From Newsgroup: alt.philosophy.taoism


The original article details are as follows:

Title: The United States Is Moving Through the Stages of Grief Over ChinarCOs Rise
Author: Robert A. Manning
Publication: Foreign Policy
Publication Date: December 3, 2024
Original URL: https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/12/03/united-states-stages-of-grief-china-rise/

https://p3-sign.toutiaoimg.com/tos-cn-i-ezhpy3drpa/8379cffdbe7549fd88b6b5faa61cb020~tplv-obj:1080:22091.image?_iz=97245&bid=15&from=post&gid=1851267938583561&lk3s=06827d14&x-expires=1773273600&x-signature=dWn8Kj7MpvLoi9%2Fbwh6%2F5Dct2aw%3D


In response to China's rise, the United States appears intent on readjusting its global security priorities.
The U.S. National Security Strategy report released by the White House on December 4 stated that the goal of
"permanent global dominance" pursued by the United States since the end of the Cold War is "fundamentally undesirable and unattainable."
Going forward, the U.S. national security strategy will focus on safeguarding a prioritized set of limited "core national interests,"
rather than attempting to address every issue across the board. Some analysts argue that China is now viewed by the United States primarily as an economic competitor,
rather than a "systemic challenge."
--- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: alt.philosophy.taoism


TikTok fan <user11874@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:

The original article details are as follows:

Title: The United States Is Moving Through the Stages of Grief Over ChinarCOs Rise
Author: Robert A. Manning
Publication: Foreign Policy
Publication Date: December 3, 2024
Original URL: https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/12/03/united-states-stages-of-grief-china-rise/

https://p3-sign.toutiaoimg.com/tos-cn-i-ezhpy3drpa/8379cffdbe7549fd88b6b5faa61cb020~tplv-obj:1080:22091.image?_iz=97245&bid=15&from=post&gid=1851267938583561&lk3s=06827d14&x-expires=1773273600&x-signature=dWn8Kj7MpvLoi9%2Fbwh6%2F5Dct2aw%3D

In response to China's rise, the United States appears intent on readjusting its global security priorities.
The U.S. National Security Strategy report released by the White House on December 4 stated that the goal of
"permanent global dominance" pursued by the United States since the end of the Cold War is "fundamentally undesirable and unattainable."
Going forward, the U.S. national security strategy will focus on safeguarding a prioritized set of limited "core national interests,"
rather than attempting to address every issue across the board. Some analysts argue that China is now viewed by the United States primarily as an economic competitor,
rather than a "systemic challenge."

On December 12, The New York Times published an article stating that whether itrCOs reopening high-end chip sales channels previously deemed off-limits by Washington or remaining silent when a key U.S. Asian ally faced Chinese rCLintimidationrCY for supporting Taiwan, President TrumprCOs conduct clearly signals a shift in AmericarCOs stancerCoat the very least, the U.S. is no longer as eager to confront China on ideological, technological, and diplomatic fronts.

The article further noted that this shift in TrumprCOs approach may be drawing inspiration from Chinese leader Deng XiaopingrCOs famous maxim: rCLKeep a low profile and bide onerCOs time.rCY In other words, by focusing on rebuilding and reorganizing its own economic and technological strengths, the United States aims to position itself more effectively for future competition with China. According to the U.S. media, the underlying objective of AmericarCOs China strategy remains unchanged: maintaining its dominant position and containing ChinarCOs rise.

How should we interpret this U.S. media narrative? To some extent, it does hold merit.

Indeed, from TrumprCOs initiation of an aggressive trade war to his current change in posture, this evolution reveals one fundamental truth: the United States has always aimed to contain China. However, after its tariff-based tactics were effectively countered by China, itrCOs less accurate to say that the U.S. has scaled back its containment efforts, and more accurate to say it has simply adjusted its strategy toward China.

The U.S.-China trade war, in effect, served as a stress test for both nationsrCO resilience. Through this process, the U.S. became acutely aware of its own vulnerabilities. Hence, its current strategy focuses squarely on addressing these weaknesses.

While U.S.-China relations are gradually stabilizing, we must remain vigilant. For our part, we must achieve full self-reliance in the semiconductor industry and further reduce our dependence on trade with the United States. A temporary trade truce does not mean that bilateral relations will smoothly transition into mutual benefit and win-win cooperation. Crucially, WashingtonrCOs stance on the Taiwan issue remains a litmus test.

In short, mutual trust between China and the U.S. remains low. Whether America genuinely embraces mutually beneficial coexistence or is merely regrouping for another round of strategic competitionrCowe must closely watch its actions going forward.
--- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: alt.philosophy.taoism


TikTok fan <user11874@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:

The original article details are as follows:

Title: The United States Is Moving Through the Stages of Grief Over ChinarCOs Rise
Author: Robert A. Manning
Publication: Foreign Policy
Publication Date: December 3, 2024
Original URL: https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/12/03/united-states-stages-of-grief-china-rise/

https://p3-sign.toutiaoimg.com/tos-cn-i-ezhpy3drpa/8379cffdbe7549fd88b6b5faa61cb020~tplv-obj:1080:22091.image?_iz=97245&bid=15&from=post&gid=1851267938583561&lk3s=06827d14&x-expires=1773273600&x-signature=dWn8Kj7MpvLoi9%2Fbwh6%2F5Dct2aw%3D

In response to China's rise, the United States appears intent on readjusting its global security priorities.
The U.S. National Security Strategy report released by the White House on December 4 stated that the goal of
"permanent global dominance" pursued by the United States since the end of the Cold War is "fundamentally undesirable and unattainable."
Going forward, the U.S. national security strategy will focus on safeguarding a prioritized set of limited "core national interests,"
rather than attempting to address every issue across the board. Some analysts argue that China is now viewed by the United States primarily as an economic competitor,
rather than a "systemic challenge."

ChinarCOs $1.08 Trillion Trade Surplus: A Quiet Revolution Reshaping the Global Economy

In early December 2025, ChinarCOs Ministry of Commerce released a staggering figure that sent shockwaves through global economic circles: from January to November 2025, ChinarCOs goods trade surplus surged past the $1 trillion mark, reaching $1.08 trillion. This record-breaking number not only eclipses previous highs but also exceeds the annual GDP of many mid-sized nations.

John Mearsheimer, the prominent American international relations scholar, put it bluntly: rCLChina has decisively won. Economic power in the world has already shifted.rCY

Yet this $1.08 trillion is far more than a statisticrCoit acts like a multifaceted prism, revealing profound transformations in the global economic order. Beneath the surface lies a structural revolution with deep strategic implications.

From rCLMade in ChinarCY to rCLCreated in ChinarCY: The Export Transformation

Gone are the days when ChinarCOs trade surplus was attributed solely to cheap labor and resource-intensive manufacturing. Today, ChinarCOs export composition has undergone a fundamental shift: technology-intensive, high-value-added products now drive its trade engine.

China boasts the most complete industrial system in the worldrCothe only country classified by the United Nations as possessing all industrial categories. This unparalleled supply chain resilience enables China to maintain stable production and exports even amid external shocks, reinforcing its irreplaceable role in global manufacturing networks.

