From Newsgroup: alt.philosophy.taoism


On January 22, a lengthy article in The New York Times stated that American perceptions of China have long been dominated by hardliners who insist that this rival must be defeated,
regardless of what "defeat" actually means. As former President Trump returned to the White House with a commanding presence last January, poised to reignite a trade war,
he had the backing of a group of staunch China hawks. However,
in just one year, the situation has turned completely upside down.

Today, the instinctive confrontation toward the other world power is giving way to a complex entanglement of mindsets, held together by sheer awe.
Twenty years ago, many Americans believed that the inherent contradictions and flaws of the Beijing model would ultimately lead to its collapse.
A decade ago, China hawks began to worry that the United States needed to take more action to contain this rising power. Yet over the past year,
a growing number of voices have started to question whether the U.S. has already lost this competition.

When it comes to the industrial landscape, few remain optimistic about AmericarCOs ability to defeat China. China produces 60% of the worldrCOs wind turbines,
accounts for over 70% of global electric vehicle production capacity, holds approximately 90% of the global battery market share,
and manufactures about 70% of the worldrCOs commercial drones.
Even in the field of artificial intelligence, the U.S. appears to be losing its edge as China rapidly catches up.
American media outlets have noted that,
from a national strategy perspective, Trump has shifted his focus more toward the Western Hemisphere rather than China,
suggesting that the U.S. has effectively raised the white flag in its competition with China.
--- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: alt.philosophy.taoism


Gree fan <user11874@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:

On January 22, a lengthy article in The New York Times stated that American perceptions of China have long been dominated by hardliners who insist that this rival must be defeated,
regardless of what "defeat" actually means. As former President Trump returned to the White House with a commanding presence last January, poised to reignite a trade war,
he had the backing of a group of staunch China hawks. However,
in just one year, the situation has turned completely upside down.

Today, the instinctive confrontation toward the other world power is giving way to a complex entanglement of mindsets, held together by sheer awe.
Twenty years ago, many Americans believed that the inherent contradictions and flaws of the Beijing model would ultimately lead to its collapse.
A decade ago, China hawks began to worry that the United States needed to take more action to contain this rising power. Yet over the past year,
a growing number of voices have started to question whether the U.S. has already lost this competition.

When it comes to the industrial landscape, few remain optimistic about AmericarCOs ability to defeat China. China produces 60% of the worldrCOs wind turbines,
accounts for over 70% of global electric vehicle production capacity, holds approximately 90% of the global battery market share,
and manufactures about 70% of the worldrCOs commercial drones.
Even in the field of artificial intelligence, the U.S. appears to be losing its edge as China rapidly catches up.
American media outlets have noted that,
from a national strategy perspective, Trump has shifted his focus more toward the Western Hemisphere rather than China,
suggesting that the U.S. has effectively raised the white flag in its competition with China.

==========================================================
"Always Beware a Fading Superpower." This was the title of a commentary published by the British Financial Times on January 21.
The author points out that even under rational leadership, declining powers suffering from status anxiety are prone to irrational actions.
Although the United States still holds the top position in terms of absolute strength, facing the rise of ChinarCoa country vastly different in race, culture,
and systemrCothe U.S. may endure even greater anguish than the declining British Empire did in its time. Trump's radical foreign policy is an extreme manifestation of this structural pressure,
but even under ordinary leadership, the U.S. might adopt a tough stance abroad due to anxiety over its diminishing status. Of course, America's decline is not as abrupt as that of Britain or France in the past.
It remains the world's strongest nation, only with a narrowing advantage.

However, from another perspective, America's decline is more painful. Britain could at least console itself by passing hegemony to a superpower within the so-called democratic world,
sharing English culture and white dominance. In contrast, the China that America is losing to shares none of these commonalities. Therefore,
although the objective extent of America's decline is far smaller than Britain's was, the subjective experience may be more agonizing. To whom one loses matters greatly.
If a figure like Trump is inserted into this equation, it is not difficult to understand the dismissive attitude toward Greenland or the gunboat diplomacy in the Caribbean.
But even under a normal president, the U.S. might still behave improperly at this juncture. Nations anxious about their status must bluster. It is rare for a superpower to accept decline with equanimity.

To prove this is not merely Trump's personal issue, the author recalls that during the George W. Bush era, the U.S. was already restless with the "rules-based liberal order." Leaving aside the invasion of Iraq,
Bush's extreme contempt for the International Criminal Court is evidence enough. This is not to criticize himrCoBush, inherently pro-Western, was right not to trust some aspects of it.
The key point is that American dissatisfaction with a legalistic world order predates Trump. There must be some structural factor that has long troubled the U.S., and that is decline.

