>>>>>> I don't know who Stephen Meyer is; my money is on G||del.


    G||del proved that there cannot possibly exist any
    sequence of inference steps in F prove that they
    themselves do not exist.

    No *FINITE* sequence of inference steps.


    Nothing can prove that itself does not
    exist because that forms proof that it
    does exist, dumbo.

    So you are just ignoring context because you are stupid.

    The statement, with the added information of the meta-system proves >>>>> (by a proof in the meta system) that the statment is true.


    Something else can prove that X cannot prove that
    X does not exist, AKA your meta-system.

    Nothing can directly prove that itself does not
    exist because this forms proof that it does exist.



    Nope, got a source for that?

    Why does my explanation not work?


    It is not that your explanation doesn't work.
    It is that it ignores the root cause of why
    G is unprovable in F.

    So, how do you think you can prove it in F?


    Nothing can prove that itself does not exist.
    Any such proof would be self-refuting.
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Dec 31 19:35:47 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/31/25 7:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 5:27 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 6:08 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 4:48 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 5:42 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 4:09 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 4:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 3:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 4:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 3:16 PM, Pierre Asselin wrote:
    In sci.logic Tristan Wibberley
    <tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>
    [ ... ]
    Then he defines a new system "P" which he uses to get even >>>>>>>>>>> more muddled,
    leaves out the crucial elements of his proof because it's too >>>>>>>>>>> easy to
    get wrong,

    G||del, muddled? He was the most meticulous sonovabitch that ever >>>>>>>>>> lived!


    and Stephen Meyer says he does get it wrong; he seems to be >>>>>>>>>>> the only person in the world that ever checked.

    People have misunderstood G||del and proved it by their comments. >>>>>>>>>> I don't know who Stephen Meyer is; my money is on G||del.


    G||del proved that there cannot possibly exist any
    sequence of inference steps in F prove that they
    themselves do not exist.

    No *FINITE* sequence of inference steps.


    Nothing can prove that itself does not
    exist because that forms proof that it
    does exist, dumbo.

    So you are just ignoring context because you are stupid.

    The statement, with the added information of the meta-system
    proves (by a proof in the meta system) that the statment is true.


    Something else can prove that X cannot prove that
    X does not exist, AKA your meta-system.

    Nothing can directly prove that itself does not
    exist because this forms proof that it does exist.



    Nope, got a source for that?

    Why does my explanation not work?


    It is not that your explanation doesn't work.
    It is that it ignores the root cause of why
    G is unprovable in F.

    So, how do you think you can prove it in F?


    Nothing can prove that itself does not exist.
    Any such proof would be self-refuting.


    But it isn't the PROOF that does the proving, it is the statement.

    THe statement G exist, and it is True.

    Because it is true, and can be proven with the additional knowledge and
    tools of the meta-system, it shows that without the addtional knowledge
    and tools you can't make the proof.

    It seems you don't understand that the base system and the meta system
    are different.

    Boy, are you stupid.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Dec 31 19:04:07 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/31/2025 6:35 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 7:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 5:27 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 6:08 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 4:48 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 5:42 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 4:09 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 4:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 3:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 4:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 3:16 PM, Pierre Asselin wrote:
    In sci.logic Tristan Wibberley
    <tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>
    [ ... ]
    Then he defines a new system "P" which he uses to get even >>>>>>>>>>>> more muddled,
    leaves out the crucial elements of his proof because it's >>>>>>>>>>>> too easy to
    get wrong,

    G||del, muddled? He was the most meticulous sonovabitch that ever >>>>>>>>>>> lived!


    and Stephen Meyer says he does get it wrong; he seems to be >>>>>>>>>>>> the only person in the world that ever checked.

    People have misunderstood G||del and proved it by their comments. >>>>>>>>>>> I don't know who Stephen Meyer is; my money is on G||del. >>>>>>>>>>>

    G||del proved that there cannot possibly exist any
    sequence of inference steps in F prove that they
    themselves do not exist.

    No *FINITE* sequence of inference steps.


    Nothing can prove that itself does not
    exist because that forms proof that it
    does exist, dumbo.

    So you are just ignoring context because you are stupid.

    The statement, with the added information of the meta-system
    proves (by a proof in the meta system) that the statment is true. >>>>>>>

    Something else can prove that X cannot prove that
    X does not exist, AKA your meta-system.

    Nothing can directly prove that itself does not
    exist because this forms proof that it does exist.



    Nope, got a source for that?

    Why does my explanation not work?


    It is not that your explanation doesn't work.
    It is that it ignores the root cause of why
    G is unprovable in F.

    So, how do you think you can prove it in F?


    Nothing can prove that itself does not exist.
    Any such proof would be self-refuting.


    But it isn't the PROOF that does the proving, it is the statement.

    THe statement G exist, and it is True.


    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    When we name this proposition G then a proof of G
    would be a sequence of inference steps that prove
    that they themselves do not exist.

    Anything that asserts its own non-existence
    is necessarily incorrect.

    Because it is true, and can be proven with the additional knowledge and tools-a of the meta-system, it shows that without the addtional knowledge and tools you can't make the proof.

    It seems you don't understand that the base system and the meta system
    are different.

    Boy, are you stupid.
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Dec 31 20:29:15 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/31/25 8:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 6:35 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 7:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 5:27 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 6:08 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 4:48 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 5:42 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 4:09 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 4:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 3:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 4:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 3:16 PM, Pierre Asselin wrote:
    In sci.logic Tristan Wibberley
    <tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>
    [ ... ]
    Then he defines a new system "P" which he uses to get even >>>>>>>>>>>>> more muddled,
    leaves out the crucial elements of his proof because it's >>>>>>>>>>>>> too easy to
    get wrong,

    G||del, muddled? He was the most meticulous sonovabitch that >>>>>>>>>>>> ever
    lived!


    and Stephen Meyer says he does get it wrong; he seems to be >>>>>>>>>>>>> the only person in the world that ever checked.

    People have misunderstood G||del and proved it by their >>>>>>>>>>>> comments.
    I don't know who Stephen Meyer is; my money is on G||del. >>>>>>>>>>>>

    G||del proved that there cannot possibly exist any
    sequence of inference steps in F prove that they
    themselves do not exist.

    No *FINITE* sequence of inference steps.


    Nothing can prove that itself does not
    exist because that forms proof that it
    does exist, dumbo.

    So you are just ignoring context because you are stupid.

    The statement, with the added information of the meta-system
    proves (by a proof in the meta system) that the statment is true. >>>>>>>>

    Something else can prove that X cannot prove that
    X does not exist, AKA your meta-system.

    Nothing can directly prove that itself does not
    exist because this forms proof that it does exist.



    Nope, got a source for that?

    Why does my explanation not work?


    It is not that your explanation doesn't work.
    It is that it ignores the root cause of why
    G is unprovable in F.

    So, how do you think you can prove it in F?


    Nothing can prove that itself does not exist.
    Any such proof would be self-refuting.


    But it isn't the PROOF that does the proving, it is the statement.

    THe statement G exist, and it is True.


    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    You keep on repeating that, but show you don't know what it means,
    proving your stupidity.


    When we name this proposition G then a proof of G
    would be a sequence of inference steps that prove
    that they themselves do not exist.

    Right, we name the proposition G.

    Then we form a set of steps in M, the Meta-system that proves that G is
    True.

    And, the steps they prove do not exist, are those that live in the base
    system F.

    It is quite possible to travel at a speed in the "Meta-System" "Car"
    that would be impossible to do in the base system "Tricycle".

    Or, to life a 10 Ton block with a hydrolic crane that you could not life
    with your bear hands.

    You don't seem to understand the simple fact that there are two
    different but related systems being talked about, because you are just
    too stupid.

    Sorry, you are just proving your stupidity, and the fact you don't even
    try to answer the problem being pointed out, that you KNOW you are too
    stupid, so you are just going to repeat your know lies because that is
    all you can think of.


    Anything that asserts its own non-existence
    is necessarily incorrect.

    Because it is true, and can be proven with the additional knowledge
    and tools-a of the meta-system, it shows that without the addtional
    knowledge and tools you can't make the proof.

    It seems you don't understand that the base system and the meta system
    are different.

    Boy, are you stupid.



    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Dec 31 20:15:21 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/31/2025 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 8:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 6:35 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 7:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 5:27 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 6:08 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 4:48 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 5:42 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 4:09 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 4:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 3:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 4:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 3:16 PM, Pierre Asselin wrote:
    In sci.logic Tristan Wibberley
    <tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>
    [ ... ]
    Then he defines a new system "P" which he uses to get even >>>>>>>>>>>>>> more muddled,
    leaves out the crucial elements of his proof because it's >>>>>>>>>>>>>> too easy to
    get wrong,

    G||del, muddled? He was the most meticulous sonovabitch that >>>>>>>>>>>>> ever
    lived!


    and Stephen Meyer says he does get it wrong; he seems to be >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the only person in the world that ever checked.

    People have misunderstood G||del and proved it by their >>>>>>>>>>>>> comments.
    I don't know who Stephen Meyer is; my money is on G||del. >>>>>>>>>>>>>

    G||del proved that there cannot possibly exist any
    sequence of inference steps in F prove that they
    themselves do not exist.

    No *FINITE* sequence of inference steps.


    Nothing can prove that itself does not
    exist because that forms proof that it
    does exist, dumbo.

    So you are just ignoring context because you are stupid.

    The statement, with the added information of the meta-system >>>>>>>>> proves (by a proof in the meta system) that the statment is true. >>>>>>>>>

    Something else can prove that X cannot prove that
    X does not exist, AKA your meta-system.

    Nothing can directly prove that itself does not
    exist because this forms proof that it does exist.



    Nope, got a source for that?

    Why does my explanation not work?


    It is not that your explanation doesn't work.
    It is that it ignores the root cause of why
    G is unprovable in F.

    So, how do you think you can prove it in F?


    Nothing can prove that itself does not exist.
    Any such proof would be self-refuting.


    But it isn't the PROOF that does the proving, it is the statement.

    THe statement G exist, and it is True.


    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    You keep on repeating that, but show you don't know what it means,
    proving your stupidity.


    It can only mean one thing when taken 100% literally.

    a proposition which asserts its own unprovability.
    G says that itself is unprovable

    G says that itself has no sequence of inference
    steps that prove that they themselves do not exist.

    It say nothing at all about any meta-system.
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Dec 31 21:48:31 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/31/25 9:15 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 8:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 6:35 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 7:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 5:27 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 6:08 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 4:48 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 5:42 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 4:09 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 4:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 3:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 4:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 3:16 PM, Pierre Asselin wrote:
    In sci.logic Tristan Wibberley
    <tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    [ ... ]
    Then he defines a new system "P" which he uses to get >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> even more muddled,
    leaves out the crucial elements of his proof because it's >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> too easy to
    get wrong,

    G||del, muddled? He was the most meticulous sonovabitch >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that ever
    lived!


    and Stephen Meyer says he does get it wrong; he seems to be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the only person in the world that ever checked.

    People have misunderstood G||del and proved it by their >>>>>>>>>>>>>> comments.
    I don't know who Stephen Meyer is; my money is on G||del. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    G||del proved that there cannot possibly exist any
    sequence of inference steps in F prove that they
    themselves do not exist.

    No *FINITE* sequence of inference steps.


    Nothing can prove that itself does not
    exist because that forms proof that it
    does exist, dumbo.

    So you are just ignoring context because you are stupid.

    The statement, with the added information of the meta-system >>>>>>>>>> proves (by a proof in the meta system) that the statment is true. >>>>>>>>>>

    Something else can prove that X cannot prove that
    X does not exist, AKA your meta-system.

    Nothing can directly prove that itself does not
    exist because this forms proof that it does exist.



    Nope, got a source for that?

    Why does my explanation not work?


    It is not that your explanation doesn't work.
    It is that it ignores the root cause of why
    G is unprovable in F.

    So, how do you think you can prove it in F?


    Nothing can prove that itself does not exist.
    Any such proof would be self-refuting.


    But it isn't the PROOF that does the proving, it is the statement.

    THe statement G exist, and it is True.


    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    You keep on repeating that, but show you don't know what it means,
    proving your stupidity.


    It can only mean one thing when taken 100% literally.

    The problem is language is not to be taken "100% literally", and thus
    you just show you don't understand how words have meaning.


    a proposition which asserts its own unprovability.
    G says that itself is unprovable

    G says that itself has no sequence of inference
    steps that prove that they themselves do not exist.

    It say nothing at all about any meta-system.

    Sure it does, as it is in the section talking about an analysis in the meta-syste

    I guess you are just proving you are a total idiot with no understanding
    of the structure of language, which is why your goal of trying to base
    your logic on words and their meaning is so hilarious, since you neve runderstod the nature of language in the first place.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Dec 31 23:03:33 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 12/31/2025 8:48 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 9:15 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 8:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 6:35 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 7:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 5:27 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 6:08 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 4:48 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 5:42 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 4:09 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 4:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 3:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 4:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 3:16 PM, Pierre Asselin wrote:
    In sci.logic Tristan Wibberley
    <tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    [ ... ]
    Then he defines a new system "P" which he uses to get >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> even more muddled,
    leaves out the crucial elements of his proof because >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it's too easy to
    get wrong,

    G||del, muddled? He was the most meticulous sonovabitch >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that ever
    lived!


    and Stephen Meyer says he does get it wrong; he seems to be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the only person in the world that ever checked. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    People have misunderstood G||del and proved it by their >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> comments.
    I don't know who Stephen Meyer is; my money is on G||del. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    G||del proved that there cannot possibly exist any >>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence of inference steps in F prove that they
    themselves do not exist.

    No *FINITE* sequence of inference steps.


    Nothing can prove that itself does not
    exist because that forms proof that it
    does exist, dumbo.

    So you are just ignoring context because you are stupid. >>>>>>>>>>>
    The statement, with the added information of the meta-system >>>>>>>>>>> proves (by a proof in the meta system) that the statment is >>>>>>>>>>> true.


    Something else can prove that X cannot prove that
    X does not exist, AKA your meta-system.

    Nothing can directly prove that itself does not
    exist because this forms proof that it does exist.



    Nope, got a source for that?

    Why does my explanation not work?


    It is not that your explanation doesn't work.
    It is that it ignores the root cause of why
    G is unprovable in F.

    So, how do you think you can prove it in F?


    Nothing can prove that itself does not exist.
    Any such proof would be self-refuting.


    But it isn't the PROOF that does the proving, it is the statement.

    THe statement G exist, and it is True.


    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    You keep on repeating that, but show you don't know what it means,
    proving your stupidity.


    It can only mean one thing when taken 100% literally.

    The problem is language is not to be taken "100% literally", and thus
    you just show you don't understand how words have meaning.


    Formal mathematical specifications are taken literally or incorrectly.

    a proposition which asserts its own unprovability.
    G says that itself is unprovable

    G says that itself has no sequence of inference
    steps that prove that they themselves do not exist.

    "a proposition which asserts its own unprovability."
    says nothing at all about any meta-system.


    a proposition which asserts its own unprovability.
    G says that itself is unprovable

    G says that itself has no sequence of inference
    steps that prove that they themselves do not exist.

    It say nothing at all about any meta-system.

    Sure it does, as it is in the section talking about an analysis in the meta-syste

    I guess you are just proving you are a total idiot with no understanding
    of the structure of language, which is why your goal of trying to base
    your logic on words and their meaning is so hilarious, since you neve runderstod the nature of language in the first place.
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jan 1 10:41:18 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 31/12/2025 21:16, Pierre Asselin wrote:
    In sci.logic Tristan Wibberley <tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk> wrote:

    [ ... ]
    Then he defines a new system "P" which he uses to get even more muddled,
    leaves out the crucial elements of his proof because it's too easy to
    get wrong,

    G||del, muddled? He was the most meticulous sonovabitch that ever
    lived!

    Have you heard about his musings on God?


    and Stephen Meyer says he does get it wrong; he seems to be
    the only person in the world that ever checked.

    People have misunderstood G||del and proved it by their comments.
    I don't know who Stephen Meyer is; my money is on G||del.


    I misremembered, it was James Meyer. He has a website on it http://www.jamesrmeyer.com . He's very angry about people telling him
    he's wrong but who never checked like he did because they keep telling
    him reasons it's right that he's certain are not reflected in the actual
    work.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jan 1 11:49:10 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/1/26 12:03 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 8:48 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 9:15 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 8:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 6:35 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 7:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 5:27 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 6:08 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 4:48 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 5:42 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 4:09 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 4:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 3:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 4:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 3:16 PM, Pierre Asselin wrote:
    In sci.logic Tristan Wibberley
    <tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    [ ... ]
    Then he defines a new system "P" which he uses to get >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> even more muddled,
    leaves out the crucial elements of his proof because >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it's too easy to
    get wrong,

    G||del, muddled? He was the most meticulous sonovabitch >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that ever
    lived!


    and Stephen Meyer says he does get it wrong; he seems >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be
    the only person in the world that ever checked. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    People have misunderstood G||del and proved it by their >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> comments.
    I don't know who Stephen Meyer is; my money is on G||del. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    G||del proved that there cannot possibly exist any >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence of inference steps in F prove that they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> themselves do not exist.

    No *FINITE* sequence of inference steps.


    Nothing can prove that itself does not
    exist because that forms proof that it
    does exist, dumbo.

    So you are just ignoring context because you are stupid. >>>>>>>>>>>>
    The statement, with the added information of the meta-system >>>>>>>>>>>> proves (by a proof in the meta system) that the statment is >>>>>>>>>>>> true.


    Something else can prove that X cannot prove that
    X does not exist, AKA your meta-system.

    Nothing can directly prove that itself does not
    exist because this forms proof that it does exist.



    Nope, got a source for that?

    Why does my explanation not work?


    It is not that your explanation doesn't work.
    It is that it ignores the root cause of why
    G is unprovable in F.

    So, how do you think you can prove it in F?


    Nothing can prove that itself does not exist.
    Any such proof would be self-refuting.


    But it isn't the PROOF that does the proving, it is the statement. >>>>>>
    THe statement G exist, and it is True.


    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    You keep on repeating that, but show you don't know what it means,
    proving your stupidity.


    It can only mean one thing when taken 100% literally.

    The problem is language is not to be taken "100% literally", and thus
    you just show you don't understand how words have meaning.


    Formal mathematical specifications are taken literally or incorrectly.


    Which only applies to formal mathematical specifications, and not to
    just natural language statements made in a paper.

    a proposition which asserts its own unprovability.
    G says that itself is unprovable

    Which is a Natural Language interpretation of the Formal Mathematical statement which G is, based on the additional meaning it obtains from
    the mete system M.

    G is actually a preposition about the non-existance of a Natural Number
    g that satisfies a particular mathematical relationship. That
    relationship in F is just some complicated formula that can be evaluated
    for any Natural Number, but the meta-system M understands that encoded
    into this formula is a proof checker of proofs of the statement G
    encoded into a number by rules in M of proofs in F.


    G says that itself has no sequence of inference
    steps that prove that they themselves do not exist.

    Yes, from knowledge obtain in M, we can understand G to mean that there
    is no sequence if F that proves it.

    You seem to be confusing the sequence of steps which prove a statement
    with the statement itself.

    Typical of you, as you have shown you don't know what "Proof" means,
    amoung your many other misunderstood words.


    "a proposition which asserts its own unprovability."
    says nothing at all about any meta-system.

    Because you are taking the statement out of its context.

    I guess you just just don't understand how languages work.

    Note, even formal mathematical specifications will depend on context,
    and most won't indicate what system they are made in, but that comes out
    of the context they were made in.

    All you are doing is proving that you are dumber that even the AI LLMs
    that you praise, because at least they look at tbe full context of a
    sttaement (even if only mechanically).

    Thus, you prove that you are just an ignorant pathological liar.



    a proposition which asserts its own unprovability.
    G says that itself is unprovable

    G says that itself has no sequence of inference
    steps that prove that they themselves do not exist.

    It say nothing at all about any meta-system.

    Sure it does, as it is in the section talking about an analysis in the
    meta-syste

    I guess you are just proving you are a total idiot with no
    understanding of the structure of language, which is why your goal of
    trying to base your logic on words and their meaning is so hilarious,
    since you neve runderstod the nature of language in the first place.



    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jan 1 12:34:27 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/1/26 5:41 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 31/12/2025 21:16, Pierre Asselin wrote:
    In sci.logic Tristan Wibberley <tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk> wrote:

    [ ... ]
    Then he defines a new system "P" which he uses to get even more muddled, >>> leaves out the crucial elements of his proof because it's too easy to
    get wrong,

    G||del, muddled? He was the most meticulous sonovabitch that ever
    lived!

    Have you heard about his musings on God?


    and Stephen Meyer says he does get it wrong; he seems to be
    the only person in the world that ever checked.

    People have misunderstood G||del and proved it by their comments.
    I don't know who Stephen Meyer is; my money is on G||del.


    I misremembered, it was James Meyer. He has a website on it http://www.jamesrmeyer.com . He's very angry about people telling him
    he's wrong but who never checked like he did because they keep telling
    him reasons it's right that he's certain are not reflected in the actual work.


    In other words, since he doesn't understand it, it must be wrong.


    Since his page begins with a rejection of the axiom of Choice, and the
    example he gives, it shows a limitation in his ability to understand the nature of infinite systems.

    To expect that infinite systems behave just like we see finite systems
    work is a funamental error.

    Yes, it seems to create paradoxes, but those paradoxes are only apparent
    due to the lack of understanding about the actual nature of infinite sets.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dart200@user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jan 1 10:59:45 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/1/26 9:34 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 5:41 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 31/12/2025 21:16, Pierre Asselin wrote:
    In sci.logic Tristan Wibberley
    <tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk> wrote:

    [ ... ]
    Then he defines a new system "P" which he uses to get even more
    muddled,
    leaves out the crucial elements of his proof because it's too easy to
    get wrong,

    G||del, muddled? He was the most meticulous sonovabitch that ever
    lived!

    Have you heard about his musings on God?


    and Stephen Meyer says he does get it wrong; he seems to be
    the only person in the world that ever checked.

    People have misunderstood G||del and proved it by their comments.
    I don't know who Stephen Meyer is; my money is on G||del.


    I misremembered, it was James Meyer. He has a website on it
    http://www.jamesrmeyer.com . He's very angry about people telling him
    he's wrong but who never checked like he did because they keep telling
    him reasons it's right that he's certain are not reflected in the actual
    work.


    i tried to talk to that fool. he banned me pretty quickly so obviously
    it's a fucking idiot


    In other words, since he doesn't understand it, it must be wrong.


    Since his page begins with a rejection of the axiom of Choice, and the example he gives, it shows a limitation in his ability to understand the nature of infinite systems.

    To expect that infinite systems behave just like we see finite systems
    work is a funamental error.

    Yes, it seems to create paradoxes, but those paradoxes are only apparent
    due to the lack of understanding about the actual nature of infinite sets.
    --
    a burnt out swe investigating into why our tooling doesn't involve
    basic semantic proofs like halting analysis

    please excuse my pseudo-pyscript,

    ~ nick
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic on Thu Jan 1 22:12:40 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 31/12/2025 23:27, Richard Damon wrote:

    So, how do you think you can prove it in F?

    What does "F" refer to?
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jan 1 22:13:48 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 01/01/2026 00:35, Richard Damon wrote:

    THe statement G exist


    Ah, I'm not so easily convinced
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Thu Jan 1 22:24:40 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 01/01/2026 01:29, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 8:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 6:35 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 7:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 5:27 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 6:08 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 4:48 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 5:42 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 4:09 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 4:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 3:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 4:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 3:16 PM, Pierre Asselin wrote:
    In sci.logic Tristan Wibberley
    <tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>
    [ ... ]
    Then he defines a new system "P" which he uses to get even >>>>>>>>>>>>>> more muddled,
    leaves out the crucial elements of his proof because it's >>>>>>>>>>>>>> too easy to
    get wrong,

    G||del, muddled? He was the most meticulous sonovabitch that >>>>>>>>>>>>> ever
    lived!


    and Stephen Meyer says he does get it wrong; he seems to be >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the only person in the world that ever checked.

    People have misunderstood G||del and proved it by their >>>>>>>>>>>>> comments.
    I don't know who Stephen Meyer is; my money is on G||del. >>>>>>>>>>>>>

    G||del proved that there cannot possibly exist any
    sequence of inference steps in F prove that they
    themselves do not exist.

    No *FINITE* sequence of inference steps.


    Nothing can prove that itself does not
    exist because that forms proof that it
    does exist, dumbo.

    So you are just ignoring context because you are stupid.

    The statement, with the added information of the meta-system >>>>>>>>> proves (by a proof in the meta system) that the statment is true. >>>>>>>>>

    Something else can prove that X cannot prove that
    X does not exist, AKA your meta-system.

    Nothing can directly prove that itself does not
    exist because this forms proof that it does exist.



    Nope, got a source for that?

    Why does my explanation not work?


    It is not that your explanation doesn't work.
    It is that it ignores the root cause of why
    G is unprovable in F.

    So, how do you think you can prove it in F?


    Nothing can prove that itself does not exist.
    Any such proof would be self-refuting.


    But it isn't the PROOF that does the proving, it is the statement.

    THe statement G exist, and it is True.


    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    You keep on repeating that, but show you don't know what it means,
    proving your stupidity.


    When we name this proposition G then a proof of G
    would be a sequence of inference steps that prove
    that they themselves do not exist.

    Right, we name the proposition G.

    Then we form a set of steps in M, the Meta-system that proves that G is
    True.

    But then all you've done is show that there exists a meta-system in
    which a non-theorem of the base-system equal to "reo G" in the meta-system
    is a theorem. Well, yes, there exist lots of them - one with "reo G" as
    its sole axiom and the deduction rule that from "reo G" deduce the
    non-theorem of the base-system, for example.

    Is this just a case of "can't see the woods through the trees" ?
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Thu Jan 1 17:40:29 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/1/26 5:24 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 01:29, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 8:04 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 6:35 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 7:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 5:27 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 6:08 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 4:48 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 5:42 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 4:09 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 4:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 3:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/31/25 4:52 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 12/31/2025 3:16 PM, Pierre Asselin wrote:
    In sci.logic Tristan Wibberley
    <tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    [ ... ]
    Then he defines a new system "P" which he uses to get even >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> more muddled,
    leaves out the crucial elements of his proof because it's >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> too easy to
    get wrong,

    G||del, muddled? He was the most meticulous sonovabitch that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> ever
    lived!


    and Stephen Meyer says he does get it wrong; he seems to be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the only person in the world that ever checked.

    People have misunderstood G||del and proved it by their >>>>>>>>>>>>>> comments.
    I don't know who Stephen Meyer is; my money is on G||del. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    G||del proved that there cannot possibly exist any
    sequence of inference steps in F prove that they
    themselves do not exist.

    No *FINITE* sequence of inference steps.


    Nothing can prove that itself does not
    exist because that forms proof that it
    does exist, dumbo.

    So you are just ignoring context because you are stupid.

    The statement, with the added information of the meta-system >>>>>>>>>> proves (by a proof in the meta system) that the statment is true. >>>>>>>>>>

    Something else can prove that X cannot prove that
    X does not exist, AKA your meta-system.

    Nothing can directly prove that itself does not
    exist because this forms proof that it does exist.



    Nope, got a source for that?

    Why does my explanation not work?


    It is not that your explanation doesn't work.
    It is that it ignores the root cause of why
    G is unprovable in F.

    So, how do you think you can prove it in F?


    Nothing can prove that itself does not exist.
    Any such proof would be self-refuting.


    But it isn't the PROOF that does the proving, it is the statement.

    THe statement G exist, and it is True.


    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    You keep on repeating that, but show you don't know what it means,
    proving your stupidity.


    When we name this proposition G then a proof of G
    would be a sequence of inference steps that prove
    that they themselves do not exist.

    Right, we name the proposition G.

    Then we form a set of steps in M, the Meta-system that proves that G is
    True.

    But then all you've done is show that there exists a meta-system in
    which a non-theorem of the base-system equal to "reo G" in the meta-system
    is a theorem. Well, yes, there exist lots of them - one with "reo G" as
    its sole axiom and the deduction rule that from "reo G" deduce the non-theorem of the base-system, for example.

    Is this just a case of "can't see the woods through the trees" ?



    But it IS a theorem of the base system, as it uses ONLY the mathematical operations definable in the base system. What makes you think it isn't a Theorem in the base system.

    G is a statement that there exists no Natural Number g that satisfies a particualar Primative Recursive Relationship that only uses operations
    avail in the base system F, and thus this G exists as a statement in F.

    We can prove that it must be true, (by using some logic from M) as if
    such a number exists, which makes G false, then we could use that number
    to create a proof IN F, that shows that G must be true.

    Since, at the beginning, it was a pre-condition that F was
    non-contradictory, this can not happen, thus there can not be a number g
    that exist, and thus G must be true.

    The statement Godel is making, that a Natural Language interpreation of
    this PRR is that any number g that satisfies it demonstrates the
    existance of a proof of G, while also being the counter example of G
    proving its converse.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jan 1 17:42:13 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/1/26 5:13 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 00:35, Richard Damon wrote:

    THe statement G exist


    Ah, I'm not so easily convinced



    What did he do that might allow it not to exist?

    He constructs it by the rules of F, and shows that for it to not be
    true, F must be inconsistant.

    You can't just complain that you don't think something exists, when it
    was constructed by the system.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic on Thu Jan 1 17:43:52 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/1/26 5:12 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 31/12/2025 23:27, Richard Damon wrote:

    So, how do you think you can prove it in F?

    What does "F" refer to?


    The base system. Depending on which discussion of Godel's paper you are reading it is described with different names.


    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Thu Jan 1 23:13:50 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 01/01/2026 22:40, Richard Damon wrote:

    But it IS a theorem of the base system, as it uses ONLY the mathematical operations definable in the base system. What makes you think it isn't a Theorem in the base system.

    It has no derivation in the base system, if it had you wouldn't think
    the base system were incomplete.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Thu Jan 1 23:17:23 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 01/01/2026 22:42, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 5:13 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 00:35, Richard Damon wrote:

    THe statement G exist


    Ah, I'm not so easily convinced



    What did he do that might allow it not to exist?

    He constructs it by the rules of F, and shows that for it to not be
    true, F must be inconsistant.

    You can't just complain that you don't think something exists, when it
    was constructed by the system.


    There's no symbol "G" in the system.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic on Thu Jan 1 23:19:13 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 01/01/2026 22:43, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 5:12 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 31/12/2025 23:27, Richard Damon wrote:

    So, how do you think you can prove it in F?

    What does "F" refer to?


    The base system. Depending on which discussion of Godel's paper you are reading it is described with different names.

    His own 1931 paper calls it P. What's the probleme with that name?
    Unless the discussion you're reading goes to the lengths that G||del went
    to then it's inevitably wrong, and if it /does/ go to those lengths then
    why wouldn't it require you to read G||del's paper as part of it?
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Thu Jan 1 18:48:27 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/1/26 6:13 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 22:40, Richard Damon wrote:

    But it IS a theorem of the base system, as it uses ONLY the mathematical
    operations definable in the base system. What makes you think it isn't a
    Theorem in the base system.

    It has no derivation in the base system, if it had you wouldn't think
    the base system were incomplete.


    It has no PROOF in the base system.

    The statement is surely a statement in the base system.

    It is shown to be true there, by a proof in the meta-system.

    I think you are confused about what you talk about.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Thu Jan 1 18:50:31 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/1/26 6:17 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 22:42, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 5:13 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 00:35, Richard Damon wrote:

    THe statement G exist


    Ah, I'm not so easily convinced



    What did he do that might allow it not to exist?

    He constructs it by the rules of F, and shows that for it to not be
    true, F must be inconsistant.

    You can't just complain that you don't think something exists, when it
    was constructed by the system.


    There's no symbol "G" in the system.



    Sure there is, as system allow the creation of names for objects in them.

    Name a system that meets the basic requirements that doesn't allow the creation of a "name" for a statement in the system.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic on Thu Jan 1 18:52:01 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/1/26 6:19 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 22:43, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 5:12 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 31/12/2025 23:27, Richard Damon wrote:

    So, how do you think you can prove it in F?

    What does "F" refer to?


    The base system. Depending on which discussion of Godel's paper you are
    reading it is described with different names.

    His own 1931 paper calls it P. What's the probleme with that name?
    Unless the discussion you're reading goes to the lengths that G||del went
    to then it's inevitably wrong, and if it /does/ go to those lengths then
    why wouldn't it require you to read G||del's paper as part of it?


    I use F here, as that is what Olcott calls it.

    It isn't worth fighting him over that name.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jan 2 00:10:53 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 01/01/2026 23:48, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 6:13 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 22:40, Richard Damon wrote:

    But it IS a theorem of the base system, as it uses ONLY the mathematical >>> operations definable in the base system. What makes you think it isn't a >>> Theorem in the base system.

    It has no derivation in the base system, if it had you wouldn't think
    the base system were incomplete.


    It has no PROOF in the base system.

    The statement is surely a statement in the base system.

    It is shown to be true there, by a proof in the meta-system.

    I think you are confused about what you talk about.

    No you're confused. You think its a theorem when its merely a statement.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jan 2 00:12:33 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 01/01/2026 23:50, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 6:17 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 22:42, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 5:13 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 00:35, Richard Damon wrote:

    THe statement G exist


    Ah, I'm not so easily convinced



    What did he do that might allow it not to exist?

    He constructs it by the rules of F, and shows that for it to not be
    true, F must be inconsistant.

    You can't just complain that you don't think something exists, when it
    was constructed by the system.


    There's no symbol "G" in the system.



    Sure there is, as system allow the creation of names for objects in them.

    Name a system that meets the basic requirements that doesn't allow the creation of a "name" for a statement in the system.

    Nope. The name is not a statement of the system, it's a statement of a
    related system such as a meta-system or extension.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic on Fri Jan 2 00:13:35 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 01/01/2026 23:52, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 6:19 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 22:43, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 5:12 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 31/12/2025 23:27, Richard Damon wrote:

    So, how do you think you can prove it in F?

    What does "F" refer to?


    The base system. Depending on which discussion of Godel's paper you are
    reading it is described with different names.

    His own 1931 paper calls it P. What's the probleme with that name?
    Unless the discussion you're reading goes to the lengths that G||del went
    to then it's inevitably wrong, and if it /does/ go to those lengths then
    why wouldn't it require you to read G||del's paper as part of it?


    I use F here, as that is what Olcott calls it.

    It isn't worth fighting him over that name.

    It sure is, his F is not G||del's P. It's Russel and Whitehead's PM.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Thu Jan 1 19:21:17 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/1/26 7:10 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 23:48, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 6:13 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 22:40, Richard Damon wrote:

    But it IS a theorem of the base system, as it uses ONLY the mathematical >>>> operations definable in the base system. What makes you think it isn't a >>>> Theorem in the base system.

    It has no derivation in the base system, if it had you wouldn't think
    the base system were incomplete.


    It has no PROOF in the base system.

    The statement is surely a statement in the base system.

    It is shown to be true there, by a proof in the meta-system.

    I think you are confused about what you talk about.

    No you're confused. You think its a theorem when its merely a statement.



    It started as a statement, and then was proven true in the system (but
    not by the system).

    What else do you need to make it a Theorem?
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Thu Jan 1 19:23:40 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/1/26 7:12 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 23:50, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 6:17 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 22:42, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 5:13 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 00:35, Richard Damon wrote:

    THe statement G exist


    Ah, I'm not so easily convinced



    What did he do that might allow it not to exist?

    He constructs it by the rules of F, and shows that for it to not be
    true, F must be inconsistant.

    You can't just complain that you don't think something exists, when it >>>> was constructed by the system.


    There's no symbol "G" in the system.



    Sure there is, as system allow the creation of names for objects in them.

    Name a system that meets the basic requirements that doesn't allow the
    creation of a "name" for a statement in the system.

    Nope. The name is not a statement of the system, it's a statement of a related system such as a meta-system or extension.



    No, G is the statement created in the system, using the mathematical relationship defined in terms of operations in the system build in the
    meta system.

    G HAS to be in the system, so the PRR can refer to it.

    OR, are you saying that in the system of arithmetic, we can't talk about
    a variable "x" as it isn't defined in the system?
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic on Thu Jan 1 19:24:36 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/1/26 7:13 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 23:52, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 6:19 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 22:43, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 5:12 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 31/12/2025 23:27, Richard Damon wrote:

    So, how do you think you can prove it in F?

    What does "F" refer to?


    The base system. Depending on which discussion of Godel's paper you are >>>> reading it is described with different names.

    His own 1931 paper calls it P. What's the probleme with that name?
    Unless the discussion you're reading goes to the lengths that G||del went >>> to then it's inevitably wrong, and if it /does/ go to those lengths then >>> why wouldn't it require you to read G||del's paper as part of it?


    I use F here, as that is what Olcott calls it.

    It isn't worth fighting him over that name.

    It sure is, his F is not G||del's P. It's Russel and Whitehead's PM.


    Sounds like a typical Olcott error.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Thu Jan 1 19:53:42 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/1/26 7:12 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 23:50, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 6:17 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 22:42, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 5:13 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 00:35, Richard Damon wrote:

    THe statement G exist


    Ah, I'm not so easily convinced



    What did he do that might allow it not to exist?

    He constructs it by the rules of F, and shows that for it to not be
    true, F must be inconsistant.

    You can't just complain that you don't think something exists, when it >>>> was constructed by the system.


    There's no symbol "G" in the system.



    Sure there is, as system allow the creation of names for objects in them.

    Name a system that meets the basic requirements that doesn't allow the
    creation of a "name" for a statement in the system.

    Nope. The name is not a statement of the system, it's a statement of a related system such as a meta-system or extension.


    Note, G is just a lable to allow us to talk about the statement.

    The actual statement is:

    There does not exist a natural number g, such that g satisifies the
    particular relationship derived in M.

    This particular relationship derived in M, is just a mathematical
    statement, using the language of the base system.

    Thus this statment is clearly a statement that can be made is the base
    system if it has the required minimum expresiveness.

    It requires NO extension to be stated.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Thu Jan 1 20:07:58 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/1/2026 4:12 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 31/12/2025 23:27, Richard Damon wrote:

    So, how do you think you can prove it in F?

    What does "F" refer to?


    F reo G_F rao -4Prov_F(riLG_FriY)
    F proves that: G_F is equivalent to G_F is not provable in F https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel-incompleteness/#FirIncTheCom

    reaG ree WFF(F) (G rao (F re4 G))
    There exists a G in F that is logically
    equivalent to its own unprovability in F

    reaG ree WFF(F) (G := (F re4 G))
    There exists a G in F that asserts its own unprovability in F

    The proof of G in F would seem to require a sequence
    of inference steps in F that prove that they themselves
    do not exist.
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Thu Jan 1 21:25:11 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/1/26 9:07 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 4:12 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 31/12/2025 23:27, Richard Damon wrote:

    So, how do you think you can prove it in F?

    What does "F" refer to?


    F reo G_F rao -4Prov_F(riLG_FriY)
    F proves that: G_F is equivalent to G_F is not provable in F https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel-incompleteness/#FirIncTheCom

    reaG ree WFF(F) (G rao (F re4 G))
    There exists a G in F that is logically
    equivalent to its own unprovability in F

    reaG ree WFF(F) (G := (F re4 G))
    There exists a G in F that asserts its own unprovability in F

    The proof of G in F would seem to require a sequence
    of inference steps in F that prove that they themselves
    do not exist.



