[continued from previous message]
While passive side-channel attacks and active fault attacks have been studied intensively in the last few decades, strong attackers combining these attacks have only been studied relatively recently. Due to its simplicity, most countermeasures against
passive attacks are based on additive sharing. Unfortunately, extending these countermeasures against faults often leads to quite a significant performance penalty, either due to the use of expensive cryptographic operations or a large number of shares
due to massive duplication. Just recently, Berndt, Eisenbarth, Gourjon, Faust, Orlt, and Seker thus proposed to use polynomial sharing against combined attackers (CRYPTO 2023). While they construct gadgets secure against combined attackers using only a
linear number of shares, the overhead introduced might still be too large for practical scenarios.
In this work, we show how the overhead of nearly all known constructions using polynomial sharing can be reduced by nearly half by embedding two secrets in the coefficients of one polynomial at the expense of increasing the degree of the polynomial by
one. We present a very general framework that allows adapting these constructions to this new sharing scheme and prove the security of this approach against purely passive side-channel attacks, purely active fault attacks, and combined attacks.
Furthermore, we present new gadgets allowing us to operate upon the different secrets in a number of useful ways.
## 2024/1026
* Title: MaSTer: Maliciously Secure Truncation for Replicated Secret Sharing without Pre-Processing
* Authors: Martin Zbudila, Erik Pohle, Aysajan Abidin, Bart Preneel
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1026)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1026.pdf)
### Abstract
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) in a three-party, honest majority scenario is currently the state-of-the-art for running machine learning algorithms in a privacy-preserving manner. For efficiency reasons, fixed-point arithmetic is widely used to
approximate computation over decimal numbers. After multiplication in fixed-point arithmetic, truncation is required to keep the result's precision. In this paper, we present an efficient three-party truncation protocol secure in the presence of an
active adversary without pre-processing and improve on the current state-of-the-art in MPC over rings using replicated secret sharing (RSS). By adding an efficient consistency check, we lift the efficient but only passively secure three-party truncation
protocol from the ABY3 framework by Mohassel and Rindal into the malicious setting without pre-processed data. Our benchmark indicates performance improvements of an order of magnitude in the offline phase for a single batch training. Finally, we apply
our protocol to a real-world application for diagnostic prediction based on publicly available ECG heartbeat data. We achieve an improvement by a factor of two in the total throughput for both LAN and WAN settings.
## 2024/1027
* Title: Structured-Seed Local Pseudorandom Generators and their Applications
* Authors: Dung Bui, Geoffroy Couteau, Nikolas Melissaris
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1027)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1027.pdf)
### Abstract
In this note, we introduce structured-seed local pseudorandom generators, a relaxation of local pseudorandom generators. We provide constructions of this primitive under the sparse-LPN assumption, and explore its implications.
## 2024/1028
* Title: FASIL: A challenge-based framework for secure and privacy-preserving federated learning
* Authors: Ferhat Karakoç, Betül Güvenç Paltun, Leyli Karaçay, Ömer Tuna, Ramin Fuladi, Utku Gülen
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1028)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1028.pdf)
### Abstract
Enhancing privacy in federal learning (FL) without considering robustness can create an open door for attacks such as poisoning attacks on the FL process. Thus, addressing both the privacy and security aspects simultaneously becomes vital. Although,
there are a few solutions addressing both privacy and security in the literature in recent years, they have some drawbacks such as requiring two non-colluding servers, heavy cryptographic operations, or peer-to-peer communication topology. In this paper,
we introduce a novel framework that allows the server to run some analysis for detection and mitigation of attacks towards the FL process, while satisfying the confidentiality requirements for the training data against the server. We evaluate the
effectiveness of the framework in terms of security and privacy by performing experiments on some concrete examples. We also provide two instantiations of the framework with two different secure aggregation protocols to give a more concrete view how the
framework works and we analyse the computation and communication overhead of the framework.
## 2024/1029
* Title: Oblivious Single Access Machines: A New Model for Oblivious Computation
* Authors: Ananya Appan, David Heath, Ling Ren
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1029)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1029.pdf)
### Abstract
Oblivious RAM (ORAM) allows a client to securely outsource memory storage to an untrusted server. It has been shown that no ORAM can simultaneously achieve small bandwidth blow-up, small client storage, and a single roundtrip of latency.
