From Newsgroup: alt.privacy.anon-server

Most EU-US data transfers are based on the rCLTransatlantic Data Privacy FrameworkrCY (TAFPF)
or so-called rCLStandard Contract ClausesrCY (SCCs). Both instruments rely on fragile US laws,
non-binding regulations and case law that is under attack rCo and is likely blown up in the
next months. As instability in the US legal system becomes undeniable and the US shows
open signs of hostility towards the EU, it is time to reconsider where our data is
flowing rCo and how long the legal rCLhouse of cardsrCY that the EU has built is holding up.

Layers of US and EU law. The rCLbridgerCY that the European Commission and previous
Democratic US administrations built to allow EU personal data to be processed in the US
does not rely on a simple, stable US privacy law. Instead, the EU and the US relied on a
wild patchwork of tons of internal guidelines and regulations, Supreme Court case law, US
factual rCLpracticesrCY or Executive Orders.

In an attempt to make ends meet, these layers are not supporting each other, but are
lined up to generate the thinnest possible connection between EU and US law rCo meaning
that the failure of just one of the many legal elements would likely make most EU-US
data transfers instantly illegal. Just like a house of cards, the instability of any
individual card will make the house collapse.

Given the enormously destructive approach of the Trump administration, many elements
of EU-US transfers are under attack rCo often times not because of any direct intentions.
Instead, the current US administration just widely attacks the US legal system and
constitutional fabric (with the help of a highly politicised Supreme Court) rCo with
many potential consequences for EU-US data flows.

1st Likely Point of Failure: FTC independence. This past Monday, the US Supreme Court
has heard a case about the independence of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Ever
since a case in 1935 (Humphrey's Executor), it is US Supreme Court case law that the
US legislator can create rCLindependentrCY bodies within the executive branch, which is
somewhat isolated from the US President.

A previously fringe theory that, under the US Constitution, all powers of the executive must rest with one person only (the President) has now gained traction
among US conservative lawyers. This so-called rCLunitary executive theoryrCY would make
any independent authority, such as the FTC, typically unconstitutional. All powers
would need to be concentrated in the President.

In Trump v. Slaughter, the US Supreme Court now heard arguments of an FTC commissioner that was removed by Trump despite all independence guarantees in 15 U.S.C.
-o 41. Based on the comments and questions of the Judges, it is widely believed
(see e.g. The Guardian, CNN or SCOTUS Blog) that the conservative majority on the
US Supreme Court will side with Trump and (to one extent or another) follow the
rCLunitary executive theoryrCY, overturning FTC independence.

In combination with the US Supreme Court rulings on absolute immunity of the President,
the US would thereby move increasingly towards a system where the President is an
absolute rCLKingrCY rCo at least for four years.

From a European perspective, FTC independence is a crucial element, because Article 8(3) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) requires that the processing

of personal data is monitored and enforce by an rCLindependentrCY body. In the TADPF
(and previously in the rCLSafe HarborrCY and rCLPrivacy ShieldrCY systems), the EU and the
US have agreed to give these powers to the FTC in the US rCo being such an rCLindependentrCY
body. Section 2.3.4. of the TADPF decision of the European Commission highlights
the Enforcement role being with the FTC. Recital 61 and Footnote 92 explicitly refer to 15 U.S.C. -o 41 as a basis to have the necessary independence guarantees
in the US.

No other element in the TADPF has the necessary investigative powers and independence.
There is private arbitration as well, but they lack any investigative powers or
relevant enforcement powers. Consequently, any TADPF participant must be either
governed by the independent FTC or the DoT (for transport organizations).

Trump v. Slaughter is scheduled to be decided in June or July 2026 the latest, but
could be decided earlier. So, itrCOs time to rCLbuckle uprCY on this one and get prepared.

One path could be to switch to SCCs or BCRs, as they do not require an independent
US body for enforcement, but also allow to make the agreement subject to an EU data
protection authority. However, there are also massive questions as to how already
transferred data can be brought rCLbackrCY to any EU approved system or even brought
rCLbackrCY to the EU in general. Furthermore, SCCs and BRCs may also be affected by
massive shifts in US law (see below).

