On 12/28/2025 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/28/25 7:42 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/28/2025 11:15 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/28/25 8:49 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/27/2025 7:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/27/25 7:54 PM, olcott wrote:
A system such all semantic meaning of the formal
system is directly encoded in the syntax of the
formal language of the formal system making
reCx ree L (Provable(L,x) rei True(L,x))
Which is IMPOSSIBLE, as for any sufficiently expressive system, as >>>>>> it has been shown that for a system that can express the Natural
Numbers, we can build a measure of meaning into the elements that >>>>>> they did not originally have.
In other words artificially contriving a fake meaning.
But it can be a real meaning.
...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)
Right, because in the language created, and "understood" by the
meta- system, that is what that number means.
According to G||del this last line sums up his whole proof.
Thus the essence of his G is correctly encoded below:
But, only in the meta-system, which ins't where the system is
allowed to create its proof.
Your problem is you just don't understand "Formal Logic Systems",
because they have RULES which you just can't understand
?- G = not(provable(F, G)).
But there is no "provable" predicate, so your statement is just
nonsense.
G = not(provable(F, G)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(G, not(provable(F, G))).
false.
In part because it doesn't know what provable is, and just can't
handle the logic.
This is merely your own utterly profound ignorance
of this specific topic.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Which shows that you think logic is limited to the simple logic of
Prolog.
Do you even know what a cycle in the directed graph
of an evaluation sequence is?
You seemed to have just diverted from the fact you LIED about Prolog
having a "provable" operator, which just shows your stupidity.
This is the final and complete total resolution
of the Liar Paradox conclusively proving that it
was never grounded in any notion of truth.
But that hasn't actually been a problem. It has been known to be a
non- truth-bearer for a long time, at least in Formal Logic.
They know-nothing philosophers might have been arguing about it, but
thas is because there field can't actually resolve anything.
G||del, Kurt 1931.
On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia
Mathematica And Related Systems
The last part is what unify_with_occurs_check() actually means.
So far everyone here has been flat out stupid about that.
Nope, as Prolog can't handle the logic of the system Godel talks
about.,
Your problem is YOU can't handle that logic system either, because
you are just to stupid.
Try to give Prolog the ACTUAL definition of G, I'm not sure it even
has the ability to represent that G asserts there isn't a natural
number g that meets some predicate, like x * x = -1
If you can't express that part, how do you expect it to understand
the full definition.
Your problem is you are just to stupid to understand your logic's
restrictions.
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
is reliably computable by the above formalism.
But it can only apply to limited systems, namely the systems
smaller than the proof of incompleteness specified.
I have thought this through for 30,000 hours over
28 years.
And you should have figured out its problems a lot earlier.
On 12/28/25 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/28/2025 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/28/25 7:42 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/28/2025 11:15 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/28/25 8:49 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/27/2025 7:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/27/25 7:54 PM, olcott wrote:
A system such all semantic meaning of the formal
system is directly encoded in the syntax of the
formal language of the formal system making
reCx ree L (Provable(L,x) rei True(L,x))
Which is IMPOSSIBLE, as for any sufficiently expressive system, >>>>>>> as it has been shown that for a system that can express the
Natural Numbers, we can build a measure of meaning into the
elements that they did not originally have.
In other words artificially contriving a fake meaning.
But it can be a real meaning.
...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)
Right, because in the language created, and "understood" by the
meta- system, that is what that number means.
According to G||del this last line sums up his whole proof.
Thus the essence of his G is correctly encoded below:
But, only in the meta-system, which ins't where the system is
allowed to create its proof.
Your problem is you just don't understand "Formal Logic Systems",
because they have RULES which you just can't understand
?- G = not(provable(F, G)).
But there is no "provable" predicate, so your statement is just
nonsense.
G = not(provable(F, G)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(G, not(provable(F, G))).
false.
In part because it doesn't know what provable is, and just can't
handle the logic.
This is merely your own utterly profound ignorance
of this specific topic.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Which shows that you think logic is limited to the simple logic of
Prolog.
Do you even know what a cycle in the directed graph
of an evaluation sequence is?
Sure. Do you?
Can you show a finite directed graph with no root node that doesn't have
a cycle?
Do you understand that your precious Prolog ADMITS that it is limited in
the form of logic it performs.
It can't even reach a full first-order logic.
You keep on diverting to simple things that just don't prove what you
claim, when something too tough is brought up.
That is just admitting that you see yourself as wrong, but can't admit
it openly.
Your "Prolog" statement about G just isn't actually Prolog, as Prolog
has no "provable" predicate.
You seemed to have just diverted from the fact you LIED about Prolog
having a "provable" operator, which just shows your stupidity.
This is the final and complete total resolution
of the Liar Paradox conclusively proving that it
was never grounded in any notion of truth.
But that hasn't actually been a problem. It has been known to be a
non- truth-bearer for a long time, at least in Formal Logic.
They know-nothing philosophers might have been arguing about it, but
thas is because there field can't actually resolve anything.
G||del, Kurt 1931.
On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia
Mathematica And Related Systems
The last part is what unify_with_occurs_check() actually means.
So far everyone here has been flat out stupid about that.
Nope, as Prolog can't handle the logic of the system Godel talks
about.,
Your problem is YOU can't handle that logic system either, because
you are just to stupid.
Try to give Prolog the ACTUAL definition of G, I'm not sure it even >>>>> has the ability to represent that G asserts there isn't a natural
number g that meets some predicate, like x * x = -1
If you can't express that part, how do you expect it to understand
the full definition.
Your problem is you are just to stupid to understand your logic's
restrictions.
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
is reliably computable by the above formalism.
But it can only apply to limited systems, namely the systems
smaller than the proof of incompleteness specified.
I have thought this through for 30,000 hours over
28 years.
And you should have figured out its problems a lot earlier.
A system such all semantic meaning of the formal
system is directly encoded in the syntax of the
formal language of the formal system making
reCx ree L (Provable(L,x) rei True(L,x))
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
is reliably computable by the above formalism.
I have thought this through for 30,000 hours over
28 years.
On 12/29/2025 7:37 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/28/25 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/28/2025 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/28/25 7:42 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/28/2025 11:15 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/28/25 8:49 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/27/2025 7:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/27/25 7:54 PM, olcott wrote:
A system such all semantic meaning of the formal
system is directly encoded in the syntax of the
formal language of the formal system making
reCx ree L (Provable(L,x) rei True(L,x))
Which is IMPOSSIBLE, as for any sufficiently expressive system, >>>>>>>> as it has been shown that for a system that can express the
Natural Numbers, we can build a measure of meaning into the
elements that they did not originally have.
In other words artificially contriving a fake meaning.
But it can be a real meaning.
...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)
Right, because in the language created, and "understood" by the
meta- system, that is what that number means.
According to G||del this last line sums up his whole proof.
Thus the essence of his G is correctly encoded below:
But, only in the meta-system, which ins't where the system is
allowed to create its proof.
Your problem is you just don't understand "Formal Logic Systems", >>>>>> because they have RULES which you just can't understand
?- G = not(provable(F, G)).
But there is no "provable" predicate, so your statement is just
nonsense.
G = not(provable(F, G)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(G, not(provable(F, G))).
false.
In part because it doesn't know what provable is, and just can't
handle the logic.
This is merely your own utterly profound ignorance
of this specific topic.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Which shows that you think logic is limited to the simple logic of
Prolog.
Do you even know what a cycle in the directed graph
of an evaluation sequence is?
Sure. Do you?
Can you show a finite directed graph with no root node that doesn't
have a cycle?
That you do not even understand what an acyclic graph
is seems to be why you can't understand an acyclic
evaluation sequence.
Do you understand that your precious Prolog ADMITS that it is limited
in the form of logic it performs.
It can't even reach a full first-order logic.
You keep on diverting to simple things that just don't prove what you
claim, when something too tough is brought up.
That is just admitting that you see yourself as wrong, but can't admit
it openly.
Your "Prolog" statement about G just isn't actually Prolog, as Prolog
has no "provable" predicate.
You seemed to have just diverted from the fact you LIED about Prolog
having a "provable" operator, which just shows your stupidity.
This is the final and complete total resolution
of the Liar Paradox conclusively proving that it
was never grounded in any notion of truth.
But that hasn't actually been a problem. It has been known to be a
non- truth-bearer for a long time, at least in Formal Logic.
They know-nothing philosophers might have been arguing about it, but
thas is because there field can't actually resolve anything.
G||del, Kurt 1931.
On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia
Mathematica And Related Systems
The last part is what unify_with_occurs_check() actually means.
So far everyone here has been flat out stupid about that.
Nope, as Prolog can't handle the logic of the system Godel talks
about.,
Your problem is YOU can't handle that logic system either, because >>>>>> you are just to stupid.
Try to give Prolog the ACTUAL definition of G, I'm not sure it
even has the ability to represent that G asserts there isn't a
natural number g that meets some predicate, like x * x = -1
If you can't express that part, how do you expect it to understand >>>>>> the full definition.
Your problem is you are just to stupid to understand your logic's >>>>>> restrictions.
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
is reliably computable by the above formalism.
But it can only apply to limited systems, namely the systems
smaller than the proof of incompleteness specified.
I have thought this through for 30,000 hours over
28 years.
And you should have figured out its problems a lot earlier.