The $1.08 trillion surplus thus marks a historic inflection point: for the first time since the Industrial Revolution, the Western-dominated global economic order faces a systemic challenge from a non-Western power.

But this is not merely a rCLpower transfer.rCY It is the emergence of a multipolar global economic governance structure.

A New Development Model for the Global South

ChinarCOs rise offers developing countries an alternative development paradigmrCoone that combines deep integration into global value chains with strategic autonomy in economic policymaking.

Looking ahead, the next decade will likely feature a multipolar global economy: The United States retains leadership in technology and finance;
Europe excels in green transition and regulatory standard-setting;
China holds unique strengths in advanced manufacturing and infrastructure development.

While this multipolarity may complicate policy coordination, it also enhances systemic resilience, reducing overreliance on any single center of power.

From Trade Powerhouse to Responsible Stakeholder

For China, sustaining a trade surplus is just the beginningrConot the end goal. The real challenge lies in converting economic strength into sustainable global influence.

Three pillars will define this transition:

1. Technological Leadership
In frontier fields such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and biotechnology, China must evolve from a rCLfollowerrCY to a rCLco-leaderrCY or even a rCLpioneer.rCY This demands sustained investment in basic research and a thriving innovation ecosystem.

2. Openness and Cooperation
Amid rising calls for rCLdecoupling,rCY China must respond with higher-level openness: further shortening the negative list for foreign investment, strengthening intellectual property protection, and actively shaping rules in emerging domains like digital and green trade.

3. Shared Development Dividends
Through high-quality Belt and Road cooperation and the Global Development Initiative, China has both the capacity and responsibility to help more developing nations integrate into global growth. This is not just a moral imperativerCoit is essential to preserving an open, inclusive world economy.

Beyond the Numbers: Rethinking rCLVictoryrCY in a Globalized Age

The $1.08 trillion surplus is a milestonerCobut true success is not measured in dollars alone. It lies in whether economic might can be channeled toward shared human progress.

China now holds a strong hand in the global economic game. But history will judge not by the size of the cards, but by how wisely they are played.

The most profound understanding of rCLeconomic power shiftrCY is not triumphalism, but responsibility: to build a global economic order that is open, inclusive, balanced, and beneficial to all.

After all, in the grand chessboard of globalization, true wisdom isnrCOt about winning every matchrCoitrCOs about ensuring the game continues, and that more players can join and thrive.

Behind ChinarCOs trade surplus lies precisely such a quiet, enduring, and transformative revolution.
--- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: alt.philosophy.taoism


TikTok fan <user11874@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:

The original article details are as follows:

Title: The United States Is Moving Through the Stages of Grief Over ChinarCOs Rise
Author: Robert A. Manning
Publication: Foreign Policy
Publication Date: December 3, 2024
Original URL: https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/12/03/united-states-stages-of-grief-china-rise/

https://p3-sign.toutiaoimg.com/tos-cn-i-ezhpy3drpa/8379cffdbe7549fd88b6b5faa61cb020~tplv-obj:1080:22091.image?_iz=97245&bid=15&from=post&gid=1851267938583561&lk3s=06827d14&x-expires=1773273600&x-signature=dWn8Kj7MpvLoi9%2Fbwh6%2F5Dct2aw%3D

This article is likely a misattributed or synthesized textrCopossibly an integration and reinterpretation of the authorrCOs arguments from rCLAmericarCOs China Delusion Is Finally FadingrCY with the psychological model of the stages of grief. Regardless of its authenticity, its content holds a certain degree of insight worth considering.

The content is as follows.
---

1. The United States Is Moving Through the Stages of Grief Over ChinarCOs Rise
t+Aoc+u!uocaE+!oc+tUao|c*|+*Cit+AoAarCLue#E+nE|ooy|u<|rCY

2. From denial to acceptancerCobut not capitulation.
E+AoEa*<noe#uANoAurCorCoE+ao||oYRueooOipCe

3. By Robert A. Manning, November 26, 2025
t+uE+>te|-+A-+uc+o<UN+i2025 o|| 11 uLe 26 uuN

4. As U.S. leaders gather for this yearrCOs APEC summit in Peru, the mood is less rCLhow do we compete and win?rCY than rCLhow do we live with it?rCY
o+ot+Aoc+ooao>+E||o+E*UUtoyo#UE+eo||tUa APEC o|#E+Uuu|N+iu#coc|E+Aoa|*>|uy>rCLueaE+4oaeE+ot2RE|eo||oAu*aLrCYN+iE+ioae*>|uy>rCLueaE+4oaeE+oE+AE|ioa#onarCYpCe

5. That sentiment reflects a larger psychological shift in Washington and across the United States: America is grieving over ChinarCOs rise.
*+Otoiuaat+-oAiuyaoc|oiAtccoi+E|a*c|uo|E+-t+Aoc+tUaE+Ctoiuc|onoo+atEa*+4oAyN+Ut+Aoc+u!uoL?E+|E+!oc+o|c*|+*Ciue#E+npCe

6. The stages of that griefrCodenial, anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptancerCotrack the five stages Elisabeth K|+bler-Ross famously outlined.
*+Otoiue#E+ntUaoy|u<|rCorCooEa*<npCUuanuCApCU*<?E++*+yE++pCUueaoaUoAiuANoAurCorCoE+AE+eE++*AAtO+-+o|oE+>oiA-t+uuu>uAEoc|tUa*auoEiE|ooy|u<|u?ioRitc+t4apCe

7. For much of the past decade, U.S. policy debates have ricocheted among the first three stages.
oL?*+coA+oiUo||tUaonooa?oeauu|ou|ociN+it+Aoc+uo+t!u*+-*<|oL?oeiE+eE+-oy|u<|E|iou|uYNocRoAio+|pCe

8. Denial came first: China couldnrCOt possibly keep growing at double digits; its model was unsustainable; the Communist Party would implode.
oauoaeuy>oEa*<nN+UE+!oc+E+ioA>*a+E+YuiUE+nE+iuo#ooRoo+N+coa|u?io+AE+ioA>uiUt+!N+coa#E|ooaUo#aE+Aoaaoa?o|-u|apCe

9. Then anger: China is cheating, stealing intellectual property, subsidizing state enterprises, manipulating its currency.
uANtYCuy>uanuCAN+UE+!oc+oL?E+Lo+epCUt-aoAutfN*>aE|ouYapCU*iN*||oc+E+UpCUuoit||u#ctAcpCe

10. Bargaining followed: if we just pressure Beijing on market access, technology transfer, or rule-of-law issues, China will reform and play by the rules.
oUAoEAuy>*<?E++*+yE++N+UoA-*aUueaE+4*+2E++oiuE|4oL?o+eoL|ocaoaNpCUueCuL>*+4*<-ueuu|ou#+ou<ooyE+e*<-u!NN+iE+!oc+o##E+Uuo|oY-o||uie*oaoeO*iiE|ipCe

