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When we ask polar yes/no questions that have no
correct yes/no answer these questions themselves
are incorrect.
We can construct a coherent, consistent and reliable
foundation of expressions of language that are proven
completely true entirely on the basis of their meaning.
The only thing that screws that up is that we do not
reject incorrect questions.
----
Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
[ Followup-To: set ]
In comp.theory olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
When we ask polar yes/no questions that have no
correct yes/no answer these questions themselves
are incorrect.
We can construct a coherent, consistent and reliable
foundation of expressions of language that are proven
completely true entirely on the basis of their meaning.
The only thing that screws that up is that we do not
reject incorrect questions.
Where you screw up (at least, one of the places) is that you reject
correct questions.
--
Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
When we ask polar yes/no questions that have no
correct yes/no answer these questions themselves
are incorrect.
On 07/10/2025 16:05, olcott wrote:
When we ask polar yes/no questions that have no
correct yes/no answer these questions themselves
are incorrect.
Question: can any question be turned into an incorrect question by your definition?
Answer: yes.
Follow-up question: does this have any bearing on the Halting Problem?
Answer: no.
[...] All three of these are correct answers to correct questions.
On 07/10/2025 17:55, Richard Heathfield wrote:
On 07/10/2025 16:05, olcott wrote:
When we ask polar yes/no questions that have no
correct yes/no answer these questions themselves
are incorrect.
Question: can any question be turned into an incorrect question
by your definition?
Answer: yes.
That is not true.
On 07/10/2025 17:55, Richard Heathfield wrote:
On 07/10/2025 16:05, olcott wrote:
When we ask polar yes/no questions that have no
correct yes/no answer these questions themselves
are incorrect.
Question: can any question be turned into an incorrect question by
your definition?
Answer: yes.
That is not true.
The quoted sentence is quite correct *per se*, although it does
not mean what Olcott surreptitiously means: Olcott is assuming
that an unprovable statement is not valid, so making two mistakes
in one, as provability is relative; OTOH, the statement above
can be read as the constructive statement that classical logic
should be used "carefully", indeed only where it is valid, i.e.
only with *decidable* propositions.
Follow-up question: does this have any bearing on the Halting Problem?
Answer: no.
That too is not true: along the lines of what I said above, "is the
Halting problem a well-posed problem" is a perfectly valid question.
[...] All three of these are correct answers to correct questions.
Nope, except for the third maybe, which is irrelevant to the above
and the bigger scheme of things.
-Julio
On 10/8/2025 12:26 PM, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
On 07/10/2025 17:55, Richard Heathfield wrote:
On 07/10/2025 16:05, olcott wrote:
When we ask polar yes/no questions that have no
correct yes/no answer these questions themselves
are incorrect.
Question: can any question be turned into an incorrect question by
your definition?
Answer: yes.
That is not true.
The quoted sentence is quite correct *per se*, although it does
not mean what Olcott surreptitiously means: Olcott is assuming
that an unprovable statement is not valid, so making two mistakes
in one, as provability is relative; OTOH, the statement above
can be read as the constructive statement that classical logic
should be used "carefully", indeed only where it is valid, i.e.
only with *decidable* propositions.
"This sentence is not true" is neither true not false.
It is neither true nor false because it is self-contradictory
thus has no truth value, thus technically is not a truth-bearer.
Follow-up question: does this have any bearing on the Halting Problem?
Answer: no.
That too is not true: along the lines of what I said above, "is the
Halting problem a well-posed problem" is a perfectly valid question.
The halting problem was intentionally defined to be
self-contradictory just like the Liar Paradox.
void P()
{
if H(P) // returns 1 for halts 0 for loops
HERE: goto HERE;
}
For the set of H/P pairs of
decider H and input P:
If H says halts then P loops
If H says loops then P halts
making each H(P) always incorrect.
When posed to Carol:
Can Carol correctly answer rCLnorCY to this (yes no) question?
Carol's question is exactly analogous to the
above H(P), both answers from any H are the
wrong answer, just like both answers from any
Carol are the wrong answer.
The halting problem was intentionally defined to be
self-contradictory just like the Liar Paradox.
On 2025-10-08, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
On 10/8/2025 12:26 PM, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
On 07/10/2025 17:55, Richard Heathfield wrote:
On 07/10/2025 16:05, olcott wrote:
When we ask polar yes/no questions that have no
correct yes/no answer these questions themselves
are incorrect.
Question: can any question be turned into an incorrect question by
your definition?
Answer: yes.
That is not true.
The quoted sentence is quite correct *per se*, although it does
not mean what Olcott surreptitiously means: Olcott is assuming
that an unprovable statement is not valid, so making two mistakes
in one, as provability is relative; OTOH, the statement above
can be read as the constructive statement that classical logic
should be used "carefully", indeed only where it is valid, i.e.
only with *decidable* propositions.
"This sentence is not true" is neither true not false.
It is neither true nor false because it is self-contradictory
thus has no truth value, thus technically is not a truth-bearer.
A sentence which talks about any property of itself, or of any
part of itself, that is not truth value, then it is not contradictory!
"This sentence has four words" is flatly false; it is a truth-bearer.
The diagonal case in the halting proof is not a proposition. It talks
about no truth value at all, let alone a self-referential one. It is a machine which calculates and terminates or not; it perpetrates a self-reference in order to determine its course of action.
So there is no relationshp to a pathological sentence like the Liar
Paradox.
Incidentally, there are ways to have self-reference regarding truth
value such that the sentence is a truth-bearer. Consider:
"Every sentence that has an odd number of words is false"
If this sentence is regarded as true, it contradicts itself because
it has an odd number of words. But it easily accepts a value of false,
and then it doesn't contradict itself. NOT EVERY sentence that
has an odd number of words is false (clearly). But that one is.
Follow-up question: does this have any bearing on the Halting Problem? >>>>
Answer: no.
That too is not true: along the lines of what I said above, "is the
Halting problem a well-posed problem" is a perfectly valid question.
The halting problem was intentionally defined to be
self-contradictory just like the Liar Paradox.
No, it wasn't. The halting problem is necessarily self-referential
because it asks whether Turing Machines can decide the halting of
all Turing Machines (which means including themselves).
Even if you don't /like/ this, there is no way to redefine the problem
around it such that it is easier.
Even if machines are excused from deciding about themselves, or
about any machine which is built on themselves, the remaining
problem is still undecidable.
void P()
{
if H(P) // returns 1 for halts 0 for loops
HERE: goto HERE;
}
For the set of H/P pairs of
decider H and input P:
If H says halts then P loops
If H says loops then P halts
making each H(P) always incorrect.
That's not the halting problem; that's some mischaracterization of the elements of a proof regarding the halting problem, which uses a self-referential program.
When posed to Carol:
Can Carol correctly answer rCLnorCY to this (yes no) question?
Carol's question is exactly analogous to the
No it isn't. The "no" ansewr to Carol's question is both correct
and incorrect depending on whether Carol is answering.
The answer to the halting question about a machine is absolutely
yes or no, regardless of who is answering.
above H(P), both answers from any H are the
wrong answer, just like both answers from any
Carol are the wrong answer.