On 12/28/25 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/28/2025 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/28/25 7:42 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/28/2025 11:15 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/28/25 8:49 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/27/2025 7:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/27/25 7:54 PM, olcott wrote:
A system such all semantic meaning of the formal
system is directly encoded in the syntax of the
formal language of the formal system making
reCx ree L (Provable(L,x) rei True(L,x))
Which is IMPOSSIBLE, as for any sufficiently expressive system, >>>>>>> as it has been shown that for a system that can express the
Natural Numbers, we can build a measure of meaning into the
elements that they did not originally have.
In other words artificially contriving a fake meaning.
But it can be a real meaning.
...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)
Right, because in the language created, and "understood" by the
meta- system, that is what that number means.
According to G||del this last line sums up his whole proof.
Thus the essence of his G is correctly encoded below:
But, only in the meta-system, which ins't where the system is
allowed to create its proof.
Your problem is you just don't understand "Formal Logic Systems",
because they have RULES which you just can't understand
?- G = not(provable(F, G)).
But there is no "provable" predicate, so your statement is just
nonsense.
G = not(provable(F, G)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(G, not(provable(F, G))).
false.
In part because it doesn't know what provable is, and just can't
handle the logic.
This is merely your own utterly profound ignorance
of this specific topic.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Which shows that you think logic is limited to the simple logic of
Prolog.
Do you even know what a cycle in the directed graph
of an evaluation sequence is?
Sure. Do you?
Can you show a finite directed graph with no root node that doesn't have
a cycle?
Do you understand that your precious Prolog ADMITS that it is limited in
the form of logic it performs.
It can't even reach a full first-order logic.
You keep on diverting to simple things that just don't prove what you
claim, when something too tough is brought up.
That is just admitting that you see yourself as wrong, but can't admit
it openly.
Your "Prolog" statement about G just isn't actually Prolog, as Prolog
has no "provable" predicate.
You seemed to have just diverted from the fact you LIED about Prolog
having a "provable" operator, which just shows your stupidity.
This is the final and complete total resolution
of the Liar Paradox conclusively proving that it
was never grounded in any notion of truth.
But that hasn't actually been a problem. It has been known to be a
non- truth-bearer for a long time, at least in Formal Logic.
They know-nothing philosophers might have been arguing about it, but
thas is because there field can't actually resolve anything.
G||del, Kurt 1931.
On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia
Mathematica And Related Systems
The last part is what unify_with_occurs_check() actually means.
So far everyone here has been flat out stupid about that.
Nope, as Prolog can't handle the logic of the system Godel talks
about.,
Your problem is YOU can't handle that logic system either, because
you are just to stupid.
Try to give Prolog the ACTUAL definition of G, I'm not sure it even >>>>> has the ability to represent that G asserts there isn't a natural
number g that meets some predicate, like x * x = -1
If you can't express that part, how do you expect it to understand
the full definition.
Your problem is you are just to stupid to understand your logic's
restrictions.
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
is reliably computable by the above formalism.
But it can only apply to limited systems, namely the systems
smaller than the proof of incompleteness specified.
I have thought this through for 30,000 hours over
28 years.
And you should have figured out its problems a lot earlier.
Am 28.12.2025 um 01:54 schrieb olcott:
A system such all semantic meaning of the formal
system is directly encoded in the syntax of the
formal language of the formal system making
reCx ree L (Provable(L,x) rei True(L,x))
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
is reliably computable by the above formalism.
I have thought this through for 30,000 hours over
28 years.
If you thought about 30.000 hours the last three decades
you're manic and delusional.
On 12/29/2025 7:37 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/28/25 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/28/2025 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/28/25 7:42 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/28/2025 11:15 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/28/25 8:49 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/27/2025 7:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/27/25 7:54 PM, olcott wrote:
A system such all semantic meaning of the formal
system is directly encoded in the syntax of the
formal language of the formal system making
reCx ree L (Provable(L,x) rei True(L,x))
Which is IMPOSSIBLE, as for any sufficiently expressive system, >>>>>>>> as it has been shown that for a system that can express the
Natural Numbers, we can build a measure of meaning into the
elements that they did not originally have.
In other words artificially contriving a fake meaning.
But it can be a real meaning.
...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)
Right, because in the language created, and "understood" by the
meta- system, that is what that number means.
According to G||del this last line sums up his whole proof.
Thus the essence of his G is correctly encoded below:
But, only in the meta-system, which ins't where the system is
allowed to create its proof.
Your problem is you just don't understand "Formal Logic Systems", >>>>>> because they have RULES which you just can't understand
?- G = not(provable(F, G)).
But there is no "provable" predicate, so your statement is just
nonsense.
G = not(provable(F, G)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(G, not(provable(F, G))).
false.
In part because it doesn't know what provable is, and just can't
handle the logic.
This is merely your own utterly profound ignorance
of this specific topic.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Which shows that you think logic is limited to the simple logic of
Prolog.
Do you even know what a cycle in the directed graph
of an evaluation sequence is?
Sure. Do you?
Can you show a finite directed graph with no root node that doesn't
have a cycle?
That you do not even understand what a directed acyclic
graph is seems to be why you can't fully understand the
effect of a cycle in the directed graph of an evaluation
sequence. The term "evaluation sequence" may also be
difficult for you.
Do you understand that your precious Prolog ADMITS that it is limited
in the form of logic it performs.
It can't even reach a full first-order logic.
You keep on diverting to simple things that just don't prove what you
claim, when something too tough is brought up.
That is just admitting that you see yourself as wrong, but can't admit
it openly.
Your "Prolog" statement about G just isn't actually Prolog, as Prolog
has no "provable" predicate.
You seemed to have just diverted from the fact you LIED about Prolog
having a "provable" operator, which just shows your stupidity.
This is the final and complete total resolution
of the Liar Paradox conclusively proving that it
was never grounded in any notion of truth.
But that hasn't actually been a problem. It has been known to be a
non- truth-bearer for a long time, at least in Formal Logic.
They know-nothing philosophers might have been arguing about it, but
thas is because there field can't actually resolve anything.
G||del, Kurt 1931.
On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia
Mathematica And Related Systems
The last part is what unify_with_occurs_check() actually means.
So far everyone here has been flat out stupid about that.
Nope, as Prolog can't handle the logic of the system Godel talks
about.,
Your problem is YOU can't handle that logic system either, because >>>>>> you are just to stupid.
Try to give Prolog the ACTUAL definition of G, I'm not sure it
even has the ability to represent that G asserts there isn't a
natural number g that meets some predicate, like x * x = -1
If you can't express that part, how do you expect it to understand >>>>>> the full definition.
Your problem is you are just to stupid to understand your logic's >>>>>> restrictions.
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
is reliably computable by the above formalism.
But it can only apply to limited systems, namely the systems
smaller than the proof of incompleteness specified.
I have thought this through for 30,000 hours over
28 years.
And you should have figured out its problems a lot earlier.
On 12/29/2025 9:08 AM, Bonita Montero wrote:
Am 28.12.2025 um 01:54 schrieb olcott:
A system such all semantic meaning of the formal
system is directly encoded in the syntax of the
formal language of the formal system making
reCx ree L (Provable(L,x) rei True(L,x))
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
is reliably computable by the above formalism.
I have thought this through for 30,000 hours over
28 years.
If you thought about 30.000 hours the last three decades
you're manic and delusional.
That you say that without bothering to understand
the full depth of what I am saying is very callous.
On 12/29/25 10:24 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/29/2025 7:37 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/28/25 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/28/2025 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/28/25 7:42 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/28/2025 11:15 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/28/25 8:49 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/27/2025 7:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/27/25 7:54 PM, olcott wrote:
A system such all semantic meaning of the formal
system is directly encoded in the syntax of the
formal language of the formal system making
reCx ree L (Provable(L,x) rei True(L,x))
Which is IMPOSSIBLE, as for any sufficiently expressive system, >>>>>>>>> as it has been shown that for a system that can express the >>>>>>>>> Natural Numbers, we can build a measure of meaning into the >>>>>>>>> elements that they did not originally have.
In other words artificially contriving a fake meaning.
But it can be a real meaning.
...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)
Right, because in the language created, and "understood" by the >>>>>>> meta- system, that is what that number means.
According to G||del this last line sums up his whole proof.
Thus the essence of his G is correctly encoded below:
But, only in the meta-system, which ins't where the system is
allowed to create its proof.
Your problem is you just don't understand "Formal Logic Systems", >>>>>>> because they have RULES which you just can't understand
?- G = not(provable(F, G)).
But there is no "provable" predicate, so your statement is just >>>>>>> nonsense.
G = not(provable(F, G)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(G, not(provable(F, G))).
false.
In part because it doesn't know what provable is, and just can't >>>>>>> handle the logic.
This is merely your own utterly profound ignorance
of this specific topic.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Which shows that you think logic is limited to the simple logic of
Prolog.
Do you even know what a cycle in the directed graph
of an evaluation sequence is?
Sure. Do you?
Can you show a finite directed graph with no root node that doesn't
have a cycle?
That you do not even understand what a directed acyclic
graph is seems to be why you can't fully understand the
effect of a cycle in the directed graph of an evaluation
sequence. The term "evaluation sequence" may also be
difficult for you.
So, you are just showing you can't do it.
The problem is there isn't a unique evaluation sequence as there is no
start to begin with.
All you are doing is showing that you initial claim was made with no
formal basis, but just you spouting words without you knowing what you
are saying.
Do you understand that your precious Prolog ADMITS that it is limited
in the form of logic it performs.
It can't even reach a full first-order logic.
You keep on diverting to simple things that just don't prove what you
claim, when something too tough is brought up.
That is just admitting that you see yourself as wrong, but can't
admit it openly.
