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And so long as one's python REPL does not save history (or you turn off history before running the above) you leave no trace behind.
Well, I am starting to put my binaries also on GitHub, in the respective repositories. That allows one then to download the programs, for
temporary usage.
alias del=">~/.bash_history;history -cw;"
Rich wrote:
I guess, instead of an erasure program, I will only use date and
put the output in my argon2id program, for key generation, which
also has the option to overwrite the clipboard.
Which means you /do/ have another program available, that could be
'looked for'....
Well, I am starting to put my binaries also on GitHub, in the
respective repositories. That allows one then to download the
programs, for temporary usage.
On Tue, 18 Jun 2024 22:01:19 +0200, Stefan Claas wrote:
alias del=">~/.bash_history;history -cw;"
Can't you stop Bash from ever creating a history?
https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/disable-bash-shell-history-linux/
it's like English speaking people who own web sites have some general
allergy towards mentioning a date
It's not just "english speaking people". This mentality seems to
perfuse across the entire web ecosystem. Something about the relative
/ease/ of putting up a web page causes by far too many of those people
to omit publication dates from anywhere on their page(s).
On Tue, 18 Jun 2024 22:10:44 +0200, Stefan Claas wrote:
Well, I am starting to put my binaries also on GitHub, in the respective repositories. That allows one then to download the programs, for
temporary usage.
Or perhaps install KeePassXC that can use a binary file as part of a
complete key, some image somewhere, like a company logo, an mp3 file or whatever. Store your GPG private key in a KeePassXC container and lock it with a long key and that binary file.
On Wed, 19 Jun 2024 02:53:34 -0000 (UTC), Rich wrote:
It's not just "english speaking people". This mentality seems to
perfuse across the entire web ecosystem. Something about the relative
/ease/ of putting up a web page causes by far too many of those people
to omit publication dates from anywhere on their page(s).
Yes, maybe you're right. I read maybe 95% English web stuff so that's why
I notice them more.
On 6/18/2024 6:55 AM, Stefan Claas wrote:
You thoughts please, gentlemen.
Let's say you travel and do not want to store your secret hex key on your device and recreate it from memory.
What do you think about this proposal?
$ printf '%x' $(date -u -d '1979-01-01 12:34:56' +%s) $(date ...) 4 or 8 times.
One has to remember only the dates (times are optional) and then simply run the
one liner.
The encryption software can be downloaded when one arrives at his destination.
Generate a hex key from a password? It seems like my site can do it:2bf63f8ee90dfed997b115aa711600c45a8212a1e35f4f75ccfa36ee459b3fedd8b5f477ebb8871dd94025e7731f39cf7650f864fd6d5ce6908bb2609f96e81a413ccf40b33380a569155cb79612def387c76dd1ae436bcb4fb8c9b959be255708d020d559e07492ba24aae3705ba700a5d9c857418a0050d9ad5935efbfc36
http://fractallife247.com/test/hmac_cipher/ver_0_0_0_1?ct_hmac_cipher=
It encrypts a key using the default password. The key is generated using
the same program. This example basically generates a key using the
default password, then encrypts said key using a different password.
Everybody can decrypt the generated key because the ciphertext in the
link uses the default password:
https://i.ibb.co/BybrYDw/image.png
The plaintext is:
A key:
f65952b125ba6860e21aef9c55e69e0612b153e5fd2599ac00b67945f9bec7563d5edf8bf9fa0db27aeb78b0c8f40f0a6a69b2cd720d59ecc73a01c1ccad0933cfe9e014dda35db6eaba760c9dbdff0f4ad24c5b702baab8e225189179b8bd
Chris M. Thomasson wrote:b895329cabeacbc7cefdee04834b4d392e50501c55587361bd6ca7337083fcd16ddf95d50072ea61cf2aaeb45d4d676abf93d39ad0a386399d55f2d0dba6be91521068f1120573e96aa1d81362e62f91bf88f63fe159175c13a1abec4184aae1cadfe2e18be27cac0fbefbae0c57cec531bc71e8a86d0f15a727e98bafe0239
Generate a hex key from a password? It seems like my site can do it:
http://fractallife247.com/test/hmac_cipher/ver_0_0_0_1?ct_hmac_cipher= 2bf63f8ee90dfed997b115aa711600c45a8212a1e35f4f75ccfa36ee459b3fedd8b5f477ebb8871dd94025e7731f39cf7650f864fd6d5ce6908bb2609f96e81a413ccf40b33380a569155cb79612def387c76dd1ae436bcb4fb8c9b959be255708d020d559e07492ba24aae3705ba700a5d9c857418a0050d9ad5935efbfc36
It encrypts a key using the default password. The key is generated
using the same program. This example basically generates a key
using the default password, then encrypts said key using a different
password.