The answer opposite to the H one is the right answer,
unlike the Carol sentence. When Carol gives the answer "no",
the correct answer from a non-Carol is still "no".
On 10/8/2025 1:33 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
On 2025-10-08, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
On 10/8/2025 12:26 PM, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
On 07/10/2025 17:55, Richard Heathfield wrote:
On 07/10/2025 16:05, olcott wrote:
When we ask polar yes/no questions that have no
correct yes/no answer these questions themselves
are incorrect.
Question: can any question be turned into an incorrect question by
your definition?
Answer: yes.
That is not true.
The quoted sentence is quite correct *per se*, although it does
not mean what Olcott surreptitiously means: Olcott is assuming
that an unprovable statement is not valid, so making two mistakes
in one, as provability is relative; OTOH, the statement above
can be read as the constructive statement that classical logic
should be used "carefully", indeed only where it is valid, i.e.
only with *decidable* propositions.
"This sentence is not true" is neither true not false.
It is neither true nor false because it is self-contradictory
thus has no truth value, thus technically is not a truth-bearer.
A sentence which talks about any property of itself, or of any
part of itself, that is not truth value, then it is not contradictory!
"This sentence has four words" is flatly false; it is a truth-bearer.
Yes that is correct.
The diagonal case in the halting proof is not a proposition. It talks
about no truth value at all, let alone a self-referential one. It is a
machine which calculates and terminates or not; it perpetrates a
self-reference in order to determine its course of action.
It maps to a decision problem to a specific decider/input
pair template subset.
So there is no relationshp to a pathological sentence like the Liar
Paradox.
Incidentally, there are ways to have self-reference regarding truth
value such that the sentence is a truth-bearer. Consider:
"Every sentence that has an odd number of words is false"
If this sentence is regarded as true, it contradicts itself because
it has an odd number of words. But it easily accepts a value of false,
and then it doesn't contradict itself. NOT EVERY sentence that
has an odd number of words is false (clearly). But that one is.
Follow-up question: does this have any bearing on the Halting Problem? >>>>>
Answer: no.
That too is not true: along the lines of what I said above, "is the
Halting problem a well-posed problem" is a perfectly valid question.
The halting problem was intentionally defined to be
self-contradictory just like the Liar Paradox.
No, it wasn't. The halting problem is necessarily self-referential
because it asks whether Turing Machines can decide the halting of
all Turing Machines (which means including themselves).
Even if you don't /like/ this, there is no way to redefine the problem
around it such that it is easier.
Yes when you make sure to ignore what I say and
form a rebuttal on some other basis than what I
said it would certainly seem this way.
Even if machines are excused from deciding about themselves, or
about any machine which is built on themselves, the remaining
problem is still undecidable.
Not the best approach, but exactly how is that?
void P()
{
if H(P) // returns 1 for halts 0 for loops
HERE: goto HERE;
}
For the set of H/P pairs of
decider H and input P:
If H says halts then P loops
If H says loops then P halts
making each H(P) always incorrect.
That's not the halting problem; that's some mischaracterization of the
elements of a proof regarding the halting problem, which uses a
self-referential program.
That is the essence of the halting problem
counter-example proof.
When posed to Carol:
Can Carol correctly answer rCLnorCY to this (yes no) question?
Carol's question is exactly analogous to the
No it isn't. The "no" ansewr to Carol's question is both correct
and incorrect depending on whether Carol is answering.
That leeway was not permitted in the above specification.
The answer to the halting question about a machine is absolutely
yes or no, regardless of who is answering.
Proven false by the H/P pairs.
One cannot correctly ignore the linguistic context
of who is asked as an intrinsic and essential aspect
of the full meaning of the question.
When any H is asked about its corresponding P
it is always incorrect in the exact same way
that when any Carol is asked Carol's question
both answers are necessarily incorrect.
On 2025-10-08, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
On 10/8/2025 1:33 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
On 2025-10-08, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
On 10/8/2025 12:26 PM, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
On 07/10/2025 17:55, Richard Heathfield wrote:
On 07/10/2025 16:05, olcott wrote:
When we ask polar yes/no questions that have no
correct yes/no answer these questions themselves
are incorrect.
Question: can any question be turned into an incorrect question by >>>>>> your definition?
Answer: yes.
That is not true.
The quoted sentence is quite correct *per se*, although it does
not mean what Olcott surreptitiously means: Olcott is assuming
that an unprovable statement is not valid, so making two mistakes
in one, as provability is relative; OTOH, the statement above
can be read as the constructive statement that classical logic
should be used "carefully", indeed only where it is valid, i.e.
only with *decidable* propositions.
"This sentence is not true" is neither true not false.
It is neither true nor false because it is self-contradictory
thus has no truth value, thus technically is not a truth-bearer.
A sentence which talks about any property of itself, or of any
part of itself, that is not truth value, then it is not contradictory!
"This sentence has four words" is flatly false; it is a truth-bearer.
Yes that is correct.
The diagonal case in the halting proof is not a proposition. It talks
about no truth value at all, let alone a self-referential one. It is a
machine which calculates and terminates or not; it perpetrates a
self-reference in order to determine its course of action.
It maps to a decision problem to a specific decider/input
pair template subset.
The decision problem is only about the input, and has a correct
answer for that input.
The input's halting behavior /depends/ on a certain decider producing
the wrong answer on that input.
So there is no relationshp to a pathological sentence like the Liar
Paradox.
Incidentally, there are ways to have self-reference regarding truth
value such that the sentence is a truth-bearer. Consider:
"Every sentence that has an odd number of words is false"
If this sentence is regarded as true, it contradicts itself because
it has an odd number of words. But it easily accepts a value of false,
and then it doesn't contradict itself. NOT EVERY sentence that
has an odd number of words is false (clearly). But that one is.
Follow-up question: does this have any bearing on the Halting Problem? >>>>>>
Answer: no.
That too is not true: along the lines of what I said above, "is the
Halting problem a well-posed problem" is a perfectly valid question. >>>>>
The halting problem was intentionally defined to be
self-contradictory just like the Liar Paradox.
No, it wasn't. The halting problem is necessarily self-referential
because it asks whether Turing Machines can decide the halting of
all Turing Machines (which means including themselves).
Even if you don't /like/ this, there is no way to redefine the problem
around it such that it is easier.
Yes when you make sure to ignore what I say and
form a rebuttal on some other basis than what I
said it would certainly seem this way.
What you say is garbage. You cannot build on garbage.
Even if machines are excused from deciding about themselves, or
about any machine which is built on themselves, the remaining
problem is still undecidable.
Not the best approach, but exactly how is that?
Because it leaves the decision problem.
void P()
{
if H(P) // returns 1 for halts 0 for loops
HERE: goto HERE;
}
For the set of H/P pairs of
decider H and input P:
If H says halts then P loops
If H says loops then P halts
making each H(P) always incorrect.
That's not the halting problem; that's some mischaracterization of the
elements of a proof regarding the halting problem, which uses a
self-referential program.
That is the essence of the halting problem
counter-example proof.
When posed to Carol:
Can Carol correctly answer rCLnorCY to this (yes no) question?