Your "Prolog" statement about G just isn't actually Prolog, as Prolog
has no "provable" predicate.
You seemed to have just diverted from the fact you LIED about
Prolog having a "provable" operator, which just shows your stupidity. >>>>>
This is the final and complete total resolution
of the Liar Paradox conclusively proving that it
was never grounded in any notion of truth.
But that hasn't actually been a problem. It has been known to be a
non- truth-bearer for a long time, at least in Formal Logic.
They know-nothing philosophers might have been arguing about it,
but thas is because there field can't actually resolve anything.
G||del, Kurt 1931.
On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia
Mathematica And Related Systems
The last part is what unify_with_occurs_check() actually means. >>>>>>>> So far everyone here has been flat out stupid about that.
Nope, as Prolog can't handle the logic of the system Godel talks >>>>>>> about.,
Your problem is YOU can't handle that logic system either,
because you are just to stupid.
Try to give Prolog the ACTUAL definition of G, I'm not sure it
even has the ability to represent that G asserts there isn't a
natural number g that meets some predicate, like x * x = -1
If you can't express that part, how do you expect it to
understand the full definition.
Your problem is you are just to stupid to understand your logic's >>>>>>> restrictions.
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
is reliably computable by the above formalism.
But it can only apply to limited systems, namely the systems >>>>>>>>> smaller than the proof of incompleteness specified.
I have thought this through for 30,000 hours over
28 years.
And you should have figured out its problems a lot earlier.
On 12/29/25 9:55 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/29/2025 7:37 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/28/25 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/28/2025 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/28/25 7:42 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/28/2025 11:15 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/28/25 8:49 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/27/2025 7:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/27/25 7:54 PM, olcott wrote:
A system such all semantic meaning of the formal
system is directly encoded in the syntax of the
formal language of the formal system making
reCx ree L (Provable(L,x) rei True(L,x))
Which is IMPOSSIBLE, as for any sufficiently expressive system, >>>>>>>>> as it has been shown that for a system that can express the >>>>>>>>> Natural Numbers, we can build a measure of meaning into the >>>>>>>>> elements that they did not originally have.
In other words artificially contriving a fake meaning.
But it can be a real meaning.
...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)
Right, because in the language created, and "understood" by the >>>>>>> meta- system, that is what that number means.
According to G||del this last line sums up his whole proof.
Thus the essence of his G is correctly encoded below:
But, only in the meta-system, which ins't where the system is
allowed to create its proof.
Your problem is you just don't understand "Formal Logic Systems", >>>>>>> because they have RULES which you just can't understand
?- G = not(provable(F, G)).
But there is no "provable" predicate, so your statement is just >>>>>>> nonsense.
G = not(provable(F, G)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(G, not(provable(F, G))).
false.
In part because it doesn't know what provable is, and just can't >>>>>>> handle the logic.
This is merely your own utterly profound ignorance
of this specific topic.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Which shows that you think logic is limited to the simple logic of
Prolog.
Do you even know what a cycle in the directed graph
of an evaluation sequence is?
Sure. Do you?
Can you show a finite directed graph with no root node that doesn't
have a cycle?
That you do not even understand what an acyclic graph
is seems to be why you can't understand an acyclic
evaluation sequence.
No, I understand what an acyclical graph is, but you just can't call something an acyclical graph if it has cycles.
It seems TRUTH isn't a concept you understand.
You can't just assume that something exists or can be done.
Do you understand that your precious Prolog ADMITS that it is limited
in the form of logic it performs.
It can't even reach a full first-order logic.
You keep on diverting to simple things that just don't prove what you
claim, when something too tough is brought up.
That is just admitting that you see yourself as wrong, but can't
admit it openly.
Your "Prolog" statement about G just isn't actually Prolog, as Prolog
has no "provable" predicate.
You seemed to have just diverted from the fact you LIED about
Prolog having a "provable" operator, which just shows your stupidity. >>>>>
This is the final and complete total resolution
of the Liar Paradox conclusively proving that it
was never grounded in any notion of truth.
But that hasn't actually been a problem. It has been known to be a
non- truth-bearer for a long time, at least in Formal Logic.
They know-nothing philosophers might have been arguing about it,
but thas is because there field can't actually resolve anything.
G||del, Kurt 1931.
On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia
Mathematica And Related Systems
The last part is what unify_with_occurs_check() actually means. >>>>>>>> So far everyone here has been flat out stupid about that.
Nope, as Prolog can't handle the logic of the system Godel talks >>>>>>> about.,
Your problem is YOU can't handle that logic system either,
because you are just to stupid.
Try to give Prolog the ACTUAL definition of G, I'm not sure it
even has the ability to represent that G asserts there isn't a
natural number g that meets some predicate, like x * x = -1
If you can't express that part, how do you expect it to
understand the full definition.
Your problem is you are just to stupid to understand your logic's >>>>>>> restrictions.
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
is reliably computable by the above formalism.
But it can only apply to limited systems, namely the systems >>>>>>>>> smaller than the proof of incompleteness specified.
I have thought this through for 30,000 hours over
28 years.
And you should have figured out its problems a lot earlier.
...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)
According to G||del this last line sums up his whole proof.
Thus the essence of his G is correctly encoded below:
?- G = not(provable(F, G)).
G = not(provable(F, G)).
G||del, Kurt 1931.
On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia
Mathematica And Related Systems
On 12/29/2025 9:11 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/29/25 9:55 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/29/2025 7:37 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/28/25 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/28/2025 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/28/25 7:42 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/28/2025 11:15 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/28/25 8:49 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/27/2025 7:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/27/25 7:54 PM, olcott wrote:
A system such all semantic meaning of the formal
system is directly encoded in the syntax of the
formal language of the formal system making
reCx ree L (Provable(L,x) rei True(L,x))
Which is IMPOSSIBLE, as for any sufficiently expressive
system, as it has been shown that for a system that can
express the Natural Numbers, we can build a measure of meaning >>>>>>>>>> into the elements that they did not originally have.
In other words artificially contriving a fake meaning.
But it can be a real meaning.
...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)
Right, because in the language created, and "understood" by the >>>>>>>> meta- system, that is what that number means.
According to G||del this last line sums up his whole proof.
Thus the essence of his G is correctly encoded below:
But, only in the meta-system, which ins't where the system is >>>>>>>> allowed to create its proof.
Your problem is you just don't understand "Formal Logic
Systems", because they have RULES which you just can't understand >>>>>>>>
?- G = not(provable(F, G)).
But there is no "provable" predicate, so your statement is just >>>>>>>> nonsense.
G = not(provable(F, G)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(G, not(provable(F, G))).
false.
In part because it doesn't know what provable is, and just can't >>>>>>>> handle the logic.
This is merely your own utterly profound ignorance
of this specific topic.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Which shows that you think logic is limited to the simple logic of >>>>>> Prolog.
Do you even know what a cycle in the directed graph
of an evaluation sequence is?
Sure. Do you?
Can you show a finite directed graph with no root node that doesn't
have a cycle?
That you do not even understand what an acyclic graph
is seems to be why you can't understand an acyclic
evaluation sequence.
No, I understand what an acyclical graph is, but you just can't call
something an acyclical graph if it has cycles.
It seems TRUTH isn't a concept you understand.
The entire body of general knowledge is inherently
structured within a directed acyclic graph.
You can't just assume that something exists or can be done.
Do you understand that your precious Prolog ADMITS that it is
limited in the form of logic it performs.
It can't even reach a full first-order logic.
You keep on diverting to simple things that just don't prove what
you claim, when something too tough is brought up.
That is just admitting that you see yourself as wrong, but can't
admit it openly.
Your "Prolog" statement about G just isn't actually Prolog, as
Prolog has no "provable" predicate.
You seemed to have just diverted from the fact you LIED about
Prolog having a "provable" operator, which just shows your stupidity. >>>>>>
This is the final and complete total resolution
of the Liar Paradox conclusively proving that it
was never grounded in any notion of truth.
But that hasn't actually been a problem. It has been known to be a >>>>>> non- truth-bearer for a long time, at least in Formal Logic.
They know-nothing philosophers might have been arguing about it,
but thas is because there field can't actually resolve anything.
G||del, Kurt 1931.
On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia
Mathematica And Related Systems
The last part is what unify_with_occurs_check() actually means. >>>>>>>>> So far everyone here has been flat out stupid about that.
Nope, as Prolog can't handle the logic of the system Godel talks >>>>>>>> about.,
Your problem is YOU can't handle that logic system either,
because you are just to stupid.
Try to give Prolog the ACTUAL definition of G, I'm not sure it >>>>>>>> even has the ability to represent that G asserts there isn't a >>>>>>>> natural number g that meets some predicate, like x * x = -1
If you can't express that part, how do you expect it to
understand the full definition.
Your problem is you are just to stupid to understand your
logic's restrictions.
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
is reliably computable by the above formalism.
But it can only apply to limited systems, namely the systems >>>>>>>>>> smaller than the proof of incompleteness specified.
I have thought this through for 30,000 hours over
28 years.
And you should have figured out its problems a lot earlier. >>>>>>>>>
On 12/29/2025 9:31 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/29/25 10:24 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/29/2025 7:37 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/28/25 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/28/2025 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/28/25 7:42 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/28/2025 11:15 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/28/25 8:49 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/27/2025 7:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/27/25 7:54 PM, olcott wrote:
A system such all semantic meaning of the formal
system is directly encoded in the syntax of the
formal language of the formal system making
reCx ree L (Provable(L,x) rei True(L,x))
Which is IMPOSSIBLE, as for any sufficiently expressive
system, as it has been shown that for a system that can
express the Natural Numbers, we can build a measure of meaning >>>>>>>>>> into the elements that they did not originally have.
