• Re: The true nature of Undecidability

    From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to comp.theory on Wed Oct 8 12:40:06 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 2025-10-07 15:05:07 +0000, olcott said:

    When we ask polar yes/no questions that have no
    correct yes/no answer these questions themselves
    are incorrect.

    Whether we want to call them "incorrect" or not is irrelevant. One
    important thing about them is that in natural languages there are
    such questions, which can be useful to know. Such questions are
    also possible in some interpretations of some formal lanuguages.
    Therefore, when a formal lanugage is designed one may want to make
    such questions possible or impossible in the intended interpretation.

    Questions with no correct answer also have some philosohical
    significance as they show that there are some limitations to
    our ability to answer questions.

    In certain sense these questions have a correct answer. That answer
    just is neither "yes" nor "no".

    We can construct a coherent, consistent and reliable
    foundation of expressions of language that are proven
    completely true entirely on the basis of their meaning.

    But it cannot be complete as it does not cover expressions that will
    be introduced later.

    The only thing that screws that up is that we do not
    reject incorrect questions.

    All questions are rejected because none of them can be proven true
    on the basis of their meaning.
    --
    Mikko

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  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to comp.theory on Wed Oct 8 12:41:04 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 2025-10-07 15:45:31 +0000, olcott said:

    On 10/7/2025 10:33 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    [ Followup-To: set ]

    In comp.theory olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
    When we ask polar yes/no questions that have no
    correct yes/no answer these questions themselves
    are incorrect.

    We can construct a coherent, consistent and reliable
    foundation of expressions of language that are proven
    completely true entirely on the basis of their meaning.

    The only thing that screws that up is that we do not
    reject incorrect questions.

    Where you screw up (at least, one of the places) is that you reject
    correct questions.

    You provided no example of this.

    Not needed, we already know.
    --
    Mikko

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  • From Julio Di Egidio@julio@diegidio.name to comp.theory,sci.logic on Wed Oct 8 19:26:23 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 07/10/2025 17:55, Richard Heathfield wrote:
    On 07/10/2025 16:05, olcott wrote:

    When we ask polar yes/no questions that have no
    correct yes/no answer these questions themselves
    are incorrect.

    Question: can any question be turned into an incorrect question by your definition?

    Answer: yes.

    That is not true.

    The quoted sentence is quite correct *per se*, although it does
    not mean what Olcott surreptitiously means: Olcott is assuming
    that an unprovable statement is not valid, so making two mistakes
    in one, as provability is relative; OTOH, the statement above
    can be read as the constructive statement that classical logic
    should be used "carefully", indeed only where it is valid, i.e.
    only with *decidable* propositions.

    Follow-up question: does this have any bearing on the Halting Problem?

    Answer: no.

    That too is not true: along the lines of what I said above, "is the
    Halting problem a well-posed problem" is a perfectly valid question.

    [...] All three of these are correct answers to correct questions.

    Nope, except for the third maybe, which is irrelevant to the above
    and the bigger scheme of things.

    -Julio

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  • From Richard Heathfield@rjh@cpax.org.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic on Wed Oct 8 18:44:01 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 08/10/2025 18:26, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
    On 07/10/2025 17:55, Richard Heathfield wrote:
    On 07/10/2025 16:05, olcott wrote:

    When we ask polar yes/no questions that have no
    correct yes/no answer these questions themselves
    are incorrect.

    Question: can any question be turned into an incorrect question
    by your definition?

    Answer: yes.

    That is not true.

    Yes, it is, if Peter Olcott is at the wheel..

    The Halting Problem question is: "Is it possible for a universal
    halt decider to exist?"

    The correct answer is no".

    Enter Peter Olcott, and suddenly the question is something like
    "what time is it? Carol or birthday cake? You must only answer on
    one side of the square root of a hamburger patty", which is most
    assuredly an incorrect question.
    --
    Richard Heathfield
    Email: rjh at cpax dot org dot uk
    "Usenet is a strange place" - dmr 29 July 1999
    Sig line 4 vacant - apply within
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  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic on Wed Oct 8 12:44:42 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/8/2025 12:26 PM, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
    On 07/10/2025 17:55, Richard Heathfield wrote:
    On 07/10/2025 16:05, olcott wrote:

    When we ask polar yes/no questions that have no
    correct yes/no answer these questions themselves
    are incorrect.

    Question: can any question be turned into an incorrect question by
    your definition?

    Answer: yes.

    That is not true.

    The quoted sentence is quite correct *per se*, although it does
    not mean what Olcott surreptitiously means: Olcott is assuming
    that an unprovable statement is not valid, so making two mistakes
    in one, as provability is relative; OTOH, the statement above
    can be read as the constructive statement that classical logic
    should be used "carefully", indeed only where it is valid, i.e.
    only with *decidable* propositions.


    "This sentence is not true" is neither true not false.
    It is neither true nor false because it is self-contradictory
    thus has no truth value, thus technically is not a truth-bearer.

    Follow-up question: does this have any bearing on the Halting Problem?

    Answer: no.

    That too is not true: along the lines of what I said above, "is the
    Halting problem a well-posed problem" is a perfectly valid question.


    The halting problem was intentionally defined to be
    self-contradictory just like the Liar Paradox.

    void P()
    {
    if H(P) // returns 1 for halts 0 for loops
    HERE: goto HERE;
    }

    For the set of H/P pairs of
    decider H and input P:
    If H says halts then P loops
    If H says loops then P halts
    making each H(P) always incorrect.


    [...] All three of these are correct answers to correct questions.

    Nope, except for the third maybe, which is irrelevant to the above
    and the bigger scheme of things.

    -Julio


    When posed to Carol:
    Can Carol correctly answer rCLnorCY to this (yes no) question?

    Carol's question is exactly analogous to the
    above H(P), both answers from any H are the
    wrong answer, just like both answers from any
    Carol are the wrong answer.

    Objective and Subjective Specifications
    Computer science professor Eric Hehner PhD https://www.cs.toronto.edu/~hehner/OSS.pdf
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
    hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
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  • From Kaz Kylheku@643-408-1753@kylheku.com to comp.theory,sci.logic on Wed Oct 8 18:33:16 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 2025-10-08, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
    On 10/8/2025 12:26 PM, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
    On 07/10/2025 17:55, Richard Heathfield wrote:
    On 07/10/2025 16:05, olcott wrote:

    When we ask polar yes/no questions that have no
    correct yes/no answer these questions themselves
    are incorrect.

    Question: can any question be turned into an incorrect question by
    your definition?

    Answer: yes.

    That is not true.

    The quoted sentence is quite correct *per se*, although it does
    not mean what Olcott surreptitiously means: Olcott is assuming
    that an unprovable statement is not valid, so making two mistakes
    in one, as provability is relative; OTOH, the statement above
    can be read as the constructive statement that classical logic
    should be used "carefully", indeed only where it is valid, i.e.
    only with *decidable* propositions.


    "This sentence is not true" is neither true not false.
    It is neither true nor false because it is self-contradictory
    thus has no truth value, thus technically is not a truth-bearer.

    A sentence which talks about any property of itself, or of any
    part of itself, that is not truth value, then it is not contradictory!

    "This sentence has four words" is flatly false; it is a truth-bearer.

    The diagonal case in the halting proof is not a proposition. It talks
    about no truth value at all, let alone a self-referential one. It is a
    machine which calculates and terminates or not; it perpetrates a
    self-reference in order to determine its course of action.

    So there is no relationshp to a pathological sentence like the Liar
    Paradox.

    Incidentally, there are ways to have self-reference regarding truth
    value such that the sentence is a truth-bearer. Consider:

    "Every sentence that has an odd number of words is false"

    If this sentence is regarded as true, it contradicts itself because
    it has an odd number of words. But it easily accepts a value of false,
    and then it doesn't contradict itself. NOT EVERY sentence that
    has an odd number of words is false (clearly). But that one is.

    Follow-up question: does this have any bearing on the Halting Problem?

    Answer: no.

    That too is not true: along the lines of what I said above, "is the
    Halting problem a well-posed problem" is a perfectly valid question.


    The halting problem was intentionally defined to be
    self-contradictory just like the Liar Paradox.

    No, it wasn't. The halting problem is necessarily self-referential
    because it asks whether Turing Machines can decide the halting of
    all Turing Machines (which means including themselves).

    Even if you don't /like/ this, there is no way to redefine the problem
    around it such that it is easier.

    Even if machines are excused from deciding about themselves, or
    about any machine which is built on themselves, the remaining
    problem is still undecidable.


    void P()
    {
    if H(P) // returns 1 for halts 0 for loops
    HERE: goto HERE;
    }

    For the set of H/P pairs of
    decider H and input P:
    If H says halts then P loops
    If H says loops then P halts
    making each H(P) always incorrect.

    That's not the halting problem; that's some mischaracterization of the
    elements of a proof regarding the halting problem, which uses a self-referential program.

    When posed to Carol:
    Can Carol correctly answer rCLnorCY to this (yes no) question?

    Carol's question is exactly analogous to the

    No it isn't. The "no" ansewr to Carol's question is both correct
    and incorrect depending on whether Carol is answering.

    The answer to the halting question about a machine is absolutely
    yes or no, regardless of who is answering.

    above H(P), both answers from any H are the
    wrong answer, just like both answers from any
    Carol are the wrong answer.

    The answer opposite to the H one is the right answer,
    unlike the Carol sentence. When Carol gives the answer "no",
    the correct answer from a non-Carol is still "no".
    --
    TXR Programming Language: http://nongnu.org/txr
    Cygnal: Cygwin Native Application Library: http://kylheku.com/cygnal
    Mastodon: @Kazinator@mstdn.ca
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  • From Richard Heathfield@rjh@cpax.org.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic on Wed Oct 8 19:45:08 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 08/10/2025 18:44, olcott wrote:
    The halting problem was intentionally defined to be
    self-contradictory just like the Liar Paradox.


    The Halting Problem is not self-contradictory.

    "Can a universal halt decider exist?"

    "No."

    Perfectly straightforward question with a perfectly
    straightforward answer.

    When you try to picture a world where the answer is "yes",
    /that's when difficulties arise.

    The knock-on effect from a universal halt decider is
    considerable. For example, you can suddenly establish a minimum
    Kolmogorov complexity for a given string, and bang goes Chaitin's
    Theorem (note: Theorem, not hypothesis). You can prove Goldbach's
    conjecture (or disprove it). You can determine whether a set of
    Wang's tiles can tile the plane - the serendipitously-named
    domino problem. Emil Post's correspondence problem. Etc etc etc.
    A *huge* number of mathematical results depend on the fact of
    undecidability.

    You don't have to accept mathematical proofs in general. There
    are circle-squarers and angle tri-secters to this day. And you
    don't have to accept the diagonalisation argument; you can wear
    earmuffs or a blindfold or both. But it isn't the only proof of undecidability. It's a done deal, it really is.

    You'd have better luck with a flat earth.
    --
    Richard Heathfield
    Email: rjh at cpax dot org dot uk
    "Usenet is a strange place" - dmr 29 July 1999
    Sig line 4 vacant - apply within
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  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic on Wed Oct 8 13:47:29 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/8/2025 1:33 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
    On 2025-10-08, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
    On 10/8/2025 12:26 PM, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
    On 07/10/2025 17:55, Richard Heathfield wrote:
    On 07/10/2025 16:05, olcott wrote:

    When we ask polar yes/no questions that have no
    correct yes/no answer these questions themselves
    are incorrect.

    Question: can any question be turned into an incorrect question by
    your definition?

    Answer: yes.

    That is not true.

    The quoted sentence is quite correct *per se*, although it does
    not mean what Olcott surreptitiously means: Olcott is assuming
    that an unprovable statement is not valid, so making two mistakes
    in one, as provability is relative; OTOH, the statement above
    can be read as the constructive statement that classical logic
    should be used "carefully", indeed only where it is valid, i.e.
    only with *decidable* propositions.


    "This sentence is not true" is neither true not false.
    It is neither true nor false because it is self-contradictory
    thus has no truth value, thus technically is not a truth-bearer.

    A sentence which talks about any property of itself, or of any
    part of itself, that is not truth value, then it is not contradictory!

    "This sentence has four words" is flatly false; it is a truth-bearer.


    Yes that is correct.

    The diagonal case in the halting proof is not a proposition. It talks
    about no truth value at all, let alone a self-referential one. It is a machine which calculates and terminates or not; it perpetrates a self-reference in order to determine its course of action.


    It maps to a decision problem to a specific decider/input
    pair template subset.

    So there is no relationshp to a pathological sentence like the Liar
    Paradox.

    Incidentally, there are ways to have self-reference regarding truth
    value such that the sentence is a truth-bearer. Consider:

    "Every sentence that has an odd number of words is false"

    If this sentence is regarded as true, it contradicts itself because
    it has an odd number of words. But it easily accepts a value of false,
    and then it doesn't contradict itself. NOT EVERY sentence that
    has an odd number of words is false (clearly). But that one is.

    Follow-up question: does this have any bearing on the Halting Problem? >>>>
    Answer: no.

    That too is not true: along the lines of what I said above, "is the
    Halting problem a well-posed problem" is a perfectly valid question.


    The halting problem was intentionally defined to be
    self-contradictory just like the Liar Paradox.

    No, it wasn't. The halting problem is necessarily self-referential
    because it asks whether Turing Machines can decide the halting of
    all Turing Machines (which means including themselves).

    Even if you don't /like/ this, there is no way to redefine the problem
    around it such that it is easier.


    Yes when you make sure to ignore what I say and
    form a rebuttal on some other basis than what I
    said it would certainly seem this way.

    Even if machines are excused from deciding about themselves, or
    about any machine which is built on themselves, the remaining
    problem is still undecidable.


    Not the best approach, but exactly how is that?


    void P()
    {
    if H(P) // returns 1 for halts 0 for loops
    HERE: goto HERE;
    }

    For the set of H/P pairs of
    decider H and input P:
    If H says halts then P loops
    If H says loops then P halts
    making each H(P) always incorrect.

    That's not the halting problem; that's some mischaracterization of the elements of a proof regarding the halting problem, which uses a self-referential program.


    That is the essence of the halting problem
    counter-example proof.

    When posed to Carol:
    Can Carol correctly answer rCLnorCY to this (yes no) question?

    Carol's question is exactly analogous to the

    No it isn't. The "no" ansewr to Carol's question is both correct
    and incorrect depending on whether Carol is answering.


    That leeway was not permitted in the above specification.

    The answer to the halting question about a machine is absolutely
    yes or no, regardless of who is answering.


    Proven false by the H/P pairs.
    One cannot correctly ignore the linguistic context
    of who is asked as an intrinsic and essential aspect
    of the full meaning of the question.

    That computer science people are not aware
    of the details of how expressions of language
    acquire meaning is no excuse.

    When any H is asked about its corresponding P
    it is always incorrect in the exact same way
    that when any Carol is asked Carol's question
    both answers are necessarily incorrect.
    above H(P), both answers from any H are the
    wrong answer, just like both answers from any
    Carol are the wrong answer.

    The answer opposite to the H one is the right answer,
    unlike the Carol sentence. When Carol gives the answer "no",
    the correct answer from a non-Carol is still "no".

    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
    hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
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  • From Kaz Kylheku@643-408-1753@kylheku.com to comp.theory,sci.logic on Wed Oct 8 19:46:09 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 2025-10-08, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
    On 10/8/2025 1:33 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
    On 2025-10-08, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
    On 10/8/2025 12:26 PM, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
    On 07/10/2025 17:55, Richard Heathfield wrote:
    On 07/10/2025 16:05, olcott wrote:

    When we ask polar yes/no questions that have no
    correct yes/no answer these questions themselves
    are incorrect.

    Question: can any question be turned into an incorrect question by
    your definition?

    Answer: yes.

    That is not true.

    The quoted sentence is quite correct *per se*, although it does
    not mean what Olcott surreptitiously means: Olcott is assuming
    that an unprovable statement is not valid, so making two mistakes
    in one, as provability is relative; OTOH, the statement above
    can be read as the constructive statement that classical logic
    should be used "carefully", indeed only where it is valid, i.e.
    only with *decidable* propositions.


    "This sentence is not true" is neither true not false.
    It is neither true nor false because it is self-contradictory
    thus has no truth value, thus technically is not a truth-bearer.

    A sentence which talks about any property of itself, or of any
    part of itself, that is not truth value, then it is not contradictory!

    "This sentence has four words" is flatly false; it is a truth-bearer.


    Yes that is correct.

    The diagonal case in the halting proof is not a proposition. It talks
    about no truth value at all, let alone a self-referential one. It is a
    machine which calculates and terminates or not; it perpetrates a
    self-reference in order to determine its course of action.


    It maps to a decision problem to a specific decider/input
    pair template subset.

    The decision problem is only about the input, and has a correct
    answer for that input.

    The input's halting behavior /depends/ on a certain decider producing
    the wrong answer on that input.

    So there is no relationshp to a pathological sentence like the Liar
    Paradox.

    Incidentally, there are ways to have self-reference regarding truth
    value such that the sentence is a truth-bearer. Consider:

    "Every sentence that has an odd number of words is false"

    If this sentence is regarded as true, it contradicts itself because
    it has an odd number of words. But it easily accepts a value of false,
    and then it doesn't contradict itself. NOT EVERY sentence that
    has an odd number of words is false (clearly). But that one is.

    Follow-up question: does this have any bearing on the Halting Problem? >>>>>
    Answer: no.

    That too is not true: along the lines of what I said above, "is the
    Halting problem a well-posed problem" is a perfectly valid question.


    The halting problem was intentionally defined to be
    self-contradictory just like the Liar Paradox.

    No, it wasn't. The halting problem is necessarily self-referential
    because it asks whether Turing Machines can decide the halting of
    all Turing Machines (which means including themselves).

    Even if you don't /like/ this, there is no way to redefine the problem
    around it such that it is easier.

    Yes when you make sure to ignore what I say and
    form a rebuttal on some other basis than what I
    said it would certainly seem this way.

    What you say is garbage. You cannot build on garbage.


    Even if machines are excused from deciding about themselves, or
    about any machine which is built on themselves, the remaining
    problem is still undecidable.


    Not the best approach, but exactly how is that?

    Because it leaves the decision problem.



    void P()
    {
    if H(P) // returns 1 for halts 0 for loops
    HERE: goto HERE;
    }

    For the set of H/P pairs of
    decider H and input P:
    If H says halts then P loops
    If H says loops then P halts
    making each H(P) always incorrect.

    That's not the halting problem; that's some mischaracterization of the
    elements of a proof regarding the halting problem, which uses a
    self-referential program.


    That is the essence of the halting problem
    counter-example proof.

    When posed to Carol:
    Can Carol correctly answer rCLnorCY to this (yes no) question?

    Carol's question is exactly analogous to the

    No it isn't. The "no" ansewr to Carol's question is both correct
    and incorrect depending on whether Carol is answering.

    That leeway was not permitted in the above specification.

    So then that's another way the question is not analogous to anything in halting. In halting it is an open question whether a machine halts, open
    to any decider whatsoever, not posed strictly to a certain decider. It
    has a right answer.

    The answer to the halting question about a machine is absolutely
    yes or no, regardless of who is answering.


    Proven false by the H/P pairs.

    No, it isn't. The diagonal pairs only show a decider getting it wrong;
    and in every such case, the opposite answer is the right one.

    One cannot correctly ignore the linguistic context
    of who is asked as an intrinsic and essential aspect
    of the full meaning of the question.

    There is no such context in halting. The question "does this
    machine halt" has no such context; it is not subjective
    to who/what is being tasked with answering.

    When any H is asked about its corresponding P
    it is always incorrect in the exact same way

    You are using the word "always" to refer to one instance.

    It's kind of like saying 2 is "always" located between 1 and 3.

    H(P) produces exactly /one/ answer which is wrong.

    There are other H's that produce wrong answers for their
    respective P's.

    Every P is "custom-built" on its respective H, showing a behavior that /depends/ on the respective H giving the incorrect answer.

    You can't change the answer without changing to a different H
    which changes P.

    that when any Carol is asked Carol's question
    both answers are necessarily incorrect.

    Unlike H Carol doesn't become a different person by trying different
    answer. For the analogy to even begin to have slight baby teeth, you
    need different Carols, e.g.

    "Question003: can Carol003 answer 'no' to Question003?"

    Suppose Carol003 answers "no", and that is such an inseparable
    characteristics of Carol003 that Carol003 can give no other
    answer.

    A different Carol, Carol004 can correctl answer Question003,
    giving the correct answer "no".