We consider a weakening of the RAM model, which we call the Single Access Machine (SAM) model. In the SAM model, each memory slot can be written to at most once and read from at most once. We adapt existing tree-based ORAM to obtain an oblivious SAM (
OSAM) that has $O(\log n)$ bandwidth blow-up (which we show is optimal), small client storage, and a single roundtrip.
OSAM unlocks improvements to oblivious data structures/algorithms. For instance, we achieve oblivious unbalanced binary trees (e.g. tries, splay trees). By leveraging splay trees, we obtain a notion of caching ORAM, where an access in the worst case
incurs amortized $O(\log^2 n)$ bandwidth blow-up and $O(\log n)$ roundtrips, but in many common cases (e.g. sequential scans) incurs only amortized $O(\log n)$ bandwidth blow-up and $O(1)$ roundtrips. We also give new oblivious graph algorithms,
including computing minimum spanning trees and single source shortest paths, in which the OSAM client reads/writes $O(|E| \cdot \log |E|)$ words using $O(|E|)$ roundtrips, where $|E|$ is the number of edges. This improves over prior custom solutions by a
log factor.
At a higher level, OSAM provides a general model for oblivious computation. We construct a programming interface around OSAM that supports arbitrary pointer-manipulating programs such that dereferencing a pointer to an object incurs $O(\log d \log n)$
bandwidth blowup and $O(\log d)$ roundtrips, where $d$ is the number of pointers to that object. This new interface captures a wide variety of data structures and algorithms (e.g., trees, tries, doubly-linked lists) while matching or exceeding prior best
asymptotic results. It both unifies much of our understanding of oblivious computation and allows the programmer to write oblivious algorithms combining various common data structures/algorithms and beyond.
## 2024/1030
* Title: GRASP: Accelerating Hash-based PQC Performance on GPU Parallel Architecture
* Authors: Yijing Ning, Jiankuo Dong, Jingqiang Lin, Fangyu Zheng, Yu Fu, Zhenjiang Dong, Fu Xiao
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1030)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1030.pdf)
### Abstract
$SPHINCS^+$, one of the Post-Quantum Cryptography Digital Signature Algorithms (PQC-DSA) selected by NIST in the third round, features very short public and private key lengths but faces significant performance challenges compared to other post-quantum
cryptographic schemes, limiting its suitability for real-world applications. To address these challenges, we propose the GPU-based paRallel Accelerated $SPHINCS^+$ (GRASP), which leverages GPU technology to enhance the efficiency of $SPHINCS^+$ signing
and verification processes. We propose an adaptable parallelization strategy for $SPHINCS^+$, analyzing its signing and verification processes to identify critical sections for efficient parallel execution. Utilizing CUDA, we perform bottom-up
optimizations, focusing on memory access patterns and hypertree computation, to enhance GPU resource utilization. These efforts, combined with kernel fusion technology, result in significant improvements in throughput and overall performance. Extensive
experimentation demonstrates that our optimized CUDA implementation of $SPHINCS^+$ achieves superior performance. Specifically, our GRASP scheme delivers throughput improvements ranging from 1.37× to 5.13× compared to state-of-the-art GPU-based
solutions and surpasses the NIST reference implementation by over three orders of magnitude, highlighting a significant performance advantage.
## 2024/1031
* Title: SACfe: Secure Access Control in Functional Encryption with Unbounded Data
* Authors: Uddipana Dowerah, Subhranil Dutta, Frank Hartmann, Aikaterini Mitrokotsa, Sayantan Mukherjee, Tapas Pal
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1031)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1031.pdf)
### Abstract
Privacy is a major concern in large-scale digital applications, such as cloud-computing, machine learning services, and access control. Users want to protect not only their plain data but also their associated attributes (e.g., age, location, etc).
Functional encryption (FE) is a cryptographic tool that allows fine-grained access control over encrypted data. However, existing FE fall short as they are either inefficient and far from reality or they leak sensitive user-specific information.
We propose SACfe, a novel attribute-based FE scheme that provides secure, fine-grained access control and hides both the user’s attributes and the function applied to the data, while preserving the data’s confidentiality. Moreover, it enables users
to encrypt unbounded-length messages along with an arbitrary number of hidden attributes into ciphertexts. We design SACfe, a protocol for performing linear computation on encrypted data while enforcing access control based on inner product predicates.
