• Bug#1091169: sbuild unshare mode unhappy about symlink'd tarballs

    From Johannes Schauer Marin Rodrigues@21:1/5 to All on Thu Jan 2 19:30:02 2025
    Hi,

    Quoting Antoine Beaupré (2025-01-01 03:52:54)
    Essentially, we do not pass a path to zstd anymore but we let sbuild open the path and then pass the filedescriptor to what we opened to zstd via its standard input.

    Ah yes, that would work of course!

    Probably harmless in terms of security too... riiight? :)

    yes. Do you have any suspicions why it would not be harmless?

    Thanks!

    cheers, josch
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  • From =?utf-8?Q?Antoine_Beaupr=C3=A9?=@21:1/5 to Johannes Schauer Marin Rodrigues on Fri Jan 3 01:20:01 2025
    On 2025-01-02 19:17:38, Johannes Schauer Marin Rodrigues wrote:
    Hi,

    Quoting Antoine Beaupré (2025-01-01 03:52:54)
    Essentially, we do not pass a path to zstd anymore but we let sbuild open >> > the path and then pass the filedescriptor to what we opened to zstd via its
    standard input.

    Ah yes, that would work of course!

    Probably harmless in terms of security too... riiight? :)

    yes. Do you have any suspicions why it would not be harmless?

    For reading files? Not really. And especially in this context, where the
    cache directory is owned by the user, I can't really think of an attack
    vector there that wouldn't already otherwise give the attacker RCE
    access (ie. if i can write to your ~/.cache i can write to your
    ~/.bashrc).

    a.
    --
    Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.
    - Arthur C. Clarke

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