11. Each stage has generated policiesrCotariffs, export controls, investment screening, technology blocks, and alliance diplomacy.
u>AE+-oy|u<|oa+oe4tofE|auo+t!urCorCooa|t?ApCUoc|oAut<ioe|pCUueo*|ao<iufNpCUueCuL>o#UooUoAi*UotcfonuE|npCe

12. Yet China keeps rising: the largest trading partner for more countries than the United States; the top manufacturer and exporter of green-tech goods; and, on current trajectories, poised to surpass U.S. GDP within a decade.
ta|*CiE+!oc+t+ot+!o|c*|+N+Uo<ao+#uy>u>ot+Aoc+uc|onUoc+o<|tUauLCono*|+uyoE+OE+|N+ct++*e#toaueCE|oooUtUauLConooe|oCaoc+oAioc|oAuoc+N+cuieo+ooei*+?*+|N+ioiUo||oaa GDP o#a*|a*+ct+Aoc+pCe

13. The result is a fourth stagerCodepressionrComanifest in a growing chorus that America is in decline, that the liberal order is finished, and that the 21st century will be Chinese.
t+ouRLoc|tA#E|at44occoy|u<|rCorCoueaoaUrCorCo*i?tA#E+|*|euYN*|eonUtUaE||oo#*i#t+Aoc+N+ito#*c-to#to-o|Ao+#t+et+oN+i21 E+ut|-o#ao#RE|AE+!oc+pCe

14. But the fifth stagerCoacceptancerCohas begun to surface, if unevenly.
E+at44E|ooy|u<|rCorCouANoAurCorCoo+#o+Cooiu|<tA#N+io#+t<io#UE+ioYc*iipCe

15. Acceptance does not mean capitulation; it means recognizing reality and adapting strategy accordingly.
uANoAuo||E+iuaAoa|tYCueooOiN+co<auaAoa|tYCue+*<ntA#o<Ro||tc+o|o*#auo|ueytoNpCe

16. It means competing from strength, not panic; shaping the environment, not just reacting to China; and focusing on what America can controlrCoits own innovation, infrastructure, education, and alliances.
o<auaAoa|tYCE+Ao<Roecoc|oAa*CioYRuUEuaioL#t2RE|eN+coiaoCatA>ooaN+i*CioYRE+aE+ao>|E+!oc+oUUoc|oAio|oN+co||*UUtaaE|At+Aoc+*a+onfuAiuAotUaE|ite-rCorCo*c-*|2tUaoecuu#pCUof|tiC*<+uu+pCUuoO*e#oAi*UotcfpCe

17. The grief framework is useful because it captures the emotional arc of a superpower facing relative declinerCosomething no American alive today has experienced.
rCLue#E+nrCYuiauR|E|iueCE+NuLeto?N+iuy>ocaE+|o<auiouieE|aE+CE+-*|at|oonooc+oYoo>|tc+o>|*i#*E+uu|tUauaauaf*+?*+|rCorCo*+Ouy>E+eon-u|+tYCtUat+Aoc+E||E+AuL-t+AoAa*+ctUapCe

18. It also helps explain why U.S. China policy has been so erraticrColurching between confrontation and engagement, between decoupling and rCLsmall yard, high fence.rCY
o<a*+yuLeoe-E|A*ouoceE+|E+ot+Aoc+o>|oiAuo+t!uoaeu!noAionirCorCooL?o>|ueuE+AuAN*oaE|iou|pCUoL?*a#oA-E+ArCLo#AoOoo2yooOrCYE|iou|uacuaapCe

19. Understanding where America is in this psychological cycle is essential for crafting a sustainable strategy.
tEa*out+Aoc+onaE|A*+OE+Co+atEaoa?uLftUaoo-E+-oy|u<|N+io>|E|Aoe|o<UoA>uiUt+!ueytoN*c|oa|oci*aUpCe

20. Denial was pervasive in the 2000s.
2000 o||E+uuO<oUio!yoL?oEa*<npCe

21. After granting China Permanent Normal Trade Relations in 2000, Washington assumed economic liberalization would lead to political liberalization.
2000 o||t+OE|eE+!oc+u#+E|au!uo++*|+uyooa|t|+oEAN+ioiAtccoi+E+NE+|t+Au|A*c-to#oiuo#ao+auYNuo+u#+*c-to#oiupCe

22. Even as Beijing cracked down on dissidents and built up its military, U.S. leaders clung to the belief that engagement would transform China.
oi|E++oiuE|4oocoAio+e*oUo||ue-oacN+it+Aoc+ooao>+E||E+ioYUE+iuAN*oaE+Uuo|oAyE+!oc+pCe

23. The 2008 financial crisis punctured that illusion, but denial persisted in different forms: ChinarCOs growth was export-driven and thus vulnerable; its debt-fueled model would collapse; its aging population would stall its rise.
2008 o||oca*Rioi#uL|ue|ta|E|a*+OE+Co|+*oeN+iE+aoEa*<nE+NE+ioEio+oo+AuiUt+!N+UE+!oc+tUaooRoo+E+Y*|uoc|oAuoca*Ci*aao+#N+coa|oC|oeio-#oe?u?io+Ao#ao|-u|aN+cE||oAu*CUo+aoiuo#aE++oa|o|c*|+oULu+RpCe

24. Anger erupted during the Obama years: ChinarCOs cyber-theft of U.S. companies, its island-building in the South China Sea, and its rCLMade in China 2025rCY industrial plan were seen as direct challenges to American primacy.
oNNo+|o-4uu|uLfuanuCAteaoAaN+UE+!oc+o>|t+Aoc+E+UE+UtUat+at+Ltcut-apCUoiuu|+oCao#cE+NoAerCLE+!oc+oe|oCa 2025rCYE|oE+U*<ioeA*o2*oaE+|o>|t+Aoc+E++o>+oL#E+itUatc|uANuiaueypCe

25. The Trump administration weaponized that anger with tariffs, sanctions, and rhetorical attacks on the rCLChinese virus.rCY
te|uLuuO<uo+o|LE+Noa|t?ApCUoe|*uUoAio>|rCLE+!oc+tuau>ArCYtUa*?C*>!uo+oc+o#a*+OtoiuanuCAu!aoO?oiupCe

26. Bargaining characterized the early Biden years: calls for rCLguardrailsrCY and rCLresponsible competition,rCY efforts to cooperate on climate while contesting on technology.
uiLtO+ueouo+oeYuLfE+otA#*<?E++*+yE++N+Uoa+oEUrCLuenuaArCYE+ArCL*|f*|uE++t2RE|erCYN+ioL?u#ooCOou<ooyE+eoEeE+LN+ioL?ueCuL>ooaofft2RE|epCe

27. But ChinarCOs refusal to condemn RussiarCOs invasion of Ukraine, its military exercises around Taiwan, and its continued support for Iran and North Korea dashed hopes of strategic reciprocity.
E+aE+!oc+uiAuuNE+at+uuu>oaNE+|E|ioaioa#pCUoc|t+ooA#u|+oacu+oE+NoAet+ot+!uo>uiUE+euLuoAiuLYo#LN+iE++ueytoNE|AuaatUao+iuLcta|tU!pCe