We show how SACfe can be used for online biometric authentication for privacy-preserving access control. As an additional contribution, we introduce an attribute-based linear FE for unbounded length of messages and functions where access control is
realized by monotone span programs. We implement our protocols using the CiFEr cryptographic library and show its efficiency for practical settings.
## 2024/1032
* Title: Threshold OPRF from Threshold Additive HE
* Authors: Animesh Singh, Sikhar Patranabis, Debdeep Mukhopadhyay
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1032)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1032.pdf)
### Abstract
An oblivious pseudorandom function (OPRF) is a two-party protocol in which a party holds an input and the other party holds the PRF key, such that the party having the input only learns the PRF output and the party having the key would not learn the
input. Now, in a threshold oblivious pseudorandom function (TOPRF) protocol, a PRF key K is initially shared among T servers. A client can obtain a PRF value by interacting with t(≤ T) servers but is unable to compute the same with up to (t − 1)
servers. In this paper, we present a practically efficient homomorphic encryption (HE)-based post-quantum secure TOPRF protocol. Our proposed approach, which is based on a novel use of threshold HE, is agnostic of the underlying PRF and outperforms
existing fully homomorphic encryption (FHE)-based approaches for TOPRF computation by several orders of magnitude in terms of running time. The FHE-based approaches require bootstrapping, a computationally extensive operation, and the primary bottleneck
for evaluating large-depth circuits. Whereas, our proposed approach is based on a multi-party computation (MPC) protocol that uses a threshold additive HE scheme based on Regev’s cryptosystem (J’ACM 2009) alternative to FHE-based approaches.
Concretely, we show a novel replacement of bootstrapping required in traditional FHE schemes by a threshold additive HE-based interactive protocol that performs masked decryption followed by table look-ups, jointly performed by a group of servers holding
secret shares of the HE decryption key. Finally, We present a practical validation of our approach by realizing an AES-based TOPRF with an evaluation time of less than 1 second on consumer-grade server(s).
## 2024/1033
* Title: Adaptively Secure 5 Round Threshold Signatures from MLWE/MSIS and DL with Rewinding
* Authors: Shuichi Katsumata, Michael Reichle, Kaoru Takemure
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1033)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1033.pdf)
### Abstract
T-out-of-N threshold signatures have recently seen a renewed interest, with various types now available, each offering different tradeoffs.
However, one property that has remained elusive is adaptive security. When we target thresholdizing existing efficient signatures schemes based on the Fiat-Shamir paradigm such as Schnorr, the elusive nature becomes clear. This class of signature schemes
typically rely on the forking lemma to prove unforgeability. That is, an adversary is rewound and run twice within the security game. Such a proof is at odds with adaptive security, as the reduction must be ready to answer 2(T-1) secret key shares in
total, implying that it can reconstruct the full secret key. Indeed, prior works either assumed strong idealized models such as the algebraic group model (AGM) or modified the underlying signature scheme so as not to rely on rewinding based proofs.
In this work, we propose a new proof technique to construct adaptively secure threshold signatures for existing rewinding-based Fiat-Shamir signatures. As a result, we obtain the following:
1. The first adaptively secure 5 round lattice-based threshold signature under the MLWE and MSIS assumptions in the ROM. The resulting signature is a standard signature of Raccoon, a lattice-based signature scheme by del Pino et al., submitted to the
additional NIST call for proposals.
2. The first adaptively secure 5 round threshold signature under the DL assumption in the ROM. The resulting signature is a standard Schnorr signature. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first adaptively secure threshold signature based on DL
even assuming stronger models like AGM.
Our work is inspired by the recent statically secure lattice-based 3 round threshold signature by del Pino et al. (Eurocrypt~2024) based on Raccoon. While they relied on so-called one-time additive masks to solve lattice specific issues, we notice that
these masks can also be a useful tool to achieve adaptive security. At a very high level, we use these masks throughout the signing protocol to carefully control the information the adversary can learn from the signing transcripts. Intuitively, this
allows the reduction to return a total of 2(T-1) randomly sampled secret key shares to the adversary consistently and without being detected, resolving the above paradoxical situation. Lastly, by allowing the parties to maintain a simple state, we can
compress our 5 round schemes into 4 rounds.