2nd Likely Point of Failure: Data Protection Review Court. Directly in connection
to Trump v. Slaughter, which deals with oversight in the private sector, the parallel question arises on how the so-called rCLData Protection Review CourtrCY
(DPRC) can still be relied upon as any form of realistic redress against US government surveillance.

The DPRC has many legal issues (you could easily fill a PhD thesis with these problems), but crucially the DPRC is not a real US court rCo also because it is
not established by law. It is actually a group of people within the executive branch that is solely established by an Executive Order of Biden (EO 14.086, see details below). This group of people may at best be called a rCLtribunalrCY
from the perspective of Article 6 ECHR, but even this claim is probably an overstatement.

The crux is that, in relation to Trump v. Slaughter, the rCLindependencerCY of this so-called rCLCourtrCY is not even established by law (as 15 USC -o 41 for the
FTC), but by EO 14.086, so a merely internal Presidential Order that can be changed at any time.

Logically, if the Supreme Court in Trump v. Slaughter holds that independent executive bodies are unconstitutional, it may well be that any independence claims in EO 14.086 itself are (logically) also unconstitutional. This very much depends on the line of arguments that the Supreme Court will use in
Trump v. Slaughter, but we may very likely see this as a direct consequence
of any broader ruling.

This problem would expand far beyond the TADPF, because other transfer
systems (SCCs or BCRs) rely on so-called rCLTransfer Impact AssessmentsrCY (TIAs)
that in turn usually point to EO 14.086 and the DPRC as a ground why any EU controller came to the conclusion that US law may not overrule SCCs or BCRs beyond what is permissible under Article 7, 8 and 47 of the Charter.

If these elements are gone, we are down to Article 49 GDPR for rCLnecessaryrCY transfers (e.g. sending an email to the US, placing an order or booking a hotel or flight), but any rCLoutsourcingrCY to US cloud providers or SaaS providers
would typically not have any viable legal basis anymore.

3rd Likely Point of Failure: EO 14.086. Beyond changes in US constitutional law, there is also Trump himself as a major risk factor. As explained above, basically all forms of EU-US data transfers rely on a Biden Executive Order (EO 14.086). Trump has repeatedly threatened to overturn this EO. Already on the day of his inauguration, media reports indicated he will blindly
overturn all Biden EOs. In the end he signed EO 14.148, which only overturned 68 Biden EOs and 11 Biden Presidential Memoranda rCo but not EO 14.086.

EO 14.148 demands that all rCLnational securityrCY EOs should have been reviewed
within 45 days by the National Security Advisor rCo this should have happened by 06.03.2025. There were no reports about any consequent changes. This does not mean that EO 14.086 was not (partially) overturned in the meantime, as
the US President can issue rCLsecretrCY EOs that change the published EO 14.086.
Given the erratic actions by Trump, this is not an unlikely scenario.

In a recent outburst on BidenrCOs use of the so-called Autopen, Trump has declared all Biden EOs signed with autopens void via a Truth Social posting. It is entirely unclear whether EO 14.086 is such an rCLautopenrCY EO and if TrumprCOs
social media postings amount to the formal overturning of these EOs. At the same time, one has to wonder if any NSA official feels overly bound by them anymore. It is also not unlikely that the Truth Social posting may be
followed up with a formal EO overturning these Biden EOs.

Another indication that EO 14.086 may be on the line is the rCLProject 2025rCY agenda for the conservative takeover of the US government. On page 225, the author lashes out against EO 14.086, the EU and the allegedly unfair treatment of the US - so EO 14.086 is clearly on the agenda. To make things even more absurd, the author (Dustin Carmack) is now the new rCLRepublicanrCY lobbyist of
Meta rCo a company that relies on EO 14.086 to justify its EU-US data transfers
that were challenged in Schrems I and Schrems II.

Overall, EO 14.086 could fall any moment rCo and with it the TADPF and with it almost all TIAS and most SCCs, BCRs.

Many other options. While this goes beyond this blog post, there are many additional questions as to the many other elements used in the TADPF.