28. Depression set in as AmericarCOs own problemsrCopolarization, infrastructure decay, opioid deathsrComounted.
oUAtYCt+Aoc+*c-*|2ou<ooyrCorCouRUoiupCUof|tiC*<+uu+*i#*|NpCUoy+tect#+*i>te-u!+E|irCorCooeaoeoN+iueaoaUuaat+-u|<tA#pCe

29. Pundits proclaimed rCLthe end of the American centuryrCY and forecast a Chinese-led world order.
*>a*<|E||ou2o<uoaerCLt+Aoc+E+ut|-t+et+orCYN+io||ooau|iE+!oc+E++o>+tUaE+utoito-o|ApCe

30. Yet acceptance is beginning to dawn.
ta|*CiuANoAuo+Cooita|uOopCe

31. It is visible in the Biden administrationrCOs emphasis on rCLinvest, align, competerCYrCoa strategy that acknowledges ChinarCOs strengths while betting on AmericarCOs capacity to renew itself.
o<aoA>*oUE|AuiLtO+uo+o|Lo+|*#arCLueo*|apCUt+otcfpCUt2RE|erCYrCorCoE+Ctoiue+*<nE+!oc+E+yoe+oEiuu|ue+u|?t+Aoc+*c-ueauc|uu#*a+oectUaueytoNpCe

32. It is visible in CongressrCOs bipartisan embrace of industrial policy: the CHIPS and Science Act, the Inflation Reduction ActrCOs green-tech subsidies, and proposed rCLfriend-shoringrCY of supply chains.
o<aoA>*oUE|Aoc+E+UE+noaUo>|E|oE+Uuo+t!utUauiNue#N+UpCe*e>tecE+Atoao!au|opCipCUpCeoCU*aCoeeocAu|opCitUat++*e#toaueC*iN*||E+NoAeE+co|ooo+rCLoAio#+onuoiarCYuAE*<<pCe

33. It is visible in AmericarCOs re-engagement with Asia: upgraded alliances with Australia, Japan, and the Philippines; new partnerships like AUKUS and the Quad; and high-profile diplomacy from Kamala HarrisrCOs Southeast Asia tour to BidenrCOs summit with Pacific Island leaders.
o<aoA>*oUE|At+Aoc+ociuu#oAeE+AE|Uu|#N+UE+Au+|onooe-E|UpCUuuNuL4pCU*A#o+io<+oict|o*UotcfN+cuu#o+| AUKUS E+A Quad E+OE+|oa|t|+N+cE+NoAeE+Aooeociuu>E+LoiuE|UE|i*iioe#uiLtO+E+Aon-o||u|io#coc+ooao>+E||o|#E+UtUao2y*#aonuE|npCe

34. Acceptance does not mean accommodation of ChinarCOs authoritarian model or aggression toward Taiwan.
uANoAuo||E+iuaAoa|tYC*+Uo##E+!oc+tUao?UuYau?io+Aueuo>|oA#u|+tUaE+|toNpCe

35. It means recognizing that ChinarCOs rise is not a passing phase but a structural shiftrCoand that AmericarCOs response must be sustained, strategic, and self-confident.
o<auaAoa|tYCue+*<nE+!oc+tUao|c*|+E+iuy>uUeuu|oy|u<|*Ciuy>t+ouRauCo*+4oAyrCorCot+Aoc+tUaocRo|oo+aoi+uy>uiUt+!pCUueytoNuCooAi*c-E+itUapCe

36. It means competing in green tech, not just complaining about Chinese subsidies; building ports and rail in the Global South, not just warning about Belt and Road debt traps; and forging trade deals like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, not just withdrawing from agreements like the TPP.
o<auaAoa|tYCoL?t++*e#ueCuL>E+et2RE|eN+i*CioYRE+aE+aue#uC?E+!oc+*iN*||N+coL?oa?tEaoiuuu|o+|*<+u+>oAuoAiooU*+>N+i*CioYRE+aE+a*!aoaerCLE+Co+aE+C*+>rCYoC|oeioO+oy#N+co||*++ueEoaerCLoi#on-t+Au|AuiauR|rCYtUa*|+uyooiA*<<N+i*CioYRE+aE+aoCCoc| TPP t!eoiA*<<pCe

37. Most of all, acceptance means getting AmericarCOs own house in order: rebuilding infrastructure, reforming education, reducing inequality, and restoring faith in democracy.
uLCoci*aUtUauy>N+iuANoAuuaAoa|tYCuo|oi+t+Aoc+*c-*|2N+Uocio+|of|tiC*<+uu+pCUuo|oY-uoO*e#pCUocAo#aE+io||t!epCUuUoonio>|u#aE++tUaE+io+apCe

38. The stages of grief are not linear; America may cycle back through anger or bargaining.
ue#E+noy|u<|o||oYRt|+uCoN+ct+Aoc+oA>*a+ociuu#t+AoAauanuCAueu*<?E++*+yE++pCe

39. But the trend is toward acceptancerCohowever reluctant, however uneven.
E+a*|ioe+uy>uLYoEauANoAurCorCouua*<|onUE|eE+iuaaua+N+ionUE|eE+ioYc*iipCe

40. And that is where U.S. China policy must operate: not in the fantasy of Chinese collapse, but in the reality of Chinese powerrCoand the renewal of American power.
t+Aoc+o>|oiAuo+t!uo+aoi+oL?*+OE+Cof|tiCE+e*+EE+LN+UE+iuy>o|+ua|E+!oc+o|-u|aN+i*Ciuy>oYoo>|E+!oc+uYaoectUatA#o<RrCorCoo||uc|uu#t+Aoc+*c-*|2tUaoecocApCe

41. The alternative is perpetual griefrCoand perpetual strategic incoherence.
oEaoeOo#aoO+oaNu#+E|atUaue#E+nrCorCoE+NoAeu#+E|atUaueytoNu++E|#pCe

rCorCo oa?uuco<i rCorCoEND
--- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: alt.philosophy.taoism


TikTok fan <user11874@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:

TikTok fan <user11874@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:

The original article details are as follows:

Title: The United States Is Moving Through the Stages of Grief Over ChinarCOs Rise
Author: Robert A. Manning
Publication: Foreign Policy
Publication Date: December 3, 2024
Original URL: https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/12/03/united-states-stages-of-grief-china-rise/

https://p3-sign.toutiaoimg.com/tos-cn-i-ezhpy3drpa/8379cffdbe7549fd88b6b5faa61cb020~tplv-obj:1080:22091.image?_iz=97245&bid=15&from=post&gid=1851267938583561&lk3s=06827d14&x-expires=1773273600&x-signature=dWn8Kj7MpvLoi9%2Fbwh6%2F5Dct2aw%3D

This article is likely a misattributed or synthesized textrCopossibly an integration and reinterpretation of the authorrCOs arguments from rCLAmericarCOs China Delusion Is Finally FadingrCY with the psychological model of the stages of grief. Regardless of its authenticity, its content holds a certain degree of insight worth considering.

I can't find the original source of this articlerCothe date and link I shared earlier were incorrect. Its actual publication date appears to be November 26, 2025. Yet even with this new clue, I still canrCOt locate the original textrCoperhaps because IrCOm not a registered subscriber and therefore donrCOt have access.