    But Carol004 does not correctly answer Question004. Carol004's
    characteristic answer is "yes", which is wrong. Carol004 cannot
    try any other answer; that would make her a different Carol.

    This personification analogy business is really just a fool's
    errand that doesn't lead anywhere.
    --
    TXR Programming Language: http://nongnu.org/txr
    Cygnal: Cygwin Native Application Library: http://kylheku.com/cygnal
    Mastodon: @Kazinator@mstdn.ca
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic on Wed Oct 8 15:04:42 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/8/2025 2:46 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
    On 2025-10-08, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
    On 10/8/2025 1:33 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
    On 2025-10-08, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
    On 10/8/2025 12:26 PM, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
    On 07/10/2025 17:55, Richard Heathfield wrote:
    On 07/10/2025 16:05, olcott wrote:

    When we ask polar yes/no questions that have no
    correct yes/no answer these questions themselves
    are incorrect.

    Question: can any question be turned into an incorrect question by >>>>>> your definition?

    Answer: yes.

    That is not true.

    The quoted sentence is quite correct *per se*, although it does
    not mean what Olcott surreptitiously means: Olcott is assuming
    that an unprovable statement is not valid, so making two mistakes
    in one, as provability is relative; OTOH, the statement above
    can be read as the constructive statement that classical logic
    should be used "carefully", indeed only where it is valid, i.e.
    only with *decidable* propositions.


    "This sentence is not true" is neither true not false.
    It is neither true nor false because it is self-contradictory
    thus has no truth value, thus technically is not a truth-bearer.

    A sentence which talks about any property of itself, or of any
    part of itself, that is not truth value, then it is not contradictory!

    "This sentence has four words" is flatly false; it is a truth-bearer.


    Yes that is correct.

    The diagonal case in the halting proof is not a proposition. It talks
    about no truth value at all, let alone a self-referential one. It is a
    machine which calculates and terminates or not; it perpetrates a
    self-reference in order to determine its course of action.


    It maps to a decision problem to a specific decider/input
    pair template subset.

    The decision problem is only about the input, and has a correct
    answer for that input.


    There is a subset of H/P decider/input pairs such that
    both accept and reject are the wrong answer.

    The input's halting behavior /depends/ on a certain decider producing
    the wrong answer on that input.

    So there is no relationshp to a pathological sentence like the Liar
    Paradox.

    Incidentally, there are ways to have self-reference regarding truth
    value such that the sentence is a truth-bearer. Consider:

    "Every sentence that has an odd number of words is false"

    If this sentence is regarded as true, it contradicts itself because
    it has an odd number of words. But it easily accepts a value of false,
    and then it doesn't contradict itself. NOT EVERY sentence that
    has an odd number of words is false (clearly). But that one is.

    Follow-up question: does this have any bearing on the Halting Problem? >>>>>>
    Answer: no.

    That too is not true: along the lines of what I said above, "is the
    Halting problem a well-posed problem" is a perfectly valid question. >>>>>

    The halting problem was intentionally defined to be
    self-contradictory just like the Liar Paradox.

    No, it wasn't. The halting problem is necessarily self-referential
    because it asks whether Turing Machines can decide the halting of
    all Turing Machines (which means including themselves).

    Even if you don't /like/ this, there is no way to redefine the problem
    around it such that it is easier.

    Yes when you make sure to ignore what I say and
    form a rebuttal on some other basis than what I
    said it would certainly seem this way.

    What you say is garbage. You cannot build on garbage.


    The notion of a the semantic halting property specified by
    *AN INPUT* finite string machine description is certainly
    not nonsense.


    Even if machines are excused from deciding about themselves, or
    about any machine which is built on themselves, the remaining
    problem is still undecidable.


    Not the best approach, but exactly how is that?

    Because it leaves the decision problem.


    Sure in the same way as the decision problem instance
    of accept as true or reject as false for this input:
    "This sentence is not true."

    Boolean True(English, Expression_of_English x);
    The actual decision problem assumes the above predicate:

    If True(x) accept
    else if True(~x) reject



    void P()
    {
    if H(P) // returns 1 for halts 0 for loops
    HERE: goto HERE;
    }

    For the set of H/P pairs of
    decider H and input P:
    If H says halts then P loops
    If H says loops then P halts
    making each H(P) always incorrect.

    That's not the halting problem; that's some mischaracterization of the
    elements of a proof regarding the halting problem, which uses a
    self-referential program.


    That is the essence of the halting problem
    counter-example proof.

    When posed to Carol:
    Can Carol correctly answer rCLnorCY to this (yes no) question?

    Carol's question is exactly analogous to the

    No it isn't. The "no" ansewr to Carol's question is both correct
    and incorrect depending on whether Carol is answering.

    That leeway was not permitted in the above specification.

    So then that's another way the question is not analogous to anything in halting.

    Its exactly the same as H(P)

    In halting it is an open question whether a machine halts, open
    to any decider whatsoever, not posed strictly to a certain decider. It
    has a right answer.

    The answer to the halting question about a machine is absolutely
    yes or no, regardless of who is answering.


    Proven false by the H/P pairs.

    No, it isn't. The diagonal pairs only show a decider getting it wrong;
    and in every such case, the opposite answer is the right one.


    No. Every H/P pairs gets the wrong answer even
    the ones that say the opposite of the other one.

    You are trying to weasel out of the full meaning of
    the question that also crucially depends on who is asked.

    One cannot correctly ignore the linguistic context
    of who is asked as an intrinsic and essential aspect
    of the full meaning of the question.

    There is no such context in halting.

    The no computer science person is aware of this crucial
    aspect of of expressions of language derive their meaning
    is no excuse.

    The question "does this
    machine halt" has no such context; it is not subjective
    to who/what is being tasked with answering.


    That is proven to be false two different ways.
    Your indoctrination is no substitute for correct reasoning.

    When any H is asked about its corresponding P
    it is always incorrect in the exact same way

    You are using the word "always" to refer to one instance.


    No your indoctrination is causing you to fail to
    pay enough attention.

    For the set of H/P pairs of
    decider H and input P:
    If H says halts then P loops
    If H says loops then P halts
    making each H(P) always incorrect.

    *For the set of H/P pairs*
    *For the set of H/P pairs*
    *For the set of H/P pairs*
    *For the set of H/P pairs*
    *For the set of H/P pairs*

    It's kind of like saying 2 is "always" located between 1 and 3.

    H(P) produces exactly /one/ answer which is wrong.

    There are other H's that produce wrong answers for their
    respective P's.

    Every P is "custom-built" on its respective H, showing a behavior that /depends/ on the respective H giving the incorrect answer.

    You can't change the answer without changing to a different H
    which changes P.

    that when any Carol is asked Carol's question
    both answers are necessarily incorrect.

    Unlike H Carol doesn't become a different person by trying different
    answer. For the analogy to even begin to have slight baby teeth, you
    need different Carols, e.g.


    *For the set of H/P pairs*
    *For the set of H/P pairs*
    *For the set of H/P pairs*
    *For the set of H/P pairs*
    *For the set of H/P pairs*

    "Question003: can Carol003 answer 'no' to Question003?"

    Suppose Carol003 answers "no", and that is such an inseparable characteristics of Carol003 that Carol003 can give no other
    answer.

    A different Carol, Carol004 can correctl answer Question003,
    giving the correct answer "no".

    But Carol004 does not correctly answer Question004. Carol004's
    characteristic answer is "yes", which is wrong. Carol004 cannot
    try any other answer; that would make her a different Carol.

    This personification analogy business is really just a fool's
    errand that doesn't lead anywhere.

    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
    hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Chris M. Thomasson@chris.m.thomasson.1@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic on Wed Oct 8 13:05:39 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/8/2025 10:44 AM, olcott wrote:
    [...]

    This sentence is true.

    Fill in the gaps perhaps.

    It's 5'oclock somewhere?

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Kaz Kylheku@643-408-1753@kylheku.com to comp.theory,sci.logic on Wed Oct 8 20:19:10 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 2025-10-08, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
    On 10/8/2025 2:46 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
    On 2025-10-08, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
    On 10/8/2025 1:33 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
    On 2025-10-08, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
    On 10/8/2025 12:26 PM, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
    On 07/10/2025 17:55, Richard Heathfield wrote:
    On 07/10/2025 16:05, olcott wrote:

    When we ask polar yes/no questions that have no
    correct yes/no answer these questions themselves
    are incorrect.

    Question: can any question be turned into an incorrect question by >>>>>>> your definition?

    Answer: yes.

    That is not true.

    The quoted sentence is quite correct *per se*, although it does
    not mean what Olcott surreptitiously means: Olcott is assuming
    that an unprovable statement is not valid, so making two mistakes
    in one, as provability is relative; OTOH, the statement above
    can be read as the constructive statement that classical logic
    should be used "carefully", indeed only where it is valid, i.e.
    only with *decidable* propositions.


    "This sentence is not true" is neither true not false.
    It is neither true nor false because it is self-contradictory
    thus has no truth value, thus technically is not a truth-bearer.

    A sentence which talks about any property of itself, or of any
    part of itself, that is not truth value, then it is not contradictory! >>>>
    "This sentence has four words" is flatly false; it is a truth-bearer.


    Yes that is correct.

    The diagonal case in the halting proof is not a proposition. It talks >>>> about no truth value at all, let alone a self-referential one. It is a >>>> machine which calculates and terminates or not; it perpetrates a
    self-reference in order to determine its course of action.


    It maps to a decision problem to a specific decider/input
    pair template subset.

    The decision problem is only about the input, and has a correct
    answer for that input.


    There is a subset of H/P decider/input pairs such that
    both accept and reject are the wrong answer.

    I'm afraid there isn't; how could you still have such an idea after
    so many years at this, and debating with enough people who have their
    heads screwed on right.

    There is no H/P pair in which more than one answer occurs.

    We can find a set of H/P pairs, which contains as few as tww pairs,
    such that both answers appear:

    { <H1, P1>, <H2, P2> }

    Say H1(P1) yields False, nd H2(P2) yields True. Then we have both
    answers. Both are wrong, but if we flip them they are right: P1
    halts, P2 doesn't.

    Yes when you make sure to ignore what I say and
    form a rebuttal on some other basis than what I
    said it would certainly seem this way.

    What you say is garbage. You cannot build on garbage.


    The notion of a the semantic halting property specified by
    *AN INPUT* finite string machine description is certainly
    not nonsense.

    Which is why everyone agrees with that so you might want to spend
    energy elsewhere than repeating that.

    Proven false by the H/P pairs.

    No, it isn't. The diagonal pairs only show a decider getting it wrong;
    and in every such case, the opposite answer is the right one.


    No. Every H/P pairs gets the wrong answer even
    the ones that say the opposite of the other one.

    What other one? Given H1 decider which is wrong on the H1(P1)
    question, what is an "other one"? An other case, like P2?
    H1(P2) can certainly give the right answer, in spite of
    not giving one for H1(P1).

    You are trying to weasel out of the full meaning of
    the question that also crucially depends on who is asked.

    No, it doesn't. What depends on which decider is asked
    is: whether the answer can be correct.

    That there is a correct answer, and which answer that is,
    doesn't depend on that at all.


    One cannot correctly ignore the linguistic context
    of who is asked as an intrinsic and essential aspect
    of the full meaning of the question.

    There is no such context in halting.

    The no computer science person is aware of this crucial
    aspect of of expressions of language derive their meaning
    is no excuse.

    Computer science people are specifically aware of the
    crucial lack of extraneous context in the question.

    Whether a machine halts is entirely bound up in the
    description of tha tmachine, and nothing else.

    The question "does this
    machine halt" has no such context; it is not subjective
    to who/what is being tasked with answering.

    That is proven to be false two different ways.
    Your indoctrination is no substitute for correct reasoning.


    When any H is asked about its corresponding P
    it is always incorrect in the exact same way

    You are using the word "always" to refer to one instance.

    No your indoctrination is causing you to fail to
    pay enough attention.

    Almost all I know about the halting problem is from this newsgroup; I've
    never paid that much attention to the topic outside of the scope of
    discussing it with you.

    Coming here with a nearly blank mind in this matter, I have quickly
    discovered that your reasoning is flawed.

    *For the set of H/P pairs*

    In a set, you need to distinguish the members. The set of diagonal H/P
    pairs does not consist of H that can change its answer and be wrong.
    --
    TXR Programming Language: http://nongnu.org/txr
    Cygnal: Cygwin Native Application Library: http://kylheku.com/cygnal
    Mastodon: @Kazinator@mstdn.ca
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic on Wed Oct 8 15:35:26 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/8/2025 3:19 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
    On 2025-10-08, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
    On 10/8/2025 2:46 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
    On 2025-10-08, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
    On 10/8/2025 1:33 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
    On 2025-10-08, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
    On 10/8/2025 12:26 PM, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
    On 07/10/2025 17:55, Richard Heathfield wrote:
    On 07/10/2025 16:05, olcott wrote:

    When we ask polar yes/no questions that have no
    correct yes/no answer these questions themselves
    are incorrect.

    Question: can any question be turned into an incorrect question by >>>>>>>> your definition?

    Answer: yes.

    That is not true.

    The quoted sentence is quite correct *per se*, although it does
    not mean what Olcott surreptitiously means: Olcott is assuming
    that an unprovable statement is not valid, so making two mistakes >>>>>>> in one, as provability is relative; OTOH, the statement above
    can be read as the constructive statement that classical logic
    should be used "carefully", indeed only where it is valid, i.e.
    only with *decidable* propositions.


    "This sentence is not true" is neither true not false.
    It is neither true nor false because it is self-contradictory
    thus has no truth value, thus technically is not a truth-bearer.

    A sentence which talks about any property of itself, or of any
    part of itself, that is not truth value, then it is not contradictory! >>>>>
    "This sentence has four words" is flatly false; it is a truth-bearer. >>>>>

    Yes that is correct.

    The diagonal case in the halting proof is not a proposition. It talks >>>>> about no truth value at all, let alone a self-referential one. It is a >>>>> machine which calculates and terminates or not; it perpetrates a
    self-reference in order to determine its course of action.


    It maps to a decision problem to a specific decider/input
    pair template subset.

    The decision problem is only about the input, and has a correct
    answer for that input.


    There is a subset of H/P decider/input pairs such that
    both accept and reject are the wrong answer.

    I'm afraid there isn't; how could you still have such an idea after
    so many years at this, and debating with enough people who have their
    heads screwed on right.


    For the set of H/P pairs of
    decider H and input P:
    If H says halts then P loops
    If H says loops then P halts
    making each H(P) always incorrect.

    There is no H/P pair in which more than one answer occurs.


    In every H/P pair above both accept and reject
    are the wrong answer.

    We can find a set of H/P pairs, which contains as few as tww pairs,
    such that both answers appear:

    { <H1, P1>, <H2, P2> }

    Say H1(P1) yields False, nd H2(P2) yields True. Then we have both
    answers. Both are wrong, but if we flip them they are right: P1
    halts, P2 doesn't.

    Yes when you make sure to ignore what I say and
    form a rebuttal on some other basis than what I
    said it would certainly seem this way.

    What you say is garbage. You cannot build on garbage.


    The notion of a the semantic halting property specified by
    *AN INPUT* finite string machine description is certainly
    not nonsense.

    Which is why everyone agrees with that so you might want to spend
    energy elsewhere than repeating that.


    I am not going to stop until the halting problem
    is renamed the naive halting problem and my
    change is accepted as the halting problem
    (just like how ZFC got rid of Russell's Paradox)

    Proven false by the H/P pairs.

    No, it isn't. The diagonal pairs only show a decider getting it wrong;
    and in every such case, the opposite answer is the right one.


    No. Every H/P pairs gets the wrong answer even
    the ones that say the opposite of the other one.

    What other one? Given H1 decider which is wrong on the H1(P1)
    question, what is an "other one"? An other case, like P2?
    H1(P2) can certainly give the right answer, in spite of
    not giving one for H1(P1).


    For the set of H/P pairs of
    decider H and input P:
    If H says halts then P loops
    If H says loops then P halts
    making each H(P) always incorrect.

    The above specifies one template of every
    H that gets the wrong answer on P.

    You are trying to weasel out of the full meaning of
    the question that also crucially depends on who is asked.

    No, it doesn't. What depends on which decider is asked
    is: whether the answer can be correct.


    Every element of the H/P template gets
    the wrong answer because the H/P template
    copied the self-contradictory of the Liar Paradox.

    That there is a correct answer, and which answer that is,
    doesn't depend on that at all.


    I say that Carol cannot give a correct answer
    and you said yes she can when she is Bob.


    One cannot correctly ignore the linguistic context
    of who is asked as an intrinsic and essential aspect
    of the full meaning of the question.

    There is no such context in halting.

    The no computer science person is aware of this crucial
    aspect of of expressions of language derive their meaning
    is no excuse.

    Computer science people are specifically aware of the
    crucial lack of extraneous context in the question.


    The context of who is asked is an aspect of the
    full meaning of a question and is required whether
    you know this or not.

    Whether a machine halts is entirely bound up in the
    description of tha tmachine, and nothing else.

    The question "does this
    machine halt" has no such context; it is not subjective
    to who/what is being tasked with answering.

    That is proven to be false two different ways.
    Your indoctrination is no substitute for correct reasoning.


    When any H is asked about its corresponding P
    it is always incorrect in the exact same way

    You are using the word "always" to refer to one instance.

    No your indoctrination is causing you to fail to
    pay enough attention.

    Almost all I know about the halting problem is from this newsgroup; I've never paid that much attention to the topic outside of the scope of discussing it with you.


    So where did you get Turing computability from?

    Coming here with a nearly blank mind in this matter, I have quickly discovered that your reasoning is flawed.

    *For the set of H/P pairs*

    In a set, you need to distinguish the members. The set of diagonal H/P
    pairs does not consist of H that can change its answer and be wrong.

    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
    hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic on Wed Oct 8 15:37:30 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/8/2025 3:19 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
    On 2025-10-08, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
    On 10/8/2025 2:46 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
    On 2025-10-08, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
    On 10/8/2025 1:33 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
    On 2025-10-08, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
    On 10/8/2025 12:26 PM, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
    On 07/10/2025 17:55, Richard Heathfield wrote:
    On 07/10/2025 16:05, olcott wrote:

    When we ask polar yes/no questions that have no
    correct yes/no answer these questions themselves
    are incorrect.

    Question: can any question be turned into an incorrect question by >>>>>>>> your definition?

    Answer: yes.

    That is not true.

    The quoted sentence is quite correct *per se*, although it does
    not mean what Olcott surreptitiously means: Olcott is assuming
    that an unprovable statement is not valid, so making two mistakes >>>>>>> in one, as provability is relative; OTOH, the statement above
    can be read as the constructive statement that classical logic
    should be used "carefully", indeed only where it is valid, i.e.
    only with *decidable* propositions.


    "This sentence is not true" is neither true not false.
    It is neither true nor false because it is self-contradictory
    thus has no truth value, thus technically is not a truth-bearer.

    A sentence which talks about any property of itself, or of any
    part of itself, that is not truth value, then it is not contradictory! >>>>>
    "This sentence has four words" is flatly false; it is a truth-bearer. >>>>>

    Yes that is correct.

    The diagonal case in the halting proof is not a proposition. It talks >>>>> about no truth value at all, let alone a self-referential one. It is a >>>>> machine which calculates and terminates or not; it perpetrates a
    self-reference in order to determine its course of action.


    It maps to a decision problem to a specific decider/input
    pair template subset.

    The decision problem is only about the input, and has a correct
    answer for that input.


    There is a subset of H/P decider/input pairs such that
    both accept and reject are the wrong answer.

    I'm afraid there isn't; how could you still have such an idea after
    so many years at this, and debating with enough people who have their
    heads screwed on right.


    For the set of H/P pairs of
    decider H and input P:
    If H says halts then P loops
    If H says loops then P halts
    making each H(P) always incorrect.

    There is no H/P pair in which more than one answer occurs.


    In every H/P pair above both accept and reject
    are the wrong answer.

    We can find a set of H/P pairs, which contains as few as tww pairs,
    such that both answers appear:

    { <H1, P1>, <H2, P2> }

    Say H1(P1) yields False, nd H2(P2) yields True. Then we have both
    answers. Both are wrong, but if we flip them they are right: P1
    halts, P2 doesn't.

    Yes when you make sure to ignore what I say and
    form a rebuttal on some other basis than what I
    said it would certainly seem this way.

    What you say is garbage. You cannot build on garbage.