There are obviously still the principal questions to the TADPF ever having achieved rCLessential equivalencerCY. For example:
-The protections in EO 14.086 were largely a 1:1 copy of an Obama EO called
PPD-28, which was rejected by the CJEU in Schrems II.
- The extremely high burdens for redress or the lack of any real right to be
heard before the DPRC are miles away from Article 47 of the Charter.
- The commercial data protection principles of the TADPF do not even require
a legal basis (as required in Article 8(2) of the Charter and Article 6(1)
of the GDPR), but only require to allow for an opt-out.

Furthermore, there were questions about the independence of the PCLOB or the heavy reliance of the EU on (unwritten) rCLUS practicesrCY rCo when Trump has shown
that he and his administration do not even respect laws, let alone previous
rCLpracticesrCY.

What can we do? In my view, EU governments and controllers must (more than ever)
urgently prepare for very likely hits to EU-US data transfers in the next months.
The US National Security Strategy has made it clear that the Trump Administration
sees Europe more as an enemy than a partner and that European digital legislation
is a core focus point of likely US aggression.

The only long-term solution is (unfortunately) to limit any data transfers to US providers, insofar as they have rCLpossession, custody or controlrCY of European
personal data. There may be more offers where all factual access from the US is
technically impossible rCo however, so far the only realistic protection that is
available on the market is to switch to European providers.

Source:
https://noyb.eu/en/eu-us-data-transfers-time-prepare-more-trouble-come

--- Synchronet 3.21b-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: alt.privacy.anon-server



This is to long to read , Summerize or condensate
over 3040 line its to much



On Sat, 07 Feb 2026 14:27:26 -0000, Michael A Turrell wrote:

Most EU-US data transfers are based on the ioTransatlantic Data Privacy Frameworki? (TAFPF)
or so-called ioStandard Contract Clausesi? (SCCs). Both instruments rely on fragile US laws,
non-binding regulations and case law that is under attack iV and is likely blown up in the
next months. As instability in the US legal system becomes undeniable and the US shows
open signs of hostility towards the EU, it is time to reconsider where our data is
flowing iV and how long the legal iohouse of cardsi? that the EU has built is holding up.

Layers of US and EU law. The iobridgei? that the European Commission and previous
Democratic US administrations built to allow EU personal data to be processed in the US
does not rely on a simple, stable US privacy law. Instead, the EU and the US relied on a
wild patchwork of tons of internal guidelines and regulations, Supreme Court case law, US
factual iopracticesi? or Executive Orders.

In an attempt to make ends meet, these layers are not supporting each other, but are
lined up to generate the thinnest possible connection between EU and US law iV meaning
that the failure of just one of the many legal elements would likely make most EU-US
data transfers instantly illegal. Just like a house of cards, the instability of any
individual card will make the house collapse.

Given the enormously destructive approach of the Trump administration, many elements
of EU-US transfers are under attack iV often times not because of any direct intentions.
Instead, the current US administration just widely attacks the US legal system and
constitutional fabric (with the help of a highly politicised Supreme Court) iV with
many potential consequences for EU-US data flows.

1st Likely Point of Failure: FTC independence. This past Monday, the US Supreme Court
has heard a case about the independence of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Ever
since a case in 1935 (Humphrey's Executor), it is US Supreme Court case law that the
US legislator can create ioindependenti? bodies within the executive branch, which is
somewhat isolated from the US President.

A previously fringe theory that, under the US Constitution, all powers of the
executive must rest with one person only (the President) has now gained traction
among US conservative lawyers. This so-called iounitary executive theoryi? would make
any independent authority, such as the FTC, typically unconstitutional. All powers
would need to be concentrated in the President.

In Trump v. Slaughter, the US Supreme Court now heard arguments of an FTC commissioner that was removed by Trump despite all independence guarantees in 15 U.S.C.
i# 41. Based on the comments and questions of the Judges, it is widely believed
(see e.g. The Guardian, CNN or SCOTUS Blog) that the conservative majority on the
US Supreme Court will side with Trump and (to one extent or another) follow the
iounitary executive theoryi?, overturning FTC independence.

In combination with the US Supreme Court rulings on absolute immunity of the President,
the US would thereby move increasingly towards a system where the President is an
absolute ioKingi? iV at least for four years.