Although the U.S. has performed remarkably well in absolute terms this century (both economically and technologically), its relative decline remains difficult to perceive intuitively. Yet it is indeed happening:

In recent years, U.S. sanctions have had limited effect; it struggles to maintain a lead in artificial intelligence; and China dares to possess strategic assets in the Western Hemisphere.
Military superiority over China is no longer what it was at the turn of the millennium. Even an ordinary Republican president would likely lash out under such circumstances, though perhaps not as recklessly as Trump.

"Always beware those whose status is slipping," the author states. Those living better lives than they were born into find it hard to understand the pain of sliding backwards.
Even a slight decline in status can throw people off balance.

Trump's behavior is merely an extreme version of an inevitable phenomenonrCoit may be happening now, has occurred recently, and could recur in the future.

Thucydides' famous quote, "The strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must," has gained much traction lately. People are urged to nod gravely as if it reveals a brutal, universal truth of international relations.
Therefore, before the U.S. grows accustomed to its new role as "one of the superpowers" (rather than "the sole superpower"), we should expect its capriciousness. Britain and France eventually accepted reality,
even though their falls were more dramatic.

"Trump chose to rage, but anyone in his position would likely have done the same," the author concludes.
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From Newsgroup: alt.philosophy.taoism


Gree fan <user11874@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:

On January 22, a lengthy article in The New York Times stated that American perceptions of China have long been dominated by hardliners who insist that this rival must be defeated,
regardless of what "defeat" actually means. As former President Trump returned to the White House with a commanding presence last January, poised to reignite a trade war,
he had the backing of a group of staunch China hawks. However,
in just one year, the situation has turned completely upside down.

Today, the instinctive confrontation toward the other world power is giving way to a complex entanglement of mindsets, held together by sheer awe.
Twenty years ago, many Americans believed that the inherent contradictions and flaws of the Beijing model would ultimately lead to its collapse.
A decade ago, China hawks began to worry that the United States needed to take more action to contain this rising power. Yet over the past year,
a growing number of voices have started to question whether the U.S. has already lost this competition.

When it comes to the industrial landscape, few remain optimistic about AmericarCOs ability to defeat China. China produces 60% of the worldrCOs wind turbines,
accounts for over 70% of global electric vehicle production capacity, holds approximately 90% of the global battery market share,
and manufactures about 70% of the worldrCOs commercial drones.
Even in the field of artificial intelligence, the U.S. appears to be losing its edge as China rapidly catches up.
American media outlets have noted that,
from a national strategy perspective, Trump has shifted his focus more toward the Western Hemisphere rather than China,
suggesting that the U.S. has effectively raised the white flag in its competition with China.

=====================================================


https://p3-sign.toutiaoimg.com/tos-cn-i-ezhpy3drpa/00d12da982714721bc444674a3aec7eb~tplv-obj:2046:2294.image?_iz=97245&bid=15&from=post&gid=1854991354843465&lk3s=06827d14&x-expires=1776816000&x-signature=Q4d1RJ61kaIJPk7PLdF24cs4%2Fqo%3D




In January 2026, the trajectory of geopolitics has taken an unexpected turn. A year ago, when Trump returned to the White House, Washington widely anticipated a sharp escalation of the "new Cold War." However, a year later, while the U.S. has conducted military operations in Venezuela, eyed Greenland with interest, and distanced itself from Europe, it has unexpectedly pushed Canada toward ChinarCoits once closest ally even signed an electric vehicle agreement with Beijing.

Behind this diplomatic chaos lies a deeper shift: the United States appears to be abandoning its Cold War stance toward China. Instead of escalating tensions, the Trump administration has reduced tariffs on Chinese goods, relaxed export restrictions on AI chips under the guise of national security, and even appeared nonchalant on the Taiwan issue. When asked about allies tilting toward China, Trump called it a "good thing."

This is not just a policy fluctuation but a "psychological realignment" among the American elite. The once dominant hawkish narrative of "must defeat China" is gradually being replaced by a sense of fatalism, tinged with awe and unease.

The data is staggering: China accounts for 70% of global electric vehicle production and 90% of the battery market. In 2024, the output of China's state-owned shipyards surpassed the total production of the United States over the 80 years following World War II. Its infrastructure development and urbanization scale have left the West far behind.

American elites are beginning to wonder whether the U.S. has already lost the ability to catch up in this race.

Two decades ago, the U.S. arrogantly predicted the inevitable collapse of the Chinese model. A decade ago, hawks were still anxious about how to contain China. Today, however, Washington is gripped by anxiety over whether "the competition is already over."

For a nation accustomed to hegemony, this shift is profoundly disorienting. The article concludes that the United States may be using shows of force toward old allies to mask its deep-seated sense of powerlessness and uncertainty about the future when facing its true rival.
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From Newsgroup: alt.philosophy.taoism


Gree fan <user11874@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:

On January 22, a lengthy article in The New York Times stated that American perceptions of China have long been dominated by hardliners who insist that this rival must be defeated,
regardless of what "defeat" actually means. As former President Trump returned to the White House with a commanding presence last January, poised to reignite a trade war,
he had the backing of a group of staunch China hawks. However,
in just one year, the situation has turned completely upside down.