    The notion of a the semantic halting property specified by
    *AN INPUT* finite string machine description is certainly
    not nonsense.

    Which is why everyone agrees with that so you might want to spend
    energy elsewhere than repeating that.


    I am not going to stop until the halting problem
    is renamed the naive halting problem and my
    change is accepted as the halting problem
    (just like how ZFC got rid of Russell's Paradox)

    Proven false by the H/P pairs.

    No, it isn't. The diagonal pairs only show a decider getting it wrong;
    and in every such case, the opposite answer is the right one.


    No. Every H/P pairs gets the wrong answer even
    the ones that say the opposite of the other one.

    What other one? Given H1 decider which is wrong on the H1(P1)
    question, what is an "other one"? An other case, like P2?
    H1(P2) can certainly give the right answer, in spite of
    not giving one for H1(P1).


    For the set of H/P pairs of
    decider H and input P:
    If H says halts then P loops
    If H says loops then P halts
    making each H(P) always incorrect.

    The above specifies one template of every
    H that gets the wrong answer on P.

    You are trying to weasel out of the full meaning of
    the question that also crucially depends on who is asked.

    No, it doesn't. What depends on which decider is asked
    is: whether the answer can be correct.


    Every element of the H/P template gets
    the wrong answer because the H/P template
    copied the self-contradictory of the Liar Paradox.

    That there is a correct answer, and which answer that is,
    doesn't depend on that at all.


    I say that Carol cannot give a correct answer
    and you said yes she can when she is Bob.


    One cannot correctly ignore the linguistic context
    of who is asked as an intrinsic and essential aspect
    of the full meaning of the question.

    There is no such context in halting.

    The no computer science person is aware of this crucial
    aspect of of expressions of language derive their meaning
    is no excuse.

    Computer science people are specifically aware of the
    crucial lack of extraneous context in the question.


    The context of who is asked is an aspect of the
    full meaning of a question and is required whether
    you know this or not.

    Whether a machine halts is entirely bound up in the
    description of tha tmachine, and nothing else.

    The question "does this
    machine halt" has no such context; it is not subjective
    to who/what is being tasked with answering.

    That is proven to be false two different ways.
    Your indoctrination is no substitute for correct reasoning.


    When any H is asked about its corresponding P
    it is always incorrect in the exact same way

    You are using the word "always" to refer to one instance.

    No your indoctrination is causing you to fail to
    pay enough attention.

    Almost all I know about the halting problem is from this newsgroup; I've never paid that much attention to the topic outside of the scope of discussing it with you.


    So where did you get Turing computability from?

    Coming here with a nearly blank mind in this matter, I have quickly discovered that your reasoning is flawed.

    *For the set of H/P pairs*

    In a set, you need to distinguish the members. The set of diagonal H/P
    pairs does not consist of H that can change its answer and be wrong.

    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
    hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Kaz Kylheku@643-408-1753@kylheku.com to comp.theory,sci.logic on Wed Oct 8 21:20:42 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 2025-10-08, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
    For the set of H/P pairs of
    decider H and input P:
    If H says halts then P loops
    If H says loops then P halts
    making each H(P) always incorrect.

    A better way to say it is like this:

    Consider the set S of diagonal decider/input pairs. If <H, P> is any arbitrarily chosen pair from this set, then one of these three
    possibilities is true: H(P) indicates halting, H(P) indicates
    non-halting or else H(P) fails to terminate. If H(P) indicates halting,
    then P is necessarily non-halting, and vice versa. (If H(P) doesn't
    halt, P could be either.) In all three cases, H fails to decide P
    correctly, or at all.

    The above specifies one template of every
    H that gets the wrong answer on P.

    But the template is nothing without instantiation.

    The template's structure allows us to reason about an infinite such set
    S of diagonal pairs and be sure that each H in that set fails to decide
    its respective P.

    You are trying to weasel out of the full meaning of
    the question that also crucially depends on who is asked.

    No, it doesn't. What depends on which decider is asked
    is: whether the answer can be correct.


    Every element of the H/P template gets
    the wrong answer because the H/P template
    copied the self-contradictory of the Liar Paradox.

    No it doesn't because for every P, there is a right answer,

    Whereas the Liar Paradox is not even a set of sentences; it is one,
    and it is not a truth-bearer.

    We can have a set of self-referential sentences that are all false!

    S = { "This sentence has two words",
    "This sentence has three words",
    "This sentence has four words",
    "This sentence does not have eight words"
    ... }

    The existence of a set with falsehoods doesn't necessarily point to
    anything being pathological, even if they involve self-reference, and
    even if the set is infinite.

    That there is a correct answer, and which answer that is,
    doesn't depend on that at all.


    I say that Carol cannot give a correct answer
    and you said yes she can when she is Bob.

    If you allow the question to be answered by Bob,
    then Bob can certainly say that the correct answer is no;
    No, Carol cannot answer 'no' to the question and be correct.

    The problem is that this correct 'no' answer given by Bob
    remains correct for Bob even if Carol herself is giving
    the same answer, which is wrong for her.

    So there is a problem in the Carol sentence.




    One cannot correctly ignore the linguistic context
    of who is asked as an intrinsic and essential aspect
    of the full meaning of the question.

    There is no such context in halting.

    The no computer science person is aware of this crucial
    aspect of of expressions of language derive their meaning
    is no excuse.

    Computer science people are specifically aware of the
    crucial lack of extraneous context in the question.


    The context of who is asked is an aspect of the
    full meaning of a question and is required whether
    you know this or not.

    That is false. In a formal system which we invented from its bare
    axioms, we precisely dictate whether there is any such context or not,
    along with every other detail.

    In the halting problem, there isn't.

    In interpersonal questions between people, there is often a context, but
    even there, there isn't.

    Questions about external facts don't require personal context. E.g. what
    is the speed of light in vaccuum, or the permeability of free space.

    Almost all I know about the halting problem is from this newsgroup; I've
    never paid that much attention to the topic outside of the scope of
    discussing it with you.

    So where did you get Turing computability from?

    Looking up references, and brushing up on the material.

    I have a decent computing background, but I'm not an academic and I've
    never been focused on the halting problem. It makes no difference to me. Problems which are known to have "halting difficulty" often have
    complexity issues that you hit long before the theoretical limit, as a programmer.
    --
    TXR Programming Language: http://nongnu.org/txr
    Cygnal: Cygwin Native Application Library: http://kylheku.com/cygnal
    Mastodon: @Kazinator@mstdn.ca
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Kaz Kylheku@643-408-1753@kylheku.com to comp.theory,sci.logic on Wed Oct 8 21:28:48 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 2025-10-08, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
    On 10/8/2025 3:19 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
    I am not going to stop until the halting problem
    is renamed the naive halting problem and my
    change is accepted as the halting problem
    (just like how ZFC got rid of Russell's Paradox)

    The difference is that Russel's paradox (In regard to the set of all
    sets which do not contain themselves: does that set contain itself?)
    is a kind of nonsense. Such a set it not constructable.

    If you draw an analogy between the Liar Paradox and that of Russel,
    I can swallow that.

    But anyway, we can think of a "set which contains almost all sets
    which do not contain themselves, except that it arbitrarily excludes
    itself"; such an emergency repair doesn't seem possible on the Liar
    Paradox.

    Be that as it may, diagonal cases in halting are constructable, so you
    can't dismiss them. The halting problem is real; it is not angels
    on the head of a pin material.
    --
    TXR Programming Language: http://nongnu.org/txr
    Cygnal: Cygwin Native Application Library: http://kylheku.com/cygnal
    Mastodon: @Kazinator@mstdn.ca
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Heathfield@rjh@cpax.org.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic on Thu Oct 9 00:55:59 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 08/10/2025 21:35, olcott wrote:
    I am not going to stop until the halting problem
    is renamed

    I think we can actually take that at face value.
    --
    Richard Heathfield
    Email: rjh at cpax dot org dot uk
    "Usenet is a strange place" - dmr 29 July 1999
    Sig line 4 vacant - apply within
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic on Wed Oct 8 20:03:51 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/8/2025 6:55 PM, Richard Heathfield wrote:
    On 08/10/2025 21:35, olcott wrote:
    I am not going to stop until the halting problem
    is renamed

    I think we can actually take that at face value.


    I am not all knowing so it is theoretically
    possible that I could be proved wrong. Since
    all of rebuttals were based on one specific
    lack of understanding or another I don't
    expect this. Claude AI always provides reasoning
    for its rebuttals. That by itself is enormously
    better than most everyone here.
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
    hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic on Wed Oct 8 22:00:37 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/8/2025 4:28 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
    On 2025-10-08, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
    On 10/8/2025 3:19 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
    I am not going to stop until the halting problem
    is renamed the naive halting problem and my
    change is accepted as the halting problem
    (just like how ZFC got rid of Russell's Paradox)

    The difference is that Russel's paradox (In regard to the set of all
    sets which do not contain themselves: does that set contain itself?)
    is a kind of nonsense. Such a set it not constructable.


    Likewise with correctly determining the halt
    status of an input that does the opposite of
    whatever you say.

    If you draw an analogy between the Liar Paradox and that of Russel,
    I can swallow that.

    But anyway, we can think of a "set which contains almost all sets
    which do not contain themselves, except that it arbitrarily excludes
    itself"; such an emergency repair doesn't seem possible on the Liar
    Paradox.


    Claude AI eventually totally agreed that the
    Liar Paradox should be rejected as not a truth
    bearer on this basis.

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).

    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    It was a very long and drawn out conversation
    where Claude AI cited the gist of each
    research position on the Liar Paradox.

    https://claude.ai/share/45d3ca9c-fa9a-4a02-9e22-c6acd0057275

    Be that as it may, diagonal cases in halting are constructable, so you
    can't dismiss them. The halting problem is real; it is not angels
    on the head of a pin material.


    It is simply modeled after the Liar Paradox.
    I proved that I knew that back in 2004.

    You ignored this proof and instead got all nit
    picky that my pseudo code was not correct C
    syntax.
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
    hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic on Wed Oct 8 22:41:24 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/8/2025 4:20 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
    On 2025-10-08, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
    For the set of H/P pairs of
    decider H and input P:
    If H says halts then P loops
    If H says loops then P halts
    making each H(P) always incorrect.

    A better way to say it is like this:

    Consider the set S of diagonal decider/input pairs. If <H, P> is any arbitrarily chosen pair from this set, then one of these three
    possibilities is true: H(P) indicates halting, H(P) indicates
    non-halting or else H(P) fails to terminate. If H(P) indicates halting,
    then P is necessarily non-halting, and vice versa. (If H(P) doesn't
    halt, P could be either.) In all three cases, H fails to decide P
    correctly, or at all.

    The above specifies one template of every
    H that gets the wrong answer on P.

    But the template is nothing without instantiation.

    The template's structure allows us to reason about an infinite such set
    S of diagonal pairs and be sure that each H in that set fails to decide
    its respective P.

    You are trying to weasel out of the full meaning of
    the question that also crucially depends on who is asked.

    No, it doesn't. What depends on which decider is asked
    is: whether the answer can be correct.


    Every element of the H/P template gets
    the wrong answer because the H/P template
    copied the self-contradictory of the Liar Paradox.

    No it doesn't because for every P, there is a right answer,

    Whereas the Liar Paradox is not even a set of sentences; it is one,
    and it is not a truth-bearer.

    We can have a set of self-referential sentences that are all false!

    S = { "This sentence has two words",
    "This sentence has three words",
    "This sentence has four words",
    "This sentence does not have eight words"
    ... }

    The existence of a set with falsehoods doesn't necessarily point to
    anything being pathological, even if they involve self-reference, and
    even if the set is infinite.

    That there is a correct answer, and which answer that is,
    doesn't depend on that at all.


    I say that Carol cannot give a correct answer
    and you said yes she can when she is Bob.

    If you allow the question to be answered by Bob,
    then Bob can certainly say that the correct answer is no;
    No, Carol cannot answer 'no' to the question and be correct.

    The problem is that this correct 'no' answer given by Bob
    remains correct for Bob even if Carol herself is giving
    the same answer, which is wrong for her.

    So there is a problem in the Carol sentence.




    One cannot correctly ignore the linguistic context
    of who is asked as an intrinsic and essential aspect
    of the full meaning of the question.

    There is no such context in halting.

    The no computer science person is aware of this crucial
    aspect of of expressions of language derive their meaning
    is no excuse.

    Computer science people are specifically aware of the
    crucial lack of extraneous context in the question.


    The context of who is asked is an aspect of the
    full meaning of a question and is required whether
    you know this or not.

    That is false. In a formal system which we invented from its bare
    axioms, we precisely dictate whether there is any such context or not,
    along with every other detail.

    In the halting problem, there isn't.

    In interpersonal questions between people, there is often a context, but
    even there, there isn't.

    Questions about external facts don't require personal context. E.g. what
    is the speed of light in vaccuum, or the permeability of free space.

    Almost all I know about the halting problem is from this newsgroup; I've >>> never paid that much attention to the topic outside of the scope of
    discussing it with you.

    So where did you get Turing computability from?

    Looking up references, and brushing up on the material.

    I have a decent computing background, but I'm not an academic and I've
    never been focused on the halting problem. It makes no difference to me. Problems which are known to have "halting difficulty" often have
    complexity issues that you hit long before the theoretical limit, as a programmer.


    What is your programming expertise?
    I have been doing C++ off and on full time
    since 2000. Mostly systems level programming.
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
    hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory on Wed Oct 8 22:54:13 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/8/2025 4:40 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 2025-10-07 15:05:07 +0000, olcott said:

    When we ask polar yes/no questions that have no
    correct yes/no answer these questions themselves
    are incorrect.

    Whether we want to call them "incorrect" or not is irrelevant. One
    important thing about them is that in natural languages there are
    such questions, which can be useful to know. Such questions are
    also possible in some interpretations of some formal lanuguages.
    Therefore, when a formal lanugage is designed one may want to make
    such questions possible or impossible in the intended interpretation.


    That a halt decider gets fooled by a simple input
    that calls itself means that the requirements are
    incorrect.

    Questions with no correct answer also have some philosohical
    significance as they show that there are some limitations to
    our ability to answer questions.


    Yes we will never get any purely abstract mental
    model of a Turing machine to bake a birthday cake.
    If we didn't notice that we may have a very long
    wait to get a cake.

    Likewise with determining the halt status of
    doing the opposite of whatever you say.

    In certain sense these questions have a correct answer. That answer
    just is neither "yes" nor "no".


    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).

    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    For the Liar Paradox the correct thing
    to do is reject it as non a truth-bearer.

    We can construct a coherent, consistent and reliable
    foundation of expressions of language that are proven
    completely true entirely on the basis of their meaning.

    But it cannot be complete as it does not cover expressions that will
    be introduced later.


    It won't get fooled by self-contradictory expressions.
    It will be complete enough to know that climate change
    is drastic and caused by humans.

    I will also know that no one ever presented any evidence
    of election fraud that could possibly change the outcome
    of the 2020 presidential election and any and all claims
    to the contrary are modeled after Hitler's own propaganda
    system.

    The only thing that screws that up is that we do not
    reject incorrect questions.

    All questions are rejected because none of them can be proven true
    on the basis of their meaning.


    So if I ask is a chicken an animal? your answer is no one knows?
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
    hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to comp.theory on Thu Oct 9 12:41:06 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 2025-10-09 03:54:13 +0000, olcott said:

    On 10/8/2025 4:40 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 2025-10-07 15:05:07 +0000, olcott said:

    When we ask polar yes/no questions that have no
    correct yes/no answer these questions themselves
    are incorrect.

    Whether we want to call them "incorrect" or not is irrelevant. One
    important thing about them is that in natural languages there are
    such questions, which can be useful to know. Such questions are
    also possible in some interpretations of some formal lanuguages.
    Therefore, when a formal lanugage is designed one may want to make
    such questions possible or impossible in the intended interpretation.

    That a halt decider gets fooled by a simple input
    that calls itself means that the requirements are
    incorrect.

    What gets fooled is not a halt deciders. Requirements are correct
    as they specify about every Turing machine whether is is a halt
    decider. The requirements need not serve any other purpose.
    --
    Mikko

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From joes@noreply@example.org to comp.theory on Thu Oct 9 11:19:08 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    Am Wed, 08 Oct 2025 15:37:30 -0500 schrieb olcott:
    On 10/8/2025 3:19 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
    On 2025-10-08, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
    On 10/8/2025 2:46 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:

    There is a subset of H/P decider/input pairs such that both accept and
    reject are the wrong answer.

    I'm afraid there isn't; how could you still have such an idea after so
    many years at this, and debating with enough people who have their
    heads screwed on right.

    For the set of H/P pairs of decider H and input P:
    If H says halts then P loops If H says loops then P halts making each
    H(P) always incorrect.
    H can only give one answer. The program H2 constructed from it to give
    the opposite answer has a different input P2 that H2 gets wrong.

    There is no H/P pair in which more than one answer occurs.
    In every H/P pair above both accept and reject are the wrong answer.
    No. Every H gives exactly one answer. The correct answer is the other
    one. Every P either halts or doesnrCOt, making one answer correct.
    You could also change P to match the answer given by H, but those are
    not a pair.

    I am not going to stop until the halting problem is renamed the naive
    halting problem and my change is accepted as the halting problem (just
    like how ZFC got rid of Russell's Paradox)
    I am betting you a million dollars that wonrCOt happen in the next 50 years.
    --
    Am Sat, 20 Jul 2024 12:35:31 +0000 schrieb WM in sci.math:
    It is not guaranteed that n+1 exists for every n.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory on Thu Oct 9 07:50:25 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/9/2025 6:19 AM, joes wrote:
    Am Wed, 08 Oct 2025 15:37:30 -0500 schrieb olcott:
    On 10/8/2025 3:19 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
    On 2025-10-08, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
    On 10/8/2025 2:46 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:

    There is a subset of H/P decider/input pairs such that both accept and >>>> reject are the wrong answer.

    I'm afraid there isn't; how could you still have such an idea after so
    many years at this, and debating with enough people who have their
    heads screwed on right.

    For the set of H/P pairs of decider H and input P:
    If H says halts then P loops If H says loops then P halts making each
    H(P) always incorrect.

    H can only give one answer. The program H2 constructed from it to give
    the opposite answer has a different input P2 that H2 gets wrong.


    That seems to be a ruse. A system as smart as an LLM
    could say WTF, why the Hell are you cheating me, what
    kind of a silly head game are you try to pull?
    Your decision problem is bogus and you know it.

    There is no H/P pair in which more than one answer occurs.
    In every H/P pair above both accept and reject are the wrong answer.

    No. Every H gives exactly one answer. The correct answer is the other
    one. Every P either halts or doesnrCOt, making one answer correct.
    You could also change P to match the answer given by H, but those are
    not a pair.

    I am not going to stop until the halting problem is renamed the naive
    halting problem and my change is accepted as the halting problem (just
    like how ZFC got rid of Russell's Paradox)

    I am betting you a million dollars that wonrCOt happen in the next 50 years.


    I have already sufficiently proven my rebuttal of G||del
    incompleteness and Tarski Undefinability. I had to talk
    to someone that did not have their ego and identity tied
    to the received view.

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).

    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    Rejects the Liar Paradox that Tarski Undefinability
    depends upon, thus nullifying his whole proof.
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
    hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Alan Mackenzie@acm@muc.de to comp.theory on Thu Oct 9 15:22:03 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
    [ .... ]
    I have already sufficiently proven my rebuttal of G||del
    incompleteness and Tarski Undefinability. I had to talk
    to someone that did not have their ego and identity tied
    to the received view.
    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).
    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.
    Rejects the Liar Paradox that Tarski Undefinability
    depends upon, thus nullifying his whole proof.
    You really don't understand proof by contradiction, do you?
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
    hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
    --
    Alan Mackenzie (Nuremberg, Germany).
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory on Thu Oct 9 10:49:02 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/9/2025 10:22 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:

    [ .... ]

    I have already sufficiently proven my rebuttal of G||del
    incompleteness and Tarski Undefinability. I had to talk
    to someone that did not have their ego and identity tied
    to the received view.

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).

    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    Rejects the Liar Paradox that Tarski Undefinability
    depends upon, thus nullifying his whole proof.

    You really don't understand proof by contradiction, do you?


    You really don't understand that formal systems
    of logic are required to have only truth bearers
    and that non truth bearers must be rejected.

