• Accepted jinja2 3.1.2-1+deb12u2 (source) into proposed-updates

    From Debian FTP Masters@21:1/5 to All on Sat Mar 1 12:40:02 2025
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    Format: 1.8
    Date: Thu, 27 Feb 2025 22:30:54 +0100
    Source: jinja2
    Architecture: source
    Version: 3.1.2-1+deb12u2
    Distribution: bookworm
    Urgency: medium
    Maintainer: Piotr O┼╝arowski <piotr@debian.org>
    Changed-By: Lee Garrett <debian@rocketjump.eu>
    Changes:
    jinja2 (3.1.2-1+deb12u2) bookworm; urgency=medium
    .
    * Non-maintainer upload by the LTS security team.
    * Fix CVE-2024-56201:
    In versions on the 3.x branch prior to 3.1.5, a bug in the Jinja compiler
    allows an attacker that controls both the content and filename of a template
    to execute arbitrary Python code, regardless of if Jinja's sandbox is used.
    To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control both the filename
    and the contents of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type
    of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications
    which execute untrusted templates where the template author can also choose
    the template filename.
    * Fix CVE-2024-56326:
    Prior to 3.1.5, An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment detects
    calls to str.format allows an attacker that controls the content of a
    template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an
    attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the
    case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability
    impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's
    sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the
    sandbox. However, it's possible to store a reference to a malicious string's
    format method, then pass that to a filter that calls it. No such filters are
    built-in to Jinja, but could be present through custom filters in an
    application. After the fix, such indirect calls are also handled by the
    sandbox.
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    Checksums-Sha256:
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    Files:
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    4339bee737ba1bead35c4dac2676293a 15156 python optional jinja2_3.1.2-1+deb12u2.debian.tar.xz
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