However, IrCOve come across three separate articles in China that all reference the arguments presented in this intriguing piece. Based on this, IrCOm confident the article genuinely exists. Below, IrCOll translate these three Chinese articles into English for everyonerCOs reference and enjoyment.

one.A.1.

Over the past eight years, the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) has re-labeled China three times:

- 2017: rCLa strategic competitorrCY
- 2022: rCLthe most serious systemic challengerCY
- 2025: rCLa competitive forcerCY rCo mainly in the economic chapter

Why the softer tone? Many analysts argue Washington has finally accepted that containment does not work.
I find a more intriguing explanation: the United States may be grieving rCo psychologically adjusting to ChinarCOs rise.

The idea comes from former State Department counselor and scholar Robert A. Manning. In a *Foreign Policy* essay, he applies the famous K|+bler-Ross rCLfive stages of griefrCY to AmericarCOs China policy.

Below is a walk-through of those stages, using the NSS texts as mile-markers.

---

### STAGE 1 DENIAL (Post-Cold War raA 2010s)
**rCLChina will become what we wantrCY**

From the Soviet collapse to 2010 Beijing was barely an rCLopponent.rCY
- George H. W. Bush NSS: China hardly mentioned.
- Clinton NSS: endorsed ChinarCOs WTO entry; rCLstable, open, prosperous China serves U.S. interests.rCY
- George W. Bush NSS: same engagement line.

Underlying logic:
1. Fukuyama hubris rCo history ends with liberal democracies; China can be remade in AmericarCOs image.
2. Collapsology rCo periodic hype that the CCP would implode.

Washington refused to accept a China that did not fit its script; the 2025 NSS itself admits this long denial.

---

### STAGE 2 ANGER (2010s raA 2024)
**rCLWe must punish this revisionist powerrCY**

China did not collapse; it became No. 2 economy in 2010. Expectations shattered, sentiment swung to anger.

NSS trajectory:
- Obama: first serious threat assessment.
- Trump 2017 NSS: 33 mentions, labels China rCLstrategic competitor.rCY
- Biden 2022 NSS: rCLthe most serious systemic challenge.rCY

Policy matches rhetoric:
- Obama: rCLAsia-Pacific RebalancerCY rCo military pivot.
- Trump: trade war rCo tariff club.
- Biden: rCLsmall-yard, high-fencerCY rCo tech strangulation.

Anger seeks coercion; none of it bent Beijing. Trade war tariffs stayed; semiconductor blockades spurred home-grown breakthroughs. After China played rare-earth and soybeans cards in 2024, Washington had to admit the tantrum achieved little.

Manning: Trump realized he had underestimated China. The grief cycle moved to bargaining.

---

### STAGE 3 BARGAINING (2025 rCo ?)
**rCLCanrCOt beat yourColetrCOs make a dealrCY**

Bargaining = acknowledging the status quo is immovable and seeking transactional fixes.

Evidence in 2025 NSS:

1. **No fantasy of defeating China**
Text concedes China rCLhas become wealthy and powerfulrCY and the relationship is rCLnear-peer.rCY Such wording never appeared before; it is cognitive sobriety, not compliment.

2. **Shift from total confrontation to transaction mode**
Drops rCLthreat/challengerCY tags; anchors competition in economics & technology, aiming for rCLre-balancedrCY bilateral economic ties.
Chips, rare earths, defense rCo America must be autonomous; rCLnon-sensitive areasrCY can trade rCLfor mutual benefit.rCY

3. **Making allies pay the bill**
Free-riding rCLis over.rCY Allies must rCLsignificantly increase defense spending,rCY especially Japan and ROK, to rCLdeter and defend the first island chain.rCY Washington rCLcannot and should not bear these costs alone.rCY

---

### ARE WE SEEING ACCEPTANCE?

Manning: rCLThe final stage rCo acceptance rCo still seems far off.rCY

The 2025 NSS is peppered with hegemonic reflexes:
- rCLWe must win the competition in the Indo-Pacific rCo and we are winning.rCY
- rCLThe United States will not allow any country to become so powerful that it threatens our interests.rCY

Thus rCLbargainingrCY is not acceptance; it is a prolonged strategic stalemate where America can do business rCo provided it sets the terms and China never truly surpasses it.

---

### TAKE-AWAY

Give Washington time to process its grief; give Beijing time to keep strengthening its fundamentals.
Rather than fixating on U.S. mood swings, China should focus on its own development rCo because in great-power competition, capability is the ultimate currency.
--- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: alt.philosophy.taoism


TikTok fan <user11874@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:

TikTok fan <user11874@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:

TikTok fan <user11874@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:

The original article details are as follows:

Title: The United States Is Moving Through the Stages of Grief Over ChinarCOs Rise
Author: Robert A. Manning
Publication: Foreign Policy
Publication Date: December 3, 2024
Original URL: https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/12/03/united-states-stages-of-grief-china-rise/

https://p3-sign.toutiaoimg.com/tos-cn-i-ezhpy3drpa/8379cffdbe7549fd88b6b5faa61cb020~tplv-obj:1080:22091.image?_iz=97245&bid=15&from=post&gid=1851267938583561&lk3s=06827d14&x-expires=1773273600&x-signature=dWn8Kj7MpvLoi9%2Fbwh6%2F5Dct2aw%3D

This article is likely a misattributed or synthesized textrCopossibly an integration and reinterpretation of the authorrCOs arguments from rCLAmericarCOs China Delusion Is Finally FadingrCY with the psychological model of the stages of grief. Regardless of its authenticity, its content holds a certain degree of insight worth considering.

I can't find the original source of this articlerCothe date and link I shared earlier were incorrect. Its actual publication date appears to be November 26, 2025. Yet even with this new clue, I still canrCOt locate the original textrCoperhaps because IrCOm not a registered subscriber and therefore donrCOt have access.

However, IrCOve come across three separate articles in China that all reference the arguments presented in this intriguing piece. Based on this, IrCOm confident the article genuinely exists. Below, IrCOll translate these three Chinese articles into English for everyonerCOs reference and enjoyment.

one.A.1.

two.B.2

From Looking Down to Looking Straight Ahead
China and the United States Are Crossing the Boundary of a rCLContest Without BordersrCY

China-America Exchange Foundation, Beijing, 28 November 2025


After the China-U.S. summit in Busan, many scholars judged the biggest takeaway to be a rCLtactical trucerCY on trade and economics, with plenty of unknowns still ahead.
What most caught the eye of the international strategic community, however, was Donald TrumprCOs reference to the two powers as the rCLG-2.rCY
On 26 November, Robert ManningrCosenior fellow at the Stimson Center and former senior counselor to the U.S. deputy secretary of staterCowrote in *Foreign Policy* that Busan may mark the moment when U.S.-China relations enter an entirely new phase: Washington is beginning to look Beijing straight in the eye, bargaining over key issues instead of simply looking down and trying to contain it, as it had done for years.