    But that isn't what G is in the proof, so you are just using a bad
    reference.

    I guess you are just showing that you think lying is correct logic.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Thu Jan 1 20:38:18 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/1/2026 8:25 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 9:07 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 4:12 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 31/12/2025 23:27, Richard Damon wrote:

    So, how do you think you can prove it in F?

    What does "F" refer to?


    F reo G_F rao -4Prov_F(riLG_FriY)
    F proves that: G_F is equivalent to G_F is not provable in F
    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel-incompleteness/#FirIncTheCom

    reaG ree WFF(F) (G rao (F re4 G))
    There exists a G in F that is logically
    equivalent to its own unprovability in F

    reaG ree WFF(F) (G := (F re4 G))
    There exists a G in F that asserts its own unprovability in F

    The proof of G in F would seem to require a sequence
    of inference steps in F that prove that they themselves
    do not exist.



    But that isn't what G is in the proof, so you are just using a bad reference.


    That you do not know exactly how semantics works in
    linguistics (making sure to ignore all context) is
    not my mistake. The reason that Ludwig Wittgenstein
    was never understood is that none of his detractors
    understood how language itself really works. Not
    knowing how language really works results in
    undetected muddled thinking.

    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    G asserts its own unprovability.
    Is what the above means semantically.

    The proof of G does semantically entail a sequence
    of inference steps that prove that they themselves
    do not exist.

    I guess you are just showing that you think lying is correct logic.
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Thu Jan 1 19:45:55 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 2026-01-01 16:48, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 6:13 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 22:40, Richard Damon wrote:

    But it IS a theorem of the base system, as it uses ONLY the mathematical >>> operations definable in the base system. What makes you think it isn't a >>> Theorem in the base system.

    It has no derivation in the base system, if it had you wouldn't think
    the base system were incomplete.


    It has no PROOF in the base system.

    Which means it is not a theorem of the base system. A theorem is a
    statement which can be proven in a particular system.

    The statement is surely a statement in the base system.

    Sure, but being a statement and being a theorem are two different things.

    It is shown to be true there, by a proof in the meta-system.

    It is shown to be true in the base system, but only within the
    metasystem. Within the base system it cannot be so shown, which
    precludes it from being a theorem. That's the entire point of G||del:
    truth and theoremhood cannot be made to coincide except in very trivial systems.

    I think you are confused about what you talk about.

    I think you are both somewhat confused here.

    Andr|-
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Thu Jan 1 21:52:15 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/1/26 9:38 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 8:25 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 9:07 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 4:12 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 31/12/2025 23:27, Richard Damon wrote:

    So, how do you think you can prove it in F?

    What does "F" refer to?


    F reo G_F rao -4Prov_F(riLG_FriY)
    F proves that: G_F is equivalent to G_F is not provable in F
    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel-incompleteness/#FirIncTheCom

    reaG ree WFF(F) (G rao (F re4 G))
    There exists a G in F that is logically
    equivalent to its own unprovability in F

    reaG ree WFF(F) (G := (F re4 G))
    There exists a G in F that asserts its own unprovability in F

    The proof of G in F would seem to require a sequence
    of inference steps in F that prove that they themselves
    do not exist.



    But that isn't what G is in the proof, so you are just using a bad
    reference.


    That you do not know exactly how semantics works in
    linguistics (making sure to ignore all context) is
    not my mistake. The reason that Ludwig Wittgenstein
    was never understood is that none of his detractors
    understood how language itself really works. Not
    knowing how language really works results in
    undetected muddled thinking.


    No, YOU don't know how semantics work, or linqustics.

    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    Which is a statement in NATURAL LANGUAGE and you need to use Natural
    Language "rules" to interpret it.

    And thus each word need to include its context.

    The proposition exists in both the base system and the meta system.

    The assertion is just in the meta system, which understand the "hidden" meaning of the relationship that the statement is based on.

    The unprovabiliyt is just in the base system, which doesn't know this
    meaning.

    If you don't understand that you can't read a coded message without the
    code book, you are just stupid.


    G asserts its own unprovability.
    Is what the above means semantically.

    The proof of G does semantically entail a sequence
    of inference steps that prove that they themselves
    do not exist.

    I two different systems.

    I guuess to you cats are dog, Calulus is just 1st grade arithmatic.

    Of course, it seems you can't understand either due to your stupidity.


    I guess you are just showing that you think lying is correct logic.



    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Thu Jan 1 22:09:12 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/1/26 9:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-01-01 16:48, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 6:13 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 22:40, Richard Damon wrote:

    But it IS a theorem of the base system, as it uses ONLY the
    mathematical
    operations definable in the base system. What makes you think it
    isn't a
    Theorem in the base system.

    It has no derivation in the base system, if it had you wouldn't think
    the base system were incomplete.


    It has no PROOF in the base system.

    Which means it is not a theorem of the base system. A theorem is a
    statement which can be proven in a particular system.

    I guess it depends on your definition of a "Theorem".

    I am using the one that goes:

    "A Theorem is a statement that has been proven."

    note, no restriction that the proof was in the system the Theorem is
    stated in, as long as the proof shows that it is actually True in that
    system.

    Do you have a source that limits the proof to the system in question?

    Perhaps this is just a diffence of schools of logic.

    The statement is surely a statement in the base system.

    Sure, but being a statement and being a theorem are two different things.

    Yes, a Theorem needs to have been shown to be true. As I pointed out, at
    least the rules I learned, that proof didn't need to be in the system.


    It is shown to be true there, by a proof in the meta-system.

    It is shown to be true in the base system, but only within the
    metasystem. Within the base system it cannot be so shown, which
    precludes it from being a theorem. That's the entire point of G||del:
    truth and theoremhood cannot be made to coincide except in very trivial systems.

    No, its truth applies in the base system to. The key is that the
    mathematical formula developed has exactly the same behavior in the meta-system as in the base system. This is much more than a "trivial"
    detail.

    In the base system, the statement is "merely" about the non-existence of
    a number that satisfies a (complicated) mathematical relationship. Such
    a number will either exist or not. The results of that computation are
    the same in both systems as the meta didn't redefine arithmetic. it only defined a "meaning" for values, as the relationship understood and
    tested. Thus, in the meta the existance of such a number had a special meaning, that of expressing a proof of the statement. But this meaning
    doesn't change the arithmatic in any way, so doesn't affect its
    existance or not.


    I think you are confused about what you talk about.

    I think you are both somewhat confused here.

    Andr|-


    And I think you are.

    The key point that Godel did, was to show that basic arithmatic was
    powerful enough to actually create a "language" with semantics in it.
    This is much like the other equivalence of Computations and Logic as mathematics is essential one way to do computations.

    This means that since the base system supports the concept of
    arithmatic, that arithmatic can be used to create "logic" that
    understands the "language" of the system.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Thu Jan 1 21:26:55 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/1/2026 8:38 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 8:25 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 9:07 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 4:12 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 31/12/2025 23:27, Richard Damon wrote:

    So, how do you think you can prove it in F?

    What does "F" refer to?


    F reo G_F rao -4Prov_F(riLG_FriY)
    F proves that: G_F is equivalent to G_F is not provable in F
    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel-incompleteness/#FirIncTheCom

    reaG ree WFF(F) (G rao (F re4 G))
    There exists a G in F that is logically
    equivalent to its own unprovability in F

    reaG ree WFF(F) (G := (F re4 G))
    There exists a G in F that asserts its own unprovability in F

    The proof of G in F would seem to require a sequence
    of inference steps in F that prove that they themselves
    do not exist.



    But that isn't what G is in the proof, so you are just using a bad
    reference.


    That you do not know exactly how semantics works in
    linguistics (making sure to ignore all context) is
    not my mistake. The reason that Ludwig Wittgenstein
    was never understood is that none of his detractors
    understood how language itself really works. Not
    knowing how language really works results in
    undetected muddled thinking.

    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    G asserts its own unprovability.
    Is what the above means semantically.

    The proof of G does semantically entail a sequence
    of inference steps that prove that they themselves
    do not exist.


    Ludwig Wittgenstein

    8. I imagine someone asking my advice; he says:
    "I have constructed a proposition (1 will use
    'P' to designate it) in Russell's symbolism,
    and by means of certain definitions and
    transformations it can be so interpreted that
    it says: 'P is not provable in Russell's system'.


    Must I not say that this proposition on the one
    hand is true, and on the other hand is unprovable?
    For suppose it were false; then it is true that
    it is provable. And that surely cannot be And
    if it is proved, then it is proved that it is
    not provable. Thus it can only be true, but
    unprovable. " Just as we ask: " 'provable'
    in what system?", so we must also ask:"
    'true' in what system?" 'True in Russell's system'
    means, as was said: proved in Russell's system;
    and 'false in Russell's system' means: the
    opposite has been proved in Russell's system
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Thu Jan 1 21:33:59 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/1/2026 8:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-01-01 16:48, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 6:13 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 22:40, Richard Damon wrote:

    But it IS a theorem of the base system, as it uses ONLY the
    mathematical
    operations definable in the base system. What makes you think it
    isn't a
    Theorem in the base system.

    It has no derivation in the base system, if it had you wouldn't think
    the base system were incomplete.


    It has no PROOF in the base system.

    Which means it is not a theorem of the base system. A theorem is a
    statement which can be proven in a particular system.


    This is the kind of clarity that we need.
    True in the base system essentially means
    a theorem of the base system.

    The statement is surely a statement in the base system.

    Sure, but being a statement and being a theorem are two different things.

    It is shown to be true there, by a proof in the meta-system.

    It is shown to be true in the base system, but only within the
    metasystem. Within the base system it cannot be so shown, which
    precludes it from being a theorem. That's the entire point of G||del:
    truth and theoremhood cannot be made to coincide except in very trivial systems.

    I think you are confused about what you talk about.

    I think you are both somewhat confused here.

    Andr|-

    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Thu Jan 1 22:41:35 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/1/26 10:26 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 8:38 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 8:25 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 9:07 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 4:12 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 31/12/2025 23:27, Richard Damon wrote:

    So, how do you think you can prove it in F?

    What does "F" refer to?


    F reo G_F rao -4Prov_F(riLG_FriY)
    F proves that: G_F is equivalent to G_F is not provable in F
    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel-incompleteness/#FirIncTheCom >>>>
    reaG ree WFF(F) (G rao (F re4 G))
    There exists a G in F that is logically
    equivalent to its own unprovability in F

    reaG ree WFF(F) (G := (F re4 G))
    There exists a G in F that asserts its own unprovability in F

    The proof of G in F would seem to require a sequence
    of inference steps in F that prove that they themselves
    do not exist.



    But that isn't what G is in the proof, so you are just using a bad
    reference.


    That you do not know exactly how semantics works in
    linguistics (making sure to ignore all context) is
    not my mistake. The reason that Ludwig Wittgenstein
    was never understood is that none of his detractors
    understood how language itself really works. Not
    knowing how language really works results in
    undetected muddled thinking.

    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    G asserts its own unprovability.
    Is what the above means semantically.

    The proof of G does semantically entail a sequence
    of inference steps that prove that they themselves
    do not exist.


    Ludwig Wittgenstein

    8. I imagine someone asking my advice; he says:
    "I have constructed a proposition (1 will use
    'P' to designate it) in Russell's symbolism,
    and by means of certain definitions and
    transformations it can be so interpreted that
    it says: 'P is not provable in Russell's system'.


    Must I not say that this proposition on the one
    hand is true, and on the other hand is unprovable?
    For suppose it were false; then it is true that
    it is provable. And that surely cannot be And
    if it is proved, then it is proved that it is
    not provable. Thus it can only be true, but
    unprovable. " Just as we ask: " 'provable'
    in what system?", so we must also ask:"
    'true' in what system?" 'True in Russell's system'
    means, as was said: proved in Russell's system;
    and 'false in Russell's system' means: the
    opposite has been proved in Russell's system


    And he was mistaken in his arguement, as he also had misunderstandings
    about the statement.

    There has been much written about this, pointing out his error.

    If I remember this article right, he never actually published this in
    his life, and may have realized his error.

    And that this was written based not on reading the paper, but on hearing discriptions of it, which might be why he might have changed his mind.

    You seem to rely a lot on pointing to support from other people, and can
    never actually talk about the actual proof (except by taking snippets
    out of context, showing your error).

    It is clear you don't actually understand the material but need to latch
    on to such things as you just can't face the facts as they show your
    world view is just wrong.

    You are in the same class as flat earthers, needing to ignore facts to
    keep your false ideas.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Thu Jan 1 22:45:05 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/1/26 10:33 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 8:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-01-01 16:48, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 6:13 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 22:40, Richard Damon wrote:

    But it IS a theorem of the base system, as it uses ONLY the
    mathematical
    operations definable in the base system. What makes you think it
    isn't a
    Theorem in the base system.

    It has no derivation in the base system, if it had you wouldn't think
    the base system were incomplete.


    It has no PROOF in the base system.

    Which means it is not a theorem of the base system. A theorem is a
    statement which can be proven in a particular system.


    This is the kind of clarity that we need.
    True in the base system essentially means
    a theorem of the base system.

    Which s I explained, it is by at least the very normal definition.

    It is a statement of fact in the base system.

    And, that fact in the base system has been proven by a proof in some
    system that knows of the base system.

    If you want to limit a "Theorem" to only be a something provable in the
    base system then it is merely a True Statement in the base system, which
    the system can not be proven.

    That is still sufficent for Incompleteness, as it only requires a True statement in the base system that can not be proven by it.


    The statement is surely a statement in the base system.

    Sure, but being a statement and being a theorem are two different things.

    It is shown to be true there, by a proof in the meta-system.

    It is shown to be true in the base system, but only within the
    metasystem. Within the base system it cannot be so shown, which
    precludes it from being a theorem. That's the entire point of G||del:
    truth and theoremhood cannot be made to coincide except in very
    trivial systems.

    I think you are confused about what you talk about.

    I think you are both somewhat confused here.

    Andr|-




    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Thu Jan 1 22:17:17 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/1/2026 8:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 9:38 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 8:25 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 9:07 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 4:12 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 31/12/2025 23:27, Richard Damon wrote:

    So, how do you think you can prove it in F?

    What does "F" refer to?


    F reo G_F rao -4Prov_F(riLG_FriY)
    F proves that: G_F is equivalent to G_F is not provable in F
    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel-incompleteness/#FirIncTheCom >>>>
    reaG ree WFF(F) (G rao (F re4 G))
    There exists a G in F that is logically
    equivalent to its own unprovability in F

    reaG ree WFF(F) (G := (F re4 G))
    There exists a G in F that asserts its own unprovability in F

    The proof of G in F would seem to require a sequence
    of inference steps in F that prove that they themselves
    do not exist.



    But that isn't what G is in the proof, so you are just using a bad
    reference.


    That you do not know exactly how semantics works in
    linguistics (making sure to ignore all context) is
    not my mistake. The reason that Ludwig Wittgenstein
    was never understood is that none of his detractors
    understood how language itself really works. Not
    knowing how language really works results in
    undetected muddled thinking.


    No, YOU don't know how semantics work, or linqustics.

    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    Which is a statement in NATURAL LANGUAGE and you need to use Natural Language "rules" to interpret it.


    I have taken "interpretation" as a twisted lie since
    I was 14. Semantics of linguistics agrees.
    It has always been the exact meanings that are specified.
    it has never been the way that people twist this in
    their mind.

    a proposition which asserts its own unprovability

    Does not mean a box of chocolates crushed on the floor.
    It only means exactly one thing.

    And thus each word need to include its context.


    Linguistic Semantics is required to exclude context.
    Context is only included in linguistic pragmatics.
    Your lack of knowledge never has been my mistake.

    The proposition exists in both the base system and the meta system.

    The assertion is just in the meta system, which understand the "hidden" meaning of the relationship that the statement is based on.

    The unprovabiliyt is just in the base system, which doesn't know this meaning.

    If you don't understand that you can't read a coded message without the
    code book, you are just stupid.


    G asserts its own unprovability.
    Is what the above means semantically.

    The proof of G does semantically entail a sequence
    of inference steps that prove that they themselves
    do not exist.

    I two different systems.

    I guuess to you cats are dog, Calulus is just 1st grade arithmatic.

    Of course, it seems you can't understand either due to your stupidity.


    I guess you are just showing that you think lying is correct logic.



    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Thu Jan 1 22:22:40 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/1/2026 9:45 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 10:33 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 8:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-01-01 16:48, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 6:13 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 22:40, Richard Damon wrote:

    But it IS a theorem of the base system, as it uses ONLY the
    mathematical
    operations definable in the base system. What makes you think it
    isn't a
    Theorem in the base system.

    It has no derivation in the base system, if it had you wouldn't think >>>>> the base system were incomplete.


    It has no PROOF in the base system.

    Which means it is not a theorem of the base system. A theorem is a
    statement which can be proven in a particular system.


    This is the kind of clarity that we need.
    True in the base system essentially means
    a theorem of the base system.

    Which s I explained, it is by at least the very normal definition.

    It is a statement of fact in the base system.

    And, that fact in the base system has been proven by a proof in some
    system that knows of the base system.


    Has always been irrelevant.
    Truth in the base system has always
    actually been theorems of the base system.

    That is the way that
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    has always worked. When math diverged math erred.

    If you want to limit a "Theorem" to only be a something provable in the
    base system then it is merely a True Statement in the base system, which
    the system can not be proven.

    So when we directly encode all semantics
    in the formal language such that
    reCx ree F (Provable(F,x) rei True(F,x))
    Then incompleteness ceases to exist
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Thu Jan 1 23:32:32 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/1/26 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 8:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 9:38 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 8:25 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 9:07 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 4:12 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 31/12/2025 23:27, Richard Damon wrote:

    So, how do you think you can prove it in F?

    What does "F" refer to?


    F reo G_F rao -4Prov_F(riLG_FriY)
    F proves that: G_F is equivalent to G_F is not provable in F
    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel-incompleteness/#FirIncTheCom >>>>>
    reaG ree WFF(F) (G rao (F re4 G))
    There exists a G in F that is logically
    equivalent to its own unprovability in F

    reaG ree WFF(F) (G := (F re4 G))
    There exists a G in F that asserts its own unprovability in F

    The proof of G in F would seem to require a sequence
    of inference steps in F that prove that they themselves
    do not exist.



    But that isn't what G is in the proof, so you are just using a bad
    reference.


    That you do not know exactly how semantics works in
    linguistics (making sure to ignore all context) is
    not my mistake. The reason that Ludwig Wittgenstein
    was never understood is that none of his detractors
    understood how language itself really works. Not
    knowing how language really works results in
    undetected muddled thinking.


    No, YOU don't know how semantics work, or linqustics.

    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    Which is a statement in NATURAL LANGUAGE and you need to use Natural
    Language "rules" to interpret it.


    I have taken "interpretation" as a twisted lie since
    I was 14. Semantics of linguistics agrees.
    It has always been the exact meanings that are specified.
    it has never been the way that people twist this in
    their mind.

    In other words, you just lie and are stupid.

    The "interpreation" mentioned IS EXACTLY what is specified, but you are
    just too stupid to understand,


    a proposition which asserts its own unprovability

    Does not mean a box of chocolates crushed on the floor.
    It only means exactly one thing.

    Right, but neither does it mean, in its context. what you try to make it.


    And thus each word need to include its context.


    Linguistic Semantics is required to exclude context

    Nope, as context affect the semantics of a word.

    Yes, sometimes "Semantics" is used to talk about giving the full list of possible meanings, but if you are using it that way, then you need to
    list not just one meaning, but all the possible means in all possible contexts.

    Context is only included in linguistic pragmatics.

    Nope. Not unless you are meaning "Semantics" to give the list of
    possible meaning and pragmatics to determine which one.

    In which case, you can't use just "Semantics" as you base, as you thus
    admit you don't actually know what the sentence means, just the wide assortment of possible meanings.

    Your lack of knowledge never has been my mistake.

    No, your stupidity is yours.

    It seems you just don't know the actual meaning of what you are talking
    about as you start from an incomplete semantics and forget to apply
    pragmatics to it.


    The proposition exists in both the base system and the meta system.

    The assertion is just in the meta system, which understand the
    "hidden" meaning of the relationship that the statement is based on.

    The unprovabiliyt is just in the base system, which doesn't know this
    meaning.

    If you don't understand that you can't read a coded message without
    the code book, you are just stupid.


    G asserts its own unprovability.
    Is what the above means semantically.

    The proof of G does semantically entail a sequence
    of inference steps that prove that they themselves
    do not exist.

    I two different systems.

    I guuess to you cats are dog, Calulus is just 1st grade arithmatic.

    Of course, it seems you can't understand either due to your stupidity.


    I guess you are just showing that you think lying is correct logic.






    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Thu Jan 1 23:45:03 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/1/26 11:22 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 9:45 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 10:33 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 8:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-01-01 16:48, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 6:13 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 22:40, Richard Damon wrote:

    But it IS a theorem of the base system, as it uses ONLY the
    mathematical
    operations definable in the base system. What makes you think it >>>>>>> isn't a
    Theorem in the base system.

    It has no derivation in the base system, if it had you wouldn't think >>>>>> the base system were incomplete.


    It has no PROOF in the base system.

    Which means it is not a theorem of the base system. A theorem is a
    statement which can be proven in a particular system.


    This is the kind of clarity that we need.
    True in the base system essentially means
    a theorem of the base system.

    Which s I explained, it is by at least the very normal definition.

    It is a statement of fact in the base system.

    And, that fact in the base system has been proven by a proof in some
    system that knows of the base system.


    Has always been irrelevant.

    Nope. Got a reference?

    Truth in the base system has always
    actually been theorems of the base system.

    But only if "Theorem" includes things proven to be true in the system
    even if the proof is in another.

    Truth DOES need to be based on the axioms of the base system, but allows
    the truth to be established by an infinite chain of reasoning, unlike
    proofs that need to be finite.


    That is the way that
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    has always worked. When math diverged math erred.

    Nope. Not unless you mean by "meaning" to include the infinite chain for reasoning.

    Note, "Formal Systems" don't work the way you want, as their "semanitcs"
    are defined from the axioms and the operations of the system, possible continued for an infinite chain of operations.

    Your problem is you just don't comprehend how infinity works, because
    you mind is just to small.


    If you want to limit a "Theorem" to only be a something provable in
    the base system then it is merely a True Statement in the base system,
    which the system can not be proven.

    So when we directly encode all semantics
    in the formal language such that
    reCx ree F (Provable(F,x) rei True(F,x))
    Then incompleteness ceases to exist


    Nope, because you CAN'T do that unless you system can't support the
    Natural Numbers.

    Sorry, you just aren't allowed to ASSUME something like that.

    Your world is just exploded into a totally inconsistent mess.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Thu Jan 1 23:20:55 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/1/2026 10:32 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 8:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 9:38 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 8:25 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 9:07 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 4:12 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 31/12/2025 23:27, Richard Damon wrote:

    So, how do you think you can prove it in F?

    What does "F" refer to?


    F reo G_F rao -4Prov_F(riLG_FriY)
    F proves that: G_F is equivalent to G_F is not provable in F
    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel-incompleteness/
    #FirIncTheCom

    reaG ree WFF(F) (G rao (F re4 G))
    There exists a G in F that is logically
    equivalent to its own unprovability in F

    reaG ree WFF(F) (G := (F re4 G))
    There exists a G in F that asserts its own unprovability in F

    The proof of G in F would seem to require a sequence
    of inference steps in F that prove that they themselves
    do not exist.



    But that isn't what G is in the proof, so you are just using a bad
    reference.


    That you do not know exactly how semantics works in
    linguistics (making sure to ignore all context) is
    not my mistake. The reason that Ludwig Wittgenstein
    was never understood is that none of his detractors
    understood how language itself really works. Not
    knowing how language really works results in
    undetected muddled thinking.


    No, YOU don't know how semantics work, or linqustics.

    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    Which is a statement in NATURAL LANGUAGE and you need to use Natural
    Language "rules" to interpret it.


    I have taken "interpretation" as a twisted lie since
    I was 14. Semantics of linguistics agrees.
    It has always been the exact meanings that are specified.
    it has never been the way that people twist this in
    their mind.

    In other words, you just lie and are stupid.

    The "interpreation" mentioned IS EXACTLY what is specified, but you are
    just too stupid to understand,


    a proposition which asserts its own unprovability

    Does not mean a box of chocolates crushed on the floor.
    It only means exactly one thing.

    Right, but neither does it mean, in its context. what you try to make it.


    And thus each word need to include its context.


    Linguistic Semantics is required to exclude context

    Nope, as context affect the semantics of a word.

    Yes, sometimes "Semantics" is used to talk about giving the full list of possible meanings, but if you are using it that way, then you need to
    list not just one meaning, but all the possible means in all possible contexts.

    Context is only included in linguistic pragmatics.

    Nope. Not unless you are meaning "Semantics" to give the list of
    possible meaning and pragmatics to determine which one.


    Compositionality is a concept in the philosophy of
    language. A symbolic system is compositional if the
    meaning of every complex expression E in that system
    depends on, and depends only on, (i) ErCOs syntactic
    structure and (ii) the meanings of ErCOs simple parts.

    If a language is compositional, then the meaning of
    a sentence S in that language cannot depend directly
    on the context that sentence is used in or the intentions
    of the speaker who uses it.

    https://iep.utm.edu/compositionality-in-language/
    In which case, you can't use just "Semantics" as you base, as you thus
    admit you don't actually know what the sentence means, just the wide assortment of possible meanings.

    Your lack of knowledge never has been my mistake.

    No, your stupidity is yours.

    It seems you just don't know the actual meaning of what you are talking about as you start from an incomplete semantics and forget to apply pragmatics to it.


    The proposition exists in both the base system and the meta system.

    The assertion is just in the meta system, which understand the
    "hidden" meaning of the relationship that the statement is based on.

    The unprovabiliyt is just in the base system, which doesn't know this
    meaning.

    If you don't understand that you can't read a coded message without
    the code book, you are just stupid.


    G asserts its own unprovability.
    Is what the above means semantically.

    The proof of G does semantically entail a sequence
    of inference steps that prove that they themselves
    do not exist.

    I two different systems.

    I guuess to you cats are dog, Calulus is just 1st grade arithmatic.

    Of course, it seems you can't understand either due to your stupidity.


    I guess you are just showing that you think lying is correct logic.






    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jan 2 05:37:33 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 02/01/2026 00:21, Richard Damon wrote:

    It started as a statement, and then was proven true in the system (but
    not by the system).

    What else do you need to make it a Theorem?


    You have to derive the statement from the axioms of the system using the deduction rules of the system. It's the actual definition of "Theorem of
    a Formal System".

    Deriving it or other demonstration in your choice of alternative system
    does not make it a theorem of the base-system.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jan 2 05:48:03 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 02/01/2026 03:09, Richard Damon wrote:

    I guess it depends on your definition of a "Theorem".

    I am using the one that goes:

    "A Theorem is a statement that has been proven."

    note, no restriction that the proof was in the system the Theorem is
    stated in, as long as the proof shows that it is actually True in that system.

    Do you have a source that limits the proof to the system in question?

    Perhaps this is just a diffence of schools of logic.


    See Curry and Feys Combinatory Logic 1, Chapters 0-2. The term is well
    defined as it applies to formal systems. It's out of copyright and
    available online.

    Informal logic is another matter, where "theorem" /may/ be taken to mean
    what you thought and where mistakes are commonplace, and pretty-much inevitable.

    "Truth" is not part of formal systems except in AI where personal
    intuitive philosophy is computationally modelled. "Truth" is personal as
    any spiritualist can attest.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jan 2 05:54:21 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 02/01/2026 02:45, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-01-01 16:48, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 6:13 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 22:40, Richard Damon wrote:

    But it IS a theorem of the base system, as it uses ONLY the
    mathematical
    operations definable in the base system. What makes you think it
    isn't a
    Theorem in the base system.

    It has no derivation in the base system, if it had you wouldn't think
    the base system were incomplete.


    It has no PROOF in the base system.

    Which means it is not a theorem of the base system. A theorem is a
    statement which can be proven in a particular system.

    We have to avoid "proven in a particular system" and choose "Derived in
    a particular system" or "Derived of a particular system" or, since it's
    well defined, "Theorem of a particular system".

    The problem with "prove" is there are numerous episystems (HA being
    popular) that provide for "proofs" of statements of systems they're
    applied to. Technically, episystems may or may not prove the same set of statements that are theorem's of the system they're applied to.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jan 2 05:57:33 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 02/01/2026 03:33, olcott wrote:

    True in the base system essentially means
    a theorem of the base system.

    No, but a lot of people might say "true in the base system" when they
    ought to say "a theorem of the base system" which means there is a
    derivation from the axioms of the formal system using only the deduction
    rules of the formal system (which are restricted in what they can
    possibly be).

    "True" has such a variety of meanings that it should be avoided except
    for when it describes the speaker's feelings about reality.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Thu Jan 1 23:57:37 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/1/2026 10:45 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 11:22 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 9:45 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 10:33 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 8:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-01-01 16:48, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 6:13 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 22:40, Richard Damon wrote:

    But it IS a theorem of the base system, as it uses ONLY the
    mathematical
    operations definable in the base system. What makes you think it >>>>>>>> isn't a
    Theorem in the base system.

    It has no derivation in the base system, if it had you wouldn't >>>>>>> think
    the base system were incomplete.


    It has no PROOF in the base system.

    Which means it is not a theorem of the base system. A theorem is a
    statement which can be proven in a particular system.


    This is the kind of clarity that we need.
    True in the base system essentially means
    a theorem of the base system.

    Which s I explained, it is by at least the very normal definition.

    It is a statement of fact in the base system.

    And, that fact in the base system has been proven by a proof in some
    system that knows of the base system.


    Has always been irrelevant.

    Nope. Got a reference?

    Truth in the base system has always
    actually been theorems of the base system.

    But only if "Theorem" includes things proven to be true in the system
    even if the proof is in another.

    Truth DOES need to be based on the axioms of the base system, but allows
    the truth to be established by an infinite chain of reasoning, unlike
    proofs that need to be finite.


    That is the way that
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    has always worked. When math diverged math erred.

    Nope. Not unless you mean by "meaning" to include the infinite chain for reasoning.

    Note, "Formal Systems" don't work the way you want, as their "semanitcs"
    are defined from the axioms and the operations of the system, possible continued for an infinite chain of operations.

    Your problem is you just don't comprehend how infinity works, because
    you mind is just to small.


    If you want to limit a "Theorem" to only be a something provable in
    the base system then it is merely a True Statement in the base
    system, which the system can not be proven.

    So when we directly encode all semantics
    in the formal language such that
    reCx ree F (Provable(F,x) rei True(F,x))
    Then incompleteness ceases to exist


    Nope, because you CAN'T do that unless you system can't support the
    Natural Numbers.


    What do you think is missing from
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    about natural numbers?
    add/subtract/multiply/divide is all there

    Sorry, you just aren't allowed to ASSUME something like that.

    Your world is just exploded into a totally inconsistent mess.
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jan 2 06:14:33 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 02/01/2026 04:45, Richard Damon wrote:


    Truth in the base system has always
    actually been theorems of the base system.

    But only if "Theorem" includes things proven to be true in the system
    even if the proof is in another.

    If the statement is derived in another then it is a theorem of the other.

    If it is merely "proved" by a proof episystem then it might not be a
    theorem of either depending on the episystem and what is conventionally referred to as "proof" by that system. An intuitively safe episystem [my
    term, intended to carry some intuitive meaning] proves only its own
    theorems and /labelled/ embeddings of just the theorems of the system
    it's applied to, thus it provides alternative methods to find and
    demonstrate theorems of the embedded system (and to reason about the theory-proper of the embedded system) while being clear about which
    system(s) it reasons about.

    I don't know of any that do the required labelling except that some
    standard ones have such well established conventional symbols and are so
    small and intuitive (HA, HC, for example) that they are quite safe.

    Haskell Curry tried in his 1950 Theory of Formal Deducibility to
    establish some conventions around the use of the turnstile symbols but
    it seems like they didn't take hold.


    Truth DOES need to be based on the axioms of the base system, but allows
    the truth to be established by an infinite chain of reasoning, unlike
    proofs that need to be finite.

    An infinite chain of reasoning is not completed at any time, least of
    all this time. The limit of a chain of reasoning might be, episystems
    could be useful for that, I wouldn't want to rule it out.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jan 2 06:20:59 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 02/01/2026 00:23, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 7:12 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 23:50, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 6:17 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 22:42, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 5:13 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 00:35, Richard Damon wrote:

    THe statement G exist


    Ah, I'm not so easily convinced



    What did he do that might allow it not to exist?

    He constructs it by the rules of F, and shows that for it to not be
    true, F must be inconsistant.

    You can't just complain that you don't think something exists, when it >>>>> was constructed by the system.


    There's no symbol "G" in the system.



    Sure there is, as system allow the creation of names for objects in
    them.

    Name a system that meets the basic requirements that doesn't allow the
    creation of a "name" for a statement in the system.

    Nope. The name is not a statement of the system, it's a statement of a
    related system such as a meta-system or extension.



    No, G is the statement created in the system, using the mathematical relationship defined in terms of operations in the system build in the
    meta system.

    G HAS to be in the system, so the PRR can refer to it.

    OR, are you saying that in the system of arithmetic, we can't talk about
    a variable "x" as it isn't defined in the system?


    Godel's system P has variable objects, but no indeterminates. And it's namespace of Godel numbers is full up. You can do /some/ things like definitions using existential and universal quantification but the
    character of the propositions is different than a definition of a new
    symbol due to the Godel numbering; you have to be careful and not throw statements around like Goedel's introductory simile based on PM.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jan 2 08:15:22 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 02/01/2026 03:26, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 8:38 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 8:25 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 9:07 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 4:12 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 31/12/2025 23:27, Richard Damon wrote:

    So, how do you think you can prove it in F?

    What does "F" refer to?


    F reo G_F rao -4Prov_F(riLG_FriY)
    F proves that: G_F is equivalent to G_F is not provable in F
    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel-incompleteness/#FirIncTheCom >>>>
    reaG ree WFF(F) (G rao (F re4 G))
    There exists a G in F that is logically
    equivalent to its own unprovability in F

    reaG ree WFF(F) (G := (F re4 G))
    There exists a G in F that asserts its own unprovability in F

    The proof of G in F would seem to require a sequence
    of inference steps in F that prove that they themselves
    do not exist.



    But that isn't what G is in the proof, so you are just using a bad
    reference.


    That you do not know exactly how semantics works in
    linguistics (making sure to ignore all context) is
    not my mistake. The reason that Ludwig Wittgenstein
    was never understood is that none of his detractors
    understood how language itself really works. Not
    knowing how language really works results in
    undetected muddled thinking.

    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    G asserts its own unprovability.
    Is what the above means semantically.

    The proof of G does semantically entail a sequence
    of inference steps that prove that they themselves
    do not exist.


    Ludwig Wittgenstein

    8. I imagine someone asking my advice; he says:
    "I have constructed a proposition (1 will use
    'P' to designate it) in Russell's symbolism,
    and by means of certain definitions and
    transformations it can be so interpreted that
    it says: 'P is not provable in Russell's system'.

    False. He did not do that; he tried to do so then hallucinated that he succeeded. A contradiction follows from the negation of my
    characterisation of his actions and so from the truth of the proposition
    that he defined P so. That definitional proposition follows from the
    axioms of inconsistent systems and not from those of useful consistent
    ones. Typically it /is/ an axiom of inconsistent systems and not of
    consistent ones.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jan 2 07:40:30 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/1/2026 11:54 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 02:45, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-01-01 16:48, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 6:13 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 22:40, Richard Damon wrote:

    But it IS a theorem of the base system, as it uses ONLY the
    mathematical
    operations definable in the base system. What makes you think it
    isn't a
    Theorem in the base system.

    It has no derivation in the base system, if it had you wouldn't think
    the base system were incomplete.


    It has no PROOF in the base system.

    Which means it is not a theorem of the base system. A theorem is a
    statement which can be proven in a particular system.

    We have to avoid "proven in a particular system" and choose "Derived in
    a particular system" or "Derived of a particular system" or, since it's
    well defined, "Theorem of a particular system".

    The problem with "prove" is there are numerous episystems (HA being
    popular) that provide for "proofs" of statements of systems they're
    applied to. Technically, episystems may or may not prove the same set of statements that are theorem's of the system they're applied to.



    The term "EpiSystems" most commonly refers to Epic Systems Corporation,
    the dominant provider of Electronic Health Record (EHR) software in the
    United States. The reference to "HA being popular" likely means that
    their software is very popular in Healthcare Academia, large hospital
    systems, and associated medical facilities.
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jan 2 07:43:59 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/1/2026 11:57 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 03:33, olcott wrote:

    True in the base system essentially means
    a theorem of the base system.

    No, but a lot of people might say "true in the base system" when they
    ought to say "a theorem of the base system" which means there is a
    derivation from the axioms of the formal system using only the deduction rules of the formal system (which are restricted in what they can
    possibly be).


    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    Means true in the base system. That is the generic
    way that truth has always worked long before math
    was derived.

    "True" has such a variety of meanings that it should be avoided except
    for when it describes the speaker's feelings about reality.


    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jan 2 07:56:19 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/2/2026 12:14 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 04:45, Richard Damon wrote:


    Truth in the base system has always
    actually been theorems of the base system.

    But only if "Theorem" includes things proven to be true in the system
    even if the proof is in another.

    If the statement is derived in another then it is a theorem of the other.

    If it is merely "proved" by a proof episystem then it might not be a
    theorem of either depending on the episystem and what is conventionally referred to as "proof" by that system. An intuitively safe episystem [my term, intended to carry some intuitive meaning] proves only its own
    theorems and /labelled/ embeddings of just the theorems of the system
    it's applied to, thus it provides alternative methods to find and
    demonstrate theorems of the embedded system (and to reason about the theory-proper of the embedded system) while being clear about which
    system(s) it reasons about.

    I don't know of any that do the required labelling except that some
    standard ones have such well established conventional symbols and are so small and intuitive (HA, HC, for example) that they are quite safe.

    Haskell Curry tried in his 1950 Theory of Formal Deducibility to
    establish some conventions around the use of the turnstile symbols but
    it seems like they didn't take hold.


    Let {T} be such a theory. Then the elementary
    statements which belong to {T} we shall call the
    elementary theorems of {T}; we also say that
    these elementary statements are true for {T}.
    Thus, given {T}, an elementary theorem is an
    elementary statement which is true.
    https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
    Foundations of Mathematical Logic 1977

    He merely said the way that truth really works.
    When you want to find out if a sentence of
    English is true you must use the definitions
    of the meaning of words in English.


    Truth DOES need to be based on the axioms of the base system, but allows
    the truth to be established by an infinite chain of reasoning, unlike
    proofs that need to be finite.

    An infinite chain of reasoning is not completed at any time, least of
    all this time. The limit of a chain of reasoning might be, episystems
    could be useful for that, I wouldn't want to rule it out.