    Tarski could have done that much more easily:
    LP = "This sentence is not true"
    True(English, LP) == FALSE
    True(English, ~LP) == FALSE

    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
    hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
    hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to comp.theory on Thu Oct 9 12:00:21 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/9/2025 11:49 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:22 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:

    [ .... ]

    I have already sufficiently proven my rebuttal of G||del
    incompleteness and Tarski Undefinability. I had to talk
    to someone that did not have their ego and identity tied
    to the received view.

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).

    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    Rejects the Liar Paradox that Tarski Undefinability
    depends upon, thus nullifying his whole proof.

    You really don't understand proof by contradiction, do you?


    You really don't understand that formal systems
    of logic are required to have only truth bearers
    and that non truth bearers must be rejected.

    Which is exactly what Tarski when he assumed a truth predicate exists
    and then concluded through a series of truth preserving operations that
    the resulting system contained the liar paradox, proving that the
    assumption of the existence of a truth predicate is false.

    i.e. you demonstrated yet again that you don't understand proof by contradiction more than 50 years after it was taught to you.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory on Thu Oct 9 11:23:45 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/9/2025 11:00 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:49 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:22 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:

    [ .... ]

    I have already sufficiently proven my rebuttal of G||del
    incompleteness and Tarski Undefinability. I had to talk
    to someone that did not have their ego and identity tied
    to the received view.

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).

    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    Rejects the Liar Paradox that Tarski Undefinability
    depends upon, thus nullifying his whole proof.

    You really don't understand proof by contradiction, do you?


    You really don't understand that formal systems
    of logic are required to have only truth bearers
    and that non truth bearers must be rejected.

    Which is exactly what Tarski when he assumed a truth predicate exists
    and then concluded through a series of truth preserving operations that
    the resulting system contained the liar paradox,

    Saul Kripke (1975) proved otherwise in his
    Outline of a Theory of Truth

    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf

    Starting with truth and only applying truth preserving
    operations prevents the Liar Paradox from coming into
    existence just like ZFC prevents Russell's Paradox from
    coming into existence.

    proving that the
    assumption of the existence of a truth predicate is false.

    i.e. you demonstrated yet again that you don't understand proof by contradiction more than 50 years after it was taught to you.

    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
    hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to comp.theory on Thu Oct 9 12:29:48 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/9/2025 12:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:00 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:49 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:22 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:

    [ .... ]

    I have already sufficiently proven my rebuttal of G||del
    incompleteness and Tarski Undefinability. I had to talk
    to someone that did not have their ego and identity tied
    to the received view.

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).

    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    Rejects the Liar Paradox that Tarski Undefinability
    depends upon, thus nullifying his whole proof.

    You really don't understand proof by contradiction, do you?


    You really don't understand that formal systems
    of logic are required to have only truth bearers
    and that non truth bearers must be rejected.

    Which is exactly what Tarski when he assumed a truth predicate exists
    and then concluded through a series of truth preserving operations
    that the resulting system contained the liar paradox,

    Saul Kripke (1975) proved otherwise in his
    Outline of a Theory of Truth

    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/ files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf

    Starting with truth

    And the assumption that a truth predicate exists

    and only applying truth preserving
    operations prevents the Liar Paradox from coming into
    existence

    False, as Tarski proved.

    just like ZFC prevents Russell's Paradox from
    coming into existence.

    proving that the assumption of the existence of a truth predicate is
    false.

    i.e. you demonstrated yet again that you don't understand proof by
    contradiction more than 50 years after it was taught to you.




    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Kaz Kylheku@643-408-1753@kylheku.com to comp.theory on Thu Oct 9 16:35:19 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 2025-10-09, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
    Saul Kripke (1975) proved otherwise in his
    Outline of a Theory of Truth

    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf

    That author is humble. The following passage is what would most
    benefit you:

    "I do not regard any proposal, including the one to be advanced here,
    as definitive in the sense that it gives the interpretation of the
    ordinary use of 'true', or the solution to the semantic paradoxes. On
    the contrary, I have not at the moment thought through a careful
    philosophical justification of the proposal, nor am I sure of the exact
    areas and limitations of its applicability. "
    --
    TXR Programming Language: http://nongnu.org/txr
    Cygnal: Cygwin Native Application Library: http://kylheku.com/cygnal
    Mastodon: @Kazinator@mstdn.ca
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory on Thu Oct 9 12:01:09 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/9/2025 4:41 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 2025-10-09 03:54:13 +0000, olcott said:

    On 10/8/2025 4:40 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 2025-10-07 15:05:07 +0000, olcott said:

    When we ask polar yes/no questions that have no
    correct yes/no answer these questions themselves
    are incorrect.

    Whether we want to call them "incorrect" or not is irrelevant. One
    important thing about them is that in natural languages there are
    such questions, which can be useful to know. Such questions are
    also possible in some interpretations of some formal lanuguages.
    Therefore, when a formal lanugage is designed one may want to make
    such questions possible or impossible in the intended interpretation.

    That a halt decider gets fooled by a simple input
    that calls itself means that the requirements are
    incorrect.

    What gets fooled is not a halt deciders. Requirements are correct
    as they specify about every Turing machine whether is is a halt
    decider. The requirements need not serve any other purpose.


    See my new post.
    [Halting problem proof converted to Liar Paradox ---
    2004 post converted to C]
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
    hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory on Thu Oct 9 12:49:30 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/9/2025 11:35 AM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
    On 2025-10-09, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
    Saul Kripke (1975) proved otherwise in his
    Outline of a Theory of Truth

    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf

    That author is humble. The following passage is what would most
    benefit you:

    "I do not regard any proposal, including the one to be advanced here,
    as definitive in the sense that it gives the interpretation of the
    ordinary use of 'true', or the solution to the semantic paradoxes. On
    the contrary, I have not at the moment thought through a careful philosophical justification of the proposal, nor am I sure of the exact
    areas and limitations of its applicability. "


    Claude AI reminded me that Saul Kripke was the
    originator of my own very similar idea. Mine was
    much simpler. He had a whole infrastructure as
    his own way of abolishing the Liar Paradox.

    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    Can you see that proves itself totally true
    entirely based on the meaning of its words?
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
    hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory on Thu Oct 9 12:58:08 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/9/2025 11:29 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 12:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:00 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:49 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:22 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:

    [ .... ]

    I have already sufficiently proven my rebuttal of G||del
    incompleteness and Tarski Undefinability. I had to talk
    to someone that did not have their ego and identity tied
    to the received view.

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).

    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    Rejects the Liar Paradox that Tarski Undefinability
    depends upon, thus nullifying his whole proof.

    You really don't understand proof by contradiction, do you?


    You really don't understand that formal systems
    of logic are required to have only truth bearers
    and that non truth bearers must be rejected.

    Which is exactly what Tarski when he assumed a truth predicate exists
    and then concluded through a series of truth preserving operations
    that the resulting system contained the liar paradox,

    Saul Kripke (1975) proved otherwise in his
    Outline of a Theory of Truth

    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/
    files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf

    Starting with truth

    And the assumption that a truth predicate exists

    and only applying truth preserving
    operations prevents the Liar Paradox from coming into
    existence

    False, as Tarski proved.


    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    Can you see that proves itself totally true
    entirely based on the meaning of its words?

    just like ZFC prevents Russell's Paradox from
    coming into existence.

    proving that the assumption of the existence of a truth predicate is
    false.

    i.e. you demonstrated yet again that you don't understand proof by
    contradiction more than 50 years after it was taught to you.




    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
    hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to comp.theory on Thu Oct 9 14:06:35 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/9/2025 1:58 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:29 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 12:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:00 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:49 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:22 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:

    [ .... ]

    I have already sufficiently proven my rebuttal of G||del
    incompleteness and Tarski Undefinability. I had to talk
    to someone that did not have their ego and identity tied
    to the received view.

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).

    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    Rejects the Liar Paradox that Tarski Undefinability
    depends upon, thus nullifying his whole proof.

    You really don't understand proof by contradiction, do you?


    You really don't understand that formal systems
    of logic are required to have only truth bearers
    and that non truth bearers must be rejected.

    Which is exactly what Tarski when he assumed a truth predicate
    exists and then concluded through a series of truth preserving
    operations that the resulting system contained the liar paradox,

    Saul Kripke (1975) proved otherwise in his
    Outline of a Theory of Truth

    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/
    files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf

    Starting with truth

    And the assumption that a truth predicate exists

    and only applying truth preserving
    operations prevents the Liar Paradox from coming into
    existence

    False, as Tarski proved.


    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    And if you start with truth and the assumption that a truth predicate
    exists and only apply truth preserving operations and derive the liar
    paradox, that proves that the assumption that a truth predicate exists
    is false.


    Can you see that proves itself totally true
    entirely based on the meaning of its words?

    A finite string description of a Turing machine is specified to possess
    all of the semantic properties of that machine, including whether it
    halts when executed directly.

    Can you see that proves itself totally true
    entirely based on the meaning of its words?


    just like ZFC prevents Russell's Paradox from
    coming into existence.

    proving that the assumption of the existence of a truth predicate is
    false.

    i.e. you demonstrated yet again that you don't understand proof by
    contradiction more than 50 years after it was taught to you.







    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory on Thu Oct 9 13:26:15 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/9/2025 1:06 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:58 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:29 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 12:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:00 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:49 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:22 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:

    [ .... ]

    I have already sufficiently proven my rebuttal of G||del
    incompleteness and Tarski Undefinability. I had to talk
    to someone that did not have their ego and identity tied
    to the received view.

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).

    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    Rejects the Liar Paradox that Tarski Undefinability
    depends upon, thus nullifying his whole proof.

    You really don't understand proof by contradiction, do you?


    You really don't understand that formal systems
    of logic are required to have only truth bearers
    and that non truth bearers must be rejected.

    Which is exactly what Tarski when he assumed a truth predicate
    exists and then concluded through a series of truth preserving
    operations that the resulting system contained the liar paradox,

    Saul Kripke (1975) proved otherwise in his
    Outline of a Theory of Truth

    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/
    files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf

    Starting with truth

    And the assumption that a truth predicate exists

    and only applying truth preserving
    operations prevents the Liar Paradox from coming into
    existence

    False, as Tarski proved.


    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    And if you start with truth and the assumption that a truth predicate
    exists and only apply truth preserving operations and derive the liar paradox, that proves that the assumption that a truth predicate exists
    is false.


    You have this backwards.
    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    derives a correct and consistent Truth predicate
    and the Liar Paradox is never reached.


    Can you see that proves itself totally true
    entirely based on the meaning of its words?

    A finite string description of a Turing machine is specified to possess
    all of the semantic properties of that machine, including whether it
    halts when executed directly.

    Can you see that proves itself totally true
    entirely based on the meaning of its words?


    just like ZFC prevents Russell's Paradox from
    coming into existence.

    proving that the assumption of the existence of a truth predicate
    is false.

    i.e. you demonstrated yet again that you don't understand proof by
    contradiction more than 50 years after it was taught to you.







    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
    hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to comp.theory on Thu Oct 9 14:35:45 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/9/2025 2:26 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:06 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:58 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:29 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 12:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:00 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:49 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:22 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:

    [ .... ]

    I have already sufficiently proven my rebuttal of G||del
    incompleteness and Tarski Undefinability. I had to talk
    to someone that did not have their ego and identity tied
    to the received view.

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).

    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    Rejects the Liar Paradox that Tarski Undefinability
    depends upon, thus nullifying his whole proof.

    You really don't understand proof by contradiction, do you?


    You really don't understand that formal systems
    of logic are required to have only truth bearers
    and that non truth bearers must be rejected.

    Which is exactly what Tarski when he assumed a truth predicate
    exists and then concluded through a series of truth preserving
    operations that the resulting system contained the liar paradox,

    Saul Kripke (1975) proved otherwise in his
    Outline of a Theory of Truth

    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/
    files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf

    Starting with truth

    And the assumption that a truth predicate exists

    and only applying truth preserving
    operations prevents the Liar Paradox from coming into
    existence

    False, as Tarski proved.


    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    And if you start with truth and the assumption that a truth predicate
    exists and only apply truth preserving operations and derive the liar
    paradox, that proves that the assumption that a truth predicate exists
    is false.


    You have this backwards.
    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    derives a correct and consistent Truth predicate
    and the Liar Paradox is never reached.


    False. Tarski assumed the existence of a truth predicate and applied
    truth preserving operations to derive the liar paradox.

    Therefore a truth predicate does not exist.

    Once again, you demonstrate that you don't understand proof by
    contradiction more than 50 years after it was taught to you.


    Can you see that proves itself totally true
    entirely based on the meaning of its words?

    A finite string description of a Turing machine is specified to
    possess all of the semantic properties of that machine, including
    whether it halts when executed directly.

    Can you see that proves itself totally true
    entirely based on the meaning of its words?


    just like ZFC prevents Russell's Paradox from
    coming into existence.

    proving that the assumption of the existence of a truth predicate >>>>>> is false.

    i.e. you demonstrated yet again that you don't understand proof by >>>>>> contradiction more than 50 years after it was taught to you.










    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory on Thu Oct 9 14:12:29 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/9/2025 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:26 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:06 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:58 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:29 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 12:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:00 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:49 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:22 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:

    [ .... ]

    I have already sufficiently proven my rebuttal of G||del
    incompleteness and Tarski Undefinability. I had to talk
    to someone that did not have their ego and identity tied
    to the received view.

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).

    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    Rejects the Liar Paradox that Tarski Undefinability
    depends upon, thus nullifying his whole proof.

    You really don't understand proof by contradiction, do you?


    You really don't understand that formal systems
    of logic are required to have only truth bearers
    and that non truth bearers must be rejected.

    Which is exactly what Tarski when he assumed a truth predicate
    exists and then concluded through a series of truth preserving
    operations that the resulting system contained the liar paradox, >>>>>>
    Saul Kripke (1975) proved otherwise in his
    Outline of a Theory of Truth

    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/
    files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf

    Starting with truth

    And the assumption that a truth predicate exists

    and only applying truth preserving
    operations prevents the Liar Paradox from coming into
    existence

    False, as Tarski proved.


    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    And if you start with truth and the assumption that a truth predicate
    exists and only apply truth preserving operations and derive the liar
    paradox, that proves that the assumption that a truth predicate
    exists is false.


    You have this backwards.
    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    derives a correct and consistent Truth predicate
    and the Liar Paradox is never reached.


    False.-a Tarski assumed the existence of a truth predicate and applied
    truth preserving operations to derive the liar paradox.


    Show me the steps of how he derived the Liar Paradox
    by applying only truth preserving operations to known truth.

    Here is the step of how how derived that out of thin air: https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf

    Therefore a truth predicate does not exist.

    Once again, you demonstrate that you don't understand proof by
    contradiction more than 50 years after it was taught to you.


    Can you see that proves itself totally true
    entirely based on the meaning of its words?

    A finite string description of a Turing machine is specified to
    possess all of the semantic properties of that machine, including
    whether it halts when executed directly.

    Can you see that proves itself totally true
    entirely based on the meaning of its words?


    just like ZFC prevents Russell's Paradox from
    coming into existence.

    proving that the assumption of the existence of a truth predicate >>>>>>> is false.

    i.e. you demonstrated yet again that you don't understand proof >>>>>>> by contradiction more than 50 years after it was taught to you.










    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
    hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to comp.theory on Thu Oct 9 15:21:33 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/9/2025 3:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:26 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:06 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:58 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:29 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 12:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:00 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:49 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:22 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:

    [ .... ]

    I have already sufficiently proven my rebuttal of G||del >>>>>>>>>>> incompleteness and Tarski Undefinability. I had to talk
    to someone that did not have their ego and identity tied >>>>>>>>>>> to the received view.

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).

    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    Rejects the Liar Paradox that Tarski Undefinability
    depends upon, thus nullifying his whole proof.

    You really don't understand proof by contradiction, do you? >>>>>>>>>>

    You really don't understand that formal systems
    of logic are required to have only truth bearers
    and that non truth bearers must be rejected.

    Which is exactly what Tarski when he assumed a truth predicate >>>>>>>> exists and then concluded through a series of truth preserving >>>>>>>> operations that the resulting system contained the liar paradox, >>>>>>>
    Saul Kripke (1975) proved otherwise in his
    Outline of a Theory of Truth

    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/
    files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf

    Starting with truth

    And the assumption that a truth predicate exists

    and only applying truth preserving
    operations prevents the Liar Paradox from coming into
    existence

    False, as Tarski proved.


    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    And if you start with truth and the assumption that a truth
    predicate exists and only apply truth preserving operations and
    derive the liar paradox, that proves that the assumption that a
    truth predicate exists is false.


    You have this backwards.
    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    derives a correct and consistent Truth predicate
    and the Liar Paradox is never reached.


    False.-a Tarski assumed the existence of a truth predicate and applied
    truth preserving operations to derive the liar paradox.


    Show me the steps of how he derived the Liar Paradox
    by applying only truth preserving operations to known truth.

    Here is the step of how how derived that out of thin air: https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf

    Those pages are a high-level overview, not the proof itself.

    Read the whole thing, not just the summary, then point out the step in
    the *actual proof* that did not apply truth preserving operations.

    Given that you've demonstrated on countless examples that you don't
    understand proof by contradiction, a concept taught to and understood by
    high school students more than 50 years your junior, I highly doubt you
    can even understand it much less find an actual error.


    Therefore a truth predicate does not exist.

    Once again, you demonstrate that you don't understand proof by
    contradiction more than 50 years after it was taught to you.


    Can you see that proves itself totally true
    entirely based on the meaning of its words?

    A finite string description of a Turing machine is specified to
    possess all of the semantic properties of that machine, including
    whether it halts when executed directly.

    Can you see that proves itself totally true
    entirely based on the meaning of its words?


    just like ZFC prevents Russell's Paradox from
    coming into existence.

    proving that the assumption of the existence of a truth
    predicate is false.

    i.e. you demonstrated yet again that you don't understand proof >>>>>>>> by contradiction more than 50 years after it was taught to you. >>>>>>>>












    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory on Thu Oct 9 14:30:35 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/9/2025 2:21 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:26 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:06 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:58 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:29 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 12:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:00 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:49 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:22 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:

    [ .... ]

    I have already sufficiently proven my rebuttal of G||del >>>>>>>>>>>> incompleteness and Tarski Undefinability. I had to talk >>>>>>>>>>>> to someone that did not have their ego and identity tied >>>>>>>>>>>> to the received view.

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).

    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    Rejects the Liar Paradox that Tarski Undefinability
    depends upon, thus nullifying his whole proof.

    You really don't understand proof by contradiction, do you? >>>>>>>>>>>

    You really don't understand that formal systems
    of logic are required to have only truth bearers
    and that non truth bearers must be rejected.

    Which is exactly what Tarski when he assumed a truth predicate >>>>>>>>> exists and then concluded through a series of truth preserving >>>>>>>>> operations that the resulting system contained the liar paradox, >>>>>>>>
    Saul Kripke (1975) proved otherwise in his
    Outline of a Theory of Truth

    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/
    files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf

    Starting with truth

    And the assumption that a truth predicate exists

    and only applying truth preserving
    operations prevents the Liar Paradox from coming into
    existence

    False, as Tarski proved.


    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    And if you start with truth and the assumption that a truth
    predicate exists and only apply truth preserving operations and
    derive the liar paradox, that proves that the assumption that a
    truth predicate exists is false.


    You have this backwards.
    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    derives a correct and consistent Truth predicate
    and the Liar Paradox is never reached.


    False.-a Tarski assumed the existence of a truth predicate and applied
    truth preserving operations to derive the liar paradox.


    Show me the steps of how he derived the Liar Paradox
    by applying only truth preserving operations to known truth.

    Here is the step of how how derived that out of thin air:
    https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf

    Those pages are a high-level overview, not the proof itself.

    Read the whole thing, not just the summary, then point out the step in
    the *actual proof* that did not apply truth preserving operations.


    In other words you cannot show anywhere in the
    proof that my citation is not how Tarski
    "derived" the Liar Paradox because I just
    proved you wrong and as Kaz put it you don't
    want to "eat crow".

    Given that you've demonstrated on countless examples that you don't understand proof by contradiction, a concept taught to and understood by high school students more than 50 years your junior, I highly doubt you
    can even understand it much less find an actual error.


    Therefore a truth predicate does not exist.

    Once again, you demonstrate that you don't understand proof by
    contradiction more than 50 years after it was taught to you.


    Can you see that proves itself totally true
    entirely based on the meaning of its words?

    A finite string description of a Turing machine is specified to
    possess all of the semantic properties of that machine, including
    whether it halts when executed directly.