In other words artificially contriving a fake meaning.
But it can be a real meaning.
...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)
Right, because in the language created, and "understood" by the >>>>>>>> meta- system, that is what that number means.
According to G||del this last line sums up his whole proof.
Thus the essence of his G is correctly encoded below:
But, only in the meta-system, which ins't where the system is >>>>>>>> allowed to create its proof.
Your problem is you just don't understand "Formal Logic
Systems", because they have RULES which you just can't understand >>>>>>>>
?- G = not(provable(F, G)).
But there is no "provable" predicate, so your statement is just >>>>>>>> nonsense.
G = not(provable(F, G)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(G, not(provable(F, G))).
false.
In part because it doesn't know what provable is, and just can't >>>>>>>> handle the logic.
This is merely your own utterly profound ignorance
of this specific topic.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Which shows that you think logic is limited to the simple logic of >>>>>> Prolog.
Do you even know what a cycle in the directed graph
of an evaluation sequence is?
Sure. Do you?
Can you show a finite directed graph with no root node that doesn't
have a cycle?
That you do not even understand what a directed acyclic
graph is seems to be why you can't fully understand the
effect of a cycle in the directed graph of an evaluation
sequence. The term "evaluation sequence" may also be
difficult for you.
So, you are just showing you can't do it.
I am not going to let you dodge a mandatory prerequisite.
Your question indicates that you do not know what a
directed acyclic graph is. A DAG can have a root.
The problem is there isn't a unique evaluation sequence as there is no
start to begin with.
All you are doing is showing that you initial claim was made with no
formal basis, but just you spouting words without you knowing what you
are saying.
Do you understand that your precious Prolog ADMITS that it is
limited in the form of logic it performs.
It can't even reach a full first-order logic.
You keep on diverting to simple things that just don't prove what
you claim, when something too tough is brought up.
That is just admitting that you see yourself as wrong, but can't
admit it openly.
Your "Prolog" statement about G just isn't actually Prolog, as
Prolog has no "provable" predicate.
You seemed to have just diverted from the fact you LIED about
Prolog having a "provable" operator, which just shows your stupidity. >>>>>>
This is the final and complete total resolution
of the Liar Paradox conclusively proving that it
was never grounded in any notion of truth.
But that hasn't actually been a problem. It has been known to be a >>>>>> non- truth-bearer for a long time, at least in Formal Logic.
They know-nothing philosophers might have been arguing about it,
but thas is because there field can't actually resolve anything.
G||del, Kurt 1931.
On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia
Mathematica And Related Systems
The last part is what unify_with_occurs_check() actually means. >>>>>>>>> So far everyone here has been flat out stupid about that.
Nope, as Prolog can't handle the logic of the system Godel talks >>>>>>>> about.,
Your problem is YOU can't handle that logic system either,
because you are just to stupid.
Try to give Prolog the ACTUAL definition of G, I'm not sure it >>>>>>>> even has the ability to represent that G asserts there isn't a >>>>>>>> natural number g that meets some predicate, like x * x = -1
If you can't express that part, how do you expect it to
understand the full definition.
Your problem is you are just to stupid to understand your
logic's restrictions.
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
is reliably computable by the above formalism.
But it can only apply to limited systems, namely the systems >>>>>>>>>> smaller than the proof of incompleteness specified.
I have thought this through for 30,000 hours over
28 years.
And you should have figured out its problems a lot earlier. >>>>>>>>>
On 28/12/2025 13:49, olcott wrote:
...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)
According to G||del this last line sums up his whole proof.
Thus the essence of his G is correctly encoded below:
?- G = not(provable(F, G)).
G = not(provable(F, G)).
You mean "therefore the essence ..." or else "... G is, by his
standards, correctly encoded..."
G||del, Kurt 1931.
On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia
Mathematica And Related Systems
He uses = as a shorthand for an asymmetric relation that he credits to
PM. I have a copy of PM 1st edition here; it does /not/ define equality
that way.
His system also has a number ("individual") available in universal quantification over individuals that is indefinite *and* that indefinite number supposedly maps to a unique formula along with the other
individuals (despite all formulas being finite! O.o). I'm deeply
suspicious but the paper is so unreasonably difficult that I'm minded
not to bother going on studying it.
On 12/29/25 10:48 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/29/2025 9:11 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/29/25 9:55 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/29/2025 7:37 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/28/25 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/28/2025 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/28/25 7:42 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/28/2025 11:15 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/28/25 8:49 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/27/2025 7:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/27/25 7:54 PM, olcott wrote:
A system such all semantic meaning of the formal
system is directly encoded in the syntax of the
formal language of the formal system making
reCx ree L (Provable(L,x) rei True(L,x))
Which is IMPOSSIBLE, as for any sufficiently expressive >>>>>>>>>>> system, as it has been shown that for a system that can >>>>>>>>>>> express the Natural Numbers, we can build a measure of
meaning into the elements that they did not originally have. >>>>>>>>>>>
In other words artificially contriving a fake meaning.
But it can be a real meaning.
...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)
Right, because in the language created, and "understood" by the >>>>>>>>> meta- system, that is what that number means.
According to G||del this last line sums up his whole proof. >>>>>>>>>> Thus the essence of his G is correctly encoded below:
But, only in the meta-system, which ins't where the system is >>>>>>>>> allowed to create its proof.
Your problem is you just don't understand "Formal Logic
Systems", because they have RULES which you just can't understand >>>>>>>>>
?- G = not(provable(F, G)).
But there is no "provable" predicate, so your statement is just >>>>>>>>> nonsense.
G = not(provable(F, G)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(G, not(provable(F, G))).
false.
In part because it doesn't know what provable is, and just
can't handle the logic.
This is merely your own utterly profound ignorance
of this specific topic.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Which shows that you think logic is limited to the simple logic >>>>>>> of Prolog.
Do you even know what a cycle in the directed graph
of an evaluation sequence is?
Sure. Do you?
Can you show a finite directed graph with no root node that doesn't >>>>> have a cycle?
That you do not even understand what an acyclic graph
is seems to be why you can't understand an acyclic
evaluation sequence.
No, I understand what an acyclical graph is, but you just can't call
something an acyclical graph if it has cycles.
It seems TRUTH isn't a concept you understand.
The entire body of general knowledge is inherently
structured within a directed acyclic graph.
Then you could express a root node that needs no other knowledge to be expressed.
Your failure shows you don't know what you are talking about and thus
are admitting you are just a liar.
You-a are not allowed to just assume such a thing,
You can't just assume that something exists or can be done.
Do you understand that your precious Prolog ADMITS that it is
limited in the form of logic it performs.
It can't even reach a full first-order logic.
You keep on diverting to simple things that just don't prove what
you claim, when something too tough is brought up.
That is just admitting that you see yourself as wrong, but can't
admit it openly.
Your "Prolog" statement about G just isn't actually Prolog, as
Prolog has no "provable" predicate.
You seemed to have just diverted from the fact you LIED about
Prolog having a "provable" operator, which just shows your
stupidity.
This is the final and complete total resolution
of the Liar Paradox conclusively proving that it
was never grounded in any notion of truth.
But that hasn't actually been a problem. It has been known to be >>>>>>> a non- truth-bearer for a long time, at least in Formal Logic.
They know-nothing philosophers might have been arguing about it, >>>>>>> but thas is because there field can't actually resolve anything. >>>>>>>
G||del, Kurt 1931.
On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia
Mathematica And Related Systems
The last part is what unify_with_occurs_check() actually means. >>>>>>>>>> So far everyone here has been flat out stupid about that.
Nope, as Prolog can't handle the logic of the system Godel
talks about.,
Your problem is YOU can't handle that logic system either,
because you are just to stupid.
Try to give Prolog the ACTUAL definition of G, I'm not sure it >>>>>>>>> even has the ability to represent that G asserts there isn't a >>>>>>>>> natural number g that meets some predicate, like x * x = -1
If you can't express that part, how do you expect it to
understand the full definition.
Your problem is you are just to stupid to understand your
logic's restrictions.
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
is reliably computable by the above formalism.
But it can only apply to limited systems, namely the systems >>>>>>>>>>> smaller than the proof of incompleteness specified.
I have thought this through for 30,000 hours over
28 years.
And you should have figured out its problems a lot earlier. >>>>>>>>>>
On 12/29/25 10:47 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/29/2025 9:31 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/29/25 10:24 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/29/2025 7:37 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/28/25 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/28/2025 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/28/25 7:42 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/28/2025 11:15 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/28/25 8:49 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/27/2025 7:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/27/25 7:54 PM, olcott wrote:
A system such all semantic meaning of the formal
system is directly encoded in the syntax of the
formal language of the formal system making
reCx ree L (Provable(L,x) rei True(L,x))
Which is IMPOSSIBLE, as for any sufficiently expressive >>>>>>>>>>> system, as it has been shown that for a system that can >>>>>>>>>>> express the Natural Numbers, we can build a measure of
meaning into the elements that they did not originally have. >>>>>>>>>>>
In other words artificially contriving a fake meaning.
But it can be a real meaning.
...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)
Right, because in the language created, and "understood" by the >>>>>>>>> meta- system, that is what that number means.