    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jan 2 08:44:24 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/2/2026 12:20 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 00:23, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 7:12 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 23:50, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 6:17 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 22:42, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 5:13 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 00:35, Richard Damon wrote:

    THe statement G exist


    Ah, I'm not so easily convinced



    What did he do that might allow it not to exist?

    He constructs it by the rules of F, and shows that for it to not be >>>>>> true, F must be inconsistant.

    You can't just complain that you don't think something exists, when it >>>>>> was constructed by the system.


    There's no symbol "G" in the system.



    Sure there is, as system allow the creation of names for objects in
    them.

    Name a system that meets the basic requirements that doesn't allow the >>>> creation of a "name" for a statement in the system.

    Nope. The name is not a statement of the system, it's a statement of a
    related system such as a meta-system or extension.



    No, G is the statement created in the system, using the mathematical
    relationship defined in terms of operations in the system build in the
    meta system.

    G HAS to be in the system, so the PRR can refer to it.

    OR, are you saying that in the system of arithmetic, we can't talk about
    a variable "x" as it isn't defined in the system?


    Godel's system P has variable objects, but no indeterminates. And it's namespace of Godel numbers is full up. You can do /some/ things like definitions using existential and universal quantification but the
    character of the propositions is different than a definition of a new
    symbol due to the Godel numbering; you have to be careful and not throw statements around like Goedel's introductory simile based on PM.


    His paper is a convoluted mess hiding this simple fact
    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    G||del, Kurt 1931.
    On Formally Undecidable Propositions of
    Principia Mathematica And Related Systems
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jan 2 08:47:17 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/2/2026 2:15 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 03:26, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 8:38 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 8:25 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 9:07 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 4:12 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 31/12/2025 23:27, Richard Damon wrote:

    So, how do you think you can prove it in F?

    What does "F" refer to?


    F reo G_F rao -4Prov_F(riLG_FriY)
    F proves that: G_F is equivalent to G_F is not provable in F
    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel-incompleteness/#FirIncTheCom >>>>>
    reaG ree WFF(F) (G rao (F re4 G))
    There exists a G in F that is logically
    equivalent to its own unprovability in F

    reaG ree WFF(F) (G := (F re4 G))
    There exists a G in F that asserts its own unprovability in F

    The proof of G in F would seem to require a sequence
    of inference steps in F that prove that they themselves
    do not exist.



    But that isn't what G is in the proof, so you are just using a bad
    reference.


    That you do not know exactly how semantics works in
    linguistics (making sure to ignore all context) is
    not my mistake. The reason that Ludwig Wittgenstein
    was never understood is that none of his detractors
    understood how language itself really works. Not
    knowing how language really works results in
    undetected muddled thinking.

    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    G asserts its own unprovability.
    Is what the above means semantically.

    The proof of G does semantically entail a sequence
    of inference steps that prove that they themselves
    do not exist.


    Ludwig Wittgenstein

    8. I imagine someone asking my advice; he says:
    "I have constructed a proposition (1 will use
    'P' to designate it) in Russell's symbolism,
    and by means of certain definitions and
    transformations it can be so interpreted that
    it says: 'P is not provable in Russell's system'.

    False. He did not do that; he tried to do so then hallucinated that he succeeded. A contradiction follows from the negation of my
    characterisation of his actions and so from the truth of the proposition
    that he defined P so. That definitional proposition follows from the
    axioms of inconsistent systems and not from those of useful consistent
    ones. Typically it /is/ an axiom of inconsistent systems and not of consistent ones.



    His paper is a convoluted mess hiding this simple fact
    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    G||del, Kurt 1931.
    On Formally Undecidable Propositions of
    Principia Mathematica And Related Systems

    When we combine that with this:

    Let {T} be such a theory. Then the elementary
    statements which belong to {T} we shall call the
    elementary theorems of {T}; we also say that
    these elementary statements are true for {T}.
    Thus, given {T}, an elementary theorem is an
    elementary statement which is true.
    https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
    Foundations of Mathematical Logic 1977

    Then G||del simply made a very convoluted analog
    to the Liar Paradox.
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jan 2 10:10:34 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/2/26 12:57 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 10:45 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 11:22 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 9:45 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 10:33 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 8:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-01-01 16:48, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 6:13 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 22:40, Richard Damon wrote:

    But it IS a theorem of the base system, as it uses ONLY the >>>>>>>>> mathematical
    operations definable in the base system. What makes you think >>>>>>>>> it isn't a
    Theorem in the base system.

    It has no derivation in the base system, if it had you wouldn't >>>>>>>> think
    the base system were incomplete.


    It has no PROOF in the base system.

    Which means it is not a theorem of the base system. A theorem is a >>>>>> statement which can be proven in a particular system.


    This is the kind of clarity that we need.
    True in the base system essentially means
    a theorem of the base system.

    Which s I explained, it is by at least the very normal definition.

    It is a statement of fact in the base system.

    And, that fact in the base system has been proven by a proof in some
    system that knows of the base system.


    Has always been irrelevant.

    Nope. Got a reference?

    Truth in the base system has always
    actually been theorems of the base system.

    But only if "Theorem" includes things proven to be true in the system
    even if the proof is in another.

    Truth DOES need to be based on the axioms of the base system, but
    allows the truth to be established by an infinite chain of reasoning,
    unlike proofs that need to be finite.


    That is the way that
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    has always worked. When math diverged math erred.

    Nope. Not unless you mean by "meaning" to include the infinite chain
    for reasoning.

    Note, "Formal Systems" don't work the way you want, as their
    "semanitcs" are defined from the axioms and the operations of the
    system, possible continued for an infinite chain of operations.

    Your problem is you just don't comprehend how infinity works, because
    you mind is just to small.


    If you want to limit a "Theorem" to only be a something provable in
    the base system then it is merely a True Statement in the base
    system, which the system can not be proven.

    So when we directly encode all semantics
    in the formal language such that
    reCx ree F (Provable(F,x) rei True(F,x))
    Then incompleteness ceases to exist


    Nope, because you CAN'T do that unless you system can't support the
    Natural Numbers.


    What do you think is missing from
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    about natural numbers?
    add/subtract/multiply/divide is all there

    Then it can't havd all truths be proven, as we can form that statement G
    that asserts about the non-existance of a number that satisifies a
    particular relationship.

    Either that number exists, or it doesn't, and thus it MUST be a truth
    bearer. That is a defininition from our language.

    There can't BE such a number, as that would show us that a proof exist
    that there is no such number.

    And there can't be a proof about thins in the system, or it would show
    us a number that satisfies the relationship.

    Thus, if your system allowes Truth to be defined as provable, it can't
    allow that mathematics in the system.

    And you can't prohibit the creation of the meta-system, as there
    permission is part of the foundation of logic.

    Sorry, your problem is you are just too stupid to understand how logic actually works.


    Sorry, you just aren't allowed to ASSUME something like that.

    Your world is just exploded into a totally inconsistent mess.



    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Python@python@cccp.invalid to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jan 2 15:11:13 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    Le 02/01/2026 |a 15:47, olcott a |-crit :
    On 1/2/2026 2:15 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 03:26, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 8:38 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 8:25 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 9:07 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 4:12 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 31/12/2025 23:27, Richard Damon wrote:

    So, how do you think you can prove it in F?

    What does "F" refer to?


    F reo G_F rao -4Prov_F(riLG_FriY)
    F proves that: G_F is equivalent to G_F is not provable in F
    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel-incompleteness/#FirIncTheCom >>>>>>
    reaG ree WFF(F) (G rao (F re4 G))
    There exists a G in F that is logically
    equivalent to its own unprovability in F

    reaG ree WFF(F) (G := (F re4 G))
    There exists a G in F that asserts its own unprovability in F

    The proof of G in F would seem to require a sequence
    of inference steps in F that prove that they themselves
    do not exist.



    But that isn't what G is in the proof, so you are just using a bad
    reference.


    That you do not know exactly how semantics works in
    linguistics (making sure to ignore all context) is
    not my mistake. The reason that Ludwig Wittgenstein
    was never understood is that none of his detractors
    understood how language itself really works. Not
    knowing how language really works results in
    undetected muddled thinking.

    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    G asserts its own unprovability.
    Is what the above means semantically.

    The proof of G does semantically entail a sequence
    of inference steps that prove that they themselves
    do not exist.


    Ludwig Wittgenstein

    8. I imagine someone asking my advice; he says:
    "I have constructed a proposition (1 will use
    'P' to designate it) in Russell's symbolism,
    and by means of certain definitions and
    transformations it can be so interpreted that
    it says: 'P is not provable in Russell's system'.

    False. He did not do that; he tried to do so then hallucinated that he
    succeeded. A contradiction follows from the negation of my
    characterisation of his actions and so from the truth of the proposition
    that he defined P so. That definitional proposition follows from the
    axioms of inconsistent systems and not from those of useful consistent
    ones. Typically it /is/ an axiom of inconsistent systems and not of
    consistent ones.



    His paper is a convoluted mess hiding this simple fact
    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    G||del, Kurt 1931.
    On Formally Undecidable Propositions of
    Principia Mathematica And Related Systems

    When we combine that with this:

    Let {T} be such a theory. Then the elementary
    statements which belong to {T} we shall call the
    elementary theorems of {T}; we also say that
    these elementary statements are true for {T}.
    Thus, given {T}, an elementary theorem is an
    elementary statement which is true.
    https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
    Foundations of Mathematical Logic 1977

    Then G||del simply made a very convoluted analog
    to the Liar Paradox.

    This is delusional wishful thinking on your part.

    Your whole "work" is a defense of your ego you've forged from the fact
    that you misunderstand G||del's articles (and many others).

    The real mess is you, Peter.


    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jan 2 10:25:07 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/2/26 1:14 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 04:45, Richard Damon wrote:


    Truth in the base system has always
    actually been theorems of the base system.

    But only if "Theorem" includes things proven to be true in the system
    even if the proof is in another.

    If the statement is derived in another then it is a theorem of the other.

    I will disagree with you here. Maybe it iw what you are trying to define "derived" as.

    I can certainly use one system to guide me in building a statement in
    another. Or do you think that is a task too hard?

    I can certainly use one system that knows about another to show that a statement must be true in that other.

    If you want to reserve the lable "Theorem" for only things provable in
    taht system, I will let you, but point out I think you are in the
    minority, and ask for your reference that specifies that.


    If it is merely "proved" by a proof episystem then it might not be a
    theorem of either depending on the episystem and what is conventionally referred to as "proof" by that system. An intuitively safe episystem [my term, intended to carry some intuitive meaning] proves only its own
    theorems and /labelled/ embeddings of just the theorems of the system
    it's applied to, thus it provides alternative methods to find and
    demonstrate theorems of the embedded system (and to reason about the theory-proper of the embedded system) while being clear about which
    system(s) it reasons about.

    In other words, you don't understand the method this meta-system was
    derived in. The meta-system that Godel uses was SPECIFICALLY constructed
    so that any statement in the base system had the same truth value in the meta-system, and any statement derived in the meta-system, that did not include any of the "new" material of the system, had its same truth
    value in the base system.


    I don't know of any that do the required labelling except that some
    standard ones have such well established conventional symbols and are so small and intuitive (HA, HC, for example) that they are quite safe.

    Remember, "G" is just a name that we have given the statement so we can
    talk about it.

    G does NOT reference itself by name, so G doesn't need to be a "symbol"
    of the base system. It will be a name (or actually a number) created in
    the meta-system, which defines rules for assigning numbers to statements.

    In the base system, G as a statement is just a assertion that no number
    exists that meets a specified mathematical relationship.


    Haskell Curry tried in his 1950 Theory of Formal Deducibility to
    establish some conventions around the use of the turnstile symbols but
    it seems like they didn't take hold.


    Truth DOES need to be based on the axioms of the base system, but allows
    the truth to be established by an infinite chain of reasoning, unlike
    proofs that need to be finite.

    An infinite chain of reasoning is not completed at any time, least of
    all this time. The limit of a chain of reasoning might be, episystems
    could be useful for that, I wouldn't want to rule it out.


    So?

    Yes, That is one of the points, KNOWLEDGE comes from finite chains of reasoning, but TRUTH goes beyond that.

    For this example, we KNOW from the basics of mathematics that either a
    number will exist that meets the requirements or it doesn't. Thus the assertion MUST be either True or False. That fact is rooted in the
    basics of mathematics, there is no ambiguity, just possible lack of
    knowledge.

    Falseness is "easily" proven, find such a number.

    Truth might be harder. We MIGHT be able to find a short cut to prove
    that no number exists, but it may be that the only was to establish this
    truth is to test every number. This is a feat that we as finite beings
    can't perform, but in the system, it can do that to make the statement true.

    Otherwise you hit the problem that a statement that must be true or
    false might not be either, and thus the logic you built your system on
    is broken.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jan 2 10:26:29 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/2/26 12:57 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 03:33, olcott wrote:

    True in the base system essentially means
    a theorem of the base system.

    No, but a lot of people might say "true in the base system" when they
    ought to say "a theorem of the base system" which means there is a
    derivation from the axioms of the formal system using only the deduction rules of the formal system (which are restricted in what they can
    possibly be).

    "True" has such a variety of meanings that it should be avoided except
    for when it describes the speaker's feelings about reality.



    In other words, you deny that Truth exists, when it is actually a well
    defined quantity in a formal system.

    It seems you are just another version of a flat earther,
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jan 2 10:29:11 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/2/26 12:54 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 02:45, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-01-01 16:48, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 6:13 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 22:40, Richard Damon wrote:

    But it IS a theorem of the base system, as it uses ONLY the
    mathematical
    operations definable in the base system. What makes you think it
    isn't a
    Theorem in the base system.

    It has no derivation in the base system, if it had you wouldn't think
    the base system were incomplete.


    It has no PROOF in the base system.

    Which means it is not a theorem of the base system. A theorem is a
    statement which can be proven in a particular system.

    We have to avoid "proven in a particular system" and choose "Derived in
    a particular system" or "Derived of a particular system" or, since it's
    well defined, "Theorem of a particular system".

    The problem with "prove" is there are numerous episystems (HA being
    popular) that provide for "proofs" of statements of systems they're
    applied to. Technically, episystems may or may not prove the same set of statements that are theorem's of the system they're applied to.



    In other words, you are being Olcott and trying to redefine well defined words.

    I suspect you problem is you don't actually understand (or accept) the
    basis of Formal Logic, but are just a generic philosopher like Olcott
    that think they can apply the vagueess of that field to Formal Logic.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jan 2 10:30:16 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/2/26 8:40 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 11:54 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 02:45, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-01-01 16:48, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 6:13 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 22:40, Richard Damon wrote:

    But it IS a theorem of the base system, as it uses ONLY the
    mathematical
    operations definable in the base system. What makes you think it
    isn't a
    Theorem in the base system.

    It has no derivation in the base system, if it had you wouldn't think >>>>> the base system were incomplete.


    It has no PROOF in the base system.

    Which means it is not a theorem of the base system. A theorem is a
    statement which can be proven in a particular system.

    We have to avoid "proven in a particular system" and choose "Derived in
    a particular system" or "Derived of a particular system" or, since it's
    well defined, "Theorem of a particular system".

    The problem with "prove" is there are numerous episystems (HA being
    popular) that provide for "proofs" of statements of systems they're
    applied to. Technically, episystems may or may not prove the same set of
    statements that are theorem's of the system they're applied to.



    The term "EpiSystems" most commonly refers to Epic Systems Corporation,
    the dominant provider of Electronic Health Record (EHR) software in the United States. The reference to "HA being popular" likely means that
    their software is very popular in Healthcare Academia, large hospital systems, and associated medical facilities.


    Your Google-Foo is deficient. Or are you letting AI think for you
    because you can't.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jan 2 10:35:06 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/2/26 1:20 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 00:23, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 7:12 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 23:50, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 6:17 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 22:42, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 5:13 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 00:35, Richard Damon wrote:

    THe statement G exist


    Ah, I'm not so easily convinced



    What did he do that might allow it not to exist?

    He constructs it by the rules of F, and shows that for it to not be >>>>>> true, F must be inconsistant.

    You can't just complain that you don't think something exists, when it >>>>>> was constructed by the system.


    There's no symbol "G" in the system.



    Sure there is, as system allow the creation of names for objects in
    them.

    Name a system that meets the basic requirements that doesn't allow the >>>> creation of a "name" for a statement in the system.

    Nope. The name is not a statement of the system, it's a statement of a
    related system such as a meta-system or extension.



    No, G is the statement created in the system, using the mathematical
    relationship defined in terms of operations in the system build in the
    meta system.

    G HAS to be in the system, so the PRR can refer to it.

    OR, are you saying that in the system of arithmetic, we can't talk about
    a variable "x" as it isn't defined in the system?


    Godel's system P has variable objects, but no indeterminates. And it's namespace of Godel numbers is full up. You can do /some/ things like definitions using existential and universal quantification but the
    character of the propositions is different than a definition of a new
    symbol due to the Godel numbering; you have to be careful and not throw statements around like Goedel's introductory simile based on PM.


    No, meta-system is NOT "full up" as there are an infinite number of
    primes to use to define new objects.

    Maybe you missed that part of it.

    The base system is defined as it is, and thus can't change, but using a natural language lable to refer to a sentence in the system doesn't
    change the system.

    The meta-system CAN add the lable, which he uses in the building of the relationship, but the final results needs no reference to the statement itself, as that has been actually "encoded" into the relationship.

    You seem to miss the fact that G is a label used to talk about the
    sentence and not a "symbol" created in the base system.


    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jan 2 10:37:39 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/2/26 9:44 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/2/2026 12:20 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 00:23, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 7:12 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 23:50, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 6:17 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 22:42, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 5:13 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 00:35, Richard Damon wrote:

    THe statement G exist


    Ah, I'm not so easily convinced



    What did he do that might allow it not to exist?

    He constructs it by the rules of F, and shows that for it to not be >>>>>>> true, F must be inconsistant.

    You can't just complain that you don't think something exists,
    when it
    was constructed by the system.


    There's no symbol "G" in the system.



    Sure there is, as system allow the creation of names for objects in
    them.

    Name a system that meets the basic requirements that doesn't allow the >>>>> creation of a "name" for a statement in the system.

    Nope. The name is not a statement of the system, it's a statement of a >>>> related system such as a meta-system or extension.



    No, G is the statement created in the system, using the mathematical
    relationship defined in terms of operations in the system build in the
    meta system.

    G HAS to be in the system, so the PRR can refer to it.

    OR, are you saying that in the system of arithmetic, we can't talk about >>> a variable "x" as it isn't defined in the system?


    Godel's system P has variable objects, but no indeterminates. And it's
    namespace of Godel numbers is full up. You can do /some/ things like
    definitions using existential and universal quantification but the
    character of the propositions is different than a definition of a new
    symbol due to the Godel numbering; you have to be careful and not throw
    statements around like Goedel's introductory simile based on PM.


    His paper is a convoluted mess hiding this simple fact
    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    G||del, Kurt 1931.
    On Formally Undecidable Propositions of
    Principia Mathematica And Related Systems



    A statement of the interpreation in the meta-system of the statement in
    the base system.

    If you were smart enough to understand that basic fact you might
    understand what it means, but it seems you have killed off your ability
    to reason by forgetting to apply context to the meaning of statements,
    maybe because you are so stupid you can't keep the context while looking
    at the statement.

    TO you, if you can't understad something, it must be wrong, when in fact
    what is shown is that you are just stupid, so stupid you cah't see your
    own stupidity, which is the worse kind of stupid.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jan 2 10:43:42 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/2/26 12:20 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 10:32 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:

    Context is only included in linguistic pragmatics.

    Nope. Not unless you are meaning "Semantics" to give the list of
    possible meaning and pragmatics to determine which one.


    Compositionality is a concept in the philosophy of
    language. A symbolic system is compositional if the
    meaning of every complex expression E in that system
    depends on, and depends only on, (i) ErCOs syntactic
    structure and (ii) the meanings of ErCOs simple parts.

    If a language is compositional, then the meaning of
    a sentence S in that language cannot depend directly
    on the context that sentence is used in or the intentions
    of the speaker who uses it.

    https://iep.utm.edu/compositionality-in-language/

    Which just shows that you don't understand what you are talking about.

    To you, you think you can justify thing by pulling in random "statement"
    that doesn' actually apply to what you are talking about.

    Remember, we are talking about FORMAL SYSTEMS, and Natural Language
    talking about such things.

    "General Philosophy" is not about either, so not applicable.

    In the Formal Language, the rules are fully defined, and thus everything
    has a precise meaning,

    In Natural Language, formal rules just don't apply, and we need to apply
    the principle of seeking understanding via exegesis

    You do neither, and thus you don't understand what you are talking about.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jan 2 10:00:21 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/2/2026 9:11 AM, Python wrote:
    Le 02/01/2026 |a 15:47, olcott a |-crit :
    On 1/2/2026 2:15 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 03:26, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 8:38 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 8:25 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 9:07 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 4:12 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 31/12/2025 23:27, Richard Damon wrote:

    So, how do you think you can prove it in F?

    What does "F" refer to?


    F reo G_F rao -4Prov_F(riLG_FriY)
    F proves that: G_F is equivalent to G_F is not provable in F
    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel-incompleteness/
    #FirIncTheCom

    reaG ree WFF(F) (G rao (F re4 G))
    There exists a G in F that is logically
    equivalent to its own unprovability in F

    reaG ree WFF(F) (G := (F re4 G))
    There exists a G in F that asserts its own unprovability in F

    The proof of G in F would seem to require a sequence
    of inference steps in F that prove that they themselves
    do not exist.



    But that isn't what G is in the proof, so you are just using a bad >>>>>> reference.


    That you do not know exactly how semantics works in
    linguistics (making sure to ignore all context) is
    not my mistake. The reason that Ludwig Wittgenstein
    was never understood is that none of his detractors
    understood how language itself really works. Not
    knowing how language really works results in
    undetected muddled thinking.

    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    G asserts its own unprovability.
    Is what the above means semantically.

    The proof of G does semantically entail a sequence
    of inference steps that prove that they themselves
    do not exist.


    Ludwig Wittgenstein

    8. I imagine someone asking my advice; he says:
    "I have constructed a proposition (1 will use
    'P' to designate it) in Russell's symbolism,
    and by means of certain definitions and
    transformations it can be so interpreted that
    it says: 'P is not provable in Russell's system'.

    False. He did not do that; he tried to do so then hallucinated that he
    succeeded. A contradiction follows from the negation of my
    characterisation of his actions and so from the truth of the proposition >>> that he defined P so. That definitional proposition follows from the
    axioms of inconsistent systems and not from those of useful consistent
    ones. Typically it /is/ an axiom of inconsistent systems and not of
    consistent ones.



    His paper is a convoluted mess hiding this simple fact
    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    G||del, Kurt 1931.
    On Formally Undecidable Propositions of
    Principia Mathematica And Related Systems

    When we combine that with this:

    -a-a-a Let {T} be such a theory. Then the elementary
    -a-a-a statements which belong to {T} we shall call the
    -a-a-a elementary theorems of {T}; we also say that
    -a-a-a these elementary statements are true for {T}.
    -a-a-a Thus, given {T}, an elementary theorem is an
    -a-a-a elementary statement which is true.
    -a-a-a https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
    Foundations of Mathematical Logic 1977

    Then G||del simply made a very convoluted analog
    to the Liar Paradox.

    This is delusional wishful thinking on your part.

    Your whole "work" is a defense of your ego you've forged from the fact
    that you misunderstand G||del's articles (and many others).

    The real mess is you, Peter.



    LLM systems initially said this too.
    They give me lots and lots of push-back.
    When they finally understand my whole
    system they always totally agree, 50 times now.

    Two big advantages of LLM systems
    (1) The have no egoic attachment to conventional wisdom

    (2) They have deep knowledge across
    (a) theory of computation
    (b) foundations of mathematics
    (c) foundations of logic
    (d) Linguistic semantics
    (e) Philosophy of all of the above.

    With (1) and without (2)(d) and (2)(e) people
    lack a sufficient basis to understand me.
    This was the exact same issue for Ludwig Wittgenstein.
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jan 2 11:06:25 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/2/26 12:37 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 00:21, Richard Damon wrote:

    It started as a statement, and then was proven true in the system (but
    not by the system).

    What else do you need to make it a Theorem?


    You have to derive the statement from the axioms of the system using the deduction rules of the system. It's the actual definition of "Theorem of
    a Formal System".

    And the statement G was.


    Deriving it or other demonstration in your choice of alternative system
    does not make it a theorem of the base-system.


    It does if the statement was built using only the axioms and operation f
    the system it is being put into.

    The statement that G actually is, is merely a statement that there does
    not exist a number g that meets a specific mathematical relationship,
    all this built from the axioms and operations defined in the base system.

    Therefore it qualifies to be a Theorem, if it can be proven.

    Since it IS proven, admittedly only in a system that understands how the
    base system works, showing that there IS an infinite change of steps in
    the base system that establish its truth, using a finite chain of steps
    in the meta-system.

    This is basically like finding an "induction" principle to allow us to
    do the infinite work of testing every case, with only a finite amount of
    work.

    So, we have a statements based on JUST the axioms and operations of the
    base system that is shown to be true in the base system (the proof of
    which just happens to be outside the system).

    By the "normal" terminology, this makes it a Theorem of the System (a statement that has been proven (somewhere) to be true in the system)

    If you want to limit Theorem to be only things proven in that system, go aheadd, but that means Incompleteness can't be defined as having a
    Theorem that can't be proven, but it must be (as it is normally stated)
    a True Statement that can't be proven.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jan 2 11:10:35 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/2/26 11:00 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/2/2026 9:11 AM, Python wrote:
    Le 02/01/2026 |a 15:47, olcott a |-crit :
    On 1/2/2026 2:15 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 03:26, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 8:38 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 8:25 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 9:07 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 4:12 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 31/12/2025 23:27, Richard Damon wrote:

    So, how do you think you can prove it in F?

    What does "F" refer to?


    F reo G_F rao -4Prov_F(riLG_FriY)
    F proves that: G_F is equivalent to G_F is not provable in F
    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel-incompleteness/
    #FirIncTheCom

    reaG ree WFF(F) (G rao (F re4 G))
    There exists a G in F that is logically
    equivalent to its own unprovability in F

    reaG ree WFF(F) (G := (F re4 G))
    There exists a G in F that asserts its own unprovability in F

    The proof of G in F would seem to require a sequence
    of inference steps in F that prove that they themselves
    do not exist.



    But that isn't what G is in the proof, so you are just using a bad >>>>>>> reference.


    That you do not know exactly how semantics works in
    linguistics (making sure to ignore all context) is
    not my mistake. The reason that Ludwig Wittgenstein
    was never understood is that none of his detractors
    understood how language itself really works. Not
    knowing how language really works results in
    undetected muddled thinking.

    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    G asserts its own unprovability.
    Is what the above means semantically.

    The proof of G does semantically entail a sequence
    of inference steps that prove that they themselves
    do not exist.


    Ludwig Wittgenstein

    8. I imagine someone asking my advice; he says:
    "I have constructed a proposition (1 will use
    'P' to designate it) in Russell's symbolism,
    and by means of certain definitions and
    transformations it can be so interpreted that
    it says: 'P is not provable in Russell's system'.

    False. He did not do that; he tried to do so then hallucinated that he >>>> succeeded. A contradiction follows from the negation of my
    characterisation of his actions and so from the truth of the
    proposition
    that he defined P so. That definitional proposition follows from the
    axioms of inconsistent systems and not from those of useful consistent >>>> ones. Typically it /is/ an axiom of inconsistent systems and not of
    consistent ones.



    His paper is a convoluted mess hiding this simple fact
    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    G||del, Kurt 1931.
    On Formally Undecidable Propositions of
    Principia Mathematica And Related Systems

    When we combine that with this:

    -a-a-a Let {T} be such a theory. Then the elementary
    -a-a-a statements which belong to {T} we shall call the
    -a-a-a elementary theorems of {T}; we also say that
    -a-a-a these elementary statements are true for {T}.
    -a-a-a Thus, given {T}, an elementary theorem is an
    -a-a-a elementary statement which is true.
    -a-a-a https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
    Foundations of Mathematical Logic 1977

    Then G||del simply made a very convoluted analog
    to the Liar Paradox.

    This is delusional wishful thinking on your part.

    Your whole "work" is a defense of your ego you've forged from the fact
    that you misunderstand G||del's articles (and many others).

    The real mess is you, Peter.



    LLM systems initially said this too.
    They give me lots and lots of push-back.
    When they finally understand my whole
    system they always totally agree, 50 times now.

    Two big advantages of LLM systems
    (1) The have no egoic attachment to conventional wisdom

    (2) They have deep knowledge across
    (a) theory of computation
    (b) foundations of mathematics
    (c) foundations of logic
    (d) Linguistic semantics
    (e) Philosophy of all of the above.

    With (1) and without (2)(d) and (2)(e) people
    lack a sufficient basis to understand me.
    This was the exact same issue for Ludwig Wittgenstein.


    In other words, you claim is you were able to retrain the LLM to agree
    with you, which isn't anything to brag about as they are programmed to
    try to agree with you.

    And, you show that you don't understand how they work, as your points
    (2) and followign are utterly false as they have NO "Knowledge" as they
    have no concept of "Truth" (which is a requirement for knowledge) they
    only have incomplete memories of what has been said without regard to if
    it was true or not.

    It seems you have given up your ability to think and turned it over to
    lying machines that don't think either.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jan 2 11:32:40 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/2/26 12:48 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 03:09, Richard Damon wrote:

    I guess it depends on your definition of a "Theorem".

    I am using the one that goes:

    "A Theorem is a statement that has been proven."

    note, no restriction that the proof was in the system the Theorem is
    stated in, as long as the proof shows that it is actually True in that
    system.

    Do you have a source that limits the proof to the system in question?

    Perhaps this is just a diffence of schools of logic.


    See Curry and Feys Combinatory Logic 1, Chapters 0-2. The term is well defined as it applies to formal systems. It's out of copyright and
    available online.

    Informal logic is another matter, where "theorem" /may/ be taken to mean
    what you thought and where mistakes are commonplace, and pretty-much inevitable.

    "Truth" is not part of formal systems except in AI where personal
    intuitive philosophy is computationally modelled. "Truth" is personal as
    any spiritualist can attest.



    I seen no statement that requires a "Theorem" to be "Proven" in the
    system, mearly Constructed, and in my schooling that includes via an
    infinite chain of operations (and thus not qualifying as a proof in the system).

    Perhaps I come from a somewhat later school of thought that has accepted
    the concept of infinity and its implications.

    I see no basis for you state,ent that "Truth" isn't part of a formal
    system, as statements are sure described as True or False, and thus have
    a Truth Value.

    Thinking of "Truth" as personal, and not its universal definition just
    shows a rejection of the concept of "reality". Those who think they can redefine what "Truth" is, are just lying to themselves.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Python@python@cccp.invalid to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jan 2 16:56:01 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    Le 02/01/2026 |a 17:00, olcott a |-crit :
    On 1/2/2026 9:11 AM, Python wrote:
    Le 02/01/2026 |a 15:47, olcott a |-crit :
    On 1/2/2026 2:15 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 03:26, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 8:38 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 8:25 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 9:07 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/1/2026 4:12 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 31/12/2025 23:27, Richard Damon wrote:

    So, how do you think you can prove it in F?

    What does "F" refer to?


    F reo G_F rao -4Prov_F(riLG_FriY)
    F proves that: G_F is equivalent to G_F is not provable in F
    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel-incompleteness/
    #FirIncTheCom

    reaG ree WFF(F) (G rao (F re4 G))
    There exists a G in F that is logically
    equivalent to its own unprovability in F

    reaG ree WFF(F) (G := (F re4 G))
    There exists a G in F that asserts its own unprovability in F

    The proof of G in F would seem to require a sequence
    of inference steps in F that prove that they themselves
    do not exist.



    But that isn't what G is in the proof, so you are just using a bad >>>>>>> reference.


    That you do not know exactly how semantics works in
    linguistics (making sure to ignore all context) is
    not my mistake. The reason that Ludwig Wittgenstein
    was never understood is that none of his detractors
    understood how language itself really works. Not
    knowing how language really works results in
    undetected muddled thinking.

    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    G asserts its own unprovability.
    Is what the above means semantically.

    The proof of G does semantically entail a sequence
    of inference steps that prove that they themselves
    do not exist.


    Ludwig Wittgenstein

    8. I imagine someone asking my advice; he says:
    "I have constructed a proposition (1 will use
    'P' to designate it) in Russell's symbolism,
    and by means of certain definitions and
    transformations it can be so interpreted that
    it says: 'P is not provable in Russell's system'.

    False. He did not do that; he tried to do so then hallucinated that he >>>> succeeded. A contradiction follows from the negation of my
    characterisation of his actions and so from the truth of the proposition >>>> that he defined P so. That definitional proposition follows from the
    axioms of inconsistent systems and not from those of useful consistent >>>> ones. Typically it /is/ an axiom of inconsistent systems and not of
    consistent ones.



    His paper is a convoluted mess hiding this simple fact
    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    G||del, Kurt 1931.
    On Formally Undecidable Propositions of
    Principia Mathematica And Related Systems

    When we combine that with this:

    -a-a-a Let {T} be such a theory. Then the elementary
    -a-a-a statements which belong to {T} we shall call the
    -a-a-a elementary theorems of {T}; we also say that
    -a-a-a these elementary statements are true for {T}.
    -a-a-a Thus, given {T}, an elementary theorem is an
    -a-a-a elementary statement which is true.
    -a-a-a https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
    Foundations of Mathematical Logic 1977

    Then G||del simply made a very convoluted analog
    to the Liar Paradox.

    This is delusional wishful thinking on your part.

    Your whole "work" is a defense of your ego you've forged from the fact
    that you misunderstand G||del's articles (and many others).

    The real mess is you, Peter.



    LLM systems initially said this too.
    They give me lots and lots of push-back.
    When they finally understand my whole
    system they always totally agree, 50 times now.

    Two big advantages of LLM systems
    (1) The have no egoic attachment to conventional wisdom

    (2) They have deep knowledge across
    (a) theory of computation
    (b) foundations of mathematics
    (c) foundations of logic
    (d) Linguistic semantics
    (e) Philosophy of all of the above.

    With (1) and without (2)(d) and (2)(e) people
    lack a sufficient basis to understand me.
    This was the exact same issue for Ludwig Wittgenstein.

    One HUGE drawback of LLM systems : they tend to enforce rhetoric not
    truth.

    You fell in that trap, like many many other cranks here and there. LLM can
    be good for sane people, they are poison for auto-indulgent people of your kind.


    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mike Terry@news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jan 2 17:24:08 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 02/01/2026 15:25, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/2/26 1:14 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 04:45, Richard Damon wrote:


    Truth in the base system has always
    actually been theorems of the base system.

    But only if "Theorem" includes things proven to be true in the system
    even if the proof is in another.

    If the statement is derived in another then it is a theorem of the other.

    I will disagree with you here. Maybe it iw what you are trying to define "derived" as.

    I can certainly use one system to guide me in building a statement in another. Or do you think that
    is a task too hard?

    I can certainly use one system that knows about another to show that a statement must be true in
    that other.

    If you want to reserve the lable "Theorem" for only things provable in taht system, I will let you,
    but point out I think you are in the minority, and ask for your reference that specifies that.

    No, I'd say Tristan is spot on with how that's normally done.

    While speaking informally, "theorem" can mean "a mathematical statement that has a convincing
    argument for its truth" (e.g. Pythagoras' theorem), in formal logic "Theorem" and "Theory" have a
    technical meaning: "Theory" being the deductive closure of a set of axioms, and a Theorem being a
    sentence of the Theory. So every Theorem in the Theory has a "derivation" from the theories axioms.
    It is not directly to do with "truth" in the formal system. [Of course, we want our system
    (including axioms) to be sound, so all Theorems will be true.]

    <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_(mathematical_logic)#Deductive_theories>

    Of course, you could be learning from an author taking a different approach, but I haven't
    personally come across one who would say that the sentence represented by G was a "Theorem" of the
    underlying logical system! (That would (IMO) be grossly misleading...)

    Similarly, the word "proof" can be informal (simply an argument that convinces people of the truth
    of a statement), or refer to the "proof calculus" of the formal system being discussed. Most
    authors I've come across seem to use "proof" more or less informally and for clarity choose another
    word for whatever sequence of syntactic "proof steps" the formal system specifies. Often
    "derivation" is used, and that seems intuitive to me, so I try to always use that term here, and
    using "proof" for more general mathematial arguments, e.g. proving that the G statement is "true"
    using some meta-theory.

    Also just as an aside, I don't recall that Godel ever talked about "truth" of his G statement. His
    proof was concerned with provability. (Neither the G sentence nor its negation is provable.)


    Mike.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jan 2 12:54:01 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/2/26 12:24 PM, Mike Terry wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 15:25, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/2/26 1:14 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 04:45, Richard Damon wrote:


    Truth in the base system has always
    actually been theorems of the base system.

    But only if "Theorem" includes things proven to be true in the system
    even if the proof is in another.

    If the statement is derived in another then it is a theorem of the
    other.

    I will disagree with you here. Maybe it iw what you are trying to
    define "derived" as.

    I can certainly use one system to guide me in building a statement in
    another. Or do you think that is a task too hard?

    I can certainly use one system that knows about another to show that a
    statement must be true in that other.

    If you want to reserve the lable "Theorem" for only things provable in
    taht system, I will let you, but point out I think you are in the
    minority, and ask for your reference that specifies that.

    No, I'd say Tristan is spot on with how that's normally done.

    While speaking informally, "theorem" can mean "a mathematical statement
    that has a convincing argument for its truth" (e.g. Pythagoras'
    theorem), in formal logic "Theorem" and "Theory" have a technical
    meaning:-a "Theory" being the deductive closure of a set of axioms, and a Theorem being a sentence of the Theory.-a So every Theorem in the Theory
    has a "derivation" from the theories axioms. -aIt is not directly to do
    with "truth" in the formal system.-a [Of course, we want our system (including axioms) to be sound, so all Theorems will be true.]

    -a <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Theory_(mathematical_logic)#Deductive_theories>

    Note, the addition of the adjective DEDUCTIVE.


    Of course, you could be learning from an author taking a different
    approach, but I haven't personally come across one who would say that
    the sentence represented by G was a "Theorem" of the underlying logical system!-a (That would (IMO) be grossly misleading...)

    I will somewhat agree here, because generally the term is reserved for statements about a more general truth, as opposed to a statement about a specific fact. But the most generic definition is just a statment that
    has been proven.


    Similarly, the word "proof" can be informal (simply an argument that convinces people of the truth of a statement), or refer to the "proof calculus" of the formal system being discussed.-a Most authors I've come across seem to use "proof" more or less informally and for clarity
    choose another word for whatever sequence of syntactic "proof steps" the formal system specifies.-a Often "derivation" is used, and that seems intuitive to me, so I try to always use that term here, and using
    "proof" for more general mathematial arguments, e.g. proving that the G statement is "true" using some meta-theory.

    The issue is that "derivation" doesn't actually imply a finiteness,
    which is a necessity of "proof".

    The point is that the standard statement of "Incompleteness" talks about
    the provability of statements in the system. Provability is inherently
    about the ability to create a proof in the system.