    Can you see that proves itself totally true
    entirely based on the meaning of its words?


    just like ZFC prevents Russell's Paradox from
    coming into existence.

    proving that the assumption of the existence of a truth
    predicate is false.

    i.e. you demonstrated yet again that you don't understand proof >>>>>>>>> by contradiction more than 50 years after it was taught to you. >>>>>>>>>












    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
    hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to comp.theory on Thu Oct 9 15:36:55 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/9/2025 3:30 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:21 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:26 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:06 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:58 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:29 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 12:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:00 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:49 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:22 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:

    [ .... ]

    I have already sufficiently proven my rebuttal of G||del >>>>>>>>>>>>> incompleteness and Tarski Undefinability. I had to talk >>>>>>>>>>>>> to someone that did not have their ego and identity tied >>>>>>>>>>>>> to the received view.

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).

    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    Rejects the Liar Paradox that Tarski Undefinability
    depends upon, thus nullifying his whole proof.

    You really don't understand proof by contradiction, do you? >>>>>>>>>>>>

    You really don't understand that formal systems
    of logic are required to have only truth bearers
    and that non truth bearers must be rejected.

    Which is exactly what Tarski when he assumed a truth predicate >>>>>>>>>> exists and then concluded through a series of truth preserving >>>>>>>>>> operations that the resulting system contained the liar paradox, >>>>>>>>>
    Saul Kripke (1975) proved otherwise in his
    Outline of a Theory of Truth

    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/ >>>>>>>>> files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf

    Starting with truth

    And the assumption that a truth predicate exists

    and only applying truth preserving
    operations prevents the Liar Paradox from coming into
    existence

    False, as Tarski proved.


    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    And if you start with truth and the assumption that a truth
    predicate exists and only apply truth preserving operations and
    derive the liar paradox, that proves that the assumption that a
    truth predicate exists is false.


    You have this backwards.
    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    derives a correct and consistent Truth predicate
    and the Liar Paradox is never reached.


    False.-a Tarski assumed the existence of a truth predicate and
    applied truth preserving operations to derive the liar paradox.


    Show me the steps of how he derived the Liar Paradox
    by applying only truth preserving operations to known truth.

    Here is the step of how how derived that out of thin air:
    https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf

    Those pages are a high-level overview, not the proof itself.

    Read the whole thing, not just the summary, then point out the step in
    the *actual proof* that did not apply truth preserving operations.


    In other words you cannot show anywhere in the
    proof

    You didn't show the proof. You showed a high-level overview.

    The actual proof has been reviewed countless times. Unless you show an
    error in the *actual proof*, not just the summary, you've got nothing.


    that my citation is not how Tarski
    "derived" the Liar Paradox because I just
    proved you wrong and as Kaz put it you don't
    want to "eat crow".

    Given that you've demonstrated on countless examples that you don't
    understand proof by contradiction, a concept taught to and understood
    by high school students more than 50 years your junior, I highly doubt
    you can even understand it much less find an actual error.


    Therefore a truth predicate does not exist.

    Once again, you demonstrate that you don't understand proof by
    contradiction more than 50 years after it was taught to you.


    Can you see that proves itself totally true
    entirely based on the meaning of its words?

    A finite string description of a Turing machine is specified to
    possess all of the semantic properties of that machine, including >>>>>> whether it halts when executed directly.

    Can you see that proves itself totally true
    entirely based on the meaning of its words?


    just like ZFC prevents Russell's Paradox from
    coming into existence.

    proving that the assumption of the existence of a truth
    predicate is false.

    i.e. you demonstrated yet again that you don't understand >>>>>>>>>> proof by contradiction more than 50 years after it was taught >>>>>>>>>> to you.
















    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory on Thu Oct 9 15:08:01 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/9/2025 2:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:30 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:21 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:26 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:06 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:58 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:29 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 12:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:00 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:49 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:22 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:

    [ .... ]

    I have already sufficiently proven my rebuttal of G||del >>>>>>>>>>>>>> incompleteness and Tarski Undefinability. I had to talk >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to someone that did not have their ego and identity tied >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to the received view.

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).

    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    Rejects the Liar Paradox that Tarski Undefinability >>>>>>>>>>>>>> depends upon, thus nullifying his whole proof.

    You really don't understand proof by contradiction, do you? >>>>>>>>>>>>>

    You really don't understand that formal systems
    of logic are required to have only truth bearers
    and that non truth bearers must be rejected.

    Which is exactly what Tarski when he assumed a truth
    predicate exists and then concluded through a series of truth >>>>>>>>>>> preserving operations that the resulting system contained the >>>>>>>>>>> liar paradox,

    Saul Kripke (1975) proved otherwise in his
    Outline of a Theory of Truth

    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/ >>>>>>>>>> files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf

    Starting with truth

    And the assumption that a truth predicate exists

    and only applying truth preserving
    operations prevents the Liar Paradox from coming into
    existence

    False, as Tarski proved.


    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    And if you start with truth and the assumption that a truth
    predicate exists and only apply truth preserving operations and >>>>>>> derive the liar paradox, that proves that the assumption that a >>>>>>> truth predicate exists is false.


    You have this backwards.
    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    derives a correct and consistent Truth predicate
    and the Liar Paradox is never reached.


    False.-a Tarski assumed the existence of a truth predicate and
    applied truth preserving operations to derive the liar paradox.


    Show me the steps of how he derived the Liar Paradox
    by applying only truth preserving operations to known truth.

    Here is the step of how how derived that out of thin air:
    https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf

    Those pages are a high-level overview, not the proof itself.

    Read the whole thing, not just the summary, then point out the step
    in the *actual proof* that did not apply truth preserving operations.


    In other words you cannot show anywhere in the
    proof

    You didn't show the proof.-a You showed a high-level overview.


    If you know that Tarski derived the Liar Paradox
    by applying only truth preserving operations to
    known truths THEN I AM CALLING YOUR BLUFF.

    Cite page number and paragraph and cut-and-paste
    the text. You know that you can't because you know
    that you are not telling the truth.
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
    hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to comp.theory on Thu Oct 9 16:13:51 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/9/2025 4:08 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:30 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:21 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:26 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:06 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:58 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:29 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 12:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:00 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:49 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:22 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:

    [ .... ]

    I have already sufficiently proven my rebuttal of G||del >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incompleteness and Tarski Undefinability. I had to talk >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to someone that did not have their ego and identity tied >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to the received view.

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).

    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    Rejects the Liar Paradox that Tarski Undefinability >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depends upon, thus nullifying his whole proof.

    You really don't understand proof by contradiction, do you? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    You really don't understand that formal systems
    of logic are required to have only truth bearers
    and that non truth bearers must be rejected.

    Which is exactly what Tarski when he assumed a truth
    predicate exists and then concluded through a series of >>>>>>>>>>>> truth preserving operations that the resulting system >>>>>>>>>>>> contained the liar paradox,

    Saul Kripke (1975) proved otherwise in his
    Outline of a Theory of Truth

    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/ >>>>>>>>>>> files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf

    Starting with truth

    And the assumption that a truth predicate exists

    and only applying truth preserving
    operations prevents the Liar Paradox from coming into
    existence

    False, as Tarski proved.


    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    And if you start with truth and the assumption that a truth
    predicate exists and only apply truth preserving operations and >>>>>>>> derive the liar paradox, that proves that the assumption that a >>>>>>>> truth predicate exists is false.


    You have this backwards.
    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    derives a correct and consistent Truth predicate
    and the Liar Paradox is never reached.


    False.-a Tarski assumed the existence of a truth predicate and
    applied truth preserving operations to derive the liar paradox.


    Show me the steps of how he derived the Liar Paradox
    by applying only truth preserving operations to known truth.

    Here is the step of how how derived that out of thin air:
    https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf

    Those pages are a high-level overview, not the proof itself.

    Read the whole thing, not just the summary, then point out the step
    in the *actual proof* that did not apply truth preserving operations.


    In other words you cannot show anywhere in the
    proof

    You didn't show the proof.-a You showed a high-level overview.


    If you know that Tarski derived the Liar Paradox
    by applying only truth preserving operations to
    known truths

    PLUS the assumption that a correct truth predicate exists, thereby
    proving that assumption false.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From joes@noreply@example.org to comp.theory on Thu Oct 9 20:17:26 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    Am Thu, 09 Oct 2025 15:08:01 -0500 schrieb olcott:
    On 10/9/2025 2:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:30 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:21 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:26 PM, olcott wrote:

    You have this backwards.
    Starting with truth and only applying truth preserving operations >>>>>>> only truth is derived. (Olcott 2024)
    derives a correct and consistent Truth predicate and the Liar
    Paradox is never reached.

    False.-a Tarski assumed the existence of a truth predicate and
    applied truth preserving operations to derive the liar paradox.
    Show me the steps of how he derived the Liar Paradox by applying
    only truth preserving operations to known truth.
    Here is the step of how how derived that out of thin air:
    https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
    Those pages are a high-level overview, not the proof itself.
    Read the whole thing, not just the summary, then point out the step
    in the *actual proof* that did not apply truth preserving operations.
    In other words you cannot show anywhere in the proof
    You didn't show the proof.-a You showed a high-level overview.
    If you know that Tarski derived the Liar Paradox by applying only truth preserving operations to known truths THEN I AM CALLING YOUR BLUFF.
    Cite page number and paragraph and cut-and-paste the text. You know that
    you can't because you know that you are not telling the truth.

    Girl WTF? The burden of proof is on you to find a truth-violating
    operation. What do you even want to see? Go read the proof yourself.

    dbush: Please donrCOt spam like olcott.
    --
    Am Sat, 20 Jul 2024 12:35:31 +0000 schrieb WM in sci.math:
    It is not guaranteed that n+1 exists for every n.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory on Thu Oct 9 15:59:48 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/9/2025 3:13 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 4:08 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:30 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:21 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:26 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:06 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:58 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:29 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 12:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:00 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:49 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:22 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:

    [ .... ]

    I have already sufficiently proven my rebuttal of G||del >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incompleteness and Tarski Undefinability. I had to talk >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to someone that did not have their ego and identity tied >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to the received view.

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).

    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.

    Rejects the Liar Paradox that Tarski Undefinability >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depends upon, thus nullifying his whole proof.

    You really don't understand proof by contradiction, do you? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    You really don't understand that formal systems
    of logic are required to have only truth bearers
    and that non truth bearers must be rejected.

    Which is exactly what Tarski when he assumed a truth >>>>>>>>>>>>> predicate exists and then concluded through a series of >>>>>>>>>>>>> truth preserving operations that the resulting system >>>>>>>>>>>>> contained the liar paradox,

    Saul Kripke (1975) proved otherwise in his
    Outline of a Theory of Truth

    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/ >>>>>>>>>>>> files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf

    Starting with truth

    And the assumption that a truth predicate exists

    and only applying truth preserving
    operations prevents the Liar Paradox from coming into
    existence

    False, as Tarski proved.


    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    And if you start with truth and the assumption that a truth >>>>>>>>> predicate exists and only apply truth preserving operations and >>>>>>>>> derive the liar paradox, that proves that the assumption that a >>>>>>>>> truth predicate exists is false.


    You have this backwards.
    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    derives a correct and consistent Truth predicate
    and the Liar Paradox is never reached.


    False.-a Tarski assumed the existence of a truth predicate and
    applied truth preserving operations to derive the liar paradox.


    Show me the steps of how he derived the Liar Paradox
    by applying only truth preserving operations to known truth.

    Here is the step of how how derived that out of thin air:
    https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf

    Those pages are a high-level overview, not the proof itself.

    Read the whole thing, not just the summary, then point out the step >>>>> in the *actual proof* that did not apply truth preserving operations. >>>>>

    In other words you cannot show anywhere in the
    proof

    You didn't show the proof.-a You showed a high-level overview.


    If you know that Tarski derived the Liar Paradox
    by applying only truth preserving operations to
    known truths

    PLUS the assumption that a correct truth predicate exists, thereby
    proving that assumption false.


    He did not derive the liar paradox by applying
    truth preserving operations to known true statements
    you are just flat out lying about this.
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
    hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory on Thu Oct 9 16:25:14 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/9/2025 3:17 PM, joes wrote:
    Am Thu, 09 Oct 2025 15:08:01 -0500 schrieb olcott:
    On 10/9/2025 2:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:30 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:21 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:26 PM, olcott wrote:

    You have this backwards.
    Starting with truth and only applying truth preserving operations >>>>>>>> only truth is derived. (Olcott 2024)
    derives a correct and consistent Truth predicate and the Liar
    Paradox is never reached.

    False.-a Tarski assumed the existence of a truth predicate and
    applied truth preserving operations to derive the liar paradox.
    Show me the steps of how he derived the Liar Paradox by applying
    only truth preserving operations to known truth.
    Here is the step of how how derived that out of thin air:
    https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
    Those pages are a high-level overview, not the proof itself.
    Read the whole thing, not just the summary, then point out the step
    in the *actual proof* that did not apply truth preserving operations. >>>> In other words you cannot show anywhere in the proof
    You didn't show the proof.-a You showed a high-level overview.

    If you know that Tarski derived the Liar Paradox by applying only truth
    preserving operations to known truths THEN I AM CALLING YOUR BLUFF.
    Cite page number and paragraph and cut-and-paste the text. You know that
    you can't because you know that you are not telling the truth.

    Girl WTF? The burden of proof is on you to find a truth-violating
    operation. What do you even want to see? Go read the proof yourself.


    dbush made a claim that he refused to back up with
    a citation because he knows the claim is false.

    I proved that Tarski derived the Liar Paradox out of
    thin air. https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf

    dbush claimed the Tarski derived it by applying truth
    preserving operations to known truth.

    This is categorically impossible and I proved it
    to be flat out false, thus making dbush a liar.

    dbush: Please donrCOt spam like olcott.
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
    hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to comp.theory on Thu Oct 9 17:34:43 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/9/2025 4:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:13 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 4:08 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:30 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:21 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:26 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:06 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:58 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:29 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 12:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:00 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:49 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:22 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:

    [ .... ]

    I have already sufficiently proven my rebuttal of G||del >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incompleteness and Tarski Undefinability. I had to talk >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to someone that did not have their ego and identity tied >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to the received view.

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).

    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.

    Rejects the Liar Paradox that Tarski Undefinability >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depends upon, thus nullifying his whole proof. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    You really don't understand proof by contradiction, do you? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    You really don't understand that formal systems
    of logic are required to have only truth bearers >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and that non truth bearers must be rejected.

    Which is exactly what Tarski when he assumed a truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>> predicate exists and then concluded through a series of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth preserving operations that the resulting system >>>>>>>>>>>>>> contained the liar paradox,

    Saul Kripke (1975) proved otherwise in his
    Outline of a Theory of Truth

    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/
    blogs.dir/1358/ files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf >>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Starting with truth

    And the assumption that a truth predicate exists

    and only applying truth preserving
    operations prevents the Liar Paradox from coming into >>>>>>>>>>>>> existence

    False, as Tarski proved.


    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    And if you start with truth and the assumption that a truth >>>>>>>>>> predicate exists and only apply truth preserving operations >>>>>>>>>> and derive the liar paradox, that proves that the assumption >>>>>>>>>> that a truth predicate exists is false.


    You have this backwards.
    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    derives a correct and consistent Truth predicate
    and the Liar Paradox is never reached.


    False.-a Tarski assumed the existence of a truth predicate and >>>>>>>> applied truth preserving operations to derive the liar paradox. >>>>>>>>

    Show me the steps of how he derived the Liar Paradox
    by applying only truth preserving operations to known truth.

    Here is the step of how how derived that out of thin air:
    https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf

    Those pages are a high-level overview, not the proof itself.

    Read the whole thing, not just the summary, then point out the
    step in the *actual proof* that did not apply truth preserving
    operations.


    In other words you cannot show anywhere in the
    proof

    You didn't show the proof.-a You showed a high-level overview.


    If you know that Tarski derived the Liar Paradox
    by applying only truth preserving operations to
    known truths

    PLUS the assumption that a correct truth predicate exists, thereby
    proving that assumption false.


    He did not derive the liar paradox by applying
    truth preserving operations to known true statements
    you are just flat out lying about this.


    Either you have abysmal reading comprehension or you are intentionally
    lying about what others say to push your agenda. Read again:

    He derived the liar paradox by applying truth preserving operations to
    knows true statements *in addition to* the assumption that a correct
    truth predicate exists. Thus proving that assumption false.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Chris M. Thomasson@chris.m.thomasson.1@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic on Thu Oct 9 14:45:52 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/8/2025 8:41 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/8/2025 4:20 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
    On 2025-10-08, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
    For the set of H/P pairs of
    decider H and input P:
    If H says halts then P loops
    If H says loops then P halts
    making each H(P) always incorrect.

    A better way to say it is like this:

    Consider the set S of diagonal decider/input pairs.-a If <H, P> is any
    arbitrarily chosen pair from this set, then one of these three
    possibilities is true: H(P) indicates halting, H(P) indicates
    non-halting or else H(P) fails to terminate.-a If H(P) indicates halting,
    then P is necessarily non-halting, and vice versa. (If H(P) doesn't
    halt, P could be either.) In all three cases, H fails to decide P
    correctly, or at all.

    The above specifies one template of every
    H that gets the wrong answer on P.

    But the template is nothing without instantiation.

    The template's structure allows us to reason about an infinite such set
    S of diagonal pairs and be sure that each H in that set fails to decide
    its respective P.

    You are trying to weasel out of the full meaning of
    the question that also crucially depends on who is asked.

    No, it doesn't. What depends on which decider is asked
    is: whether the answer can be correct.


    Every element of the H/P template gets
    the wrong answer because the H/P template
    copied the self-contradictory of the Liar Paradox.

    No it doesn't because for every P, there is a right answer,

    Whereas the Liar Paradox is not even a set of sentences; it is one,
    and it is not a truth-bearer.

    We can have a set of self-referential sentences that are all false!

    S = { "This sentence has two words",
    -a-a-a-a-a-a "This sentence has three words",
    -a-a-a-a-a-a "This sentence has four words",
    -a-a-a-a-a-a "This sentence does not have eight words"
    -a-a-a-a-a-a ... }

    The existence of a set with falsehoods doesn't necessarily point to
    anything being pathological, even if they involve self-reference, and
    even if the set is infinite.

    That there is a correct answer, and which answer that is,
    doesn't depend on that at all.


    I say that Carol cannot give a correct answer
    and you said yes she can when she is Bob.

    If you allow the question to be answered by Bob,
    then Bob can certainly say that the correct answer is no;
    No, Carol cannot answer 'no' to the question and be correct.

    The problem is that this correct 'no' answer given by Bob
    remains correct for Bob even if Carol herself is giving
    the same answer, which is wrong for her.

    So there is a problem in the Carol sentence.




    One cannot correctly ignore the linguistic context
    of who is asked as an intrinsic and essential aspect
    of the full meaning of the question.

    There is no such context in halting.

    The no computer science person is aware of this crucial
    aspect of of expressions of language derive their meaning
    is no excuse.

    Computer science people are specifically aware of the
    crucial lack of extraneous context in the question.


    The context of who is asked is an aspect of the
    full meaning of a question and is required whether
    you know this or not.

    That is false. In a formal system which we invented from its bare
    axioms, we precisely dictate whether there is any such context or not,
    along with every other detail.

    In the halting problem, there isn't.

    In interpersonal questions between people, there is often a context, but
    even there, there isn't.

    Questions about external facts don't require personal context. E.g. what
    is the speed of light in vaccuum, or the permeability of free space.

    Almost all I know about the halting problem is from this newsgroup;
    I've
    never paid that much attention to the topic outside of the scope of
    discussing it with you.

    So where did you get Turing computability from?

    Looking up references, and brushing up on the material.

    I have a decent computing background, but I'm not an academic and I've
    never been focused on the halting problem. It makes no difference to me.
    Problems which are known to have "halting difficulty" often have
    complexity issues that you hit long before the theoretical limit, as a
    programmer.


    What is your programming expertise?
    I have been doing C++ off and on full time
    since 2000. Mostly systems level programming.


    BARF!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Chris M. Thomasson@chris.m.thomasson.1@gmail.com to comp.theory on Thu Oct 9 14:52:54 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/9/2025 11:26 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:06 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:58 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:29 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 12:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:00 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:49 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:22 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:

    [ .... ]

    I have already sufficiently proven my rebuttal of G||del
    incompleteness and Tarski Undefinability. I had to talk
    to someone that did not have their ego and identity tied
    to the received view.

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).

    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    Rejects the Liar Paradox that Tarski Undefinability
    depends upon, thus nullifying his whole proof.