Carol's question is exactly analogous to the
No it isn't. The "no" ansewr to Carol's question is both correct
and incorrect depending on whether Carol is answering.
That leeway was not permitted in the above specification.
So then that's another way the question is not analogous to anything in halting.
In halting it is an open question whether a machine halts, open
to any decider whatsoever, not posed strictly to a certain decider. It
has a right answer.
The answer to the halting question about a machine is absolutely
yes or no, regardless of who is answering.
Proven false by the H/P pairs.
No, it isn't. The diagonal pairs only show a decider getting it wrong;
and in every such case, the opposite answer is the right one.
One cannot correctly ignore the linguistic context
of who is asked as an intrinsic and essential aspect
of the full meaning of the question.
There is no such context in halting.
The question "does this
machine halt" has no such context; it is not subjective
to who/what is being tasked with answering.
When any H is asked about its corresponding P
it is always incorrect in the exact same way
You are using the word "always" to refer to one instance.
It's kind of like saying 2 is "always" located between 1 and 3.
H(P) produces exactly /one/ answer which is wrong.
There are other H's that produce wrong answers for their
respective P's.
Every P is "custom-built" on its respective H, showing a behavior that /depends/ on the respective H giving the incorrect answer.
You can't change the answer without changing to a different H
which changes P.
that when any Carol is asked Carol's question
both answers are necessarily incorrect.
Unlike H Carol doesn't become a different person by trying different
answer. For the analogy to even begin to have slight baby teeth, you
need different Carols, e.g.
"Question003: can Carol003 answer 'no' to Question003?"
Suppose Carol003 answers "no", and that is such an inseparable characteristics of Carol003 that Carol003 can give no other
answer.
A different Carol, Carol004 can correctl answer Question003,
giving the correct answer "no".
But Carol004 does not correctly answer Question004. Carol004's
characteristic answer is "yes", which is wrong. Carol004 cannot
try any other answer; that would make her a different Carol.
This personification analogy business is really just a fool's
errand that doesn't lead anywhere.
On 10/8/2025 2:46 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
On 2025-10-08, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
On 10/8/2025 1:33 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
On 2025-10-08, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
On 10/8/2025 12:26 PM, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
On 07/10/2025 17:55, Richard Heathfield wrote:
On 07/10/2025 16:05, olcott wrote:
When we ask polar yes/no questions that have no
correct yes/no answer these questions themselves
are incorrect.
Question: can any question be turned into an incorrect question by >>>>>>> your definition?
Answer: yes.
That is not true.
The quoted sentence is quite correct *per se*, although it does
not mean what Olcott surreptitiously means: Olcott is assuming
that an unprovable statement is not valid, so making two mistakes
in one, as provability is relative; OTOH, the statement above
can be read as the constructive statement that classical logic
should be used "carefully", indeed only where it is valid, i.e.
only with *decidable* propositions.
"This sentence is not true" is neither true not false.
It is neither true nor false because it is self-contradictory
thus has no truth value, thus technically is not a truth-bearer.
A sentence which talks about any property of itself, or of any
part of itself, that is not truth value, then it is not contradictory! >>>>
"This sentence has four words" is flatly false; it is a truth-bearer.
Yes that is correct.
The diagonal case in the halting proof is not a proposition. It talks >>>> about no truth value at all, let alone a self-referential one. It is a >>>> machine which calculates and terminates or not; it perpetrates a
self-reference in order to determine its course of action.
It maps to a decision problem to a specific decider/input
pair template subset.
The decision problem is only about the input, and has a correct
answer for that input.
There is a subset of H/P decider/input pairs such that
both accept and reject are the wrong answer.
Yes when you make sure to ignore what I say and
form a rebuttal on some other basis than what I
said it would certainly seem this way.
What you say is garbage. You cannot build on garbage.
The notion of a the semantic halting property specified by
*AN INPUT* finite string machine description is certainly
not nonsense.
Proven false by the H/P pairs.
No, it isn't. The diagonal pairs only show a decider getting it wrong;
and in every such case, the opposite answer is the right one.
No. Every H/P pairs gets the wrong answer even
the ones that say the opposite of the other one.
You are trying to weasel out of the full meaning of
the question that also crucially depends on who is asked.
One cannot correctly ignore the linguistic context
of who is asked as an intrinsic and essential aspect
of the full meaning of the question.
There is no such context in halting.
The no computer science person is aware of this crucial
aspect of of expressions of language derive their meaning
is no excuse.
The question "does this
machine halt" has no such context; it is not subjective
to who/what is being tasked with answering.
That is proven to be false two different ways.
Your indoctrination is no substitute for correct reasoning.
When any H is asked about its corresponding P
it is always incorrect in the exact same way
You are using the word "always" to refer to one instance.
No your indoctrination is causing you to fail to
pay enough attention.
*For the set of H/P pairs*
On 2025-10-08, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
On 10/8/2025 2:46 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
On 2025-10-08, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
On 10/8/2025 1:33 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
On 2025-10-08, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
On 10/8/2025 12:26 PM, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
On 07/10/2025 17:55, Richard Heathfield wrote:
On 07/10/2025 16:05, olcott wrote:
When we ask polar yes/no questions that have no
correct yes/no answer these questions themselves
are incorrect.
Question: can any question be turned into an incorrect question by >>>>>>>> your definition?
Answer: yes.
That is not true.
The quoted sentence is quite correct *per se*, although it does
not mean what Olcott surreptitiously means: Olcott is assuming
that an unprovable statement is not valid, so making two mistakes >>>>>>> in one, as provability is relative; OTOH, the statement above
can be read as the constructive statement that classical logic
should be used "carefully", indeed only where it is valid, i.e.
only with *decidable* propositions.
"This sentence is not true" is neither true not false.
It is neither true nor false because it is self-contradictory
thus has no truth value, thus technically is not a truth-bearer.
A sentence which talks about any property of itself, or of any
part of itself, that is not truth value, then it is not contradictory! >>>>>
"This sentence has four words" is flatly false; it is a truth-bearer. >>>>>
Yes that is correct.
The diagonal case in the halting proof is not a proposition. It talks >>>>> about no truth value at all, let alone a self-referential one. It is a >>>>> machine which calculates and terminates or not; it perpetrates a
self-reference in order to determine its course of action.
It maps to a decision problem to a specific decider/input
pair template subset.
The decision problem is only about the input, and has a correct
answer for that input.
There is a subset of H/P decider/input pairs such that
both accept and reject are the wrong answer.
I'm afraid there isn't; how could you still have such an idea after
so many years at this, and debating with enough people who have their
heads screwed on right.
There is no H/P pair in which more than one answer occurs.
We can find a set of H/P pairs, which contains as few as tww pairs,
such that both answers appear:
{ <H1, P1>, <H2, P2> }
Say H1(P1) yields False, nd H2(P2) yields True. Then we have both
answers. Both are wrong, but if we flip them they are right: P1
halts, P2 doesn't.
Yes when you make sure to ignore what I say and
form a rebuttal on some other basis than what I
said it would certainly seem this way.
What you say is garbage. You cannot build on garbage.
The notion of a the semantic halting property specified by
*AN INPUT* finite string machine description is certainly
not nonsense.