Everybody can decrypt the generated key because the ciphertext in
the link uses the default password:
https://i.ibb.co/BybrYDw/image.png
The plaintext is:
A key:
f65952b125ba6860e21aef9c55e69e0612b153e5fd2599ac00b67945f9bec7563d5edf8bf9fa0db27aeb78b0c8f40f0a6a69b2cd720d59ecc73a01c1ccad0933cfe9e014dda35db6eaba760c9dbdff0f4ad24c5b702baab8e225189179b8bd
Your site says it does key generation from 64 random bytes. How do
you remember the key when traveling, with no device?
Or how can you trust your site, when your are on annual leave, out of
your country, and some bad boy customized your site?
You thoughts please, gentlemen.
Let's say you travel and do not want to store your secret hex key on your device and recreate it from memory.
What do you think about this proposal?
$ printf '%x' $(date -u -d '1979-01-01 12:34:56' +%s) $(date ...) 4 or 8 times.
One has to remember only the dates (times are optional) and then simply run the
one liner.
The encryption software can be downloaded when one arrives at his destination.
Stefan Claas wrote:
Stefan Claas wrote:
You thoughts please, gentlemen.
Let's say you travel and do not want to store your secret hex key on your >>> device and recreate it from memory.
What do you think about this proposal?
$ printf '%x' $(date -u -d '1979-01-01 12:34:56' +%s) $(date ...) 4 or 8 times.
One has to remember only the dates (times are optional) and then simply run the
one liner.
And use that as a seed for Argon2id key creation.
The encryption software can be downloaded when one arrives at his destination.
I think diceware passwords with Argon2id are the solution, because one can recreate the Argon2id hex key with with the memorized diceware passphrase. :-)
On 18/06/2024 15:37, Stefan Claas wrote:
Stefan Claas wrote:
Stefan Claas wrote:
You thoughts please, gentlemen.
Let's say you travel and do not want to store your secret hex key on your >>> device and recreate it from memory.
What do you think about this proposal?
$ printf '%x' $(date -u -d '1979-01-01 12:34:56' +%s) $(date ...) 4 or 8 times.
One has to remember only the dates (times are optional) and then simply run the
one liner.
And use that as a seed for Argon2id key creation.
The encryption software can be downloaded when one arrives at his destination.
Hmm, from where? Threat analysis?
I think diceware passwords with Argon2id are the solution, because one can recreate the Argon2id hex key with with the memorized diceware passphrase. :-)
Much better.
Both diceware and argon2id can be improved on, but generally that would mostly work.
Peter Fairbrother
bored, just got out of hospital, and laid up with bad knee
On 18/06/2024 15:05, Stefan Claas wrote:
Stefan Claas wrote:
You thoughts please, gentlemen.
Let's say you travel and do not want to store your secret hex key on your >> device and recreate it from memory.
What do you think about this proposal?
$ printf '%x' $(date -u -d '1979-01-01 12:34:56' +%s) $(date ...) 4 or 8 times.
One has to remember only the dates (times are optional) and then simply run the
one liner.
And use that as a seed for Argon2id key creation.
But Izvestia! Izvestia said: (Russian double-talk) It stinks.
Entropy is considerably lower than 128 bits, probably around 30 bits at
a swag..
Stefan Claas <pollux@tilde.club> wrote:2bf63f8ee90dfed997b115aa711600c45a8212a1e35f4f75ccfa36ee459b3fedd8b5f477ebb8871dd94025e7731f39cf7650f864fd6d5ce6908bb2609f96e81a413ccf40b33380a569155cb79612def387c76dd1ae436bcb4fb8c9b959be255708d020d559e07492ba24aae3705ba700a5d9c857418a0050d9ad5935efbfc36
Chris M. Thomasson wrote:
Generate a hex key from a password? It seems like my site can do it:
http://fractallife247.com/test/hmac_cipher/ver_0_0_0_1?ct_hmac_cipher=
It encrypts a key using the default password. The key is generated
using the same program. This example basically generates a key
using the default password, then encrypts said key using a different
password.
Everybody can decrypt the generated key because the ciphertext in
the link uses the default password:
https://i.ibb.co/BybrYDw/image.png
The plaintext is:
A key:
f65952b125ba6860e21aef9c55e69e0612b153e5fd2599ac00b67945f9bec7563d5edf8bf9fa0db27aeb78b0c8f40f0a6a69b2cd720d59ecc73a01c1ccad0933cfe9e014dda35db6eaba760c9dbdff0f4ad24c5b702baab8e225189179b8bd
Your site says it does key generation from 64 random bytes. How do
you remember the key when traveling, with no device?
Or how can you trust your site, when your are on annual leave, out of
your country, and some bad boy customized your site?
A valid question -- and one that *also* applies to your argon2id on
github. How can you be sure that some cracker did not change the
argon2id present there while you are away on holiday.
Or, how can you trust that a github/microsoft insider with admin level
access did not swap out your good argon2id with a malicious argon2id.
Or that a three letter agency, having taken interest in you for some
reason, has not gotten a secret court order to swap the argon2id with a cracked one, and included a court ordered gag to prevent
github/microsoft from informing you of the swap?