According to G||del this last line sums up his whole proof. >>>>>>>>>> Thus the essence of his G is correctly encoded below:
But, only in the meta-system, which ins't where the system is >>>>>>>>> allowed to create its proof.
Your problem is you just don't understand "Formal Logic
Systems", because they have RULES which you just can't understand >>>>>>>>>
?- G = not(provable(F, G)).
But there is no "provable" predicate, so your statement is just >>>>>>>>> nonsense.
G = not(provable(F, G)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(G, not(provable(F, G))).
false.
In part because it doesn't know what provable is, and just
can't handle the logic.
This is merely your own utterly profound ignorance
of this specific topic.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Which shows that you think logic is limited to the simple logic >>>>>>> of Prolog.
Do you even know what a cycle in the directed graph
of an evaluation sequence is?
Sure. Do you?
Can you show a finite directed graph with no root node that doesn't >>>>> have a cycle?
That you do not even understand what a directed acyclic
graph is seems to be why you can't fully understand the
effect of a cycle in the directed graph of an evaluation
sequence. The term "evaluation sequence" may also be
difficult for you.
So, you are just showing you can't do it.
I am not going to let you dodge a mandatory prerequisite.
Your question indicates that you do not know what a
directed acyclic graph is. A DAG can have a root.
Right, but the thing you say is a DAG doesn't, so can't be a DAG.
Your problem is you don't understand what the words you are using
actually mean, or the fundamentals of the theory you are trying to talk about.
Your world is based on the fantasy that you can assume things to be true without them being correct, because you just don't understand the
difference between truth and knowledge, so you just assume you can know stuff.
The problem is there isn't a unique evaluation sequence as there is
no start to begin with.
All you are doing is showing that you initial claim was made with no
formal basis, but just you spouting words without you knowing what
you are saying.
Do you understand that your precious Prolog ADMITS that it is
limited in the form of logic it performs.
It can't even reach a full first-order logic.
You keep on diverting to simple things that just don't prove what
you claim, when something too tough is brought up.
That is just admitting that you see yourself as wrong, but can't
admit it openly.
Your "Prolog" statement about G just isn't actually Prolog, as
Prolog has no "provable" predicate.
You seemed to have just diverted from the fact you LIED about
Prolog having a "provable" operator, which just shows your
stupidity.
This is the final and complete total resolution
of the Liar Paradox conclusively proving that it
was never grounded in any notion of truth.
But that hasn't actually been a problem. It has been known to be >>>>>>> a non- truth-bearer for a long time, at least in Formal Logic.
They know-nothing philosophers might have been arguing about it, >>>>>>> but thas is because there field can't actually resolve anything. >>>>>>>
G||del, Kurt 1931.
On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia
Mathematica And Related Systems
The last part is what unify_with_occurs_check() actually means. >>>>>>>>>> So far everyone here has been flat out stupid about that.
Nope, as Prolog can't handle the logic of the system Godel
talks about.,
Your problem is YOU can't handle that logic system either,
because you are just to stupid.
Try to give Prolog the ACTUAL definition of G, I'm not sure it >>>>>>>>> even has the ability to represent that G asserts there isn't a >>>>>>>>> natural number g that meets some predicate, like x * x = -1
If you can't express that part, how do you expect it to
understand the full definition.
Your problem is you are just to stupid to understand your
logic's restrictions.
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
is reliably computable by the above formalism.
But it can only apply to limited systems, namely the systems >>>>>>>>>>> smaller than the proof of incompleteness specified.
I have thought this through for 30,000 hours over
28 years.
And you should have figured out its problems a lot earlier. >>>>>>>>>>
On 12/29/2025 10:05 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/29/25 10:48 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/29/2025 9:11 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/29/25 9:55 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/29/2025 7:37 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/28/25 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/28/2025 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/28/25 7:42 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/28/2025 11:15 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/28/25 8:49 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/27/2025 7:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/27/25 7:54 PM, olcott wrote:
A system such all semantic meaning of the formal
system is directly encoded in the syntax of the
formal language of the formal system making
reCx ree L (Provable(L,x) rei True(L,x))
Which is IMPOSSIBLE, as for any sufficiently expressive >>>>>>>>>>>> system, as it has been shown that for a system that can >>>>>>>>>>>> express the Natural Numbers, we can build a measure of >>>>>>>>>>>> meaning into the elements that they did not originally have. >>>>>>>>>>>>
In other words artificially contriving a fake meaning.
But it can be a real meaning.
Right, because in the language created, and "understood" by >>>>>>>>>> the meta- system, that is what that number means.
...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41) >>>>>>>>>>
According to G||del this last line sums up his whole proof. >>>>>>>>>>> Thus the essence of his G is correctly encoded below:
But, only in the meta-system, which ins't where the system is >>>>>>>>>> allowed to create its proof.
Your problem is you just don't understand "Formal Logic
Systems", because they have RULES which you just can't understand >>>>>>>>>>
?- G = not(provable(F, G)).
But there is no "provable" predicate, so your statement is >>>>>>>>>> just nonsense.
G = not(provable(F, G)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(G, not(provable(F, G))).
false.
In part because it doesn't know what provable is, and just >>>>>>>>>> can't handle the logic.
This is merely your own utterly profound ignorance
of this specific topic.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Which shows that you think logic is limited to the simple logic >>>>>>>> of Prolog.
Do you even know what a cycle in the directed graph
of an evaluation sequence is?
Sure. Do you?
Can you show a finite directed graph with no root node that
doesn't have a cycle?
That you do not even understand what an acyclic graph
is seems to be why you can't understand an acyclic
evaluation sequence.
No, I understand what an acyclical graph is, but you just can't call
something an acyclical graph if it has cycles.
It seems TRUTH isn't a concept you understand.
The entire body of general knowledge is inherently
structured within a directed acyclic graph.
Then you could express a root node that needs no other knowledge to be
expressed.
Now you are proving they you do not understand type
hierarchies.
Your failure shows you don't know what you are talking about and thus
are admitting you are just a liar.
You-a are not allowed to just assume such a thing,
You can't just assume that something exists or can be done.
Do you understand that your precious Prolog ADMITS that it is
limited in the form of logic it performs.
It can't even reach a full first-order logic.
You keep on diverting to simple things that just don't prove what >>>>>> you claim, when something too tough is brought up.
That is just admitting that you see yourself as wrong, but can't
admit it openly.
Your "Prolog" statement about G just isn't actually Prolog, as
Prolog has no "provable" predicate.
You seemed to have just diverted from the fact you LIED about >>>>>>>> Prolog having a "provable" operator, which just shows your
stupidity.
This is the final and complete total resolution
of the Liar Paradox conclusively proving that it
was never grounded in any notion of truth.
But that hasn't actually been a problem. It has been known to be >>>>>>>> a non- truth-bearer for a long time, at least in Formal Logic. >>>>>>>>
They know-nothing philosophers might have been arguing about it, >>>>>>>> but thas is because there field can't actually resolve anything. >>>>>>>>
Nope, as Prolog can't handle the logic of the system Godel >>>>>>>>>> talks about.,
G||del, Kurt 1931.
On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia
Mathematica And Related Systems
The last part is what unify_with_occurs_check() actually means. >>>>>>>>>>> So far everyone here has been flat out stupid about that. >>>>>>>>>>
Your problem is YOU can't handle that logic system either, >>>>>>>>>> because you are just to stupid.
Try to give Prolog the ACTUAL definition of G, I'm not sure it >>>>>>>>>> even has the ability to represent that G asserts there isn't a >>>>>>>>>> natural number g that meets some predicate, like x * x = -1 >>>>>>>>>>
If you can't express that part, how do you expect it to
understand the full definition.
Your problem is you are just to stupid to understand your >>>>>>>>>> logic's restrictions.
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language" >>>>>>>>>>>>> is reliably computable by the above formalism.
But it can only apply to limited systems, namely the systems >>>>>>>>>>>> smaller than the proof of incompleteness specified.
I have thought this through for 30,000 hours over
28 years.
And you should have figured out its problems a lot earlier. >>>>>>>>>>>
On 12/29/2025 10:08 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/29/25 10:47 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/29/2025 9:31 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/29/25 10:24 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/29/2025 7:37 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/28/25 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/28/2025 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/28/25 7:42 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/28/2025 11:15 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/28/25 8:49 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/27/2025 7:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/27/25 7:54 PM, olcott wrote:
A system such all semantic meaning of the formal
system is directly encoded in the syntax of the
formal language of the formal system making
reCx ree L (Provable(L,x) rei True(L,x))
Which is IMPOSSIBLE, as for any sufficiently expressive >>>>>>>>>>>> system, as it has been shown that for a system that can >>>>>>>>>>>> express the Natural Numbers, we can build a measure of >>>>>>>>>>>> meaning into the elements that they did not originally have. >>>>>>>>>>>>
In other words artificially contriving a fake meaning.
But it can be a real meaning.
Right, because in the language created, and "understood" by >>>>>>>>>> the meta- system, that is what that number means.
...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41) >>>>>>>>>>
According to G||del this last line sums up his whole proof. >>>>>>>>>>> Thus the essence of his G is correctly encoded below:
But, only in the meta-system, which ins't where the system is >>>>>>>>>> allowed to create its proof.
Your problem is you just don't understand "Formal Logic
Systems", because they have RULES which you just can't understand >>>>>>>>>>
?- G = not(provable(F, G)).
But there is no "provable" predicate, so your statement is >>>>>>>>>> just nonsense.
G = not(provable(F, G)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(G, not(provable(F, G))).
false.