Which is why everyone agrees with that so you might want to spend
energy elsewhere than repeating that.
Proven false by the H/P pairs.
No, it isn't. The diagonal pairs only show a decider getting it wrong;
and in every such case, the opposite answer is the right one.
No. Every H/P pairs gets the wrong answer even
the ones that say the opposite of the other one.
What other one? Given H1 decider which is wrong on the H1(P1)
question, what is an "other one"? An other case, like P2?
H1(P2) can certainly give the right answer, in spite of
not giving one for H1(P1).
You are trying to weasel out of the full meaning of
the question that also crucially depends on who is asked.
No, it doesn't. What depends on which decider is asked
is: whether the answer can be correct.
That there is a correct answer, and which answer that is,
doesn't depend on that at all.
One cannot correctly ignore the linguistic context
of who is asked as an intrinsic and essential aspect
of the full meaning of the question.
There is no such context in halting.
The no computer science person is aware of this crucial
aspect of of expressions of language derive their meaning
is no excuse.
Computer science people are specifically aware of the
crucial lack of extraneous context in the question.
Whether a machine halts is entirely bound up in the
description of tha tmachine, and nothing else.
The question "does this
machine halt" has no such context; it is not subjective
to who/what is being tasked with answering.
That is proven to be false two different ways.
Your indoctrination is no substitute for correct reasoning.
When any H is asked about its corresponding P
it is always incorrect in the exact same way
You are using the word "always" to refer to one instance.
No your indoctrination is causing you to fail to
pay enough attention.
Almost all I know about the halting problem is from this newsgroup; I've never paid that much attention to the topic outside of the scope of discussing it with you.
Coming here with a nearly blank mind in this matter, I have quickly discovered that your reasoning is flawed.
*For the set of H/P pairs*
In a set, you need to distinguish the members. The set of diagonal H/P
pairs does not consist of H that can change its answer and be wrong.
On 2025-10-08, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
On 10/8/2025 2:46 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
On 2025-10-08, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
On 10/8/2025 1:33 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
On 2025-10-08, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
On 10/8/2025 12:26 PM, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
On 07/10/2025 17:55, Richard Heathfield wrote:
On 07/10/2025 16:05, olcott wrote:
When we ask polar yes/no questions that have no
correct yes/no answer these questions themselves
are incorrect.
Question: can any question be turned into an incorrect question by >>>>>>>> your definition?
Answer: yes.
That is not true.
The quoted sentence is quite correct *per se*, although it does
not mean what Olcott surreptitiously means: Olcott is assuming
that an unprovable statement is not valid, so making two mistakes >>>>>>> in one, as provability is relative; OTOH, the statement above
can be read as the constructive statement that classical logic
should be used "carefully", indeed only where it is valid, i.e.
only with *decidable* propositions.
"This sentence is not true" is neither true not false.
It is neither true nor false because it is self-contradictory
thus has no truth value, thus technically is not a truth-bearer.
A sentence which talks about any property of itself, or of any
part of itself, that is not truth value, then it is not contradictory! >>>>>
"This sentence has four words" is flatly false; it is a truth-bearer. >>>>>
Yes that is correct.
The diagonal case in the halting proof is not a proposition. It talks >>>>> about no truth value at all, let alone a self-referential one. It is a >>>>> machine which calculates and terminates or not; it perpetrates a
self-reference in order to determine its course of action.
It maps to a decision problem to a specific decider/input
pair template subset.
The decision problem is only about the input, and has a correct
answer for that input.
There is a subset of H/P decider/input pairs such that
both accept and reject are the wrong answer.
I'm afraid there isn't; how could you still have such an idea after
so many years at this, and debating with enough people who have their
heads screwed on right.
There is no H/P pair in which more than one answer occurs.
We can find a set of H/P pairs, which contains as few as tww pairs,
such that both answers appear:
{ <H1, P1>, <H2, P2> }
Say H1(P1) yields False, nd H2(P2) yields True. Then we have both
answers. Both are wrong, but if we flip them they are right: P1
halts, P2 doesn't.
Yes when you make sure to ignore what I say and
form a rebuttal on some other basis than what I
said it would certainly seem this way.
What you say is garbage. You cannot build on garbage.
The notion of a the semantic halting property specified by
*AN INPUT* finite string machine description is certainly
not nonsense.
Which is why everyone agrees with that so you might want to spend
energy elsewhere than repeating that.
Proven false by the H/P pairs.
No, it isn't. The diagonal pairs only show a decider getting it wrong;
and in every such case, the opposite answer is the right one.
No. Every H/P pairs gets the wrong answer even
the ones that say the opposite of the other one.
What other one? Given H1 decider which is wrong on the H1(P1)
question, what is an "other one"? An other case, like P2?
H1(P2) can certainly give the right answer, in spite of
not giving one for H1(P1).
You are trying to weasel out of the full meaning of
the question that also crucially depends on who is asked.
No, it doesn't. What depends on which decider is asked
is: whether the answer can be correct.
That there is a correct answer, and which answer that is,
doesn't depend on that at all.
One cannot correctly ignore the linguistic context
of who is asked as an intrinsic and essential aspect
of the full meaning of the question.
There is no such context in halting.
The no computer science person is aware of this crucial
aspect of of expressions of language derive their meaning
is no excuse.
Computer science people are specifically aware of the
crucial lack of extraneous context in the question.
Whether a machine halts is entirely bound up in the
description of tha tmachine, and nothing else.
The question "does this
machine halt" has no such context; it is not subjective
to who/what is being tasked with answering.
That is proven to be false two different ways.
Your indoctrination is no substitute for correct reasoning.
When any H is asked about its corresponding P
it is always incorrect in the exact same way
You are using the word "always" to refer to one instance.
No your indoctrination is causing you to fail to
pay enough attention.
Almost all I know about the halting problem is from this newsgroup; I've never paid that much attention to the topic outside of the scope of discussing it with you.
Coming here with a nearly blank mind in this matter, I have quickly discovered that your reasoning is flawed.
*For the set of H/P pairs*
In a set, you need to distinguish the members. The set of diagonal H/P
pairs does not consist of H that can change its answer and be wrong.
For the set of H/P pairs of
decider H and input P:
If H says halts then P loops
If H says loops then P halts
making each H(P) always incorrect.
The above specifies one template of every
H that gets the wrong answer on P.
You are trying to weasel out of the full meaning of
the question that also crucially depends on who is asked.
No, it doesn't. What depends on which decider is asked
is: whether the answer can be correct.
Every element of the H/P template gets
the wrong answer because the H/P template
copied the self-contradictory of the Liar Paradox.
That there is a correct answer, and which answer that is,
doesn't depend on that at all.
I say that Carol cannot give a correct answer
and you said yes she can when she is Bob.
One cannot correctly ignore the linguistic context
of who is asked as an intrinsic and essential aspect
of the full meaning of the question.
There is no such context in halting.
The no computer science person is aware of this crucial
aspect of of expressions of language derive their meaning
is no excuse.
Computer science people are specifically aware of the
crucial lack of extraneous context in the question.
The context of who is asked is an aspect of the
full meaning of a question and is required whether
you know this or not.