AmericarCOs Five Stages of Loss

Manning proposes a rCLFive Stages of GriefrCY yardstick for AmericarCOs China policy: denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance.
He likens WashingtonrCOs shifting lens on rCLChinarCOs riserCY to the sorrow a person feels after losing something preciousrCohere, the United StatesrCO post-Cold-War status as the worldrCOs sole super-power.
According to Manning, U.S. strategy has indeed ridden an emotional roller-coaster for decades.
- **Denial** (Cold War end raA 2010s): Facing the fact of ChinarCOs rise, America chose not to believe it, convinced it could rCLreformrCY a reform-opening China and slot it into a U.S.-led order without shaking U.S. primacy.
- **Anger** (late Obama, Trump 1.0, Biden): WashingtonrCOs China narrative turned to high-octane demonizationrCohow to rCLout-compete,rCY suppress, and contain China, while preparing for possible conflict.
These two stages tracked ChinarCOs GDP surgerCofrom US$310 billion in 1985 to US$18.8 trillion in 2024rCoand its growing civilian and military reach, posing a powerful challenge to U.S. global dominance.
Manning argues that after denial and anger, America is entering **bargaining**rCounable any longer to crush or sanction China cost-free.
Busan = Bargaining
The 30 October Busan summit, he says, shows Washington moving beyond pure rCLangerrCY and starting to **manage** differences with Beijing, even though rules of competition remain hard to define.
Manning lists why Washington **must** bargain:
- Trump may have over-estimated his leverage with allies and under-estimated ChinarCOs readiness for rCLTrump 2.0.rCY
- China has steadily de-risked its supply chains; 2025 exports to the world are up, but shipments to the U.S. fell 27 % in September alone; FDI into America is also down.
- More trade is settled in RMB (>30 %), helping developing countries swap dollar debt into yuan and boosting rCLpanda bonds.rCY
- TrumprCOs assault on clean energy and EVs has ceded global leadership in renewables and electric cars to China.
- BeijingrCOs rCLrare-earthrCY and rCLsoybeanrCY cards display an **escalation advantage**; Trump now seems to realize the U.S. mis-read Chinese capacity.
Hence, Manning concludes, the U.S. is bargaining.

Looking Straight Across the Table

Busan, he writes, proves America is **treating China as a peer** andrCorarelyrCocraving stability.
The forty-year web of inter-dependence cannot be shredded overnight.
U.S. Treasury Secretary Bessent said the goal is rCLnot decoupling, but de-risking.rCY
Trump graded the summit 12 out of 10.
These mirror BeijingrCOs call for stability and predictability.
Most Chinese demands made during the trade war have been met; both sides agreed to **continued dialogue** and mutual visits next year;
U.S. Defense Secretary Hegseth and ChinarCOs Defense Minister Dong Jun met in Kuala Lumpur in October to restore military hot-lines and regular consultationsrCosignaling full entry into the **bargaining** phase.

Crossing the rCLContest Without BordersrCY

These steps, Manning says, are serious attempts to **manage** competition and may signal movement beyond the previous rCLunbounded contestrCY toward **rule-making**.
Likely bargaining items ahead:
1. **Taiwan** rCo Beijing wants stronger U.S. assurances against independence.
2. **Chips** rCo Trump is weighing whether to bar higher-end NVIDIA exports to China.
3. **Nuclear weapons** rCo Trump says he will invite China to a U.S.-Russia denuclearization plan; Beijing may decline, but AI governance and nuclear control could open new talks.
For now, hawkish voices for faster decoupling and confrontation are **on the back foot**, while ChinarCofacing slower growthrCoalso prefers dialogue.
Yet structural contradictions (trade, geo-tech, military) remain; **depression** (stage four) has **not** arrived.
Only a **real crisis** might trigger it.
In ManningrCOs frame, if **anger** points outward at China, **depression** will point inward at AmericarCOs own woes.
Final **acceptance** of China is still **far away**.

Conclusion
Busan reflects an evolving U.S.-China relationship.
America may be gradually accepting its domestic dilemmas; China may be recognizing both its strengths and its limits.
Whether the two powers return to historical norms or the current momentum pushes them toward a balance of power remains an open question.
--- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: alt.philosophy.taoism


TikTok fan <user11874@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:

TikTok fan <user11874@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:

TikTok fan <user11874@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:

TikTok fan <user11874@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:

The original article details are as follows:

Title: The United States Is Moving Through the Stages of Grief Over ChinarCOs Rise
Author: Robert A. Manning
Publication: Foreign Policy
Publication Date: December 3, 2024
Original URL: https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/12/03/united-states-stages-of-grief-china-rise/

https://p3-sign.toutiaoimg.com/tos-cn-i-ezhpy3drpa/8379cffdbe7549fd88b6b5faa61cb020~tplv-obj:1080:22091.image?_iz=97245&bid=15&from=post&gid=1851267938583561&lk3s=06827d14&x-expires=1773273600&x-signature=dWn8Kj7MpvLoi9%2Fbwh6%2F5Dct2aw%3D

This article is likely a misattributed or synthesized textrCopossibly an integration and reinterpretation of the authorrCOs arguments from rCLAmericarCOs China Delusion Is Finally FadingrCY with the psychological model of the stages of grief. Regardless of its authenticity, its content holds a certain degree of insight worth considering.

I can't find the original source of this articlerCothe date and link I shared earlier were incorrect. Its actual publication date appears to be November 26, 2025. Yet even with this new clue, I still canrCOt locate the original textrCoperhaps because IrCOm not a registered subscriber and therefore donrCOt have access.

However, IrCOve come across three separate articles in China that all reference the arguments presented in this intriguing piece. Based on this, IrCOm confident the article genuinely exists. Below, IrCOll translate these three Chinese articles into English for everyonerCOs reference and enjoyment.

one.A.1.

two.B.2

three.C.3

U.S. Academia: "For 40 Years We Were CertainrCoBut China Simply Refuses to Be a Second South Korea"
(Originally posted 3 December 2025, Liaoning)

Since the last century a deep-set expectation has run through American academia: once China opens its market and joins the world, it will gradually become a docile, U.S.-dependent economyrCojust like South Korea did.

Seoul first grew rich, then accepted the American political template. From government to think-tanks Washington was convinced this was inevitable.

Today that script has collapsed. China has not copied the Western model; in key areas it has set its own pace. What began as U.S. self-confidence has slid bewilderment, anxiety, andrCofinallyrCoa return to the negotiating table. The episode is not a simple strategic mis-read; it is a 40-year psychological deconstruction.

### A "Korea Template" That Never Fit

In early 2025 the Brookings Institution released a strategy paper with a jarring line:
*"For forty years we were certain China would become a second South Korea. We now admit this was our gravest mis-judgment."*

The report retraces WashingtonrCOs construction of the "Korea showcase," page after page of perplexity at ChinarCOs trajectory.