    Yes, often an other will use a more confined word to establish the
    method of a proof.


    Also just as an aside, I don't recall that Godel ever talked about
    "truth" of his G statement.-a His proof was concerned with provability. (Neither the G sentence nor its negation is provable.)


    Mike.


    But there are many statements that they or their negation is provable,
    all you need is a statement that isn't a truth bearer, for example, the
    liar paradox.

    Incompleteness is about a statement that is true in the system and not
    being provable. That is the ESSENCE of the concept of incompleteness.

    It uses BOTH the concept of Truth, and Proof, so trying to say that
    these aren't terms used seems to be a contradiction in your explaination.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From x@x@x.net to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Fri Jan 2 09:54:08 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/1/26 09:34, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 5:41 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 31/12/2025 21:16, Pierre Asselin wrote:
    In sci.logic Tristan Wibberley
    <tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk> wrote:

    [ ... ]
    Then he defines a new system "P" which he uses to get even more
    muddled,
    leaves out the crucial elements of his proof because it's too easy to
    get wrong,

    G||del, muddled? He was the most meticulous sonovabitch that ever
    lived!

    Have you heard about his musings on God?


    and Stephen Meyer says he does get it wrong; he seems to be
    the only person in the world that ever checked.

    People have misunderstood G||del and proved it by their comments.
    I don't know who Stephen Meyer is; my money is on G||del.


    I misremembered, it was James Meyer. He has a website on it
    http://www.jamesrmeyer.com . He's very angry about people telling him
    he's wrong but who never checked like he did because they keep telling
    him reasons it's right that he's certain are not reflected in the actual
    work.


    In other words, since he doesn't understand it, it must be wrong.

    Is that a bad definition based upon philosophic idealism?

    If no one understands it, why can it not be wrong?

    If no one explains it, doesn't it become more and
    more wrong as people do not bother to explain it?

    Since his page begins with a rejection of the axiom of Choice,
    What is the axiom of choice?

    ? and the
    example he gives,

    I generally do not want to bother sifting through all of
    the threads to find this theoretical example. Where is
    that?

    it shows a limitation in his ability to understand the
    nature of infinite systems.

    I do not understand this. I am ok with the idea that
    it is wrong until it is explained.

    If you do not explain it that tells me that you do
    not care about the concept yourself.

    To expect that infinite systems behave just like we see finite systems
    work is a funamental error.

    Yes, it seems to create paradoxes, but those paradoxes are only apparent
    due to the lack of understanding about the actual nature of infinite
    sets.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From =?UTF-8?B?QW5kcsOpIEcuIElzYWFr?=@agisaak@gm.invalid to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jan 2 19:43:02 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 2026-01-01 20:09, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 9:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-01-01 16:48, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 6:13 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 22:40, Richard Damon wrote:

    But it IS a theorem of the base system, as it uses ONLY the
    mathematical
    operations definable in the base system. What makes you think it
    isn't a
    Theorem in the base system.

    It has no derivation in the base system, if it had you wouldn't think
    the base system were incomplete.


    It has no PROOF in the base system.

    Which means it is not a theorem of the base system. A theorem is a
    statement which can be proven in a particular system.

    I guess it depends on your definition of a "Theorem".

    I am using the one that goes:

    "A Theorem is a statement that has been proven."

    note, no restriction that the proof was in the system the Theorem is
    stated in, as long as the proof shows that it is actually True in that system.

    A theorem is a statement that can be derived from the axioms of a
    particular system. It may be true in other systems, but it is only a
    theorem in systems in which it can be derived.

    An obvious example to illustrate this would be the fact that there are
    many theorems which can be derived in Euclidean geometry, but which are
    not theorems of various non-Euclidean geometries. That is to say, not
    only can they not be derived in those non-Euclidean geometries, but they
    can be shown to be *false* in those non-Euclidean geometries.

    Theoremhood is always tied to a particular formal system.

    Andr|-
    --
    To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
    service.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jan 2 22:30:34 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/2/26 9:43 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-01-01 20:09, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 9:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-01-01 16:48, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 6:13 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 22:40, Richard Damon wrote:

    But it IS a theorem of the base system, as it uses ONLY the
    mathematical
    operations definable in the base system. What makes you think it
    isn't a
    Theorem in the base system.

    It has no derivation in the base system, if it had you wouldn't think >>>>> the base system were incomplete.


    It has no PROOF in the base system.

    Which means it is not a theorem of the base system. A theorem is a
    statement which can be proven in a particular system.

    I guess it depends on your definition of a "Theorem".

    I am using the one that goes:

    "A Theorem is a statement that has been proven."

    note, no restriction that the proof was in the system the Theorem is
    stated in, as long as the proof shows that it is actually True in that
    system.

    A theorem is a statement that can be derived from the axioms of a
    particular system. It may be true in other systems, but it is only a
    theorem in systems in which it can be derived.

    Right, And the statement og Godel's G can be fully derived in the base
    system, as it is purely a mathematical relationship using the operations derivable in the system.

    The implications of this statement can't be understood in the system,
    but that isn't a requirment to be a Theorem.


    An obvious example to illustrate this would be the fact that there are
    many theorems which can be derived in Euclidean geometry, but which are
    not theorems of various non-Euclidean geometries. That is to say, not
    only can they not be derived in those non-Euclidean geometries, but they
    can be shown to be *false* in those non-Euclidean geometries.

    Right, but G isn't like this.


    Theoremhood is always tied to a particular formal system.

    Right, and the statement G needs nothing outside of the base system to
    be created.

    What the meta-system provides is a "hidden" meaning to it.


    Andr|-



    It is sort of like given a binary of a program. The base computer still considers it a program, even if the only way to figure out what this
    program does is to run it with all sorts of input. So, even without a C compiler, that binary is a program.

    WIth the C compiler and the C source code, we can understand much better
    what the program does, and might not need to run it for a bunch of inputs.

    The fact that program came out of the C compiler. doesn't make it not a program for that processor.

    In the same way, G is a statement about using a specific set of
    operations defined in the base system and whether any number given will statisfy it. WIth just the assembly code, that may be impossible to
    determine, as there are an infinite number of possible inputs, so we
    can't test them all.

    But, that sequence of operations that G uses, came out of a "compiler"
    in the meta-system, from which we can see that this set of instructions
    are just a proof tester, to see if the number is a representation of a
    give proof of the statement G in the base system, where every proof in
    the base system produces a unique number, and every number produces a
    possible proof in the base system (though many are just non-sense)

    The fact we used a "compiler" to generate the statement doesn't make it
    not a program in the base system, but does let us understand what it does.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 07:17:07 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 02/01/2026 16:32, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/2/26 12:48 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 03:09, Richard Damon wrote:

    I guess it depends on your definition of a "Theorem".

    I'm using Curry and Feys' definition and I don't expect to revert to an informal one except in informal discussion.

    ...

    Perhaps this is just a diffence of schools of logic.

    Yes, formal systems vs informal.


    Perhaps I come from a somewhat later school of thought that has accepted
    the concept of infinity and its implications.

    Perhaps it is Hilbert school, reducible to constructive formal
    systems... when one wants to avoid errors. See if you can find out which
    one was Goedel.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 08:03:07 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 03/01/2026 03:30, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/2/26 9:43 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-01-01 20:09, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 9:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-01-01 16:48, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 6:13 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 22:40, Richard Damon wrote:

    But it IS a theorem of the base system, as it uses ONLY the
    mathematical
    operations definable in the base system. What makes you think it >>>>>>> isn't a
    Theorem in the base system.

    It has no derivation in the base system, if it had you wouldn't think >>>>>> the base system were incomplete.


    It has no PROOF in the base system.

    Which means it is not a theorem of the base system. A theorem is a
    statement which can be proven in a particular system.

    I guess it depends on your definition of a "Theorem".

    I am using the one that goes:

    "A Theorem is a statement that has been proven."

    note, no restriction that the proof was in the system the Theorem is
    stated in, as long as the proof shows that it is actually True in
    that system.

    A theorem is a statement that can be derived from the axioms of a
    particular system. It may be true in other systems, but it is only a
    theorem in systems in which it can be derived.

    Right, And the statement og Godel's G can be fully derived in the base system, as it is purely a mathematical relationship using the operations derivable in the system.

    The implications of this statement can't be understood in the system,
    but that isn't a requirment to be a Theorem.


    An obvious example to illustrate this would be the fact that there are
    many theorems which can be derived in Euclidean geometry, but which
    are not theorems of various non-Euclidean geometries. That is to say,
    not only can they not be derived in those non-Euclidean geometries,
    but they can be shown to be *false* in those non-Euclidean geometries.

    Right, but G isn't like this.

    For Goedel's system of statement quoting (goedel numbering) there's the
    gotcha where the normally allowable informality of naming a statement
    with a name that isn't an indeterminate of the system is a problem... it doesn't have a quoted form.

    You can't use that informality and you have to generate a new system
    with an accommodatingly larger system of quotation (with at least one indeterminate accommodated) or else use the already quotable expression
    of the statement.

    This way, you find some of the exemplary statements you would have
    admitted are actually not part of the system because they'd be
    non-constructive (Olcott occurs here).

    A larger system of quotation might invalidated conclusions,
    necessitating that they be converted to more contingent ones.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 10:31:38 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 02/01/2026 17:24, Mike Terry wrote:
    While speaking informally, "theorem" can mean "a mathematical statement
    that has a convincing argument for its truth" (e.g. Pythagoras'
    theorem), in formal logic "Theorem" and "Theory" have a technical
    meaning:-a "Theory" being the deductive closure of a set of axioms, and a Theorem being a sentence of the Theory.-a

    We should say "theory proper" to account for historical usage of theory
    for epitheory and theory proper combined. Curry and Feys did that and
    they were clearly very good at choosing terminology.


    So every Theorem in the Theory
    has a "derivation" from the theories axioms. It is not directly to do
    with "truth" in the formal system. [Of course, we want our system
    (including axioms) to be sound, so all Theorems will be true.]

    Ergh, soundness and truth again. One needs a "wrt" in there: against
    which system (formal or personal-intuitive) will soundness be judged?

    Mainly we want the system to be useful and going further than that is
    just a matter of degree and of application. By aiming for sound (without
    mere multiple-world logics to satisfy the need for "wrt") we're really
    looking for absolute degree and universal application which you're not
    ever going to demonstrate that you have achieved.


    Also just as an aside, I don't recall that Godel ever talked about
    "truth" of his G statement.-a


    Did he talk about any "G" statement at all except in his introductory
    fallacy where he defines an inconsistent extension of PM to put the
    reader in mind of the nature of the matter?

    I haven't got through the rest of it yet. Still wondering whether his
    identity shorthand is as symmetric due to the other axioms of the system
    as it is in PM, but not having the oomph to slog through it to check
    (actually, slowly, reading PM1 to understand fully the theory by which
    PM gets symmetric identity from its asymmetric definitional axiom).
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 10:36:35 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 02/01/2026 17:54, Richard Damon wrote:

    The issue is that "derivation" doesn't actually imply a finiteness,
    which is a necessity of "proof".


    Perhaps not. When you have written any other derivation down I would be interested to visit it someday.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 09:58:04 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/3/26 5:36 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 17:54, Richard Damon wrote:

    The issue is that "derivation" doesn't actually imply a finiteness,
    which is a necessity of "proof".


    Perhaps not. When you have written any other derivation down I would be interested to visit it someday.


    Which shows your error, "derivation" doesn't imply able to write down,
    at least in this context.

    Form ME to derive, I would need to enumerate it.

    For IT to derive, we don't. It exists out of the possible infinte
    sequence that creates it.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mike Terry@news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 16:32:58 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 03/01/2026 03:30, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/2/26 9:43 PM, Andro G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-01-01 20:09, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 9:45 PM, Andro G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-01-01 16:48, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 6:13 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 22:40, Richard Damon wrote:

    But it IS a theorem of the base system, as it uses ONLY the mathematical
    operations definable in the base system. What makes you think it isn't a
    Theorem in the base system.

    It has no derivation in the base system, if it had you wouldn't think >>>>>> the base system were incomplete.


    It has no PROOF in the base system.

    Which means it is not a theorem of the base system. A theorem is a statement which can be proven
    in a particular system.

    I guess it depends on your definition of a "Theorem".

    I am using the one that goes:

    "A Theorem is a statement that has been proven."

    note, no restriction that the proof was in the system the Theorem is stated in, as long as the
    proof shows that it is actually True in that system.

    A theorem is a statement that can be derived from the axioms of a particular system. It may be
    true in other systems, but it is only a theorem in systems in which it can be derived.

    Right, And the statement og Godel's G can be fully derived in the base system, as it is purely a
    mathematical relationship using the operations derivable in the system.

    Neither G nor 4G has a derivation (in your terms, a "formal prooof") within the base system. That
    is what Godel proves, showing that the base system is incomplete.

    Mike.


    The implications of this statement can't be understood in the system, but that isn't a requirment to
    be a Theorem.


    An obvious example to illustrate this would be the fact that there are many theorems which can be
    derived in Euclidean geometry, but which are not theorems of various non-Euclidean geometries.
    That is to say, not only can they not be derived in those non-Euclidean geometries, but they can
    be shown to be *false* in those non-Euclidean geometries.

    Right, but G isn't like this.


    Theoremhood is always tied to a particular formal system.

    Right, and the statement G needs nothing outside of the base system to be created.


    Sure. Just creating a statement doesn't mean the statement is a Theorem. Theorems need a "formal
    proof" (aka, a derivation) in that formal system. You have a basic misunderstanding somewhere!

    Mike.


    What the meta-system provides is a "hidden" meaning to it.


    Andro



    It is sort of like given a binary of a program. The base computer still considers it a program, even
    if the only way to figure out what this program does is to run it with all sorts of input. So, even
    without a C compiler, that binary is a program.

    WIth the C compiler and the C source code, we can understand much better what the program does, and
    might not need to run it for a bunch of inputs.

    The fact that program came out of the C compiler. doesn't make it not a program for that processor.

    In the same way, G is a statement about using a specific set of operations defined in the base
    system and whether any number given will statisfy it. WIth just the assembly code, that may be
    impossible to determine, as there are an infinite number of possible inputs, so we can't test them all.

    But, that sequence of operations that G uses, came out of a "compiler" in the meta-system, from
    which we can see that this set of instructions are just a proof tester, to see if the number is a
    representation of a give proof of the statement G in the base system, where every proof in the base
    system produces a unique number, and every number produces a possible proof in the base system
    (though many are just non-sense)

    The fact we used a "compiler" to generate the statement doesn't make it not a program in the base
    system, but does let us understand what it does.

    You have used lots of words to explain, in effect, that the G statement is a statement of the base
    system. Well, most everybody here understands that perfectly well. (Not PO though...) Your
    analogy with programs has nothing more than

    program <---> statement in the language of the formal system
    (or what is often called a "sentence" in that language)

    so program does not correlate with "Theorem" of the formal system. All the stuff about compilers
    helping us to understand the purpose of program is ok, but has nothing to do with whether the
    program corresponds to a Theorem.

    You seem to understand that Godel proves that the G statement does NOT have a "derivation" (aka
    "formal proof using the specified proof rules of the base system") in the base system. I.e. it is
    specifically NOT a "Theorem" of the base system, in the sense that people use that word /in the
    realm of formal logic/.


    Mike.





    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 10:47:55 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/3/2026 10:32 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
    On 03/01/2026 03:30, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/2/26 9:43 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-01-01 20:09, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 9:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-01-01 16:48, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 6:13 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 22:40, Richard Damon wrote:

    But it IS a theorem of the base system, as it uses ONLY the
    mathematical
    operations definable in the base system. What makes you think it >>>>>>>> isn't a
    Theorem in the base system.

    It has no derivation in the base system, if it had you wouldn't >>>>>>> think
    the base system were incomplete.


    It has no PROOF in the base system.

    Which means it is not a theorem of the base system. A theorem is a
    statement which can be proven in a particular system.

    I guess it depends on your definition of a "Theorem".

    I am using the one that goes:

    "A Theorem is a statement that has been proven."

    note, no restriction that the proof was in the system the Theorem is
    stated in, as long as the proof shows that it is actually True in
    that system.

    A theorem is a statement that can be derived from the axioms of a
    particular system. It may be true in other systems, but it is only a
    theorem in systems in which it can be derived.

    Right, And the statement og Godel's G can be fully derived in the base
    system, as it is purely a mathematical relationship using the
    operations derivable in the system.

    Neither G nor -4G has a derivation (in your terms, a "formal prooof")
    within the base system.-a That is what Godel proves, showing that the
    base system is incomplete.

    Mike.


    The implications of this statement can't be understood in the system,
    but that isn't a requirment to be a Theorem.


    An obvious example to illustrate this would be the fact that there
    are many theorems which can be derived in Euclidean geometry, but
    which are not theorems of various non-Euclidean geometries. That is
    to say, not only can they not be derived in those non-Euclidean
    geometries, but they can be shown to be *false* in those non-
    Euclidean geometries.

    Right, but G isn't like this.


    Theoremhood is always tied to a particular formal system.

    Right, and the statement G needs nothing outside of the base system to
    be created.


    Sure.-a Just creating a statement doesn't mean the statement is a
    Theorem.-a Theorems need a "formal proof" (aka, a derivation) in that
    formal system.-a You have a basic misunderstanding somewhere!

    Mike.


    What the meta-system provides is a "hidden" meaning to it.


    Andr|-



    It is sort of like given a binary of a program. The base computer
    still considers it a program, even if the only way to figure out what
    this program does is to run it with all sorts of input. So, even
    without a C compiler, that binary is a program.

    WIth the C compiler and the C source code, we can understand much
    better what the program does, and might not need to run it for a bunch
    of inputs.

    The fact that program came out of the C compiler. doesn't make it not
    a program for that processor.

    In the same way, G is a statement about using a specific set of
    operations defined in the base system and whether any number given
    will statisfy it. WIth just the assembly code, that may be impossible
    to determine, as there are an infinite number of possible inputs, so
    we can't test them all.

    But, that sequence of operations that G uses, came out of a "compiler"
    in the meta-system, from which we can see that this set of
    instructions are just a proof tester, to see if the number is a
    representation of a give proof of the statement G in the base system,
    where every proof in the base system produces a unique number, and
    every number produces a possible proof in the base system (though many
    are just non-sense)

    The fact we used a "compiler" to generate the statement doesn't make
    it not a program in the base system, but does let us understand what
    it does.

    You have used lots of words to explain, in effect, that the G statement
    is a statement of the base system.-a Well, most everybody here
    understands that perfectly well.-a (Not PO though...)-a Your analogy with programs has nothing more than

    -a program-a <---> statement in the language of the formal system
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a (or what is often called a "sentence" in that language)

    so program does not correlate with "Theorem" of the formal system.-a All
    the stuff about compilers helping us to understand the purpose of
    program is ok, but has nothing to do with whether the program
    corresponds to a Theorem.

    You seem to understand that Godel proves that the G statement does NOT
    have a "derivation" (aka "formal proof using the specified proof rules
    of the base system") in the base system.-a I.e. it is specifically NOT a "Theorem" of the base system, in the sense that people use that word /in
    the realm of formal logic/.


    Mike.


    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    G||del, Kurt 1931.
    On Formally Undecidable Propositions of
    Principia Mathematica And Related Systems

    A proposition which asserts its own unprovability
    literally means: G asserts its own unprovability.

    This semantically entails that:
    A proof of G requires a sequence of inference
    steps that prove that they themselves do not exist.

    ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise
    be used for a similar undecidability proof...
    (G||del 1931:40-41)

    This literally means that the Liar Paradox can
    likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof.

    This semantically entails that:
    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    Expands to not(true(not(true(not(true(not(true(...))))))))
    Proves that the Liar Paradox is ungrounded, thus
    neither G nor LP are truth bearers or propositions.

    *Key difference between math and the philosophy of math*
    The philosophy of math says maybe we have
    been thinking about this stuff all wrong.

    Math says of course we haven't been thinking
    about this stuff all wrong everyone knows
    that math is infallible.

    *Hence the basis for disagreement over all these years*
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
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  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 16:54:30 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 02/01/2026 15:35, Richard Damon wrote:

    No, meta-system is NOT "full up" as there are an infinite number of
    primes to use to define new objects.

    I understood from reading it that those were occupied for variables.


    Maybe you missed that part of it.

    Perhaps.


    The base system is defined as it is, and thus can't change, but using a natural language lable to refer to a sentence in the system doesn't
    change the system.

    It didn't seem that you were doing that.


    The meta-system CAN add the lable, which he uses in the building of the relationship, but the final results needs no reference to the statement itself, as that has been actually "encoded" into the relationship.

    As long as you're doing that I'll hear more.


    You seem to miss the fact that G is a label used to talk about the
    sentence and not a "symbol" created in the base system.

    Yes, I thought you were trying to do the latter informally.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

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  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 16:58:30 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 02/01/2026 14:47, olcott wrote:

    When we combine that with this:

    -a-a Let {T} be such a theory. Then the elementary
    -a-a statements which belong to {T} we shall call the
    -a-a elementary theorems of {T}; we also say that
    -a-a these elementary statements are true for {T}.
    -a-a Thus, given {T}, an elementary theorem is an
    -a-a elementary statement which is true.
    -a-a https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
    Foundations of Mathematical Logic 1977

    Then I should have used examples such as "Theorem of the theory proper
    of a system".
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

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  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 16:59:55 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 02/01/2026 16:00, olcott wrote:
    The real mess is you, Peter.



    LLM systems initially said this too.

    lol, I like them more and more. They seem to have some sass.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

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  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 11:30:12 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/3/2026 10:58 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:

    We begin by postulating a certain non void, definite
    class {E} of statements, which we call elementary
    statements...

    The statements of {E} are called elementary statements
    to distinguish them from other statements which we may
    form from them or about them in the U language...

    A theory (over {E}) is defined as a conceptual class
    of these elementary statements. Let {T} be such a theory.
    Then the elementary statements which belong to {T}
    we shall call the elementary theorems of {T}; we also
    say that these elementary statements are true for {T}.
    Thus, given {T}, an elementary theorem is an elementary
    statement which is true. A theory is thus a way of
    picking out from the statements of {E} a certain
    subclass of true statementsrCa

    The terminology which has just been used implies that
    the elementary statements are not such that their truth
    and falsity are known to us without reference to {T}.

    Curry, Haskell 1977. Foundations of Mathematical
    Logic. New York: Dover Publications, 45 https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf

    In other words: reCx ree T ((True(T, x) rei (E reo x))


    Then I should have used examples such as "Theorem of the theory proper
    of a system".

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
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  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 17:35:09 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 02/01/2026 16:06, Richard Damon wrote:
    You have to derive the statement from the axioms of the system using the
    deduction rules of the system. It's the actual definition of "Theorem of
    a Formal System".

    And the statement G was.

    Then a system can be complete.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

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  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 11:44:07 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/3/2026 11:35 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 16:06, Richard Damon wrote:
    You have to derive the statement from the axioms of the system using the >>> deduction rules of the system. It's the actual definition of "Theorem of >>> a Formal System".

    And the statement G was.

    Then a system can be complete.



    If G is a theorem of F and G asserts its
    own unprovability in F then a sequence
    of inferences steps exist in F that
    prove that they themselves do not exist.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 13:51:52 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/3/26 12:35 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 16:06, Richard Damon wrote:
    You have to derive the statement from the axioms of the system using the >>> deduction rules of the system. It's the actual definition of "Theorem of >>> a Formal System".

    And the statement G was.

    Then a system can be complete.



    No, because the derivation isn't finite, so isn't a proof.

    It seems you are stuck in a finite world, in a logic that is infinite.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 13:53:42 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/3/26 12:44 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 11:35 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 16:06, Richard Damon wrote:
    You have to derive the statement from the axioms of the system using
    the
    deduction rules of the system. It's the actual definition of
    "Theorem of
    a Formal System".

    And the statement G was.

    Then a system can be complete.



    If G is a theorem of F and G asserts its
    own unprovability in F then a sequence
    of inferences steps exist in F that
    prove that they themselves do not exist.


    But G doesn't assert its own unprovability.

    G can be interpreted to mean that by an interpretation in the
    meta-system (and that unprovability is in the base system).

    You just don't seem to believe in the use of context, and thus don't
    actually beleive in the proper use of semantics.
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  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 18:54:58 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 03/01/2026 02:43, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:

    An obvious example to illustrate this would be the fact that there are
    many theorems which can be derived in Euclidean geometry, but which are
    not theorems of various non-Euclidean geometries. That is to say, not
    only can they not be derived in those non-Euclidean geometries, but they
    can be shown to be *false* in those non-Euclidean geometries.


    Note that "Not a theorem" does not mean exactly the same as "can be
    shown to be false", generally. Eventually, true and false come down to a mapping to another system, and to another, and to another, all the way
    down to the appraiser's personal intuition.

    There's some meaning for true and false in episystems that show whether
    or not a given statement is a theorem of a system that the episystem is
    being applied to, but then "is a theorem of EYo+" and "is not a theorem of EYo+" do the job of "is true" and "is false".

    I feel "true" and "false" are such overloaded and carelessly used terms
    that it's best to avoid them even if you can find an attempt to
    formalise them. Most apparent formalisations of them are just attempts
    to connect a real set of formal terms to intuitive notions of truth
    because discovering truth is the goal of the reader so they demand a
    connection between formalism and truth beyond the fact that it's true
    that the formalism is useful. Perhaps one day I'll appreciate some proof
    system so much I'll use "true" and "false" and then you should tell me
    to stop it.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 19:02:00 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 03/01/2026 16:32, Mike Terry wrote:
    On 03/01/2026 03:30, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/2/26 9:43 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-01-01 20:09, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 9:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-01-01 16:48, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 6:13 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 22:40, Richard Damon wrote:

    But it IS a theorem of the base system, as it uses ONLY the
    mathematical
    operations definable in the base system. What makes you think it >>>>>>>> isn't a
    Theorem in the base system.

    It has no derivation in the base system, if it had you wouldn't
    think
    the base system were incomplete.


    It has no PROOF in the base system.

    Which means it is not a theorem of the base system. A theorem is a
    statement which can be proven in a particular system.

    I guess it depends on your definition of a "Theorem".

    I am using the one that goes:

    "A Theorem is a statement that has been proven."

    note, no restriction that the proof was in the system the Theorem is
    stated in, as long as the proof shows that it is actually True in
    that system.

    A theorem is a statement that can be derived from the axioms of a
    particular system. It may be true in other systems, but it is only a
    theorem in systems in which it can be derived.

    Right, And the statement og Godel's G can be fully derived in the base
    system, as it is purely a mathematical relationship using the
    operations derivable in the system.

    Neither G nor -4G has a derivation (in your terms, a "formal prooof")
    within the base system.-a That is what Godel proves, showing that the
    base system is incomplete.

    That can't be what he meant can it? Lots of systems were known to have statements that had no derivation, all nonsense statements, for example.

    Did he really mean that there's some level of completeness in which
    there is meaninglessness (things that look like propositions but which
    are not? Well, duh. But arithmetic isn't required for that, merely self-references such as non-ranked definitions and fixed-point
    combinators (the meaning depends on a meaning that depends on a meaning that...).

    Hang on, he had two incompleteness theorems and a completeness theorem.
    Can we get some good terminology that distinguishes them because I think there's some referential ambiguity creeping in.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 14:11:38 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/3/26 11:32 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
    On 03/01/2026 03:30, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/2/26 9:43 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-01-01 20:09, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 9:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-01-01 16:48, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 6:13 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 22:40, Richard Damon wrote:

    But it IS a theorem of the base system, as it uses ONLY the
    mathematical
    operations definable in the base system. What makes you think it >>>>>>>> isn't a
    Theorem in the base system.

    It has no derivation in the base system, if it had you wouldn't >>>>>>> think
    the base system were incomplete.


    It has no PROOF in the base system.

    Which means it is not a theorem of the base system. A theorem is a
    statement which can be proven in a particular system.

    I guess it depends on your definition of a "Theorem".

    I am using the one that goes:

    "A Theorem is a statement that has been proven."

    note, no restriction that the proof was in the system the Theorem is
    stated in, as long as the proof shows that it is actually True in
    that system.

    A theorem is a statement that can be derived from the axioms of a
    particular system. It may be true in other systems, but it is only a
    theorem in systems in which it can be derived.

    Right, And the statement og Godel's G can be fully derived in the base
    system, as it is purely a mathematical relationship using the
    operations derivable in the system.

    Neither G nor -4G has a derivation (in your terms, a "formal prooof")
    within the base system.-a That is what Godel proves, showing that the
    base system is incomplete.

    But, in my nomencature, a "derivation" is NOT a "proof", only a FINITE derivation would be a proof.

    Whatever terms people want to use, G is an actual statement, expressed
    in the base system, that has been shown to be true. And that truth
    applies in the base system.

    It is also established that this statement can not be proven in that
    base system, and thus the system in incomplete.

    The proof is done with generality, so that ANY system that meets the
    basic requirements has this property. Those basic requirements are
    essentially that it supports the properties of the Natural Numbers.


    Mike.


    The implications of this statement can't be understood in the system,
    but that isn't a requirment to be a Theorem.


    An obvious example to illustrate this would be the fact that there
    are many theorems which can be derived in Euclidean geometry, but
    which are not theorems of various non-Euclidean geometries. That is
    to say, not only can they not be derived in those non-Euclidean
    geometries, but they can be shown to be *false* in those non-
    Euclidean geometries.

    Right, but G isn't like this.


    Theoremhood is always tied to a particular formal system.

    Right, and the statement G needs nothing outside of the base system to
    be created.


    Sure.-a Just creating a statement doesn't mean the statement is a
    Theorem.-a Theorems need a "formal proof" (aka, a derivation) in that
    formal system.-a You have a basic misunderstanding somewhere!


    And that is my argument, that that isn't the definition I am using.

    Theorems are statements in a system, that have been proven to be correct.

    Changing the meaning of the term "Theorem" doesn't change the fact that
    the system was incomplete.

    Mike.


    What the meta-system provides is a "hidden" meaning to it.


    Andr|-



    It is sort of like given a binary of a program. The base computer
    still considers it a program, even if the only way to figure out what
    this program does is to run it with all sorts of input. So, even
    without a C compiler, that binary is a program.

    WIth the C compiler and the C source code, we can understand much
    better what the program does, and might not need to run it for a bunch
    of inputs.

    The fact that program came out of the C compiler. doesn't make it not
    a program for that processor.

    In the same way, G is a statement about using a specific set of
    operations defined in the base system and whether any number given
    will statisfy it. WIth just the assembly code, that may be impossible
    to determine, as there are an infinite number of possible inputs, so
    we can't test them all.

    But, that sequence of operations that G uses, came out of a "compiler"
    in the meta-system, from which we can see that this set of
    instructions are just a proof tester, to see if the number is a
    representation of a give proof of the statement G in the base system,
    where every proof in the base system produces a unique number, and
    every number produces a possible proof in the base system (though many
    are just non-sense)

    The fact we used a "compiler" to generate the statement doesn't make
    it not a program in the base system, but does let us understand what
    it does.

    You have used lots of words to explain, in effect, that the G statement
    is a statement of the base system.-a Well, most everybody here
    understands that perfectly well.-a (Not PO though...)-a Your analogy with programs has nothing more than

    -a program-a <---> statement in the language of the formal system
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a (or what is often called a "sentence" in that language)

    That was to show the people that tried to claim that just because the relationship used in G wasn't "built" just within the base system,
    doesn't make it not a statement in the base system, which HAS be a claim
    her.e


    so program does not correlate with "Theorem" of the formal system.-a All
    the stuff about compilers helping us to understand the purpose of
    program is ok, but has nothing to do with whether the program
    corresponds to a Theorem.

    But does show that G correspondes to a True statement in the base system.


    You seem to understand that Godel proves that the G statement does NOT
    have a "derivation" (aka "formal proof using the specified proof rules
    of the base system") in the base system.-a I.e. it is specifically NOT a "Theorem" of the base system, in the sense that people use that word /in
    the realm of formal logic/.


    But this seems to be a nomenclature difference. My training talked about Theorems as propositions that had been proven to be true. That proof
    didn't need to be by that formal system. Perhaps this is a result of
    accepting incompleteness, and thus the truth of the statment is more
    important than the source of that truth.

    As with many things, it seems it has become a discipline separated by
    thinking it has a "common" langugage.



    Mike.






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  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 14:18:21 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/3/26 11:47 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 10:32 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
    On 03/01/2026 03:30, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/2/26 9:43 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-01-01 20:09, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 9:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-01-01 16:48, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 6:13 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 22:40, Richard Damon wrote:

    But it IS a theorem of the base system, as it uses ONLY the >>>>>>>>> mathematical
    operations definable in the base system. What makes you think >>>>>>>>> it isn't a
    Theorem in the base system.

    It has no derivation in the base system, if it had you wouldn't >>>>>>>> think
    the base system were incomplete.


    It has no PROOF in the base system.

    Which means it is not a theorem of the base system. A theorem is a >>>>>> statement which can be proven in a particular system.

    I guess it depends on your definition of a "Theorem".

    I am using the one that goes:

    "A Theorem is a statement that has been proven."

    note, no restriction that the proof was in the system the Theorem
    is stated in, as long as the proof shows that it is actually True
    in that system.

    A theorem is a statement that can be derived from the axioms of a
    particular system. It may be true in other systems, but it is only a
    theorem in systems in which it can be derived.

    Right, And the statement og Godel's G can be fully derived in the
    base system, as it is purely a mathematical relationship using the
    operations derivable in the system.

    Neither G nor -4G has a derivation (in your terms, a "formal prooof")
    within the base system.-a That is what Godel proves, showing that the
    base system is incomplete.

    Mike.


    The implications of this statement can't be understood in the system,
    but that isn't a requirment to be a Theorem.


    An obvious example to illustrate this would be the fact that there
    are many theorems which can be derived in Euclidean geometry, but
    which are not theorems of various non-Euclidean geometries. That is
    to say, not only can they not be derived in those non-Euclidean
    geometries, but they can be shown to be *false* in those non-
    Euclidean geometries.

    Right, but G isn't like this.


    Theoremhood is always tied to a particular formal system.

    Right, and the statement G needs nothing outside of the base system
    to be created.


    Sure.-a Just creating a statement doesn't mean the statement is a
    Theorem.-a Theorems need a "formal proof" (aka, a derivation) in that
    formal system.-a You have a basic misunderstanding somewhere!

    Mike.


    What the meta-system provides is a "hidden" meaning to it.


    Andr|-



    It is sort of like given a binary of a program. The base computer
    still considers it a program, even if the only way to figure out what
    this program does is to run it with all sorts of input. So, even
    without a C compiler, that binary is a program.

    WIth the C compiler and the C source code, we can understand much
    better what the program does, and might not need to run it for a
    bunch of inputs.

    The fact that program came out of the C compiler. doesn't make it not
    a program for that processor.

    In the same way, G is a statement about using a specific set of
    operations defined in the base system and whether any number given
    will statisfy it. WIth just the assembly code, that may be impossible
    to determine, as there are an infinite number of possible inputs, so
    we can't test them all.

    But, that sequence of operations that G uses, came out of a
    "compiler" in the meta-system, from which we can see that this set of
    instructions are just a proof tester, to see if the number is a
    representation of a give proof of the statement G in the base system,
    where every proof in the base system produces a unique number, and
    every number produces a possible proof in the base system (though
    many are just non-sense)

    The fact we used a "compiler" to generate the statement doesn't make
    it not a program in the base system, but does let us understand what
    it does.

    You have used lots of words to explain, in effect, that the G
    statement is a statement of the base system.-a Well, most everybody
    here understands that perfectly well.-a (Not PO though...)-a Your
    analogy with programs has nothing more than

    -a-a program-a <---> statement in the language of the formal system
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a (or what is often called a "sentence" in that language)

    so program does not correlate with "Theorem" of the formal system.
    All the stuff about compilers helping us to understand the purpose of
    program is ok, but has nothing to do with whether the program
    corresponds to a Theorem.

    You seem to understand that Godel proves that the G statement does NOT
    have a "derivation" (aka "formal proof using the specified proof rules
    of the base system") in the base system.-a I.e. it is specifically NOT
    a "Theorem" of the base system, in the sense that people use that
    word /in the realm of formal logic/.


    Mike.


    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    WHich you don't seem to understand is the INTERPREATION of the statement
    made in the meta system about the statement.


    G||del, Kurt 1931.
    On Formally Undecidable Propositions of
    Principia Mathematica And Related Systems

    A proposition which asserts its own unprovability
    literally means: G asserts its own unprovability.

    Nope. Just that it uses language too complicated for you to understand.

    G, itself, asserts no such thing.


    This semantically entails that:
    A proof of G requires a sequence of inference
    steps that prove that they themselves do not exist.

    Right, so no such prove IN THE BASE SYSTEM can exist.


    ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise
    be used for a similar undecidability proof...
    (G||del 1931:40-41)

    Right, the core


    This literally means that the Liar Paradox can
    likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof.

    And it was, but the FORM of the Liar, under a syntactic transform that
    actualy changes its meaning.

    Of course, taht is beyound you understanding.


    This semantically entails that:
    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.


    Nope. You are just showing your stupidity.

    Expands to not(true(not(true(not(true(not(true(...))))))))
    Proves that the Liar Paradox is ungrounded, thus
    neither G nor LP are truth bearers or propositions.

    Right, because Prolog is unable to handle the needed Grammar, and since
    Prolog is


    *Key difference between math and the philosophy of math*
    The philosophy of math says maybe we have
    been thinking about this stuff all wrong.

    Nope.


    Math says of course we haven't been thinking
    about this stuff all wrong everyone knows
    that math is infallible.

    *Hence the basis for disagreement over all these years*


    In other words, you are admitting you don't know what you are talking
    about, and don't care.

    Note, the "Philosophy of Math" isn't relevent here, that would be used
    to help decide which rules of math we should use.

    But the formal system has made that choice, and thus move past the
    philosophy.

    Your "Philosophies" can't actually answer their questions, as they have
    no actual foundations for what is true.

    Formal Logic defines Truth within it, and thus can answer the question
    in their systems.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 14:27:12 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/3/26 2:02 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 03/01/2026 16:32, Mike Terry wrote:
    On 03/01/2026 03:30, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/2/26 9:43 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-01-01 20:09, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 9:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-01-01 16:48, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 6:13 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 22:40, Richard Damon wrote:

    But it IS a theorem of the base system, as it uses ONLY the
    mathematical
    operations definable in the base system. What makes you think it >>>>>>>>> isn't a
    Theorem in the base system.

    It has no derivation in the base system, if it had you wouldn't >>>>>>>> think
    the base system were incomplete.


    It has no PROOF in the base system.

    Which means it is not a theorem of the base system. A theorem is a >>>>>> statement which can be proven in a particular system.

    I guess it depends on your definition of a "Theorem".

    I am using the one that goes:

    "A Theorem is a statement that has been proven."

    note, no restriction that the proof was in the system the Theorem is >>>>> stated in, as long as the proof shows that it is actually True in
    that system.

    A theorem is a statement that can be derived from the axioms of a
    particular system. It may be true in other systems, but it is only a
    theorem in systems in which it can be derived.

    Right, And the statement og Godel's G can be fully derived in the base
    system, as it is purely a mathematical relationship using the
    operations derivable in the system.