In part because it doesn't know what provable is, and just >>>>>>>>>> can't handle the logic.
This is merely your own utterly profound ignorance
of this specific topic.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Which shows that you think logic is limited to the simple logic >>>>>>>> of Prolog.
Do you even know what a cycle in the directed graph
of an evaluation sequence is?
Sure. Do you?
Can you show a finite directed graph with no root node that
doesn't have a cycle?
That you do not even understand what a directed acyclic
graph is seems to be why you can't fully understand the
effect of a cycle in the directed graph of an evaluation
sequence. The term "evaluation sequence" may also be
difficult for you.
So, you are just showing you can't do it.
I am not going to let you dodge a mandatory prerequisite.
Your question indicates that you do not know what a
directed acyclic graph is. A DAG can have a root.
Right, but the thing you say is a DAG doesn't, so can't be a DAG.
Cite a source proving that no DAG can have a root.
[can a DAG that is not a tree have a root]
Your problem is you don't understand what the words you are using
actually mean, or the fundamentals of the theory you are trying to
talk about.
Your world is based on the fantasy that you can assume things to be
true without them being correct, because you just don't understand the
difference between truth and knowledge, so you just assume you can
know stuff.
The problem is there isn't a unique evaluation sequence as there is
no start to begin with.
All you are doing is showing that you initial claim was made with no
formal basis, but just you spouting words without you knowing what
you are saying.
Do you understand that your precious Prolog ADMITS that it is
limited in the form of logic it performs.
It can't even reach a full first-order logic.
You keep on diverting to simple things that just don't prove what >>>>>> you claim, when something too tough is brought up.
That is just admitting that you see yourself as wrong, but can't
admit it openly.
Your "Prolog" statement about G just isn't actually Prolog, as
Prolog has no "provable" predicate.
You seemed to have just diverted from the fact you LIED about >>>>>>>> Prolog having a "provable" operator, which just shows your
stupidity.
This is the final and complete total resolution
of the Liar Paradox conclusively proving that it
was never grounded in any notion of truth.
But that hasn't actually been a problem. It has been known to be >>>>>>>> a non- truth-bearer for a long time, at least in Formal Logic. >>>>>>>>
They know-nothing philosophers might have been arguing about it, >>>>>>>> but thas is because there field can't actually resolve anything. >>>>>>>>
Nope, as Prolog can't handle the logic of the system Godel >>>>>>>>>> talks about.,
G||del, Kurt 1931.
On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia
Mathematica And Related Systems
The last part is what unify_with_occurs_check() actually means. >>>>>>>>>>> So far everyone here has been flat out stupid about that. >>>>>>>>>>
Your problem is YOU can't handle that logic system either, >>>>>>>>>> because you are just to stupid.
Try to give Prolog the ACTUAL definition of G, I'm not sure it >>>>>>>>>> even has the ability to represent that G asserts there isn't a >>>>>>>>>> natural number g that meets some predicate, like x * x = -1 >>>>>>>>>>
If you can't express that part, how do you expect it to
understand the full definition.
Your problem is you are just to stupid to understand your >>>>>>>>>> logic's restrictions.
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language" >>>>>>>>>>>>> is reliably computable by the above formalism.
But it can only apply to limited systems, namely the systems >>>>>>>>>>>> smaller than the proof of incompleteness specified.
I have thought this through for 30,000 hours over
28 years.
And you should have figured out its problems a lot earlier. >>>>>>>>>>>
On 12/29/2025 10:04 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 28/12/2025 13:49, olcott wrote:
...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)
According to G||del this last line sums up his whole proof.
Thus the essence of his G is correctly encoded below:
?- G = not(provable(F, G)).
G = not(provable(F, G)).
You mean "therefore the essence ..." or else "... G is, by his
standards, correctly encoded..."
G||del, Kurt 1931.
On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia
Mathematica And Related Systems
He uses = as a shorthand for an asymmetric relation that he credits to
PM. I have a copy of PM 1st edition here; it does /not/ define equality
that way.
His system also has a number ("individual") available in universal
quantification over individuals that is indefinite *and* that indefinite
number supposedly maps to a unique formula along with the other
individuals (despite all formulas being finite! O.o). I'm deeply
suspicious but the paper is so unreasonably difficult that I'm minded
not to bother going on studying it.
Yet the essence of what he is saying is boiled down
to something much simpler as he says in his own words:
...there is also a close relationship with the rCLliarrCY antinomy,14 ...
...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof...
...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)
G||del, Kurt 1931.
On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica And
Related Systems
The Liar Paradox is an epistemological antinomy.
This sentence is not true.
It is not true about what?
It is not true about being not true.
It is not true about being not true about what?
It is not true about being not true about being not true.
Oh I see you are stuck in a loop!
The simple English shows that the Liar Paradox never
gets to the point. It is ungrounded in a truth value.
This is formalized in the Prolog programming language
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
False.
Expands to: not(true(not(true(not(true(not(true(...))))))))
On 12/29/25 11:27 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/29/2025 10:04 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 28/12/2025 13:49, olcott wrote:
...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)
According to G||del this last line sums up his whole proof.
Thus the essence of his G is correctly encoded below:
?- G = not(provable(F, G)).
G = not(provable(F, G)).
You mean "therefore the essence ..." or else "... G is, by his
standards, correctly encoded..."
G||del, Kurt 1931.
On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia
Mathematica And Related Systems
He uses = as a shorthand for an asymmetric relation that he credits to
PM. I have a copy of PM 1st edition here; it does /not/ define equality
that way.
His system also has a number ("individual") available in universal
quantification over individuals that is indefinite *and* that indefinite >>> number supposedly maps to a unique formula along with the other
individuals (despite all formulas being finite! O.o). I'm deeply
suspicious but the paper is so unreasonably difficult that I'm minded
not to bother going on studying it.
Yet the essence of what he is saying is boiled down
to something much simpler as he says in his own words:
...there is also a close relationship with the rCLliarrCY antinomy,14 ...
Yes, but "close relationship" doesn't mean is the same as.
...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
similar undecidability proof...
Right, but that doesn't mean he derives directly from the liar.
...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which asserts its
own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)
Right, in the meta-system that understands the encoded meaning that the
PRR understands.
But that meaning is NOT in the base system.
G||del, Kurt 1931.
On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica And
Related Systems
The Liar Paradox is an epistemological antinomy.
This sentence is not true.
It is not true about what?
It is not true about being not true.
It is not true about being not true about what?
It is not true about being not true about being not true.
Oh I see you are stuck in a loop!
The simple English shows that the Liar Paradox never
gets to the point. It is ungrounded in a truth value.
This is formalized in the Prolog programming language
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
False.
Expands to: not(true(not(true(not(true(not(true(...))))))))
Which proves nothing about Godel and his G, as he doesn't "derive" from
the liars paradox, but uses its general form but with a transformation
that breaks the actual contraditction in the epistemological antinomy, because there IS a resolution, the statement is True but Unprovable.
On 12/28/25 8:49 AM, olcott wrote:
In other words artificially contriving a fake meaning.
In other words, you don't undertstand how things get their meaning?
Words and Symbols don't inherently have a meaning. That meaning is
assigned, and others can be assigned to them.
On 28/12/2025 17:58, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/28/25 8:49 AM, olcott wrote:
In other words artificially contriving a fake meaning.
In other words, you don't undertstand how things get their meaning?
Words and Symbols don't inherently have a meaning. That meaning is
assigned, and others can be assigned to them.
No. Meaning is inferred by the receiver and presumed by the producer
except when the producer is acting on the receiver instead of
communicating with it - although I think you might say the two are
unifiable - if a sound always precedes a movement does it /mean/ that
that the movement is coming? was it assigned?
That the receiver and producer can do all that by prior agreement is
merely a sophistication; an effect of earlier memoranda.
On 12/29/2025 12:24 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/29/25 11:27 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/29/2025 10:04 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:Yes, but "close relationship" doesn't mean is the same as.
On 28/12/2025 13:49, olcott wrote:
...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)
According to G||del this last line sums up his whole proof.
Thus the essence of his G is correctly encoded below:
?- G = not(provable(F, G)).
G = not(provable(F, G)).
You mean "therefore the essence ..." or else "... G is, by his
standards, correctly encoded..."
G||del, Kurt 1931.
On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia
Mathematica And Related Systems
He uses = as a shorthand for an asymmetric relation that he credits to >>>> PM. I have a copy of PM 1st edition here; it does /not/ define equality >>>> that way.
His system also has a number ("individual") available in universal
quantification over individuals that is indefinite *and* that
indefinite
number supposedly maps to a unique formula along with the other
individuals (despite all formulas being finite! O.o). I'm deeply
suspicious but the paper is so unreasonably difficult that I'm minded
not to bother going on studying it.
Yet the essence of what he is saying is boiled down
to something much simpler as he says in his own words:
...there is also a close relationship with the rCLliarrCY antinomy,14 ... >>
...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
similar undecidability proof...
Right, but that doesn't mean he derives directly from the liar.
...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which asserts its
own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)
Right, in the meta-system that understands the encoded meaning that
the PRR understands.
But that meaning is NOT in the base system.
G||del, Kurt 1931.
On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica And
Related Systems
The Liar Paradox is an epistemological antinomy.
This sentence is not true.
It is not true about what?
It is not true about being not true.
It is not true about being not true about what?
It is not true about being not true about being not true.
Oh I see you are stuck in a loop!
The simple English shows that the Liar Paradox never
gets to the point. It is ungrounded in a truth value.
This is formalized in the Prolog programming language
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
False.