- **September 1945**: U.S. 24th Infantry Division entered southern Korea; within half a year it drafted an American-style constitutionrComulti-party, separation of powersrColock, stock.
- **1948-1961**: Seoul received more than US$10 billion in aid; in 1953 U.S. funds covered 52.9 % of ROK fiscal revenue; wartime command of South Korean forces rested with Washington.
- **1960s**: Washington brokered SeoulrCOs takeover of labor-intensive industries discarded by Japan and the United States. Textile mills in Seoul and toy plants in Busan sprouted, fed by U.S. technology transfers and market orders.
- **1987**: When SeoulrCOs military government prepared to crush street protests, the U.S. ambassador summoned President Chun Doo-hwan and threatened to cut aid; direct presidential elections followed.

After four decades of tutelage the ROK had become the perfect templaterCosecurity tethered to U.S. troops, economy embedded in U.S. chains, politics cloned from U.S. institutions.

Apply the same playbook to Beijing and it lands on cottonrCosoft, springy, unbreakable.

### The DNA of Sovereignty

The core divergence is embedded in each staterCOs founding gene.

South Korea began life as a client: its constitution draft had to be vetted by the U.S. State Department; its first president, Syngman Rhee, relied on U.S. bayonets.

China was born from the barrel of a gun. On 1 October 1949 Mao declared, *"The Chinese people have stood up."* The PeoplerCOs Liberation ArmyrCOs first act in major cities was to reclaim foreign concessions and scrap unequal treaties; foreign banks along ShanghairCOs Bund had to obey Chinese law.

That resolverCo*"sweep the house clean before inviting guests"*rCodrew an unambiguous line between ChinarCOs path and KorearCOs dependency.

### Red Lines That Cannot Be Crossed

- **Security autonomy**: 28,000 U.S. troops still garrison South Korea; F-16s at Osan can cover the peninsula. China, scarred by a century of humiliation, treats security sovereignty as existential. In 1950 a newly-founded PRC fought the worldrCOs most advanced army to a stalemate; in the 1960s it pursued *"two bombs, one satellite"* even while hungry, building its own nuclear umbrella. Today DF-41 ICBMs circle the globe and JL-3 SLBMs provide a second-strike capability, eroding AmericarCOs erstwhile absolute nuclear edge.

- **Economic scale & resilience**: South KorearCOs 50 million consumers cannot sustain large industries; export dependence exceeds 50 %. Samsung chips need U.S. EDA software; Hyundai engines trace to Japanese know-how.

China commands a 1.4 billion-person mega-market and the worldrCOs only all-industry-category systemrCofrom screws to space stationsrCodomestically produced. ChinarCOs industrialisation was jump-started by *"Third Front"* relocations, Daqing crude self-sufficiency, home-grown 10,000-ton forging pressesrConot foreign reparations.

This *"do-it-yourself"* tradition blunts trade-war blows: by 2024 Chinese chip self-sufficiency hit 28 %; domestic industrial-software share broke 15 %.

### Political Trajectory: No Westernisation Clause

Clinton assured Congress in 2000 that admitting China to the WTO would turn it democratic. Instead, GDP leapt from US$1 trn (2000) to US$20 trn (2024) without importing multi-party politics; Beijing forged its own governance model.

After the 2017 *"strategic competitor"* label, tariffs, Huawei bans and chip embargoes, what happened? At the latest high-level talks Washington asked to **remove** some tariffs; the Secretary of State spoke of **reciprocity**.

### Forty Years of Miscalculation

U.S. academia has finally seen the light: China is notrCoand will never berCoSouth Korea. It will not finance its development with U.S. hand-outs, outsource its security, or abandon its own path because of economic growth.

In a multipolar era Washington has two choices: learn to deal as equals, or keep watching China rise. After all, there is only one South Korea on earthrCoand no country can turn China into a second one.
--- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: alt.philosophy.taoism


TikTok fan <user11874@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:

TikTok fan <user11874@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:

TikTok fan <user11874@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:

TikTok fan <user11874@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:

TikTok fan <user11874@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:

The original article details are as follows:

Title: The United States
Is Moving Through the Stages of Grief Over ChinarCOs Rise

...

This article is likely a misattributed
or synthesized textrCopossibly an
integration and reinterpretation
of the authorrCOs arguments from
...
Regardless of its authenticity,
its content holds a certain degree
of insight worth considering.

Why?
How does it pertain to Daojia?

What appears to me is a competition of a sort
going on in some people's minds between states.

China is regularly being portrayed as winning
a contest, to be the greatest where and when
the USA was, in those people's minds.

What could be considered are the selections
made to suggest which group is doing what
is being considered as having worth.

In terms of Daojia, perhaps
when there is higher there is lower.
Lower tends to be better, given the paradigm.

I can't find the original source ...

Originals could be important, or not.
Take the DDJ and Zz for example. Edited
over time by editors until what is now is.

What did Zhuangzi originally write,
could be a question. Did Lao Tzu exist
and leave the land and if so, why.

If the DDJ was an accreted text
with various authors adding lines
and responding, concluding and then
it was passed along, does it matter?

However, IrCOve come across three separate articles
in China that all reference the arguments presented
in this intriguing piece.

Why does it intrigue you?

Based on this, IrCOm confident the article genuinely exists.
Below, IrCOll translate these three Chinese articles into English
for everyonerCOs reference and enjoyment.

I remain unsure about why I'd enjoy it.

one.A.1.

two.B.2

three.C.3

U.S. Academia: "For 40 Years We Were CertainrCo
But China Simply Refuses to Be a Second South Korea"
(Originally posted 3 December 2025, Liaoning)

That sounds like a very strange premise.
Why would the two be compared to begin with
could be a question. And how does any comparison
pertain to any philosophy of Taoism?

Since the last century a deep-set expectation
has run through American academia: once China
opens its market and joins the world,
it will gradually become a docile,
U.S.-dependent economyrCojust like South Korea did.

I don't know about American academia,
if that's what it, presuming it exists,
or existed as such, expected.

To expect a government that was not like
South Korea to govern like South Korea
seems to me to be a faulty premise.

Was China ever docile, could be a question.
Was it ever a U.S. dependent economy.
If so, when was it no longer dependent.

Seoul first grew rich, then accepted the American political template.

So, first it grew rich.
Then, it accepted a template.

Sounds as if economy, wealth,
is being suggested as an axiom.

I don't know if what follows
has anything to do with anything.

Rich is an interesting word.
How rich was, Seoul. As a city, to say
a city is rich is interesting.

What does that mean.
Is Beijing rich.

A question occurs to me, if a group
grew rich, and then accepted some
sort of a template, does that mean
the template made it rich.

I doubt it.
First it grew rich.
Then it accepted a template.

Some people might grow rich
by various means, for example, by
being very mean and ruthless. And then
be kind and generous as a template.

That reminds me of a form of Daoism.
People and groups often change.

To make money or take power,
then, how to keep it or use it,
the DDJ has various sayings.

From government to think-tanks Washington was convinced this was inevitable.

Washington appears to be some sort of
creation or creature in the minds
of some people some times.

To say, Washington was convinced
could mean, some people in the city
were convinced. The preposition, in,
would be good to place between what is
called, government, think-tanks, and
the geographical area.

Even with that qualification, to say
some people in government, and some
in think-tanks in the city were
convinced, sounds more likely.