    Neither G nor -4G has a derivation (in your terms, a "formal prooof")
    within the base system.-a That is what Godel proves, showing that the
    base system is incomplete.

    That can't be what he meant can it? Lots of systems were known to have statements that had no derivation, all nonsense statements, for example.

    Did he really mean that there's some level of completeness in which
    there is meaninglessness (things that look like propositions but which
    are not? Well, duh. But arithmetic isn't required for that, merely self-references such as non-ranked definitions and fixed-point
    combinators (the meaning depends on a meaning that depends on a meaning that...).

    Hang on, he had two incompleteness theorems and a completeness theorem.
    Can we get some good terminology that distinguishes them because I think there's some referential ambiguity creeping in.


    The first incompleteness theorem was that all system of sufficent expressiveness (able to handle the Natural Numbers) have a statement
    that IS true, but can not be proven.

    The second incompleteness theorem was that all such system can not prove
    that they are consistant, and thus, even if that is true (which for the commonly used ones we hope it is) that is one of the statements that can
    not be proven in that system.

    The Completeness Theorem is about the provablity of a certain subset of statements in a first order system that are true in all models of the
    system.

    Since Natual Numbers need more than a first order system (The axiom of Induction is not first order) there is a dividing line between those statements.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 14:33:33 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/3/26 11:54 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 15:35, Richard Damon wrote:

    No, meta-system is NOT "full up" as there are an infinite number of
    primes to use to define new objects.

    I understood from reading it that those were occupied for variables.

    or new terms, after all, we have an infinite number of them.

    In fact, I thought he talked about assigning a number for proven
    statements in the base system, so we could refer to them. This is needed
    to create the lable of "G" in the meta, so we can refer to it as we
    build the proof checker, that at the end we finally know the "value" it represents.



    Maybe you missed that part of it.

    Perhaps.


    The base system is defined as it is, and thus can't change, but using a
    natural language lable to refer to a sentence in the system doesn't
    change the system.

    It didn't seem that you were doing that.

    "G" is just a label assigned to talk about the statement. It isn't
    actually used in the definition of G. G is just a statement asserting
    that there does not exist a number that satisfies



    The meta-system CAN add the lable, which he uses in the building of the
    relationship, but the final results needs no reference to the statement
    itself, as that has been actually "encoded" into the relationship.

    As long as you're doing that I'll hear more.


    You seem to miss the fact that G is a label used to talk about the
    sentence and not a "symbol" created in the base system.

    Yes, I thought you were trying to do the latter informally.



    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 14:24:33 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/3/2026 1:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/3/26 11:47 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 10:32 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
    On 03/01/2026 03:30, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/2/26 9:43 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-01-01 20:09, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 9:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-01-01 16:48, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 6:13 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 22:40, Richard Damon wrote:

    But it IS a theorem of the base system, as it uses ONLY the >>>>>>>>>> mathematical
    operations definable in the base system. What makes you think >>>>>>>>>> it isn't a
    Theorem in the base system.

    It has no derivation in the base system, if it had you wouldn't >>>>>>>>> think
    the base system were incomplete.


    It has no PROOF in the base system.

    Which means it is not a theorem of the base system. A theorem is >>>>>>> a statement which can be proven in a particular system.

    I guess it depends on your definition of a "Theorem".

    I am using the one that goes:

    "A Theorem is a statement that has been proven."

    note, no restriction that the proof was in the system the Theorem >>>>>> is stated in, as long as the proof shows that it is actually True >>>>>> in that system.

    A theorem is a statement that can be derived from the axioms of a
    particular system. It may be true in other systems, but it is only
    a theorem in systems in which it can be derived.

    Right, And the statement og Godel's G can be fully derived in the
    base system, as it is purely a mathematical relationship using the
    operations derivable in the system.

    Neither G nor -4G has a derivation (in your terms, a "formal prooof")
    within the base system.-a That is what Godel proves, showing that the
    base system is incomplete.

    Mike.


    The implications of this statement can't be understood in the
    system, but that isn't a requirment to be a Theorem.


    An obvious example to illustrate this would be the fact that there
    are many theorems which can be derived in Euclidean geometry, but
    which are not theorems of various non-Euclidean geometries. That is >>>>> to say, not only can they not be derived in those non-Euclidean
    geometries, but they can be shown to be *false* in those non-
    Euclidean geometries.

    Right, but G isn't like this.


    Theoremhood is always tied to a particular formal system.

    Right, and the statement G needs nothing outside of the base system
    to be created.


    Sure.-a Just creating a statement doesn't mean the statement is a
    Theorem.-a Theorems need a "formal proof" (aka, a derivation) in that
    formal system.-a You have a basic misunderstanding somewhere!

    Mike.


    What the meta-system provides is a "hidden" meaning to it.


    Andr|-



    It is sort of like given a binary of a program. The base computer
    still considers it a program, even if the only way to figure out
    what this program does is to run it with all sorts of input. So,
    even without a C compiler, that binary is a program.

    WIth the C compiler and the C source code, we can understand much
    better what the program does, and might not need to run it for a
    bunch of inputs.

    The fact that program came out of the C compiler. doesn't make it
    not a program for that processor.

    In the same way, G is a statement about using a specific set of
    operations defined in the base system and whether any number given
    will statisfy it. WIth just the assembly code, that may be
    impossible to determine, as there are an infinite number of possible
    inputs, so we can't test them all.

    But, that sequence of operations that G uses, came out of a
    "compiler" in the meta-system, from which we can see that this set
    of instructions are just a proof tester, to see if the number is a
    representation of a give proof of the statement G in the base
    system, where every proof in the base system produces a unique
    number, and every number produces a possible proof in the base
    system (though many are just non-sense)

    The fact we used a "compiler" to generate the statement doesn't make
    it not a program in the base system, but does let us understand what
    it does.

    You have used lots of words to explain, in effect, that the G
    statement is a statement of the base system.-a Well, most everybody
    here understands that perfectly well.-a (Not PO though...)-a Your
    analogy with programs has nothing more than

    -a-a program-a <---> statement in the language of the formal system
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a (or what is often called a "sentence" in that
    language)

    so program does not correlate with "Theorem" of the formal system.
    All the stuff about compilers helping us to understand the purpose of
    program is ok, but has nothing to do with whether the program
    corresponds to a Theorem.

    You seem to understand that Godel proves that the G statement does
    NOT have a "derivation" (aka "formal proof using the specified proof
    rules of the base system") in the base system.-a I.e. it is
    specifically NOT a "Theorem" of the base system, in the sense that
    people use that word /in the realm of formal logic/.


    Mike.


    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    WHich you don't seem to understand is the INTERPREATION of the statement made in the meta system about the statement.


    That is not what the sentence literally says.


    G||del, Kurt 1931.
    On Formally Undecidable Propositions of
    Principia Mathematica And Related Systems

    A proposition which asserts its own unprovability
    literally means: G asserts its own unprovability.

    Nope. Just that it uses language too complicated for you to understand.

    G, itself, asserts no such thing.


    This semantically entails that:
    A proof of G requires a sequence of inference
    steps that prove that they themselves do not exist.

    Right, so no such prove IN THE BASE SYSTEM can exist.


    ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise
    be used for a similar undecidability proof...
    (G||del 1931:40-41)

    Right, the core


    This literally means that the Liar Paradox can
    likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof.

    And it was, but the FORM of the Liar, under a syntactic transform that actualy changes its meaning.


    Not we don't need fifty pages of 85 formulas.
    LP := ~True(LP)

    Of course, taht is beyound you understanding.


    This semantically entails that:
    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.


    Nope. You are just showing your stupidity.

    Expands to not(true(not(true(not(true(not(true(...))))))))
    Proves that the Liar Paradox is ungrounded, thus
    neither G nor LP are truth bearers or propositions.

    Right, because Prolog is unable to handle the needed Grammar, and since Prolog is


    The Liar Paradox literally specifies infinite
    recursion that never resolves to a truth value.
    Your ignorance of Prolog is no rebuttal.


    *Key difference between math and the philosophy of math*
    The philosophy of math says maybe we have
    been thinking about this stuff all wrong.

    Nope.


    Math says of course we haven't been thinking
    about this stuff all wrong everyone knows
    that math is infallible.

    *Hence the basis for disagreement over all these years*


    In other words, you are admitting you don't know what you are talking
    about, and don't care.

    Note, the "Philosophy of Math" isn't relevent here,

    Sure it is. I am proposing the idea that the foundations
    of math might be incorrect and you are essentially saying
    that these foundations are impossibly incorrect because
    they are inherently infallible.

    My "error" is merely your own closed-mindedness.

    that would be used
    to help decide which rules of math we should use.

    But the formal system has made that choice, and thus move past the philosophy.

    Your "Philosophies" can't actually answer their questions, as they have
    no actual foundations for what is true.

    Formal Logic defines Truth within it, and thus can answer the question
    in their systems.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 15:34:31 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/3/26 3:24 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 1:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/3/26 11:47 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 10:32 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
    On 03/01/2026 03:30, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/2/26 9:43 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-01-01 20:09, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 9:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-01-01 16:48, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 6:13 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 22:40, Richard Damon wrote:

    But it IS a theorem of the base system, as it uses ONLY the >>>>>>>>>>> mathematical
    operations definable in the base system. What makes you think >>>>>>>>>>> it isn't a
    Theorem in the base system.

    It has no derivation in the base system, if it had you
    wouldn't think
    the base system were incomplete.


    It has no PROOF in the base system.

    Which means it is not a theorem of the base system. A theorem is >>>>>>>> a statement which can be proven in a particular system.

    I guess it depends on your definition of a "Theorem".

    I am using the one that goes:

    "A Theorem is a statement that has been proven."

    note, no restriction that the proof was in the system the Theorem >>>>>>> is stated in, as long as the proof shows that it is actually True >>>>>>> in that system.

    A theorem is a statement that can be derived from the axioms of a >>>>>> particular system. It may be true in other systems, but it is only >>>>>> a theorem in systems in which it can be derived.

    Right, And the statement og Godel's G can be fully derived in the
    base system, as it is purely a mathematical relationship using the
    operations derivable in the system.

    Neither G nor -4G has a derivation (in your terms, a "formal prooof") >>>> within the base system.-a That is what Godel proves, showing that the >>>> base system is incomplete.

    Mike.


    The implications of this statement can't be understood in the
    system, but that isn't a requirment to be a Theorem.


    An obvious example to illustrate this would be the fact that there >>>>>> are many theorems which can be derived in Euclidean geometry, but >>>>>> which are not theorems of various non-Euclidean geometries. That
    is to say, not only can they not be derived in those non-Euclidean >>>>>> geometries, but they can be shown to be *false* in those non-
    Euclidean geometries.

    Right, but G isn't like this.


    Theoremhood is always tied to a particular formal system.

    Right, and the statement G needs nothing outside of the base system >>>>> to be created.


    Sure.-a Just creating a statement doesn't mean the statement is a
    Theorem.-a Theorems need a "formal proof" (aka, a derivation) in that >>>> formal system.-a You have a basic misunderstanding somewhere!

    Mike.


    What the meta-system provides is a "hidden" meaning to it.


    Andr|-



    It is sort of like given a binary of a program. The base computer
    still considers it a program, even if the only way to figure out
    what this program does is to run it with all sorts of input. So,
    even without a C compiler, that binary is a program.

    WIth the C compiler and the C source code, we can understand much
    better what the program does, and might not need to run it for a
    bunch of inputs.

    The fact that program came out of the C compiler. doesn't make it
    not a program for that processor.

    In the same way, G is a statement about using a specific set of
    operations defined in the base system and whether any number given
    will statisfy it. WIth just the assembly code, that may be
    impossible to determine, as there are an infinite number of
    possible inputs, so we can't test them all.

    But, that sequence of operations that G uses, came out of a
    "compiler" in the meta-system, from which we can see that this set
    of instructions are just a proof tester, to see if the number is a
    representation of a give proof of the statement G in the base
    system, where every proof in the base system produces a unique
    number, and every number produces a possible proof in the base
    system (though many are just non-sense)

    The fact we used a "compiler" to generate the statement doesn't
    make it not a program in the base system, but does let us
    understand what it does.

    You have used lots of words to explain, in effect, that the G
    statement is a statement of the base system.-a Well, most everybody
    here understands that perfectly well.-a (Not PO though...)-a Your
    analogy with programs has nothing more than

    -a-a program-a <---> statement in the language of the formal system
    -a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a (or what is often called a "sentence" in that
    language)

    so program does not correlate with "Theorem" of the formal system.
    All the stuff about compilers helping us to understand the purpose
    of program is ok, but has nothing to do with whether the program
    corresponds to a Theorem.

    You seem to understand that Godel proves that the G statement does
    NOT have a "derivation" (aka "formal proof using the specified proof
    rules of the base system") in the base system.-a I.e. it is
    specifically NOT a "Theorem" of the base system, in the sense that
    people use that word /in the realm of formal logic/.


    Mike.


    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    WHich you don't seem to understand is the INTERPREATION of the
    statement made in the meta system about the statement.


    That is not what the sentence literally says.

    Yes, it does, when you take it in context.

    A statement taken out of context is just a pretext for a lie.

    Your problem is you are just admitting that you aren't looking at actual meaning, but what you can twist something to mean, which just prove you
    are just a basic stupid liar.



    G||del, Kurt 1931.
    On Formally Undecidable Propositions of
    Principia Mathematica And Related Systems

    A proposition which asserts its own unprovability
    literally means: G asserts its own unprovability.

    Nope. Just that it uses language too complicated for you to understand.

    G, itself, asserts no such thing.


    This semantically entails that:
    A proof of G requires a sequence of inference
    steps that prove that they themselves do not exist.

    Right, so no such prove IN THE BASE SYSTEM can exist.


    ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise
    be used for a similar undecidability proof...
    (G||del 1931:40-41)

    Right, the core


    This literally means that the Liar Paradox can
    likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof.

    And it was, but the FORM of the Liar, under a syntactic transform that
    actualy changes its meaning.


    Not we don't need fifty pages of 85 formulas.
    LP := ~True(LP)

    Of course, taht is beyound you understanding.


    This semantically entails that:
    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.


    Nope. You are just showing your stupidity.

    Expands to not(true(not(true(not(true(not(true(...))))))))
    Proves that the Liar Paradox is ungrounded, thus
    neither G nor LP are truth bearers or propositions.

    Right, because Prolog is unable to handle the needed Grammar, and
    since Prolog is


    The Liar Paradox literally specifies infinite
    recursion that never resolves to a truth value.
    Your ignorance of Prolog is no rebuttal.

    Nope, only if you try to express into a form that can't handle self-references.

    The problem is the grammar you are using just can't handle a lot of
    statements that have actual meaning.

    Try to express that x is equal to 2 * x in that language.

    Rather than the result of, that means x must be 0, you will be an
    inability to understand as it becomes

    x = 2 * x -> 2 * 2 * x -> continues as an infinite loop

    The problem is that the "occurs check" is just checking if the
    definition creates a loop, not that it creates a paradoxical or
    meaningless loop.



    *Key difference between math and the philosophy of math*
    The philosophy of math says maybe we have
    been thinking about this stuff all wrong.

    Nope.


    Math says of course we haven't been thinking
    about this stuff all wrong everyone knows
    that math is infallible.

    *Hence the basis for disagreement over all these years*


    In other words, you are admitting you don't know what you are talking
    about, and don't care.

    Note, the "Philosophy of Math" isn't relevent here,

    Sure it is. I am proposing the idea that the foundations
    of math might be incorrect and you are essentially saying
    that these foundations are impossibly incorrect because
    they are inherently infallible.

    My "error" is merely your own closed-mindedness.

    Nope, your error is you stupidity.

    If you want to show that foundations of math might be incorrect, you
    need to show a contradiction that occurs just within math.

    Or, you can create a new mathematics, and try to showwhat it can be used
    for, and see if you can persuade the world to switch to yours.

    Just showing that you idea of truth doesn't mesh with the current model
    of mathematics doesn't show that math is wrong.

    Go ahead, try to make your own mathematics.

    Might only take you a couple of hundred years to learn enough of how
    theories work to be able to define yours and what it can do.

    Then, since by necessisty, it can't have the infinity of the Natural
    Numbers, you will find it hard to get people (at least smart people) to
    accept it.


    that would be used to help decide which rules of math we should use.

    But the formal system has made that choice, and thus move past the
    philosophy.

    Your "Philosophies" can't actually answer their questions, as they
    have no actual foundations for what is true.

    Formal Logic defines Truth within it, and thus can answer the question
    in their systems.



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  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 20:55:45 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 02/01/2026 14:47, olcott wrote:

    His paper is a convoluted mess hiding this simple fact
    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    G||del, Kurt 1931.
    On Formally Undecidable Propositions of
    Principia Mathematica And Related Systems

    When we combine that with this:

    -a-a Let {T} be such a theory. Then the elementary
    -a-a statements which belong to {T} we shall call the
    -a-a elementary theorems of {T}; we also say that
    -a-a these elementary statements are true for {T}.
    -a-a Thus, given {T}, an elementary theorem is an
    -a-a elementary statement which is true.
    -a-a https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
    Foundations of Mathematical Logic 1977

    Then G||del simply made a very convoluted analog
    to the Liar Paradox.

    I also half suspect G||del's incompleteness theorem proof makes Richard's informal "G" shorthand be shorthand for an unbounded statement (not constructive).

    I would like to see Richard's construction of the statement for which G
    is shorthand. As it is mere shorthand then there is such a thing.

    Obviously any finite individual can have an ordinary expression of the
    natural number it represents and I won't reject it (or some "n+xreU" with definite natural n for the non-determinate individuals like "15+xreU" or "3|u5+xreU" for "fffffffffffffffxreU", for example). Because otherwise I'd
    just be making it unreasonably difficult just for the typing. No "any
    soln in x of x=sqrt(-1)" is not okay, nor is "lim{xraAreR}{x}". I won't
    accept an infinite sequence of 'f' because I haven't got time to wait
    for the message to download.

    I half suspect G||del's incompleteness proof was just using Hilbert's
    methods socratically to prove Hilbert's formalism wrong so G||del's constructive approach would win out (correctly). (was it G||del's
    doctrine, I think I recall Curry and Feys saying it was).
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

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  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 20:58:57 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 03/01/2026 17:30, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 10:58 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:

    We begin by postulating a certain non void, definite
    class {E} of statements, which we call elementary
    statements...

    I didn't write that.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

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  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 21:06:48 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 03/01/2026 17:30, olcott wrote (quoting Curry):

    We begin by postulating a certain non void, definite
    class {E} of statements, which we call elementary
    statements...

    The statements of {E} are called elementary statements
    to distinguish them from other statements which we may
    form from them or about them in the U language...

    Odd, in other places "elementary statement" also distinguishes them from "compound statements". Perhaps the 1977 work is restricted to his
    simplified notion of formal system that eliminates binary predicates essentially leaving only logistic systems and maybe systems also with
    nullary "primitive statements" as axioms not formed from formulas/terms.


    A theory (over {E}) is defined as a conceptual class
    of these elementary statements. Let {T} be such a theory.
    Then the elementary statements which belong to {T}
    we shall call the elementary theorems of {T}; we also
    say that these elementary statements are true for {T}.
    Thus, given {T}, an elementary theorem is an elementary
    statement which is true. A theory is thus a way of
    picking out from the statements of {E} a certain
    subclass of true statementsrCa

    The terminology which has just been used implies that
    the elementary statements are not such that their truth
    and falsity are known to us without reference to {T}.

    Curry, Haskell 1977. Foundations of Mathematical
    Logic. New York: Dover Publications, 45 https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf

    In other words: reCx ree T ((True(T, x) rei (E reo x))

    Curry would not approve of you formalising that without defining the
    system in which you formalise it. His notions of U-language and
    A-language and progressive refinement of the U-language were carefully
    thought through leading to his incredible written lucidity, and the
    immense benefit of reading his work carefully from the start.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

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  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 21:24:04 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 03/01/2026 18:51, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/3/26 12:35 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 16:06, Richard Damon wrote:
    You have to derive the statement from the axioms of the system using
    the
    deduction rules of the system. It's the actual definition of
    "Theorem of
    a Formal System".

    And the statement G was.

    Then a system can be complete.



    No, because the derivation isn't finite, so isn't a proof.

    It seems you are stuck in a finite world, in a logic that is infinite.

    You mean its a fixed point that terminates at G but doesn't start? Non-constructive? It's reverse derivation (computation of its valuation) doesn't halt? (cue Olcott re. occurs check).

    I'm certain G||del thought he hadn't produced an inconsistent system. It
    is supposed to be /consistent/ and in-completable, not /inconsistent/ so
    who cares.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

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  • From Mike Terry@news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 21:39:17 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 03/01/2026 19:02, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 03/01/2026 16:32, Mike Terry wrote:
    On 03/01/2026 03:30, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/2/26 9:43 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-01-01 20:09, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 9:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-01-01 16:48, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 6:13 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 22:40, Richard Damon wrote:

    But it IS a theorem of the base system, as it uses ONLY the
    mathematical
    operations definable in the base system. What makes you think it >>>>>>>>> isn't a
    Theorem in the base system.

    It has no derivation in the base system, if it had you wouldn't >>>>>>>> think
    the base system were incomplete.


    It has no PROOF in the base system.

    Which means it is not a theorem of the base system. A theorem is a >>>>>> statement which can be proven in a particular system.

    I guess it depends on your definition of a "Theorem".

    I am using the one that goes:

    "A Theorem is a statement that has been proven."

    note, no restriction that the proof was in the system the Theorem is >>>>> stated in, as long as the proof shows that it is actually True in
    that system.

    A theorem is a statement that can be derived from the axioms of a
    particular system. It may be true in other systems, but it is only a
    theorem in systems in which it can be derived.

    Right, And the statement og Godel's G can be fully derived in the base
    system, as it is purely a mathematical relationship using the
    operations derivable in the system.

    Neither G nor -4G has a derivation (in your terms, a "formal prooof")
    within the base system.-a That is what Godel proves, showing that the
    base system is incomplete.

    That can't be what he meant can it? Lots of systems were known to have statements that had no derivation, all nonsense statements, for example.

    Yes it was what he meant! :/

    His theorem was about formal systems of arithmetic. Such systems don't contain "nonsense
    statements". They have construction rules that define what constitues a well formed formula (WFF),
    and amongst those what so constitutes a "sentence". The semantics for the system define what every
    sentence "means". It is not possible to create "nonsense" sentences.

    ok, we can put together nonsense strings of symbols like reareo=reo, but that is not a WFF, let alone a
    sentence. Derivations (formal proofs using the system proof rules) produce sentences as their
    derived conclusion. Incompleteness means that there is a /sentence/ s such that neither s nor its
    negation -4s has a derivation. (Of course the formulas "reareo=reo" and "-4reareo=reo" and do not have a
    derivation, but that's irrelevant.)

    And yes, lots of theories are incomplete, for totally unremarkable reasons. Godel wasn't claiming
    to have discovered a new phenomenon! :) He was pointing out that a /particular/ theory, which to
    the best of anyone's knowledge at the time might well be complete [we would certainly be pleased if
    it were incomplete] /in fact/ was incomplete.

    Look, imagine it turned out that P was in fact complete rather than incomplete. Obviously if we
    chop out a few axioms, keeping same language etc., we can make the resulting system incomplete,
    right? We may not even have enough derivation rules to prove very simple arithmetic statements like
    2+2=4 or their negations. If Godel had announced that he had found this incomplete system people
    would have been puzzled at the joke, because nobody ever considered such a system might be complete
    in the first place. This is just how some systems behave, no problem.

    (Alternatively, it's totally trivial to give examples of FOL systems which are obviously incomplete,
    and we would be quite happy with that. Such theories may well be worthy of study in their own
    right, although they are incomplete. Um, example: the theory with equality and no non-logical
    symbols, and one single non-logical axiom:

    Axiom: reCxreCyreCz (x=y riU x=z riU y=z) // there are at most 2 objects in our domain.

    The resulting theory is obviously incomplete, and there's nothing "wrong" in that. Some theories
    are just incomplete... In our case we can't prove either of the following:

    [a] reCxreCy (x=y) // there's only one object in our domain
    [b] -4reCxreCy (x=y) // there's at least two objects in our domain

    Looked at in terms of models of our Theory, models are those sets containing at most 2 elements.
    Once we fix on a particular model, one of [a] or [b] become TRUE in that model, but which depends on
    the model.

    That's all incompleteness is saying (for FOL at least). In GIT (FOL version) neither the G
    statement nor its negation is derivable, and in fact there are models of the theory where G is TRUE,
    and models where it is false. G is TRUE in the model consisting of the natural numbers with usual
    arithmetic operations (sometimes called the "intended" model), i.e. G is true when interpreted as an
    arithmetic statement.

    Hmmm, just for clarity, G is not a Theorem of the base system, although it is TRUE in the particular
    model we are most interested in. If G were a Theorem of the base system, it would be TRUE in every
    model of that system, because FOL is sound and only proves true statements in its models!
    )

    GIT was shocking because it showed that a system we /hoped/ might be complete, in fact was not. And
    the method of proof for GIT basically shows that we can't fix such logical systems in the nice we
    we'd like by simply adding some "missing" axioms that we'd overlooked. Either the new system would
    still be incomplete, or it would be inconsistent, or we would lose the ability to effectively
    recognise whether or not a statement is an axiom. The world was not as simple as people had hoped, sob.


    Did he really mean that there's some level of completeness in which
    there is meaninglessness (things that look like propositions but which
    are not? Well, duh. But arithmetic isn't required for that, merely self-references such as non-ranked definitions and fixed-point
    combinators (the meaning depends on a meaning that depends on a meaning that...).

    No, I'm pretty sure he didn't mean that!


    Mike.

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  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 16:54:41 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/3/26 3:55 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 14:47, olcott wrote:

    His paper is a convoluted mess hiding this simple fact
    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    G||del, Kurt 1931.
    On Formally Undecidable Propositions of
    Principia Mathematica And Related Systems

    When we combine that with this:

    -a-a Let {T} be such a theory. Then the elementary
    -a-a statements which belong to {T} we shall call the
    -a-a elementary theorems of {T}; we also say that
    -a-a these elementary statements are true for {T}.
    -a-a Thus, given {T}, an elementary theorem is an
    -a-a elementary statement which is true.
    -a-a https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
    Foundations of Mathematical Logic 1977

    Then G||del simply made a very convoluted analog
    to the Liar Paradox.

    I also half suspect G||del's incompleteness theorem proof makes Richard's informal "G" shorthand be shorthand for an unbounded statement (not constructive).

    I would like to see Richard's construction of the statement for which G
    is shorthand. As it is mere shorthand then there is such a thing.

    G is the statement

    There does not exist a natural number (g) that satisfies the
    relationship ...

    Where the ... is the incredibly complicated formula that he derives
    thorough most of the paper, that can't be expressed in simple ascii.



    Obviously any finite individual can have an ordinary expression of the natural number it represents and I won't reject it (or some "n+xreU" with definite natural n for the non-determinate individuals like "15+xreU" or "3|u5+xreU" for "fffffffffffffffxreU", for example). Because otherwise I'd just be making it unreasonably difficult just for the typing. No "any
    soln in x of x=sqrt(-1)" is not okay, nor is "lim{xraAreR}{x}". I won't accept an infinite sequence of 'f' because I haven't got time to wait
    for the message to download.

    I half suspect G||del's incompleteness proof was just using Hilbert's
    methods socratically to prove Hilbert's formalism wrong so G||del's constructive approach would win out (correctly). (was it G||del's
    doctrine, I think I recall Curry and Feys saying it was).


    No, he specifically described a formal enumerable method to encode all
    of the possible statements in the base system as a number, and then
    developed what was effectively a "proof checker" for a value, that would
    see if that statment was actually a proof of a specific statement, and
    would only "accept" a value that represented such a proof.

    The mapping was specifically designed so that ANY statement in the base
    system produced a number, and any number produces a statement in the
    base system (but perhaps nonsensical).

    This means that the existance of a number that satisfies it mean that
    number can be interpredted to create a proof in the base system of the specified statement, and the lack of such a number means that no such
    proof is possible .

    The statement for the proof program is then bound to the value of the statement that no number exists that satisfies this reatlingship bound
    to the number that represent this statement.



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  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 22:03:48 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 03/01/2026 19:27, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/3/26 2:02 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 03/01/2026 16:32, Mike Terry wrote:
    On 03/01/2026 03:30, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/2/26 9:43 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-01-01 20:09, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 9:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-01-01 16:48, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 6:13 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 22:40, Richard Damon wrote:

    But it IS a theorem of the base system, as it uses ONLY the >>>>>>>>>> mathematical
    operations definable in the base system. What makes you think it >>>>>>>>>> isn't a
    Theorem in the base system.

    It has no derivation in the base system, if it had you wouldn't >>>>>>>>> think
    the base system were incomplete.


    It has no PROOF in the base system.

    Which means it is not a theorem of the base system. A theorem is a >>>>>>> statement which can be proven in a particular system.

    I guess it depends on your definition of a "Theorem".

    I am using the one that goes:

    "A Theorem is a statement that has been proven."
    -a-a>
    note, no restriction that the proof was in the system the Theorem is >>>>>> stated in, as long as the proof shows that it is actually True in
    that system.

    A theorem is a statement that can be derived from the axioms of a
    particular system. It may be true in other systems, but it is only a >>>>> theorem in systems in which it can be derived.

    Right, And the statement og Godel's G can be fully derived in the base >>>> system, as it is purely a mathematical relationship using the
    operations derivable in the system.

    Neither G nor -4G has a derivation (in your terms, a "formal prooof")
    within the base system.-a That is what Godel proves, showing that the
    base system is incomplete.

    That can't be what he meant can it? Lots of systems were known to have
    statements that had no derivation, all nonsense statements, for example.

    Did he really mean that there's some level of completeness in which
    there is meaninglessness (things that look like propositions but which
    are not? Well, duh. But arithmetic isn't required for that, merely
    self-references such as non-ranked definitions and fixed-point
    combinators (the meaning depends on a meaning that depends on a meaning
    that...).

    Hang on, he had two incompleteness theorems and a completeness theorem.
    Can we get some good terminology that distinguishes them because I think
    there's some referential ambiguity creeping in.


    The first incompleteness theorem was that all system of sufficent expressiveness (able to handle the Natural Numbers) have a statement
    that IS true, but can not be proven.

    And we've been talking about that one, so the discussion of the liar
    paradox is about a different--inconsistent--system exemplifying the liar paradox?

    And we're looking at a constructible statement of the base-system P that
    is not a theorem of the theory proper of P, but which is
    epitheoretically true in:

    a) all epitheories of P
    b) all epitheories of P with the same limitation
    c) some epitheories of P
    d) a meta-system constructed with a fixed point embedding of P in an
    embedding of P in an ...
    e) something else
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 22:11:36 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 03/01/2026 19:33, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/3/26 11:54 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 15:35, Richard Damon wrote:

    No, meta-system is NOT "full up" as there are an infinite number of
    primes to use to define new objects.

    I understood from reading it that those were occupied for variables.

    or new terms, after all, we have an infinite number of them.

    In fact, I thought he talked about assigning a number for proven
    statements in the base system, so we could refer to them.

    I missed that, it looked like they were taken for all naturals just for
    an all the variables. I shall read that bit again.

    This is needed
    to create the lable of "G" in the meta, so we can refer to it as we
    build the proof checker, that at the end we finally know the "value" it represents.


    And what number does it get? It should be expressible by the primitive
    symbols of the system P and the conventional shorthands that he defines.

    If he merely defines the liar paradox then his system is inconsistent,
    either P, or the meta-system.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 16:18:01 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/3/2026 2:55 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 14:47, olcott wrote:

    His paper is a convoluted mess hiding this simple fact
    ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
    asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)

    G||del, Kurt 1931.
    On Formally Undecidable Propositions of
    Principia Mathematica And Related Systems

    When we combine that with this:

    -a-a Let {T} be such a theory. Then the elementary
    -a-a statements which belong to {T} we shall call the
    -a-a elementary theorems of {T}; we also say that
    -a-a these elementary statements are true for {T}.
    -a-a Thus, given {T}, an elementary theorem is an
    -a-a elementary statement which is true.
    -a-a https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
    Foundations of Mathematical Logic 1977

    Then G||del simply made a very convoluted analog
    to the Liar Paradox.

    I also half suspect G||del's incompleteness theorem proof makes Richard's informal "G" shorthand be shorthand for an unbounded statement (not constructive).

    I would like to see Richard's construction of the statement for which G
    is shorthand. As it is mere shorthand then there is such a thing.

    Obviously any finite individual can have an ordinary expression of the natural number it represents and I won't reject it (or some "n+xreU" with definite natural n for the non-determinate individuals like "15+xreU" or "3|u5+xreU" for "fffffffffffffffxreU", for example). Because otherwise I'd just be making it unreasonably difficult just for the typing. No "any
    soln in x of x=sqrt(-1)" is not okay, nor is "lim{xraAreR}{x}". I won't accept an infinite sequence of 'f' because I haven't got time to wait
    for the message to download.

    I half suspect G||del's incompleteness proof was just using Hilbert's
    methods socratically to prove Hilbert's formalism wrong so G||del's constructive approach would win out (correctly). (was it G||del's
    doctrine, I think I recall Curry and Feys saying it was).


    ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be
    used for a similar undecidability proof...(G||del 1931:40-41)

    Thus the resolution of the Liar Paradox resolves
    G||del incompleteness.

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    Expands to not(true(not(true(not(true(not(true(...))))))))
    Proves that the Liar Paradox is ungrounded.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
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  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 16:23:20 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/3/2026 2:58 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 03/01/2026 17:30, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 10:58 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:

    We begin by postulating a certain non void, definite
    class {E} of statements, which we call elementary
    statements...

    I didn't write that.


    That is part of how Curry defined True(x) rei Theorem(x) https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 16:27:44 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/3/2026 3:06 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 03/01/2026 17:30, olcott wrote (quoting Curry):

    We begin by postulating a certain non void, definite
    class {E} of statements, which we call elementary
    statements...

    The statements of {E} are called elementary statements
    to distinguish them from other statements which we may
    form from them or about them in the U language...

    Odd, in other places "elementary statement" also distinguishes them from "compound statements". Perhaps the 1977 work is restricted to his
    simplified notion of formal system that eliminates binary predicates essentially leaving only logistic systems and maybe systems also with
    nullary "primitive statements" as axioms not formed from formulas/terms.


    A theory (over {E}) is defined as a conceptual class
    of these elementary statements. Let {T} be such a theory.
    Then the elementary statements which belong to {T}
    we shall call the elementary theorems of {T}; we also
    say that these elementary statements are true for {T}.
    Thus, given {T}, an elementary theorem is an elementary
    statement which is true. A theory is thus a way of
    picking out from the statements of {E} a certain
    subclass of true statementsrCa

    The terminology which has just been used implies that
    the elementary statements are not such that their truth
    and falsity are known to us without reference to {T}.

    Curry, Haskell 1977. Foundations of Mathematical
    Logic. New York: Dover Publications, 45
    https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf

    In other words: reCx ree T ((True(T, x) rei (E reo x))

    Curry would not approve of you formalising that without defining the
    system in which you formalise it.

    You have to read my quote of Curry to see that he
    already defined {T} and {E}.

    {E} is merely my own notion of atomic facts,
    previously called base facts.

    His notions of U-language and
    A-language and progressive refinement of the U-language were carefully thought through leading to his incredible written lucidity, and the
    immense benefit of reading his work carefully from the start.


    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 17:51:11 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/3/26 5:11 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 03/01/2026 19:33, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/3/26 11:54 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 15:35, Richard Damon wrote:

    No, meta-system is NOT "full up" as there are an infinite number of
    primes to use to define new objects.

    I understood from reading it that those were occupied for variables.

    or new terms, after all, we have an infinite number of them.

    In fact, I thought he talked about assigning a number for proven
    statements in the base system, so we could refer to them.

    I missed that, it looked like they were taken for all naturals just for
    an all the variables. I shall read that bit again.

    Natural numbers are set to effectively SSSS0 (with the number of Ses
    being the value)


    This is needed
    to create the lable of "G" in the meta, so we can refer to it as we
    build the proof checker, that at the end we finally know the "value" it
    represents.


    And what number does it get? It should be expressible by the primitive symbols of the system P and the conventional shorthands that he defines.

    Its base number is just some prime.

    Its definition is based on expressing the formula derived


    If he merely defines the liar paradox then his system is inconsistent,
    either P, or the meta-system.


    No, he doesn't actually use the liar paradox. His comment is that his
    basic statement came from the syntactic transformation of

    L := Not(True(L))

    to

    G := Not(Provable(G))

    and then converting that to:

    G := There does not exist a proof of G

    to

    G := There does not exist a S such that S proves G

    Since we can encode EVERY possible statement as a number, and thus any possible proof, then if we have a proof checker:

    G := There does not exist a g such that Prove(G, g) is true


    His comment is that you could have changed that first statement to any contradiction, and thus created a similar statement about proofs whose
    only resloution would be true and not provable. (as False but Provable
    is a contradiction).

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From joes@noreply@example.org to comp.theory on Sat Jan 3 23:33:46 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    Am Sun, 28 Dec 2025 23:41:41 -0800 schrieb dart200:
    On 12/28/25 3:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 12/28/25 5:30 PM, dart200 wrote:

    the halting problem is generally held up as an example of
    incompleteness in action, and that machines can halt/not without it
    being provable/ knowable.

    First, The Halting Problem more directly shows "Uncomputability"
    instead of "Incompleteness". Note, "Uncomputability" is a property of a
    "Problem", that there are mappings that exist that can not be generated
    by a computation.

    but it's always demonstrated by a specific machine, and unless you're
    gunna say all machines of a certain property cannot be decided to have
    that property (which is ridiculous), then ofc it involves specific input being undecidable.

    No, the HP counterexample is decidable, like every machine.

    "Incompleteness" is a property of a Logical System, indicating that
    there are true statements in the system that can not be proven.

    the truth that backs incompleteness is still proven, just not within the system as it stands.
    what it doesn't say is that unprovable truths exists


    the problem with halting is that your claims truths that exist which
    cannot be proven by any means, which is not the same thing as
    incompleteness. the truth godel demonstrated was still provable, else
    how would we know it's "true"?

    It's only provable in the metasystem.
    --
    Am Sat, 20 Jul 2024 12:35:31 +0000 schrieb WM in sci.math:
    It is not guaranteed that n+1 exists for every n.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 20:35:05 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/3/26 5:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 2:58 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 03/01/2026 17:30, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 10:58 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:

    We begin by postulating a certain non void, definite
    class {E} of statements, which we call elementary
    statements...

    I didn't write that.


    That is part of how Curry defined True(x) rei Theorem(x) https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf


    But he doesn't define True(x) to be = Theorem(x)

    Note also, that page is about "Theories" not "Theorems"

    In this section a theory will be defined as a class of statements.

    A theory (over f) is defined as a conceptual class of these elementary statements.

    His "Theory" is more like what we have been calling a Formal System.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 19:45:38 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/3/2026 7:35 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/3/26 5:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 2:58 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 03/01/2026 17:30, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 10:58 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:

    We begin by postulating a certain non void, definite
    class {E} of statements, which we call elementary
    statements...