Expands to: not(true(not(true(not(true(not(true(...))))))))
Which proves nothing about Godel and his G, as he doesn't "derive"
from the liars paradox, but uses its general form but with a
transformation that breaks the actual contraditction in the
epistemological antinomy, because there IS a resolution, the statement
is True but Unprovable.
...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be
used for a similar undecidability proof...
The Liar Paradox is an epistemological antinomy.
Your inability to pay 100% complete attention to the
exact meaning of words never has been my mistake.
On 12/29/25 1:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/29/2025 12:24 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/29/25 11:27 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/29/2025 10:04 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:Yes, but "close relationship" doesn't mean is the same as.
On 28/12/2025 13:49, olcott wrote:
...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)
According to G||del this last line sums up his whole proof.
Thus the essence of his G is correctly encoded below:
?- G = not(provable(F, G)).
G = not(provable(F, G)).
You mean "therefore the essence ..." or else "... G is, by his
standards, correctly encoded..."
G||del, Kurt 1931.
On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia
Mathematica And Related Systems
He uses = as a shorthand for an asymmetric relation that he credits to >>>>> PM. I have a copy of PM 1st edition here; it does /not/ define
equality
that way.
His system also has a number ("individual") available in universal
quantification over individuals that is indefinite *and* that
indefinite
number supposedly maps to a unique formula along with the other
individuals (despite all formulas being finite! O.o). I'm deeply
suspicious but the paper is so unreasonably difficult that I'm minded >>>>> not to bother going on studying it.
Yet the essence of what he is saying is boiled down
to something much simpler as he says in his own words:
...there is also a close relationship with the rCLliarrCY antinomy,14 ... >>>
...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
similar undecidability proof...
Right, but that doesn't mean he derives directly from the liar.
...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which asserts its
own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)
Right, in the meta-system that understands the encoded meaning that
the PRR understands.
But that meaning is NOT in the base system.
G||del, Kurt 1931.
On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica And
Related Systems
The Liar Paradox is an epistemological antinomy.
This sentence is not true.
It is not true about what?
It is not true about being not true.
It is not true about being not true about what?
It is not true about being not true about being not true.
Oh I see you are stuck in a loop!
The simple English shows that the Liar Paradox never
gets to the point. It is ungrounded in a truth value.
This is formalized in the Prolog programming language
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
False.
Expands to: not(true(not(true(not(true(not(true(...))))))))
Which proves nothing about Godel and his G, as he doesn't "derive"
from the liars paradox, but uses its general form but with a
transformation that breaks the actual contraditction in the
epistemological antinomy, because there IS a resolution, the
statement is True but Unprovable.
...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be
used for a similar undecidability proof...
The Liar Paradox is an epistemological antinomy.
Your inability to pay 100% complete attention to the
exact meaning of words never has been my mistake.
Right, But the FORM of the Liars Paradox, that "X is defined to be X is
not True", can be transformed by a syntactic transformation that changes
its meaning to "X is defined to be X is not Provable".
Since Provable is NOT the same predicate as True, this changes its
meaning, and makes it only an APPARENT contradiction, as there is a
valid realization of the statement with X actually being True, but also
not being Provable.
By the definitions of the two terms, this means that X logically follows from the fundamental truth makers of the system, but onlyl with an--
infinite number of inferences.
THe fact that YOU can't understand this, or even comment about where you think this is wrong, just shows your inability to THINK about the topic.
Your problem is YOU don't know the meaning for the words, but are
beleiving your own lies about them, and by your refusal to learn the
actual meanings have made yourself a pathological liar.
That you say that without bothering to understand
the full depth of what I am saying is very callous.
On 12/29/2025 1:23 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/29/25 1:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/29/2025 12:24 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/29/25 11:27 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/29/2025 10:04 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:Yes, but "close relationship" doesn't mean is the same as.
On 28/12/2025 13:49, olcott wrote:
...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
asserts its own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)
According to G||del this last line sums up his whole proof.
Thus the essence of his G is correctly encoded below:
?- G = not(provable(F, G)).
G = not(provable(F, G)).
You mean "therefore the essence ..." or else "... G is, by his
standards, correctly encoded..."
G||del, Kurt 1931.
On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia
Mathematica And Related Systems
He uses = as a shorthand for an asymmetric relation that he
credits to
PM. I have a copy of PM 1st edition here; it does /not/ define
equality
that way.
His system also has a number ("individual") available in universal >>>>>> quantification over individuals that is indefinite *and* that
indefinite
number supposedly maps to a unique formula along with the other
individuals (despite all formulas being finite! O.o). I'm deeply
suspicious but the paper is so unreasonably difficult that I'm minded >>>>>> not to bother going on studying it.
Yet the essence of what he is saying is boiled down
to something much simpler as he says in his own words:
...there is also a close relationship with the rCLliarrCY antinomy,14 ... >>>>
...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
similar undecidability proof...
Right, but that doesn't mean he derives directly from the liar.
...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which asserts its >>>>> own unprovability. 15 rCa (G||del 1931:40-41)
Right, in the meta-system that understands the encoded meaning that
the PRR understands.
But that meaning is NOT in the base system.
G||del, Kurt 1931.
On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica And
Related Systems
The Liar Paradox is an epistemological antinomy.
This sentence is not true.
It is not true about what?
It is not true about being not true.
It is not true about being not true about what?
It is not true about being not true about being not true.
Oh I see you are stuck in a loop!
The simple English shows that the Liar Paradox never
gets to the point. It is ungrounded in a truth value.
This is formalized in the Prolog programming language
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
False.
Expands to: not(true(not(true(not(true(not(true(...))))))))
Which proves nothing about Godel and his G, as he doesn't "derive"
from the liars paradox, but uses its general form but with a
transformation that breaks the actual contraditction in the
epistemological antinomy, because there IS a resolution, the
statement is True but Unprovable.
...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be
used for a similar undecidability proof...
The Liar Paradox is an epistemological antinomy.
Your inability to pay 100% complete attention to the
exact meaning of words never has been my mistake.
Right, But the FORM of the Liars Paradox, that "X is defined to be X
is not True", can be transformed by a syntactic transformation that
changes its meaning to "X is defined to be X is not Provable".
Since Provable is NOT the same predicate as True, this changes its
meaning, and makes it only an APPARENT contradiction, as there is a
valid realization of the statement with X actually being True, but
also not being Provable.
This has always only been complete ignorance
of the deep meaning of: unify_with_occurs_check()
Ungrounded is a term that computer scientists,
mathematicians and logicians never heard of thus
they conclude it is complete nonsense on the
basis of their own ignorance.
By the definitions of the two terms, this means that X logically
follows from the fundamental truth makers of the system, but onlyl
with an infinite number of inferences.
THe fact that YOU can't understand this, or even comment about where
you think this is wrong, just shows your inability to THINK about the
topic.
Your problem is YOU don't know the meaning for the words, but are
beleiving your own lies about them, and by your refusal to learn the
actual meanings have made yourself a pathological liar.
Am 29.12.2025 um 16:25 schrieb olcott:
That you say that without bothering to understand
the full depth of what I am saying is very callous.
If someone thinks 30.000 hours about a dozen lines of code he is sick.
On 12/29/2025 1:50 PM, Bonita Montero wrote:
Am 29.12.2025 um 16:25 schrieb olcott:
That you say that without bothering to understand
the full depth of what I am saying is very callous.
If someone thinks 30.000 hours about a dozen lines of code he is sick.
My 28 year goal has been to make
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
reliably computable.
*Here is a key element of that*
A system such all semantic meaning of the formal
system is directly encoded in the syntax of the
formal language of the formal system making
reCx ree L (Provable(L,x) rei True(L,x))
Your definition is inherently subjective, and thus no compatible with formalism.
On 12/29/25 10:47 AM, olcott wrote:
I am not going to let you dodge a mandatory prerequisite.
Your question indicates that you do not know what a
directed acyclic graph is. A DAG can have a root.
Right, but the thing you say is a DAG doesn't, so can't be a DAG.
Your problem is you don't understand what the words you are using
actually mean, or the fundamentals of the theory you are trying to talk about.
On 29/12/2025 16:08, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/29/25 10:47 AM, olcott wrote:
I am not going to let you dodge a mandatory prerequisite.
Your question indicates that you do not know what a
directed acyclic graph is. A DAG can have a root.
Right, but the thing you say is a DAG doesn't, so can't be a DAG.
Your problem is you don't understand what the words you are using
actually mean, or the fundamentals of the theory you are trying to talk
about.
I just flicked through Volume 4A "Combinatorial Algorithms Part 1) of
TAOCP (Knuth). Knuth only uses "Root" there, AFAICS, wrt. trees and tree diagrams such as Binary Decision Trees. The DAG doesn't have a "root"
defined but the trees that some DAGs and networks on them correspond to
do. He doesn't give a definition with properties that we can use to
label a node of a DAG as "root" formally.
I think its fair to allow anyone to call a node the root when being a
typical conversationalist when the DAG or a network on it maps to
exactly one tree but to allow anyone to say no a DAG has a root. The
root of a tree comes with the perspective that it is a tree - which
doesn't merely have a unique node with no inarcs but it has a node
nominated as a root to make it a tree instead of a mere DAG or a network
on a DAG.
Tree's are usually networks (graphs with data associated). I don't know
if, formally, they always are.
He wants all knowledge to form a Tree, but since it doesn't have a root,
it can't be.