Rich wrote:b895329cabeacbc7cefdee04834b4d392e50501c55587361bd6ca7337083fcd16ddf95d50072ea61cf2aaeb45d4d676abf93d39ad0a386399d55f2d0dba6be91521068f1120573e96aa1d81362e62f91bf88f63fe159175c13a1abec4184aae1cadfe2e18be27cac0fbefbae0c57cec531bc71e8a86d0f15a727e98bafe0239
Stefan Claas <pollux@tilde.club> wrote:
Chris M. Thomasson wrote:
Generate a hex key from a password? It seems like my site can do it:
http://fractallife247.com/test/hmac_cipher/ver_0_0_0_1?ct_hmac_cipher= 2bf63f8ee90dfed997b115aa711600c45a8212a1e35f4f75ccfa36ee459b3fedd8b5f477ebb8871dd94025e7731f39cf7650f864fd6d5ce6908bb2609f96e81a413ccf40b33380a569155cb79612def387c76dd1ae436bcb4fb8c9b959be255708d020d559e07492ba24aae3705ba700a5d9c857418a0050d9ad5935efbfc36
It encrypts a key using the default password. The key is generated
using the same program. This example basically generates a key
using the default password, then encrypts said key using a different
password.
Everybody can decrypt the generated key because the ciphertext in
the link uses the default password:
https://i.ibb.co/BybrYDw/image.png
The plaintext is:
A key:
f65952b125ba6860e21aef9c55e69e0612b153e5fd2599ac00b67945f9bec7563d5edf8bf9fa0db27aeb78b0c8f40f0a6a69b2cd720d59ecc73a01c1ccad0933cfe9e014dda35db6eaba760c9dbdff0f4ad24c5b702baab8e225189179b8bd
Your site says it does key generation from 64 random bytes. How do
you remember the key when traveling, with no device?
Or how can you trust your site, when your are on annual leave, out of
your country, and some bad boy customized your site?
A valid question -- and one that *also* applies to your argon2id on
github. How can you be sure that some cracker did not change the
argon2id present there while you are away on holiday.
Or, how can you trust that a github/microsoft insider with admin level
access did not swap out your good argon2id with a malicious argon2id.
Or that a three letter agency, having taken interest in you for some
reason, has not gotten a secret court order to swap the argon2id
with a cracked one, and included a court ordered gag to prevent
github/microsoft from informing you of the swap?
Prior upload and departure I can write down on a piece of paper the
shasum and once arrived at my destination I can compare the shasum
from the download with the shasum on paper.
Only problem would be IMHO, if the shasum would no longer match and I
have no plan B.
And, sadly, it even happens with websites that *should* know better,
i.e., the traditional newspaper websites far too often have no dates on
their articles on the web, meanwhile for their legacy paper they date
each physical paper as of the day it was published.
On Wed, 19 Jun 2024 19:43:09 -0000 (UTC), Rich wrote:
And, sadly, it even happens with websites that *should* know better,
i.e., the traditional newspaper websites far too often have no dates
on their articles on the web, meanwhile for their legacy paper they
date each physical paper as of the day it was published.
I suppose one could pester them with questions on a daily basis,
until they learned that it would be easier to put the date on the
page already from day one. :)
Then again, I also see a trend that companies that are represented on
the web, these days seldom provide any means of contacting them.
At least not until you provide something like a DNA sample. Then
what will you receive? SPAM.
When they allowed commercial interests onto the web in the early to
mid 1990's, it's been downhill from there.
Stefan Claas <pollux@tilde.club> wrote:
Prior upload and departure I can write down on a piece of paper the
shasum and once arrived at my destination I can compare the shasum
from the download with the shasum on paper.
That would work, presuming the border crossing guards do not question
your shasum paper....
Only problem would be IMHO, if the shasum would no longer match and I
have no plan B.
True, but at least you can recognize you've been targeted, and know not
to trust the binary currently on github.
the web, these days seldom provide any means of contacting them.
Yes, this is indeed the problem. Most want to "broadcast", but never "receive", any information.
One could argue that "the web" might not be as big as it is at present without those ommercial interests. But there has been a lot lost in
pursuit of that growth as well.
On Thu, 20 Jun 2024 15:54:30 -0000 (UTC), Rich wrote:
the web, these days seldom provide any means of contacting them.
Yes, this is indeed the problem. Most want to "broadcast", but never
"receive", any information.
With email there used to be this required recipient mailbox "postmaster"
on email servers, through which the email admin received, e.g., complaints about misuse of resources, or other things deemed "illegal", from an email and a general online conduct perspective.
Although it may still be required, I don't think this mailbox is monitored
by many admins these days. Or you need to be in on some secret usage of vocabulary to circumvent heavy filtering.
Same trend on Usenet. One can no longer see the path to servers (at least
not on my server). Now it just says "Path: not-for-mail."
When I asked about it, they, of course, said "for security reasons."