    I didn't write that.


    That is part of how Curry defined True(x) rei Theorem(x)
    https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf


    But he doesn't define True(x) to be = Theorem(x)


    Thus, given {T}, an elementary theorem is an elementary statement
    which is true.

    https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf

    Are you capable of ever paying complete attention?
    I hyper-focus instead. This makes most everyone
    else seem like they have severe attention deficit
    by contrast.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 21:25:47 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/3/26 5:11 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 03/01/2026 19:33, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/3/26 11:54 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 15:35, Richard Damon wrote:

    No, meta-system is NOT "full up" as there are an infinite number of
    primes to use to define new objects.

    I understood from reading it that those were occupied for variables.

    or new terms, after all, we have an infinite number of them.

    In fact, I thought he talked about assigning a number for proven
    statements in the base system, so we could refer to them.

    I missed that, it looked like they were taken for all naturals just for
    an all the variables. I shall read that bit again.

    This is needed
    to create the lable of "G" in the meta, so we can refer to it as we
    build the proof checker, that at the end we finally know the "value" it
    represents.


    And what number does it get? It should be expressible by the primitive symbols of the system P and the conventional shorthands that he defines.

    If he merely defines the liar paradox then his system is inconsistent,
    either P, or the meta-system.


    It depends on the exact system it is built on, and the order that the
    pieces are taken up.

    This is one thing that make the ability to "understand" the meaning of
    the relationship impossible, as its meaning changes based on the order
    used in the meta-system (and what derived statements get encoded in a
    number).
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 21:31:26 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/3/26 8:45 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 7:35 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/3/26 5:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 2:58 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 03/01/2026 17:30, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 10:58 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:

    We begin by postulating a certain non void, definite
    class {E} of statements, which we call elementary
    statements...

    I didn't write that.


    That is part of how Curry defined True(x) rei Theorem(x)
    https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf


    But he doesn't define True(x) to be = Theorem(x)


    Thus, given {T}, an elementary theorem is an elementary statement
    which is true.

    https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf

    Are you capable of ever paying complete attention?
    I hyper-focus instead. This makes most everyone
    else seem like they have severe attention deficit
    by contrast.


    Which says that Theorems are true statement, not that truth are proven statements.



    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 20:49:32 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/3/2026 8:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/3/26 8:45 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 7:35 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/3/26 5:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 2:58 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 03/01/2026 17:30, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 10:58 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:

    We begin by postulating a certain non void, definite
    class {E} of statements, which we call elementary
    statements...

    I didn't write that.


    That is part of how Curry defined True(x) rei Theorem(x)
    https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf


    But he doesn't define True(x) to be = Theorem(x)


    Thus, given {T}, an elementary theorem is an elementary statement
    which is true.

    https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf

    Are you capable of ever paying complete attention?
    I hyper-focus instead. This makes most everyone
    else seem like they have severe attention deficit
    by contrast.


    Which says that Theorems are true statement,
    not that truth are proven statements.


    So you have no idea how true statements are derived
    from other true statements ?

    https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 22:07:43 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/3/26 9:49 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 8:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/3/26 8:45 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 7:35 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/3/26 5:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 2:58 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 03/01/2026 17:30, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 10:58 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:

    We begin by postulating a certain non void, definite
    class {E} of statements, which we call elementary
    statements...

    I didn't write that.


    That is part of how Curry defined True(x) rei Theorem(x)
    https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf


    But he doesn't define True(x) to be = Theorem(x)


    Thus, given {T}, an elementary theorem is an elementary statement
    which is true.

    https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf

    Are you capable of ever paying complete attention?
    I hyper-focus instead. This makes most everyone
    else seem like they have severe attention deficit
    by contrast.


    Which says that Theorems are true statement, not that truth are proven
    statements.


    So you have no idea how true statements are derived
    from other true statements ?

    https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/


    Right, but the chain can be infinite, and thus not a proof.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sat Jan 3 21:36:45 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/3/2026 9:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/3/26 9:49 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 8:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/3/26 8:45 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 7:35 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/3/26 5:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 2:58 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 03/01/2026 17:30, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 10:58 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:

    We begin by postulating a certain non void, definite
    class {E} of statements, which we call elementary
    statements...

    I didn't write that.


    That is part of how Curry defined True(x) rei Theorem(x)
    https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf


    But he doesn't define True(x) to be = Theorem(x)


    Thus, given {T}, an elementary theorem is an elementary statement
    which is true.

    https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf

    Are you capable of ever paying complete attention?
    I hyper-focus instead. This makes most everyone
    else seem like they have severe attention deficit
    by contrast.


    Which says that Theorems are true statement, not that truth are
    proven statements.


    So you have no idea how true statements are derived
    from other true statements ?

    https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/


    Right, but the chain can be infinite, and thus not a proof.

    Right so we may never know if the Goldbach conjecture is true.
    We do now that all paradoxes resolve to nonsense.
    This means that True(L, x) can be defined for the
    entire body of knowledge expressed in language.

    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    Eliminates a key issue that has plagued epistemology since 1951

    https://www.theologie.uzh.ch/dam/jcr:ffffffff-fbd6-1538-0000-000070cf64bc/Quine51.pdf
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sun Jan 4 07:42:58 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/3/26 10:36 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 9:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/3/26 9:49 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 8:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/3/26 8:45 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 7:35 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/3/26 5:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 2:58 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 03/01/2026 17:30, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 10:58 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:

    We begin by postulating a certain non void, definite
    class {E} of statements, which we call elementary
    statements...

    I didn't write that.


    That is part of how Curry defined True(x) rei Theorem(x)
    https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf


    But he doesn't define True(x) to be = Theorem(x)


    Thus, given {T}, an elementary theorem is an elementary statement
    which is true.

    https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf

    Are you capable of ever paying complete attention?
    I hyper-focus instead. This makes most everyone
    else seem like they have severe attention deficit
    by contrast.


    Which says that Theorems are true statement, not that truth are
    proven statements.


    So you have no idea how true statements are derived
    from other true statements ?

    https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/


    Right, but the chain can be infinite, and thus not a proof.

    Right so we may never know if the Goldbach conjecture is true.

    But it must be either True or False.

    Your system can't handle that.

    Unknown is a value of Knowledge, not Truth.

    All you are doing is showing that you own system must be incomplete
    becuase it can't even HANDLE some statements that we know must have a
    truth value.

    We do now that all paradoxes resolve to nonsense.

    No, because the word "Paradox" just means an APPARENT contradiction.

    For example, Zeno's paradox that seems to show that Achilies can't pass
    the Tortoise is resolved by noting that while you went through an
    infinite number of steps of logic, those only encompassed a finite
    amount of time, and after that Achilies does pass the Tortoise.

    The Liar's Paradox gets resolved by seeing that the statement just
    doesn't have a Truth Value (Not all syntacticly valid statemente do) and
    thus isn't a Semantically valid statement, and the "Not" operator is
    being given an invalid value (or Not(not-a-truth-value) is just not-a-truth-value).

    This means that True(L, x) can be defined for the
    entire body of knowledge expressed in language.

    No, because we can still express in that language statements that we can
    not know if they are true, like the Goldbach conjecture.

    Note, the True predicate has a domain of all syntactially valid
    expressions, and returns false for any that are semantically invalid.

    Thus True(L, "The Goldbach Conjecture") needs to resolve that actual
    truth of that conjecture.

    All you are showing is your inability to understand the rules of the
    game you got in.


    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    Eliminates a key issue that has plagued epistemology since 1951

    No, because it just admits its own limitation, and put forward a
    mis-defintion of Truth.


    https://www.theologie.uzh.ch/dam/jcr:ffffffff- fbd6-1538-0000-000070cf64bc/Quine51.pdf


    Which is about Philosophy, not Logic, which is part of your problem, you
    don't understand the difference.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sun Jan 4 08:48:43 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/4/2026 6:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/3/26 10:36 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 9:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/3/26 9:49 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 8:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/3/26 8:45 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 7:35 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/3/26 5:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 2:58 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 03/01/2026 17:30, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 10:58 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:

    We begin by postulating a certain non void, definite
    class {E} of statements, which we call elementary
    statements...

    I didn't write that.


    That is part of how Curry defined True(x) rei Theorem(x)
    https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf


    But he doesn't define True(x) to be = Theorem(x)


    Thus, given {T}, an elementary theorem is an elementary statement
    which is true.

    https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf

    Are you capable of ever paying complete attention?
    I hyper-focus instead. This makes most everyone
    else seem like they have severe attention deficit
    by contrast.


    Which says that Theorems are true statement, not that truth are
    proven statements.


    So you have no idea how true statements are derived
    from other true statements ?

    https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/


    Right, but the chain can be infinite, and thus not a proof.

    Right so we may never know if the Goldbach conjecture is true.

    But it must be either True or False.

    Your system can't handle that.

    Unknown is a value of Knowledge, not Truth.

    All you are doing is showing that you own system must be incomplete
    becuase it can't even HANDLE some statements that we know must have a
    truth value.


    It is not incomplete in the G||del sense.

    We do now that all paradoxes resolve to nonsense.

    No, because the word "Paradox" just means an APPARENT contradiction.

    For example, Zeno's paradox that seems to show that Achilies can't pass
    the Tortoise is resolved by noting that while you went through an
    infinite number of steps of logic, those only encompassed a finite
    amount of time, and after that Achilies does pass the Tortoise.


    paradoxes resolve to nonsense.

    The Liar's Paradox gets resolved by seeing that the statement just
    doesn't have a Truth Value (Not all syntacticly valid statemente do) and thus isn't a Semantically valid statement, and the "Not" operator is
    being given an invalid value (or Not(not-a-truth-value) is just not-a- truth-value).


    Yes

    This means that True(L, x) can be defined for the
    *entire body of knowledge expressed in language*

    No, because we can still express in that language statements that we can
    not know if they are true, like the Goldbach conjecture.


    Did you notice that those are not in the body of knowledge?
    *entire body of knowledge expressed in language*

    Note, the True predicate has a domain of all syntactially valid
    expressions, and returns false for any that are semantically invalid.


    If X is unknown or
    semantically incoherent or
    simply not encoded then True(X)==FALSE and True(~X)==FALSE

    Thus True(L, "The Goldbach Conjecture") needs to resolve that actual
    truth of that conjecture.


    This is the domain
    *entire body of knowledge expressed in language*
    The Goldbach Conjecture's truth value is not in that domain

    All you are showing is your inability to understand the rules of the
    game you got in.


    After 28 years I have finally got it.


    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    Eliminates a key issue that has plagued epistemology since 1951

    No, because it just admits its own limitation, and put forward a mis- defintion of Truth.


    The analytic/synthetic distinction was broken by Quine
    since 1951. I reframed it as the Analytic(Olcott) / Empirical
    distinction.


    https://www.theologie.uzh.ch/dam/jcr:ffffffff-
    fbd6-1538-0000-000070cf64bc/Quine51.pdf


    Which is about Philosophy, not Logic, which is part of your problem, you don't understand the difference.

    I defined the computable subset of knowledge.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mike Terry@news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sun Jan 4 18:55:51 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 02/01/2026 17:54, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/2/26 12:24 PM, Mike Terry wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 15:25, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/2/26 1:14 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 04:45, Richard Damon wrote:


    Truth in the base system has always
    actually been theorems of the base system.

    But only if "Theorem" includes things proven to be true in the system >>>>> even if the proof is in another.

    If the statement is derived in another then it is a theorem of the other. >>>
    I will disagree with you here. Maybe it iw what you are trying to define "derived" as.

    I can certainly use one system to guide me in building a statement in another. Or do you think
    that is a task too hard?

    I can certainly use one system that knows about another to show that a statement must be true in
    that other.

    If you want to reserve the lable "Theorem" for only things provable in taht system, I will let
    you, but point out I think you are in the minority, and ask for your reference that specifies that.

    No, I'd say Tristan is spot on with how that's normally done.

    While speaking informally, "theorem" can mean "a mathematical statement that has a convincing
    argument for its truth" (e.g. Pythagoras' theorem), in formal logic "Theorem" and "Theory" have a
    technical meaning:a "Theory" being the deductive closure of a set of axioms, and a Theorem being a
    sentence of the Theory.a So every Theorem in the Theory has a "derivation" from the theories
    axioms. aIt is not directly to do with "truth" in the formal system.a [Of course, we want our
    system (including axioms) to be sound, so all Theorems will be true.]

    aa <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Theory_(mathematical_logic)#Deductive_theories>

    Note, the addition of the adjective DEDUCTIVE.

    That's the type of theory most often encountered, I'd say. GIT is concerned with such a theory,
    where axioms are given etc. and we are looking at what sentences can be proved from those axioms.
    Wikipedia always tries to be as general as it can possibly be, making it an awful place for someone
    trying to /learn/ a maths topic. It's great if you're already a maths professor, then you can read
    some article and nod wisely, and suggest edits to make it /even more/ general! :)



    Of course, you could be learning from an author taking a different approach, but I haven't
    personally come across one who would say that the sentence represented by G was a "Theorem" of the
    underlying logical system!a (That would (IMO) be grossly misleading...)

    I will somewhat agree here, because generally the term is reserved for statements about a more
    general truth, as opposed to a statement about a specific fact. But the most generic definition is
    just a statment that has been proven.

    Yes, but we are talking about formal systems, and "Theorem" in such a context implies a proof
    /within the proof calculus of that formal system/. That is what GIT is concerned with. (I give an
    example of what I mean by "proof calculus" below, but I'm sure you understand the idea, just
    possibly not the wording.)



    Similarly, the word "proof" can be informal (simply an argument that convinces people of the truth
    of a statement), or refer to the "proof calculus" of the formal system being discussed.a Most
    authors I've come across seem to use "proof" more or less informally and for clarity choose
    another word for whatever sequence of syntactic "proof steps" the formal system specifies.a Often
    "derivation" is used, and that seems intuitive to me, so I try to always use that term here, and
    using "proof" for more general mathematial arguments, e.g. proving that the G statement is "true"
    using some meta-theory.

    The issue is that "derivation" doesn't actually imply a finiteness, which is a necessity of "proof".

    Where do you get that idea? Are you thinking "derivation" is just an informal word? I'm using it
    in the technical sense previously explained.

    Within a formal system there will be a set of rules which define what a valid "derivation" looks
    like. These would ensure that such derivations are finite. (I'm sure someone at some time has made
    a special study of "infinite proofs", but that is off the beaten track.) As explained in my
    previous post, I'm using "derivation" as the technical term for whatever passes as a "formal proof
    conforming to the requirements of the proof calculus of the system". This is so that the idea does
    not get muddled with your more general kind of proof = "convincing argument in some meta-theory".

    Derivations have G%del numbers. "Convincing arguments in the meta-theory" do not. The idea of a
    G%del number for an infinite derivation does not make sense.


    The point is that the standard statement of "Incompleteness" talks about the provability of
    statements in the system. Provability is inherently about the ability to create a proof in the system.

    "(FORMAL) Proof in the system" = "derivation". You want to use the word "proof" more generally,
    namely to cover arguments in a meta-theory which establish some meta-truth concerning the base
    system. That's ok [and the reason I use "derivation" to distinguish from "informal proof"], but not
    the type of "proof" that incompleteness refers to.


    Yes, often an other will use a more confined word to establish the method of a proof.

    Right. The logical system will have some kind of "proof calculus" which says EXACTLY what
    constitutes a valid derivation for that system. E.g. perhaps something like:

    A derivation is a finite sequence of sentences in the language of the formal system, such that
    each sentence is either:
    - an axiom of the system,
    - or can be constructed from previous sentences by applying one of the
    following "deduction rules":
    - [probably something equivalent to Modus Ponens]
    - [maybe other listed rules]
    The last sentence of the derivation is the "result" of the derivation.

    When G%del talks of provability in a system, he always means such a derivation, not some informal
    convincing argument.

    From here on I'm just going to use the word derivation without explaining it every time!



    Also just as an aside, I don't recall that Godel ever talked about "truth" of his G statement.
    His proof was concerned with provability. (Neither the G sentence nor its negation is provable.)


    Mike.


    But there are many statements that they or their negation is provable, all you need is a statement
    that isn't a truth bearer, for example, the liar paradox.

    We are talking about sentences in the language of some formal system. You have been arguing for too
    long with PO!!


    Incompleteness is about a statement that is true in the system and not being provable. That is the
    ESSENCE of the concept of incompleteness.

    There are different types of incompleteness, and different definitions. G%del's concerns there
    being a statement G such that neither G nor 4G has a derivation in the system. There is no
    reference to "truth" in that and I'd say his proof is essentially syntactical in nature.

    All that aside, yes there are many statements of formal systems for which neither they nor their
    negations are provable - those systems are incomplete, and its no big deal because largely speaking
    people did not expect them to be complete! The surprise with GIT is that it showed specific systems
    were incomplete, where we previously had no good reason to think that might be the case.

    In more modern terms e.g. we have FOL (first order logic) and PA (Peano's Arithmetic - a FOL theory
    with its own symbols/axioms) and it might well seem that all arithmetic truths could be proved
    within that system - after all, it has an induction axiom schema, and seems to be sufficient for our
    needs when we look at typical proofs we see in school. What else could we need? Have we got
    "enough" axioms with PA? Mathematicians at the time of G%del would have liked to think so. But GIT
    (more modern FOL version) shows that's not the case: PA is incomplete. Also we see that extending PA
    adding a few more axioms isn't going to change this.

    [It's strange - both you and Tristan expressed surprise that everyday theories might be incomplete.
    Incompleteness is not a "fatal flaw" in a theory in the way that inconsistency is - some theories
    are just incomplete by their nature.)

    It uses BOTH the concept of Truth, and Proof, so trying to say that these aren't terms used seems to
    be a contradiction in your explaination.

    You just SAY what you think incompleteness means, and then point out that your definition used the
    word truth and mine doesn't! Very PO-like :) A better way to go would be to look at G%del's paper
    and see how he defined incompleteness.

    I'd say we have two notions:

    a) A theory T is incomplete if there exists a sentence s such that
    neither s nor 4s is a theorem of T

    b) A theory T is incomplete if there is a true sentence s which is
    not a theorem of T??

    (Not sure of your exact definition - once you start introducing "truth", you need to define truth.
    E.g. with FOL, statements are not "true" in their own sense until an "interpretation" is given of
    all the symbols in the statement, /then/ the interpreted statement will be true or false. In your
    system there is a "preferred model" (the natural numbers with usual operations) defining when
    statements are true, so your definition makes sense in your system of logic, but needs adjusting for
    other systems with no built-in preferred model. (a) does not depend on semantics of the logical
    system, just the syntactically based derivation rules for the system. I'm not suggesting (b) is Wrong.)

    The impression I get is that at the time G%del published GIT, the notion (a) which is purely
    syntactical in nature was considered problem free, but he was less sure how (mathematically or
    perhaps philosophically) the "truth" of such statements should be handled, so he avoided (b),
    particularly as it wasn't needed for his result. (I'm not a historian so I could have this all wrong.)

    Hmmmm, so if we have a FOL theory T which is incomplete in sense (a), then if we assign an "intended
    model" N, then in that model s will be either true or false. In either case, either s or 4s will be
    true in N but have no derivation, which is essentially (b). Conversely if s is true in N but has no
    derivation then it turns out neither s nor 4s can have a derivation, so T is incomplete in sense
    (a). So you shouldn't be thinking I've just invented some totally unrelated new concept and given
    it the same name as something you've encountered. I suspect (a) is the more common definition
    encountered, if only because students these days tend to learn about FOL first...


    Mike.
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  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sun Jan 4 14:21:57 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/4/26 9:48 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/4/2026 6:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/3/26 10:36 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 9:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/3/26 9:49 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 8:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/3/26 8:45 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 7:35 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/3/26 5:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 2:58 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 03/01/2026 17:30, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 10:58 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:

    We begin by postulating a certain non void, definite
    class {E} of statements, which we call elementary
    statements...

    I didn't write that.


    That is part of how Curry defined True(x) rei Theorem(x)
    https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf


    But he doesn't define True(x) to be = Theorem(x)


    Thus, given {T}, an elementary theorem is an elementary statement >>>>>>> which is true.

    https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf

    Are you capable of ever paying complete attention?
    I hyper-focus instead. This makes most everyone
    else seem like they have severe attention deficit
    by contrast.


    Which says that Theorems are true statement, not that truth are
    proven statements.


    So you have no idea how true statements are derived
    from other true statements ?

    https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/


    Right, but the chain can be infinite, and thus not a proof.

    Right so we may never know if the Goldbach conjecture is true.

    But it must be either True or False.

    Your system can't handle that.

    Unknown is a value of Knowledge, not Truth.

    All you are doing is showing that you own system must be incomplete
    becuase it can't even HANDLE some statements that we know must have a
    truth value.


    It is not incomplete in the G||del sense.

    Then it is just inconsistant, and incomplete in the more general sense.

    You CAN'T have you goal of "all general knowledge" and Truth is Provable
    at the same time without having a broken system.


    We do now that all paradoxes resolve to nonsense.

    No, because the word "Paradox" just means an APPARENT contradiction.

    For example, Zeno's paradox that seems to show that Achilies can't
    pass the Tortoise is resolved by noting that while you went through an
    infinite number of steps of logic, those only encompassed a finite
    amount of time, and after that Achilies does pass the Tortoise.


    paradoxes resolve to nonsense.

    So, the sum of the number 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + 1/16 ... is nonsense?


    The Liar's Paradox gets resolved by seeing that the statement just
    doesn't have a Truth Value (Not all syntacticly valid statemente do)
    and thus isn't a Semantically valid statement, and the "Not" operator
    is being given an invalid value (or Not(not-a-truth-value) is just
    not-a- truth-value).


    Yes

    So (as the PREDICATE) True(LP) is false, and True(~LP) is also false.

    But if X = ~True(X) can't use this excape, as the "True" preidcate is
    ALWAYS a truth value, and thus ~True(X) is also ALWAYS a truth value.

    This is the problem with a truth predicate, it looses the escape valve
    of just using the not operator.


    This means that True(L, x) can be defined for the
    *entire body of knowledge expressed in language*

    No, because we can still express in that language statements that we
    can not know if they are true, like the Goldbach conjecture.


    Did you notice that those are not in the body of knowledge?
    *entire body of knowledge expressed in language*

    So, are you saying you language can only express statements already know
    to be true?

    In other words, it isn't a "logic" that allows discovery?

    The body of knowldege certainly understand the concepts of summing two numbers, of even numbers, and primes, so, if able to be inquisative, ask
    about the sums of primes and even numbers.

    This shows that you system just can't do what you want it to do, and you
    view of "semantics" is just insufficent to do what you want it to,


    Note, the True predicate has a domain of all syntactially valid
    expressions, and returns false for any that are semantically invalid.


    If X is unknown or
    semantically incoherent or
    simply not encoded then True(X)==FALSE and True(~X)==FALSE

    Nope.

    The fact we don't KNOW the truth of X doesn't affect the value returned
    by True(x)

    It seems you confuse Known with True, and not even go so far as Knowable.

    That means truth values in you system CHANGE over time, which is
    unacceptable in an actual logic system.


    Thus True(L, "The Goldbach Conjecture") needs to resolve that actual
    truth of that conjecture.


    This is the domain
    *entire body of knowledge expressed in language*
    The Goldbach Conjecture's truth value is not in that domain

    But is expressible in that language.

    I guess you are just asserting your system is just a repository of
    Knowledge, and WORTHLESS in dealing with statement not in its repository.


    All you are showing is your inability to understand the rules of the
    game you got in.


    After 28 years I have finally got it.

    Nop,e just showing you have lost it.



    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    Eliminates a key issue that has plagued epistemology since 1951

    No, because it just admits its own limitation, and put forward a mis-
    defintion of Truth.


    The analytic/synthetic distinction was broken by Quine
    since 1951. I reframed it as the Analytic(Olcott) / Empirical
    distinction.

    But that isn't part of Formal Logic, just general Philosophy.

    It seems you don't even understand the scope of the field you are trying
    to talk about.



    https://www.theologie.uzh.ch/dam/jcr:ffffffff-
    fbd6-1538-0000-000070cf64bc/Quine51.pdf


    Which is about Philosophy, not Logic, which is part of your problem,
    you don't understand the difference.

    I defined the computable subset of knowledge.


    No, you have failed to actually define anything.

    You have a concept for a worthless system to record knowledge that you
    can interograte to see if something was already known.
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  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sun Jan 4 13:44:34 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/4/2026 12:55 PM, Mike Terry wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 17:54, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/2/26 12:24 PM, Mike Terry wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 15:25, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/2/26 1:14 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 04:45, Richard Damon wrote:


    Truth in the base system has always
    actually been theorems of the base system.

    But only if "Theorem" includes things proven to be true in the system >>>>>> even if the proof is in another.

    If the statement is derived in another then it is a theorem of the
    other.

    I will disagree with you here. Maybe it iw what you are trying to
    define "derived" as.

    I can certainly use one system to guide me in building a statement
    in another. Or do you think that is a task too hard?

    I can certainly use one system that knows about another to show that
    a statement must be true in that other.

    If you want to reserve the lable "Theorem" for only things provable
    in taht system, I will let you, but point out I think you are in the
    minority, and ask for your reference that specifies that.

    No, I'd say Tristan is spot on with how that's normally done.

    While speaking informally, "theorem" can mean "a mathematical
    statement that has a convincing argument for its truth" (e.g.
    Pythagoras' theorem), in formal logic "Theorem" and "Theory" have a
    technical meaning:-a "Theory" being the deductive closure of a set of
    axioms, and a Theorem being a sentence of the Theory.-a So every
    Theorem in the Theory has a "derivation" from the theories axioms.
    -aIt is not directly to do with "truth" in the formal system.-a [Of
    course, we want our system (including axioms) to be sound, so all
    Theorems will be true.]

    -a-a <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
    Theory_(mathematical_logic)#Deductive_theories>

    Note, the addition of the adjective DEDUCTIVE.

    That's the type of theory most often encountered, I'd say.-a GIT is concerned with such a theory, where axioms are given etc. and we are
    looking at what sentences can be proved from those axioms. Wikipedia
    always tries to be as general as it can possibly be, making it an awful place for someone trying to /learn/ a maths topic.-a It's great if you're already a maths professor, then you can read some article and nod
    wisely, and suggest edits to make it /even more/ general! :)



    Of course, you could be learning from an author taking a different
    approach, but I haven't personally come across one who would say that
    the sentence represented by G was a "Theorem" of the underlying
    logical system!-a (That would (IMO) be grossly misleading...)

    I will somewhat agree here, because generally the term is reserved for
    statements about a more general truth, as opposed to a statement about
    a specific fact. But the most generic definition is just a statment
    that has been proven.

    Yes, but we are talking about formal systems, and "Theorem" in such a context implies a proof
    /within the proof calculus of that formal system/.-a That is what GIT is concerned with.-a (I give an example of what I mean by "proof calculus" below, but I'm sure you understand the idea, just possibly not the
    wording.)



    Similarly, the word "proof" can be informal (simply an argument that
    convinces people of the truth of a statement), or refer to the "proof
    calculus" of the formal system being discussed.-a Most authors I've
    come across seem to use "proof" more or less informally and for
    clarity choose another word for whatever sequence of syntactic "proof
    steps" the formal system specifies.-a Often "derivation" is used, and
    that seems intuitive to me, so I try to always use that term here,
    and using "proof" for more general mathematial arguments, e.g.
    proving that the G statement is "true" using some meta-theory.

    The issue is that "derivation" doesn't actually imply a finiteness,
    which is a necessity of "proof".

    Where do you get that idea?-a Are you thinking "derivation" is just an informal word?-a I'm using it in the technical sense previously explained.

    Within a formal system there will be a set of rules which define what a valid "derivation" looks like.-a These would ensure that such derivations are finite.-a (I'm sure someone at some time has made a special study of "infinite proofs", but that is off the beaten track.)-a As explained in
    my previous post, I'm using "derivation" as the technical term for
    whatever passes as a "formal proof conforming to the requirements of the proof calculus of the system".-a This is so that the idea does not get muddled with your more general kind of proof = "convincing argument in
    some meta-theory".

    Derivations have G||del numbers.-a "Convincing arguments in the meta- theory" do not.-a The idea of a G||del number for an infinite derivation does not make sense.


    The point is that the standard statement of "Incompleteness" talks
    about the provability of statements in the system. Provability is
    inherently about the ability to create a proof in the system.

    "(FORMAL) Proof in the system" = "derivation".-a You want to use the word "proof" more generally, namely to cover arguments in a meta-theory which establish some meta-truth concerning the base system.-a That's ok [and
    the reason I use "derivation" to distinguish from "informal proof"], but
    not the type of "proof" that incompleteness refers to.


    Yes, often an other will use a more confined word to establish the
    method of a proof.

    Right.-a The logical system will have some kind of "proof calculus" which says EXACTLY what constitutes a valid derivation for that system.-a E.g. perhaps something like:

    -a A derivation is a finite sequence of sentences in the language of the formal system, such that
    -a each sentence is either:
    -a --a-a an axiom of the system,
    -a --a-a or can be constructed from previous sentences by applying one of the
    -a-a-a-a-a following "deduction rules":
    -a-a-a-a-a --a-a [probably something equivalent to Modus Ponens]
    -a-a-a-a-a --a-a [maybe other listed rules]
    -a The last sentence of the derivation is the "result" of the derivation.

    When G||del talks of provability in a system, he always means such a derivation, not some informal convincing argument.

    From here on I'm just going to use the word derivation without
    explaining it every time!



    Also just as an aside, I don't recall that Godel ever talked about
    "truth" of his G statement. His proof was concerned with provability.
    (Neither the G sentence nor its negation is provable.)


    Mike.


    But there are many statements that they or their negation is provable,
    all you need is a statement that isn't a truth bearer, for example,
    the liar paradox.

    We are talking about sentences in the language of some formal system.
    You have been arguing for too long with PO!!


    Incompleteness is about a statement that is true in the system and not
    being provable. That is the ESSENCE of the concept of incompleteness.

    There are different types of incompleteness, and different definitions. G||del's concerns there being a statement G such that neither G nor -4G
    has a derivation in the system.-a There is no reference to "truth" in
    that and I'd say his proof is essentially syntactical in nature.

    All that aside, yes there are many statements of formal systems for
    which neither they nor their negations are provable - those systems are incomplete, and its no big deal because largely speaking people did not expect them to be complete!-a The surprise with GIT is that it showed specific systems were incomplete, where we previously had no good reason
    to think that might be the case.

    In more modern terms e.g. we have FOL (first order logic) and PA
    (Peano's Arithmetic - a FOL theory with its own symbols/axioms) and it
    might well seem that all arithmetic truths could be proved within that system - after all, it has an induction axiom schema, and seems to be sufficient for our needs when we look at typical proofs we see in
    school. What else could we need?-a Have we got "enough" axioms with PA? Mathematicians at the time of G||del would have liked to think so.-a But
    GIT (more modern FOL version) shows that's not the case: PA is
    incomplete. Also we see that extending PA adding a few more axioms isn't going to change this.

    [It's strange - both you and Tristan expressed surprise that everyday theories might be incomplete. Incompleteness is not a "fatal flaw" in a theory in the way that inconsistency is - some theories are just
    incomplete by their nature.)

    It uses BOTH the concept of Truth, and Proof, so trying to say that
    these aren't terms used seems to be a contradiction in your explaination.

    You just SAY what you think incompleteness means, and then point out
    that your definition used the word truth and mine doesn't!-a Very PO-
    like :)-a-a A better way to go would be to look at G||del's paper and see how he defined incompleteness.

    I'd say we have two notions:

    a) A theory T is incomplete if there exists a sentence s such that
    -a-a neither s nor -4s is a theorem of T


    T is complete when for any sentence -a, either TrCareo -a or TrCareo -4-a. https://www.cairn.info/revue-philosophia-scientiae-2014-3-page-23.htm

    According to the above when -a is self-contradictory this makes T
    incomplete.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sun Jan 4 14:21:33 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/4/2026 1:21 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/4/26 9:48 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/4/2026 6:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/3/26 10:36 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 9:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/3/26 9:49 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 8:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/3/26 8:45 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 7:35 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/3/26 5:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 2:58 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 03/01/2026 17:30, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 10:58 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:

    We begin by postulating a certain non void, definite
    class {E} of statements, which we call elementary
    statements...

    I didn't write that.


    That is part of how Curry defined True(x) rei Theorem(x)
    https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf


    But he doesn't define True(x) to be = Theorem(x)


    Thus, given {T}, an elementary theorem is an elementary statement >>>>>>>> which is true.

    https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf

    Are you capable of ever paying complete attention?
    I hyper-focus instead. This makes most everyone
    else seem like they have severe attention deficit
    by contrast.


    Which says that Theorems are true statement, not that truth are >>>>>>> proven statements.


    So you have no idea how true statements are derived
    from other true statements ?

    https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/


    Right, but the chain can be infinite, and thus not a proof.

    Right so we may never know if the Goldbach conjecture is true.

    But it must be either True or False.

    Your system can't handle that.

    Unknown is a value of Knowledge, not Truth.

    All you are doing is showing that you own system must be incomplete
    becuase it can't even HANDLE some statements that we know must have a
    truth value.


    It is not incomplete in the G||del sense.

    Then it is just inconsistant, and incomplete in the more general sense.

    You CAN'T have you goal of "all general knowledge" and Truth is Provable
    at the same time without having a broken system.


    It is categorically impossible to derive any element
    of the body of knowledge that can be expressed in
    language that is not entirely comprised of some relation
    between finite strings.


    We do now that all paradoxes resolve to nonsense.

    No, because the word "Paradox" just means an APPARENT contradiction.

    For example, Zeno's paradox that seems to show that Achilies can't
    pass the Tortoise is resolved by noting that while you went through
    an infinite number of steps of logic, those only encompassed a finite
    amount of time, and after that Achilies does pass the Tortoise.


    paradoxes resolve to nonsense.

    So, the sum of the number 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + 1/16 ... is nonsense?


    The Liar's Paradox gets resolved by seeing that the statement just
    doesn't have a Truth Value (Not all syntacticly valid statemente do)
    and thus isn't a Semantically valid statement, and the "Not" operator
    is being given an invalid value (or Not(not-a-truth-value) is just
    not-a- truth-value).


    Yes

    So (as the PREDICATE) True(LP) is false, and True(~LP) is also false.


    Indicating that LP is not a truth-bearer / proposition.

    But if X = ~True(X) can't use this excape, as the "True" preidcate is
    ALWAYS a truth value, and thus ~True(X) is also ALWAYS a truth value.


    We just went over this:
    LP is not a truth-bearer even when LP is called X.

    This is the problem with a truth predicate, it looses the escape valve
    of just using the not operator.


    This means that True(L, x) can be defined for the
    *entire body of knowledge expressed in language*

    No, because we can still express in that language statements that we
    can not know if they are true, like the Goldbach conjecture.


    Did you notice that those are not in the body of knowledge?
    *entire body of knowledge expressed in language*

    So, are you saying you language can only express statements already know
    to be true?


    Language can express the the truth value of
    the Goldbach conjecture is unknown.

    In other words, it isn't a "logic" that allows discovery?

    The body of knowldege certainly understand the concepts of summing two numbers, of even numbers, and primes, so, if able to be inquisative, ask about the sums of primes and even numbers.


    No infinite proof completes in finite time.
    Not even with the magic fairy dust of an
    Oracle Machine.

    This shows that you system just can't do what you want it to do, and you view of "semantics" is just insufficent to do what you want it to,


    I can't get my kitchen sink to bake me a birthday cake either.


    Note, the True predicate has a domain of all syntactially valid
    expressions, and returns false for any that are semantically invalid.


    If X is unknown or
    semantically incoherent or
    simply not encoded then True(X)==FALSE and True(~X)==FALSE

    Nope.


    I stipulate that is an element of the architecture
    that I am specifying. stipulated specifications
    can only be incorrect when they are impossible
    of incoheeent.

    The fact we don't KNOW the truth of X doesn't affect the value returned
    by True(x)


    Unknowns are not in the domain of knowledge.

    It seems you confuse Known with True, and not even go so far as Knowable.


    domain of knowledge.
    domain of knowledge.
    domain of knowledge.
    domain of knowledge.
    domain of knowledge.

    That means truth values in you system CHANGE over time, which is unacceptable in an actual logic system.


    Pluto being measured against updated criteria
    is no longer a planet.


    Thus True(L, "The Goldbach Conjecture") needs to resolve that actual
    truth of that conjecture.


    This is the domain
    *entire body of knowledge expressed in language*
    The Goldbach Conjecture's truth value is not in that domain

    But is expressible in that language.


    It is categorically impossible to derive any element
    of the body of knowledge that can be expressed in
    language that is not entirely comprised of some relation
    between finite strings.

    I guess you are just asserting your system is just a repository of Knowledge, and WORTHLESS in dealing with statement not in its repository.


    It is not an all knowing mind of God.


    All you are showing is your inability to understand the rules of the
    game you got in.


    After 28 years I have finally got it.

    Nop,e just showing you have lost it.



    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    Eliminates a key issue that has plagued epistemology since 1951

    No, because it just admits its own limitation, and put forward a mis-
    defintion of Truth.


    The analytic/synthetic distinction was broken by Quine
    since 1951. I reframed it as the Analytic(Olcott) / Empirical
    distinction.

    But that isn't part of Formal Logic, just general Philosophy.


    My "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    within the body of knowledge specifies the precise subset
    of knowledge that can be computed on the basis of relations
    between finite strings. It also reframes the analytic/synthetic
    distinction with an unequivocal line-of-demarcation between
    Analytic(Olcott) and Empirical(Olcott).

    It seems you don't even understand the scope of the field you are trying
    to talk about.



    https://www.theologie.uzh.ch/dam/jcr:ffffffff-
    fbd6-1538-0000-000070cf64bc/Quine51.pdf


    Which is about Philosophy, not Logic, which is part of your problem,
    you don't understand the difference.

    I defined the computable subset of knowledge.


    No, you have failed to actually define anything.


    It is categorically impossible to derive any element
    of the body of knowledge that can be expressed in
    language that is not entirely comprised of some relation
    between finite strings.

    You have a concept for a worthless system to record knowledge that you
    can interograte to see if something was already known.

    That you require an acceptable system to be the
    omniscient mind of God is a category error.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sun Jan 4 15:23:56 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/4/26 3:21 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/4/2026 1:21 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/4/26 9:48 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/4/2026 6:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/3/26 10:36 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 9:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/3/26 9:49 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 8:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/3/26 8:45 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 7:35 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/3/26 5:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 2:58 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 03/01/2026 17:30, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 10:58 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:

    We begin by postulating a certain non void, definite >>>>>>>>>>>>> class {E} of statements, which we call elementary
    statements...

    I didn't write that.


    That is part of how Curry defined True(x) rei Theorem(x) >>>>>>>>>>> https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf


    But he doesn't define True(x) to be = Theorem(x)


    Thus, given {T}, an elementary theorem is an elementary statement >>>>>>>>> which is true.

    https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf

    Are you capable of ever paying complete attention?
    I hyper-focus instead. This makes most everyone
    else seem like they have severe attention deficit
    by contrast.