Almost all I know about the halting problem is from this newsgroup; I've
never paid that much attention to the topic outside of the scope of
discussing it with you.
So where did you get Turing computability from?
On 10/8/2025 3:19 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
I am not going to stop until the halting problem
is renamed the naive halting problem and my
change is accepted as the halting problem
(just like how ZFC got rid of Russell's Paradox)
I am not going to stop until the halting problem
is renamed
On 08/10/2025 21:35, olcott wrote:
I am not going to stop until the halting problem
is renamed
I think we can actually take that at face value.
On 2025-10-08, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
On 10/8/2025 3:19 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
I am not going to stop until the halting problem
is renamed the naive halting problem and my
change is accepted as the halting problem
(just like how ZFC got rid of Russell's Paradox)
The difference is that Russel's paradox (In regard to the set of all
sets which do not contain themselves: does that set contain itself?)
is a kind of nonsense. Such a set it not constructable.
If you draw an analogy between the Liar Paradox and that of Russel,
I can swallow that.
But anyway, we can think of a "set which contains almost all sets
which do not contain themselves, except that it arbitrarily excludes
itself"; such an emergency repair doesn't seem possible on the Liar
Paradox.
Be that as it may, diagonal cases in halting are constructable, so you
can't dismiss them. The halting problem is real; it is not angels
on the head of a pin material.
On 2025-10-08, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
For the set of H/P pairs of
decider H and input P:
If H says halts then P loops
If H says loops then P halts
making each H(P) always incorrect.
A better way to say it is like this:
Consider the set S of diagonal decider/input pairs. If <H, P> is any arbitrarily chosen pair from this set, then one of these three
possibilities is true: H(P) indicates halting, H(P) indicates
non-halting or else H(P) fails to terminate. If H(P) indicates halting,
then P is necessarily non-halting, and vice versa. (If H(P) doesn't
halt, P could be either.) In all three cases, H fails to decide P
correctly, or at all.
The above specifies one template of every
H that gets the wrong answer on P.
But the template is nothing without instantiation.
The template's structure allows us to reason about an infinite such set
S of diagonal pairs and be sure that each H in that set fails to decide
its respective P.
You are trying to weasel out of the full meaning of
the question that also crucially depends on who is asked.
No, it doesn't. What depends on which decider is asked
is: whether the answer can be correct.
Every element of the H/P template gets
the wrong answer because the H/P template
copied the self-contradictory of the Liar Paradox.
No it doesn't because for every P, there is a right answer,
Whereas the Liar Paradox is not even a set of sentences; it is one,
and it is not a truth-bearer.
We can have a set of self-referential sentences that are all false!
S = { "This sentence has two words",
"This sentence has three words",
"This sentence has four words",
"This sentence does not have eight words"
... }
The existence of a set with falsehoods doesn't necessarily point to
anything being pathological, even if they involve self-reference, and
even if the set is infinite.
That there is a correct answer, and which answer that is,
doesn't depend on that at all.
I say that Carol cannot give a correct answer
and you said yes she can when she is Bob.
If you allow the question to be answered by Bob,
then Bob can certainly say that the correct answer is no;
No, Carol cannot answer 'no' to the question and be correct.
The problem is that this correct 'no' answer given by Bob
remains correct for Bob even if Carol herself is giving
the same answer, which is wrong for her.
So there is a problem in the Carol sentence.
One cannot correctly ignore the linguistic context
of who is asked as an intrinsic and essential aspect
of the full meaning of the question.
There is no such context in halting.
The no computer science person is aware of this crucial
aspect of of expressions of language derive their meaning
is no excuse.
Computer science people are specifically aware of the
crucial lack of extraneous context in the question.
The context of who is asked is an aspect of the
full meaning of a question and is required whether
you know this or not.
That is false. In a formal system which we invented from its bare
axioms, we precisely dictate whether there is any such context or not,
along with every other detail.
In the halting problem, there isn't.
In interpersonal questions between people, there is often a context, but
even there, there isn't.
Questions about external facts don't require personal context. E.g. what
is the speed of light in vaccuum, or the permeability of free space.
Almost all I know about the halting problem is from this newsgroup; I've >>> never paid that much attention to the topic outside of the scope of
discussing it with you.
So where did you get Turing computability from?
Looking up references, and brushing up on the material.
I have a decent computing background, but I'm not an academic and I've
never been focused on the halting problem. It makes no difference to me. Problems which are known to have "halting difficulty" often have
complexity issues that you hit long before the theoretical limit, as a programmer.
On 10/8/2025 4:20 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
On 2025-10-08, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
For the set of H/P pairs of
decider H and input P:
If H says halts then P loops
If H says loops then P halts
making each H(P) always incorrect.
A better way to say it is like this:
Consider the set S of diagonal decider/input pairs.-a If <H, P> is any
arbitrarily chosen pair from this set, then one of these three
possibilities is true: H(P) indicates halting, H(P) indicates
non-halting or else H(P) fails to terminate.-a If H(P) indicates halting,
then P is necessarily non-halting, and vice versa. (If H(P) doesn't
halt, P could be either.) In all three cases, H fails to decide P
correctly, or at all.
The above specifies one template of every
H that gets the wrong answer on P.
But the template is nothing without instantiation.
The template's structure allows us to reason about an infinite such set
S of diagonal pairs and be sure that each H in that set fails to decide
its respective P.
You are trying to weasel out of the full meaning of
the question that also crucially depends on who is asked.
No, it doesn't. What depends on which decider is asked
is: whether the answer can be correct.
Every element of the H/P template gets
the wrong answer because the H/P template
copied the self-contradictory of the Liar Paradox.
No it doesn't because for every P, there is a right answer,
Whereas the Liar Paradox is not even a set of sentences; it is one,
and it is not a truth-bearer.
We can have a set of self-referential sentences that are all false!
S = { "This sentence has two words",
-a-a-a-a-a-a "This sentence has three words",
-a-a-a-a-a-a "This sentence has four words",
-a-a-a-a-a-a "This sentence does not have eight words"
-a-a-a-a-a-a ... }
The existence of a set with falsehoods doesn't necessarily point to
anything being pathological, even if they involve self-reference, and
even if the set is infinite.
That there is a correct answer, and which answer that is,
doesn't depend on that at all.
I say that Carol cannot give a correct answer
and you said yes she can when she is Bob.
If you allow the question to be answered by Bob,
then Bob can certainly say that the correct answer is no;
No, Carol cannot answer 'no' to the question and be correct.
The problem is that this correct 'no' answer given by Bob
remains correct for Bob even if Carol herself is giving
the same answer, which is wrong for her.
So there is a problem in the Carol sentence.
One cannot correctly ignore the linguistic context
of who is asked as an intrinsic and essential aspect
of the full meaning of the question.
There is no such context in halting.
The no computer science person is aware of this crucial
aspect of of expressions of language derive their meaning
is no excuse.
Computer science people are specifically aware of the
crucial lack of extraneous context in the question.
The context of who is asked is an aspect of the
full meaning of a question and is required whether
you know this or not.
That is false. In a formal system which we invented from its bare
axioms, we precisely dictate whether there is any such context or not,
along with every other detail.