## 2024/1034
* Title: A Practical Protocol for Quantum Oblivious Transfer from One-Way Functions
* Authors: Eleni Diamanti, Alex B. Grilo, Adriano Innocenzi, Pascal Lefebvre, Verena Yacoub, Álvaro Yángüez
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1034)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1034.pdf)
### Abstract
We present a new simulation-secure quantum oblivious transfer (QOT) protocol based on one-way functions in the plain model. With a focus on practical implementation, our protocol surpasses prior works in efficiency, promising feasible experimental
realization. We address potential experimental errors and their correction, offering analytical expressions to facilitate the analysis of the required quantum resources. Technically, we achieve simulation security for QOT through an equivocal and relaxed-
extractable quantum bit commitment.
## 2024/1035
* Title: Reading It like an Open Book: Single-trace Blind Side-channel Attacks on Garbled Circuit Frameworks
* Authors: Sirui Shen, Chenglu Jin
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1035)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1035.pdf)
### Abstract
Garbled circuits (GC) are a secure multiparty computation protocol that enables two parties to jointly compute a function using their private data without revealing it to each other. While garbled circuits are proven secure at the protocol level,
implementations can still be vulnerable to side-channel attacks. Recently, side-channel analysis of GC implementations has garnered significant interest from researchers.
We investigate popular open-source GC frameworks and discover that the AES encryption used in the garbling process follows a secret-dependent sequence. This vulnerability allows private inputs to be exposed through side-channel analysis. Based on this
finding, we propose a side-channel attack on garbled circuits to recover the private inputs of both parties. Our attack does not require access to any plaintexts or ciphertexts in the protocol and is single-trace, adhering to the constraint that a
garbled circuit can be executed only once. Furthermore, unlike existing attacks that can only target input non-XOR gates, our method applies to both input and internal non-XOR gates. Consequently, the secrets associated with every non-XOR gate are fully
exposed as in an open book.
We comprehensively evaluate our attack in various scenarios. First, we perform the attack on single-platform software implementations of standard AES and interleaved AES on a 32-bit ARM processor, achieving a $100\%$ success rate in both cases. Next, we
target a hardware implementation on a Xilinx Artix-7 FPGA, where the resolution of power consumption measurements and the number of samples are significantly limited. In this scenario, our attack achieves a success rate of $79.58\%$. Finally, we perform
a cross-platform attack on two processors with different microarchitectures representing the two parties. The differing execution cycles and power sensors across the platforms increase the difficulty of side-channel analysis. Despite these challenges,
our point-of-interest (POI) selection method allows our attack to achieve a $100\%$ success rate in this scenario as well. We also discuss effective countermeasures that can be readily applied to GC frameworks to mitigate this vulnerability.
## 2024/1036
* Title: A note on the G-FFT
* Authors: Ulrich Haboeck
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1036)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1036.pdf)
### Abstract
For primes $p$ with $p+1$ being smooth, the G-FFT from Li and Xing [LX23] is an algebraic FFT, which at first glance seems equivalent to the circle FFT from [IACR eprint 2024/278]: It also uses the circle curve over $\mathbb F_p$ (in other words the
projective line) as underlying domain, and interpolates by low-degree functions with poles over the same set of points. However, their approach to control the degree of the FFT basis is fundamentally different.
The G-FFT makes use of punctured Riemann-Roch spaces, and the construction works with the group doubling map only, no projection onto the $x$-axis involved.
In this note we give an elementary description of the G-FFT without using abstract algebra. We describe a variant which uses a simpler, and in our opinion more natural function space, and which treats the exceptional point of the domain (the group
identity) differently. In comparison to the circle FFT, the G-FFT (both the original as well as our variant) has the following downsides. Interpolation and domain evaluation costs the double number of multiplications (the twiddle is not an ``odd''
function), and the function space is not invariant under the group action, causing additional overhead when applied in STARKs.
## 2024/1037
* Title: A note on adding zero-knowledge to STARKs
* Authors: Ulrich Haboeck, Al Kindi
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1037)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1037.pdf)
### Abstract
We discuss zero-knowledge in the context of FRI-based STARKs using techniques desirable in practice: Randomization by polynomials over the basefield, and decomposing the overall quotient into polynomials of smaller degree.