    Which says that Theorems are true statement, not that truth are >>>>>>>> proven statements.


    So you have no idea how true statements are derived
    from other true statements ?

    https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/


    Right, but the chain can be infinite, and thus not a proof.

    Right so we may never know if the Goldbach conjecture is true.

    But it must be either True or False.

    Your system can't handle that.

    Unknown is a value of Knowledge, not Truth.

    All you are doing is showing that you own system must be incomplete
    becuase it can't even HANDLE some statements that we know must have
    a truth value.


    It is not incomplete in the G||del sense.

    Then it is just inconsistant, and incomplete in the more general sense.

    You CAN'T have you goal of "all general knowledge" and Truth is
    Provable at the same time without having a broken system.


    It is categorically impossible to derive any element
    of the body of knowledge that can be expressed in
    language that is not entirely comprised of some relation
    between finite strings.


    We do now that all paradoxes resolve to nonsense.

    No, because the word "Paradox" just means an APPARENT contradiction.

    For example, Zeno's paradox that seems to show that Achilies can't
    pass the Tortoise is resolved by noting that while you went through
    an infinite number of steps of logic, those only encompassed a
    finite amount of time, and after that Achilies does pass the Tortoise. >>>>

    paradoxes resolve to nonsense.

    So, the sum of the number 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + 1/16 ... is nonsense?


    The Liar's Paradox gets resolved by seeing that the statement just
    doesn't have a Truth Value (Not all syntacticly valid statemente do)
    and thus isn't a Semantically valid statement, and the "Not"
    operator is being given an invalid value (or Not(not-a-truth-value)
    is just not-a- truth-value).


    Yes

    So (as the PREDICATE) True(LP) is false, and True(~LP) is also false.


    Indicating that LP is not a truth-bearer / proposition.

    But if X = ~True(X) can't use this excape, as the "True" preidcate is
    ALWAYS a truth value, and thus ~True(X) is also ALWAYS a truth value.


    We just went over this:
    LP is not a truth-bearer even when LP is called X.

    This is the problem with a truth predicate, it looses the escape valve
    of just using the not operator.


    This means that True(L, x) can be defined for the
    *entire body of knowledge expressed in language*

    No, because we can still express in that language statements that we
    can not know if they are true, like the Goldbach conjecture.


    Did you notice that those are not in the body of knowledge?
    *entire body of knowledge expressed in language*

    So, are you saying you language can only express statements already
    know to be true?


    Language can express the the truth value of
    the Goldbach conjecture is unknown.

    In other words, it isn't a "logic" that allows discovery?

    The body of knowldege certainly understand the concepts of summing two
    numbers, of even numbers, and primes, so, if able to be inquisative,
    ask about the sums of primes and even numbers.


    No infinite proof completes in finite time.
    Not even with the magic fairy dust of an
    Oracle Machine.

    This shows that you system just can't do what you want it to do, and
    you view of "semantics" is just insufficent to do what you want it to,


    I can't get my kitchen sink to bake me a birthday cake either.


    Note, the True predicate has a domain of all syntactially valid
    expressions, and returns false for any that are semantically invalid.


    If X is unknown or
    semantically incoherent or
    simply not encoded then True(X)==FALSE and True(~X)==FALSE

    Nope.


    I stipulate that is an element of the architecture
    that I am specifying. stipulated specifications
    can only be incorrect when they are impossible
    of incoheeent.

    The fact we don't KNOW the truth of X doesn't affect the value
    returned by True(x)


    Unknowns are not in the domain of knowledge.

    It seems you confuse Known with True, and not even go so far as Knowable.


    domain of knowledge.
    domain of knowledge.
    domain of knowledge.
    domain of knowledge.
    domain of knowledge.

    That means truth values in you system CHANGE over time, which is
    unacceptable in an actual logic system.


    Pluto being measured against updated criteria
    is no longer a planet.


    Thus True(L, "The Goldbach Conjecture") needs to resolve that actual
    truth of that conjecture.


    This is the domain
    *entire body of knowledge expressed in language*
    The Goldbach Conjecture's truth value is not in that domain

    But is expressible in that language.


    It is categorically impossible to derive any element
    of the body of knowledge that can be expressed in
    language that is not entirely comprised of some relation
    between finite strings.

    I guess you are just asserting your system is just a repository of
    Knowledge, and WORTHLESS in dealing with statement not in its repository.


    It is not an all knowing mind of God.


    All you are showing is your inability to understand the rules of the
    game you got in.


    After 28 years I have finally got it.

    Nop,e just showing you have lost it.



    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    Eliminates a key issue that has plagued epistemology since 1951

    No, because it just admits its own limitation, and put forward a
    mis- defintion of Truth.


    The analytic/synthetic distinction was broken by Quine
    since 1951. I reframed it as the Analytic(Olcott) / Empirical
    distinction.

    But that isn't part of Formal Logic, just general Philosophy.


    My "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    within the body of knowledge specifies the precise subset
    of knowledge that can be computed on the basis of relations
    between finite strings. It also reframes the analytic/synthetic
    distinction with an unequivocal line-of-demarcation between
    Analytic(Olcott) and Empirical(Olcott).

    It seems you don't even understand the scope of the field you are
    trying to talk about.



    https://www.theologie.uzh.ch/dam/jcr:ffffffff-
    fbd6-1538-0000-000070cf64bc/Quine51.pdf


    Which is about Philosophy, not Logic, which is part of your problem,
    you don't understand the difference.

    I defined the computable subset of knowledge.


    No, you have failed to actually define anything.


    It is categorically impossible to derive any element
    of the body of knowledge that can be expressed in
    language that is not entirely comprised of some relation
    between finite strings.

    So?

    The problem is we want to derive things that aren't yet in the body of knowledge.

    And, the relationship between finite strings is often not what you
    consider the "meaning of the words", as the strings often aren't just words.


    You have a concept for a worthless system to record knowledge that you
    can interograte to see if something was already known.

    That you require an acceptable system to be the
    omniscient mind of God is a category error.


    That you require the system to be impotent, and not able to talk about something unknow makes it worthless.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sun Jan 4 14:32:37 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/4/2026 2:23 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/4/26 3:21 PM, olcott wrote:

    It is categorically impossible to derive any element
    of the body of knowledge that can be expressed in
    language that is not entirely comprised of some relation
    between finite strings.

    So?


    That is the conclusive proof that I am correct.

    The problem is we want to derive things that aren't yet in the body of knowledge.


    If you want to know the name of your wife's
    mother and you have not met your wife yet
    then the answer is not available by any means.

    Once the body of general knowledge is fully
    populated an intelligent system can derive
    brand new knowledge on the basis of semantic
    entailment from this basis.

    And, the relationship between finite strings is often not what you
    consider the "meaning of the words", as the strings often aren't just
    words.


    I made sure to never limit it to words.


    You have a concept for a worthless system to record knowledge that
    you can interograte to see if something was already known.

    That you require an acceptable system to be the
    omniscient mind of God is a category error.


    That you require the system to be impotent, and not able to talk about something unknow makes it worthless.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sun Jan 4 15:45:15 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/4/26 3:32 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/4/2026 2:23 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/4/26 3:21 PM, olcott wrote:

    It is categorically impossible to derive any element
    of the body of knowledge that can be expressed in
    language that is not entirely comprised of some relation
    between finite strings.

    So?


    That is the conclusive proof that I am correct.

    No it isn't. That doesn't make Truth computable, it makes everything computable true.


    The problem is we want to derive things that aren't yet in the body of
    knowledge.


    If you want to know the name of your wife's
    mother and you have not met your wife yet
    then the answer is not available by any means.\

    So? She still has a name.


    Once the body of general knowledge is fully
    populated an intelligent system can derive
    brand new knowledge on the basis of semantic
    entailment from this basis.

    Not if you don't allow it to be expressed.

    You just said we couldn't write Goldbach's conjecture as it wasn't
    knowledge.

    If you can't write what isn't know, you can't write a proof to make it
    known.


    And, the relationship between finite strings is often not what you
    consider the "meaning of the words", as the strings often aren't just
    words.


    I made sure to never limit it to words.

    You have at times.

    Note, it also isn't limited to FINTE strings of deduction, and thus the results aren't proofs.

    Goldbach's conjecture might be true based on an infinite string of
    operations, the testing of every Natural Number, and showing it can be expressed as the sum of two primes.



    You have a concept for a worthless system to record knowledge that
    you can interograte to see if something was already known.

    That you require an acceptable system to be the
    omniscient mind of God is a category error.


    That you require the system to be impotent, and not able to talk about
    something unknow makes it worthless.



    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Jeff Barnett@jbb@notatt.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sun Jan 4 15:13:52 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/4/2026 11:55 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 17:54, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/2/26 12:24 PM, Mike Terry wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 15:25, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/2/26 1:14 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 04:45, Richard Damon wrote:
    <SNIP>
    Similarly, the word "proof" can be informal (simply an argument that
    convinces people of the truth of a statement), or refer to the "proof
    calculus" of the formal system being discussed.-a Most authors I've
    come across seem to use "proof" more or less informally and for
    clarity choose another word for whatever sequence of syntactic "proof
    steps" the formal system specifies.-a Often "derivation" is used, and
    that seems intuitive to me, so I try to always use that term here,
    and using "proof" for more general mathematial arguments, e.g.
    proving that the G statement is "true" using some meta-theory.

    The issue is that "derivation" doesn't actually imply a finiteness,
    which is a necessity of "proof".

    Where do you get that idea?-a Are you thinking "derivation" is just an informal word?-a I'm using it in the technical sense previously explained.

    Within a formal system there will be a set of rules which define what a valid "derivation" looks like.-a These would ensure that such derivations are finite.-a (I'm sure someone at some time has made a special study of "infinite proofs", but that is off the beaten track.)-a As explained in
    my previous post, I'm using "derivation" as the technical term for
    whatever passes as a "formal proof conforming to the requirements of the proof calculus of the system".-a This is so that the idea does not get muddled with your more general kind of proof = "convincing argument in
    some meta-theory". <SNIP>

    There are examples of the following situations that I remember from discussions with logicians circa. 60 years ago. Assume we have a simple axiomatic system that allows us to express some facts about what we
    believe to be natural numbers. Call the objects in a model of the system
    N and we wish to prove, in our little system, that for all n in N p(n).
    Now it turns out that for any n in N we can write a simple finite proof
    of p(n) but are (provably in a larger or meta system) not able to prove
    the universally quantified statement in the little system. Well actually
    .... if you wrote a proof, in the little system, for each n in N and
    joined them with and "&" operator you would prove the quantified
    statement albeit with an infinity proof. In a little larger system,
    perhaps with an induction axiom, or a meta system it might be trivial to
    prove the whole thing with a finite effort.
    --
    Jeff Barnett

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sun Jan 4 17:50:55 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/4/26 5:13 PM, Jeff Barnett wrote:
    On 1/4/2026 11:55 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 17:54, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/2/26 12:24 PM, Mike Terry wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 15:25, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/2/26 1:14 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 04:45, Richard Damon wrote:
    -a-a <SNIP>
    Similarly, the word "proof" can be informal (simply an argument that
    convinces people of the truth of a statement), or refer to the
    "proof calculus" of the formal system being discussed.-a Most authors >>>> I've come across seem to use "proof" more or less informally and for
    clarity choose another word for whatever sequence of syntactic
    "proof steps" the formal system specifies.-a Often "derivation" is
    used, and that seems intuitive to me, so I try to always use that
    term here, and using "proof" for more general mathematial arguments,
    e.g. proving that the G statement is "true" using some meta-theory.

    The issue is that "derivation" doesn't actually imply a finiteness,
    which is a necessity of "proof".

    Where do you get that idea?-a Are you thinking "derivation" is just an
    informal word?-a I'm using it in the technical sense previously explained. >>
    Within a formal system there will be a set of rules which define what
    a valid "derivation" looks like.-a These would ensure that such
    derivations are finite.-a (I'm sure someone at some time has made a
    special study of "infinite proofs", but that is off the beaten
    track.)-a As explained in my previous post, I'm using "derivation" as
    the technical term for whatever passes as a "formal proof conforming
    to the requirements of the proof calculus of the system".-a This is so
    that the idea does not get muddled with your more general kind of
    proof = "convincing argument in some meta-theory".-a-a-a-a <SNIP>

    There are examples of the following situations that I remember from discussions with logicians circa. 60 years ago. Assume we have a simple axiomatic system that allows us to express some facts about what we
    believe to be natural numbers. Call the objects in a model of the system
    N and we wish to prove, in our little system, that for all n in N p(n).
    Now it turns out that for any n in N we can write a simple finite proof
    of p(n) but are (provably in a larger or meta system) not able to prove
    the universally quantified statement in the little system. Well
    actually .... if you wrote a proof, in the little system, for each n in
    N and joined them with and "&" operator you would prove the quantified statement albeit with an infinity proof. In a little larger system,
    perhaps with an induction axiom, or a meta system it might be trivial to prove the whole thing with a finite effort.


    The issue how can you know or show that you can make such a proof for
    all n within the system?

    IF you can break the infinite number of n into a finite number of cases,
    then you can built a finite proof based on those cases.

    The problem is that the normal definition of "proof" requires it to be
    finite, as proofs are supposed to SHOW to a person that the statement is
    true, and we can't handle such an infinite series.

    System that try to define "Proof" to include infinite logic, run into
    the issue that infinte proofs can't be actually created or viewed, and
    thus the system has decoupled "knoweledge" from proofs.

    What you describe is sort of what Godel does, but points out that your infinite chain isn't a proof by the rules of standard logic, as the
    proof in the meta system provides a reason why each of the numbers
    applied to the relationship will fail. Thus, we DO have your concept of
    an infinite "proof" in the system, which actually shows that the
    statement must actually be true in the system (but this truth can't be
    shown in the system except with infinite work).
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Jeff Barnett@jbb@notatt.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sun Jan 4 18:48:12 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/4/2026 3:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/4/26 5:13 PM, Jeff Barnett wrote:
    On 1/4/2026 11:55 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 17:54, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/2/26 12:24 PM, Mike Terry wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 15:25, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/2/26 1:14 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 04:45, Richard Damon wrote:
    -a-a-a <SNIP>
    Similarly, the word "proof" can be informal (simply an argument
    that convinces people of the truth of a statement), or refer to the >>>>> "proof calculus" of the formal system being discussed.-a Most
    authors I've come across seem to use "proof" more or less
    informally and for clarity choose another word for whatever
    sequence of syntactic "proof steps" the formal system specifies.
    Often "derivation" is used, and that seems intuitive to me, so I
    try to always use that term here, and using "proof" for more
    general mathematial arguments, e.g. proving that the G statement is >>>>> "true" using some meta-theory.

    The issue is that "derivation" doesn't actually imply a finiteness,
    which is a necessity of "proof".

    Where do you get that idea?-a Are you thinking "derivation" is just an
    informal word?-a I'm using it in the technical sense previously
    explained.

    Within a formal system there will be a set of rules which define what
    a valid "derivation" looks like.-a These would ensure that such
    derivations are finite.-a (I'm sure someone at some time has made a
    special study of "infinite proofs", but that is off the beaten
    track.)-a As explained in my previous post, I'm using "derivation" as
    the technical term for whatever passes as a "formal proof conforming
    to the requirements of the proof calculus of the system".-a This is so
    that the idea does not get muddled with your more general kind of
    proof = "convincing argument in some meta-theory".-a-a-a-a <SNIP>

    There are examples of the following situations that I remember from
    discussions with logicians circa. 60 years ago. Assume we have a
    simple axiomatic system that allows us to express some facts about
    what we believe to be natural numbers. Call the objects in a model of
    the system N and we wish to prove, in our little system, that for all
    n in N p(n). Now it turns out that for any n in N we can write a
    simple finite proof of p(n) but are (provably in a larger or meta
    system) not able to prove the universally quantified statement in the
    little system. Well actually .... if you wrote a proof, in the little
    system, for each n in N and joined them with and "&" operator you
    would prove the quantified statement albeit with an infinity proof. In
    a little larger system, perhaps with an induction axiom, or a meta
    system it might be trivial to prove the whole thing with a finite effort.


    The issue how can you know or show that you can make such a proof for
    all n within the system?

    Some of the facts in the above are knowable in more powerful systems and
    can only be appreciated from that viewpoint.
    > IF you can break the infinite number of n into a finite number of
    cases,
    then you can built a finite proof based on those cases.

    If that were true in the examples I was shown, then none of the rest
    would follow and I wouldn't have posted what I did.

    The problem is that the normal definition of "proof" requires it to be finite, as proofs are supposed to SHOW to a person that the statement is true, and we can't handle such an infinite series.

    That is simply not true. Period. If I recall correctly, the book
    "Zermelo's Axiom of Choice -- Its Origins, Development and Influence" by Gregory H. Moore, talks about infinite proofs in a few places. (My copy
    of the book is 40+ years ago and was unholy expensive. You can now get a paperback copy for $13.99 at US Amazon.con.) Where, other then in silly USENET, dose it say that all proofs in all formal systems must be
    finite? Serious question. Maybe this is a point that you and Peter can
    agree on, but don't implicate innocent bystanders.

    System that try to define "Proof" to include infinite logic, run into
    the issue that infinte proofs can't be actually created or viewed, and
    thus the system has decoupled "knoweledge" from proofs.

    Logicians qualified to discuss and develop theories of and using
    infinitary proofs do not have such problems. (I'm using the term
    "qualified logician" to distinguish an individual from myself and other want-a-bees participating in these idiotic discussions.) They know what
    they are doing and often are exploring the interesting question of what
    you can and cannot know in particular (styles of) formal systems. This
    seems to be the main theme from all the want-a-bees but, for them, the discussion continues without a clue. By the way, do you have a single reference to a book published by one of the "technical" houses of repute
    or a peer referenced journal around for at least 25 years that supports
    a single thought expressed in your above paragraph that begins "System
    (sic) that try to..."?

    What you describe is sort of what Godel does, but points out that your infinite chain isn't a proof by the rules of standard logic, as the
    proof in the meta system provides a reason why each of the numbers
    applied to the relationship will fail. Thus, we DO have your concept of
    an infinite "proof" in the system, which actually shows that the
    statement must actually be true in the system (but this truth can't be
    shown in the system except with infinite work).

    It's not what Godel does in any energetic sense. But it's a good "appeal
    to authority", misguided but an appeal. As to standard logic -- there
    are at least 20 want-a-bees in these discussions and no two of them
    could write down the same precise definition! And the above is not my
    idea; I'm really old and the idea was around before I was born. Unless
    the system has appropriate rules for making and/or certifying the
    infinity proof you can't prove it in the system. This, by the way, is
    just another technique for showing that a system is incomplete, i.e.,
    there is a fact that is true in all models and cannot be proven in the
    system. One last comment: Don't think of a proof as work. Its an entity
    that exists by the definition of some formal system, e.g., a string that satisfies some mathematical predicate.
    --
    Jeff Barnett

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sun Jan 4 21:23:29 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/4/26 8:48 PM, Jeff Barnett wrote:
    On 1/4/2026 3:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/4/26 5:13 PM, Jeff Barnett wrote:
    On 1/4/2026 11:55 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 17:54, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/2/26 12:24 PM, Mike Terry wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 15:25, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/2/26 1:14 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 04:45, Richard Damon wrote:
    -a-a-a <SNIP>
    Similarly, the word "proof" can be informal (simply an argument
    that convinces people of the truth of a statement), or refer to
    the "proof calculus" of the formal system being discussed.-a Most >>>>>> authors I've come across seem to use "proof" more or less
    informally and for clarity choose another word for whatever
    sequence of syntactic "proof steps" the formal system specifies.
    Often "derivation" is used, and that seems intuitive to me, so I
    try to always use that term here, and using "proof" for more
    general mathematial arguments, e.g. proving that the G statement
    is "true" using some meta-theory.

    The issue is that "derivation" doesn't actually imply a finiteness, >>>>> which is a necessity of "proof".

    Where do you get that idea?-a Are you thinking "derivation" is just
    an informal word?-a I'm using it in the technical sense previously
    explained.

    Within a formal system there will be a set of rules which define
    what a valid "derivation" looks like.-a These would ensure that such
    derivations are finite.-a (I'm sure someone at some time has made a
    special study of "infinite proofs", but that is off the beaten
    track.)-a As explained in my previous post, I'm using "derivation" as >>>> the technical term for whatever passes as a "formal proof conforming
    to the requirements of the proof calculus of the system".-a This is
    so that the idea does not get muddled with your more general kind of
    proof = "convincing argument in some meta-theory".-a-a-a-a <SNIP>

    There are examples of the following situations that I remember from
    discussions with logicians circa. 60 years ago. Assume we have a
    simple axiomatic system that allows us to express some facts about
    what we believe to be natural numbers. Call the objects in a model of
    the system N and we wish to prove, in our little system, that for all
    n in N p(n). Now it turns out that for any n in N we can write a
    simple finite proof of p(n) but are (provably in a larger or meta
    system) not able to prove the universally quantified statement in the
    little system. Well actually .... if you wrote a proof, in the little
    system, for each n in N and joined them with and "&" operator you
    would prove the quantified statement albeit with an infinity proof.
    In a little larger system, perhaps with an induction axiom, or a meta
    system it might be trivial to prove the whole thing with a finite
    effort.


    The issue how can you know or show that you can make such a proof for
    all n within the system?

    Some of the facts in the above are knowable in more powerful systems and
    can only be appreciated from that viewpoint.
    IF you can break the infinite number of n into a finite number of
    cases,

    Yes, As Tarski showed, SOME of the statements unprovable in a system can
    be proven in a "higher order" meata-system, but not all. There will
    ALWAYS be more statements, true in the original bases system, that can
    not be proven in any system.

    And the fact that some can be proven in a higher order system is why we
    can assert them to be true, and thus (at least in the language I
    learned) be called Theorems.

    then you can built a finite proof based on those cases.

    If that were true in the examples I was shown, then none of the rest
    would follow and I wouldn't have posted what I did.

    Yes, I was pointing out that we can't be talking about looking at
    "infinite cases" that actual are just a finite number of generic cases.


    The problem is that the normal definition of "proof" requires it to be
    finite, as proofs are supposed to SHOW to a person that the statement
    is true, and we can't handle such an infinite series.

    That is simply not true. Period. If I recall correctly, the book
    "Zermelo's Axiom of Choice -- Its Origins, Development and Influence" by Gregory H. Moore, talks about infinite proofs in a few places. (My copy
    of the book is 40+ years ago and was unholy expensive. You can now get a paperback copy for $13.99 at US Amazon.con.) Where, other then in silly USENET, dose it say that all proofs in all formal systems must be
    finite? Serious question. Maybe this is a point that you and Peter can
    agree on, but don't implicate innocent bystanders.

    Note, Choice is an AXIOM because it can't actually be proven.

    Those "proof" are just arguements on why the Axiom of Choice makes sense.

    As for a reference, look at Wikipedia at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal_proof and the papers it references.

    Note, Proofs are written down and presented. This can only be done if
    finite.


    System that try to define "Proof" to include infinite logic, run into
    the issue that infinte proofs can't be actually created or viewed, and
    thus the system has decoupled "knoweledge" from proofs.

    Logicians qualified to discuss and develop theories of and using
    infinitary proofs do not have such problems. (I'm using the term
    "qualified logician" to distinguish an individual from myself and other want-a-bees participating in these idiotic discussions.) They know what
    they are doing and often are exploring the interesting question of what
    you can and cannot know in particular (styles of) formal systems. This
    seems to be the main theme from all the want-a-bees but, for them, the discussion continues without a clue. By the way, do you have a single reference to a book published by one of the "technical" houses of repute
    or a peer referenced journal around for at least 25 years that supports
    a single thought expressed in your above paragraph that begins "System
    (sic) that try to..."?

    What you describe is sort of what Godel does, but points out that your
    infinite chain isn't a proof by the rules of standard logic, as the
    proof in the meta system provides a reason why each of the numbers
    applied to the relationship will fail. Thus, we DO have your concept
    of an infinite "proof" in the system, which actually shows that the
    statement must actually be true in the system (but this truth can't be
    shown in the system except with infinite work).

    It's not what Godel does in any energetic sense. But it's a good "appeal
    to authority", misguided but an appeal. As to standard logic -- there
    are at least 20 want-a-bees in these discussions and no two of them
    could write down the same precise definition! And the above is not my
    idea; I'm really old and the idea was around before I was born. Unless
    the system has appropriate rules for making and/or certifying the
    infinity proof you can't prove it in the system. This, by the way, is
    just another technique for showing that a system is incomplete, i.e.,
    there is a fact that is true in all models and cannot be proven in the system. One last comment: Don't think of a proof as work. Its an entity
    that exists by the definition of some formal system, e.g., a string that satisfies some mathematical predicate.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Mon Jan 5 04:42:55 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 03/01/2026 22:18, olcott wrote:

    ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be
    used for a similar undecidability proof...(G||del 1931:40-41)

    Thus the resolution of the Liar Paradox resolves
    G||del incompleteness.


    Misuse of "thus": ought to be "therefore". Then you still have the
    second statement of your syllogism missing. Perhaps you can construct it
    using a syllogism that derives the equivalence of all epistemological antinomies with the liar paradox.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Mon Jan 5 04:54:19 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 04/01/2026 03:07, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/3/26 9:49 PM, olcott wrote:

    So you have no idea how true statements are derived
    from other true statements ?

    https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/


    Right, but the chain can be infinite, and thus not a proof.

    It must have both a start and an end to be a derivation. I'm curious to
    know how you came to think a derivation refers to a class of things that includes a variety that one would say was an infinite chain.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Mon Jan 5 05:11:10 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 04/01/2026 12:42, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/3/26 10:36 PM, olcott wrote:

    We do now that all paradoxes resolve to nonsense.

    No, because the word "Paradox" just means an APPARENT contradiction.

    No, it means an apparently valid apparent contradiction. But definitely
    not nonsense because epithoretically there is structure and therefore
    meaning.


    The Liar's Paradox gets resolved by seeing that the statement just
    doesn't have a Truth Value (Not all syntacticly valid statemente do) and
    thus isn't a Semantically valid statement, and the "Not" operator is
    being given an invalid value (or Not(not-a-truth-value) is just not-a-truth-value).

    The term "lie" in the axioms of the system of the liar paradox invalidly assigns the statement to the class of things deterministically having a
    truth value (having exactly one truth value) when it can be deduced that
    it is not a member of that class - that is the contradiction which is
    actually present. I wonder if that is the proper characteristic of an inconsistent system. I am interested to know of well-received works on
    that matter in particular.

    I qualify my use of "invalidly" above as being produced intuitively. I
    reserve the right to be corrected shamelessly on nuanced technical grounds.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sun Jan 4 23:26:56 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/4/2026 10:42 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 03/01/2026 22:18, olcott wrote:

    ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be
    used for a similar undecidability proof...(G||del 1931:40-41)

    Thus the resolution of the Liar Paradox resolves
    G||del incompleteness.


    Misuse of "thus": ought to be "therefore".

    X fucking does Y, close enough.

    Then you still have the
    second statement of your syllogism missing. Perhaps you can construct it using a syllogism that derives the equivalence of all epistemological antinomies with the liar paradox.


    I breath therefore I live, only two pieces required.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Mon Jan 5 06:22:16 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 04/01/2026 19:21, Richard Damon wrote:

    So, the sum of the number 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + 1/16 ... is nonsense?

    It's nondeterministic because "..." has more than one meaning for the
    effect it has extending the series. It's not nonsense because it's not a statement.

    +ureOreireU 2->rU+

    /is/ deterministic, however... it's 1.

    You might be mapping time nonlinearly whereby each imagined change
    occurs in its imagined reality at a constant +oreL from the previous. It's
    a common affliction among classical mediterranean philosophers.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From wij@wyniijj5@gmail.com to comp.theory on Mon Jan 5 14:45:27 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On Mon, 2026-01-05 at 06:22 +0000, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 04/01/2026 19:21, Richard Damon wrote:

    So, the sum of the number 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + 1/16 ... is nonsense?

    It's nondeterministic because "..." has more than one meaning for the
    effect it has extending the series. It's not nonsense because it's not a statement.

    +ureOreireU 2->rU+

    /is/ deterministic, however... it's 1.
    You just repeat what is told, brainlessly. Lots of rumors about infinity are there.
    Repeating decimal is irrational. https://sourceforge.net/projects/cscall/files/MisFiles/RealNumber2-en.txt/download
    You might be mapping time nonlinearly whereby each imagined change
    occurs in its imagined reality at a constant +oreL from the previous. It's
    a common affliction among classical mediterranean philosophers.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Jeff Barnett@jbb@notatt.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Sun Jan 4 23:53:32 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/4/2026 7:23 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/4/26 8:48 PM, Jeff Barnett wrote:
    On 1/4/2026 3:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/4/26 5:13 PM, Jeff Barnett wrote:
    On 1/4/2026 11:55 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 17:54, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/2/26 12:24 PM, Mike Terry wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 15:25, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/2/26 1:14 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 04:45, Richard Damon wrote:
    -a-a-a <SNIP>
    Similarly, the word "proof" can be informal (simply an argument >>>>>>> that convinces people of the truth of a statement), or refer to >>>>>>> the "proof calculus" of the formal system being discussed.-a Most >>>>>>> authors I've come across seem to use "proof" more or less
    informally and for clarity choose another word for whatever
    sequence of syntactic "proof steps" the formal system specifies. >>>>>>> Often "derivation" is used, and that seems intuitive to me, so I >>>>>>> try to always use that term here, and using "proof" for more
    general mathematial arguments, e.g. proving that the G statement >>>>>>> is "true" using some meta-theory.

    The issue is that "derivation" doesn't actually imply a
    finiteness, which is a necessity of "proof".

    Where do you get that idea?-a Are you thinking "derivation" is just >>>>> an informal word?-a I'm using it in the technical sense previously
    explained.

    Within a formal system there will be a set of rules which define
    what a valid "derivation" looks like.-a These would ensure that such >>>>> derivations are finite.-a (I'm sure someone at some time has made a >>>>> special study of "infinite proofs", but that is off the beaten
    track.)-a As explained in my previous post, I'm using "derivation"
    as the technical term for whatever passes as a "formal proof
    conforming to the requirements of the proof calculus of the
    system".-a This is so that the idea does not get muddled with your
    more general kind of proof = "convincing argument in some meta-
    theory".-a-a-a-a <SNIP>

    There are examples of the following situations that I remember from
    discussions with logicians circa. 60 years ago. Assume we have a
    simple axiomatic system that allows us to express some facts about
    what we believe to be natural numbers. Call the objects in a model
    of the system N and we wish to prove, in our little system, that for
    all n in N p(n). Now it turns out that for any n in N we can write a
    simple finite proof of p(n) but are (provably in a larger or meta
    system) not able to prove the universally quantified statement in
    the little system. Well actually .... if you wrote a proof, in the
    little system, for each n in N and joined them with and "&" operator
    you would prove the quantified statement albeit with an infinity
    proof. In a little larger system, perhaps with an induction axiom,
    or a meta system it might be trivial to prove the whole thing with a
    finite effort.


    The issue how can you know or show that you can make such a proof for
    all n within the system?

    Some of the facts in the above are knowable in more powerful systems
    and can only be appreciated from that viewpoint.
    -a-a> IF you can break the infinite number of n into a finite number of
    cases,

    Yes, As Tarski showed, SOME of the statements unprovable in a system can
    be proven in a "higher order" meata-system, but not all. There will
    ALWAYS be more statements, true in the original bases system, that can
    not be proven in any system.

    And the fact that some can be proven in a higher order system is why we
    can assert them to be true, and thus (at least in the language I
    learned) be called Theorems.

    then you can built a finite proof based on those cases.

    If that were true in the examples I was shown, then none of the rest
    would follow and I wouldn't have posted what I did.

    Yes, I was pointing out that we can't be talking about looking at
    "infinite cases" that actual are just a finite number of generic cases.


    The problem is that the normal definition of "proof" requires it to
    be finite, as proofs are supposed to SHOW to a person that the
    statement is true, and we can't handle such an infinite series.

    That is simply not true. Period. If I recall correctly, the book
    "Zermelo's Axiom of Choice -- Its Origins, Development and Influence"
    by Gregory H. Moore, talks about infinite proofs in a few places. (My
    copy of the book is 40+ years ago and was unholy expensive. You can
    now get a paperback copy for $13.99 at US Amazon.con.) Where, other
    then in silly USENET, dose it say that all proofs in all formal
    systems must be finite? Serious question. Maybe this is a point that
    you and Peter can agree on, but don't implicate innocent bystanders.

    Note, Choice is an AXIOM because it can't actually be proven.

    Those "proof" are just arguements on why the Axiom of Choice makes sense.

    As for a reference, look at Wikipedia at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Formal_proof and the papers it references.

    Note, Proofs are written down and presented. This can only be done if finite.

    Perhaps you can find a legitimate reference that says that. Forget high
    school geometry books, and USENET newsgroups. I don't think you can! I
    think you are making a lot of this up as you go along. Save that stuff
    for debates with Peter, a past master at that. Your statement just above
    is a proof description given to a high school class about how to get a
    good grade. If you think you are speaking in the world of research in logic(s), it's nonsense.

    System that try to define "Proof" to include infinite logic, run into
    the issue that infinte proofs can't be actually created or viewed,
    and thus the system has decoupled "knoweledge" from proofs.

    Logicians qualified to discuss and develop theories of and using
    infinitary proofs do not have such problems. (I'm using the term
    "qualified logician" to distinguish an individual from myself and
    other want-a-bees participating in these idiotic discussions.) They
    know what they are doing and often are exploring the interesting
    question of what you can and cannot know in particular (styles of)
    formal systems. This seems to be the main theme from all the want-a-
    bees but, for them, the discussion continues without a clue. By the
    way, do you have a single reference to a book published by one of the
    "technical" houses of repute or a peer referenced journal around for
    at least 25 years that supports a single thought expressed in your
    above paragraph that begins "System (sic) that try to..."?

    What you describe is sort of what Godel does, but points out that
    your infinite chain isn't a proof by the rules of standard logic, as
    the proof in the meta system provides a reason why each of the
    numbers applied to the relationship will fail. Thus, we DO have your
    concept of an infinite "proof" in the system, which actually shows
    that the statement must actually be true in the system (but this
    truth can't be shown in the system except with infinite work).

    It's not what Godel does in any energetic sense. But it's a good
    "appeal to authority", misguided but an appeal. As to standard logic
    -- there are at least 20 want-a-bees in these discussions and no two
    of them could write down the same precise definition! And the above is
    not my idea; I'm really old and the idea was around before I was born.
    Unless the system has appropriate rules for making and/or certifying
    the infinity proof you can't prove it in the system. This, by the way,
    is just another technique for showing that a system is incomplete,
    i.e., there is a fact that is true in all models and cannot be proven
    in the system. One last comment: Don't think of a proof as work. Its
    an entity that exists by the definition of some formal system, e.g., a
    string that satisfies some mathematical predicate.
    --
    Jeff Barnett

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Mon Jan 5 07:30:57 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 04/01/2026 20:45, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/4/26 3:32 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/4/2026 2:23 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/4/26 3:21 PM, olcott wrote:

    It is categorically impossible to derive any element
    of the body of knowledge that can be expressed in
    language that is not entirely comprised of some relation
    between finite strings.

    So?


    That is the conclusive proof that I am correct.

    No it isn't. That doesn't make Truth computable, it makes everything computable true.


    The problem is we want to derive things that aren't yet in the body
    of knowledge.


    If you want to know the name of your wife's
    mother and you have not met your wife yet
    then the answer is not available by any means.\

    So? She still has a name.

    Is this how the church banned divorce and also remarriage after a
    bereavement?

    They'd made an AI knowledge-base and used the same axiom that you just did?

    Henry VIII made a more sophisticated one and the rest is history. It was
    a system that attested reality and was written in prolog: protestant.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Mon Jan 5 07:46:14 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 03/01/2026 22:27, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 3:06 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 03/01/2026 17:30, olcott wrote (quoting Curry):

    In other words: reCx ree T ((True(T, x) rei (E reo x))

    Curry would not approve of you formalising that without defining the
    system in which you formalise it.

    You have to read my quote of Curry to see that he
    already defined {T} and {E}.

    You forget the history of the posts of who you're talking to.


    {E} is merely my own notion of atomic facts,
    previously called base facts.

    I think not. Elementary statements are those made from predicates
    adjoining terms but not adjoining other statements. Your atomic facts
    are nullary predicates, or unary predicates adjoined to primitive terms,
    or binary predicates adjoining terms to some world (perhaps if the world
    is represented by a term - we reach the limits of my ready
    understanding), etc...


    -aHis notions of U-language and
    A-language and progressive refinement of the U-language were carefully
    thought through leading to his incredible written lucidity, and the
    immense benefit of reading his work carefully from the start.
    ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
    |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
    |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||

    TAKE NOTE and also read his Theory of Formal Deducibility
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Mon Jan 5 07:53:44 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 03/01/2026 21:54, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/3/26 3:55 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:

    I would like to see Richard's construction of the statement for which G
    is shorthand. As it is mere shorthand then there is such a thing.

    G is the statement

    There does not exist a natural number (g) that satisfies the
    relationship ...

    Where the ... is the incredibly complicated formula that he derives
    thorough most of the paper,

    Failing the actual construction, a demonstration that the statement has
    a construction (therefore is finite *and* is a statement of the system)
    will satisfy my immediate curiosity. I believe G||del called this
    "existence", formally.

    that can't be expressed in simple ascii.

    Yes, he uses +a and material implication "hook", doesn't he? There are straightforward UTF-8 re-presentations that will do.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Mon Jan 5 08:43:54 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 03/01/2026 21:39, Mike Terry wrote:
    On 03/01/2026 19:02, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 03/01/2026 16:32, Mike Terry wrote:
    On 03/01/2026 03:30, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/2/26 9:43 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-01-01 20:09, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 9:45 PM, Andr|- G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-01-01 16:48, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/1/26 6:13 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 01/01/2026 22:40, Richard Damon wrote:

    But it IS a theorem of the base system, as it uses ONLY the >>>>>>>>>> mathematical
    operations definable in the base system. What makes you think it >>>>>>>>>> isn't a
    Theorem in the base system.

    It has no derivation in the base system, if it had you wouldn't >>>>>>>>> think
    the base system were incomplete.


    It has no PROOF in the base system.

    Which means it is not a theorem of the base system. A theorem is a >>>>>>> statement which can be proven in a particular system.

    I guess it depends on your definition of a "Theorem".

    I am using the one that goes:

    "A Theorem is a statement that has been proven."
    -a-a>
    note, no restriction that the proof was in the system the Theorem is >>>>>> stated in, as long as the proof shows that it is actually True in
    that system.

    A theorem is a statement that can be derived from the axioms of a
    particular system. It may be true in other systems, but it is only a >>>>> theorem in systems in which it can be derived.

    Right, And the statement og Godel's G can be fully derived in the base >>>> system, as it is purely a mathematical relationship using the
    operations derivable in the system.

    Neither G nor -4G has a derivation (in your terms, a "formal prooof")
    within the base system.-a That is what Godel proves, showing that the
    base system is incomplete.

    That can't be what he meant can it? Lots of systems were known to have
    statements that had no derivation, all nonsense statements, for example.