In the halting problem, there isn't.
In interpersonal questions between people, there is often a context, but
even there, there isn't.
Questions about external facts don't require personal context. E.g. what
is the speed of light in vaccuum, or the permeability of free space.
Almost all I know about the halting problem is from this newsgroup;
I've
never paid that much attention to the topic outside of the scope of
discussing it with you.
So where did you get Turing computability from?
Looking up references, and brushing up on the material.
I have a decent computing background, but I'm not an academic and I've
never been focused on the halting problem. It makes no difference to me.
Problems which are known to have "halting difficulty" often have
complexity issues that you hit long before the theoretical limit, as a
programmer.
What is your programming expertise?
I have been doing C++ off and on full time
since 2000. Mostly systems level programming.
On 10/9/2025 8:02 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 6:54 PM, dbush wrote:
On 10/9/2025 7:49 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 4:34 PM, dbush wrote:
On 10/9/2025 4:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 3:13 PM, dbush wrote:
On 10/9/2025 4:08 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 2:36 PM, dbush wrote:
On 10/9/2025 3:30 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 2:21 PM, dbush wrote:
On 10/9/2025 3:12 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
On 10/9/2025 2:26 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 1:06 PM, dbush wrote:
On 10/9/2025 1:58 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 11:29 AM, dbush wrote:
On 10/9/2025 12:23 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 11:00 AM, dbush wrote:
On 10/9/2025 11:49 AM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 10:22 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>Which is exactly what Tarski when he assumed a truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> predicate exists and then concluded through a series >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of truth preserving operations that the resulting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system contained the liar paradox,
[ .... ]
I have already sufficiently proven my rebuttal of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> G||delYou really don't understand proof by contradiction, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> do you?
incompleteness and Tarski Undefinability. I had to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> talk
to someone that did not have their ego and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> identity tied
to the received view.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
Rejects the Liar Paradox that Tarski Undefinability >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depends upon, thus nullifying his whole proof. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
You really don't understand that formal systems >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of logic are required to have only truth bearers >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and that non truth bearers must be rejected. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Saul Kripke (1975) proved otherwise in his >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Outline of a Theory of Truth
https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> blogs.dir/1358/ files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Truth.pdf
Starting with truth
And the assumption that a truth predicate exists >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
and only applying truth preserving
operations prevents the Liar Paradox from coming into >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> existence
False, as Tarski proved.
Starting with truth and only applying truth
preserving operations only truth is derived.
(Olcott 2024)
And if you start with truth and the assumption that a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth predicate exists and only apply truth preserving >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> operations and derive the liar paradox, that proves that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the assumption that a truth predicate exists is false. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
You have this backwards.
Starting with truth and only applying truth
preserving operations only truth is derived.
(Olcott 2024)
derives a correct and consistent Truth predicate
and the Liar Paradox is never reached.
False.-a Tarski assumed the existence of a truth predicate >>>>>>>>>>>>> and applied truth preserving operations to derive the liar >>>>>>>>>>>>> paradox.
Show me the steps of how he derived the Liar Paradox
by applying only truth preserving operations to known truth. >>>>>>>>>>>>
Here is the step of how how derived that out of thin air: >>>>>>>>>>>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
Those pages are a high-level overview, not the proof itself. >>>>>>>>>>>
Read the whole thing, not just the summary, then point out >>>>>>>>>>> the step in the *actual proof* that did not apply truth >>>>>>>>>>> preserving operations.
In other words you cannot show anywhere in the
proof
You didn't show the proof.-a You showed a high-level overview. >>>>>>>>>
If you know that Tarski derived the Liar Paradox
by applying only truth preserving operations to
known truths
PLUS the assumption that a correct truth predicate exists,
thereby proving that assumption false.
He did not derive the liar paradox by applying
truth preserving operations to known true statements
you are just flat out lying about this.
Either you have abysmal reading comprehension or you are
intentionally lying about what others say to push your agenda.
Read again:
He derived the liar paradox by applying truth preserving operations >>>>> to knows true statements
*Prove it or your are a damned liar*
*Prove it or your are a damned liar*
*Prove it or your are a damned liar*
*Prove it or your are a damned liar*
*Prove it or your are a damned liar*
The fact that you stopped reading here
*in addition to* the assumption that a correct truth predicate
exists.-a Thus proving that assumption false.
And didn't bother to look at this part proves you're lying to push
your agenda and have no interest in the truth.
Page number and link to the source
It's common knowledge to those that know the proof that it's a proof by contradiction that does exactly that.
But if it makes you happy, I'll pull something from the high level
overview you posted.-a In fact, I'll use your highlighted passages:
Should we succeed in constructing in the metalanguage a correct
definition of truth
i.e. given the assumption that a truth predicate exists
it would then be possible to reconstruct the antimony of the liar
paradox in the metalanguage
i.e. truth preserving operations can be applied to that assumption
together with known true statements to derive the liar paradox.
Therefore proving the assumption that a truth predicate exists to be false.
On 10/9/2025 7:13 PM, dbush wrote:
On 10/9/2025 8:02 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 6:54 PM, dbush wrote:
On 10/9/2025 7:49 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 4:34 PM, dbush wrote:
On 10/9/2025 4:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 3:13 PM, dbush wrote:
On 10/9/2025 4:08 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 2:36 PM, dbush wrote:
On 10/9/2025 3:30 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 2:21 PM, dbush wrote:
On 10/9/2025 3:12 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
On 10/9/2025 2:26 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 1:06 PM, dbush wrote:
On 10/9/2025 1:58 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 11:29 AM, dbush wrote:
On 10/9/2025 12:23 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 11:00 AM, dbush wrote:
On 10/9/2025 11:49 AM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 10:22 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>Which is exactly what Tarski when he assumed a truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> predicate exists and then concluded through a series >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of truth preserving operations that the resulting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system contained the liar paradox,
[ .... ]
I have already sufficiently proven my rebuttal of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> G||delYou really don't understand proof by >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contradiction, do you?
incompleteness and Tarski Undefinability. I had >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to talk
to someone that did not have their ego and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> identity tied
to the received view.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
Rejects the Liar Paradox that Tarski Undefinability >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depends upon, thus nullifying his whole proof. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
You really don't understand that formal systems >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of logic are required to have only truth bearers >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and that non truth bearers must be rejected. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Saul Kripke (1975) proved otherwise in his >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Outline of a Theory of Truth
https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> blogs.dir/1358/ files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Truth.pdf
Starting with truth
And the assumption that a truth predicate exists >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
and only applying truth preserving
operations prevents the Liar Paradox from coming into >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> existence
False, as Tarski proved.
Starting with truth and only applying truth
preserving operations only truth is derived. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (Olcott 2024)
And if you start with truth and the assumption that a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth predicate exists and only apply truth preserving >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> operations and derive the liar paradox, that proves that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the assumption that a truth predicate exists is false. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
You have this backwards.
Starting with truth and only applying truth
preserving operations only truth is derived.
(Olcott 2024)
derives a correct and consistent Truth predicate >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and the Liar Paradox is never reached.