From a European perspective, FTC independence is a crucial element, because

Article 8(3) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) requires that the processing
of personal data is monitored and enforce by an ioindependenti? body. In the TADPF
(and previously in the ioSafe Harbori? and ioPrivacy Shieldi? systems), the EU and the
US have agreed to give these powers to the FTC in the US iV being such an ioindependenti?
body. Section 2.3.4. of the TADPF decision of the European Commission highlights
the Enforcement role being with the FTC. Recital 61 and Footnote 92 explicitly
refer to 15 U.S.C. i# 41 as a basis to have the necessary independence guarantees
in the US.

No other element in the TADPF has the necessary investigative powers and independence.
There is private arbitration as well, but they lack any investigative powers or
relevant enforcement powers. Consequently, any TADPF participant must be either
governed by the independent FTC or the DoT (for transport organizations).

Trump v. Slaughter is scheduled to be decided in June or July 2026 the latest, but
could be decided earlier. So, itias time to iobuckle upi? on this one and get prepared.

One path could be to switch to SCCs or BCRs, as they do not require an independent
US body for enforcement, but also allow to make the agreement subject to an EU data
protection authority. However, there are also massive questions as to how already
transferred data can be brought iobacki? to any EU approved system or even brought
iobacki? to the EU in general. Furthermore, SCCs and BRCs may also be affected by
massive shifts in US law (see below).

2nd Likely Point of Failure: Data Protection Review Court. Directly in connection
to Trump v. Slaughter, which deals with oversight in the private sector, the parallel question arises on how the so-called ioData Protection Review Courti?
(DPRC) can still be relied upon as any form of realistic redress against US government surveillance.

The DPRC has many legal issues (you could easily fill a PhD thesis with these
problems), but crucially the DPRC is not a real US court iV also because it is
not established by law. It is actually a group of people within the executive
branch that is solely established by an Executive Order of Biden (EO 14.086, see details below). This group of people may at best be called a iotribunali?
from the perspective of Article 6 ECHR, but even this claim is probably an overstatement.

The crux is that, in relation to Trump v. Slaughter, the ioindependencei? of this so-called ioCourti? is not even established by law (as 15 USC i# 41 for the
FTC), but by EO 14.086, so a merely internal Presidential Order that can be changed at any time.

Logically, if the Supreme Court in Trump v. Slaughter holds that independent executive bodies are unconstitutional, it may well be that any independence claims in EO 14.086 itself are (logically) also unconstitutional. This very much depends on the line of arguments that the Supreme Court will use in Trump v. Slaughter, but we may very likely see this as a direct consequence of any broader ruling.

This problem would expand far beyond the TADPF, because other transfer systems (SCCs or BCRs) rely on so-called ioTransfer Impact Assessmentsi? (TIAs)
that in turn usually point to EO 14.086 and the DPRC as a ground why any EU controller came to the conclusion that US law may not overrule SCCs or BCRs beyond what is permissible under Article 7, 8 and 47 of the Charter.

If these elements are gone, we are down to Article 49 GDPR for ionecessaryi? transfers (e.g. sending an email to the US, placing an order or booking a hotel or flight), but any iooutsourcingi? to US cloud providers or SaaS providers
would typically not have any viable legal basis anymore.

3rd Likely Point of Failure: EO 14.086. Beyond changes in US constitutional law, there is also Trump himself as a major risk factor. As explained above, basically all forms of EU-US data transfers rely on a Biden Executive Order (EO 14.086). Trump has repeatedly threatened to overturn this EO. Already on the day of his inauguration, media reports indicated he will blindly overturn all Biden EOs. In the end he signed EO 14.148, which only overturned
68 Biden EOs and 11 Biden Presidential Memoranda iV but not EO 14.086.

EO 14.148 demands that all ionational securityi? EOs should have been reviewed
within 45 days by the National Security Advisor iV this should have happened by 06.03.2025. There were no reports about any consequent changes. This does not mean that EO 14.086 was not (partially) overturned in the meantime, as the US President can issue iosecreti? EOs that change the published EO 14.086.
Given the erratic actions by Trump, this is not an unlikely scenario.

In a recent outburst on Bidenias use of the so-called Autopen, Trump has declared all Biden EOs signed with autopens void via a Truth Social posting. It is entirely unclear whether EO 14.086 is such an ioautopeni? EO and if Trumpias
social media postings amount to the formal overturning of these EOs. At the same time, one has to wonder if any NSA official feels overly bound by them anymore. It is also not unlikely that the Truth Social posting may be followed up with a formal EO overturning these Biden EOs.