    You really don't understand proof by contradiction, do you?


    You really don't understand that formal systems
    of logic are required to have only truth bearers
    and that non truth bearers must be rejected.

    Which is exactly what Tarski when he assumed a truth predicate
    exists and then concluded through a series of truth preserving
    operations that the resulting system contained the liar paradox,

    Saul Kripke (1975) proved otherwise in his
    Outline of a Theory of Truth

    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/
    files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf

    Starting with truth

    And the assumption that a truth predicate exists

    and only applying truth preserving
    operations prevents the Liar Paradox from coming into
    existence

    False, as Tarski proved.


    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    And if you start with truth and the assumption that a truth predicate
    exists and only apply truth preserving operations and derive the liar
    paradox, that proves that the assumption that a truth predicate exists
    is false.


    You have this backwards.
    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    derives a correct and consistent Truth predicate
    and the Liar Paradox is never reached.


    Can you see that proves itself totally true
    entirely based on the meaning of its words?

    A finite string description of a Turing machine is specified to
    possess all of the semantic properties of that machine, including
    whether it halts when executed directly.

    Can you see that proves itself totally true
    entirely based on the meaning of its words?


    just like ZFC prevents Russell's Paradox from
    coming into existence.

    proving that the assumption of the existence of a truth predicate >>>>>> is false.

    i.e. you demonstrated yet again that you don't understand proof by >>>>>> contradiction more than 50 years after it was taught to you.

    Oh come on! You don't care about the truth. A bunch of people actually
    tried, and are still trying to help you. Give me a break.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Chris M. Thomasson@chris.m.thomasson.1@gmail.com to comp.theory on Thu Oct 9 14:57:06 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/9/2025 11:26 AM, olcott wrote:
    [...]

    Are you Stern, or Hanover?

    (Heavy Metal (1981) - Captain Sternn & Hanover Fiste) https://youtu.be/Lqsg1RE6Jag




    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to comp.theory on Thu Oct 9 19:37:00 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/9/2025 5:34 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 4:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:13 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 4:08 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:30 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:21 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:26 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:06 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:58 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:29 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 12:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:00 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:49 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:22 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:

    [ .... ]

    I have already sufficiently proven my rebuttal of G||del >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incompleteness and Tarski Undefinability. I had to talk >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to someone that did not have their ego and identity tied >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to the received view.

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).

    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.

    Rejects the Liar Paradox that Tarski Undefinability >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depends upon, thus nullifying his whole proof. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    You really don't understand proof by contradiction, do >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you?


    You really don't understand that formal systems >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of logic are required to have only truth bearers >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and that non truth bearers must be rejected.

    Which is exactly what Tarski when he assumed a truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> predicate exists and then concluded through a series of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth preserving operations that the resulting system >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contained the liar paradox,

    Saul Kripke (1975) proved otherwise in his
    Outline of a Theory of Truth

    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/
    blogs.dir/1358/ files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of- >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Truth.pdf

    Starting with truth

    And the assumption that a truth predicate exists

    and only applying truth preserving
    operations prevents the Liar Paradox from coming into >>>>>>>>>>>>>> existence

    False, as Tarski proved.


    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    And if you start with truth and the assumption that a truth >>>>>>>>>>> predicate exists and only apply truth preserving operations >>>>>>>>>>> and derive the liar paradox, that proves that the assumption >>>>>>>>>>> that a truth predicate exists is false.


    You have this backwards.
    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    derives a correct and consistent Truth predicate
    and the Liar Paradox is never reached.


    False.-a Tarski assumed the existence of a truth predicate and >>>>>>>>> applied truth preserving operations to derive the liar paradox. >>>>>>>>>

    Show me the steps of how he derived the Liar Paradox
    by applying only truth preserving operations to known truth.

    Here is the step of how how derived that out of thin air:
    https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf

    Those pages are a high-level overview, not the proof itself.

    Read the whole thing, not just the summary, then point out the
    step in the *actual proof* that did not apply truth preserving
    operations.


    In other words you cannot show anywhere in the
    proof

    You didn't show the proof.-a You showed a high-level overview.


    If you know that Tarski derived the Liar Paradox
    by applying only truth preserving operations to
    known truths

    PLUS the assumption that a correct truth predicate exists, thereby
    proving that assumption false.


    He did not derive the liar paradox by applying
    truth preserving operations to known true statements
    you are just flat out lying about this.


    Either you have abysmal reading comprehension or you are intentionally
    lying about what others say to push your agenda.-a Read again:

    He derived the liar paradox by applying truth preserving operations to
    knows true statements *in addition to* the assumption that a correct
    truth predicate exists.-a Thus proving that assumption false.


    Your lack of response to the above despite several responses to other
    messages in the last 2 hours constitutes your admission that the above
    point is correct.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory on Thu Oct 9 18:49:07 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/9/2025 4:34 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 4:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:13 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 4:08 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:30 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:21 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:26 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:06 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:58 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:29 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 12:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:00 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:49 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:22 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:

    [ .... ]

    I have already sufficiently proven my rebuttal of G||del >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incompleteness and Tarski Undefinability. I had to talk >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to someone that did not have their ego and identity tied >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to the received view.

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).

    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.

    Rejects the Liar Paradox that Tarski Undefinability >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depends upon, thus nullifying his whole proof. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    You really don't understand proof by contradiction, do >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you?


    You really don't understand that formal systems >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of logic are required to have only truth bearers >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and that non truth bearers must be rejected.

    Which is exactly what Tarski when he assumed a truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> predicate exists and then concluded through a series of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth preserving operations that the resulting system >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contained the liar paradox,

    Saul Kripke (1975) proved otherwise in his
    Outline of a Theory of Truth

    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/
    blogs.dir/1358/ files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of- >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Truth.pdf

    Starting with truth

    And the assumption that a truth predicate exists

    and only applying truth preserving
    operations prevents the Liar Paradox from coming into >>>>>>>>>>>>>> existence

    False, as Tarski proved.


    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    And if you start with truth and the assumption that a truth >>>>>>>>>>> predicate exists and only apply truth preserving operations >>>>>>>>>>> and derive the liar paradox, that proves that the assumption >>>>>>>>>>> that a truth predicate exists is false.


    You have this backwards.
    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    derives a correct and consistent Truth predicate
    and the Liar Paradox is never reached.


    False.-a Tarski assumed the existence of a truth predicate and >>>>>>>>> applied truth preserving operations to derive the liar paradox. >>>>>>>>>

    Show me the steps of how he derived the Liar Paradox
    by applying only truth preserving operations to known truth.

    Here is the step of how how derived that out of thin air:
    https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf

    Those pages are a high-level overview, not the proof itself.

    Read the whole thing, not just the summary, then point out the
    step in the *actual proof* that did not apply truth preserving
    operations.


    In other words you cannot show anywhere in the
    proof

    You didn't show the proof.-a You showed a high-level overview.


    If you know that Tarski derived the Liar Paradox
    by applying only truth preserving operations to
    known truths

    PLUS the assumption that a correct truth predicate exists, thereby
    proving that assumption false.


    He did not derive the liar paradox by applying
    truth preserving operations to known true statements
    you are just flat out lying about this.


    Either you have abysmal reading comprehension or you are intentionally
    lying about what others say to push your agenda.-a Read again:

    He derived the liar paradox by applying truth preserving operations to
    knows true statements

    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*

    *in addition to* the assumption that a correct
    truth predicate exists.-a Thus proving that assumption false.

    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
    hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to comp.theory on Thu Oct 9 19:54:20 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/9/2025 7:49 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 4:34 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 4:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:13 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 4:08 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:30 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:21 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:26 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:06 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:58 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:29 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 12:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:00 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:49 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:22 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:

    [ .... ]

    I have already sufficiently proven my rebuttal of G||del >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incompleteness and Tarski Undefinability. I had to talk >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to someone that did not have their ego and identity tied >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to the received view.

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).

    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.

    Rejects the Liar Paradox that Tarski Undefinability >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depends upon, thus nullifying his whole proof. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    You really don't understand proof by contradiction, do >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you?


    You really don't understand that formal systems >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of logic are required to have only truth bearers >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and that non truth bearers must be rejected.

    Which is exactly what Tarski when he assumed a truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> predicate exists and then concluded through a series of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth preserving operations that the resulting system >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contained the liar paradox,

    Saul Kripke (1975) proved otherwise in his
    Outline of a Theory of Truth

    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/
    blogs.dir/1358/ files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Truth.pdf

    Starting with truth

    And the assumption that a truth predicate exists

    and only applying truth preserving
    operations prevents the Liar Paradox from coming into >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> existence

    False, as Tarski proved.


    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    And if you start with truth and the assumption that a truth >>>>>>>>>>>> predicate exists and only apply truth preserving operations >>>>>>>>>>>> and derive the liar paradox, that proves that the assumption >>>>>>>>>>>> that a truth predicate exists is false.


    You have this backwards.
    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    derives a correct and consistent Truth predicate
    and the Liar Paradox is never reached.


    False.-a Tarski assumed the existence of a truth predicate and >>>>>>>>>> applied truth preserving operations to derive the liar paradox. >>>>>>>>>>

    Show me the steps of how he derived the Liar Paradox
    by applying only truth preserving operations to known truth. >>>>>>>>>
    Here is the step of how how derived that out of thin air:
    https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf

    Those pages are a high-level overview, not the proof itself.

    Read the whole thing, not just the summary, then point out the >>>>>>>> step in the *actual proof* that did not apply truth preserving >>>>>>>> operations.


    In other words you cannot show anywhere in the
    proof

    You didn't show the proof.-a You showed a high-level overview.


    If you know that Tarski derived the Liar Paradox
    by applying only truth preserving operations to
    known truths

    PLUS the assumption that a correct truth predicate exists, thereby
    proving that assumption false.


    He did not derive the liar paradox by applying
    truth preserving operations to known true statements
    you are just flat out lying about this.


    Either you have abysmal reading comprehension or you are intentionally
    lying about what others say to push your agenda.-a Read again:

    He derived the liar paradox by applying truth preserving operations to
    knows true statements

    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*

    The fact that you stopped reading here


    *in addition to* the assumption that a correct truth predicate
    exists.-a Thus proving that assumption false.

    And didn't bother to look at this part proves you're lying to push your
    agenda and have no interest in the truth.

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory on Thu Oct 9 19:02:28 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/9/2025 6:54 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 7:49 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 4:34 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 4:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:13 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 4:08 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:30 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:21 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:26 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:06 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:58 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:29 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 12:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:00 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:49 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:22 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:

    [ .... ]

    I have already sufficiently proven my rebuttal of G||del >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incompleteness and Tarski Undefinability. I had to talk >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to someone that did not have their ego and identity >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tied
    to the received view.

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).

    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.

    Rejects the Liar Paradox that Tarski Undefinability >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depends upon, thus nullifying his whole proof. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    You really don't understand proof by contradiction, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> do you?


    You really don't understand that formal systems >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of logic are required to have only truth bearers >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and that non truth bearers must be rejected. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which is exactly what Tarski when he assumed a truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> predicate exists and then concluded through a series of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth preserving operations that the resulting system >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contained the liar paradox,

    Saul Kripke (1975) proved otherwise in his
    Outline of a Theory of Truth

    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> blogs.dir/1358/ files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Truth.pdf

    Starting with truth

    And the assumption that a truth predicate exists >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    and only applying truth preserving
    operations prevents the Liar Paradox from coming into >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> existence

    False, as Tarski proved.


    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    And if you start with truth and the assumption that a truth >>>>>>>>>>>>> predicate exists and only apply truth preserving operations >>>>>>>>>>>>> and derive the liar paradox, that proves that the
    assumption that a truth predicate exists is false.


    You have this backwards.
    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    derives a correct and consistent Truth predicate
    and the Liar Paradox is never reached.


    False.-a Tarski assumed the existence of a truth predicate and >>>>>>>>>>> applied truth preserving operations to derive the liar paradox. >>>>>>>>>>>

    Show me the steps of how he derived the Liar Paradox
    by applying only truth preserving operations to known truth. >>>>>>>>>>
    Here is the step of how how derived that out of thin air:
    https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf

    Those pages are a high-level overview, not the proof itself. >>>>>>>>>
    Read the whole thing, not just the summary, then point out the >>>>>>>>> step in the *actual proof* that did not apply truth preserving >>>>>>>>> operations.


    In other words you cannot show anywhere in the
    proof

    You didn't show the proof.-a You showed a high-level overview.


    If you know that Tarski derived the Liar Paradox
    by applying only truth preserving operations to
    known truths

    PLUS the assumption that a correct truth predicate exists, thereby
    proving that assumption false.


    He did not derive the liar paradox by applying
    truth preserving operations to known true statements
    you are just flat out lying about this.


    Either you have abysmal reading comprehension or you are
    intentionally lying about what others say to push your agenda.-a Read
    again:

    He derived the liar paradox by applying truth preserving operations
    to knows true statements

    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*

    The fact that you stopped reading here


    *in addition to* the assumption that a correct truth predicate
    exists.-a Thus proving that assumption false.

    And didn't bother to look at this part proves you're lying to push your agenda and have no interest in the truth.


    Page number and link to the source
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
    hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to comp.theory on Thu Oct 9 20:13:11 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/9/2025 8:02 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 6:54 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 7:49 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 4:34 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 4:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:13 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 4:08 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:30 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:21 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:26 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:06 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:58 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:29 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 12:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:00 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:49 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:22 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:

    [ .... ]

    I have already sufficiently proven my rebuttal of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> G||del
    incompleteness and Tarski Undefinability. I had to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> talk
    to someone that did not have their ego and identity >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tied
    to the received view.

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).

    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.

    Rejects the Liar Paradox that Tarski Undefinability >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depends upon, thus nullifying his whole proof. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    You really don't understand proof by contradiction, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> do you?


    You really don't understand that formal systems >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of logic are required to have only truth bearers >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and that non truth bearers must be rejected. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which is exactly what Tarski when he assumed a truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> predicate exists and then concluded through a series >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of truth preserving operations that the resulting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system contained the liar paradox,

    Saul Kripke (1975) proved otherwise in his
    Outline of a Theory of Truth

    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> blogs.dir/1358/ files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Truth.pdf

    Starting with truth

    And the assumption that a truth predicate exists >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    and only applying truth preserving
    operations prevents the Liar Paradox from coming into >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> existence

    False, as Tarski proved.


    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    And if you start with truth and the assumption that a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth predicate exists and only apply truth preserving >>>>>>>>>>>>>> operations and derive the liar paradox, that proves that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the assumption that a truth predicate exists is false. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    You have this backwards.
    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    derives a correct and consistent Truth predicate
    and the Liar Paradox is never reached.


    False.-a Tarski assumed the existence of a truth predicate >>>>>>>>>>>> and applied truth preserving operations to derive the liar >>>>>>>>>>>> paradox.


    Show me the steps of how he derived the Liar Paradox
    by applying only truth preserving operations to known truth. >>>>>>>>>>>
    Here is the step of how how derived that out of thin air: >>>>>>>>>>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf

    Those pages are a high-level overview, not the proof itself. >>>>>>>>>>
    Read the whole thing, not just the summary, then point out the >>>>>>>>>> step in the *actual proof* that did not apply truth preserving >>>>>>>>>> operations.


    In other words you cannot show anywhere in the
    proof

    You didn't show the proof.-a You showed a high-level overview. >>>>>>>>

    If you know that Tarski derived the Liar Paradox
    by applying only truth preserving operations to
    known truths

    PLUS the assumption that a correct truth predicate exists, thereby >>>>>> proving that assumption false.


    He did not derive the liar paradox by applying
    truth preserving operations to known true statements
    you are just flat out lying about this.


    Either you have abysmal reading comprehension or you are
    intentionally lying about what others say to push your agenda.-a Read >>>> again:

    He derived the liar paradox by applying truth preserving operations
    to knows true statements

    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*

    The fact that you stopped reading here


    *in addition to* the assumption that a correct truth predicate
    exists.-a Thus proving that assumption false.

    And didn't bother to look at this part proves you're lying to push
    your agenda and have no interest in the truth.


    Page number and link to the source


    It's common knowledge to those that know the proof that it's a proof by contradiction that does exactly that.

    But if it makes you happy, I'll pull something from the high level
    overview you posted. In fact, I'll use your highlighted passages:

    Should we succeed in constructing in the metalanguage a correct
    definition of truth

    i.e. given the assumption that a truth predicate exists

    it would then be possible to reconstruct the antimony of the liar
    paradox in the metalanguage

    i.e. truth preserving operations can be applied to that assumption
    together with known true statements to derive the liar paradox.

    Therefore proving the assumption that a truth predicate exists to be false.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory on Thu Oct 9 20:44:07 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/9/2025 7:13 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 8:02 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 6:54 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 7:49 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 4:34 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 4:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:13 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 4:08 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:30 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:21 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:26 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:06 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:58 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:29 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 12:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:00 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:49 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:22 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    [ .... ]

    I have already sufficiently proven my rebuttal of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> G||del
    incompleteness and Tarski Undefinability. I had to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> talk
    to someone that did not have their ego and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> identity tied
    to the received view.

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).

    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.

    Rejects the Liar Paradox that Tarski Undefinability >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depends upon, thus nullifying his whole proof. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    You really don't understand proof by contradiction, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> do you?


    You really don't understand that formal systems >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of logic are required to have only truth bearers >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and that non truth bearers must be rejected. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which is exactly what Tarski when he assumed a truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> predicate exists and then concluded through a series >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of truth preserving operations that the resulting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system contained the liar paradox,

    Saul Kripke (1975) proved otherwise in his >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Outline of a Theory of Truth

    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> blogs.dir/1358/ files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Truth.pdf

    Starting with truth

    And the assumption that a truth predicate exists >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    and only applying truth preserving
    operations prevents the Liar Paradox from coming into >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> existence

    False, as Tarski proved.


    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    And if you start with truth and the assumption that a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth predicate exists and only apply truth preserving >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> operations and derive the liar paradox, that proves that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the assumption that a truth predicate exists is false. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    You have this backwards.
    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    derives a correct and consistent Truth predicate
    and the Liar Paradox is never reached.


    False.-a Tarski assumed the existence of a truth predicate >>>>>>>>>>>>> and applied truth preserving operations to derive the liar >>>>>>>>>>>>> paradox.


    Show me the steps of how he derived the Liar Paradox
    by applying only truth preserving operations to known truth. >>>>>>>>>>>>
    Here is the step of how how derived that out of thin air: >>>>>>>>>>>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf

    Those pages are a high-level overview, not the proof itself. >>>>>>>>>>>
    Read the whole thing, not just the summary, then point out >>>>>>>>>>> the step in the *actual proof* that did not apply truth >>>>>>>>>>> preserving operations.


    In other words you cannot show anywhere in the
    proof

    You didn't show the proof.-a You showed a high-level overview. >>>>>>>>>

    If you know that Tarski derived the Liar Paradox
    by applying only truth preserving operations to
    known truths

    PLUS the assumption that a correct truth predicate exists,
    thereby proving that assumption false.


    He did not derive the liar paradox by applying
    truth preserving operations to known true statements
    you are just flat out lying about this.


    Either you have abysmal reading comprehension or you are
    intentionally lying about what others say to push your agenda.
    Read again:

    He derived the liar paradox by applying truth preserving operations >>>>> to knows true statements

    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*

    The fact that you stopped reading here


    *in addition to* the assumption that a correct truth predicate
    exists.-a Thus proving that assumption false.

    And didn't bother to look at this part proves you're lying to push
    your agenda and have no interest in the truth.


    Page number and link to the source


    It's common knowledge
    Bullshit cite the source cheater !!!


    Outline of a Theory of Truth
    Saul Kripke

    The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 72, No. 19, Seventy-Second Annual
    Meeting American
    Philosophical Association, Eastern Division. (Nov. 6, 1975), pp. 690-716.

    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf

    His paper shows how the Liar Paradox can be
    avoided by only applying truth preserving
    operations to known true statements.

    He was so smart that they wanted him to teach
    at University before he got out of high school.
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
    hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic on Thu Oct 9 21:14:46 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/9/2025 7:13 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 8:02 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 6:54 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 7:49 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 4:34 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 4:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:13 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 4:08 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:30 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:21 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:26 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:06 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:58 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:29 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 12:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:00 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:49 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:22 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    [ .... ]

    I have already sufficiently proven my rebuttal of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> G||del
    incompleteness and Tarski Undefinability. I had to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> talk
    to someone that did not have their ego and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> identity tied
    to the received view.

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).

    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.