## 2024/1038
* Title: Constraint-Packing and the Sum-Check Protocol over Binary Tower Fields * Authors: Quang Dao, Justin Thaler
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1038)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1038.pdf)
### Abstract
SNARKs based on the sum-check protocol often invoke the ``zero-check PIOP''. This reduces the vanishing of many constraints to a single sum-check instance applied to an $n$-variate polynomial of the form $g(x) = \text{eq}(r,x) \cdot p(x)$, where $p$ is a
product of multilinear polynomials, $r$ is a random vector, and $\text{eq}$ is the multilinear extension of the equality function. In recent SNARK designs, $p(x)$ is defined over a ``small'' base field, while $r$ is drawn from a large extension field $\
mathbb{F}$ for security.
Recent papers (Bagad, Domb, and Thaler 2024; Gruen 2024) have optimized the sum-check protocol prover for this setting. However, these works still require the prover to ``pre-compute'' all evaluations of $\text{eq}(r, x)$ as $x$ ranges over $\{0, 1\}^{n}$
,
and this computation involves about $n$ multiplications over the extension field $\mathbb{F}$.
In this note, we describe a modification to the zero-check PIOP in the case of binary tower fields that reduces this ``pre-computation'' cost by a factor of close to $\log |\mathbb{F}|$, which is $128$ in important applications. We show that our
modification is sound, and that it strictly generalizes a (possibly folklore) technique of constraint-packing over field extensions.
## 2024/1039
* Title: Reduction from Average-Case M-ISIS to Worst-Case CVP Over Perfect Lattices
* Authors: Samuel Lavery
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1039)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1039.pdf)
### Abstract
This paper presents a novel reduction from the average-case hardness of the Module Inhomogeneous Short Integer Solution (M-ISIS) problem to the worst-case hardness of the Closest Vector Problem (CVP) by defining and leveraging “perfect” lattices for
cryptographic purposes.
Perfect lattices, previously only theoretical constructs, are characterized by their highly regular structure, optimal density, and a central void, which we term the “Origin Cell.” The simplest Origin Cell is a hypercube with edge length 1 centered
at the origin, guaranteed to be devoid of any valid lattice points.
By exploiting the unique properties of the Origin Cell, we recalibrate the parameters of the M-ISIS and CVP problems. Our results demonstrate that solving M-ISIS on average over perfect lattices is at least as hard as solving CVP in the worst case,
thereby providing a robust hardness guarantee for M-ISIS. Additionally, perfect lattices facilitate exceptionally compact cryptographic variables, enhancing the efficiency of cryptographic schemes.
This significant finding enhances the theoretical foundation of lattice-based cryptographic problems and confirms the potential of perfect lattices in ensuring strong cryptographic security. The Appendix includes SageMath code to demonstrate the
reproducibility of the reduction process from M-ISIS to CVP.
## 2024/1040
* Title: PeaceFounder: centralised E2E verifiable evoting via pseudonym braiding and history trees
* Authors: Janis Erdmanis
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1040)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1040.pdf)
### Abstract
PeaceFounder is a centralised E2E verifiable e-voting system that leverages pseudonym braiding and history trees. The immutability of the bulletin board is maintained replication-free by voter’s client devices with locally stored consistency-proof
chains. Meanwhile, pseudonym braiding done via an exponentiation mix before the vote allows anonymisation to be transactional with a single braider at a time. In contrast to existing E2E verifiable e-voting systems, it is much easier to deploy as the
system is fully centralised, free from threshold decryption ceremonies, trusted setup phases and bulletin board replication. Furthermore, the body of a vote is signed with a braided pseudonym, enabling unlimited ballot types.
## 2024/1041
* Title: Embedding Integer Lattices as Ideals into Polynomial Rings
* Authors: Yihang Cheng, Yansong Feng, Yanbin Pan
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1041)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1041.pdf)
### Abstract
Many lattice-based crypstosystems employ ideal lattices for high efficiency. However, the additional algebraic structure of ideal lattices usually makes us worry about the security, and it is widely believed that the algebraic structure will help us
solve the hard problems in ideal lattices more efficiently. In this paper, we study the additional algebraic structure of ideal lattices further and find that a given ideal lattice in a polynomial ring can be embedded as an ideal into infinitely many
different polynomial rings by the coefficient embedding. We design an algorithm to verify whether a given full-rank lattice in $\mathbb{Z}^n$ is an ideal lattice and output all the polynomial rings that the given lattice can be embedded into as an ideal
with bit operations $\mathcal{O}(n^3(\log n + B)^2(\log n)^2)$, where $n$ is the dimension of the lattice and $B$ is the upper bound of the bit length of the entries of the input lattice basis. We would like to point out that Ding and Lindner proposed an
algorithm for identifying ideal lattices and outputting a single polynomial ring of which the input lattice can be regarded as an ideal with bit operations $\mathcal{O}(n^5B^2)$ in 2007. However, we find a flaw in Ding and Lindner's algorithm, and it
causes some ideal lattices can't be identified by their algorithm.