Another indication that EO 14.086 may be on the line is the ioProject 2025i? agenda for the conservative takeover of the US government. On page 225, the author lashes out against EO 14.086, the EU and the allegedly unfair treatment
of the US - so EO 14.086 is clearly on the agenda. To make things even more absurd, the author (Dustin Carmack) is now the new ioRepublicani? lobbyist of
Meta iV a company that relies on EO 14.086 to justify its EU-US data transfers
that were challenged in Schrems I and Schrems II.

Overall, EO 14.086 could fall any moment iV and with it the TADPF and with it
almost all TIAS and most SCCs, BCRs.

Many other options. While this goes beyond this blog post, there are many additional questions as to the many other elements used in the TADPF.

There are obviously still the principal questions to the TADPF ever having achieved ioessential equivalencei?. For example:
-The protections in EO 14.086 were largely a 1:1 copy of an Obama EO called
PPD-28, which was rejected by the CJEU in Schrems II.
- The extremely high burdens for redress or the lack of any real right to be
heard before the DPRC are miles away from Article 47 of the Charter.
- The commercial data protection principles of the TADPF do not even require
a legal basis (as required in Article 8(2) of the Charter and Article 6(1)
of the GDPR), but only require to allow for an opt-out.

Furthermore, there were questions about the independence of the PCLOB or the heavy reliance of the EU on (unwritten) ioUS practicesi? iV when Trump has shown
that he and his administration do not even respect laws, let alone previous
iopracticesi?.

What can we do? In my view, EU governments and controllers must (more than ever)
urgently prepare for very likely hits to EU-US data transfers in the next months.
The US National Security Strategy has made it clear that the Trump Administration
sees Europe more as an enemy than a partner and that European digital legislation
is a core focus point of likely US aggression.

The only long-term solution is (unfortunately) to limit any data transfers to
US providers, insofar as they have iopossession, custody or controli? of European
personal data. There may be more offers where all factual access from the US is
technically impossible iV however, so far the only realistic protection that is
available on the market is to switch to European providers.

Source: https://noyb.eu/en/eu-us-data-transfers-time-prepare-more-trouble-come

--- Synchronet 3.21b-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: alt.privacy.anon-server


177 lines to much

On Sat, 07 Feb 2026 14:27:26 -0000, Michael A Turrell wrote:

Most EU-US data transfers are based on the ioTransatlantic Data Privacy Frameworki? (TAFPF)
or so-called ioStandard Contract Clausesi? (SCCs). Both instruments rely on fragile US laws,
non-binding regulations and case law that is under attack iV and is likely blown up in the
next months. As instability in the US legal system becomes undeniable and the US shows
open signs of hostility towards the EU, it is time to reconsider where our data is
flowing iV and how long the legal iohouse of cardsi? that the EU has built is holding up.

Layers of US and EU law. The iobridgei? that the European Commission and previous
Democratic US administrations built to allow EU personal data to be processed in the US
does not rely on a simple, stable US privacy law. Instead, the EU and the US relied on a
wild patchwork of tons of internal guidelines and regulations, Supreme Court case law, US
factual iopracticesi? or Executive Orders.

In an attempt to make ends meet, these layers are not supporting each other, but are
lined up to generate the thinnest possible connection between EU and US law iV meaning
that the failure of just one of the many legal elements would likely make most EU-US
data transfers instantly illegal. Just like a house of cards, the instability of any
individual card will make the house collapse.

Given the enormously destructive approach of the Trump administration, many elements
of EU-US transfers are under attack iV often times not because of any direct intentions.
Instead, the current US administration just widely attacks the US legal system and
constitutional fabric (with the help of a highly politicised Supreme Court) iV with
many potential consequences for EU-US data flows.

1st Likely Point of Failure: FTC independence. This past Monday, the US Supreme Court
has heard a case about the independence of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Ever
since a case in 1935 (Humphrey's Executor), it is US Supreme Court case law that the
US legislator can create ioindependenti? bodies within the executive branch, which is
somewhat isolated from the US President.