    Rejects the Liar Paradox that Tarski Undefinability >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depends upon, thus nullifying his whole proof. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    You really don't understand proof by contradiction, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> do you?


    You really don't understand that formal systems >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of logic are required to have only truth bearers >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and that non truth bearers must be rejected. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which is exactly what Tarski when he assumed a truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> predicate exists and then concluded through a series >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of truth preserving operations that the resulting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system contained the liar paradox,

    Saul Kripke (1975) proved otherwise in his >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Outline of a Theory of Truth

    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> blogs.dir/1358/ files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Truth.pdf

    Starting with truth

    And the assumption that a truth predicate exists >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    and only applying truth preserving
    operations prevents the Liar Paradox from coming into >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> existence

    False, as Tarski proved.


    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    And if you start with truth and the assumption that a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth predicate exists and only apply truth preserving >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> operations and derive the liar paradox, that proves that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the assumption that a truth predicate exists is false. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    You have this backwards.
    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    derives a correct and consistent Truth predicate
    and the Liar Paradox is never reached.


    False.-a Tarski assumed the existence of a truth predicate >>>>>>>>>>>>> and applied truth preserving operations to derive the liar >>>>>>>>>>>>> paradox.


    Show me the steps of how he derived the Liar Paradox
    by applying only truth preserving operations to known truth. >>>>>>>>>>>>
    Here is the step of how how derived that out of thin air: >>>>>>>>>>>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf

    Those pages are a high-level overview, not the proof itself. >>>>>>>>>>>
    Read the whole thing, not just the summary, then point out >>>>>>>>>>> the step in the *actual proof* that did not apply truth >>>>>>>>>>> preserving operations.


    In other words you cannot show anywhere in the
    proof

    You didn't show the proof.-a You showed a high-level overview. >>>>>>>>>

    If you know that Tarski derived the Liar Paradox
    by applying only truth preserving operations to
    known truths

    PLUS the assumption that a correct truth predicate exists,
    thereby proving that assumption false.


    He did not derive the liar paradox by applying
    truth preserving operations to known true statements
    you are just flat out lying about this.


    Either you have abysmal reading comprehension or you are
    intentionally lying about what others say to push your agenda.
    Read again:

    He derived the liar paradox by applying truth preserving operations >>>>> to knows true statements

    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*

    The fact that you stopped reading here


    *in addition to* the assumption that a correct truth predicate
    exists.-a Thus proving that assumption false.

    And didn't bother to look at this part proves you're lying to push
    your agenda and have no interest in the truth.


    Page number and link to the source


    It's common knowledge to those that know the proof that it's a proof by contradiction that does exactly that.

    But if it makes you happy, I'll pull something from the high level
    overview you posted.-a In fact, I'll use your highlighted passages:

    Should we succeed in constructing in the metalanguage a correct
    definition of truth

    i.e. given the assumption that a truth predicate exists

    it would then be possible to reconstruct the antimony of the liar
    paradox in the metalanguage

    i.e. truth preserving operations can be applied to that assumption
    together with known true statements to derive the liar paradox.

    Therefore proving the assumption that a truth predicate exists to be false.

    I just went over Kripke's work and Tarski's work and Kripke
    is correct and Tarski is incorrect. It turns out that Kripke
    avoids the Liar Paradox by starting with truth and only
    applying truth preserving operations. The Liar Paradox then
    simply becomes ungrounded in truth.

    Tarski big mistake is believing that a truth predicate
    should apply to self-contradictory expressions. Kripke
    doesn't buy this.
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
    hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to comp.theory on Thu Oct 9 23:15:15 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/9/2025 9:44 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 7:13 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 8:02 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 6:54 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 7:49 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 4:34 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 4:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:13 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 4:08 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:30 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:21 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:26 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:06 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:58 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:29 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 12:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:00 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:49 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:22 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    [ .... ]

    I have already sufficiently proven my rebuttal of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> G||del
    incompleteness and Tarski Undefinability. I had >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to talk
    to someone that did not have their ego and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> identity tied
    to the received view.

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).

    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.

    Rejects the Liar Paradox that Tarski Undefinability >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depends upon, thus nullifying his whole proof. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    You really don't understand proof by >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contradiction, do you?


    You really don't understand that formal systems >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of logic are required to have only truth bearers >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and that non truth bearers must be rejected. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which is exactly what Tarski when he assumed a truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> predicate exists and then concluded through a series >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of truth preserving operations that the resulting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system contained the liar paradox,

    Saul Kripke (1975) proved otherwise in his >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Outline of a Theory of Truth

    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> blogs.dir/1358/ files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Truth.pdf

    Starting with truth

    And the assumption that a truth predicate exists >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    and only applying truth preserving
    operations prevents the Liar Paradox from coming into >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> existence

    False, as Tarski proved.


    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (Olcott 2024)

    And if you start with truth and the assumption that a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth predicate exists and only apply truth preserving >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> operations and derive the liar paradox, that proves that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the assumption that a truth predicate exists is false. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    You have this backwards.
    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    derives a correct and consistent Truth predicate >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and the Liar Paradox is never reached.


    False.-a Tarski assumed the existence of a truth predicate >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and applied truth preserving operations to derive the liar >>>>>>>>>>>>>> paradox.


    Show me the steps of how he derived the Liar Paradox >>>>>>>>>>>>> by applying only truth preserving operations to known truth. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Here is the step of how how derived that out of thin air: >>>>>>>>>>>>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf

    Those pages are a high-level overview, not the proof itself. >>>>>>>>>>>>
    Read the whole thing, not just the summary, then point out >>>>>>>>>>>> the step in the *actual proof* that did not apply truth >>>>>>>>>>>> preserving operations.


    In other words you cannot show anywhere in the
    proof

    You didn't show the proof.-a You showed a high-level overview. >>>>>>>>>>

    If you know that Tarski derived the Liar Paradox
    by applying only truth preserving operations to
    known truths

    PLUS the assumption that a correct truth predicate exists,
    thereby proving that assumption false.


    He did not derive the liar paradox by applying
    truth preserving operations to known true statements
    you are just flat out lying about this.


    Either you have abysmal reading comprehension or you are
    intentionally lying about what others say to push your agenda.
    Read again:

    He derived the liar paradox by applying truth preserving
    operations to knows true statements

    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*

    The fact that you stopped reading here


    *in addition to* the assumption that a correct truth predicate
    exists.-a Thus proving that assumption false.

    And didn't bother to look at this part proves you're lying to push
    your agenda and have no interest in the truth.


    Page number and link to the source


    It's common knowledge
    Bullshit cite the source cheater !!!

    I'll let you reply to yourself:

    On 7/30/2024 10:21 AM, olcott wrote:
    *Its all in the part that you erased*

    Once again, you prove that you have no interest in the truth and hide
    the evidence that proves you wrong.


    to those that know the proof that it's a proof by
    contradiction that does exactly that.

    But if it makes you happy, I'll pull something from the high level
    overview you posted. In fact, I'll use your highlighted passages:

    Should we succeed in constructing in the metalanguage a correct
    definition of truth

    i.e. given the assumption that a truth predicate exists

    it would then be possible to reconstruct the antimony of the liar
    paradox in the metalanguage

    i.e. truth preserving operations can be applied to that assumption
    together with known true statements to derive the liar paradox.

    Therefore proving the assumption that a truth predicate exists to be false.


    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic on Thu Oct 9 23:17:56 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/9/2025 10:14 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 7:13 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 8:02 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 6:54 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 7:49 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 4:34 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 4:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:13 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 4:08 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:30 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:21 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:26 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:06 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:58 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:29 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 12:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:00 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:49 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:22 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    [ .... ]

    I have already sufficiently proven my rebuttal of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> G||del
    incompleteness and Tarski Undefinability. I had >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to talk
    to someone that did not have their ego and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> identity tied
    to the received view.

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).

    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.

    Rejects the Liar Paradox that Tarski Undefinability >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depends upon, thus nullifying his whole proof. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    You really don't understand proof by >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contradiction, do you?


    You really don't understand that formal systems >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of logic are required to have only truth bearers >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and that non truth bearers must be rejected. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which is exactly what Tarski when he assumed a truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> predicate exists and then concluded through a series >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of truth preserving operations that the resulting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system contained the liar paradox,

    Saul Kripke (1975) proved otherwise in his >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Outline of a Theory of Truth

    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> blogs.dir/1358/ files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Truth.pdf

    Starting with truth

    And the assumption that a truth predicate exists >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    and only applying truth preserving
    operations prevents the Liar Paradox from coming into >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> existence

    False, as Tarski proved.


    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (Olcott 2024)

    And if you start with truth and the assumption that a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth predicate exists and only apply truth preserving >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> operations and derive the liar paradox, that proves that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the assumption that a truth predicate exists is false. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

    You have this backwards.
    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    derives a correct and consistent Truth predicate >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and the Liar Paradox is never reached.


    False.-a Tarski assumed the existence of a truth predicate >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and applied truth preserving operations to derive the liar >>>>>>>>>>>>>> paradox.


    Show me the steps of how he derived the Liar Paradox >>>>>>>>>>>>> by applying only truth preserving operations to known truth. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Here is the step of how how derived that out of thin air: >>>>>>>>>>>>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf

    Those pages are a high-level overview, not the proof itself. >>>>>>>>>>>>
    Read the whole thing, not just the summary, then point out >>>>>>>>>>>> the step in the *actual proof* that did not apply truth >>>>>>>>>>>> preserving operations.


    In other words you cannot show anywhere in the
    proof

    You didn't show the proof.-a You showed a high-level overview. >>>>>>>>>>

    If you know that Tarski derived the Liar Paradox
    by applying only truth preserving operations to
    known truths

    PLUS the assumption that a correct truth predicate exists,
    thereby proving that assumption false.


    He did not derive the liar paradox by applying
    truth preserving operations to known true statements
    you are just flat out lying about this.


    Either you have abysmal reading comprehension or you are
    intentionally lying about what others say to push your agenda.
    Read again:

    He derived the liar paradox by applying truth preserving
    operations to knows true statements

    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*

    The fact that you stopped reading here


    *in addition to* the assumption that a correct truth predicate
    exists.-a Thus proving that assumption false.

    And didn't bother to look at this part proves you're lying to push
    your agenda and have no interest in the truth.


    Page number and link to the source


    It's common knowledge to those that know the proof that it's a proof
    by contradiction that does exactly that.

    But if it makes you happy, I'll pull something from the high level
    overview you posted.-a In fact, I'll use your highlighted passages:

    Should we succeed in constructing in the metalanguage a correct
    definition of truth

    i.e. given the assumption that a truth predicate exists

    it would then be possible to reconstruct the antimony of the liar
    paradox in the metalanguage

    i.e. truth preserving operations can be applied to that assumption
    together with known true statements to derive the liar paradox.

    Therefore proving the assumption that a truth predicate exists to be
    false.

    I just went over Kripke's work and Tarski's work and Kripke
    is correct and Tarski is incorrect. It turns out that Kripke
    avoids the Liar Paradox by starting with truth and only
    applying truth preserving operations.

    Which has nothing to do with Tarski's proof which is a proof by
    contradiction. You know, that type of proof that you still don't
    understand more than 50 years after it was taught to you.

    The Liar Paradox then
    simply becomes ungrounded in truth.

    Tarski big mistake is believing that a truth predicate
    should apply to self-contradictory expressions.
    Nope, he shows that the existence of an truth predicate allows such expressions to be created.
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory on Thu Oct 9 23:29:24 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/9/2025 10:15 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 9:44 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 7:13 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 8:02 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 6:54 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 7:49 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 4:34 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 4:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:13 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 4:08 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:30 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:21 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:26 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:06 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:58 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:29 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 12:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:00 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:49 AM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 10/9/2025 10:22 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    [ .... ]

    I have already sufficiently proven my rebuttal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of G||del
    incompleteness and Tarski Undefinability. I had >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to talk
    to someone that did not have their ego and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> identity tied
    to the received view.

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).

    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.

    Rejects the Liar Paradox that Tarski Undefinability >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depends upon, thus nullifying his whole proof. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    You really don't understand proof by >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contradiction, do you?


    You really don't understand that formal systems >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of logic are required to have only truth bearers >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and that non truth bearers must be rejected. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which is exactly what Tarski when he assumed a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth predicate exists and then concluded through a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> series of truth preserving operations that the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> resulting system contained the liar paradox, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Saul Kripke (1975) proved otherwise in his >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Outline of a Theory of Truth

    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> blogs.dir/1358/ files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of- Truth.pdf

    Starting with truth

    And the assumption that a truth predicate exists >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    and only applying truth preserving
    operations prevents the Liar Paradox from coming into >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> existence

    False, as Tarski proved.


    Starting with truth and only applying truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preserving operations only truth is derived. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (Olcott 2024)

    And if you start with truth and the assumption that a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth predicate exists and only apply truth preserving >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> operations and derive the liar paradox, that proves >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the assumption that a truth predicate exists is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.


    You have this backwards.
    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    derives a correct and consistent Truth predicate >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and the Liar Paradox is never reached.


    False.-a Tarski assumed the existence of a truth predicate >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and applied truth preserving operations to derive the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> liar paradox.


    Show me the steps of how he derived the Liar Paradox >>>>>>>>>>>>>> by applying only truth preserving operations to known truth. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Here is the step of how how derived that out of thin air: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf

    Those pages are a high-level overview, not the proof itself. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Read the whole thing, not just the summary, then point out >>>>>>>>>>>>> the step in the *actual proof* that did not apply truth >>>>>>>>>>>>> preserving operations.


    In other words you cannot show anywhere in the
    proof

    You didn't show the proof.-a You showed a high-level overview. >>>>>>>>>>>

    If you know that Tarski derived the Liar Paradox
    by applying only truth preserving operations to
    known truths

    PLUS the assumption that a correct truth predicate exists,
    thereby proving that assumption false.


    He did not derive the liar paradox by applying
    truth preserving operations to known true statements
    you are just flat out lying about this.


    Either you have abysmal reading comprehension or you are
    intentionally lying about what others say to push your agenda.
    Read again:

    He derived the liar paradox by applying truth preserving
    operations to knows true statements

    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*

    The fact that you stopped reading here


    *in addition to* the assumption that a correct truth predicate
    exists.-a Thus proving that assumption false.

    And didn't bother to look at this part proves you're lying to push
    your agenda and have no interest in the truth.


    Page number and link to the source


    It's common knowledge
    Bullshit cite the source cheater !!!

    I'll let you reply to yourself:

    On 7/30/2024 10:21 AM, olcott wrote:
    *Its all in the part that you erased*

    Once again, you prove that you have no interest in the truth and hide
    the evidence that proves you wrong.


    I found that Kripke does EXCLUDE the
    Liar Paradox and all that he does to
    do this is derive expressions of
    language that are true by applying
    truth preserving operations and he
    never reaches the Liar Paradox.

    Here's his whole paper. https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf


    to those that know the proof that it's a proof by contradiction that
    does exactly that.

    But if it makes you happy, I'll pull something from the high level
    overview you posted.-a In fact, I'll use your highlighted passages:

    Should we succeed in constructing in the metalanguage a correct
    definition of truth

    i.e. given the assumption that a truth predicate exists

    it would then be possible to reconstruct the antimony of the liar
    paradox in the metalanguage

    i.e. truth preserving operations can be applied to that assumption
    together with known true statements to derive the liar paradox.

    Therefore proving the assumption that a truth predicate exists to be
    false.


    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
    hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic on Thu Oct 9 23:33:22 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/9/2025 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:14 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 7:13 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 8:02 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 6:54 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 7:49 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 4:34 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 4:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:13 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 4:08 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:30 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:21 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:26 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:06 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:58 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:29 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 12:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:00 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:49 AM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 10/9/2025 10:22 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    [ .... ]

    I have already sufficiently proven my rebuttal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of G||del
    incompleteness and Tarski Undefinability. I had >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to talk
    to someone that did not have their ego and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> identity tied
    to the received view.

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).

    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.

    Rejects the Liar Paradox that Tarski Undefinability >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depends upon, thus nullifying his whole proof. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    You really don't understand proof by >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contradiction, do you?


    You really don't understand that formal systems >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of logic are required to have only truth bearers >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and that non truth bearers must be rejected. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which is exactly what Tarski when he assumed a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth predicate exists and then concluded through a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> series of truth preserving operations that the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> resulting system contained the liar paradox, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Saul Kripke (1975) proved otherwise in his >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Outline of a Theory of Truth

    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> blogs.dir/1358/ files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of- Truth.pdf

    Starting with truth

    And the assumption that a truth predicate exists >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    and only applying truth preserving
    operations prevents the Liar Paradox from coming into >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> existence

    False, as Tarski proved.


    Starting with truth and only applying truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preserving operations only truth is derived. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (Olcott 2024)

    And if you start with truth and the assumption that a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth predicate exists and only apply truth preserving >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> operations and derive the liar paradox, that proves >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the assumption that a truth predicate exists is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.


    You have this backwards.
    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived.
    (Olcott 2024)

    derives a correct and consistent Truth predicate >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and the Liar Paradox is never reached.


    False.-a Tarski assumed the existence of a truth predicate >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and applied truth preserving operations to derive the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> liar paradox.


    Show me the steps of how he derived the Liar Paradox >>>>>>>>>>>>>> by applying only truth preserving operations to known truth. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Here is the step of how how derived that out of thin air: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf

    Those pages are a high-level overview, not the proof itself. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Read the whole thing, not just the summary, then point out >>>>>>>>>>>>> the step in the *actual proof* that did not apply truth >>>>>>>>>>>>> preserving operations.


    In other words you cannot show anywhere in the
    proof

    You didn't show the proof.-a You showed a high-level overview. >>>>>>>>>>>

    If you know that Tarski derived the Liar Paradox
    by applying only truth preserving operations to
    known truths

    PLUS the assumption that a correct truth predicate exists,
    thereby proving that assumption false.


    He did not derive the liar paradox by applying
    truth preserving operations to known true statements
    you are just flat out lying about this.


    Either you have abysmal reading comprehension or you are
    intentionally lying about what others say to push your agenda.
    Read again:

    He derived the liar paradox by applying truth preserving
    operations to knows true statements

    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*

    The fact that you stopped reading here


    *in addition to* the assumption that a correct truth predicate
    exists.-a Thus proving that assumption false.

    And didn't bother to look at this part proves you're lying to push
    your agenda and have no interest in the truth.


    Page number and link to the source


    It's common knowledge to those that know the proof that it's a proof
    by contradiction that does exactly that.

    But if it makes you happy, I'll pull something from the high level
    overview you posted.-a In fact, I'll use your highlighted passages:

    Should we succeed in constructing in the metalanguage a correct
    definition of truth

    i.e. given the assumption that a truth predicate exists

    it would then be possible to reconstruct the antimony of the liar
    paradox in the metalanguage

    i.e. truth preserving operations can be applied to that assumption
    together with known true statements to derive the liar paradox.

    Therefore proving the assumption that a truth predicate exists to be
    false.

    I just went over Kripke's work and Tarski's work and Kripke
    is correct and Tarski is incorrect. It turns out that Kripke
    avoids the Liar Paradox by starting with truth and only
    applying truth preserving operations.

    Which has nothing to do with Tarski's proof which is a proof by contradiction.-a You know, that type of proof that you still don't understand more than 50 years after it was taught to you.


    Self-contradictory expressions only prove that
    they must be excluded from, formal systems of logic.

    The Liar Paradox then
    simply becomes ungrounded in truth.

    Tarski big mistake is believing that a truth predicate
    should apply to self-contradictory expressions.

    Nope, he shows that the existence of an truth predicate allows such expressions to be created.

    Not when applying only truth preserving operations
    to known truths. That is how Kripke got rid of
    the Liar Paradox.

    Read his paper and see for yourself. https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
    hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic on Fri Oct 10 07:36:38 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/10/2025 12:33 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:14 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 7:13 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 8:02 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 6:54 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 7:49 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 4:34 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 4:59 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:13 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 4:08 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:36 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:30 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:21 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 3:12 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 2:26 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:06 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 1:58 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:29 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 12:23 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 11:00 AM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 10/9/2025 11:49 AM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 10/9/2025 10:22 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    [ .... ]

    I have already sufficiently proven my rebuttal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of G||del
    incompleteness and Tarski Undefinability. I had >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to talk
    to someone that did not have their ego and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> identity tied
    to the received view.

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).

    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.

    Rejects the Liar Paradox that Tarski >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Undefinability
    depends upon, thus nullifying his whole proof. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    You really don't understand proof by >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contradiction, do you?