## 2024/1042
* Title: Efficient Verifiable Differential Privacy with Input Authenticity in the Local and Shuffle Model
* Authors: Tariq Bontekoe, Hassan Jameel Asghar, Fatih Turkmen
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1042)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1042.pdf)
### Abstract
Local differential privacy (LDP) is an efficient solution for providing privacy to client's sensitive data while simultaneously releasing aggregate statistics without relying on a trusted central server (aggregator) as in the central model of
differential privacy. The shuffle model with LDP provides an additional layer of privacy, by disconnecting the link between clients and the aggregator, further improving the utility of LDP. However, LDP has been shown to be vulnerable to malicious
clients who can perform both input and output manipulation attacks, i.e., before and after applying the LDP mechanism, to skew the aggregator's results. In this work, we show how to prevent malicious clients from compromising LDP schemes. Specifically,
we give efficient constructions to prevent both input ánd output manipulation attacks from malicious clients for generic LDP algorithms. Our proposed schemes for verifiable LDP (VLDP), completely protect from output manipulation attacks, and prevent
input attacks using signed data, requiring only one-time interaction between client and server, unlike existing alternatives [28, 33]. Most importantly, we are the first to provide an efficient scheme for VLDP in the shuffle model. We describe and prove
secure, two schemes for VLDP in the regular model, and one in the shuffle model. We show that all schemes are highly practical, with client runtimes of < 2 seconds, and server runtimes of 5-7 milliseconds per client.
## 2024/1043
* Title: Cryptography in the Common Haar State Model: Feasibility Results and Separations
* Authors: Prabhanjan Ananth, Aditya Gulati, Yao-Ting Lin
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1043)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1043.pdf)
### Abstract
Common random string model is a popular model in classical cryptography. We study a quantum analogue of this model called the common Haar state (CHS) model. In this model, every party participating in the cryptographic system receives many copies of one
or more i.i.d Haar random states.
We study feasibility and limitations of cryptographic primitives in this model and its variants:
- We present a construction of pseudorandom function-like states with security against computationally unbounded adversaries, as long as the adversaries only receive (a priori) bounded number of copies. By suitably instantiating the CHS model, we obtain
a new approach to construct pseudorandom function-like states in the plain model.
- We present separations between pseudorandom function-like states (with super-logarithmic length) and quantum cryptographic primitives, such as interactive key agreement and bit commitment, with classical communication. To show these separations, we
prove new results on the indistinguishability of identical versus independent Haar states against LOCC (local operations, classical communication) adversaries.
## 2024/1044
* Title: Searching for differential addition chains
* Authors: Daniel J. Bernstein, Jolijn Cottaar, Tanja Lange
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1044)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1044.pdf)
### Abstract
The literature sometimes uses slow algorithms to find minimum-length continued-fraction differential addition chains to speed up subsequent computations of multiples of points on elliptic curves. This paper introduces two faster algorithms to find these
chains. The first algorithm prunes more effectively than previous algorithms. The second algorithm uses a meet-in-the-middle approach and appears to have a limiting cost exponent below 1.
## 2024/1045
* Title: Efficient Secret Sharing for Large-Scale Applications
* Authors: Sarvar Patel, Giuseppe Persiano, Joon Young Seo, Kevin Yeo
* [Permalink](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1045)
* [Download](
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1045.pdf)
### Abstract
Threshold secret sharing enables distributing a message to $n$ parties such that no subset of fewer than $t$ parties can learn the message, whereas any subset of at least $t$ parties can recover the message. Despite being a fundamental primitive, secret
sharing still suffers from one significant drawback, where its message reconstruction algorithm is computationally expensive for large privacy thresholds $t$. In this paper, we aim to address this significant drawback.
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