A previously fringe theory that, under the US Constitution, all powers of the
executive must rest with one person only (the President) has now gained traction
among US conservative lawyers. This so-called iounitary executive theoryi? would make
any independent authority, such as the FTC, typically unconstitutional. All powers
would need to be concentrated in the President.

In Trump v. Slaughter, the US Supreme Court now heard arguments of an FTC commissioner that was removed by Trump despite all independence guarantees in 15 U.S.C.
i# 41. Based on the comments and questions of the Judges, it is widely believed
(see e.g. The Guardian, CNN or SCOTUS Blog) that the conservative majority on the
US Supreme Court will side with Trump and (to one extent or another) follow the
iounitary executive theoryi?, overturning FTC independence.

In combination with the US Supreme Court rulings on absolute immunity of the President,
the US would thereby move increasingly towards a system where the President is an
absolute ioKingi? iV at least for four years.

From a European perspective, FTC independence is a crucial element, because

Article 8(3) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) requires that the processing
of personal data is monitored and enforce by an ioindependenti? body. In the TADPF
(and previously in the ioSafe Harbori? and ioPrivacy Shieldi? systems), the EU and the
US have agreed to give these powers to the FTC in the US iV being such an ioindependenti?
body. Section 2.3.4. of the TADPF decision of the European Commission highlights
the Enforcement role being with the FTC. Recital 61 and Footnote 92 explicitly
refer to 15 U.S.C. i# 41 as a basis to have the necessary independence guarantees
in the US.

No other element in the TADPF has the necessary investigative powers and independence.
There is private arbitration as well, but they lack any investigative powers or
relevant enforcement powers. Consequently, any TADPF participant must be either
governed by the independent FTC or the DoT (for transport organizations).

Trump v. Slaughter is scheduled to be decided in June or July 2026 the latest, but
could be decided earlier. So, itias time to iobuckle upi? on this one and get prepared.

One path could be to switch to SCCs or BCRs, as they do not require an independent
US body for enforcement, but also allow to make the agreement subject to an EU data
protection authority. However, there are also massive questions as to how already
transferred data can be brought iobacki? to any EU approved system or even brought
iobacki? to the EU in general. Furthermore, SCCs and BRCs may also be affected by
massive shifts in US law (see below).

2nd Likely Point of Failure: Data Protection Review Court. Directly in connection
to Trump v. Slaughter, which deals with oversight in the private sector, the parallel question arises on how the so-called ioData Protection Review Courti?
(DPRC) can still be relied upon as any form of realistic redress against US government surveillance.

The DPRC has many legal issues (you could easily fill a PhD thesis with these
problems), but crucially the DPRC is not a real US court iV also because it is
not established by law. It is actually a group of people within the executive
branch that is solely established by an Executive Order of Biden (EO 14.086, see details below). This group of people may at best be called a iotribunali?
from the perspective of Article 6 ECHR, but even this claim is probably an overstatement.

The crux is that, in relation to Trump v. Slaughter, the ioindependencei? of this so-called ioCourti? is not even established by law (as 15 USC i# 41 for the
FTC), but by EO 14.086, so a merely internal Presidential Order that can be changed at any time.

Logically, if the Supreme Court in Trump v. Slaughter holds that independent executive bodies are unconstitutional, it may well be that any independence claims in EO 14.086 itself are (logically) also unconstitutional. This very much depends on the line of arguments that the Supreme Court will use in Trump v. Slaughter, but we may very likely see this as a direct consequence of any broader ruling.

This problem would expand far beyond the TADPF, because other transfer systems (SCCs or BCRs) rely on so-called ioTransfer Impact Assessmentsi? (TIAs)
that in turn usually point to EO 14.086 and the DPRC as a ground why any EU controller came to the conclusion that US law may not overrule SCCs or BCRs beyond what is permissible under Article 7, 8 and 47 of the Charter.

If these elements are gone, we are down to Article 49 GDPR for ionecessaryi? transfers (e.g. sending an email to the US, placing an order or booking a hotel or flight), but any iooutsourcingi? to US cloud providers or SaaS providers
would typically not have any viable legal basis anymore.