False.-a Tarski assumed the existence of a truth predicate >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and applied truth preserving operations to derive the liar >>>>>>>>>>>>>> paradox.
Show me the steps of how he derived the Liar Paradox >>>>>>>>>>>>> by applying only truth preserving operations to known truth. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
Here is the step of how how derived that out of thin air: >>>>>>>>>>>>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
Those pages are a high-level overview, not the proof itself. >>>>>>>>>>>>
Read the whole thing, not just the summary, then point out >>>>>>>>>>>> the step in the *actual proof* that did not apply truth >>>>>>>>>>>> preserving operations.
In other words you cannot show anywhere in the
proof
You didn't show the proof.-a You showed a high-level overview. >>>>>>>>>>
If you know that Tarski derived the Liar Paradox
by applying only truth preserving operations to
known truths
PLUS the assumption that a correct truth predicate exists,
thereby proving that assumption false.
He did not derive the liar paradox by applying
truth preserving operations to known true statements
you are just flat out lying about this.
Either you have abysmal reading comprehension or you are
intentionally lying about what others say to push your agenda.
Read again:
He derived the liar paradox by applying truth preserving
operations to knows true statements
*Prove it or your are a damned liar*
*Prove it or your are a damned liar*
*Prove it or your are a damned liar*
*Prove it or your are a damned liar*
*Prove it or your are a damned liar*
The fact that you stopped reading here
*in addition to* the assumption that a correct truth predicate
exists.-a Thus proving that assumption false.
And didn't bother to look at this part proves you're lying to push
your agenda and have no interest in the truth.
Page number and link to the source
It's common knowledge to those that know the proof that it's a proof
by contradiction that does exactly that.
But if it makes you happy, I'll pull something from the high level
overview you posted.-a In fact, I'll use your highlighted passages:
Should we succeed in constructing in the metalanguage a correct
definition of truth
i.e. given the assumption that a truth predicate exists
it would then be possible to reconstruct the antimony of the liar
paradox in the metalanguage
i.e. truth preserving operations can be applied to that assumption
together with known true statements to derive the liar paradox.
Therefore proving the assumption that a truth predicate exists to be
false.
I just went over Kripke's work and Tarski's work and Kripke
is correct and Tarski is incorrect. It turns out that Kripke
avoids the Liar Paradox by starting with truth and only
applying truth preserving operations.
The Liar Paradox thenNope, he shows that the existence of an truth predicate allows such expressions to be created.
simply becomes ungrounded in truth.
Tarski big mistake is believing that a truth predicate
should apply to self-contradictory expressions.
On 10/9/2025 10:14 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 7:13 PM, dbush wrote:
On 10/9/2025 8:02 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 6:54 PM, dbush wrote:
On 10/9/2025 7:49 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 4:34 PM, dbush wrote:
On 10/9/2025 4:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 3:13 PM, dbush wrote:
On 10/9/2025 4:08 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 2:36 PM, dbush wrote:
On 10/9/2025 3:30 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 2:21 PM, dbush wrote:
On 10/9/2025 3:12 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
On 10/9/2025 2:26 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 1:06 PM, dbush wrote:
On 10/9/2025 1:58 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 11:29 AM, dbush wrote:
On 10/9/2025 12:23 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 11:00 AM, dbush wrote:
On 10/9/2025 11:49 AM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 10/9/2025 10:22 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>Saul Kripke (1975) proved otherwise in his >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Outline of a Theory of Truth
Which is exactly what Tarski when he assumed a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth predicate exists and then concluded through a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> series of truth preserving operations that the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> resulting system contained the liar paradox, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>[ .... ]
I have already sufficiently proven my rebuttal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of G||delYou really don't understand proof by >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contradiction, do you?
incompleteness and Tarski Undefinability. I had >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to talk
to someone that did not have their ego and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> identity tied
to the received view.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
Rejects the Liar Paradox that Tarski Undefinability >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depends upon, thus nullifying his whole proof. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
You really don't understand that formal systems >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of logic are required to have only truth bearers >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and that non truth bearers must be rejected. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> blogs.dir/1358/ files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of- Truth.pdf
Starting with truth
And the assumption that a truth predicate exists >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
and only applying truth preserving
operations prevents the Liar Paradox from coming into >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> existence
False, as Tarski proved.
Starting with truth and only applying truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preserving operations only truth is derived. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (Olcott 2024)
And if you start with truth and the assumption that a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth predicate exists and only apply truth preserving >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> operations and derive the liar paradox, that proves >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the assumption that a truth predicate exists is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
You have this backwards.
Starting with truth and only applying truth
preserving operations only truth is derived.
(Olcott 2024)
derives a correct and consistent Truth predicate >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and the Liar Paradox is never reached.
False.-a Tarski assumed the existence of a truth predicate >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and applied truth preserving operations to derive the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> liar paradox.
Show me the steps of how he derived the Liar Paradox >>>>>>>>>>>>>> by applying only truth preserving operations to known truth. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Here is the step of how how derived that out of thin air: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
Those pages are a high-level overview, not the proof itself. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
Read the whole thing, not just the summary, then point out >>>>>>>>>>>>> the step in the *actual proof* that did not apply truth >>>>>>>>>>>>> preserving operations.
In other words you cannot show anywhere in the
proof
You didn't show the proof.-a You showed a high-level overview. >>>>>>>>>>>
If you know that Tarski derived the Liar Paradox
by applying only truth preserving operations to
known truths
PLUS the assumption that a correct truth predicate exists,
thereby proving that assumption false.
He did not derive the liar paradox by applying
truth preserving operations to known true statements
you are just flat out lying about this.
Either you have abysmal reading comprehension or you are
intentionally lying about what others say to push your agenda.
Read again:
He derived the liar paradox by applying truth preserving
operations to knows true statements
*Prove it or your are a damned liar*
*Prove it or your are a damned liar*
*Prove it or your are a damned liar*
*Prove it or your are a damned liar*
*Prove it or your are a damned liar*
The fact that you stopped reading here
*in addition to* the assumption that a correct truth predicate
exists.-a Thus proving that assumption false.
And didn't bother to look at this part proves you're lying to push
your agenda and have no interest in the truth.
Page number and link to the source
It's common knowledge to those that know the proof that it's a proof
by contradiction that does exactly that.
But if it makes you happy, I'll pull something from the high level
overview you posted.-a In fact, I'll use your highlighted passages:
Should we succeed in constructing in the metalanguage a correct
definition of truth
i.e. given the assumption that a truth predicate exists
it would then be possible to reconstruct the antimony of the liar
paradox in the metalanguage
i.e. truth preserving operations can be applied to that assumption
together with known true statements to derive the liar paradox.
Therefore proving the assumption that a truth predicate exists to be
false.
I just went over Kripke's work and Tarski's work and Kripke
is correct and Tarski is incorrect. It turns out that Kripke
avoids the Liar Paradox by starting with truth and only
applying truth preserving operations.
Which has nothing to do with Tarski's proof which is a proof by contradiction.-a You know, that type of proof that you still don't understand more than 50 years after it was taught to you.
The Liar Paradox then
simply becomes ungrounded in truth.
Tarski big mistake is believing that a truth predicate
should apply to self-contradictory expressions.