    Yes it was what he meant!-a :/

    His theorem was about formal systems of arithmetic.-a Such systems don't contain "nonsense statements".-a They have construction rules that define what constitues a well formed formula (WFF), and amongst those what so constitutes a "sentence".-a The semantics for the system define what
    every sentence "means".-a It is not possible to create "nonsense" sentences.

    Thanks, his 1931 paper isn't very clear about what, exactly, it is demonstrating.

    The G rei -4Provable(G) isn't terribly remarkable although I still haven't
    got the the bottom of the meaning of that because I still rely on
    ontology for "Provable" but I'm sure I will think it through. I wonder
    if it turns out that a real "provability" object which has its natural
    meaning the same as its properties just can't be encoded in a formal
    system and that's the real meaning of "incomplete" (ie, putting its
    properties in the primitive frame gives an inconsistent system).

    How does he demonstrate that system P has the amount of arithmetic
    claimed to force an incomplete system *and* demonstrate that there is
    nothing else in the system which could cause it in combination with
    arithmetic? I suspect it's really about the embedding that forms the meta-system: "forall such-a-class-of embeddings of arithmetic ..."
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Mon Jan 5 11:18:09 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 04/01/2026 18:55, Mike Terry wrote:
    G||del's concerns there being a statement G such that neither G nor -4G
    has a derivation in the system.-a There is no reference to "truth" in
    that and I'd say his proof is essentially syntactical in nature.

    From Curry and Feys very brief mention of the distinction I think
    G||del's system P is a semantical system (it has numbers as objects
    distinct from their presentation - which allows him to just make it all
    the more complicated). Does that mean his proof must be semantical?

    Also he relies on a meta-system which means embedding, does that force
    the proof to be semantical even if derivations in P are syntactical?

    I haven't got a handle on semantical vs syntactical.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Mon Jan 5 11:24:49 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 04/01/2026 18:55, Mike Terry wrote:
    It's strange - both you and Tristan expressed surprise that everyday
    theories might be incomplete

    I didn't mean to. I meant to express surprise that anything proving that
    a particular system is incomplete should be held to be such a mystical
    object of intrigue whose investigation and jeopardy should be so opposed.

    I might have modulated my expressions socratically to modify the nature
    of the conversation more to my utility. oopsie
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Mon Jan 5 11:48:17 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 04/01/2026 19:44, olcott wrote:
    T is complete when for any sentence -a, either TrCareo -a or TrCareo -4-a. https://www.cairn.info/revue-philosophia-scientiae-2014-3-page-23.htm

    According to the above when -a is self-contradictory this makes T
    incomplete.

    Is this now a totally conventional definition? The unfortunate thing
    about it is that it references negation even though there have been many notions of negation. It uses "-4" implying the intuitionist negation but
    should "incompleteness" be defined only for such systems?

    There's an important stronger notion for positive intuitionist systems
    that extending the system with an axiom extension either asserting -a or asserting -4-a is inconsistent. It's incompletable. Do you know the term
    for that?
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Mon Jan 5 12:09:09 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 04/01/2026 19:44, olcott wrote:

    T is complete when for any sentence -a, either TrCareo -a or TrCareo -4-a. https://www.cairn.info/revue-philosophia-scientiae-2014-3-page-23.htm

    According to the above when -a is self-contradictory this makes T
    incomplete.

    I have to worry about that document:

    "any sound and sufficiently strong and recursively enumerable theory is incomplete"

    That doesn't even mean there exists a description of the level of
    strength over which a recursively enumerable theory is incomplete. I
    suspect G||del showed there /does/ exist a description so they could have
    made a stronger statement. Then it /still/ wouldn't say that there
    exists at least one system satisfying that description. I suspect G||del
    showed there /does/ exist at least one system that would satisfy such a description so they could have made an even stronger statement. As Mike
    has said, it is /totally/ uninteresting that there are systems strong
    enough to be incomplete (but ergh do we use "strong" like that? we fix inconsistency by weakening, even if that makes them incomplete - I think
    they mean "sufficiently broad" or something like that).

    Bodes ill for continued reading.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
    of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
    verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
    superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
    any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
    will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Mon Jan 5 07:28:21 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/5/26 1:22 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 04/01/2026 19:21, Richard Damon wrote:

    So, the sum of the number 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + 1/16 ... is nonsense?

    It's nondeterministic because "..." has more than one meaning for the
    effect it has extending the series. It's not nonsense because it's not a statement.

    Not in the system I was working in. Maybe I was less than clear which
    one that was.


    +ureOreireU 2->rU+

    /is/ deterministic, however... it's 1.

    You might be mapping time nonlinearly whereby each imagined change
    occurs in its imagined reality at a constant +oreL from the previous. It's
    a common affliction among classical mediterranean philosophers.


    And that was Zeno's error, as he was talking about events in "the real
    world" where that isn't how it works. Perhaps that was part of his
    error, that he was thinking he was in such a system.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Mon Jan 5 07:28:30 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/5/26 2:30 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 04/01/2026 20:45, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/4/26 3:32 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 1/4/2026 2:23 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/4/26 3:21 PM, olcott wrote:

    It is categorically impossible to derive any element
    of the body of knowledge that can be expressed in
    language that is not entirely comprised of some relation
    between finite strings.

    So?


    That is the conclusive proof that I am correct.

    No it isn't. That doesn't make Truth computable, it makes everything
    computable true.


    The problem is we want to derive things that aren't yet in the body
    of knowledge.


    If you want to know the name of your wife's
    mother and you have not met your wife yet
    then the answer is not available by any means.\

    So? She still has a name.

    Is this how the church banned divorce and also remarriage after a bereavement?

    And what does that have to do with the price of tea in China?

    The point is that statements are True or False, not on the basis of what
    we happen to know, but on the facts, known or unknown, and thus
    Knowledge is not a valid basis to DEFINE truth, but can perhaps be a
    test to help us determine if something it true.

    It seems you make some of the same errors as Olcott, and do not
    understand the fundamental difference between the field called Formal
    Logic, with its rigidly defined terms, and the more general Philosophy,
    where such rules do not exist.


    They'd made an AI knowledge-base and used the same axiom that you just did?

    Henry VIII made a more sophisticated one and the rest is history. It was
    a system that attested reality and was written in prolog: protestant.


    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Damon@Richard@Damon-Family.org to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Mon Jan 5 07:28:38 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/4/26 11:54 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 04/01/2026 03:07, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/3/26 9:49 PM, olcott wrote:

    So you have no idea how true statements are derived
    from other true statements ?

    https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/


    Right, but the chain can be infinite, and thus not a proof.

    It must have both a start and an end to be a derivation. I'm curious to
    know how you came to think a derivation refers to a class of things that includes a variety that one would say was an infinite chain.



    Perhaps because things like a "derivative" in mathematics is a limit,
    and thus goes to infinity.

    It seems you belong to a tribe of reasoning that doesn't like the
    infinite and thinks it needs to be excluded from common thinking.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Mon Jan 5 08:22:57 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/5/2026 1:46 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 03/01/2026 22:27, olcott wrote:
    On 1/3/2026 3:06 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 03/01/2026 17:30, olcott wrote (quoting Curry):

    In other words: reCx ree T ((True(T, x) rei (E reo x))

    Curry would not approve of you formalising that without defining the
    system in which you formalise it.

    You have to read my quote of Curry to see that he
    already defined {T} and {E}.

    You forget the history of the posts of who you're talking to.


    No everyone else erases the full quote and
    then paraphrases it incorrectly.


    {E} is merely my own notion of atomic facts,
    previously called base facts.

    I think not. Elementary statements

    are stipulated to be true that exactly the
    same thing as my own atomic facts. The only
    thing that matters is that they are stipulated
    to be true, thus TRUE IN THE SYSTEM EXISTS
    WITHOUT NEEDING ANY INTERPRETATION THROUGH A
    META-SYSTEM.

    Adding extraneous details does not form any
    rebuttal.

    are those made from predicates
    adjoining terms but not adjoining other statements. Your atomic facts
    are nullary predicates, or unary predicates adjoined to primitive terms,
    or binary predicates adjoining terms to some world (perhaps if the world
    is represented by a term - we reach the limits of my ready
    understanding), etc...


    -aHis notions of U-language and
    A-language and progressive refinement of the U-language were carefully
    thought through leading to his incredible written lucidity, and the
    immense benefit of reading his work carefully from the start.
    ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
    |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
    |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||

    TAKE NOTE and also read his Theory of Formal Deducibility


    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Mon Jan 5 08:44:31 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/5/2026 5:48 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 04/01/2026 19:44, olcott wrote:
    T is complete when for any sentence -a, either TrCareo -a or TrCareo -4-a. >> https://www.cairn.info/revue-philosophia-scientiae-2014-3-page-23.htm

    According to the above when -a is self-contradictory this makes T
    incomplete.

    Is this now a totally conventional definition?

    To the best of my knowledge that is the conventional
    essence of how incomplete is defined.

    Hence
    G := ((F re4 G) re? (F re4 -4G))

    The unfortunate thing
    about it is that it references negation even though there have been many notions of negation.

    That is screwy. The correct way to take it is
    that any term or symbol takes the common meaning
    unless explicitly qualified. If it is not explicitly
    qualified intuitionist negation then this is ruled-out.

    It uses "-4" implying the intuitionist negation but
    should "incompleteness" be defined only for such systems?




    There's an important stronger notion for positive intuitionist systems
    that extending the system with an axiom extension either asserting -a or asserting -4-a is inconsistent. It's incompletable. Do you know the term
    for that?

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Mon Jan 5 08:49:20 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/5/2026 6:09 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 04/01/2026 19:44, olcott wrote:

    T is complete when for any sentence -a, either TrCareo -a or TrCareo -4-a. >> https://www.cairn.info/revue-philosophia-scientiae-2014-3-page-23.htm

    According to the above when -a is self-contradictory this makes T
    incomplete.

    I have to worry about that document:


    I worry not. It is merely stupidly incorrect.
    I have given this stuff at least 30,000 hours
    of my time over 28 years. I carefully boil these
    otherwise complex ideas into their barest possible
    essence: G := (F re4 G)

    If incompleteness and undecidability are correct then
    truth itself is broken. Truth itself is NOT broken
    therefore incompleteness and undecidability are incorrect.

    "any sound and sufficiently strong and recursively enumerable theory is incomplete"

    That doesn't even mean there exists a description of the level of
    strength over which a recursively enumerable theory is incomplete. I
    suspect G||del showed there /does/ exist a description so they could have made a stronger statement. Then it /still/ wouldn't say that there
    exists at least one system satisfying that description. I suspect G||del showed there /does/ exist at least one system that would satisfy such a description so they could have made an even stronger statement. As Mike
    has said, it is /totally/ uninteresting that there are systems strong
    enough to be incomplete (but ergh do we use "strong" like that? we fix inconsistency by weakening, even if that makes them incomplete - I think
    they mean "sufficiently broad" or something like that).

    Bodes ill for continued reading.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mike Terry@news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Mon Jan 5 17:04:47 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 04/01/2026 22:13, Jeff Barnett wrote:
    On 1/4/2026 11:55 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 17:54, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/2/26 12:24 PM, Mike Terry wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 15:25, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/2/26 1:14 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 04:45, Richard Damon wrote:
    -a-a <SNIP>
    Similarly, the word "proof" can be informal (simply an argument that convinces people of the
    truth of a statement), or refer to the "proof calculus" of the formal system being discussed.
    Most authors I've come across seem to use "proof" more or less informally and for clarity choose
    another word for whatever sequence of syntactic "proof steps" the formal system specifies.
    Often "derivation" is used, and that seems intuitive to me, so I try to always use that term
    here, and using "proof" for more general mathematial arguments, e.g. proving that the G
    statement is "true" using some meta-theory.

    The issue is that "derivation" doesn't actually imply a finiteness, which is a necessity of "proof".

    Where do you get that idea?-a Are you thinking "derivation" is just an informal word?-a I'm using it
    in the technical sense previously explained.

    Within a formal system there will be a set of rules which define what a valid "derivation" looks
    like.-a These would ensure that such derivations are finite.-a (I'm sure someone at some time has
    made a special study of "infinite proofs", but that is off the beaten track.)-a As explained in my
    previous post, I'm using "derivation" as the technical term for whatever passes as a "formal proof
    conforming to the requirements of the proof calculus of the system".-a This is so that the idea
    does not get muddled with your more general kind of proof = "convincing argument in some
    meta-theory".-a-a-a-a <SNIP>

    There are examples of the following situations that I remember from discussions with logicians
    circa. 60 years ago. Assume we have a simple axiomatic system that allows us to express some facts
    about what we believe to be natural numbers. Call the objects in a model of the system N and we wish
    to prove, in our little system, that for all n in N p(n). Now it turns out that for any n in N we
    can write a simple finite proof of p(n) but are (provably in a larger or meta system) not able to
    prove the universally quantified statement in the little system.

    Yes, that can happen. It's known as -e-incompleteness. That's where we have
    reo p(1)
    reo p(2)
    reo p(3)
    ...
    but not
    reo reCn p(n)

    There is a related phenomenon which is much more severe, which we have
    reo p(1)
    reo p(2)
    reo p(3)
    ...
    and additionally
    reo -4reCn p(n)

    This is called -e-inconsistency. (Any inconsistent theory will also be -e-inconsistent, but it's
    possible for a consistent theory to be -e-inconsistent, so they are not equivalent concepts.)

    <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%CE%A9-consistent_theory>

    So -e-incompleteness is saying our theory lacks some Theorems we would like [regarding universal
    quantification for certain properties p], while -e-inconsistency is much worse, actually saying that
    some n exists such that -4p(n) holds, despite p(1), p(2),... all holding. [Clearly such an n can't
    be a (standard) natural number.]

    I'm not really up on all this, but seem to (randomly!) recall:
    1. -e-incompleteness is fairly common (not too worrying)
    2. Godel's proof of GIT needed the assumption that his base system P was
    /-e-consistent/, which is a stronger condition than just consistency.
    3. A few years after GIT was published, someone published an improved proof,
    along the same lines but "tweaked" so it required only that P is /consistent/,
    rather than -e-consistent. (So nowadays when people discuss GIT they typically
    don't even mention -e-consistency.)


    Well actually .... if you wrote a
    proof, in the little system, for each n in N and joined them with and "&" operator you would prove
    the quantified statement albeit with an infinity proof.

    Not sure if you're joining the proofs or the statements p(n) with an & operator. Well, you can't
    join proofs with '&', so you must mean allowing infinitely long sentences like

    p(0) & p(1) & p(2) &...

    Or you could concatenating the proofs to make an infinitely long proof, or both, I get where you're
    going.

    Yeah, those sorts of ideas have all been studied, but it's not as simple as you make out.

    OK, so we string together an infinite number of proofs for p(1), p(2), p(3)... and/or we have an
    infinitely long conjunction as above, but how would that (of itself) actually prove reCn p(n) ?

    Just from what's been said, it /wouldn't/, because we can build models where all your infinitary
    stuff above happens, AND reCn p(n) is actually still false, and we wouldn't want to be proving false
    statements. We're missing something /in our logical calculus/ that encapsulates the idea that our
    domain is /only/ n=0,1,2,3... (i.e. the natural numbers) So to actually prove reCn p(n), as well as
    /allowing/ infinitary proofs in some fashion, we'd also need to add /further/ infinitary logical
    deduction rules somehow reflecting that our base domain is /only/ N. (Just /saying/ "N is our
    preferred model" doesn't change things.)


    In a little larger system, perhaps with an
    induction axiom, or a meta system it might be trivial to prove the whole thing with a
    finite effort.

    Yes that's common. For example there are common systems where for all (natural numbers) m,n we can
    prove

    reo <m> + <n> = <n> + <m>

    typically using induction over m,n (in the meta-system). [<n> means the numeral for n in our
    system, i.e. <3> is typically SSS0, and so on]. However it can fail to be the case for our sytem that

    reo reCmreCn m + n = n + m

    Mike.

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  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Mon Jan 5 12:01:43 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/5/2026 11:04 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
    On 04/01/2026 22:13, Jeff Barnett wrote:
    On 1/4/2026 11:55 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 17:54, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/2/26 12:24 PM, Mike Terry wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 15:25, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/2/26 1:14 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 04:45, Richard Damon wrote:
    -a-a-a <SNIP>
    Similarly, the word "proof" can be informal (simply an argument
    that convinces people of the truth of a statement), or refer to the >>>>> "proof calculus" of the formal system being discussed. Most authors >>>>> I've come across seem to use "proof" more or less informally and
    for clarity choose another word for whatever sequence of syntactic
    "proof steps" the formal system specifies. Often "derivation" is
    used, and that seems intuitive to me, so I try to always use that
    term here, and using "proof" for more general mathematial
    arguments, e.g. proving that the G statement is "true" using some
    meta-theory.

    The issue is that "derivation" doesn't actually imply a finiteness,
    which is a necessity of "proof".

    Where do you get that idea?-a Are you thinking "derivation" is just an
    informal word?-a I'm using it in the technical sense previously
    explained.

    Within a formal system there will be a set of rules which define what
    a valid "derivation" looks like.-a These would ensure that such
    derivations are finite.-a (I'm sure someone at some time has made a
    special study of "infinite proofs", but that is off the beaten
    track.)-a As explained in my previous post, I'm using "derivation" as
    the technical term for whatever passes as a "formal proof conforming
    to the requirements of the proof calculus of the system".-a This is so
    that the idea does not get muddled with your more general kind of
    proof = "convincing argument in some meta-theory".-a-a-a-a <SNIP>

    There are examples of the following situations that I remember from
    discussions with logicians circa. 60 years ago. Assume we have a
    simple axiomatic system that allows us to express some facts about
    what we believe to be natural numbers. Call the objects in a model of
    the system N and we wish to prove, in our little system, that for all
    n in N p(n). Now it turns out that for any n in N we can write a
    simple finite proof of p(n) but are (provably in a larger or meta
    system) not able to prove the universally quantified statement in the
    little system.

    Yes, that can happen.-a It's known as -e-incompleteness.-a That's where we have
    -a-a reo p(1)
    -a-a reo p(2)
    -a-a reo p(3)
    -a-a ...
    but not
    -a-a reo reCn p(n)

    There is a related phenomenon which is much more severe, which we have
    -a-a reo p(1)
    -a-a reo p(2)
    -a-a reo p(3)
    -a-a ...
    and additionally
    -a-a reo -4reCn p(n)

    This is called -e-inconsistency.-a (Any inconsistent theory will also be -e-inconsistent, but it's possible for a consistent theory to be -e- inconsistent, so they are not equivalent concepts.)


    reCn ree rao (n < 4 raA p(n))

    -a <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%CE%A9-consistent_theory>

    So -e-incompleteness is saying our theory lacks some Theorems we would
    like [regarding universal quantification for certain properties p],
    while -e-inconsistency is much worse, actually saying that some n exists such that -4p(n) holds, despite p(1), p(2),... all holding.-a [Clearly
    such an n can't be a (standard) natural number.]

    I'm not really up on all this, but seem to (randomly!) recall:
    1.-a -e-incompleteness is fairly common (not too worrying)
    2.-a Godel's proof of GIT needed the assumption that his base system P was
    -a-a-a /-e-consistent/, which is a stronger condition than just consistency. 3.-a A few years after GIT was published, someone published an improved proof,
    -a-a-a along the same lines but "tweaked" so it required only that P is / consistent/,
    -a-a-a rather than -e-consistent.-a (So nowadays when people discuss GIT they typically
    -a-a-a don't even mention -e-consistency.)


    Well actually .... if you wrote a
    proof, in the little system, for each n in N and joined them with and
    "&" operator you would prove
    the quantified statement albeit with an infinity proof.

    Not sure if you're joining the proofs or the statements p(n) with an & operator.-a Well, you can't join proofs with '&', so you must mean
    allowing infinitely long sentences like

    -a p(0) & p(1) & p(2) &...

    Or you could concatenating the proofs to make an infinitely long proof,
    or both, I get where you're going.

    Yeah, those sorts of ideas have all been studied, but it's not as simple
    as you make out.

    OK, so we string together an infinite number of proofs for p(1), p(2), p(3)... and/or we have an infinitely long conjunction as above, but how would that (of itself) actually prove reCn p(n) ?

    Just from what's been said, it /wouldn't/, because we can build models
    where all your infinitary stuff above happens, AND reCn p(n) is actually still false, and we wouldn't want to be proving false statements.
    We're missing something /in our logical calculus/ that encapsulates the
    idea that our domain is /only/ n=0,1,2,3... (i.e. the natural numbers)
    So to actually prove reCn p(n), as well as /allowing/ infinitary proofs in some fashion, we'd also need to add /further/ infinitary logical
    deduction rules somehow reflecting that our base domain is /only/ N.
    (Just /saying/ "N is our preferred model" doesn't change things.)


    In a little larger system, perhaps with an
    induction axiom, or a meta system it might be trivial to prove the
    whole thing with a
    finite effort.

    Yes that's common.-a For example there are common systems where for all (natural numbers) m,n we can prove

    -a-a reo <m> + <n> = <n> + <m>

    typically using induction over m,n (in the meta-system).-a [<n> means the numeral for n in our system, i.e. <3> is typically SSS0, and so on]. However it can fail to be the case for our sytem that

    -a-a reo reCmreCn m + n = n + m

    Mike.

    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott<br><br>

    My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"<br>
    reliably computable.<br><br>

    This required establishing a new foundation<br>
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  • From Jeff Barnett@jbb@notatt.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Mon Jan 5 14:16:12 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 1/5/2026 10:04 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
    On 04/01/2026 22:13, Jeff Barnett wrote:
    On 1/4/2026 11:55 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 17:54, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/2/26 12:24 PM, Mike Terry wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 15:25, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/2/26 1:14 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 04:45, Richard Damon wrote:
    -a-a-a <SNIP>
    Similarly, the word "proof" can be informal (simply an argument
    that convinces people of the truth of a statement), or refer to the >>>>> "proof calculus" of the formal system being discussed. Most authors >>>>> I've come across seem to use "proof" more or less informally and
    for clarity choose another word for whatever sequence of syntactic
    "proof steps" the formal system specifies. Often "derivation" is
    used, and that seems intuitive to me, so I try to always use that
    term here, and using "proof" for more general mathematial
    arguments, e.g. proving that the G statement is "true" using some
    meta-theory.

    The issue is that "derivation" doesn't actually imply a finiteness,
    which is a necessity of "proof".

    Where do you get that idea?-a Are you thinking "derivation" is just an
    informal word?-a I'm using it in the technical sense previously
    explained.

    Within a formal system there will be a set of rules which define what
    a valid "derivation" looks like.-a These would ensure that such
    derivations are finite.-a (I'm sure someone at some time has made a
    special study of "infinite proofs", but that is off the beaten
    track.)-a As explained in my previous post, I'm using "derivation" as
    the technical term for whatever passes as a "formal proof conforming
    to the requirements of the proof calculus of the system".-a This is so
    that the idea does not get muddled with your more general kind of
    proof = "convincing argument in some meta-theory".-a-a-a-a <SNIP>

    There are examples of the following situations that I remember from
    discussions with logicians circa. 60 years ago. Assume we have a
    simple axiomatic system that allows us to express some facts about
    what we believe to be natural numbers. Call the objects in a model of
    the system N and we wish to prove, in our little system, that for all
    n in N p(n). Now it turns out that for any n in N we can write a
    simple finite proof of p(n) but are (provably in a larger or meta
    system) not able to prove the universally quantified statement in the
    little system.

    Yes, that can happen.-a It's known as -e-incompleteness.-a That's where we have
    -a-a reo p(1)
    -a-a reo p(2)
    -a-a reo p(3)
    -a-a ...
    but not
    -a-a reo reCn p(n)

    There is a related phenomenon which is much more severe, which we have
    -a-a reo p(1)
    -a-a reo p(2)
    -a-a reo p(3)
    -a-a ...
    and additionally
    -a-a reo -4reCn p(n)

    This is called -e-inconsistency.-a (Any inconsistent theory will also be -e-inconsistent, but it's possible for a consistent theory to be -e- inconsistent, so they are not equivalent concepts.)

    -a <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%CE%A9-consistent_theory>

    So -e-incompleteness is saying our theory lacks some Theorems we would
    like [regarding universal quantification for certain properties p],
    while -e-inconsistency is much worse, actually saying that some n exists such that -4p(n) holds, despite p(1), p(2),... all holding.-a [Clearly
    such an n can't be a (standard) natural number.]

    I'm not really up on all this, but seem to (randomly!) recall:
    1.-a -e-incompleteness is fairly common (not too worrying)
    2.-a Godel's proof of GIT needed the assumption that his base system P was
    -a-a-a /-e-consistent/, which is a stronger condition than just consistency. 3.-a A few years after GIT was published, someone published an improved proof,
    -a-a-a along the same lines but "tweaked" so it required only that P is / consistent/,
    -a-a-a rather than -e-consistent.-a (So nowadays when people discuss GIT they typically
    -a-a-a don't even mention -e-consistency.)


    Well actually .... if you wrote a
    proof, in the little system, for each n in N and joined them with and
    "&" operator you would prove
    the quantified statement albeit with an infinity proof.

    Not sure if you're joining the proofs or the statements p(n) with an & operator.-a Well, you can't join proofs with '&', so you must mean
    allowing infinitely long sentences like

    -a p(0) & p(1) & p(2) &...

    Or you could concatenating the proofs to make an infinitely long proof,
    or both, I get where you're going.

    Yeah, those sorts of ideas have all been studied, but it's not as simple
    as you make out.

    OK, so we string together an infinite number of proofs for p(1), p(2), p(3)... and/or we have an infinitely long conjunction as above, but how would that (of itself) actually prove reCn p(n) ?

    Just from what's been said, it /wouldn't/, because we can build models
    where all your infinitary stuff above happens, AND reCn p(n) is actually still false, and we wouldn't want to be proving false statements.
    We're missing something /in our logical calculus/ that encapsulates the
    idea that our domain is /only/ n=0,1,2,3... (i.e. the natural numbers)
    So to actually prove reCn p(n), as well as /allowing/ infinitary proofs in some fashion, we'd also need to add /further/ infinitary logical
    deduction rules somehow reflecting that our base domain is /only/ N.
    (Just /saying/ "N is our preferred model" doesn't change things.)


    In a little larger system, perhaps with an
    induction axiom, or a meta system it might be trivial to prove the
    whole thing with a
    finite effort.

    Yes that's common.-a For example there are common systems where for all (natural numbers) m,n we can prove

    -a-a reo <m> + <n> = <n> + <m>

    typically using induction over m,n (in the meta-system).-a [<n> means the numeral for n in our system, i.e. <3> is typically SSS0, and so on]. However it can fail to be the case for our sytem that

    -a-a reo reCmreCn m + n = n + m
    Everything you've said above seems about right to me. As to joining the individual proofs with an "&", I probably should have specified ";"
    instead - it would look classier!
    -- Jeff Barnett

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  • From Mike Terry@news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Mon Jan 5 23:10:16 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 05/01/2026 11:18, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 04/01/2026 18:55, Mike Terry wrote:
    G%del's concerns there being a statement G such that neither G nor 4G
    has a derivation in the system.a There is no reference to "truth" in
    that and I'd say his proof is essentially syntactical in nature.

    From Curry and Feys very brief mention of the distinction I think
    G%del's system P is a semantical system (it has numbers as objects
    distinct from their presentation - which allows him to just make it all
    the more complicated). Does that mean his proof must be semantical?

    I'd say not necessarily...

    The system P is motivated by wanting to discuss claims about arithmetic, and we can think of
    statements in P as being about numbers. For example Godel describes variables as representing
    natural numbers. But also we can regard P as a purely formal system with no given meaning for its
    symbols. The question would be whether Godel's proof only works if we interpret the statements as
    having their arithmetic interpretation, or does the proof work even if we give no interpretation for
    the terms? [Of course, manipulation of terms and constructions of derivations must follow the rules
    of the system, but those do not rely on interpreting terms as natural numbers.]

    If Godel's paper had said "P contains a statement that is TRUE but unprovable" that would be a
    semantic claim, because to say whether a statement is true we need to understand its meaning. But
    for Godel, incompleteness meant there's an "undecidable" sentence that can be neither proved nor
    disproved within the system. That requires only understanding how to manipulate strings of symbols
    according to the syntactic rules for constructing formal proofs within the system.


    Also he relies on a meta-system which means embedding, does that force
    the proof to be semantical even if derivations in P are syntactical?

    This is trickier. It's been a Long Time since I looked at any of this, and I'm not going to have
    the time it would take to refresh my understanding. I suppose the point is whether or not the proof
    relies on the /meaning/ of terms and symbols as being numbers for the proof to work. It's ok that
    Godel /uses/ the natural numbers in his meta-system to discuss properties of P - for example in
    defining a mapping from N to terms of P taking n to the /numeral/ for n. This isn't assuming any
    meaning for the terms of P, so this much doesn't make it semantical. But... the proof is long and
    I'm not as familiar with the details as I once was [which even then was well less than 100% :( ], so
    really we need a professor or someone who works routinely with all this to help us! Sci.logic used
    to have some very knowledgable contributors, but I fear they've left over time.


    I haven't got a handle on semantical vs syntactical.

    Yeah, I have difficulties sometimes. E.g. with Propositional Logic we can define the length of a
    sentence as the number of symbols it contains, and that is clearly "syntactic". Similarly for the
    "rank" of a sentence, being the depth of nesting of logical operators. In both cases we can write a
    program to inspect the string involved and simply tell us the answer, fair enough. But we can also
    write a program that simply inspects a sentence and tells us whether that sentence is a tautology or
    not, based just on its structure, so is "tautology" a syntactic or semantic concept? Authors
    reasonably sidestep the question, because in the end the answer doesn't matter for their subject
    development... [Lots of people insist it is a semantic notion, but it can be defined without
    assigning any meaning to the sentence in question - just look at the symbols and calculate! I
    believe Smullyan defines "tautology" in exactly that way... So I'm unclear on this - perhaps it
    depends on the wording that introduces the term.]


    Mike.

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  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Mon Jan 5 23:44:04 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 05/01/2026 01:48, Jeff Barnett wrote:
    On 1/4/2026 3:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/4/26 5:13 PM, Jeff Barnett wrote:
    On 1/4/2026 11:55 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 17:54, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/2/26 12:24 PM, Mike Terry wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 15:25, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 1/2/26 1:14 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
    On 02/01/2026 04:45, Richard Damon wrote:
    -a-a-a <SNIP>
    Similarly, the word "proof" can be informal (simply an argument
    that convinces people of the truth of a statement), or refer to
    the "proof calculus" of the formal system being discussed.-a Most
    authors I've come across seem to use "proof" more or less
    informally and for clarity choose another word for whatever
    sequence of syntactic "proof steps" the formal system specifies.-a >>>>>> Often "derivation" is used, and that seems intuitive to me, so I
    try to always use that term here, and using "proof" for more
    general mathematial arguments, e.g. proving that the G statement
    is "true" using some meta-theory.

    The issue is that "derivation" doesn't actually imply a finiteness,
    which is a necessity of "proof".

    Where do you get that idea?-a Are you thinking "derivation" is just
    an informal word?-a I'm using it in the technical sense previously
    explained.

    Within a formal system there will be a set of rules which define
    what a valid "derivation" looks like.-a These would ensure that such
    derivations are finite.-a (I'm sure someone at some time has made a
    special study of "infinite proofs", but that is off the beaten
    track.)-a As explained in my previous post, I'm using "derivation" as
    the technical term for whatever passes as a "formal proof conforming
    to the requirements of the proof calculus of the system".-a This is
    so that the idea does not get muddled with your more general kind of
    proof = "convincing argument in some meta-theory".-a-a-a-a <SNIP>

    There are examples of the following situations that I remember from
    discussions with logicians circa. 60 years ago. Assume we have a
    simple axiomatic system that allows us to express some facts about
    what we believe to be natural numbers. Call the objects in a model of
    the system N and we wish to prove, in our little system, that for all
    n in N p(n). Now it turns out that for any n in N we can write a
    simple finite proof of p(n) but are (provably in a larger or meta
    system) not able to prove the universally quantified statement in the
    little system. Well actually .... if you wrote a proof, in the little
    system, for each n in N and joined them with and "&" operator you
    would prove the quantified statement albeit with an infinity proof.
    In a little larger system, perhaps with an induction axiom, or a meta
    system it might be trivial to prove the whole thing with a finite
    effort.


    The issue how can you know or show that you can make such a proof for
    all n within the system?

    Some of the facts in the above are knowable in more powerful systems and
    can only be appreciated from that viewpoint.
    IF you can break the infinite number of n into a finite number of cases,
    then you can built a finite proof based on those cases.

    If that were true in the examples I was shown, then none of the rest
    would follow and I wouldn't have posted what I did.

    The problem is that the normal definition of "proof" requires it to be
    finite, as proofs are supposed to SHOW to a person that the statement
    is true, and we can't handle such an infinite series.

    That is simply not true. Period. If I recall correctly, the book
    "Zermelo's Axiom of Choice -- Its Origins, Development and Influence" by Gregory H. Moore, talks about infinite proofs in a few places. (My copy
    of the book is 40+ years ago and was unholy expensive. You can now get a paperback copy for $13.99 at US Amazon.con.) Where, other then in silly USENET, dose it say that all proofs in all formal systems must be
    finite? Serious question. Maybe this is a point that you and Peter can
    agree on, but don't implicate innocent bystanders.

    Natural induction is finite, eg:

    it's true for 0
    if it's true for n then it's true for f(n).

    Some, as G||del's Axiom I.3, might have an axiom that takes the "it" of
    the above induction and implies that forall n "it" is so of f(n).

    Ah, but is that right? for every system? suppose we are able to do
    inference under the quantifier and then get it back out.

    I don't know the terminology here, f(n) might be said to be an object of
    the system but not the infinite f(f(f(...))) yet forall quantification
    could be used to make crazy deductions because of the self-reference it /describes/ even though it doesn't /exemplify/ one.

    I distrust G||del's I.3 for that reason until I know more.


    Logicians qualified to discuss and develop theories of and using
    infinitary proofs do not have such problems. (I'm using the term
    "qualified logician" to distinguish an individual from myself and other want-a-bees participating in these idiotic discussions.)

    They are not idiotic, they are the learning process. Even a book listing correct facts is not good enough because being able to repeat facts that
    you cannot understand enough to check is just a job for a computer - it
    is programming, not learning.

    You have used the term "qualified" essentially undefined. What's the
    point of that? Mere politics? Isn't there enough of that here already?

    The chief quality of a qualified logician is doubt. Anyone without doubt
    is no logician. I disqualify anyone without doubt.


    there are at least 20 want-a-bees

    They're conventionally called "learners", "pupils", "students" etc. I
    know there is a popular movement for the derision of the attempt to
    become educated but I prefer not to have it come to me.

    I will agree some of us learners are trying to dominate the others by pretending to be professors but sometimes learners had professors that
    taught them wrong (even though that would still conventionally make them qualified) including making it seem less of a challenge and a smaller
    matter than it really is.

    We're 2 generations dead from the last wave of confusion and discussion
    among English-speaking academics for these foundational matters - expect
    many people that have declarations of qualification that are wildly
    wrong because the process to produce the declarations was inadequate.

    Fortunately we're only 1 generation dead from the development of modal
    logic among English-speaking academics so there's still some proper
    discerning judgement out there.


    ... in these discussions and no two of them
    could write down the same precise definition! And the above is not my
    idea; I'm really old and the idea was around before I was born.

    I'm reading PM1 and it was around when that was written. Matters around
    forall quantification and the nature of what restrictions must be placed
    on axioms was clearly still ongoing in 1958 based on Combinatory Logic
    1. And still ongoing in the 1970s! I expect professors today are still
    not fully understanding these things - making essentially everyone
    unqualified and perhaps it should be so for a hundred years.


    One last comment: Don't think of a proof as work. Its an entity
    that exists by the definition of some formal system, e.g., a string that satisfies some mathematical predicate.

    For other learners: the "work" is called a "demonstration" and is a
    derivation written down (or spoken but that is harder to judge - too
    hard, I feel, for almost anyone including the best professors). It is
    best provided along with some note about the difference from one step to another to guide the judge in recognising the difference.


    The language seems to me to still not be fully conventionalised. Russel
    and Whitehead did a super job naming things by their respective
    character but it doesn't seem to have stuck, perhaps because their names
    for their things was for a system with a type system that is not still
    in use and so new names are needed even if essentially the same syntax
    is used.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

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  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Tue Jan 6 00:47:45 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 05/01/2026 06:53, Jeff Barnett wrote:
    On 1/4/2026 7:23 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

    Note, Proofs are written down and presented. This can only be done if
    finite.

    Perhaps you can find a legitimate reference that says that. Forget high school geometry books, and USENET newsgroups. I don't think you can! I
    think you are making a lot of this up as you go along. Save that stuff
    for debates with Peter, a past master at that. Your statement just above
    is a proof description given to a high school class about how to get a
    good grade. If you think you are speaking in the world of research in logic(s), it's nonsense.

    I don't think that's what /he/ thinks he's doing. I think he thinks he's correcting us to the things he has been taught are so. But so much
    education is fraud.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

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  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Tue Jan 6 01:02:38 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 05/01/2026 17:04, Mike Terry wrote:
    On 04/01/2026 22:13, Jeff Barnett wrote:

    In a little larger system, perhaps with an
    induction axiom, or a meta system it might be trivial to prove the
    whole thing with a
    finite effort.

    Yes that's common.-a For example there are common systems where for all
    ^^^
    each
    (natural numbers) m,n we can prove
    ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
    m,n constructible only such that they represent natural numbers?


    -a-a reo <m> + <n> = <n> + <m>

    typically using induction over m,n (in the meta-system).

    Is it always the case that valid episystems derive production rules for deductions for a system? Ie, a derivation in a meta-system generated by applying an episystem to a system tells us how to generate a deduction
    for the base-system?

    It kind of looks that way to me so far and that I should expect nothing
    more than that from them.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

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  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Tue Jan 6 01:59:42 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 05/01/2026 17:04, Mike Terry wrote:

    There is a related phenomenon which is much more severe, which we have
    -a-a reo p(1)
    -a-a reo p(2)
    -a-a reo p(3)
    -a-a ...
    and additionally
    -a-a reo -4reCn p(n)

    This is called -e-inconsistency.

    Does the -e in -e-inconsistency refer to the number larger than all
    naturals? It seems an obvious focus of the matter for the fixed-point of
    the successor function and perhaps sufficient that one gave its name to
    the other.

    And so does -e properly refer to the fixed-point of the successor function?
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

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  • From Tristan Wibberley@tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math on Tue Jan 6 02:26:01 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 05/01/2026 12:28, Richard Damon wrote:

    Perhaps because things like a "derivative" in mathematics is a limit,
    and thus goes to infinity.

    It seems you belong to a tribe of reasoning that doesn't like the
    infinite and thinks it needs to be excluded from common thinking.


    A limit is expressed finitely, you can tell by how quickly you can read
    it. Even "the infinite" is encoded in a computer file with a finite
    number of characters.
    --
    Tristan Wibberley

    The message body is Copyright (C) 2026 Tristan Wibberley except
    citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
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    promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
    of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
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