3rd Likely Point of Failure: EO 14.086. Beyond changes in US constitutional law, there is also Trump himself as a major risk factor. As explained above, basically all forms of EU-US data transfers rely on a Biden Executive Order (EO 14.086). Trump has repeatedly threatened to overturn this EO. Already on the day of his inauguration, media reports indicated he will blindly overturn all Biden EOs. In the end he signed EO 14.148, which only overturned
68 Biden EOs and 11 Biden Presidential Memoranda iV but not EO 14.086.

EO 14.148 demands that all ionational securityi? EOs should have been reviewed
within 45 days by the National Security Advisor iV this should have happened by 06.03.2025. There were no reports about any consequent changes. This does not mean that EO 14.086 was not (partially) overturned in the meantime, as the US President can issue iosecreti? EOs that change the published EO 14.086.
Given the erratic actions by Trump, this is not an unlikely scenario.

In a recent outburst on Bidenias use of the so-called Autopen, Trump has declared all Biden EOs signed with autopens void via a Truth Social posting. It is entirely unclear whether EO 14.086 is such an ioautopeni? EO and if Trumpias
social media postings amount to the formal overturning of these EOs. At the same time, one has to wonder if any NSA official feels overly bound by them anymore. It is also not unlikely that the Truth Social posting may be followed up with a formal EO overturning these Biden EOs.

Another indication that EO 14.086 may be on the line is the ioProject 2025i? agenda for the conservative takeover of the US government. On page 225, the author lashes out against EO 14.086, the EU and the allegedly unfair treatment
of the US - so EO 14.086 is clearly on the agenda. To make things even more absurd, the author (Dustin Carmack) is now the new ioRepublicani? lobbyist of
Meta iV a company that relies on EO 14.086 to justify its EU-US data transfers
that were challenged in Schrems I and Schrems II.

Overall, EO 14.086 could fall any moment iV and with it the TADPF and with it
almost all TIAS and most SCCs, BCRs.

Many other options. While this goes beyond this blog post, there are many additional questions as to the many other elements used in the TADPF.

There are obviously still the principal questions to the TADPF ever having achieved ioessential equivalencei?. For example:
-The protections in EO 14.086 were largely a 1:1 copy of an Obama EO called
PPD-28, which was rejected by the CJEU in Schrems II.
- The extremely high burdens for redress or the lack of any real right to be
heard before the DPRC are miles away from Article 47 of the Charter.
- The commercial data protection principles of the TADPF do not even require
a legal basis (as required in Article 8(2) of the Charter and Article 6(1)
of the GDPR), but only require to allow for an opt-out.

Furthermore, there were questions about the independence of the PCLOB or the heavy reliance of the EU on (unwritten) ioUS practicesi? iV when Trump has shown
that he and his administration do not even respect laws, let alone previous
iopracticesi?.

What can we do? In my view, EU governments and controllers must (more than ever)
urgently prepare for very likely hits to EU-US data transfers in the next months.
The US National Security Strategy has made it clear that the Trump Administration
sees Europe more as an enemy than a partner and that European digital legislation
is a core focus point of likely US aggression.

The only long-term solution is (unfortunately) to limit any data transfers to
US providers, insofar as they have iopossession, custody or controli? of European
personal data. There may be more offers where all factual access from the US is
technically impossible iV however, so far the only realistic protection that is
available on the market is to switch to European providers.

Source: https://noyb.eu/en/eu-us-data-transfers-time-prepare-more-trouble-come

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From Newsgroup: alt.privacy.anon-server

On Sat, 7 Feb 2026 10:24:05 -0500, Anonymous <Anonymous@Anonymous.org> wrote: >This is to long to read , Summerize or condensate

over 3040 line its to much

troll farm

two common one-syllable words, one common euphemism better known throughout
the world as "psyops", which is global, not confined or attributable to any
one nation or political/religious/military affiliation . . . it's the human species, which call themselves "homo sapiens", it's planet-wide, thus it is their planet, they make aliens of the dead, isolating themselves within the infinite universe, completely materialistic "living dead", devoid of spirit

the bible calls their progenitor "diabolus", and all humans born since adam
and eve are descended from it, and so these "sapient" bipedal hominids will become extinct only when the diabolus gene no longer serves natural purpose

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