On 29/12/2025 23:11, Richard Damon wrote:
He wants all knowledge to form a Tree, but since it doesn't have a root,
it can't be.
It does have a root: "There is knowledge".
On 12/29/25 6:46 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 29/12/2025 23:11, Richard Damon wrote:
He wants all knowledge to form a Tree, but since it doesn't have a root, >>> it can't be.
It does have a root: "There is knowledge".
And how is that understood without a meaning for the term.
He wants a non-axiomatic system, based on meaning in the system.
The problem is that just doesn't work.
On 12/30/2025 8:34 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/29/25 6:46 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 29/12/2025 23:11, Richard Damon wrote:
He wants all knowledge to form a Tree, but since it doesn't have a
root,
it can't be.
It does have a root: "There is knowledge".
And how is that understood without a meaning for the term.
He wants a non-axiomatic system, based on meaning in the system.
The problem is that just doesn't work.
Th Root is defined in terms of its constituents.
{Thing} is divided into
-a {physically existing thing}
-a {Mentally existing thing}
-a-a-a {Coherent ideas}
-a-a-a {Incoherent ideas}
On 12/30/25 9:56 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/30/2025 8:34 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/29/25 6:46 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 29/12/2025 23:11, Richard Damon wrote:
He wants all knowledge to form a Tree, but since it doesn't have a
root,
it can't be.
It does have a root: "There is knowledge".
And how is that understood without a meaning for the term.
He wants a non-axiomatic system, based on meaning in the system.
The problem is that just doesn't work.
Th Root is defined in terms of its constituents.
In other word, by a cycle.
Note, you are also changing your goalposts, as your original claim was
about a DAG of KNOWLEDGE, not TYPES.
It seems you don't understand what you are trying to talk about.
{Thing} is divided into
-a-a {physically existing thing}
-a-a {Mentally existing thing}
-a-a-a-a {Coherent ideas}
-a-a-a-a {Incoherent ideas}
On 12/29/25 3:06 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/29/2025 1:50 PM, Bonita Montero wrote:
Am 29.12.2025 um 16:25 schrieb olcott:
That you say that without bothering to understand
the full depth of what I am saying is very callous.
If someone thinks 30.000 hours about a dozen lines of code he is sick.
My 28 year goal has been to make
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
reliably computable.
*Here is a key element of that*
A system such all semantic meaning of the formal
system is directly encoded in the syntax of the
formal language of the formal system making
reCx ree L (Provable(L,x) rei True(L,x))
In other words, you wasted your life trying to do something you don't understand.
Since in your system, words do not need to have their actual meaning, NOTHING can be truthfully derived from the words.
Your problem is you fundamentally don't understand the basics of what
you are talking about, because you CHOSE to remain ignorant of the
field, and chose instead to try to derive meaning by GUESSING without knowledge, and calling it "first principles", not even knowing what
that means.
Am 29.12.2025 um 21:27 schrieb Richard Damon:
On 12/29/25 3:06 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/29/2025 1:50 PM, Bonita Montero wrote:
Am 29.12.2025 um 16:25 schrieb olcott:
That you say that without bothering to understand
the full depth of what I am saying is very callous.
If someone thinks 30.000 hours about a dozen lines of code he is sick. >>>>
My 28 year goal has been to make
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
reliably computable.
*Here is a key element of that*
A system such all semantic meaning of the formal
system is directly encoded in the syntax of the
formal language of the formal system making
reCx ree L (Provable(L,x) rei True(L,x))
In other words, you wasted your life trying to do something you don't
understand.
Since in your system, words do not need to have their actual meaning,
NOTHING can be truthfully derived from the words.
Your problem is you fundamentally don't understand the basics of what
you are talking about, because you CHOSE to remain ignorant of the
field, and chose instead to try to derive meaning by GUESSING without
knowledge, and calling it "first principles", not even knowing what
that means.
Engaging with Pete's arguments in a meaningful way is just as stupid as
his delusion.
On 12/30/2025 9:07 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/30/25 9:56 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/30/2025 8:34 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/29/25 6:46 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 29/12/2025 23:11, Richard Damon wrote:
He wants all knowledge to form a Tree, but since it doesn't have a >>>>>> root,
it can't be.
It does have a root: "There is knowledge".
And how is that understood without a meaning for the term.
He wants a non-axiomatic system, based on meaning in the system.
The problem is that just doesn't work.
Th Root is defined in terms of its constituents.
In other word, by a cycle.
Note, you are also changing your goalposts, as your original claim was
about a DAG of KNOWLEDGE, not TYPES.
It seems you don't understand what you are trying to talk about.
{Thing} is divided into
-a-a {physically existing thing}
-a-a {Mentally existing thing}
-a-a-a-a {Coherent ideas}
-a-a-a-a {Incoherent ideas}
I just proved that I do understand.
On 12/30/2025 12:45 PM, Bonita Montero wrote:
Am 29.12.2025 um 21:27 schrieb Richard Damon:
On 12/29/25 3:06 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/29/2025 1:50 PM, Bonita Montero wrote:
Am 29.12.2025 um 16:25 schrieb olcott:
That you say that without bothering to understand
the full depth of what I am saying is very callous.
If someone thinks 30.000 hours about a dozen lines of code he is sick. >>>>>
My 28 year goal has been to make
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
reliably computable.
*Here is a key element of that*
A system such all semantic meaning of the formal
system is directly encoded in the syntax of the
formal language of the formal system making
reCx ree L (Provable(L,x) rei True(L,x))
In other words, you wasted your life trying to do something you don't
understand.
Since in your system, words do not need to have their actual meaning,
NOTHING can be truthfully derived from the words.
Your problem is you fundamentally don't understand the basics of what
you are talking about, because you CHOSE to remain ignorant of the
field, and chose instead to try to derive meaning by GUESSING without
knowledge, and calling it "first principles", not even knowing what
that means.
Engaging with Pete's arguments in a meaningful way is just as stupid
as his delusion.
Not one person was every able to find a single
mistake with my actual reasoning and you repeat
this mere ad hominem.
The biggest issue in technical forums is that
no one can think outside of the box. They construe
the foundations of math, logic and computer
science as infallible even when these foundations
of been proven to be inconsistent.
On 12/30/25 1:53 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/30/2025 12:45 PM, Bonita Montero wrote:
Am 29.12.2025 um 21:27 schrieb Richard Damon:
On 12/29/25 3:06 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/29/2025 1:50 PM, Bonita Montero wrote:
Am 29.12.2025 um 16:25 schrieb olcott:
That you say that without bothering to understand
the full depth of what I am saying is very callous.
If someone thinks 30.000 hours about a dozen lines of code he is
sick.
My 28 year goal has been to make
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
reliably computable.
*Here is a key element of that*
A system such all semantic meaning of the formal
system is directly encoded in the syntax of the
formal language of the formal system making
reCx ree L (Provable(L,x) rei True(L,x))
In other words, you wasted your life trying to do something you
don't understand.
Since in your system, words do not need to have their actual
meaning, NOTHING can be truthfully derived from the words.
Your problem is you fundamentally don't understand the basics of
what you are talking about, because you CHOSE to remain ignorant of
the field, and chose instead to try to derive meaning by GUESSING
without knowledge, and calling it "first principles", not even
knowing what that means.
Engaging with Pete's arguments in a meaningful way is just as stupid
as his delusion.
Not one person was every able to find a single
mistake with my actual reasoning and you repeat
this mere ad hominem.
The biggest issue in technical forums is that
no one can think outside of the box. They construe
the foundations of math, logic and computer
science as infallible even when these foundations
of been proven to be inconsistent.
Sure we have.
You are just too stupid to understand, and just reject the truth of the world to live in your own world of lies.--
That is why you can't find any foundation to build you system on,
because it is just baseless.
On 12/30/2025 1:06 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/30/25 1:53 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/30/2025 12:45 PM, Bonita Montero wrote:
Am 29.12.2025 um 21:27 schrieb Richard Damon:
On 12/29/25 3:06 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/29/2025 1:50 PM, Bonita Montero wrote:
Am 29.12.2025 um 16:25 schrieb olcott:
That you say that without bothering to understand
the full depth of what I am saying is very callous.
If someone thinks 30.000 hours about a dozen lines of code he is >>>>>>> sick.
My 28 year goal has been to make
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
reliably computable.
*Here is a key element of that*
A system such all semantic meaning of the formal
system is directly encoded in the syntax of the
formal language of the formal system making
reCx ree L (Provable(L,x) rei True(L,x))
In other words, you wasted your life trying to do something you
don't understand.
Since in your system, words do not need to have their actual
meaning, NOTHING can be truthfully derived from the words.
Your problem is you fundamentally don't understand the basics of
what you are talking about, because you CHOSE to remain ignorant of >>>>> the field, and chose instead to try to derive meaning by GUESSING
without knowledge, and calling it "first principles", not even
knowing what that means.
Engaging with Pete's arguments in a meaningful way is just as stupid
as his delusion.
Not one person was every able to find a single
mistake with my actual reasoning and you repeat
this mere ad hominem.
The biggest issue in technical forums is that
no one can think outside of the box. They construe
the foundations of math, logic and computer
science as infallible even when these foundations
of been proven to be inconsistent.
Sure we have.
So then you explain to me the details of how the
foundations of math, logic and computer science
can be redefined to make:
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
reliably computable.
You are just too stupid to understand, and just reject the truth of
the world to live in your own world of lies.
That is why you can't find any foundation to build you system on,
because it is just baseless.
Engaging with Pete's arguments in a meaningful way is just as stupid as
his delusion.
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