    You really don't understand that formal systems >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of logic are required to have only truth bearers >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and that non truth bearers must be rejected. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Which is exactly what Tarski when he assumed a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth predicate exists and then concluded through >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a series of truth preserving operations that the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> resulting system contained the liar paradox, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Saul Kripke (1975) proved otherwise in his >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Outline of a Theory of Truth

    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> blogs.dir/1358/ files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of- Truth.pdf

    Starting with truth

    And the assumption that a truth predicate exists >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    and only applying truth preserving
    operations prevents the Liar Paradox from coming into >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> existence

    False, as Tarski proved.


    Starting with truth and only applying truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preserving operations only truth is derived. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (Olcott 2024)

    And if you start with truth and the assumption that a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth predicate exists and only apply truth preserving >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> operations and derive the liar paradox, that proves >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the assumption that a truth predicate exists is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.


    You have this backwards.
    Starting with truth and only applying truth
    preserving operations only truth is derived. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (Olcott 2024)

    derives a correct and consistent Truth predicate >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and the Liar Paradox is never reached.


    False.-a Tarski assumed the existence of a truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> predicate and applied truth preserving operations to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> derive the liar paradox.


    Show me the steps of how he derived the Liar Paradox >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by applying only truth preserving operations to known truth. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Here is the step of how how derived that out of thin air: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf

    Those pages are a high-level overview, not the proof itself. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    Read the whole thing, not just the summary, then point out >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the step in the *actual proof* that did not apply truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>> preserving operations.


    In other words you cannot show anywhere in the
    proof

    You didn't show the proof.-a You showed a high-level overview. >>>>>>>>>>>>

    If you know that Tarski derived the Liar Paradox
    by applying only truth preserving operations to
    known truths

    PLUS the assumption that a correct truth predicate exists, >>>>>>>>>> thereby proving that assumption false.


    He did not derive the liar paradox by applying
    truth preserving operations to known true statements
    you are just flat out lying about this.


    Either you have abysmal reading comprehension or you are
    intentionally lying about what others say to push your agenda. >>>>>>>> Read again:

    He derived the liar paradox by applying truth preserving
    operations to knows true statements

    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*
    *Prove it or your are a damned liar*

    The fact that you stopped reading here


    *in addition to* the assumption that a correct truth predicate >>>>>>>> exists.-a Thus proving that assumption false.

    And didn't bother to look at this part proves you're lying to push >>>>>> your agenda and have no interest in the truth.


    Page number and link to the source


    It's common knowledge to those that know the proof that it's a proof
    by contradiction that does exactly that.

    But if it makes you happy, I'll pull something from the high level
    overview you posted.-a In fact, I'll use your highlighted passages:

    Should we succeed in constructing in the metalanguage a correct
    definition of truth

    i.e. given the assumption that a truth predicate exists

    it would then be possible to reconstruct the antimony of the liar
    paradox in the metalanguage

    i.e. truth preserving operations can be applied to that assumption
    together with known true statements to derive the liar paradox.

    Therefore proving the assumption that a truth predicate exists to be
    false.

    I just went over Kripke's work and Tarski's work and Kripke
    is correct and Tarski is incorrect. It turns out that Kripke
    avoids the Liar Paradox by starting with truth and only
    applying truth preserving operations.

    Which has nothing to do with Tarski's proof which is a proof by
    contradiction.-a You know, that type of proof that you still don't
    understand more than 50 years after it was taught to you.


    Self-contradictory expressions only prove that
    they must be excluded from, formal systems of logic.

    And as Tarski showed, that requires removing a truth predicate.


    The Liar Paradox then
    simply becomes ungrounded in truth.

    Tarski big mistake is believing that a truth predicate
    should apply to self-contradictory expressions.

    Nope, he shows that the existence of an truth predicate allows such
    expressions to be created.

    Not when applying only truth preserving operations
    to known truths. That is how Kripke got rid of
    the Liar Paradox.

    But if you attempt to add a truth predicate to that list of known
    truths, Tarski proved the the liar paradox is derived.


    Read his paper and see for yourself. https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/ files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf


    How about this passage:

    "G||del put the issue of the legitimacy of
    self-referential sentences beyond doubt; he showed that they are as incontestably legitimate as arithmetic itself."

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic on Fri Oct 10 08:56:22 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/10/2025 6:36 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/10/2025 12:33 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:14 PM, olcott wrote:

    Self-contradictory expressions only prove that
    they must be excluded from, formal systems of logic.

    And as Tarski showed, that requires removing a truth predicate.


    He was wrong.

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).

    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.


    The Liar Paradox then
    simply becomes ungrounded in truth.

    Tarski big mistake is believing that a truth predicate
    should apply to self-contradictory expressions.

    Nope, he shows that the existence of an truth predicate allows such
    expressions to be created.

    Not when applying only truth preserving operations
    to known truths. That is how Kripke got rid of
    the Liar Paradox.

    But if you attempt to add a truth predicate to that list of known
    truths, Tarski proved the the liar paradox is derived.


    Kripke proved this is counterfactual.


    Read his paper and see for yourself.
    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/
    files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf


    How about this passage:

    "G||del put the issue of the legitimacy of
    self-referential sentences beyond doubt; he showed that they are as incontestably legitimate as arithmetic itself."


    Such a self-promoting fool.
    He died from starving himself to death.
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
    hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic on Fri Oct 10 15:41:52 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/10/2025 9:56 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/10/2025 6:36 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/10/2025 12:33 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:14 PM, olcott wrote:

    Self-contradictory expressions only prove that
    they must be excluded from, formal systems of logic.

    And as Tarski showed, that requires removing a truth predicate.


    He was wrong.

    ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
    LP = not(true(LP)).

    ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
    false.

    Tarski didn't use prolog in his proof, so the above is irrelevant. You
    need to find an error in the actual proof.



    The Liar Paradox then
    simply becomes ungrounded in truth.

    Tarski big mistake is believing that a truth predicate
    should apply to self-contradictory expressions.

    Nope, he shows that the existence of an truth predicate allows such
    expressions to be created.

    Not when applying only truth preserving operations
    to known truths. That is how Kripke got rid of
    the Liar Paradox.

    But if you attempt to add a truth predicate to that list of known
    truths, Tarski proved the the liar paradox is derived.


    Kripke proved this is counterfactual.

    In other words, you're stating that Kripke found an error in Tarski's
    proof. Where exactly?



    Read his paper and see for yourself.
    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/
    files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf


    How about this passage:

    "G||del put the issue of the legitimacy of
    self-referential sentences beyond doubt; he showed that they are as
    incontestably legitimate as arithmetic itself."


    Such a self-promoting fool.
    He died from starving himself to death.


    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Richard Heathfield@rjh@cpax.org.uk to comp.theory,sci.logic on Fri Oct 10 21:28:08 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/10/2025 20:41, dbush wrote:
    On 10/10/2025 9:56 AM, olcott wrote:

    <snip>

    Such a self-promoting fool.

    I'm no longer keeping track, but that's a keeper for someone.
    --
    Richard Heathfield
    Email: rjh at cpax dot org dot uk
    "Usenet is a strange place" - dmr 29 July 1999
    Sig line 4 vacant - apply within
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to comp.theory on Sat Oct 11 12:12:31 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 2025-10-10 13:56:22 +0000, olcott said:

    On 10/10/2025 6:36 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/10/2025 12:33 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:14 PM, olcott wrote:

    Self-contradictory expressions only prove that
    they must be excluded from, formal systems of logic.

    And as Tarski showed, that requires removing a truth predicate.

    He was wrong.

    You can say but you can't show.
    --
    Mikko

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory on Sat Oct 11 08:11:19 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/11/2025 4:12 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 2025-10-10 13:56:22 +0000, olcott said:

    On 10/10/2025 6:36 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/10/2025 12:33 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:14 PM, olcott wrote:

    Self-contradictory expressions only prove that
    they must be excluded from, formal systems of logic.

    And as Tarski showed, that requires removing a truth predicate.

    He was wrong.

    You can say but you can't show.


    Kripke proved it https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf


    Kripke avoided the Liar Paradox by starting with
    truth and only applied truth preserving operations.
    A correct truth predicate naturally follows from this.
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
    hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to comp.theory on Sun Oct 12 11:54:31 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 2025-10-11 13:11:19 +0000, olcott said:

    On 10/11/2025 4:12 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 2025-10-10 13:56:22 +0000, olcott said:

    On 10/10/2025 6:36 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/10/2025 12:33 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:14 PM, olcott wrote:

    Self-contradictory expressions only prove that
    they must be excluded from, formal systems of logic.

    And as Tarski showed, that requires removing a truth predicate.

    He was wrong.

    You can say but you can't show.


    Kripke proved it https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf


    That is a lie. In the above linked text Kripke does not prove that
    Tarski was wrong about anything, or even says so. Kripke accepts
    all mentioned results of Tarski as a valid material for further work.

    That it is a sin to lie about other people covers lying about what
    they have said or written.
    --
    Mikko

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory on Sun Oct 12 09:48:38 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/12/2025 3:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 2025-10-11 13:11:19 +0000, olcott said:

    On 10/11/2025 4:12 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 2025-10-10 13:56:22 +0000, olcott said:

    On 10/10/2025 6:36 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/10/2025 12:33 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:14 PM, olcott wrote:

    Self-contradictory expressions only prove that
    they must be excluded from, formal systems of logic.

    And as Tarski showed, that requires removing a truth predicate.

    He was wrong.

    You can say but you can't show.


    Kripke proved it
    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/
    files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf

    That is a lie. In the above linked text Kripke does not prove that
    Tarski was wrong about anything, or even says so. Kripke accepts
    all mentioned results of Tarski as a valid material for further work.


    That Kripke didn't mention this, or claim this, and
    even disavowed this is not an actual rebuttal.

    Any system of reasoning that begins with a consistent
    system of stipulated truths and only applies the truth
    preserving operation operation of semantic logical
    entailment to this finite set of basic facts inherently
    derives a truth predicate that works consistently and
    correctly for this whole body of knowledge that can be
    expressed in language.

    That it is a sin to lie about other people covers lying about what
    they have said or written.

    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
    hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to comp.theory on Mon Oct 13 11:17:54 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 2025-10-12 14:48:38 +0000, olcott said:

    On 10/12/2025 3:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 2025-10-11 13:11:19 +0000, olcott said:

    On 10/11/2025 4:12 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 2025-10-10 13:56:22 +0000, olcott said:

    On 10/10/2025 6:36 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/10/2025 12:33 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:14 PM, olcott wrote:

    Self-contradictory expressions only prove that
    they must be excluded from, formal systems of logic.

    And as Tarski showed, that requires removing a truth predicate.

    He was wrong.

    You can say but you can't show.

    Kripke proved it
    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/
    files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf

    That is a lie. In the above linked text Kripke does not prove that
    Tarski was wrong about anything, or even says so. Kripke accepts
    all mentioned results of Tarski as a valid material for further work.

    That Kripke didn't mention this, or claim this, and
    even disavowed this is not an actual rebuttal.

    Yes it is. That Kripke didn't mention that or claim that obviously
    entails that Kripke did not prove that and that your claim that he
    did prove was false.
    --
    Mikko

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory on Mon Oct 13 10:23:15 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/13/2025 3:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 2025-10-12 14:48:38 +0000, olcott said:

    On 10/12/2025 3:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 2025-10-11 13:11:19 +0000, olcott said:

    On 10/11/2025 4:12 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 2025-10-10 13:56:22 +0000, olcott said:

    On 10/10/2025 6:36 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/10/2025 12:33 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:14 PM, olcott wrote:

    Self-contradictory expressions only prove that
    they must be excluded from, formal systems of logic.

    And as Tarski showed, that requires removing a truth predicate.

    He was wrong.

    You can say but you can't show.

    Kripke proved it
    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/
    files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf

    That is a lie. In the above linked text Kripke does not prove that
    Tarski was wrong about anything, or even says so. Kripke accepts
    all mentioned results of Tarski as a valid material for further work.

    That Kripke didn't mention this, or claim this, and
    even disavowed this is not an actual rebuttal.

    Yes it is. That Kripke didn't mention that or claim that obviously
    entails that Kripke did not prove that and that your claim that he
    did prove was false.


    My claim is semantically entailed by Kripke's system.
    I had to add some details and clarifications.

    Any system of reasoning that begins with a consistent
    system of stipulated truths and only applies the truth
    preserving operation of semantic logical entailment to
    this finite set of basic facts inherently derives a
    truth predicate that works consistently and correctly
    for this entire body of knowledge that can be expressed
    in language.
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
    hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to comp.theory on Tue Oct 14 11:49:36 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 2025-10-13 15:23:15 +0000, olcott said:

    On 10/13/2025 3:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 2025-10-12 14:48:38 +0000, olcott said:

    On 10/12/2025 3:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 2025-10-11 13:11:19 +0000, olcott said:

    On 10/11/2025 4:12 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 2025-10-10 13:56:22 +0000, olcott said:

    On 10/10/2025 6:36 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/10/2025 12:33 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:14 PM, olcott wrote:

    Self-contradictory expressions only prove that
    they must be excluded from, formal systems of logic.

    And as Tarski showed, that requires removing a truth predicate. >>>>>>>
    He was wrong.

    You can say but you can't show.

    Kripke proved it
    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/
    files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf

    That is a lie. In the above linked text Kripke does not prove that
    Tarski was wrong about anything, or even says so. Kripke accepts
    all mentioned results of Tarski as a valid material for further work.

    That Kripke didn't mention this, or claim this, and
    even disavowed this is not an actual rebuttal.

    Yes it is. That Kripke didn't mention that or claim that obviously
    entails that Kripke did not prove that and that your claim that he
    did prove was false.

    My claim is semantically entailed by Kripke's system.
    I had to add some details and clarifications.

    Above you claimed otherwise.

    You have not proven that your claim be semantically entaiiled by
    Kripke's system.
    --
    Mikko

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory on Tue Oct 14 10:36:21 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/14/2025 3:49 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 2025-10-13 15:23:15 +0000, olcott said:

    On 10/13/2025 3:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 2025-10-12 14:48:38 +0000, olcott said:

    On 10/12/2025 3:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 2025-10-11 13:11:19 +0000, olcott said:

    On 10/11/2025 4:12 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 2025-10-10 13:56:22 +0000, olcott said:

    On 10/10/2025 6:36 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/10/2025 12:33 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:14 PM, olcott wrote:

    Self-contradictory expressions only prove that
    they must be excluded from, formal systems of logic.

    And as Tarski showed, that requires removing a truth predicate. >>>>>>>>
    He was wrong.

    You can say but you can't show.

    Kripke proved it
    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/
    files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf

    That is a lie. In the above linked text Kripke does not prove that
    Tarski was wrong about anything, or even says so. Kripke accepts
    all mentioned results of Tarski as a valid material for further work. >>>>
    That Kripke didn't mention this, or claim this, and
    even disavowed this is not an actual rebuttal.

    Yes it is. That Kripke didn't mention that or claim that obviously
    entails that Kripke did not prove that and that your claim that he
    did prove was false.

    My claim is semantically entailed by Kripke's system.
    I had to add some details and clarifications.

    Above you claimed otherwise.

    You have not proven that your claim be semantically entaiiled by
    Kripke's system.


    It is,but, if you don't want to read Kripke here
    is my self-contained view.

    Any system of reasoning that begins with a consistent
    system of stipulated truths and only applies the truth
    preserving operation of semantic logical entailment to
    this finite set of basic facts inherently derives a
    truth predicate that works consistently and correctly
    for this entire body of knowledge that can be expressed
    in language.
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
    hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to comp.theory on Wed Oct 15 10:59:16 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 2025-10-14 15:36:21 +0000, olcott said:

    On 10/14/2025 3:49 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 2025-10-13 15:23:15 +0000, olcott said:

    On 10/13/2025 3:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 2025-10-12 14:48:38 +0000, olcott said:

    On 10/12/2025 3:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 2025-10-11 13:11:19 +0000, olcott said:

    On 10/11/2025 4:12 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 2025-10-10 13:56:22 +0000, olcott said:

    On 10/10/2025 6:36 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/10/2025 12:33 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:14 PM, olcott wrote:

    Self-contradictory expressions only prove that
    they must be excluded from, formal systems of logic.

    And as Tarski showed, that requires removing a truth predicate. >>>>>>>>>
    He was wrong.

    You can say but you can't show.

    Kripke proved it
    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/
    files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf

    That is a lie. In the above linked text Kripke does not prove that >>>>>> Tarski was wrong about anything, or even says so. Kripke accepts
    all mentioned results of Tarski as a valid material for further work. >>>>>
    That Kripke didn't mention this, or claim this, and
    even disavowed this is not an actual rebuttal.

    Yes it is. That Kripke didn't mention that or claim that obviously
    entails that Kripke did not prove that and that your claim that he
    did prove was false.

    My claim is semantically entailed by Kripke's system.
    I had to add some details and clarifications.

    Above you claimed otherwise.

    You have not proven that your claim be semantically entaiiled by
    Kripke's system.

    It is,but, if you don't want to read Kripke here
    is my self-contained view.

    Any system of reasoning that begins with a consistent
    system of stipulated truths and only applies the truth
    preserving operation of semantic logical entailment to
    this finite set of basic facts inherently derives a
    truth predicate that works consistently and correctly
    for this entire body of knowledge that can be expressed
    in language.

    No, it does not. A truth predicate must assign a truth value
    to every sentence of the language on the system. If a sentence
    is not derivable from the "stipulated truths" and its negation
    isn't either then one of them must be assigned the value true
    and the other false (because otherwise it would not be a predicate).
    A sentence must be assigned the value true if it can be derived with
    truth preserving operations from sentences that are assigned the
    value true. As Tarski proved, that predicate cannot be defined
    with a formula in the language of the system it applies to.
    --
    Mikko

    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory on Wed Oct 15 07:09:39 2025
    From Newsgroup: comp.theory

    On 10/15/2025 2:59 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 2025-10-14 15:36:21 +0000, olcott said:

    On 10/14/2025 3:49 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 2025-10-13 15:23:15 +0000, olcott said:

    On 10/13/2025 3:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 2025-10-12 14:48:38 +0000, olcott said:

    On 10/12/2025 3:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 2025-10-11 13:11:19 +0000, olcott said:

    On 10/11/2025 4:12 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 2025-10-10 13:56:22 +0000, olcott said:

    On 10/10/2025 6:36 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/10/2025 12:33 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 10/9/2025 10:14 PM, olcott wrote:

    Self-contradictory expressions only prove that
    they must be excluded from, formal systems of logic.

    And as Tarski showed, that requires removing a truth predicate. >>>>>>>>>>
    He was wrong.

    You can say but you can't show.

    Kripke proved it
    https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/
    files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf

    That is a lie. In the above linked text Kripke does not prove that >>>>>>> Tarski was wrong about anything, or even says so. Kripke accepts >>>>>>> all mentioned results of Tarski as a valid material for further >>>>>>> work.

    That Kripke didn't mention this, or claim this, and
    even disavowed this is not an actual rebuttal.

    Yes it is. That Kripke didn't mention that or claim that obviously
    entails that Kripke did not prove that and that your claim that he
    did prove was false.

    My claim is semantically entailed by Kripke's system.
    I had to add some details and clarifications.

    Above you claimed otherwise.

    You have not proven that your claim be semantically entaiiled by
    Kripke's system.

    It is,but, if you don't want to read Kripke here
    is my self-contained view.

    Any system of reasoning that begins with a consistent
    system of stipulated truths and only applies the truth
    preserving operation of semantic logical entailment to
    this finite set of basic facts inherently derives a
    truth predicate that works consistently and correctly
    for this entire body of knowledge that can be expressed
    in language.

    No, it does not. A truth predicate must assign a truth value
    to every sentence of the language on the system. If a sentence
    is not derivable from the "stipulated truths" and its negation
    isn't either then one of them must be assigned the value true
    and the other false (because otherwise it would not be a predicate).
    A sentence must be assigned the value true if it can be derived with
    truth preserving operations from sentences that are assigned the
    value true. As Tarski proved, that predicate cannot be defined
    with a formula in the language of the system it applies to.


    Nope. He just derived the Liar Paradox out
    of thin air, no truth preserving operations applied.

    Any system of reasoning that begins with a consistent
    system of stipulated truths and only applies the truth
    preserving operation of semantic logical entailment to
    this finite set of basic facts inherently derives a
    truth predicate that works consistently and correctly
    for this entire body of knowledge that can be expressed
    in language.
    --
    Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
    hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
    --- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2