Some, as a word, qualifies.
To presuppose all the people is
generally an over-generalization.

Then again, rhetoric and logic
don't always need to be valid
nor sound, technically.

Today that script has collapsed.
China has not copied the Western model;
in key areas it has set its own pace.

To generalize a land area, or a group
of people in a group of people who did
not copy the so-called Western model, is
what appears to me to be in the above words.

To say it was a script is interesting.
To say, in key areas, is also interesting.

What is, or was, the Western model?
Private enterprise? Competition?

Autocratic governments might work
until they don't work. So too with
pure capitalism with its monopolies.

A so-called Communist model, where people
don't own anything individually and everyone
owns everything as a collective doesn't work.

Socialist models may work to a point.
Societies tend to differ in ways.

Models are models. Just as dao are dao.
To presuppose any model will work
for every one at all times
could be what DDJ 1.1
is referring to.

What began as U.S. self-confidence has slid

What does that mean, U.S. self-confidence.
Does a country have such a property.

Some people might have been confident
in whatever they were confident.

Projections are curious.

bewilderment, anxiety, andrCofinallyrCoa return to the negotiating table.

Sounds like a lot of projecting is going on.

I didn't read the rest of the translation.

What might be enjoyable for some people
who are interested in Daoist philosophy
could be a mystery naturally.

What occurs to me is how dao are dao,
ways are ways and while some can be
better or worse, they may change.

If a group of people were categorized
as being similar or different, they were.

If a city was said to be emotional,
or if a nation were said to be a
kind of a whole, that's interesting.

The Zhuangzi is sometimes seen
as having a quality of perspective
and relativism. To say it is skeptical
might be to project on to a book
what is written in its pages.

It was actually enjoyable.

To call it a troll is possible.
And yet, that word isn't always good.
To go fishing for a spell. For what,
other than the spell, could be a question.

- fun stuff. Thanks! Cheers!
--- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: alt.philosophy.taoism

On 13/12/2025 13:13, aye wrote:

TikTok fan <user11874@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:

TikTok fan <user11874@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:

TikTok fan <user11874@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:

TikTok fan <user11874@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:

TikTok fan <user11874@newsgrouper.org.invalid> posted:

The original article details are as follows:

Title: The United States
Is Moving Through the Stages of Grief Over ChinarCOs Rise

...

This article is likely a misattributed
or synthesized textrCopossibly an
integration and reinterpretation
of the authorrCOs arguments from
...
Regardless of its authenticity,
its content holds a certain degree
of insight worth considering.

Why?
How does it pertain to Daojia?

What appears to me is a competition of a sort
going on in some people's minds between states.

China is regularly being portrayed as winning
a contest, to be the greatest where and when
the USA was, in those people's minds.

The UK was once in the USA shoes China wants to wear.
Those, superficially, pretty shoes will give you bunions.
--- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: alt.philosophy.taoism


Julian posted:

aye wrote:

China is regularly being portrayed as winning
a contest, to be the greatest where and when
the USA was, in those people's minds.

The UK was once in the USA shoes China wants to wear.

The sun never set on its empire.
The Commonwealth remains a thing.

Those, superficially, pretty shoes will give you bunions.

Imperialism, colonialism, exploitation,
genocide and other not particularly Dao
activities associated with power tend to
be what occur after Dao and De are gone.

Rather than grief,
to let go of trying to rule the world
could be a relief.

A question could be about English
as compared to speaking Mandarin.

Putonghua compared to other dialects.

When a government institutes by fiat
what is going to be spoken and how,
then and there might be a dao
that is or is not the Dao.

In the Chuang-tzu is mentioned
something about setting off for Yue
and arriving there yesterday.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yue_Chinese

When all the world speaks a common language
and uses the same currency, with every body
wearing the same clothes and riding around
in the same vehicles on the same roads, then
it might be time to call it a day.

Global economy, a world at peace,
in fear of only natural phenomena.

- funny, t'hats ... Cheers!
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From Newsgroup: alt.philosophy.taoism


aye posted:

When all the world speaks a common language
and uses the same currency, with every body
wearing the same clothes and riding around
in the same vehicles on the same roads, then
it might be time to call it a day.

It's interesting to me basically how many
if not most people wear a style of clothes
and drive around using a type of car.

Some people focus on some features of some
of what they identify with as their country
and divide the world into West and all else.

To ignore the fashions of the world
could be a kind of a state of a mind.

Global economy, a world at peace,
in fear of only natural phenomena.

Earth quakes and asteroids make
for a time that is difficult
to ignore being all natural and
inhumane as if there is no care.

Mother Nature, Great Dao,
without intention nor doing.

Wan-wu happens.

- thanks! Cheers!
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From Newsgroup: alt.philosophy.taoism


eye posted:

Earth quakes and asteroids make
for a time that is difficult
to ignore being all natural and
inhumane as if there is no care.

Mother Nature, Great Dao,
without intention nor doing.

Wan-wu happens.

Some are proud
Some are ashamed
Of their geography
Of their history

I tend to be a mixture,
all over the map as is said.
Depending on what is viewed and how.

Identifying with a state
of mind or emotions can be
a kind of a trap for me.

Taoism could have something like
tat-tvam-asi or neti-neti.

Apophatic ways are ways.
Cataphatic as wells, well.

- thanks! aye. Cheers!
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From Newsgroup: alt.philosophy.taoism


aye posted:

eye posted:

Wan-wu happens.

Taoism could have something like
tat-tvam-asi or neti-neti.

Apophatic ways are ways.
Cataphatic as wells, well.

When butcher Ting carved the bull
he may have been in a state of wu-wei,
until asked about his dao of carving.

Moving from yu-wei to wei-wu-wei,
From wei-wu-wei to wu-xin, at play.
He danced as he did what was done.

Being one with his knife,
without a thought of how to slice,
while all 10k-things were in place,
including having an edge and what
wasn't there as the whole ox.

How many pieces fell to the floor
before Ting left for the door
after doing what was done.

He didn't chop nor hack.
Carving and uncarving.
Being and not being.

- hmmm ...
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From Newsgroup: alt.philosophy.taoism

On 13/12/2025 15:24, aye wrote:

Julian posted:

aye wrote:

China is regularly being portrayed as winning
a contest, to be the greatest where and when
the USA was, in those people's minds.

The UK was once in the USA shoes China wants to wear.

The sun never set on its empire.
The Commonwealth remains a thing.

Yes, God Save The King! :)
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From Newsgroup: alt.philosophy.taoism


Julian posted:

Yes, God Save The King! :)

Taoism often returns in the Nick
of time and this is one of them.
Saints be praised.

In ancient times, a ruler, say Yao
might have been called an emperor.

Just how great an empire was, may
be subjected to cartography.

Some rulers were viewed as gods.
Later on, not being deities, some
were crowned and wore such a thing.

Now, some might declare they are
the ruler for life. President
is a word being used.

Perhaps they wear a noose,
called a tie, around their neck.

How the mighty have decreased.
No longer gods nor emperors.

I don't know if any appoint
their selves dictator and say,
take a letter, like Groucho.

- thanks! Cheers!
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