Today, the instinctive confrontation toward the other world power is giving way to a complex entanglement of mindsets, held together by sheer awe.
Twenty years ago, many Americans believed that the inherent contradictions and flaws of the Beijing model would ultimately lead to its collapse.
A decade ago, China hawks began to worry that the United States needed to take more action to contain this rising power. Yet over the past year,
a growing number of voices have started to question whether the U.S. has already lost this competition.

When it comes to the industrial landscape, few remain optimistic about AmericarCOs ability to defeat China. China produces 60% of the worldrCOs wind turbines,
accounts for over 70% of global electric vehicle production capacity, holds approximately 90% of the global battery market share,
and manufactures about 70% of the worldrCOs commercial drones.
Even in the field of artificial intelligence, the U.S. appears to be losing its edge as China rapidly catches up.
American media outlets have noted that,
from a national strategy perspective, Trump has shifted his focus more toward the Western Hemisphere rather than China,
suggesting that the U.S. has effectively raised the white flag in its competition with China.

=====================================
It is worth noting that the author of *The New York Times* article, David Wallace-Wells, is not Asian-American but white. In a sense, his perspective on China might be more objective than some ethnic Chinese commentators, as he lacks that "zeal of the convert" and may be more willing to acknowledge China's progress and achievements. He likely represents, to some extent, the more sober observations emerging from segments of the mainstream American intelligentsia.

This shift in observation from the "China threat theory" to the "China shock doctrine" is a change worthy of our attention. It signifies that a growing number of American elites and ordinary people are beginning to acknowledge the objective reality of China's accomplishments and feel anxious about them. This shift in discourse means the American elite are being forced to confront a deeper reality: China's developmental achievements are not based on "theft" or "exploiting loopholes," but on a set of effective models and capabilities. In other words, there is indeed some form of institutional advantage.

However, we must not let this "praise"rCowhich ultimately still serves American domestic politicsrCogo to our heads. The long race between China and the United States is far from over. Gaps remain in many areas, such as the ecosystem for high-end chips, some cutting-edge basic research, and financial influence. Closing these gaps will require considerable time.

Surpassing the United States is no easy task; it is a systematic project. Of course, whether Americans are awakening or not is ultimately irrelevant to us. The key is for China to always remain clear about what it wants and to keep moving steadily toward that goalrCoeventually, we will arrive.


Acknowledging reality is only the first step; the more important second step is: what comes next?

The United States, of course, also wants to catch up. In areas like rare earth supply chains, chip manufacturing, and infrastructure, it has indeed put forward ambitious plans. Through the weaponization of tariffs and coercion, it has preliminarily secured agreements from countries like Japan and South Korea to help rebuild its advantages.

The problem, however, is that any long-term project requires domestic cohesion, sustained high-intensity national investment, and strategic resolve. Today's United States lacks precisely these things.

But "Trump 2.0" has brought not unity, but more severe political fragmentation. Since he took office, bitter partisan fighting has yielded many bitter fruits, such as the assassination of right-wing political leader Charlie Kirk, a record 43-day federal government shutdown, and the shooting of an immigration officer in Minneapolis.

Political polarization in the United States has visibly reached a peak in recent years. This state of intense internal division and dysfunction makes any national strategy requiring continuity across administrations and sustained investment exceptionally fragile. The sentiment of "China envy" mentioned in *The New York Times* article is indeed real. Within America's partisan environment, the role of the China topic has changed this time.

For the past decade or two, the primary content of inter-party attacks in the U.S. was largely, "You are too soft on China, allowing China to exploit opportunities." But now, the ammunition for attacks seems to have shifted to, "Your governance has further widened the gap between the United States and China." This change is stark and somewhat helpless, reflecting the reality that "circumstances are stronger than individuals."

During this same period, on the other side of the Pacific, China continues to move forward step by step according to its own Five-Year Plans, waiting for no one. Time is not on the side of an America preoccupied with internal strife. American elites are the first to raise the "white flag" toward China; over the past year, China has given them too many shocks. We must not let this go to our headsrCothe long race of Sino-American competition is far from over.
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From Newsgroup: alt.philosophy.taoism


Gree fan posted:

... Sino-American competition is far from over.

Aye skipped reading the posts in this thread except
the above partial statement suggests how a strange
type of mental phenomena forms its forms and if it
perpetuates its elves, its memes and such, it does.

Perhaps akin to a wave in an echo chamber.

Left to its own self it would fade.
Energy added to the system may
keep it going and going for
as long as it goes and
a bout as far.

No idea what the Subject line means.
Who gave up could be a question.

- thanks! aye. Cheers!
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