Nope, he shows that the existence of an truth predicate allows such expressions to be created.
On 10/9/2025 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
On 10/9/2025 10:14 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 7:13 PM, dbush wrote:
On 10/9/2025 8:02 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 6:54 PM, dbush wrote:
On 10/9/2025 7:49 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 4:34 PM, dbush wrote:
On 10/9/2025 4:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 3:13 PM, dbush wrote:
On 10/9/2025 4:08 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 2:36 PM, dbush wrote:
On 10/9/2025 3:30 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 2:21 PM, dbush wrote:
On 10/9/2025 3:12 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
On 10/9/2025 2:26 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 1:06 PM, dbush wrote:
On 10/9/2025 1:58 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 11:29 AM, dbush wrote:
On 10/9/2025 12:23 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 11:00 AM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 10/9/2025 11:49 AM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 10/9/2025 10:22 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Saul Kripke (1975) proved otherwise in his >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Outline of a Theory of TruthWhich is exactly what Tarski when he assumed a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth predicate exists and then concluded through >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a series of truth preserving operations that the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> resulting system contained the liar paradox, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>[ .... ]
I have already sufficiently proven my rebuttal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of G||delYou really don't understand proof by >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contradiction, do you?
incompleteness and Tarski Undefinability. I had >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to talk
to someone that did not have their ego and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> identity tied
to the received view.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
Rejects the Liar Paradox that Tarski >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Undefinability
depends upon, thus nullifying his whole proof. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
You really don't understand that formal systems >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of logic are required to have only truth bearers >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and that non truth bearers must be rejected. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> blogs.dir/1358/ files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of- Truth.pdf
Starting with truth
And the assumption that a truth predicate exists >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
and only applying truth preserving
operations prevents the Liar Paradox from coming into >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> existence
False, as Tarski proved.
Starting with truth and only applying truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preserving operations only truth is derived. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (Olcott 2024)
And if you start with truth and the assumption that a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth predicate exists and only apply truth preserving >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> operations and derive the liar paradox, that proves >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the assumption that a truth predicate exists is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
You have this backwards.
Starting with truth and only applying truth
preserving operations only truth is derived. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (Olcott 2024)
derives a correct and consistent Truth predicate >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and the Liar Paradox is never reached.
False.-a Tarski assumed the existence of a truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> predicate and applied truth preserving operations to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> derive the liar paradox.
Show me the steps of how he derived the Liar Paradox >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by applying only truth preserving operations to known truth. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Here is the step of how how derived that out of thin air: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
Those pages are a high-level overview, not the proof itself. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Read the whole thing, not just the summary, then point out >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the step in the *actual proof* that did not apply truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>> preserving operations.
In other words you cannot show anywhere in the
proof
You didn't show the proof.-a You showed a high-level overview. >>>>>>>>>>>>
If you know that Tarski derived the Liar Paradox
by applying only truth preserving operations to
known truths
PLUS the assumption that a correct truth predicate exists, >>>>>>>>>> thereby proving that assumption false.
He did not derive the liar paradox by applying
truth preserving operations to known true statements
you are just flat out lying about this.
Either you have abysmal reading comprehension or you are
intentionally lying about what others say to push your agenda. >>>>>>>> Read again:
He derived the liar paradox by applying truth preserving
operations to knows true statements
*Prove it or your are a damned liar*
*Prove it or your are a damned liar*
*Prove it or your are a damned liar*
*Prove it or your are a damned liar*
*Prove it or your are a damned liar*
The fact that you stopped reading here
*in addition to* the assumption that a correct truth predicate >>>>>>>> exists.-a Thus proving that assumption false.
And didn't bother to look at this part proves you're lying to push >>>>>> your agenda and have no interest in the truth.
Page number and link to the source
It's common knowledge to those that know the proof that it's a proof
by contradiction that does exactly that.
But if it makes you happy, I'll pull something from the high level
overview you posted.-a In fact, I'll use your highlighted passages:
Should we succeed in constructing in the metalanguage a correct
definition of truth
i.e. given the assumption that a truth predicate exists
it would then be possible to reconstruct the antimony of the liar
paradox in the metalanguage
i.e. truth preserving operations can be applied to that assumption
together with known true statements to derive the liar paradox.
Therefore proving the assumption that a truth predicate exists to be
false.
I just went over Kripke's work and Tarski's work and Kripke
is correct and Tarski is incorrect. It turns out that Kripke
avoids the Liar Paradox by starting with truth and only
applying truth preserving operations.
Which has nothing to do with Tarski's proof which is a proof by
contradiction.-a You know, that type of proof that you still don't
understand more than 50 years after it was taught to you.
Self-contradictory expressions only prove that
they must be excluded from, formal systems of logic.
The Liar Paradox then
simply becomes ungrounded in truth.
Tarski big mistake is believing that a truth predicate
should apply to self-contradictory expressions.
Nope, he shows that the existence of an truth predicate allows such
expressions to be created.
Not when applying only truth preserving operations
to known truths. That is how Kripke got rid of
the Liar Paradox.
Read his paper and see for yourself. https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/ files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf
On 10/10/2025 12:33 AM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
On 10/9/2025 10:14 PM, olcott wrote:
Self-contradictory expressions only prove that
they must be excluded from, formal systems of logic.
And as Tarski showed, that requires removing a truth predicate.
The Liar Paradox then
simply becomes ungrounded in truth.
Tarski big mistake is believing that a truth predicate
should apply to self-contradictory expressions.
Nope, he shows that the existence of an truth predicate allows such
expressions to be created.
Not when applying only truth preserving operations
to known truths. That is how Kripke got rid of
the Liar Paradox.
But if you attempt to add a truth predicate to that list of known
truths, Tarski proved the the liar paradox is derived.
Read his paper and see for yourself.
https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/
files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf
How about this passage:
"G||del put the issue of the legitimacy of
self-referential sentences beyond doubt; he showed that they are as incontestably legitimate as arithmetic itself."
On 10/10/2025 6:36 AM, dbush wrote:
On 10/10/2025 12:33 AM, olcott wrote:
On 10/9/2025 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
On 10/9/2025 10:14 PM, olcott wrote:
Self-contradictory expressions only prove that
they must be excluded from, formal systems of logic.
And as Tarski showed, that requires removing a truth predicate.
He was wrong.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
The Liar Paradox then
simply becomes ungrounded in truth.
Tarski big mistake is believing that a truth predicate
should apply to self-contradictory expressions.
Nope, he shows that the existence of an truth predicate allows such
expressions to be created.
Not when applying only truth preserving operations
to known truths. That is how Kripke got rid of
the Liar Paradox.
But if you attempt to add a truth predicate to that list of known
truths, Tarski proved the the liar paradox is derived.
Kripke proved this is counterfactual.
Read his paper and see for yourself.
https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/
files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf
How about this passage:
"G||del put the issue of the legitimacy of
self-referential sentences beyond doubt; he showed that they are as
incontestably legitimate as arithmetic itself."
Such a self-promoting fool.
He died from starving himself to death.
On 10/10/2025 9:56 AM, olcott wrote:
Such a self-promoting fool.